PRIZE ESSAY, JANUARY 1, 1906.
Motto: Look before you leap.
The professional atmosphere is again alive to the whisperings of promotion by selection. Like some planetary orb, "selection" has its seasons of approach and recession, and at present it appears to be on its way toward perihelion.
Its claims are pressed upon our attention, sometimes by direct exposition, sometimes indirectly by suggestion. A number of officers openly advocate it and there are reasons for believing that it finds encouragement in the higher circles of government, both legislative and executive. On the other hand, it is opposed by a large number, possibly a majority, of officers who feel that its adoption would be a serious, if not a crushing, blow to the best interests of the service.
There are some who sincerely feel and believe that they will not get what is rightfully "coming to them" without selection; and there are others who feel and believe with equal sincerity that they will not get what is rightfully "coming to them" with it.
In the presence of such diametrically opposite views, the hope may not unreasonably be entertained that a free discussion of the important points involved will, at least, disclose prevailing service opinion and possibly settle some minor elements of the topic.
In entering upon such a discussion it can be confidently assumed that the highest welfare of the service constitutes the common ground upon which all would wish to stand, and that to attribute to anyone a motive inconsistent with such welfare is, in itself, sufficient to merit reflected censure.
It is difficult to believe that there is anyone so self-conscious of unworthiness that he fears the application of any uniformly applied fair rule; and, per contra, it is equally difficult to believe that there is anyone so lost to sense of honor and patriotism that he would willingly abandon these virtues and enter deliberately into base schemes of self-seeking. We may reasonably agree that the possible number of both these classes, occupying the very extremes of unworthiness, is so small as to be negligible.
So much has been said from time to time upon both sides of this fruitful question that one feels pardonable in avowing at the outset that no attempt has been made to review the entire field of its literature. The attempt has been rather to discover, if possible, the chief principles and reasons that have inspired those who advocate selection in either its fullness or some modification thereof, and to examine these reasons as to their force and validity.
The result of such search for fundamental principles as time permitted, disclosed four grounds upon some one or more of which the various arguments in favor of selection seemed ultimately to rest. These may be stated without particular regard to order of importance as follows:
1st. Selection is desirable in order to obtain and keep younger officers in the grade of commander and above.
2d. It is desirable as supplying reward to deserving officers.
3d. It is desirable in order that those having the higher professional qualifications may occupy the places involving the greater responsibilities.
4th. It is desirable because it would stimulate energy throughout the service and thereby promote efficiency.
YOUNGER OFFICERS IN THE GRADE OF COMMANDER AND ABOVE.
In taking up the first of these principles, which may for brevity be designated the "younger men" theory, it is desirable to explain at once that the caption scarcely deserves a place, on its merits as a principle, in this discussion. But those who advocate selection so frequently refer to the benefits it would bestow in bringing younger men into the upper grades that it seems necessary to look into the matter, if for no other purpose than to clear the field of confused issues. There is, in fact, no essential connection between the desirability of having younger men in the upper grades and the means of getting them there. It is obvious that even if we agree as to the need, we may still disagree as to the means of supplying it. Selection is only one method among others.
When selection is urged upon us for the purpose under consideration, it is usually prefaced or accompanied by a vivid description of an alarming attack upon some city of our seacoast, and our present condition is represented as providing only antiquated admirals and decrepit captains for its defense. The end is clearly seen from the start, and we save time here by admitting disaster at once without going through the distressing details. Younger men would have saved the day, and, according to the theory, enough of them, at least for such an occasion, should have been selected from the lower grades and placed where they would have been available on demand.
Do we interpret the thought correctly in believing that they want a few young men sprinkled in among the older ones, ready in emergency to actually take the wheel and relieve their incapable associates? This is not probable. For, apart from the anomaly of such a travesty of organization, it is open to the obvious comment that if a few younger men are so serviceable, then more younger men would be still more serviceable and the necessity of the reliefs would be avoided.
Do they desire younger admirals over captains who are their seniors in age and experience? It is not reasonable: for surely the duties of a captain are more exacting, physically, than those of an admiral. And similarly, the duties of an executive officer are more exacting physically than those of higher positions. So we seem driven to the other horn of the dilemma and must assume that all members of the upper grades should be younger. We then realize that this may be readily brought about by the establishment of appropriate age limits in the several grades. This leaves the issue of selection still as unsettled as ever and merely warns us that the question of younger officers should not be permitted to confuse or obscure it.
And here seems a suitable place to invite attention to the very prevalent error that the incumbents of the higher grades are incompetent, physically, mentally, or both, because of age. This is far from the truth. The rare instances that seem to support such belief are marked exceptions. This false alarm has been overworked. An unprejudiced survey of our captains and flag officers will develop the fact that they are a capable body of men ready for any contingency of service. In fact, such capacity is not rare on the list of those retired for age. If there is any question involved it is one of neither physical nor mental incapacity, but purely of administrative expediency. It may indeed be that the age limits for lieutenant-commander, commander, and captain need to be lowered; but if so the reason is to accelerate promotion in the lower grades and give opportunity for more experience in the higher ones, and not at all because of declining powers due to age.
There is something in the mere fact of attaining the higher grades and thus reaching full length of service that, of itself, proves fitness. It is a kind of natural selection whose exacting requirements determine more certainly than do any other means an all-around fitness for responsibility and command. Many things may affect ultimate fitness that are undeveloped and hence cannot be detected in the earlier years. There are weak points in character, obscure elements of physical ailment, lack of staying power in either physical, moral, or intellectual fields, that too often develop into practical disqualifications.
What particular merit has youthfulness in supplying the qualities of an admiral? Are experience, wisdom, and judgment characteristics of youth? For physical action we need the enthusiasm and energy of younger men. In fact, we concede willingly that our commanding officers should have the stamina and physical energy of meridian manhood. Their duties involving loss of sleep, unending vigilance, and frequent exposure, can be performed satisfactorily only by men of vigorous health. But these physical demands do not fall so heavily upon admirals.
Hot blood for action, but cool blood for council, under all circumstances, not excepting war. A man of sixty years would probably not be the best to lead a cutting-out expedition, but he might easily be the best to plan one. The dashing young hero who leads it successfully might easily mar his own plans in their preparation by over-eagerness and enthusiasm. The man immediately behind the gun, and in the fire-room, needs emphatically the energy of youth to stimulate exertion and endurance. But the man of the cabin, of the conning tower, and of the bridge, needs that familiarity with emergencies which experience, and experience alone, can give, and which steadies his judgment and gives him confidence.
It would be easy, but it is unnecessary, to quote from history long lists of instances where leaders over fifty years of age have won great victories. It is sufficient to recall the work of our own Farragut, and of those who conducted the naval campaigns of the war with Spain.
The following quotation from a leading daily newspaper of recent date, in an article commenting upon the age of officers in the upper grades, is worthy of notice as indicating a surprising trend of thought among reformers:
"Experience in lower rank no longer fits for promotion." There can be no greater perversion of truth than this statement; and it is just such loose utterances that engender the belief among the civil officials of government that "selection" is superior to experience. Experience in the successive lower grades is as beneficial and as necessary to-day as it ever was in the history of navies, for the development of the all-around thorough officer, master of his profession and fitted for meeting emergencies. In fact, the one objection, worthy of consideration, to the lowering of grade ages is that it reduces this preliminary experience.
SELECTION DESIRABLE AS SUPPLYING REWARD TO DESERVING OFFICERS.
We will now consider selection as a system that enables us to reward deserving officers. This has always been a favorite ground for its advocacy. History is replete with records of rewards and honors bestowed upon successful commanders, and special promotion, or advancement, is usually the means by which extremely hazardous or important duty and extraordinary heroism are recognized. For such services our laws provide rewards of that kind.
The propriety of such advancements when the deeds are commensurate with the high purpose of the rewards will rarely be questioned. But such deeds are necessarily unusual and infrequent; else they would be ordinary and not extraordinary. They must be deeds that approach the very limits of human endeavor and courage to merit the descriptive terms employed; and so long as special advancement is limited to such exceptional and deserving cases we can give unanimous approval.
But if rewards of any kind are given too liberally, or if we attempt to grade them to meet the estimated merits of less worthy services, we defeat our own ends. The value of even the highest reward then becomes degraded, and the hopeless attempt to discriminate among the minor services leads at once to confusion, injustice, and favoritism. Selection for reward, accepted as a general principle of promotion, would lead immediately to these disorganizing and destructive conditions. To lower the standard is, at once, to lose the standard and imperil ourselves.
The scheme to introduce promotion by selection whereby zeal, energy and accomplishment may attain immediate reward is attractive in theory but illusory in practice. Luck, opportunity, circumstances and environment are elements that enter so largely into the ordinary events of life, military no less than civil, that human judgment is baffled and thwarted by their operation.
We may contemplate, for example, a soul-stirring act of heroism where life itself is deliberately and obviously carried to the altar of duty; and on the other hand we may have for illustration the possible case of Ensign "Bluffy." Sent on some duty to a remote part of the ship, he discovers an incipient fire in paymaster's stores lying in the passage. Turning quickly in his excitement to give the alarm, he stumbles, falls, bruises his thumb, and upsets a bucket of water from a rack where it had been placed by the executive officer for just such a contingency. Reminded by the water of its usefulness he finds a second bucket and completely extinguishes the flames. In the meantime a petty officer, aroused by the noise and seeing the smoke, has given the alarm. When the first nozzle-man reaches the scene it is all over. "Bluffy" has entirely forestalled him. His thumb is carefully bandaged by the surgeon, and at the end of nine days, being of robust constitution developed by football at Annapolis, he is on duty as usual.
Between these two extreme types of performance all acts of service may be grouped, but they cannot be justly graded. Furthermore, an individual act of undisputed merit will be weighed very differently by different superiors. With one it may rank as heroism, with another as commonplace performance of duty to be expected of any good officer. By the skillful and kindly services of interested friends an incident of service may be inflated to the dimensions of an omelet, while under less favorable circumstances another's cake becomes dough. Mere eye-service sometimes imposes upon a superior, while modest and constant staying powers are unobserved. Unfortunate misunderstandings and prejudices from which none is free, often lead commanding officers into error in judging the character and qualifications of their subordinates.
Under a system of selection for reward "Bluffy," no doubt, will be advanced over many of his associates on the ground that he is an enterprising man who "does things," and deserves encouragement.
While such general considerations would seem clearly sufficient to condemn the reward theory as a general method of promotion, its disadvantages, not to say evils, are equally manifest when we look into its practical application at closer range. At the conclusion of the Spanish war, for example, numbers of officers had done distinguished service ranging to the very highest measure of worthiness. The large-hearted enthusiasm of our countrymen for their soldiers and sailors, always so manifest in the presence of war, moved them earnestly to the bestowal of reward. Advancement in rank seemed at once to be the natural, simple, and appropriate form for the expression of the recognition; and, in general, the movement was accepted ungrudgingly by the service at large. Accordingly, the "jumping" began. As a result of later reports and revisions the jumpers were themselves jumped by other jumpers, and the measure was in danger of defeating its own ends. One was reminded of the famous problem of the frog escaping from the well. It could jump up three feet in the day time but slid back two feet every night. The bestowal of these rewards led immediately to confusion and unexpected difficulties affecting regular promotions.
