In the Proceedings of the Naval Institute for June, 1906, in an article entitled: "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea," Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, retired, has stated his conclusions concerning the characteristics of men-of-war best suited for increasing a nation's naval Power—assuming a certain limit of expenditure for new vessels. These conclusions are, I believe, opposed to those reached by practically all naval officers who have given this subject serious consideration; but so great is the weight of Captain Mahan's opinions, that they would doubtless be accepted by those who may not be in possession of certain recently acquired information, which bears with such directness and force upon the question of the fighting qualities of battleships as apparently to demonstrate that Captain Mahan's conclusions thereon are in error.
In the following analysis of this question, I will endeavor to show that this information is of such a fundamental nature as to necessitate a re-examination of both old and new facts, from a point of view differing widely from that taken by Captain Mahan, concerning the qualities of the design that will permit the development of the maximum concentration of effective gun-fire, that is, a fleet's maximum concentration of hits.
In the first place I beg to express the opinion that if, when Captain Mahan wrote his article, he had been in possession of certain important information that has since become available, his conclusions would have been considerably modified; and while I would not presume to oppose his views as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts as he has assumed them, and as he understands them, still, I feel that I am justified in restating these facts, as I understand them, in the light of the new evidence above referred to, and basing thereon my conclusions.
Captain Mahan's principal conclusions may be summarized, briefly, as follows:
1. That, in designing battleships of a certain displacement, we are never justified in increasing the speed, within reasonable limits, at the expense of the equivalent weight in gun-power.
2. That we are not justified in substituting heavy turret guns, such as 12-inch, for the equivalent weight of the usual intermediate guns, 6-inch, etc. In other words, that the all-big-gun ship is a mistake.
3. That, considering the necessary limit of expenditures, and the requirements of a navy with wide naval responsibility, we should not materially increase the size of the ships now being designed.
These conclusions are admittedly derived from, or supported by, an analysis of the available information concerning the battle of the Sea of Japan, and also upon an analysis of the battle efficiency of guns of various calibers, based upon Captain Mahan's ideas upon the subject.
In reference to this important battle, Captain Mahan has stated that many details are wanting, and probably can never be supplied, the drama having passed too rapidly, and the actors having been too busily occupied, to take precise notes.
Fortunately, this is no longer true, for in the same number of the Naval Institute in which Captain Mahan's article appears there is published a very important paper, giving a history of this battle, that is founded upon very precise notes. The author of this paper, Lieutenant R. D. White, U. S. N., is a distinguished gunnery officer who was, at my request, recently assigned to duty as my assistant. I am therefore informed as to the manner in which his information was obtained; and while I am not at liberty to state more in this respect than Mr. White has thought proper to give in the introductory note that precedes his article, still I may state that his plan, or chart, of the battle (herewith reproduced) was drawn to scale from the very full data (bearings, distances, and speeds) supplied by the Russian observer indicated, who also gave him the other important information contained in the article—the acquisition of all of this information fortunately being facilitated by a continuous and intimate association of two or three weeks with the observer in question, whose competence is fully established by Mr. White's testimony.
As this officer was a naval constructor, "having no station in battle, he was selected to observe and record the events of the battle," I think it may therefore be fairly assumed that Mr. White's article gives the history of this action with greater precision than that with which any naval battle has ever before been reported; and that we may therefore rely upon the main facts contained in his account.
Assuming that Lieutenant's White's account of the battle in question is substantially correct, it follows that much of the information upon which Captain Mahan has based his conclusions is in error to a greater or less degree. The errors in some cases are not important, but in others they appear to be in effect diametrically opposed to the truth.
For example, taking these errors as they come, Captain Mahan has assumed that, shortly after the Russian and Japanese fleets sighted each other, the Japanese changed course from SW to East, while the Russians were steering about NE, and that the Japanese speed was slower than that of the Russian—" 2 or 3 miles to the Russian 4." Under these conditions, that is, with the courses and speeds assumed, the rate of change of range would have been very rapid, and therefore very little hitting could have been done. As a matter of fact, the Russians were steering about NNE, and the Japanese, after turning from SW to East, took a course nearly parallel to them, on their port bow. Thus, the rate of change of range was rendered small, the Japanese fire was concentrated upon the head of the Russian column, and was so effective that the Suvaroff was driven out of the line and the Osliabia sunk by the time the Russians had advanced about five miles.
The above shows that the nature of the action was rather different from that which Captain Mahan's information led him to suppose. It is therefore unnecessary to follow out the details of the reasoning by which he assumes that Admiral Togo was influenced in taking a position (across the head of the enemy's column) which he did not take; but it is important to point out that the Japanese admiral's plan of action was what we would have supposed it to be, in the light of our present knowledge of the conditions necessary to the most effective hitting at long ranges.
In the first place it may be confidently assumed that Togo was in possession of the following important facts:
1. That his fleet speed was considerably greater than that of his enemy—the bottoms of his ships being clean and theirs foul, and there being slower ships in the Russian fleet than in his.
2. That his marksmanship was superior to that of the Russians.
3. That Russian gunnery training had for years been carried out with the object of bringing an enemy to close quarters, and that, even assuming that they had profited by their experience in the actions off Port Arthur, the Baltic fleet could not have had adequate training in long-range firing.
4. That, in order to render effective the tactics indicated above, the Russian ships were heavily armed and their crews trained for rapidity of fire.
The above being true, it is clear that Admiral Togo must have gone into action with two principal objects clearly defined in his mind, namely:
1. Fight at the maximum range at which actual experience at battle practices had shown him that he could do effective hitting (about 6000 yards), and at which he knew that the Russian fire would not be dangerous.
2. So maneuver as to maintain the least practicable rate of change of range while concentrating his fire as frequently as possible upon the head of the enemy's column.
