For the Broader Study of Tactics.
(See No. 118.)
Captain A. C. Dillingham, U. S. Navy.—In the plea of Rear-Admiral Goodrich for a broader study of tactics, he has the sympathy of many officers of experience, or rather, we should say, long service.
The tactics of formation is indispensable, but such tactics come with a knowledge of captains of ships, of the tactical value of their vessels.
The captain of a ship knowing the tactical qualities of his vessel, it is only necessary for the division commander or squadron commander to standardize the vessels of his command, and tactics of formation should be complete.
We must get beyond the tactics of formation to learn battle tactics. Admiral Barker once for an hour, under the direction of the Admiral of the Navy, did attempt battle tactics on a very limited scale, by maneuvering six battleships against four cruisers. At this exercise there were no battle conditions, but it was an exercise for the benefit of the two rear- admirals engaged. I do not know what the present commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet has done or contemplates doing, but I do know that the service has great confidence in his ability as a sea officer to get results.
The delay in doing battle work with divisions or squadrons has been due, first, to the delay in getting separate vessels under the flag.
A vessel going in commission should join the flag as soon as possible after her captain has obtained the tactical data of his vessel; the school of the ship coming with “tactics of formation.”
With the “tactics of formation” complete, the answers to Admiral Goodrich’s question can only be given when we have had actual practice in handling for battle the material that we have at our disposition.
The question is not “Has the fleet the analogues of cavalry, the signal corps, the skirmish line, or the commissariat ?” but “What will the admiral do with what he has?” The judgment of the commander-in-chief cannot be analyzed or studied, until he has taken action with what material he has at his disposal.
I think we can predict that methods of signaling, fire control, external communications, battery arrangements, armor distribution, range finding, etc., will affect the judgment of the commander-in-chief, by just the amount of confidence that he has in these adjuncts of efficiency; and, furthermore, we will never know what the commander-in-chief will do with the analogues of cavalry, the signal corps, the skirmish line, and his commissariat, till he has had them ready to move in accordance with his judgment. Admiral Goodrich’s standpoint, from which the scheme of naval tactics must develop, is, I believe, correct—that of the commander- in-chief, and in approaching the subject from Admiral Goodrich’s side, we should have, first, the school of the ship, which is learned in the “tactics of formation,” and, second, the school of the commander-in-chief, which is nothing more than assembling such material as he may have, and the practical handling of this force under conditions as nearly as possible those of actual war.
With the material assembled, strategical study is at the disposition of the commander-in-chief, the tactical results can only be gotten by dividing the fleet, and allowing one flag officer to operate against another under war conditions.
I think the people who attempt to write grand, or battle tactics, are liable to impress the student with the great depth of something they are seeking, whereas such tactics is the practical handling of the forces at one’s disposal.
Naval history convinces us of certain axioms in handling large numbers of vessels against an enemy; with these axioms known and appreciated, it becomes a question in battle which commander-in-chief is going to get the advantage. I believe it would be safe to say, that the commander- in-chief who has had the greatest actual amount of practical experience in handling one force against another in time of peace, under as nearly as possible war conditions, will win.
It was once thought that it would require months for a vessel just commissioned, before she was fit to join the flag. I believe it is accepted now, that the sooner the vessel joins the flag, the better. It only requires that the captain shall have gotten the tactical data of his vessel.
It may before long be decided that it is best for the commander-in-chief to begin battle tactics as soon as possible after the division commanders have standardized the vessels of their commands, and the commander-in-chief has organized the units of his fleet.
The judgment of any commander in time of war, who has not had actual practical experience in time of peace, in conducting battle maneuvers, will be snap judgment. We cannot make battle tactics; we must do them, and this brings the question with us, Have we the flag officers in grade long enough, to do the necessary amount of practical work, to bring effective knowledge; or, if we have such flag officers, do enough of them have the opportunity of getting such practical knowledge, in order to give us sufficient flag officers in time of war? Admiral Goodrich, for instance, has been afloat, but with such a command that his opportunities for studying battle tactics were few. If he now becomes the superintendent of the Naval Academy it will end his career as a fleet commander, although he has yet three years to serve.
The Board on Navy Personnel may recommend such legislation as will give us flag officers who will be long enough in the grade to be of practical use to the service; but in this connection it can be said that not all flag officers possess the natural gift or talent for handling large forces opposed to each other. Under such circumstances it would seem to be for the best interest of the service to employ only such officers for battle work who do possess the talent or gift; the others no doubt have talents for administering at naval stations, naval academy, etc.
If our flag officers have the opportunities for the practical handling of large forces against each other under battle conditions, the captains will learn, and be ready to take their places when required.
Without a satisfactory interview with Togo, it is impossible to know what he had in mind when the “ball opened,” but it is fair to say that his previous experience to the north’ard stood him in good service at the battle in the Sea of Japan.
Togo had been careless to the north’ard, but he came to the south’ard with that experience, and I have no doubt that at the great fight at the Sea of Japan, Togo was much gratified upon observing that the Russian commander had neglected the axioms taught by naval history, and the results of Togo’s practical experience, which gave to him the practical knowledge of the forces under his command, allowed him to take advantage of the defects of his enemy.
The great thing that Togo had in mind at the battle of the Sea of Japan was that he was going to lick his enemy, and seeing the weak points of the enemy’s formation, he hastened to take advantage of them.
We can throw some light on the “mental processes” of Togo’s mind, and explain to a certain extent what he had in mind, if we will put ourselves in Togo’s place, and imagine that we are waiting for information as to the disposition of the enemy’s force.
It is probable that Togo felt a self-confidence, gained by his practical experience, which allowed his mind to remain tranquil till the necessary information was obtained; then his practical experience, with his natural talent for handling large forces, allowed him to act promptly and effectively.
With the details of fleet organization complete, and effective, battle tactics can only be studied by the actual handling of forces under battle conditions.
Presumably it is the duty of the commander-in-chief to satisfy himself that the adjuncts to fleet efficiency are efficient, and the best possible. If battle signals are not satisfactory, if the tactical signal book is not complete, then they must be taken up at once, and made as satisfactory as possible, in order to get the best results from battle tactics.
With battle maneuvers, like any other problems, the simpler and fewer the details, the less is on the mind of the responsible leader, and the success of the commander-in-chief depends, as does that of the head of any great organization, greatly upon the men he has about him; in civil life the success of a leader will depend greatly upon the character of the men he has associated with him, so with a commander-in-chief, his success will depend in a large measure, upon the character of his subcommanders, and his captain, and for this reason, should the commander-in-chief at any time find his assistants lacking, he must straightway remedy the obstruction to success, the same as he would perfect his signal and tactical book, in which case he would eliminate the useless, and keep that part which will be of use.