Not only this, but the natural feelings of justice and generosity within the service itself, among those who were rewarded, induced individuals thus benefited to write official letters of protest in behalf of the interests of their less fortunate comrades.
If such great dissatisfaction results when advancements are made by the operation of existing law and upon the basis of generally recognized meritorious conduct and gallantry, more certainly will there be dissatisfaction in time of peace when the only basis is the opinion of a board.
The subject of "reward," by itself, is so pertinent to this topic that it may not be amiss to glance briefly at its motives and effects as it pertains to military service. The most common motive in giving rewards is, probably, to encourage people to right conduct and endeavor. We give them liberally to children both in the home and school in the form of toys, money, etc. Later, as character develops, we rely less and less upon these artificial aids until, in mature life in noble characters, their necessity becomes rare. Rewards are given for the return of stolen and lost articles and there can be no doubt that this practice is beneficial in maintaining and promoting honesty. But the man or woman whose character in this regard is already strongly developed declines the reward under the feeling that its acceptance is in some sense humiliating, involving possibly the admission that it is trading character for material gain.
In naval and military service the one object of effort to which all are urged by precept and example is the performance of duty. It is the watchword of our service. It is the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night. It is an end so worthy and satisfactory in itself that it needs no tinsel tag. Shall we displace the pure motive of duty by the baser motive of reward as an inspiration for our young officers? Poets and philosophers who study fundamental causes reach conclusions that are verified by our observation and experience, and all unite in attributing success in arms, as in any other supreme endeavor, to the integrity of character and to the pure motives that are covered by the outward armor and material weapons.
No position in the navy exists as a reward for service however distinguished or however commonplace. The positions exist primarily and only because of important duties that must be performed and heavy responsibilities that must be borne for the general welfare. Promotion to advanced grade merely as a reward for service, however gallantly accomplished, is unwise. If the service rendered assures us of the competency of the officer to perform satisfactorily a higher class of duties for which a call or a vacancy exists, then naturally give that man, who has proved his competency, to the place. Do not give the place to the man. If the performance of a duty merits the honor and applause of the people, these will be accorded in full measure, whatever the rank or position of the individual.
The word "reward" has attained wide currency in connection with the subject under discussion. This seems regrettable. The very meaning of the word as given by standard authorities embodies the ideas of recompense, compensation, remuneration, pay, requital, etc., and these are alien to the ideal of military duty. The word "gift" or "present" would be less objectionable from this point of view.
But must they have reward? Are rewards desirable for adults? Are they desirable for a body of men trained and encouraged from youth to act from motives of honor and duty alone? Is not the practice, said to exist in Japan, whereby rewards are not given even for the bravest personal sacrifices, more glorious and more effective?
Does the officer want reward? Does he seriously deem his country to be his debtor? Then let us provide a money reward from the public treasury. But does he look askance and hesitate in the acceptance because it seems sordid, or base, or belittling? He need not. Rewards in money are common elsewhere in life. In fact, money reward for military service is by no means unknown in other countries. Possibly the objectionable feeling is due, in reality, to the reward itself, and that it is the attempted measurement of supposed deserts by money that makes the repugnance manifest. But if a money reward is objectionable, then surely no one would seek the reward of advancement, that takes money from his comrades, and, in addition, is unjust to them in other ways.
Does he want reward? Does he fear that his name may not survive in the hearts of his countrymen? Indeed it may not. Republics are proverbially ungrateful. Let him then have it carved on a bronze tablet, or marble column, or impressed upon a medal.
It would be going too far to assert that under no circumstances should there be special recognition of important military service. Such assertion is distinctly not made. But it is contended that enough is shown to make us exceedingly cautious in bestowing rewards; that they should never be used as a basis for general promotions; and finally that the ideal of military and naval duty should be so exalted and rigid as to need no support by them.
In reply to those who may think such standard too high to be practicable, we may point to the honorable records in our naval history. They will find that it was not too high for our predecessors; and it was reached in these later times, as shown by a letter to the President, written in behalf of others, wherein it is said:
" . . . I have felt that I have done my duty in the conduct of the West Indian naval campaign to the utmost extent of my ability, as thoroughly as I was able, and if no reward should come that I could be satisfied with the consciousness of having done my best. . ."
THOSE HAVING HIGHER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS SHOULD OCCUPY THE PLACES INVOLVING THE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES.
The central idea of this heading may be expressed more briefly as the theory of "the best man on top." It is attractive in appearance and honest in purpose. But appearances are not always reliable as a basis of judgment; and the advantages claimed in having our officers graded in a list according to their individual professional merits are not so obvious as might seem at first glance.
We shall assume for discussion, at this point, a perfect graduation the accuracy of which no one will question. How shall we put our machinery in operation to fulfill its avowed purpose of giving the most important duty to the best man? First of all we should assure ourselves of the place or places where responsibility bears most heavily. This, in itself, is a problem involving no little difficulty. It may seem to be in China waters to-day and develop suddenly in Africa to-morrow. It would probably be deemed neither wise nor expedient to keep the ranking individual on the move following up the points of possible trouble. We might also reasonably assume that cruising duty, in general, involves greater responsibilities than shore duty. Would we, therefore, send and keep all the upper men of the various grades at sea? Manifestly not. In due course reliefs would have to be provided and our theory would then be exactly reversed in application. In actual practice the assignments to duty, in all probability, would soon reduce themselves to the very conditions under which we work to-day. Not the ranking man but the best available man would be assigned. Commanders of fleets and squadrons, captains of battleships and armored cruisers are now so chosen, and so on down, with more or less choice, through the various posts of responsibility. This is done now with a list, which, according to selectionist doctrine, is unsatisfactorily graded. What different course would be followed if the list were perfectly graded?
The list, however well arranged according to the best selection theory, would never be taken in the emergency of war, and hardly in the routine work of peace, to give us commanders-in-chief or captains of battleships in their order of standing. Then, as now, and as in times past, the President and his advisers would go over the list and under the stress of necessity would still seek from its large numbers the particular man for the particular place. Here there will always be a selection willy-nilly; a selection contemplated by existing law. Why then keep the list in an unsettled turmoil that in the end obviates nothing, and in the meantime accomplishes little else than discontent and harm?
The mistaken notion as to the advantages of perfect grading results from the fact that in the service there are numerous posts of duty and many different classes of duty in simultaneous existence, and largely independent of each other. If there were but one duty to be done, involving but one organization, like a regiment or a single ship, there might be some convenience or advantage in having the list in strict keeping with the grades of duty. Such, however, is far from being the case.
But, further, if we should all agree as to the perfection of the grading at any time, it is certain that opinions would change and the list would never be in an established condition.
A list, after all, is merely a group of names, but it is often very necessary. When the names of a number of people are presented for consideration they have to be arranged in some order. When a body of people pass through a doorway one at a time, recognized order is very desirable. But there are many bases of arrangement other than ability that give satisfactory results. A company commander might be able to write a list of his men in the exact order of their qualifications as soldiers. But for most purposes he might still prefer to use merely an alphabetical list; and in forming his company he probably would give no regard to either. For one kind of duty one man would be his "best" soldier, and for another kind of duty, another. It would seem then that the importance of any special order in a list of names may be exaggerated.
But, if grading by merit is insisted upon as desirable, we are brought to a consideration of the crucial question in selection. By what means can we accurately determine the relative merits and worth of officers? Can these things be satisfactorily measured in any way by any body? It is scarcely possible. After a great war we may be able to pass acceptable judgment in some cases upon individuals, but even after such great test our judgment may involve grave errors. We cannot be certain that luck may not have entered largely into the careers of our pronounced successful men; luck, that might easily fail them in a second trial. We cannot be sure that others may not have gone down to defeat because of unavoidable mischance rather than because of incompetency.
The insect most gifted among its fellows by physical perfection and high development may be suddenly crushed by the footfall of man, the dropping of an apple, or the bursting of a storm. Its truest instincts and best actions are subject to conditions that can be neither foreseen nor evaded. So with man in his larger sphere and his accompanying larger contact with enveloping circumstances.
Who can select the great leaders before they have proved that they are great leaders? Who heralded Grant or Lincoln? The fact is that great leaders select themselves. They join with opportunity to show and prove their fitness. Furthermore, the men who are ultimately accepted as great by the estimate of history and the approval of posterity are often unappreciated by their contemporaries, and quite as often the reciprocal is true.
There is no adequate test of superiority as a military or naval leader except the great and ultimate test of real war itself. The maneuvers, the sham battles, the mobilization of armies or of fleets, for mere practice, are wholly unreliable for the discovery of those grim war qualities that may lie dormant only to be aroused to action by the call to arms for business.
Can the advocates of selection hope to arrange the upper grades of the navy list in an order that accurately measures ability in this ultimate purpose of all navy work? Such difficulty is well illustrated and apparently well recognized at the Naval Academy. Here we carefully grade the classes, giving appropriate weight to each subject, having in view the qualities of an ideally equipped naval officer. After three years of this careful grading the first class enters upon its important work. How are the cadet officers appointed? Are they taken in order from the carefully graded list? Decidedly not, and with good reason. Further, at the close of the fourth year, when we have had opportunity to judge the class as cadet officers and could arrange them in order according to their performance of duty alone, do we do so and give them to the service in that order? Decidedly not, and for good reasons. Without discussing what is done, or what ought to be done, we notice the conservative view finding its expression in long-continued custom that it is neither expedient nor wise to try to arrange a class according to their all-around fitness as officers.
And even in mature years how unstable is mere "success" as a pedestal upon which to place our heroes and worthies while they are yet living to overturn it by their unsteady antics. Was the Bonaparte of Italy and the Bonaparte of Egypt the same man? What is left of Marengo and Jena after the retreat from Moscow? Even in this generation we may call to mind a commander of the highest reputation in the navy of a great nation who, by an unaccountable lapse, brought fatal disaster to his fleet in time of profound peace, and escaped malediction only through a gallant death with his comrades.
As among very divergent qualities, who can judge rightly which is entitled to the greater weight? Of two flag-officers, which serves his country best; he who, as an acknowledged expert tactician, can handle his ships with precision, maintain discipline, and promote efficiency, but who is remiss in knowledge of international law, blunders stupidly in diplomacy, and may needlessly involve his country in war; or he who, as a master of tact, diplomacy, precedent, and law, averts from his country a great war, though he is admittedly weak as a drill-master?
How many commanding generals were "selected," only to be displaced, during the first few months of our Civil War? And why was our great general so long undiscovered by both the civil and military experts on ability?
Such incidents and questions as the preceding seem to indicate the absolute futility of attempting to solve the complicated problem of human merit in any exact manner.
The difficulty of "picking winners" from among the personnel of naval and military establishments is by no means exceptional. Similar attempts in other fields of strenuous exertion usually prove to be a fruitful source of disappointment to all concerned excepting those who control the operations. "Favorites" often "go stale;" "unknowns" develop unexpected qualities; and "ringers" too often are worked into classes and win prizes to which they are not entitled. The chief result upon the community is widespread vexation of spirit.