If he had not been able to accomplish these two objects he might still have won the battle, because the Russians were so very inferior in many other respects, but he certainly would have suffered more. For example, if the Russians had been able, by superior speed, to run in to 1800 yards (the battle range of their choice), they would have made a large percentage of hits, and these hits would have been very effective, especially from their modern ships of French design (Suvaroff, Alexander III, Borodino, Orel).
A glance at Lieutenant White's chart will show, however, that the Japanese admiral had no difficulty (barring thick weather) in repeatedly choosing his own position (distance and bearing) with reference to the head of the enemy's fleet, and that the battle therefore resolved itself into a competition between the fire control officers of the two fleets as to which could make the most hits, under the conditions selected by the Japanese—these conditions being of course very unequal, since the Japanese were able frequently to concentrate the fire of many ships upon a few of the Russians.
Let us now consider the manifest object of the Russian admiral's strategy and tactics, with a view of determining why he was unable to succeed.
In the first place, we know, from a certain unpublished report, based upon indisputable authority (and which is practically confirmed by Lieutenant White's report), that the Rusian battleships were so overloaded with stores and coal that the upper edges of their heavy armor belts were well below the water-line (and that therefore, in so far as hull protection was concerned, they were armored cruisers and not battleships); also that compartments, cabins, passages, etc., were so filled with coal and stores that the men's water-closets and urinals had been blocked since leaving Saigon, and that the decks were in consequence in an indescribable condition.
We may, therefore, safely assume that the Russian admiral approached the Tsushima Straits with two objects uppermost in his mind, namely:
1. The most important was to elude the Japanese and take shelter in Vladivostok until he could land his stores, dock and refit his ships.
2. If forced to fight, to do so at the shortest range possible, where most of his shots would count.
He was defeated in both of these objects solely by the superior speed of the Japanese; assuming, of course, that he could not pass through the Straits without being detected. Once he was sighted by the Japanese, which was inevitable, their superior speed (which as shown later, was 6 to 7 knots greater than that of the Russians) rendered impossible his escape without fighting; and, as previously shown, this superiority of speed enabled the Japanese repeatedly to concentrate upon his leading ships, and thus destroy or disable them one at a time—or force them to accept defeat in a worse form, namely, by abandoning their attempt to reach Vladivostok, thus surrendering the command of the sea without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.
It is, of course, understood that, assuming all other qualities to be equal, a relatively small superiority of speed cannot alone determine a victory by gun-fire, under the usual " game-board " conditions; that is, where sea room is unlimited; where it is always daylight; where thick weather does not act as an occasional screen; where the slow fleet is not embarrassed by having to get anywhere in particular; where there is no convoy or fleet of essential auxiliaries to lose in case of retreat, etc.
In this case the slow fleet can prevent the fast one from taking up a position of continuous advantage, by simply keeping the head of the enemy's column abeam—thus steaming on the arc of a circle of sufficiently smaller radius to counteract the superiority of speed of the fast fleet.
The sole tactical ability of the slow fleet is a negative one— one of equality only, as regards gun-fire; it can never attain an advantage of position, assuming equal skill on both sides; its tactical ability exists only in the open sea; and, even then, the fast fleet always has the great advantage of being able to:
(1) Refuse or accept battle.
(2) Choose his own range.
(3) Control the rate of change of range.
(4) Control the compass bearing, thus taking advantage of the weather conditions that favor his own gun-fire.
That is to say, always assuming equal tactical skill, the slow fleet can neither gain an advantage nor accomplish a definite object, while a fleet that is slightly faster can:
(1) Bring the slow one to action, or refrain from so doing until the conditions suit him, or until he has made such disposition of his forces or auxiliaries as he pleases.
(2) Can choose his own range, and change it at will.
(3) Can close to fighting range when the wind and sea and sun are in the most advantageous positions for increasing the efficiency of his own gun-fire, withdrawing outside of effective range when these conditions become unfavorable to him.
It follows from the above that the slow fleet must always fight at a disadvantage, even in the open sea; and that when restricted in its movements by the neighborhood of land or shoal water, by the necessity of protecting essential auxiliaries, by the necessity of reaching a definite point, or by the necessity of leaving a port in the face of a blockading enemy, it must inevitably be defeated by a faster fleet of equal power, and can be defeated even by a faster fleet of less power.
For example, twelve 16-knot vessels could be blockaded by a less number of 20-knot, or even 18-knot, vessels of the same individual gun-power, even assuming that the latter would refrain from attacking until the former were all outside and formed for battle, because the blockaded vessels would, on coming out, be caught between the land and the enemy, and thus forced to steer a practically straight course, while the faster fleet could, while keeping outside of effective range, draw ahead and then close in with a concentrated fire on the head of the column—or the stern of the column, if it reversed its course.
The blockaded fleet would be constrained to try and reach the open sea (in the same manner that the Russian squadron was constrained to continue northward, sooner or later, through the Tsushima Straits), and would suffer defeat in the process, by reason of the ability of the faster fleet repeatedly to assume positions enabling it to concentrate its fire on the extremities of the enemy's fleet.
Incidentally, it should also be noted that a feet of small vessels would have a considerably less coal endurance than a fleet of large ones, when both are maneuvering at the speed of the former, and that the fleet of large vessels, while avoiding decisive action and preventing its enemy from proceeding in any given direction, can ultimately attack when the latter is obliged to abandon the open sea.
If, therefore, a fast fleet can defeat a slow one under all circumstances except when the latter is entirely unrestricted in its movements, it seems clear that no nation would be justified in deliberately building a slow fleet having the above enumerated dangerous disadvantages; that is, a fleet that would be practically certain of defeat whenever the exigencies of its service in war brought it in contact with an enemy of equal force while in the neighborhood of land, or while restricted in its movements by the nature of its service or from any other cause.
From the above it seems clear that, in the light of our present knowledge of the fundamental principles of long-range gun-fire, a superiority of speed that will enable a fleet frequently to concentrate its fire on an enemy that is not entirely unrestricted in its movements, as above explained, is more important than the additional guns corresponding to the weight (in boilers and engines) required to give this superiority in speed.