But if results are so uncertain in mere physical contests, where every care is taken to make the conditions uniform, where the course is exactly the same for all, where one quality and one only is on trial; how hopeless must be the attempt to make correct choice where the conditions are widely different, where no two courses can be alike and where a score of qualities enter into the issue to be weighed and measured against each other.
The views of General Grant upon this subject cannot be without value to the discussion. In his book "Around the World with General Grant," Vol. II, p. 351, John Russel Young quotes the General as follows:
I am always indulgent in my opinions of the generals who did not succeed. There can be no greater mistake than to say that because generals failed in the field they lacked high qualities In the popular estimate of generals nothing succeeds like success…Some of the men who were most unfortunate in our war are men in whom I have perfect confidence, whom I would not be afraid to trust with important commands. It is difficult to know what constitutes a great general.
SELECTION DESIRABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD STIMULATE ENERGY THROUGHOUT THE SERVICE AND THEREBY PROMOTE EFFICIENCY.
In the PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE, September, 1905, there is presented a "modified system of promotion by selection" based upon the ground defined by the above sub-title, the last of the four to be specifically considered. It is clearly stated that the scheme is "designed as a spur to action to a large class of men. . . ." Although disagreeing with several of the statements made in advocacy of the system proposed, we may well admit that the case is strongly presented and that its supporters have unquestioned confidence in the efficacy of the plan. It is referred to here because it is a fair type of the various schemes proposed having the same motive.
But let us look at the motive and method of application. In this aspect selection presents itself to us as a mechanical, or at least, an artificial, agency brought into the service to perform the part of an energizer. It would seem to be a sort of bugaboo, or incorporeal policeman, to incite fear and make us "step lively." Perhaps a more acceptable comparison would be to liken it to a stimulant that induces desired physical or mental energy when the normal powers have become fatigued or are inadequate to our needs. It would also appear that those who support selection on the basis now under consideration are not really selectionists at heart, for the hope is plainly held out that if the plan works well there will be little or no selection and promotion will continue by seniority, as heretofore. Selection apparently is not regarded as a wholesome diet, but is to be taken as a tonic to brace up the system.
Artificial stimulants, however serviceable at times and for special purposes, have recognized faults when used habitually. They rapidly exhaust the vital powers, and the system becoming accustomed to their presence demands larger supplies to maintain the desired effect. Would not this be true of selection? If we should start with even a little selection, would we not experience its possible evils along with its possible good, and would we not find ourselves in need of larger applications as the service became accustomed or callous to its effects? Would not the sensual palate, represented here by self-seeking interests, demand excess of stimulant to the great detriment, and against the protest, of the other members of the organism?
There is no doubt that the energizer proposed would produce effect. But would the effect be of a satisfactory and desirable kind? There might be more activity. There certainly would be more showy performance, more subserviency, more eye-service, more gallery-play. But would the healthy tone and vital qualities characteristic of a loyal service be improved? It is more than doubtful. Increased energy does not spell increased efficiency. A mouse, for example, can energize a herd of elephants into frenzy. It can throw a missionary meeting into panic. But in neither case is the energy productive of benefit.
Moreover, we cannot forget that while selection may be an energizer it has strong re-active properties. One can scarcely conceive of a more certain way of quenching the zeal and killing the spirit of any nine good men than by advancing the tenth one over them.
We must consider also the increase of official machinery that apparently must accompany selection methods. One proposition contemplates a special board for selecting vice-admirals, a continuous board of five rear-admirals to make selection for that grade, and a second continuous board of five captains to make selection for captains and commanders. These numbers seem excessive, but are possibly deemed necessary to insure the service against any deplorable mistake.
If selections are made quarterly, as it is suggested, we have before us the probability every three months of interesting topics for gossip and criticism. There would be whisperings, comment and mutterings throughout the service detrimental to discipline and disorganizing in tendency.
It might easily happen also that the department, unable to anticipate the action of the selecting boards would find itself embarrassed in making assignments to serious duties. An officer, for example, appointed to an important ship or post for a reasonable term of service, is selected to a higher grade before he has fairly grasped his command. He must then be relieved. Frequent changes of this kind are undesirable for the service and vexatious to the detailing authorities.
Selection is sometimes urged, not so distinctly on the ground that it would improve good men, but on the somewhat modified ground that the unworthy would not be promoted. We are, therefore, entitled to ask; are the unworthy promoted under the present system? Let any one run over the list and feeling, if possible, full responsibility count how many he would have the assurance to cut out and so to advocate before a committee of officers. Is there not at times too much irresponsible talk about incompetents in the upper grades? But, for the integrity of discussion, let us admit that a few may be pronounced unworthy. How did they attain promotion? A board of officers of high character, of patriotism, of courage, has pronounced them physically, mentally, and morally fit for their places. The opinion of the board apparently is different from our own. Thus the question is seen to be one of mere opinion rather than of fact. Can we charge that the board is unfaithful or incompetent? Has an unworthy candidate been permitted to pass with its full knowledge? If so, then we must admit that sworn boards are not reliable. They cannot turn down a known inefficient or unworthy man. Then, in reason, we are forced to believe that these same boards will not be able to resist the pressure of interest, relationship, political and social considerations, and the temptation to put themselves in position of future advantage, in making selections upward. If there are not nerve and stamina enough to keep out the manifestly incompetent, there will not be courage to resist the insidious temptation to promote a man for trifling reasons, which in the very nature of things can never be brought to the light of day.
It is unnecessary to introduce any artificial spur for the unworthy. It is not the spur that we lack, but its application. There are natural and efficient spurs already at hand in the organization. Let Courts-martial and Examining and Retiring Boards do their duty with vigor, with constant consideration for the uplift of the service, with less compassion for moral weaknesses, with less frequent recommendations to clemency: Let official reports of fitness be made with still greater discrimination, sharpness and emphasis, and the laggards and delinquents will be eliminated.
The worthy need no spur and should not be goaded.
On the other hand, what have we to offer as an inducement to effort; as encouragement for zeal? Frankly and plainly, nothing. These motives, if they exist, are also to be found within the system itself. They are in the mind and heart of every officer worthy of his training and his uniform. By favor, or merit, or both, he is called to honorable service in a profession already made illustrious by his predecessors. Assured of a competence that places him beyond the reach of want, it is his good fortune to know and feel the life of duty and service, to be in close touch with those who labor, and at the same time to enjoy the fullness of life in social and official circles beyond the reach of the many. Common gratitude alone should stir him to honest endeavor; patriotism should make the performance of duty a sacred trust; and the rich traditions and splendid achievements of the past should inspire and sustain him on supreme occasion through the end of all human service.
If officers are not moved by these fundamental and vital considerations, then external and artificial devices will be worse than useless. They will further weaken and degrade. If we should ever reach a condition where such wholesome principles are no longer potent for good, we will have indeed a fruitful soil for the development of all that is evil in selection.
"SAFE SELECTION" HAS ABUNDANT APPLICATION IN THE SERVICE AT PRESENT.
Having now considered the chief grounds upon which selection is usually advocated, we will present other phases of the subject that seem to deserve notice.
Throughout the entire domain of life there is a process of selection by the elimination of the unfit, the weak and the unfortunate. It operates with uniformity and universality, and so long as human methods for obtaining good products conform to nature's method there is little danger of going wrong. Trees, for example, may be selected from a nursery for an orchard. While young they may be transplanted with ease. If one dies its place is readily filled; if some show but little vitality they are uprooted and others put in their places.
The best chance of having a good orchard is merely to see that no bad trees are carried. As the trees approach maturity we may know which yield the better and more abundant fruit. But no good orchard is ever made by selecting and transplanting such trees. The period for performing this operation with safety and success is past.
Our present method of maintaining the line personnel of the navy appears natural, reasonable, and adequate. Young men are chosen, first of all, from every part of the country, with at least some discrimination, by those empowered to appoint. From these selection is made on the basis of health, and still again on the basis of intellectual qualifications. They undergo a further process of rigid selection during four years of training at Annapolis, under conditions of justice and fairness unexcelled in the world, by which there is an elimination of about forty per cent from the rolls. Passing thence into the active duties of their profession their official records are carefully noted from year to year and filed in the department. During these years there is a further elimination of the physically unsound, of those who develop weak character or bad habits, and of the culpably inefficient.
"Safe" selection does not end here. As officers approach command grade their professional personalities are recognized. The directions in which they excel, and the lines along which they have developed, as well as their points of weakness, have begun to manifest themselves. They will be called to positions and "selected" for duties for which they have shown marked ability. In the grades of captain and admiral assignment to special duties and important commands will be made, as now, by selecting the most competent man available. Little attention will be paid to the graded place a name happens to occupy on the register in making these assignments. Finally, the President, by statute, may select any officer not below the grade of commander and assign him to the command of a squadron.
Thus, it would seem, the country has full advantage of all that can reasonably be expected from a safe system of selection carried to the utmost point of propriety. What better conditions for efficiency can one desire than a body of generally recognized capable men in the higher grades from which selections for important duties may be made as required? And, be it observed, these selections are smoothly accomplished without setting people by the ears through the positively ungracious, and probably untruthful, assertion every few months that certain individuals are not quite as good as certain others.
COMPARISON OF CIVIL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS.
In the extended application of safe selection to which the Service is subject, is found the answer to the question, so often asked by civilians, as to why promotion by seniority is the rule in the navy. They call attention to the competition for place that exists in business pursuits; to the obvious interests of the management in bringing to the front the best talent among subordinates; and express surprise that any system, other than selection, should find favor anywhere.
It is well known, to begin with, that advancement by merit alone, to desirable places in business establishments, is by no means closely followed. The higher positions are filled, in a large proportion of cases, by relatives and connections of the financial backers; and often outside parties, with little or no experience, are brought in to secure advantages and interests to the concern, by indirect means, while faithful and competent employes are retained in low places on small salaries.
In the second place the conditions in civil pursuits and in the naval profession are very different. In the navy, just and fair selection by elimination has already done the important work, leaving a sound corps from which the benefits of any further selection upward are doubtful; while in civil life the selection of an energetic and capable man from a promiscuous ungraded body of employes may be as easy as it is advantageous.
OBJECTIONS TO PROMOTION BY SELECTION.
In controverting the propositions upon which selection is usually based, we have at times, incidentally but unavoidably as it seemed, anticipated some of the direct arguments that may be urged against the system. But the objections to selection are so generally known that, in what follows, the attempt is little else than to give formal completeness to the subject.
(a) Corrupting and disintegrating effects of personal, social, and political influences. It needs no argument to convince anyone of the destructive effects of favoritism and injustice upon the morals of any human organization. It is more to the purpose to convince people that there is no possible way to eliminate these influences from the machinery of any selecting agency. If the selection is left to one or more persons not of the naval service proper, who can never hope to understand or appreciate the sentiments and conditions peculiar to the profession, things too elusive for definition, we know by all experience within and without government circles that these evil influences would soon assert full sway. The very liberality of our government institutions and the facility with which people of all classes have access to the appointing power, constitute a field of opportunity most attractive and inviting to those who study to advance themselves by dispensing favors to both friends and foes.
Nor can we hope to fare better by setting up selecting boards within our own membership. We would still have to contend with the strong forces of personal and service friendships, and family ties. It would engender a spirit of subserviency, and breed parasites and trucklers, instead of developing manly independence of action and opinion. The board itself would become the target of insidious approach, if not of direct assault, from without; and the action of individual members would be constrained by regard for their own future. It is a fine thing, indeed, to be able to stand firm against great temptations, but it is safer for most men to avoid them.