Captain Mahan assumed that the Russian fleet maintained "on May 27 a fleet-speed of at least twelve knots, while the Japanese seem not to have used more than 15." Lieutenant White's informant states that the Russian fleet speed was 9 knots, and the Russians estimated the Japanese speed as 16 knots. As Mr. White's chart is a chart, plotted to scale from the precise data taken by his informant, and not simply a diagram to illustrate his text, it follows that if we measure the distances steamed by the two fleets, from 1.55 p. m. to 6.25 p. m. (4.5 hours), and divide these distances by this elapsed time, the results will be the fleet speeds—though the calculation will be rough, as the scale of the chart is small. This calculation shows that, during the 4.5 hours, the Russians steamed 40 miles while the Japanese steamed 68, which gives the average speed of the former, as a little less than 9 knots and that of the latter as a little more than 15. It should be noted, however, that the Japanese speed "alternated o to 16 knots" between 3.40 and 4.15, therefore their fleet speed was probably considerably more than 15 knots.
The Japanese superiority in speed was therefore more than six knots, an advantage so enormous that no conceivable strategical or tactical skill, and no possible augmentation of gun-fire (without increasing the displacement) on the part of the Russians, could have prevented their defeat, even supposing but a rudimentary knowledge of strategy and tactics on the part of the Japanese admiral, and assuming, of course, that the Russian fleet was constrained to force its way sooner or later through the Straits.
Before leaving this question of speed, it may be well to point out that if the speeds of the Japanese and Russian fleets had been reversed, Admiral Togo could not possibly have prevented the Russians (1) escaping to Vladivostok, or (2) bringing the Japanese to battle at short range—if they had so desired. This is clear by a reference to Mr. White's chart. For example, at 1.55 p. m. the head of the Japanese column bore about WNW from the Russian flagship, distant about 3.5 miles, so that the Russian ships, by steering an easterly course, could have left the Japanese
CHART (page 10)
It is true that the speed of a fleet may be reduced by damage to the motive power of one of its units, but this has very rarely happened, because engines, boilers, etc., are below the water-line, and well protected by the heaviest armor. Captain Mahan lays great stress upon the alleged effect of the loss of funnels, or smoke pipes, saying that the resulting loss of speed would be so great that "The loss of a modern funnel will be like the loss of a former-day mast." This appears to me to be a great exaggeration. As I understand this matter, the principal reason for building a tall funnel is to increase the natural draft, and thus render steaming more economical in time of peace. With lower funnels the natural draft is smaller, as the column of hot air is shorter, and this necessitates the use of forced- or "assisted" draft during ordinary cruising. Tall funnels have always been a mistake, from a military point of view, because when a vessel having them goes into battle, and forced draft is put on to develop her maximum speed, the tall funnel adds very little to the draft, by reason of its height. It has been reported that the British ship Edgar lost two of her funnels in a gale of wind without any material diminution in her speed. If, therefore, we should be obliged to go into battle with our present absurdly high funnels, we may regard their being shot away, or riddled with holes, with comparative equanimity (provided they do not fall on deck and disable guns), since in either case the draft will not be materially decreased—as a high funnel corresponds to a pressure of about one-half an inch of water, whereas blowers will create a pressure corresponding to about two inches of water.
It may be well to notice, moreover, that the requirements of fire-control necessitate much shorter funnels, because gun-fire can be controlled efficiently only from elevated platforms on the masts (about 'co feet from the water), and as funnels cannot be made high enough to carry the smoke over these platforms they must be made so low that the smoke will not reach them. It is for this reason that experienced gunnery-officers now recommend short funnels—and I believe that such funnels will be a feature of our new designs.
Concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that is, discarding all smaller guns (except torpedo-defense guns) and designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns, these alone to be used in battle against other ships, I think it could be clearly shown that Captain Mahan is in error in concluding that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns (6-inch, etc.) ; and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the fact that much important information concerning the new methods of gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article.
Note—Unfortunately, these methods of gun-fire cannot at present be specifically explained in a published article, as this would involve a discussion of our .methods of controlling our ships' batteries and bringing our ships into action with an enemy.
I may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build a man-of-war, of any type whatever, having more than one caliber of gun in her main battery. In other words, it may be stated that the abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favor of the all-big gun, one-caliber ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain fundamental principles of naval marksmanship developed by gunnery officers.
Therefore we have but to decide what the caliber for each class of Ships should be, a decision which should present no special difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships (by sinking them or disabling their guns) or by the destruction or demoralization of their personnel.
In this connection the following facts should first be clearly understood, namely:
1. Turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. Instead of having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and officers are exposed to disablement (as frequently happened on the Russian ships) there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side walls of the turret, and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armor plates, so arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets.
2. On the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armor belt will be about 8 feet above the water-line and extending from end to end. The conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armor; and there being no intermediate battery (which could not be protected by heavy armor, on account of its extent), it follows that in battle all of the gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire control party aloft, will be behind heavy armor, and that, therefore, neither the ship nor her personnel can be materially injured by small caliber guns.
Considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun, one-caliber ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their guns.
Captain Mahan states that it has long been his opinion that the so-called secondary battery is really entitled to the name primary, because its effect is exerted mainly upon the personnel, rather than the material of a vessel. I believe that it can be shown that this opinion is based upon certain mistaken assumptions in regard to the efficiency of these guns. But in order to avoid possible confusion, let me first state that Captain Mahan uses the term "secondary battery" to indicate guns of "6 to 8-inch," whereas our present official designation of the various classes of guns is as follows: Heavy guns, 8-inch to 13-inch, inclusive; intermediate guns, 7-inch to 4-inch, inclusive; secondary guns, all those of 3-inch caliber or less.
For example, at 6000 yards, a 12-inch gun, having an initial velocity of 2400 feet per second, has an angle of fall of 4.75 degrees, while that of a 6-inch gun, having the same velocity, is 8.50 degrees; and the respective danger spaces, for a target 30 feet high, are 120 and 64 yards.