Even if selections were made with justice and exactness in fact, who can certify this fact with conviction to those interested? And we cannot forget that the essential damage is actually accomplished when there is suspicion of motive, and lack of confidence in the result, even if they are but groundless apprehensions.
The following passages quoted from articles in the "Army and Navy Journal" present strong views against selection:
The violent ups and downs in relative rank of commanders can scarcely be conducive to harmony and good-will among those high officers which are essential to success in war . . . . is there not something in the situation which suggests or invites officers to assist the President? And when the pressure is started does it not compel candidates in self-defense even against their inclinations perhaps to enter into the strife for advancement? . . May it not be noted also that the greater a soldier's ambition the keener will be his sensitiveness to injustice and humiliation (May 10, 1902.)
The trouble is that the ways of the seeker after undue preferment are such that the bestower of favors does not always when he is affected by (?) what influences affect him. The President can hardly be expected to make the acquaintance of every officer and he is not necessarily competent to judge in all cases as to the relative merits of individuals. He must necessarily depend upon the reports that come to him and it is impossible for him to determine whether or not the elements of political or personal influence have affected these reports. (Nov. 23, 1901.)
If an avoidance of personality did not compel us to refrain from comparisons we could easily show what excellent reasons the army have for this distrust of selection…If the selection made upon short acquaintance does not prove to be a happy one the officer continues longer in a Position to which he is not adapted and for a longer time blocks promotion to the discouragement and disgust of the hundreds of officers who follow him. (Jan. 9, 1904.)
The demoralizing effects of promotion by selection are so apparent to any one who understands military life as scarcely to need mention. It is amazing to army men that any intelligent person should seriously consider such a proposition. (Jan. 30, 1904.)
Our correspondent seems to share an error that is very common, that the career of the soldier is the path to glory. In fact, it is the path of duty, and duty often keeps an officer in the rear . . . . or not on the fighting line. (Oct. 1, 1898.)
A good army depends upon the average efficiency of its entire corps of officers much more than upon shining merit of the few. The greater the average excellence the more numerous also will be the instances of exceptional brilliancy. Cherish then average excellence. (Mar. 31, 1900.)
From other sources:
Nothing so soon undermines the very foundation of efficiency, nothing so soon stifles military ardor, loyalty, pride, and enthusiasm in the profession of arms, nothing so soon blights the esprit de corps of an army as to have the impression abroad amongst officers and men that political, personal, or social influence gives any claim to military preferment or to military reward. (Captain Peter E. Traub, Journal Military Service Institution, "Esprit de Corps.")
These irregularities (special advancements) in which there is excess of favor on one side with denials of justice on another, are the fruits of the influence of popular feeling over a corps . . . . that is entitled at all times to have its interests protected by a uniform, consistent, rigidly just and high-toned code of civil regulations. (Cooper's Naval History, Vol. II, P. 175.)
(b) Selection ill adapted to republics. One can understand the existence of military selection in strongly centralized governments where the practice of years has reconciled the masses to the selection of individuals to offices of honor and trust, whether from motives of mere favoritism or from more worthy ones. The system finds its natural home in governments where the people are accustomed to endure, without protest, that sense of injustice involved in the consciousness that they are debarred from preferment. But even in such countries one would be disposed to doubt the wisdom of its application to the military branches of government. Recent history, naval and military alike, gives no encouragement to those who would belittle the influence of the underlying spirit that actuates men, and who would pin their faith upon material power alone.
There is sometimes too ready complaisance with which officials in a republic oblige all comers who apply for favors. Public office is too often a mere episode of life. Its duties are undertaken with full knowledge that they are merely temporary and hence are treated lightly, even humorously, rather than seriously. This lack of firmness is reflected at times in large representative bodies where punitive statutes for the general welfare are enacted to-day to be inconsistently suspended to-morrow by special legislation for the relief of those who violate them.
As illustrating conditions inherent in republics, that pertain directly to our subject, we may recall that quite recently, in view of the pressure brought to bear by aspirants for position, the President found it necessary to issue an order forbidding the use of influence by army and navy officers in securing assignments.
It must be manifest that promotion by selection would place before officers a temptation incomparably greater than any that exists at present, and that every means to secure advancement would be studied with corresponding intensity. And should self-seekers be threatened by the thunderbolts of genuine Executive wrath, the resulting injustice would cut through the service like a two-edged sword. The conscientious would respect the order, the friendless would fear it, while those having powerful interests at their backs would violate it with every advantage and all impunity. And this not because of Executive connivance or passivity, but because of conditions and engagements from which no chief of a republic can hope to be free.
To place advancement upon the foundation of selection will lead naturally and inevitably to the man seeking the office, and not the office seeking the man. It will lead officers to seek notoriety through newspapers, and other means, and the services of a professional press agent will become a necessary part of the equipment for success.
Human nature unfortunately is weak at best; and life can be kept up to high ideals and noble purposes only by the most favorable environment of example and motive. Impair the healthfulness of official surroundings by opening the way to political and social favor, or to bargain and trade, and more insidiously than water seeping through a defective dam will corruption enter to overwhelm us in the day of flood and stress.
Where the contact between the people and the governing authorities is so direct and easy as in a republic the corrupting influence of selection would spread with rapidity and intensity. The durability of a republic in either peace or war rests first, last, and all the time upon the integrity and self-sacrificing patriotism of its individual members. Nothing so disintegrates loyalty and patriotism as a sense of injustice, even if it be a mistaken one. To cherish such patriotic spirit and hold the confidence of the people the nation must display exact equality of justice and make manifest purity of motive beyond suspicion.
(c) Frequent changes of order on the registered list undesirable. An order of precedence in any body of men who must act together as an organization is an obvious necessity. It is the first means by which confusion is reduced to orderliness; and if we had no other aim than mere mechanical formation and movement, such order of precedence would be necessary in any military group. But there are other aims in abundance in the duties of the service, and their prompt and smooth attainment demands that the recognized order should be certain and established. It is this that gives consistency and even the necessary rigidity to the organization and distinguishes it from the jelly-fish condition of a mere association.
In this order each individual becomes familiar with his personal environment, knows his place, and feels at home. He is sharply conscious of, and alert to, a certain polarized condition of authority on the one hand and subordination on the other. As fundamental conditions of efficiency these facts are often overlooked. To introduce any method of advancement that has for its avowed purpose a constant and habitual changing of precedence is a most serious project.
The mere contemplation by the entire body of officers, of the possibility that their juniors of to-day may be their seniors to-morrow, and vice-versa, at once loosens the cohesive forces that give firmness to the corps. The changes when actually accomplished would further weaken the system by putting people in new environments and often with antagonistic sentiments to overcome. It is a wise principle by which we have hitherto been guided that no change be made in the established list save as a distinctly recognized exception based upon inspiring deeds of valor and heroism that find approval in every heart. With established order, as here urged, there is, as we have previously shown, abundant elasticity for safe selection in the assignment of officers to particular duties.
Apart from direct considerations of duty and efficiency, but in no conflict with them, is that peculiar sense of "property" in a place that an individual has occupied without protest or disturbance for a long time. Common law recognizes the principle, and it is well illustrated in the individual places accorded by common consent to the members of the family circle. So long as an officer has not forfeited right to his old-time place, he should not be forced into an inferior one.
REGULAR ADVANCEMENT SHOULD BE BY SENIORITY TO THE HIGHEST GRADE.
It is probable that the officer's list will be increased in the near future by the authorized establishment of a small number of vice admirals. Interests will be awakened to control the supply of this grade by selection. It will be urged that the numbers in the grade are so few, and the duties so superior in character, that selection is justified.
We cannot deem either of these grounds, or both combined, sufficiently strong to warrant the displacement of an approved system by one so fraught with possible evil as that under consideration. Throughout the essay we have endeavored to advance propositions and find reasons fundamental and general in character; and if any of these are found valid they apply as strongly to one part of the list as to another.
As a more specific answer to the small number of selections necessary to this grade, we would observe that the peculiar evils inseparable from selection would immediately penetrate down the list into the grade of commander at least. In these upper grades it is far more essential than elsewhere that mutual confidence and harmony should prevail. Moreover, the precedent would be dangerous as constituting the entering wedge by which the system would be all too quickly enlarged.
As to the higher character of the duties, these are very questionable on closer examination. The general service duties of a rear-admiral and of a vice-admiral are but little, if any, different in character. The controlling reasons for establishing the superior grade are to confer the additional dignity that should accompany wider command, and to put our service on an equal footing with foreign navies.
It is difficult to see clearly what requisites may be lacking in any man who has qualified and served satisfactorily as a rear admiral that should disqualify him for service as a vice-admiral. What distinction could any one reasonably make in establishing examinations or discovering tests for admittance to these two grades?
Why should a rear-admiral of good record, who has proved his capacity by long service, be humiliated at the close of his career by debarment from an open grade ahead of him? By what favor, or by what uncertain reason, will his junior displace him? Is the hard-earned fruitage of long service to be treated as a jest? Can we advocate a measure which, with bold effrontery, informs him that his professional record, the accumulation of years, has suddenly become worthless, and that at the last he is discredited?
We should not be deceived in these matters. Consideration for the honors and dignity due to long years of faithful performance of duty are more vital to the best interests of the service in the long run, than are the uncertain and doubtful results of even the best-intended efforts to find superior merit.
Let us suppose that the appointing authority were granted full power to summarily retire any rear-admiral at pleasure without assigning reasons. Promotion to vice-admiral by seniority could then be maintained by the simple expedient of retiring those considered unworthy of promotion and who stand in the way. Under such conditions how many of these veterans would any one be willing to strike? It is likely that very few would suffer. Their merits would be more readily seen and appreciated from this point of view. Yet, promotion by selection enables the appointing authority to practically accomplish, under the cover of virtue, what it very probably would decline to do openly. Yet, if it is all for the good of the service, why should there be any hesitation?
CONCLUSION.
Occasional phrases in the arguments of those who advocate selection suggest the possibility that divergence of opinion upon the subject may be due largely to the different mental impressions received by individuals when the service is considered as a whole with regard to efficiency. It would seem to be a case of looking at opposite sides of the shield. The selectionists are rather pessimistic. They see the blue side. To their vision the officers appear as a more or less inefficient body with a comparatively small number of energetic, capable men scattered here and there through the mass; and they feel that the only hope of efficiency is to get these conspicuously capable people to the top where their intelligent direction can save the situation. On the other hand, those opposed to selection see in the body of officers a generally competent set of men, well trained to their profession, the peers, at least, of any possible antagonists. Sprinkled among these, unfortunately, are a few unworthy ones such as are to be found in all professions. These they would like to eliminate for the good of the service.
Correct judgment between these two views would go largely toward indicating the better course to follow for securing efficiency so far as this depends upon the method of promotion. Those who believe the selectionist view of the situation to be a mistaken one, rely not only upon their own vision, which would be illogical, but upon their belief that the selectionist view involves its own contradiction.