This illustrates how much more difficult it is to hit with the 6-inch than the 12-inch gun, and makes it clear, I believe, that Captain Mahan is greatly in error in saying that if we determine the number of shots fired by each caliber we may assume a "probability of a proportionate number of hits."
As a matter of fact, Captain Mahan has drawn his conclusions from the "volume of fire" of the different calibers instead of from their volume of hitting, or "rapidity of hitting," which is the only true standard of efficiency for all kinds of gun-fire. He has also assumed that the Japanese rapidity of 6-inch fire was about four times as great as that of the 12-inch fire, when, as a matter of fact, it was probably not much more than twice as great. We have, of course, no actual figures, but as we know that 12-inch guns can fire two shots per minute (and with improved loading-gear, this rapidity will be increased), and that 6-inch controlled firing is at the rate of four shots per minute, and as we also know that since i9oi the Japanese have used the most modern methods of training, we may safely assume that the relation between their 6-inch and 12-inch rapidity of fire is about as above stated, though both calibers may be actually less, or more, rapid.
Referring, however, to Lieutenant White's article, page 613; we may form a tolerably fair estimate of the relative rapidity of hitting of the 12-inch and 6-inch guns. He estimates that the Japanese fired 1275 heavy shell (12-inch) and made 250 hits, or 19.6% which was good shooting, considering the long ranges and the unfavorable weather. As for the “90 odd secondary guns" (Captain Mahan's estimate), if we assume that, on an average, each fired 2½ times as many shots as each 12-inch gun, the total number of shots was 16,875 (2.5 times 75 times 90). If they had made a "proportionate number of hits," or 19.6%, they would have scored 3307 hits, or about 13 times as many as the 12-inch hits, which we know they did not make.
Unfortunately we cannot obtain the exact figures, though we can make an estimate that will be close enough to show the comparative hitting capacity of these guns. For example, the Orel was struck 42 times by 12-inch shells and over 100 by 6-inch and 8-inch shells." She was fourth in the line at the beginning of the action, and second at the end, therefore she at no time received the brunt of the Japanese fire, which was directed principally at the leading vessel. This accounts for the comparatively small number of 12-inch hits that this vessel received. We know that after her guns were disabled, she was pounded by minor cruisers, having 6-inch and 8-inch guns, and that at one stage of the action (2.55 p. m.) she sustained the fire of six armored cruisers at a range of less than 5000 yards. We may therefore fairly conclude that she received more 6-inch and 8-inch hits than any other vessel.
We will assume, however, that the Suvaroff received as many. This vessel was fearfully exposed, first at the beginning of the action, and again at 3.40 p. m., when she sustained the concentrated fire of 12 battleships and cruisers, which accounts for her being "struck over 100 times by 12-inch shells alone." Assuming, therefore, that the Alexander III, Borodino, and Osliabia each received fifty 6-inch and 8-inch hits, we have a total of 350 hits out of 16,875 shots, or 2.1%. That is to say, they fired 50 pounds of the smaller projectiles for every pound that hit, whereas they fired only 5 pounds of 12-inch metal for every pound that hit— which accords with the law that we have deduced from our target practices, namely, that the smaller the gun the more projectiles you must waste to make a hit; but as the Japanese battleships and armored cruisers carried these guns they were of course justified in firing them—as best they could without diminishing the rapidity of the 12-inch guns. They did not, however, fire any of their small guns—those less than 6-inch—because to do so would have caused too much " interference " with more important guns; though the " hail " of small projectiles, that is so popular in newspaper accounts, would have been very effective—if the shots had hit.
Let us now consider what would have been the probable effect if the designers of the Japanese battleships had installed as many 12-inch turret guns as possible in place of the 40 small guns. They could doubtless have mounted one turret forward and two turrets aft on the center line, or vice versa, thus increasing the heavy broadside fire by 50%, that is six 12-inch guns instead of four. The result would have been 125 more 12-inch hits. Similarly, if the cruisers had been designed to carry heavy guns only, they could doubtless each have mounted at least four heavy turret guns of, say, 10-inch or 1-inch caliber, thus substituting 32 heavy turret guns in place of all of their 6-inch and 8-inch guns. The result would have been 500 more heavy-gun hits which, added to the 125 additional hits made by the battleships, make in all 625 heavy-gun hits in place of the 350 hits by 6-inch and 8-inch guns.
In other words, if the Japanese vessels had been designed in accordance with the principles of modern gun-fire (had been all-big-gun ships), their fleet would have developed a greater rapidity of hitting with heavy guns (875 hits) than it actually did develop with 12-inch, 8-inch, and 6-inch guns (700 hits)—and this for the simple reason that, it long ranges, the hitting capacity of their heavy guns was 19.6% while that of the small guns was only 2.1%. Moreover, as a matter of fact, a fleet having but one caliber of heavy guns on each vessel, would have been able to make still more hits in a given time, because their fire-control officers would not have suffered from the " interference " (delay) caused by the more numerous discharges of the smaller guns.
Thus we see that, at modern battle ranges, an all-big-gun fleet will actually deliver a greater volume of hitting—a greater number of hits, twice the weight of metal hitting, and twice the weight in bursting charges—than a fleet of mixed-battery ships of the same nominal power.
As for the comparative moral effect of the explosion of 12-inch and 6-inch shells, it seems to me that when we compare the difference in weight of the bursting charges (that of the 12-inch is 38 lbs. while the 6-inch is only 4 lbs.) and the difference in the strength of the walls of the shell, there can be no doubt that the moral effect of the former is very much greater than that of the latter.
As reliable evidence of this effect I may cite the testimony of Captain Semenoff, as reported editorially in the Boston Herald of September 3, 1906.
"He appears from his statements to have occupied the position on the Baltic fleet of a trained observer having no official duties to perform, but simply to make notes, and from shortly after noon on the 27th of May until 7:40 p. m., when, in consequence of wounds, he was compelled to abandon his post, he had nothing to do but to watch and record the events of the battle, . . . . as seen by him from the rear bridge of the battleship Suvaroff, Admiral Rodjestvensky's flagship."
"After fire had been opened between the combatants, Capt. Semenoff was struck by the fact that the 4-foot shells (12-inch) of the Japanese invariably burst on hitting the water, but the moment they obtained the range that the effect of their fire was terrific. A young lieutenant came up and asked him if this recalled his previous experience of August 10, at which time the Czarevitch was hit nineteen times by heavy shells in the course of several hours fighting. In order to keep up the courage of the inquirer, Captain Semenoff said, 'Yes,' but his real opinion was that he had never seen or imagined such accuracy of fire, the shells coming one after another without interruption, and hitting so frequently that he could not count the number of hits. (This was doubtless at 1.55 and at 2.30 p. m., when practically the whole of the Japanese fire of 12 ships was concentrated on the Suvaroff. Wm. S. S.). The force of their explosion was so great that it seemed to him that mines were exploding under the deck or against the ships side" . . . .” At 3.20 p. m., about an hour and a half from the time the first gun was fired Captain Semenoff was obliged to record in his note-book that the battle was lost."
If they were 6-inch shells that made Captain Semenoff think that " mines were exploding" it is ,probable that 12-inch shells would have impressed him as being earthquakes, and that he would accordingly have made special mention of the fact.
If it be admitted, from a consideration of the necessities of modern gunnery, that it would "be unwise ever to build a man-of-war, of any type whatever, having more than one caliber of guns in her main battery," and if it be admitted that the heavier the shell the greater the percentage of hits, and the greater its effect in disabling ships and demoralizing their personnels, it is evident that these guns should be of the smallest caliber that will do the work required, because the smaller the caliber the more ammunition can be carried. As the object of building a battleship is that she may meet her possible enemies on at least equal terms, it follows that the caliber of her guns must necessarily be governed by the thickness and character of the armor protection of these enemies. If an ii-inch 50-caliber gun is large enough to answer the purpose it should be adopted.
This is, however, a matter of detail. The essential principle of a ship's battery is, from the point of view of the modern gunnery officer, that all of her battle guns be of the same caliber.
But, it may be asked, if this is true now, has it not always been true? And how can we account for the fact that, until recently, practically all naval officers have favored ships with two or more calibers of main-battery guns? The explanation is afforded by a former erroneous belief, namely, that it was not considered advisable to increase the number of heavy guns on battleships, because the greater the caliber of the guns the less their hitting capacity, due to the weight to be handled in aiming, etc. While this may have been true to a certain extent during the time when most navies paid practically no intelligent attention to shooting, it ceased to be true as soon as the present competitive system of training developed the real hitting capacity of these guns, thus reversing this supposed law and showing that the true law was, as should have been recognized, in perfect accord with the ballistic properties of the various calibers.
Referring, now, to a point previously indicated, but not explained, I beg to invite special attention to the tactical advantage that we shall gain by having battleships of large displacement— an advantage which appears to me so great as entirely to out weigh all of the alleged advantages of numbers, mentioned by Captain Mahan. This may best be illustrated by contrasting the tactical qualities of two fleets, one of large vessels and one of small.
Before doing so, however, it may be well to state my understanding of the principal tactical qualities that are desirable in a fleet. These are:
1. The compactness of the battle formation.
2. The flexibility of the fleet as a unit, that is, its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and space with safety to its units.
For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to be equally skillful, with the exception of the Commanders- in-Chief, whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been so drilled as to be able to maneuver with precision and safety while maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other fleet requires.
This is putting the extreme case, but it shows:
1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certain important maneuvers (such as Admiral Togo performed at 1.55 p. m. and 2.55 p. m.), in about one-half the time and one-half the space required for similar maneuvers of the long fleet.
2. That, when ranged alongside each other, as shown in Fig. 1, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the 5th or 6th vessel of the long fleet—the 7th and 8th being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several more vessels astern of these.
It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions; that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills.
Doubtless, some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in maneuvering may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and maneuvering qualities. For example, the German interval is 300 meters from center to center, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.
If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire—the loss of these advantages to be fully realized 25 years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present type.
In order clearly to illustrate the above, I will assume a fleet of ten 20-knot battleships of about 20,000 tons displacement, each having a main-battery of five 12-inch, double-gun turrets, or a broadside fire of eight 12-inch guns, disposed as in the Dreadnought type, that is, one turret forward, one on each beam, well forward, and two aft on the center line.
Assume the cost of these ships to be 10 millions each, or 100 million for the fleet, and assume that the same sum of money will build a fleet of 20 battleships (though the number would, in reality, be considerably less) of the smaller type, of, say, 13,000 tons and 16 knots speed, each ship armed with two 12-inch, double-gun turrets, or a broadside of four 12-inch guns, and as many of the smaller guns, recommended by Captain Mahan, as can be mounted upon this displacement.
It is further assumed that, as all of the gun-crews of the fleet of large vessels are behind heavy armor, in the 12-inch turrets of new design (heretofore described), neither the crews nor the guns can be materially injured by the intermediate guns of the
FIGURE Page 20
fleet of small vessels; whereas, on the contrary, the majority of the men composing the gun-crews of the small vessels (all but about 90, for the two 12-inch turrets and their ammunition supply) are behind the armor of the intermediate guns—necesarily light on account of its great extent—and that these guns and their crews must be disabled or destroyed early in an action. It is, therefore; evidently well within the truth to assume that the gunfire of each large vessel will be more than twice as effective as that of each small one.