If the service is really as defective as selectionists sometimes describe, then selection itself is convicted as a cause. For, although we have promotion by seniority, the personnel of officers is essentially the product of a rigid system of approved selection.
Accepting, then, the more optimistic view as that which more nearly accords with the facts, it will scarcely be contested that it is a much more difficult task to select the exact best man to go up from a body of generally recognized good men, than it is to find the conspicuous black sheep to be eliminated from that same body. Thus, promotion by seniority with elimination of the unworthy would seem to be the more natural and logical method.
The naval service asks only that to which every individual is entitled, whatever his profession or occupation—common justice and a square deal. As regards promotion, we believe that these necessary and desirable ends will be more securely maintained by adhering to the present system. It is believed that a fair review of the paper here presented will show that all the important issues have been considered; that more reasons and much weightier reasons can be given in favor of seniority; and that fewer objections can be charged against seniority than against selection.
As an incidental development of the subject we would emphasize the importance of inculcating in young officers high ideals of duty and patriotism during the initial years of training, in the earnest belief that these are no less vital to enduring success than is professional skill. In this connection the suggestion presses upon us that a regular course of lectures on ethics with special application to military life and illustrated by naval and military history would be most valuable as a minor feature of the Academy course.
Any occasion when promotion by selection is seriously advanced for adoption must be regarded as a critical one. Its advocates, though perhaps weak in numbers, are persistent in purpose, and, like all reformers who are stirred by strong motives, manifest far greater energy than do their opponents. Selection arguments often find ready access to the minds of civil officials of government and there is danger that in some sudden emergency, or peculiar wave of sentiment, this mischievous doctrine may find expression in statute.
The present influx of young officers in large numbers signifies increased difficulty and responsibility in their supervision and training. The naval establishment has become a large and complex system of men and material. Many important questions of organization are yet unsettled. Under these conditions we cannot be too vigilant in guarding the integrity of fundamental principles: principles of fairness and justice that give officers confidence in each other and in the government, and without which there can be no efficiency.
DISCUSSION.
Commander STAUNTON, U. S. Navy.—The essayist's motto is "Look before you leap," and having looked, he finds no necessity for change in the administration of the personnel, but, on the contrary, profound reasons for congratulation in the wisdom, security and efficiency of the present method. Some of his statements appear indeed to involve contradictions. He "concedes willingly that our commanding officers should have the stamina and physical energy of meridian manhood," and on the same page says: "If there is any question it is one of neither physical nor mental incapacity, but purely one of administrative expediency. It may indeed be that the age limits for lieutenant-commander, commander and captain need to be lowered; but, if so, the reason is to accelerate promotion in the lower grades and give opportunity for more experience in the higher ones, and not at all because of declining power due to age."
The essayist does not tell us what he considers the limits of "meridian manhood," but the ages of our captains are from 55 to 61.
Again, on the following page he quotes with approval:
"In fact, the one objective worthy of consideration to the lowering of grade ages is that it reduces this preliminary experience" (service in the lower grades).
It is impossible to have more service in the higher grades without reducing that in the lower grades, unless the term of service is prolonged; i. e., unless the retiring age is advanced.
I make these quotations in no carping spirit, but because I do not see their agreement, and do not find in them that continuity of thought to which the importance of the subject is entitled.
I shall not follow the essayist in his discussion separately of the several arguments in favor of selection. To my mind, all arguments for or against any change in naval administration are applicable to only one text—"The efficiency of the navy for war." The ambitions and interests of individuals are not worth counting, except in so far as the influence upon them produces results which add to or diminish this efficiency.
What kind of "look" should be taken before deciding as to a change in promotion? What is the character and description of the field that should be surveyed? The question is wholly practical and the field is neither new nor untried. It appears, therefore, that we should study history, examine the experience of others, and gather such lessons and suggestions as are therein contained. The "inductive" method is the one to employ in this as in similar cases.
Does a nation promote by selection in its navy? Examine its history, and the social, political and military conditions under which its history has been made, the length of time during which selection has obtained, and what has been its apparent influence upon the loyalty, esprit de corps and efficiency of the navy as measured by its achievements in war. Compare this efficiency with that of other navies in which selection has not obtained. Extend the inquiry to armies. These comparisons may not be, and probably will not be, conclusive. Modifications follow differences in racial temperament, in social and political organization. These are fair grounds for examination and deductive reasoning. The field is wide. Great Britain has had selection since the beginning of her organized marine, thoroughly systematized probably for two hundred years. Throughout the upbuilding of her colonial system, the French and Spanish wars, the Napoleonic era, her commanding and flag officers were the product of selection. It has been much modified, and continually for the better. Favoritism and accidental promotion have been substantially eliminated; and Great Britain, the first maritime power of the world, whose national existence depends upon her naval efficiency, still finds that, all considerations included—the stimulus of success and the discouragement of failure—selection adds to the value of her navy.
In the navy of Japan, whose achievements are of yesterday, promotions are made by selection. Russia also, the defeated enemy, has the same system. What causes the difference? Is the selection wise and prudent in one case, based upon merit; vicious and demoralizing in the other, based upon favoritism, or have other causes overwhelmed the influence of administrative method—differences of race, of aptitude, of social environment or national aspirations? This experience is worth examination, and that the Japanese navy has been largely modelled upon that of Great Britain is of import.
There is that in our own naval history which applies: Many of its achievements have been the work of young men. In the war of 1812 all its captains were young. In the war of secession the action of the Retiring Board of 1855, the resignations of Southern officers and the application of an age retirement in 1861 had the effect of bringing a body of young officers into positions of command, and a large part of the work was done by men who were lieutenants and midshipmen when the war began. There were no fleet actions, and but little fighting with ships, but the wear and tear of four years of blockade were successfully met by the physical vigor of youth.
But this field of experience—of actual fact—is not entered upon by the essayist. He makes passing references to Bonaparte, to Grant, to Farragut and to the Spanish war, but no analysis or examination of the effects of any system. With the exception of a paragraph upon the advance of numbers for Spanish war service—which is dealt with under the caption of personal reward, and which never had any administrative significance—there is more space devoted to the hypothetical case of Ensign "Bluffy" than to all the experience of the past. The essayist "looks" into his own mind and finds there his arguments for sustaining the position which he has taken. His reasoning is that which is known as "subjective," and the result is only to give us a personal opinion.
Subjective reasoning is a part of the system of logic, and its value within the limits of its proper application is not denied. Even in a purely practical question, like the one under discussion, it bridges our gaps in data, influences the grouping and comparisons of data, diminishes or accentuates inconsistencies and modifies the conclusions drawn. It is the ego of the essay, the play of the individual intelligence upon the material for discussion. But it is not reliable, if exclusively employed. It is not held down to any facts, and the subjective reasoner is at liberty to set forth, and probably does set forth, only such arguments as suit his bias and prejudgment. The inductive reasoner, on the contrary, who examines all the data of experience bearing upon his question, is bound and hampered by it. He may not be free to expand a preconceived opinion. If he is honest with his data—does not juggle it or suppress it—it may lead him to unexpected conclusions. Instances are not infrequent where an investigator has been driven by the results of his investigation to adopt an opinion diametrically opposite to that which he expected to sustain.
I believe that fair arguments from experience would confute many of the essayist's propositions. For example, he appears to find nothing but menace and moral danger in an honorable and gratified ambition. Is this the experience of the world? Isn't selection—the survival of the fittest—the bringing of the best to the top—a law of nature which we find applied in all social, industrial and political organizations? It exists in plants, in animals and in men; in law, in medicine, in art, in commercial life and in the church. Every boy is stimulated and encouraged by his parents and teachers to study and work to honorably excel—to pass his associates in the race—to justify a desirable selection. I find no reason why a navy should be crystallized in a mould and be deprived of the healthy influences of this honorable competition. The burden of proof lies upon him who would take the negative.
I speak, of course, of sound selection, based upon merit and approved service in all the previous grades, and subject only to such limitations and errors as are inseparable from all human judgment, controlled by a board of officers of continuing existence and of responsibility and authority in naval administration, like the sea lords of the admiralty, who in Great Britain make the selections. I agree with the essayist that political and personal pressure may be gravely injurious to the application of selection and may exert an influence so controlling as to render such application inadvisable, but this is a defect of governmental agencies, not of naval selection; and the essayist condemns selection for other reasons before he reaches the question of external influence. Among these reasons I find this: "Surely no one would seek the reward of advancement that takes money from his comrades."
It is a novel proposition that a man selected for his merit, his approved qualifications and his better capacity to fill higher positions and meet greater responsibilities, is guilty of a moral wrong toward his comrade by accepting his advancement. If this were a fact all successful men—governors, bishops and presidents—would rest under this reproach; all great generals and admirals would have this moral taint. But robust and wholesome experience renounces such an opinion as essentially unsound.
The essayist quotes from John Russell Young's "Around the World With General Grant," a remark ascribed by Mr. Young to the General, in which he is made to appear to admire unsuccessful generals. One can hardly say how far any detached quotation represents a man's deliberate and completed opinion, but if it controverts his practice it may be looked Upon with suspicion. General Grant, like other victorious commanders-in- chief, selected his generals from among those who had succeeded—not from among those who had failed.
The essayist quotes from a newspaper, as follows: "A good army depends upon the average efficiency of its entire corps of officers, much more than upon the shining merit of the few. The greater the average excellence, the more numerous also will be the instances of exceptional brilliancy. Cherish, then, average excellence."
It would be difficult to find, I think, a sentiment more opposed to the teaching of experience than the one contained in this complacent apotheosis of mediocrity. It is precisely the "shining merit of the few" that is of controlling value, and that nation which places this few at the heads of its fleets and armies has accomplished the most important problem of military administration, and has by that act more than by any other possible act, increased the efficiency and value of its rank and file. It is leaders that are wanted—not men. Men can always be obtained. They are the pawns in the great game of war. Generals and admirals play the game. Sheridan was worth an army corps at Cedar Creek, his invincible purpose and skill snatching victory from defeat. Hannibal in Italy, Wolfe at Quebec, Washington at Trenton—hundreds of instances, irrefutable proof of the superior value of leadership.
Napoleon said: "Les hommes ne sont rien: C'est un homme qui est tout," and history proves it.
Leaders of any grade—military geniuses or merely good admirals and generals—do not develop without opportunity, and the business of peace administration should be to bring forward likely candidates for such distinction; to give a certain number of men such rank and such experience in time of peace that they can enter without embarrassment or novelty upon the duties of a campaign. Early promotion, and the selection which in some form should go with it, are the only means thus far devised for accomplishing this end. The most important duty to the personnel is to train generals and admirals.
The form of selection which the essayist approves as adequate for war necessities is the one of which I most heartily disapprove. That is, the appointment of juniors to command fleets upon the outbreak of war. It may be necessary: if the best men have been stranded by seniority promotion, far below the head of the navy list, it will be necessary; but this necessity is an absolute condemnation of the system thus departed from. An officer who, upon the outbreak of war, is advanced from the rank of captain or commodore to that of rear-admiral, is so advanced because of qualities previously displayed, and might more logically have been advanced before the emergency arose, in which case he would have become assured in his position and accustomed to its duties.
There should be the most intimate relation between the organization and administration of a navy in time of peace and its work in time of war. The one is a preparation for the other: the methods of the one should meet the exigencies of the other. Any opponent of selection in time of peace, who admits that selection may be properly employed in preparation for war, or at any time before actual experience of war has marked the differences between men, forfeits his argument.
Advancements made while the war is in progress, and based upon service in the war, belong in quite another category.
I made, sometime since, a critical examination of our navy list from 1866 to 1905. Without entering into tabulations and explanations, which take up space and time, it is sufficient to say that the result showed the average ages of promotion to commander, captain and rear-admiral under our system to be 51 3/12, 56 7/12 and 60 3/12 years, respectively. They will vary under different circumstances. Expansion will diminish them for the time being, and contraction will increase them, but these figures represent the normal and average ages.
In August, 1904, the ages of British naval captains varied from 33 to 54, the average being 48. The maximum age of reaching the grade of rear-admiral was 55. During the session of Parliament of the previous winter "the First Lord stated that it was the opinion of the Admiralty that captains were reaching flag rank much too old to prove equal to the requirements of the service, thereby imparing the efficiency of the navy; and that in order to obtain younger flag officers a large number of commanders and lieutenants had been advanced by selection to the grade of captain and commander, respectively. Of those advanced to commander, six were under thirty years of age. This affords temporary relief, while Parliament and the Admiralty are considering permanent measures."
German captains in 1904 ranged from 45 to 54 years of age—average 48. Count Reventlow, in the Berlin Tageblatt of March 10, 1904, deprecates the age of flag officers, captains and commanders, whom he considers "too old for sea service and to command fleets."
Japanese captains ranged from 36 to 51 in 1904—average 44.
Summing up, the situation is this:
(1) Promotion by seniority, with only one retiring age, bring officers to command and flag rank much too old for the best efficiency. This is the best naval opinion and is fortified by the practice of the best foreign navies.
(2) These ages can be reduced only by the removal from the active list at different points of a certain number of officers at ages below 62.
(3) Shall selection enter into this removal—selection for advancement or selection for retirement? The best naval opinion, fortified by the practice of the best foreign navies, says that it should, and a considerable body of opinion in our navy favors the German method—selection for retirement and seniority promotion of those who remain—rather than the British method, selection for promotion, and age in grade retirement.
This is the problem that we face today, and I regret that the prize essay of 1906 does nothing to solve it.
Lieutenant RIDLEY MCLEAN, U. S. Navy.—The Board of Control of the Naval Institute, having accorded the prize to the essay on promotion by selection, I am naturally inclined to be timorous in criticizing it; but the fact that the essayist has, I believe, failed adequately to consider certain basic principles and certain axioms of human nature, thus rendering his paper incomplete and its logic unconvincing, lends me assurance in submitting the following discussion for consideration. An apology for the length of this paper is based upon the importance of the subject, and the many points involved on which I differ from the essayist.
I am surprised to find that the prize essay is not so much an essay, as a reply to selectionists. Nor is it indeed a complete reply; it is a discussion of four alleged fundamental principles upon which arguments for selection are said to be based, the development of these fundamental principles being, however, the work of the essayist.
I had, of course, anticipated a complete review of this important subject from the standpoint of its influence upon naval efficiency, its advantages and disadvantages being compared with those found under existing conditions. Instead of this logical treatment, the essayist has refrained from replying to the numerous articles by selectionists which have appeared in the public press, and, instead of attempting to discredit their arguments, he has contended himself with refuting arguments which he alone advances. He assumes, or implies, a method of selection in favor of which he would doubtless find but few, if any, advocates in the entire naval service; he assumes that our naval force is "the peer at least, of possible antagonists" (and by implication entirely satisfactory) ; he assumes a Utopian condition of human nature .under which men will work as hard for the sake of duty as for personal interest; he assumes that increased energy on the part of the personnel does not increase naval efficiency; and, utilizing these assumptions, he replies so very convincingly to his own interpretations of
the arguments in favor of selection as to conclude that promotion by
seniority actually lends itself to efficiency, and that promotion by any form
of selection would be detrimental thereto. Surely, one may be excused
for failure to be convinced by such a line of argument.
Though a majority of officers are so-called "anti-selectionists," I can safely state that, after some years' interest in this subject, I have yet to find a single officer who does not admit that perfectly fair selection would benefit the service; the opposition being based upon the belief that a fair system, devoid of influence, cannot be devised. The essayist has, therefore, left the ranks of the great majority of anti-selectionists, and has proved to his own satisfaction that even the theory of promoting officers in accordance with their military efficiency is fallacious. In consideration of this new phase of the question, a different line of argument is necessary. In discussing the views of the great majority of anti-selectionists it has heretofore been necessary to concentrate attention only upon the features of a system which would eliminate the ever present bug-bear of social and political influence; but in considering the views of the essayist it becomes necessary first to demonstrate that fair selection would increase the fighting efficiency of the navy. If it can be proved that promotion based on the merit of the individual will increase our naval efficiency, then the details of the system can and (it would seem) must be devised.
I agree with the essayist that an essential difference between those who oppose and those who favor selection is as to the present military efficiency of the service—the former believing this condition to be satisfactory, while the latter believe that material shortcomings actually exist.
Another material difference of opinion concerns the "inherent personal rights" of officers. Before proceeding further, I therefore wish to state clearly that in no case do I believe that officers have any inherent right to promotion on account of length of service. Even when an officer has served "satisfactorily" and has passed his examinations for promotion, I still believe he has no inherent right to promotion unless he is the best man for the position. The essayist states that "so long as an officer has not forfeited his old-time place, he should not be forced into an inferior one." In my opinion an officer forfeits his "right" to his old-time place, or at least his right to promotion to a higher place, the moment a junior, eligible for promotion to such higher place, demonstrates his superior fitness for the position. The one is a consideration of the rights of the officer, the other, the rights of the naval service. I believe that, in making promotions, the only point that we are justified in considering is the effect of such promotion upon the fighting efficiency of the service. Efficiency of course demands fair competition, which in turn requires that officers have equal opportunities for promotion. Efficiency also demands that, other things being equal, the officer of the greatest length of service receives the first consideration, but this is nevertheless a criterion of efficiency not of personality, not an inherent right due to length of service.
Other fundamental differences are:
Selectionists believe there is a very material difference between men in all walks of life, a difference in ability, in energy, in zeal and therefore in results; they believe that as much difference exists in the professional ability of officers of any one grade as exists in the intellectual ability of midshipmen of the same graduating class at Annapolis, all of whom have been pronounced "satisfactory"; that efficiency demands that the highest grades should be filled by those of the highest military fitness, and that a possibility of being unable to determine with exactitude the relative abilities of eligible officers should not be allowed to interfere with our getting them all near the top, even though they be not in the exact order of their merit; that an increase of energy, intelligently applied, does increase efficiency, almost in direct ratio to the increase of energy; that it is human nature to work harder for yourself than for the sake of duty; that continuous effort is fully incited only by personal interest; that an officer, who is a member of a competing athletic team, will keep his body in better physical condition because of his personal interest in victory, than he will simply because his duty demands that he be in the best possible physical condition; that the experience of an officer who has passed successively through each grade and attained command rank at 45, will give him as much "confidence and steadiness of judgment" as he would have gained by ten years' more experience in the lower grades; that the present system of promotion is defective in that, instead of inciting and requiring a higher degree of efficiency, it simply provides for the "elimination of the physically unsound, of those who develop weak character or bad habits, and of the culpably inefficient," as admitted by the essayist.
It is needless to say that if the essayist's hypothesis is correct, that is, if the fighting efficiency of our navy is equal to that of our possible antagonists, and if we should content ourselves with this equality, then selectionists would have no case. Changes are noxious; they are only justified when we are convinced that they will cause improvement. If naval efficiency is satisfactory under the present system, one could not logically advocate a change.
The discussion, therefore, resolves itself into a consideration of the basic principle which was neglected by the essayist. It resolves itself into a yea or nay reply to the question: "Is there any method of promotion by selection which would increase present naval efficiency?"
I am convinced that there is, my conviction being founded upon certain reasons hereinafter stated and compared with the arguments which the essayist himself has attributed to selectionists, but which few of them have ever advanced.
So many words have been put into the mouths of selectionists, and there have been so many misinterpretations of their statements, and even of their motives, that I desire once for all to state what I mean by "selection"; and further, that to ascribe to selectionists certain ludicrous and impracticable forms of promotion is not only an unwarranted reflection upon their intelligence, but so befogs the question as to render many of the arguments not pertinent to the issue. Refutations of forms of selection not falling under the general description given below are therefore totally foreign to the question. I have been among the first to condemn any form of selection that I have ever heard attacked by an anti-selectionist. I am willing to agree with their conclusions without argument, because they are founded upon a false premise. Without refuting proposed schemes, or discrediting existing schemes of selection, they simply state that fair selection is impossible. Unfortunately the essayist, following the persistent custom of other anti-selectionists, has assumed a form of selection which I, for one, would condemn without an argument, and has then ruthlessly torn it to pieces.
Stated categorically, "I am convinced that promotion by selection would be more conducive to the efficiency of the naval service than promotion by seniority."
By promotion by selection I mean a system which would render an officer eligible for promotion to the next higher grade only after an adequate length of service in each grade,' a sufficient proportion being sea duty, provided he be chosen solely on account of his meritorious qualities as an officer. Such a system is practicable, and its details have been worked out and published in brief; such a system is in operation abroad. These details are not, however, germane to the present discussion, the object of which is to prove that such a scheme, if practicable, would be more conducive to naval efficiency than promotion by seniority.
By promotion by seniority I mean the present form of promotion, whereby each officer who obtains a commission as ensign is promoted in regular order through all grades until he emerges as a retired rear admiral. This general statement, of course, excepts those who retire for physical disability, or at their own volition, in accordance with laws designed to increase the flow of promotion.
By efficiency of the naval service I mean its constant readiness for war. Nothing short of this can be fairly assumed as our goal. It is comprehensive. It embraces personnel, material and administration. It requires the constant readiness of the peace establishment, and a readiness of efficient war-reserves, both personnel and material. In time of peace it requires an administrative system which, on the outbreak of war, can by expansion, not by violent change of system, efficiently assume the increased work thrown upon it. Like an enormous manufacturing plant running at less than its normal output, but ever ready to assume its full rated capacity, it requires skilled and experienced operators always in attendance, both to maintain it always ready for its increased work and to operate efficiently the various units when the extra load is thrown upon it.
Under the above definitions, does promotion by seniority accomplish this? If not, will promotion by selection do so? If neither will do so, which will most nearly accomplish it?
My arguments presuppose that the present state of naval efficiency is not what it might and should be; that we fall far short of readiness for war, though it may be that we are "the peers of certain possible antagonists."
I do not believe that, after many years' trial of promotion by seniority our administrative system is adaptable to war requirements; that the necessary reserve material is available or that an efficiently trained and properly organized reserve personnel is provided; that we have skillful operators already trained and awaiting the signal for the units of the plant to be placed in operation; that the ships of the squadrons, the squadrons of the fleets, or the fleets of the navy are as well trained as it is possible for them to be; that the science of fleet tactics has as yet advanced beyond its elementary stages (however expert certain units may be in the art of ordinary fleet maneuvers). In brief, I do not believe we are in that state of efficiency which we could reasonably have expected, had increased zeal and energy supplemented the ability of all officers of the service for the past decade, and had the flag officers of the service held their important positions for a sufficient period of time to have permitted them to have carried out a consistent policy looking toward preparation for war.