If the length of a large ship is 500 feet, and a small one 400 feet, and the interval between centers is, respectively, 450 and 400 yards, it follows that, when in column of vessels, the long fleet (small vessels) is 3.9 miles long, while the short fleet (large vessels) is 2.1 miles. That is to say, the long fleet (L) has a broadside fire of less than 21 big guns for each mile of length, while the short fleet (S) has 38 guns per mile—a concentration of gun-fire that is inherent in the design of the large vessels, and which no conceivable tactical skill on the part of the small ones could offset.
The tactical advantage of this concentration of gun-fire may be shown graphically by the following diagrams of fleets S and L.
From Fig. 2, which shows S in a position of disadvantage, the rear vessels outflanked, it is apparent that the first nine vessels of the L fleet can be destroyed by the first nine of the S fleet, since the latter have more than twice the gun-power of the former, while No. 10 S can sustain the fire of both 10 and 11 L, but not that of 12, 13, and 14 L, also. Assuming, however, that the 14th vessel of the L fleet is the last one whose fire would be effective against 10 S, the rear vessels of the S fleet can (by reason of having more than twice the individual gun-fire of their individual opponents) protect themselves by dividing the fire of 10 S between 13 and 14 L; 9 S between 11 and 12 L, 8 S between 9 and 10 L, and 7 S between 7 and 8 L, thus leaving the first vessels of L to be destroyed by twice their gun-power from the first six vessels of S; an advantage that is possible only with big ships, and this advantage is of great importance, because when the S fleet is taken at a disadvantage it enables each of its vessels to hold her own against at least two of the enemy.
Observe that, even when the L fleet is in the advantageous position shown in Fig. 2, no increase in the number of vessels in the L fleet can possibly prevent the successive destruction of the leading vessels, since all vessels behind No. 14 are practically out of the action.
Observe, also, that if for any cause the L fleet should be restricted in its maneuvers, the S fleet, instead of exposing its rear vessels to concentrated fire, as in Fig. 2, would take advantage of its superior speed and assume the position shown in Fig. 3, thus concentrating upon the leading vessels of the L fleet its entire gun-fire at a greatly less average range than would be possible if the positions of the fleets were reversed. That is to say, the concentration of the S fleet upon the leading vessels of the L fleet (Fig. 3) is very much more intense than would be the concentration of L upon the leading vessels of S.
It would therefore appear that, from a tactical point of view alone, the advantages of large vessels are such that they afford greatly increased offensive power when in a position of advantage and greatly increased defensive power when temporarily in a position of disadvantage.
It should also be noted that if, through an accident to the motive power of a large vessel, the fleet speed of S were reduced to that of the L fleet, the S fleet would still be a superior tactical unit, because it is more compact (is shorter and has less units) and can therefore maneuver with greater ease, and frequently in much less time—an advantage that is in some cases analogous to superior speed.
For example, the time necessary to communicate a signal to the 20 vessels of the L fleet, and be sure it is understood, and for this fleet to complete a change of course in column, so as to make a simultaneous movement, would be at least twice is long as that required for the ten vessels of the S fleet.
It follows, of course, from the above, that as soon as we build any fast vessels of the large displacement above indicated, and put them in the line of battle with 16-knot ships, we strengthen the fleet much more than if we added as many 16-knot ships as could be built for the cost of the big ships; for though we cannot at once utilize the superior speed of the big ships, we have nevertheless increased the compactness of our fleet, diminished the number of units and, therefore, for the reasons given above, have rendered it a superior tactical unit—which means that, with equal skill, it would out-maneuver a fleet of the same cost composed of small vessels throughout.
It should be noted, also, that if we place two only of these large ships at the head of a column of small vessels, each having one-half of the broadside fire of the former, we not only render the fleet more flexible, by shortening it my more than 2000 feet, but we strengthen our fleet at the weakest point, by concentrating within a distance of 1800 feet a broadside fire equivalent to that of four vessels occupying a space of 4000 feet. The above advantages are evidently so great that the alleged value of homogenity of units is not worth considering.
Concerning the alleged strategic value of numbers, and assuming that Captain Mahan's statement that: "A nation with wide naval responsibilities must have numbers in proportion" means that we would better spend our available appropriations in building small vessels, rather than large ones, in order to facilitate dispersing them over the world, I beg to say that, in my opinion, the above analysis shows very conclusively that a fleet of the large vessels is greatly superior in fighting value to a fleet of the small ones, no matter into how many equal squadrons (of, say, four or more vessels) we subdivide them.
For example, for 280 millions we could build 28 of the Dreadnought class or 40 Connecticuts, or four squadrons of 7 and 10 vessels, respectively. The former squadron would be 1.4 miles long, with a broadside fire of 40 12-inch guns per mile, and the latter 2.1 miles long with a broadside fire of 20 12-inch and 20 8-inch (neglecting the smaller guns as not effective against any of the armor of the Dreadnought class).
The above assumes that a nation with even the widest naval responsibilities would ever deem it advisable to disperse their naval units throughout the world, even in time of peace, thus diminishing individual efficiency, unity of purpose and action and the indispensable ability to maneuver large fleets at battle speed. (Rodjestvensky's fleet had been maneuvered but once as a fleet before the battle of the sea of Japan).
I had always supposed that the subdivision in time of peace of a nation's fighting units into numerous independent squadrons was due more to personal reasons than to a consideration of the principles of naval training and strategy—which latter seems to be more correctly illustrated by the rapid concentration that takes place when war is imminent. I understand that where the command of the sea is involved, a nation is not deterred from going to war by the state of dispersion of a rival nation's battleships, but by the knowledge that he has a certain number; that they possess certain material fighting qualities; and that they have been continuously trained to a high degree of individual and fleet efficiency by concentration in one or more large fleets.
It is for the above reasons, I believe, that the Naval War College has for a number of years consistently advocated all-big-gun, one-caliber ships, and the concentration in time of peace of all our heavy fighting ships under one command in the Atlantic, thence to be dispersed in squadrons of the required size to meet the requirements of the situation, after rather than before we know who our enemy is to be.