In what way will promotion by selection rectify the above shortcomings? Herein lie the "fundamental principles" of the main arguments for selection.
1. Selection will provide flag-officers who have eight or ten years to serve.—The advantage of obtaining younger men in the upper grades is merely an incidental to the above, and the essayist's treatment of the subject shows that he has completely overlooked the real purport of the so-called "younger-men" theory. The importance of having the average age of the upper grades three or four years younger has, I think, been exaggerated, and I do not think the importance given this point has come as much from selectionists as from anti-selectionists, who realize the anomalous workings of promotion by seniority, which gives our officers only one or two years' service in flag-rank. I cannot but believe, however, that an officer of 40 or 45 would ordinarily be better fitted for command, had he passed up through all grades (with a definite length of service in each) in the 20 or 25 years since his graduation, than he would be at 52 to 58. I believe this because, while realizing the advantage of experience, I cannot believe that a man who would be competent to command at 55, would not have been better fitted at 45, had he passed successively through each grade. I believe, in other words, that there is a limit to the amount of useful experience one can digest, and that this limit will probably have been reached at the age of 40 or 45. The points wherein a captain of this age would excel one of 55 years would be in a far greater familiarity with the details of his profession, because he would be to to 12 years nearer the days when his were detail duties; he would have more initiative; would be less conservative and more open to new ideas, all of which are essential to real improvement of the profession. But economy would prohibit the average age of captains being so small, and besides it is more a question of the relative ability of individuals than of average ages. Some men of 55 or 6o would in every respect excel others of 40; but a man of 55 or 60, however efficient, would be less efficient as a commanding officer than he himself would have been at 45.
I, therefore, believe that efficiency is more a question of individuality than of age, and while selection would work in the proper direction in regard to age, this point, instead of being a fundamental principle, is of merely incidental importance. But I do consider that an increase in the length of flag-officers' service is a fundamental and irrefutable argument for selection.
In order to explain clearly why admirals of considerable length of service in the flag grades are necessary to preparedness for war, we may regard war in the light of a game of skill.
When we are to shoot for the Palma Trophy, 15 or 20 men are selected from among a large number of America's most expert riflemen, they practice for weeks under the conditions governing the match, and the final team is selected from those who evince the greatest skill under these conditions. The same applies to the somewhat more applicable game of chess, where each member of the team must defeat his opponent by superior tactics, by his superior knowledge of the game, by his ability to recognize and attack vulnerable points in the enemy without exposing weak points in his own lines. The team of already skilled players would be kept in constant practice at the game they were to play during the match—not at some other game.
Or, taking the even more similar "war game," suppose we should accept a challenge from the British Navy to play such a game, not upon a specified date, but on ten days' notice, at any time subsequent to, say, January 1, 1907. What would probably happen? A team-captain bearing the entire responsibility of preparation, would be appointed. Every officer who was known by his service reputation to be fairly skillful at the game would be assembled at the War College, where practice would be incessant. The war-game outfits on board ships would be broken out and placed in operation. As men of exceptional skill developed they would be ordered to the War College to compete. A team composed of those officers believed to be the most skillful would be selected, and would be in all respects ready for the contest by January 1st, and thereafter, while awaiting the signal, they would be kept in daily training by contests with each other under the prescribed conditions of the match. All of these preparations would be made simply for the pleasure of seeing in large headlines "American Fleet Wins Glorious Victory."
Now the challenge to play the actual game of war, using real ships and guns, will come like the above—except that there may be even less warning; we do not know that it will be postponed until January 1st. When it is a matter of handling dummy ships, any capable officer can compete for the team and train himself to expertness on the tactical board, but in case of actual war, naval organization demands that the team that is to play the game and handle the fleets and squadrons be composed of flag-officers, and as they can attain skill in their duties only by experience in these duties, they should, when war breaks out, have been flag-officers long enough to have attained skill in the duties they must perform during war, not in subordinate duties.
Note the preparations for a contest in which only a cup is at stake. Are any such preparations made for the game in which life, treasure and national honor are at stake? We have many officers of flag rank, but have we a team of admirals, skilled and experienced in the duties of their grade afloat, who would be available for command in time of wart Manifestly not! On January 1st, 5906, the average age of rear-admirals was 61 years, which is also almost exactly the average age of the six juniors. It is apparent that when this grade is reached only a year before retirement, the experience gained in the duties of a flag-officer afloat is practically nil, and even if reached somewhat earlier, and proportional experience be gained, of what benefit is this experience to the service when the officer is immediately placed on the retired list. Some may say that these officers are experienced by service in lower grades. Without underrating such experience, we may confidently assert that experience in the duties of his grade is as necessary to a flag-officer as to A gunnery officer, a chess player or a player of the war-game. Not to admit this is to belittle the duties of flag-rank. Here then is a game with the greatest of all stakes, a game liable to be called at any instant, for which the automatic working of our system of promotion by seniority must always render us unprepared by reason of the lack of a number of commanders skilled and experienced in the vitally essential duties which they will be called upon to perform in war.
I believe the above is a sufficient reason in itself to demand an abandonment of promotion by seniority. In other words, I believe that the ordinary preparation for any contest, however trivial, would require a team of men always in readiness who were already trained in the duties they would perform in the contest. This is true even if the team were composed of men of only average ability, but, in view of the tremendous importance of the game they are to play, it is manifestly essential that this team of flag-officers be better than the average.
2. This brings us to another fundamental principle of selection, which the essayist states as follows: "Selection is desirable in order that those having higher professional qualifications may occupy the places involving greater responsibility." This I consider a "fundamental principle," but I believe it to be incorrectly stated and illogically argued. I believe, moreover, that the argument is tainted throughout by the essayist's belief in the "inherent right of officers," rather than by a consideration of whether naval efficiency would be improved. The essayist considers it entirely satisfactory to have our higher grades composed of average graduates of Annapolis who, after forty years' service, during which there is no active incentive to attain excellence, have not developed "bad habits, bad health, or been found culpably inefficient." He asks how could we determine the positions of the greatest responsibility, or determine with exactitude the qualification of officers. In other words, he enunciates the "principle" as he himself understands it, proves that it cannot be followed with exactitude, and therefore concludes that he has disposed of that question. In his quandary as to the exact positions of greatest responsibility, and as to whether the relative qualifications of officers could be exactly determined, he appears entirely to lose sight of the question as to whether the efficiency of the service would be improved if all of the men filling all of the positions of responsibility were better than the average, even though they were not in perfect order of merit In other words, the controlling idea of the "inherent rights of officers," whereby no change whatever is allowable unless each officer gets the exact niche to which his merits entitle him, has been permitted entirely to obscure the fundamental question as to whether naval efficiency would be improved. I cannot believe the essayist is serious in his doubts as to the positions of greatest responsibility in the naval service, but to avoid misconception of this point, I would enunciate the principle thus: "Selection is desirable in order that the higher grades of the navy may be composed of officers of more than the average ability and energy."
The essayist admits a difference in ability between officers. Seniority must necessarily give us average officers in each grade; and, to quote from "The Letters of a Self-Made Merchant to His Son": "You can't run a business on the law of averages and have more than an average business"—and an average navy must necessarily be defeated by an expert one.
I deny that any officer has any rights which should be allowed to interfere with our naval efficiency. If by any just means we can get the upper grades filled by men of more than the average capabilities, the efficiency of the service will be increased. Even though the very best man in a class may fail to go up more rapidly than any other member of the class, we can be sure that he will go up, and that he won't be far behind his more fortunate inferior. We may feel sure that the men who go up ahead of him are good men; and that the navy is benefited by having these men in the upper grades, even though they may not be in exact order of merit. The impossibility of attaining perfection in grading is, of course, admitted; also the impossibility of attaining perfection in other things; but perfection in grading, however desirable, is not our aim—it is the improvement of naval efficiency which we seek, and as this will manifestly be accomplished by utilizing our best abilities in the upper grades, it is a strong argument for fair selection.
It is true in one sense, but a play on words in another, to say that it is impossible to determine the good men in each grade; that one man is good at one thing and another at another. Again the trouble is the fear of wronging some individual. In each grade certain officers are known to the service for their efficiency, and on each ship the ability of officers is well known. If every captain and executive with whom an officer has served in his present grade certify on oath that if ten officers were to be selected from the grade, they would include him in the ten, we may feel sure that he is a good man, and though he may not be the very best, he is so near the best that he can be promoted with the certainty of his being a man far above the average. And just here I would point out another fallacy in the essayist's line of argument. He apparently assumes that the entire object of our desire to get good men on top is that officers may be chosen in the emergency of war in their order of standing on the navy list. The assumption is not flattering to the intelligence of selectionists, to say the least. It matters little where officers stand on the list of their grade, when they are wanted for certain duty, but one thing we do want, and that is to get the best men into the higher grades, so that they may have been trained in the duties of high command, and hence be available to be assigned to responsible duty immediately upon an outbreak of war. It is true that in time of war the President has authority to appoint any officer of the rank of commander or above to the command of a division of a squadron, but would it be desirable to assign a commander to flag duty, considering the fact that such an officer would be without previous training and experience in the position?
Another requirement of no less importance than the above, but one which the essayist completely loses sight of, relates only to peace. During time of peace we need the best men in the upper grades in order that they may efficiently prepare us for war. However good may be the leaders which the essayist would choose after war broke out, unless efficient preparations have been made during peace we must lose. When average officers compose the upper grades during the ten years prior to war you will have preparations of average efficiency. This cannot be denied. There are good, energetic and progressive officers among those of average ability, and they will make their influence felt, but so will the less efficient. In war it is possible to select good men for specially important positions, though they cannot have had much training in their duties; in peace the less efficient officers of high rank must necessarily occupy positions of influence and responsibility, and the amount by which their services are less efficient than would be that of the best officers cannot be measured, but it exists nevertheless.
For the above reasons, I believe no one can successfully contradict that efficiency would be increased:
(1). If flag-officers served eight or ten years.
(2). If the higher grades of the navy were composed of officers of more than average ability.
Promotion by selection will accomplish this. Can it be accomplished by promotion by seniority? Manifestly not. By its very nature, promotion by seniority requires that each grade be composed of officers of all degrees of ability. It is futile to talk of "boards of officers of high character, of patriotism, of courage, having pronounced them physically, mentally and morally fit for these places." As the essayist, as well as every other person, admits a wide difference in professional ability, why theorize about the effect of promotion by seniority? Why say "Let courts-martial, examining and retiring boards do their duty with vigor"? We have with us the actual workings of seniority, and such words as the above are idle exclamations. We all know that of officers who maintain only reasonably good health, at least 99 per cent of those who are commissioned as ensigns are promoted from grade to grade until they are 62, unless they voluntarily retire or resign. We all know that in practice a board, however conscientious, must promote unless it can prove incompetence in a manner which would hold before reviewing authorities, in much the same manner that a verdict of a court-martial must be sustained. We know that when an officer goes before a board he must either be promoted or dropped, and that in consequence, it is but human nature, in all cases of doubtful fitness, for the board to give the benefit of the doubt to the officer instead of to the navy—thereby risking disaster to the navy if any of these officers, having arrived near the head of the navy, happen to be in command of a fleet at the outbreak of war.
The fault is not, as the essayist implies, in the manner in which the boards do their duty, but in the system—a system which, while meting out punishment for bad habits and overt violations of discipline, offers positively no incentive to acquire efficiency in excess of the amount required not to be unsatisfactory, because we all know that a merely perfunctory performance of duty is never alone a cause of failure to promote. When, after years of trial, a system does not work as designed, when it is necessary for its advocates even then to say "Let them do their duty and all will be right," we may be sure that it is the system, not the board or the individual, which is at fault. Hence it is certain that promotion by seniority will always give us in the upper grades officers of only average ability, including the best officers, along with those whose unfitness for responsible command in war cannot quite be proved by a board.
Can it ever give us officers in flag-rank with eight or ten years to serve? Again, manifestly not If officers of flag-rank from only 2 per cent of officers of the active list, the most elementary mathematics will show that their term of service must necessarily be short. How then can the necessary length of service in flag grades be secured? By age-in-grade retirement, or by selecting out? We of the navy know little of economy, but we know that it would not be economical to propose to retire every officer at 53 or 54 who fails to attain flag-rank by that age. It is not, moreover, illogical to have a man's promotion to a higher position depend entirely upon his age, upon the age at which he entered Annapolis rather than upon his ability? In regard to "selecting out," that system removes the most inefficient and hence raises the average somewhat, but still does not give us the ablest officers in the positions of greatest responsibility. If such a large percentage of officers were selected out of the upper grades exclusively as to leave only the ablest men, and if the men so selected out were placed on a reserve list, and their services still utilized, it would accomplish many of the results claimed for selection, but it would fail to exert on the lower grades the necessary incentive to secure efficiency in training. Hence, for the above reasons, I believe "selection up" to be the logically sound method and the only one which will insure the highest efficiency in war and in preparing for war, while the various forms of "selection out" are more or less efficient compromises which have been proposed for reasons of expediency.
3. As the essayist states, one of the fundamental principles upon which selectionists base their argument is that selection is desirable because it would stimulate energy throughout the service and thereby promote efficiency"; but, as I cannot accept the attempt he has made to discredit this principle by ascribing to human motives an influence that is diametrically opposed to what I have always understood this influence to be, I am impelled formally to prove what I have always regarded as axioms.
(1) I believe that the vast majority of men will work harder for themselves than for duty's sake. As a fair proof of this I may cite the increased work and energy in all grades concerned with gunnery training, since it was placed on a basis of fair competition; since the time when pointers and division officers, ships and squadrons, began to be compared with each other. Was it an increased sense of duty which caused this change, which caused officers and men cheerfully to spend hours at daily training? No, it was the personal desire to attain a higher standing and a reputation for ability. Regulations pointing out that it was their duty to train their crews to as high a degree of efficiency as practicable had long since been in force, but the improvement, the result of increased intelligent work, was coincident with the regulation which placed the divisions, ships and squadrons in competition. In other words, it was the direct personal motive, not the call of duty which had the effect.
The spirit of competition is one of the most powerful forces acting upon human nature. It is the natural personal desire to win. To attain the greatest result in ordinary life, one must have an ever present personal incentive. We daily introduce local incentives; for example, those which increase excellence in gunnery, in small arms, in boat racing, but does not the very success of this incentive applied locally, demonstrate the necessity of a more general application of the principle—one which will incite all officers to exert at all times their best energies in whatever duty they may have to perform?'
(2) I differ diametrically from the essayist in his statement that "Increased energy does not spell increased efficiency," when applied to naval conditions. An increase of misdirected energy might fail to increase efficiency, but it surely begs the question to assume that all increase of energy on the part of naval officers would be misdirected. Would not the exertion of the best energies of each officer be more productive of naval efficiency than the exertion of the energies incited by the average sense of duty? Was improvement in gunnery not due to increased energy? Is the remarkable difference in the efficiency of ships not due largely to a difference in energy, incited usually by some stimulant such as ship spirit? Does the essayist believe that the results accomplished by an officer who is noted for his zeal and energy, are no better than those accomplished by the barely satisfactory officer? Does he believe their divisions will be equally efficient? Which of these not uncommon types would he prefer on a ship which he commanded? One who will not admit that an increase of energy applied to all routine duties would not produce increased efficiency, appears to me to be unfamiliar with human nature. Increased energy may not spell increased ability, but it does spell increased efficiency; especially under naval conditions. Surely every step that increases the energy put into our daily labors must increase the result therefrom; and examples abound which show that personal incentive is the means by which the greatest possible energy can be infused into human beings.
(3) Now as to the theory of "ruining" good officers by placing their juniors ahead of them. With concrete examples in existence, it is hardly necessary to resort to theories. Does it ruin a good student to see others advance above him? How many officers have been ruined in our own service by being "jumped"; are foreign officers ruined by this process? Is the trophy ship or the crack turret or division ruined by losing the leading position? No, the theory requires modification. The efficiency of some officers would be decreased if other officers were promoted over their heads for other than reasons of superior professional fitness. But I cannot believe that zeal would be diminished if, in a competition, open to all and acknowledged by all to be fair, some one went over their heads. It is not borne out by existing examples, nor is it logical to suppose that it would act thus. It is an unsupported theory that is frequently advanced in the face of proof to the contrary. A man defeated in fair competition redoubles his efforts, and this is especially true if he feels that he is the better man and that "bad luck" caused his defeat, for of course there is a certain element of chance in all competition. Especially is an intelligent man not going to lose interest when the moment he loses in one competition he finds himself entered in another. By doing so he loses forever his chances of attaining higher rank. In fact, I cannot see how any man whose qualities are such as to render him desirable in the upper grades, or in fact, who would be useful in any grade, would by any form of reasonably fair selection, based on proficiency, lose interest or suffer any decrease in efficiency.
Concerning the essayist's assumption that one of the "fundamental principles" of those who advocate promotion for merit is that: "It is desirable as supplying reward to deserving officers," I would state that I have never heard this suggested as an argument, except in so far as it bound up in the feature of stimulating energy. It has been pointed out how a knowledge that an officer's promotion :depends largely upon his personal efforts would stimulate energy, develop ability and hence increase naval efficiency, which is our sole aim; but to urge promotion as a reward, pure and simple, aside from its stimulating effect, reverts to and depends upon the theory of the personal rights of officers, a theory cherished chiefly by anti-selectionists. Therefore the pages devoted to this subject are not pertinent.
Referring to the essayist's "comparison of civil and military conditions," wherein he suggests that high business positions are frequently filled by men selected for other reasons than their ability, it will be noted that in no case have I based an argument on business organization. The essayist's point is, however, poorly taken, since to use this as an argument against selection it would be necessary for him to demonstrate the efficiency of filling the high position in a business with incompetent relatives or friends.
Replying briefly to the essayist's objections to promotion by selection:
(a) "Corrupting and disintegrating effects of personals social and political influences." Any satisfactory system of selection must necessarily reduce these to a minimum. As I have stated, my arguments are all based upon the assumption that these influences can be practically eliminated (as in the British navy), so much so as to destroy the force of this argument, otherwise I am opposed to selection, for all must agree that if promotions were determined even considerably by political or social influence, it would result in developing proficiency in social amenities, rather than in professional duties. But so long as the officers are convinced that the method employed would eventually insure the promotion of all of the best men to the highest grades, and would render it impossible that any indifferent man could be promoted successively through all grades, that is, so that the main object of selection is accomplished, it is illogical to cast aside this benefit to efficiency, simply because we do not attain perfection in eliminating absolutely all of these influences.
It will be observed that the essayist assumes that naval officers will always be actuated by the highest sense of patriotic devotion to duty, except when serving on a selection board, when, for some unexplained reason, they will be influenced by the most ignoble motives. Can selectionists not expect their boards to possess as "high character, patriotism and courage" as the members of the loyal examining boards described by the essayist?
(b) "Selection ill-adapted to republics."—I believe I have shown logically that fair selection would increase naval efficiency. If this is true for one navy it is for another, and therefore I cannot see the force of the above statement. It might truthfully read: "Republics are ill-adapted to own navies." But as we are a republic, and as we own a navy, and as we may be obliged to fight, it would seem that if selection will improve our efficiency we need it all the more.
(c) "Frequent changes of order on the registered list undesirable." I cannot take this objection seriously. If naval efficiency needs to be increased, is the mere fact of the undesirability or inconvenience of a detail of this nature to be considered? Because individual places are "accorded by common consent to the members of a family circle," are we to accord to every individual in a fighting organization a place for life, regardless of his prowess. In savage warfare the leaders are selected solely because they are the most skilled in that style of warfare. Because our standards are more complex must we definitely abandon this sound principle and adopt the family circle as our criterion?
In conclusion, I beg that words be not put in my mouth. I do not advocate that "Ensign Bluffy" be promoted for falling over a bucket of water at an opportune moment. I do not advocate promoting ensigns or lieutenants directly to flag rank. I do not advocate a system which will advance any man who has not had adequate experience; but I do advocate selection for promotion to the next higher grade from the upper half of the list of lieutenants, lieutenant-commanders and commanders, said selection to be based upon the military efficiency of the officer selected, as certified to, not by a board of high rank at Washington, but by the large number of officers with whom he has served. Such a form of selection would result in the benefits above pointed out, and will be conceded by the large majority of anti-selectionists as being correct in theory, but they will unite in saying that it "cannot be accomplished." To such officers I would point out that they have no right to say "can't." I believe it can, and the Naval Institute has published one such system which has not been attacked; the French and British have such a system; but regardless of whether the particular ones would work successfully or not; if selection is necessary, if it will increase naval efficiency, have we any right to say "can't"? If officers believe in the theory, believe that naval efficiency would be increased by a fair form of promotion, based on professional fitness, is it not too serious a matter to be calmly dismissed with a "can't"? On the contrary, is it not our duty to expend every energy, and leave no stone unturned to find a practicable method whereby it can be successfully accomplished?
Commander BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. Navy.—Everybody knows that, in any organization, the amount of success achieved is the direct result of the character and abilities of the men composing it. This applies to all the men, but more to those in high positions than to those in low positions. Therefore, in any organization, in order to achieve the greatest, success, the most important thing is to get the best men in the high positions. Not only is it more important than any other thing, but it is more important than all the other things put together; because the other things follow directly from it. In a navy, at the present day, such complete preparation must be made in time of peace that everything shall be ready when war comes. Therefore the ideal towards which we should strive is to get the best men in the high positions, and to get them there in time of peace. The fact that a satisfactory plan for accomplishing this has not yet been devised has nothing to do with the case. The fact that a very desirable thing is hard to accomplish is not a reason against trying—but the reverse.
Doubtless this discussion will bring out the views of many officers. After this has been done, I beg leave to suggest the appointment of a board—composed of officers of various grades—to consider and report upon the subject; and that officers of the navy be invited to submit their views to this board, and propose schemes for accomplishing fair promotion by selection. The conclusions of this board, after, say, six months of work, would have overwhelming weight with the service, and with Congress and the people.