If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the large vessel to 16 knots and put the weight saved into guns, it may be replied that heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel) without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed largely by the length of the ship—which increases slowly with the displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a German publication. I do not remember the displacements used by the author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,060 tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a 20,000-ton battleship for 16 instead of 20 knots, you cannot utilize the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch turrets—as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns.
It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the "interference " caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.
Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about 20,000 tons) as a "wilful premature antiquating of good vessels" . . . . "a growing and wanton evil." If these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand.
This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's naval power than the same amount expended for smaller vessels; for it cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly each nation earnestly strives so to expend these sums as to derive the greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to their armies. As the mechanical arts improve, each nation endeavors to improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it is a case of force majeure—it must adopt them or suffer a relative loss of military efficiency; and it must make no mistake as to the relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs.
The same law—that of necessity—governs the evolution of battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception is the recent sudden increase (4000 to 5000 tons) in displacement. This exception therefore needs explanation. As partially indicated heretofore, it was due to a complete change of opinion as to the hitting capacity of guns of various calibers. This is now well understood by all officers who have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been increased several thousand per cent, and that of smaller guns about in proportion to their caliber.
(Incidentally, it should never be forgotten that the credit for the inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods of training belongs exclusively to Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Percy Scott, Director of Target Practice of the British Navy, who has, I believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to this matter since the first introduction of rifled cannon on men-of-war—nor should we forget that this degree of improvement was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander B. A. Fiske, U. S. Navy, as early as 1892).
As soon as the above facts gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the evolution of the all-big-gun, one-caliber battleship became a foregone conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient.
We were obliged to do the best we could in this respect upon 16,000 tons, because Congress fixed that as the maximum " trial " displacement; but the resulting design is not satisfactory (except in the newspapers), for, though our 16,000-tonner has the same broadside fire as the Dreadnought (having four, double-gun turrets on the center line), she has 50 per cent less bow fire, and a much lower freeboard—the forcastle and poop decks being, respectively, about 18 and 10 feet above the water-line, whereas the Dreadnought is an efficient sea-going battleship, capable of using her guns while steaming at full speed in any sea in which reasonably accurate aiming could be done. The profile of this ship is that of a scout, her forward turret being mounted upon a high forecastle about 35 feet above the water, and the remaining four turrets about 28 feet. All this not to mention the fact that the Dreadnought is a better gun-platform, has better protection and has a superiority in speed of two or three knots. (The Dreadnought's trial speed was about 21.5 knots).
It would undoubtedly be desirable if we could procure an international agreement that no nation would adopt for its armies a rifle superior to that now used. Similarly, it would be desirable if the displacement of men-of-war could be limited, say, to 20,000 tons. But in the absence of such an agreement, we must keep pace with the increased efficiency in battleships as well as in small-arms, otherwise we cannot reasonably expect to win battles. We have, indeed, no choice in the matter, if we are to remain a world power.
However, from the point of view of naval efficiency, we need have nothing to fear from even a still further increase in the size of our battleships. For example, referring to the supposed fleet of ten 20-knot ships—the short (S) fleet—above described, there can be no doubt that the same sum ( 100 millions) expended for a less number of still larger ships would produce a superior fighting fleet. For the same sum we could doubtless build eight ships each having a broadside fire of ten 12-inch guns, instead of eight, and one knot more speed. Such a fleet would be 1.7 miles long, instead of 2.1 miles, with a concentration of 48 heavy guns per mile to oppose to the 21 per mile of the long (L) fleet (3.9 miles) of small vessels—not to mention the increased superiority of its maneuvering qualities, and the superiority of its protection against both gun-fire and torpedoes. One of the great advantages of a large vessel is that the under-water hull can be so designed that the ship cannot be materially damaged by one torpedo.
From the facts and arguments herein presented, as I understand them, I derive the following main conclusions, founded upon what I believe to be the fundamental, elementary principles of gunfire and tactics:
1. That, in consideration of the fact that the ultimate object of a fleet is that, in the event of war, we may be able to overcome our possible enemies upon the sea, we should so design our battleships that they will at least equal those of our possible enemies in all of their fighting qualities—speed, gun-power, height of gun positions, protection, etc.
2. That, subject to the above requirements, it is always desirable to increase the speed a certain reasonable amount.
(Incidentally, it may be remarked that this indicates the advisability of developing maximum speed and minimum coal consumption, by placing all similar vessels in continuous competition in steaming—in much the same manner that we now utilize the competitive principle to develop their maximum gun-power.)
3. That it is always desirable to substitute heavy turret guns, such as 12-inch, for the equivalent weight of the usual intermediate guns, 6-inch, etc. In other words, that the all-big-gun, one-caliber ship affords the greatest possible capacity of effective hitting.
4. That, in order to simplify fire-control and attain its maximum efficiency, all of the main-battery guns of ships of whatever type should be of the same caliber.
5. That, for similar reasons, all of the torpedo-defense guns should be of the same caliber.
6. That very important tactical advantages are obtained by the concentration of many heavy guns on each large vessel of high speed, and by the consequent intense concentration of fleet gunfire, due to the compactness of the fleet.
7. That the tactical advantages of size, speed and diminished numbers are of much greater importance than any advantages to be obtained from the increased number of smaller and slower vessels that can be built at the same total cost.
In conclusion, I beg to submit the following considerations that do not bear directly upon the relation of speed, displacement and gun-power to effective gun-fire and tactics.
Captain Mahan assumes that the importance now given to long-range fire with heavy guns implies an indisposition to close, which he assumes would be to the disadvantage of the all-big-gun ships (as opposed to those having numerous intermediate guns), and that history teaches us that this alleged moral attitude is a dangerous one: "that the fleet which has thus placed its dependence on long-range fire has with it assumed the moral tone and temperament associated with the indisposition to close" . . . . and "that the navy which, for any reason, habitually seeks to keeps its enemy at a distance, in order to secure a preliminary advantage, usually fails to achieve more than a defensive success for the occasion, and in the long run finds itself brought to battle at an unexpected moment, under conditions unfavorable to it, both materially and morally."
Doubtless the above is true in all cases where individual ships are materially equal in force and in protection, and, particularly where the inefficiency of the artillery practically precludes effective hitting (that is, a large enough percentage of hits to be decisive) at any but short ranges. However, the conditions of gun-fire have changed fundamentally with the introduction of high-power guns and, particularly, with our recently acquired knowledge of these guns and their proper use.
Nelson's ships could not do effective hitting at a distance of about one mile, and the shooting of his enemies at the same range was equally as good, or bad. There was practically no possibility of effective marksmanship at long range, because of the rudimentary design of guns, sights, etc. Protection was practically equal, there being no armor. Hitting was dependent upon short range, and superiority of gun-fire depended almost wholly upon superior rapidity of fire. Collingwood said to his men: "If you can get off two broadsides in the first five minutes, you will win." (I quote from memory, and may have the figures wrong, but the above is the gist of his remark).
In order to contrast this with modern methods of gun-fire, I will take the actual case of two actual, similar ships, A and B. At a recent battle practice, while firing under way, at a target 90 by 30 feet, distant not less than 6000 yards, A made about 40 per cent of hits, and B made zero. At the previous test, on a short range, marked by buoys, A made about as good a score as B, thus showing about equal skill in aiming and rapidity of fire on the part of their gun-pointers (whose sole duty is to aim while their officers control the fire). Therefore, if these two ships (or a fleet of A's and a fleet of B's) had met in battle, and A, having sufficient speed (and no moral indisposition to close), had at once steamed in to short range, he would have received practically as many hits as his enemy, and if his rapidity of fire had been somewhat less than B's, even for a short period of time (due, say, to an otherwise insignificant accident to his cornmunciation system), he would have been defeated; whereas, had he taken advantage of the superior skill of his fire-control officers, and remained at long range (as Admiral Togo did), he would not only have won the battle, but would have done so without material damage to his ships or personnel (as in the case of the Japanese), and without danger of defeat through a temporary disability.
If a commander-in-chief knows that his ships are inferior in fire-control, he will of course seek to diminish this inferiority by fighting at short range (as was unsuccessfully attempted by the Russians); but the commander-in-chief of a fleet that is skillful in fire-control, and who has an indiscriminating disposition to close, appears to me to be out of place as a commander of modern vessels.
Concerning the ships in question—large, all-big-gun, one-caliber ships—I believe it has already been clearly shown that, besides being necessarily superior at long ranges to ordinary battleships (having intermediate guns), they are also superior to them at all ranges, because of the superior protection of the big guns and their gun-crews—not to mention the superior hull protection.
In addition to the superior individual and tactical advantages of large vessels, they also possess the following economical advantages:
1. A fleet of ten 20,000-ton ships, each having a broadside fire of eight 12-inch guns (or 80 in all) would cost about 100 millions.
2. A fleet of 20 smaller vessels, each having a broadside fire of four 12-inch guns (or 80 in all), and the usual intermediate guns, would cost about 120 or 130 millions—though I previously assumed the cost of these fleets to be equal, in order to accentuate the tactical value of large ships.
3. It requires less men to man the main-battery guns of an all-big- gun ship than of a mixed-battery ship. For example, it requires less men to serve the ten 12-inch guns of the Dreadnought than the four 12-inch, and sixteen 6-inch guns of the Missouri.
4. It will require no more men for the Dreadnought's crew than it would for the Missouri's—if she had a full complement of men (as measured by European standards), which neither she nor any of our battleships have.
5. The complement of officers of the Dreadnought is not as great as should be that of the Missouri, or Louisiana, because the former requires but one fire-control party, while the latter ships require respectively two and three parties, as well as more officers to command the guns.
6. Therefore, assuming 800 men and 20 combatant officers in each ship, it will require 8000 men and 200 officers for 10 all-big-gun ships, and about 16,000 men and 400 officers for the fleet of small vessels having the same broadside fire.
(Incidentally, it may be remarked that if the money we have expended for the ships recently commissioned and now being completed, had been put into 20,000-ton, all-big-gun ships, we would not now be embarrassed for either men or officers to man them—and would have a stronger fleet.)
7. It will cost nearly twice as much to dock the 20 small vessels as the m large ones—and the latter fleet can be docked in one-half the time, which is a great advantage in time of war.
(Captain Mahan notes that the absence of a big ship—for docking,. coaling, repairing, etc.—reduces the strength of its fleet more than the absence of a small one, but he neglects to note that with twice as many ships in a fleet there will be twice as many absentees in a given time.)
8. From the above it is clear that the cost of maintaining a fleet of small vessels, having the same broadside fire as a fleet of large vessels (of double the individual broadside fire), will be nearly twice as much as that of a fleet of large vessels of about the same total gun-power.
9. I understand that the cost of maintaining a battleship is over one million dollars per year. Therefore the yearly maintenance of the fleet of 10 large vessels would cost about 10 million dollars less than that of the 20 smaller ones.
10. The final conclusion is that, for the sum that it would cost to maintain 20 small battleships, we could maintain a fleet of 10 large ones, that would be greatly superior in tactical qualities, effective hitting capacity, speed, protection, and inherent ability, to concentrate its gun-fire, and have a sufficient sum left over to build one 20,000-ton battleship each year—not to mention needing fewer officers and men to handle the more efficient fleet.
By the above examination, I have attempted to show that Captain Mahan's conclusions are probably in error, only because they are, in my opinion, founded largely upon mistaken facts (as to the battle of the Sea of Japan), mistaken principles of gunfire, and upon an apparent failure to consider the inherent and very important tactical qualities of large vessels. In my analysis, I have considered only those alleged errors by which I believe that Captain Mahan was mainly influenced, omitting, for the sake of brevity, a number of minor ones that bear upon, but are not essential to, his conclusions.