After reading Captain Mahan's "Reflections, Historic and Other, suggested by the Battle of the Sea of Japan," No. 118 PROCEEDINGS, I have felt impelled to say one word more for the big ship as typified by the English Dreadnought. Separating his arguments into parts, I find his usually strong method of presenting the facts and illustrating the theories of strategy and tactics most convincing. It is only when they are all assembled and the final deductions are made that, I think, he shows clearly that a very strong prejudice against big ships has given a false trend to his "Reflections."
Take his diagram, which he uses to show that Togo's position gave him an advantage that no reasonable speed could have overcome, as he could move his fleet along one side of the triangle while the Russian fleet must take the hypothenuse; had Rodjestvensky turned west when Togo bore north the conditions would have been reversed. His diagram serves to illustrate the well-known tactical maxim, if you advance toward your enemy in column, you are liable to be capped by him. It certainly is a case where speed can be left out of the question.
Again, Togo's position at Masampho, on interior lines was such as to give him an advantage that no rational excess of speed could overcome. I think we may all safely agree with Captain Mahan, that there are tactical and strategical advantages that we cannot expect to overcome by increased speed, no matter what sacrifices are made.
Captain Mahan says: "The only case in which inequality of speed may be utilized is in the close pursuit of a flying enemy—what our forbears called 'a general chase.' There the fastest ships may overtake the enemy's slower, and compel the whole body to fight or abandon them; but in such case, if speed have been gained at the sacrifice of gun power, the advantage is contestable, unless the main force of the pursuer is very close behind." Leaving out the question of what is sacrificed for speed here, one advantage of speed is clearly stated and it is admirably illustrated in the paragraph that follows his statement, using the cases of the Rurik, the President, and the Guillaume Tell. Another advantage of speed is shown in the accounts of this year's English maneuvers, where the fast division was enabled to escape by its speed and to continue its work against the shipping of its enemy. The high sustained speed of this division was largely due to the use of oil. None of the excess was due to a sacrifice of gun-fire, some of it may have been due to an increase in size; but the advantageous use of oil, when the distance of the coal from the boilers and the dirty fires became a serious question, was the ruling factor. While the English get their oil from Texas and are building large oil tanks at all the principal naval stations, our conservatism has prevented its use.
Captain Mahan's definition of the correct compromise, that it should always be an offensive power, is surely sound, and I am inclined to carry the principle further. I believe the increased speed gained by increased size in many recently launched battleships, without increase in the primary battery, the real offensive power, is not of sufficient value to warrant the increased cost.
Captain Mahan also opposes the all-big-gun idea exemplified in the Dreadnought. He says: "It has long been my own opinion that the so-called secondary battery is really entitled to the name primary, because its effect is exerted mainly on the personnel, rather than the materiel of a vessel, and I am glad to find this view supported by the author of the article in Blackwood, though he does not use the same words. Whatever the improvements in quickness of handling 12-inch guns, it can scarcely be that, with an equal aggregate weight of broadsides, they can rival in volume of fire the much greater number and more rapidly discharged pieces of smaller caliber; and when within the limits of useful perforation, volume of fire, multiplicity of projectiles, is better than individual weight of projectile, because it gives a greater number of hits, but under any useful construction of battleships there cannot fail to be important parts vulnerable to the smaller calibers." In the Dreadnought the personnel is fairly well protected against the secondary battery guns. It is believed by the advocates of the big ship, with all big guns, that the comparative accuracy of the 12-inch gun at long range, with the present rate of fire, is sufficient to largely decrease if not to annihilate the secondary battery fire before the ship carrying the small guns comes within their effective range. The crews will be killed or wounded, the guns and mounts injured by the explosive force of the big shells, with their many fragments. It is not necessary for the Dreadnought to be kept at long ranges to maintain its advantage; but while closing in with a broadside of eight 12-inch guns or a bow fire of six it will be able to largely destroy the secondary battery, and the real contest will be with eight 12-inch guns against four, and the morale of the crews of the ships with the smaller number of big guns may be injuriously affected by the losses in the secondary battery.
Captain Mahan takes the battle of the Sea of Japan to illustrate his point. "In the Battle of Japan Sea, the Japanese had in broadside 17 guns of primary battery: 16 of 12-inch, and one of 10-inch; mainly if not all turret guns. It had also a total of Ho guns of secondary battery, in broadside. Of these totals, all the primary pieces and forty at least of the 6-inch guns were in Togo's own division, which began the action, received the first fire, and apparently endured the brunt and inflicted the greatest damage. In this division alone the lighter pieces were to the heavy in the proportion of 272 to I, and we may be justified in assuming that caliber for caliber there were at least four discharges of the secondary to one of the heavier, with the consequent probability of a proportionate number of hits. This estimate is the more to be accepted, because Kamimura's division, the armored cruisers, carrying nothing heavier than 8-inch guns, certainly brought their fifty odd into the contest, for the Asama of this class was forced for a time to withdraw, in order to repair injuries from the Russian shells. The volume of Japanese fire then amounts to seventeen primary and some ninety odd secondary guns. With what result?" Captain Mahan then goes on to show how the Oslyabya, Souvaroff, Alexander III, and Borodino were destroyed by gun-fire and the Orel badly damaged. This is, as far as it goes, a clear presentation of the case. But, if the forty 6-inch guns of Togo's fleet were responsible for so much of the damage done by his division, why was so little done by the fifty odd of Karnimura's? The weaker coast-defense vessels following after the division led by the Oslyabya were so little injured by gun-fire that they escaped the attack of the torpedoboats, and they were principally under the fire of Kamimura's division (squadron?) throughout the first day. The great damage was done by the leading vessels of Togo's squadron. One after the other, the Oslyabya, the Souvaroff, the Alexander III, and the Borodino succumbed to the fire of the ships carrying the big guns. Even the Sissoi Veliki, the Navarin, and the Nachimoff, were part of the time under the fire of the big guns of the battleships and were so damaged by gun-fire as to fall a prey to the torpedo attack. Whereas, the Nicolai, the Apraxsin, and Senyavin and the Oushakoff that were constantly under the fire of the greater number of smaller guns, escaped, until surrounded the following day. Were all the best gunners in the battleships? Or is it fair to presume that the 12-inch guns were the governing factor?
One remark of Captain Mahan's serves especially to show how his bias for the secondary battery has given a wrong trend to his reasoning. He says: "It is to be observed, also, that the great distances proposed do away with the advantage of the flat trajectory— the point-blank of to-day—in which the heavier guns excel the lighter. Recourse must be had to elevation of guns, with which, against a target of horizontal extension, such as a ship's hull, errors of aim increase in accelerating ratio." While partly true, this statement is most misleading. The smaller gun will have the same if not a greater muzzle velocity than the big gun, and the first branch of the trajectory will be as flat, if not flatter, in the smaller gun; but the heavier projectile will give greater remaining velocity to the big gun, and the angle of fall will be less, consequently the danger space greater. Therefore, the advantage is with the big gun at long ranges. At these ranges it can make more hits, and being able to penetrate the lighter armor, will overwhelm the smaller gun before it comes within effective range.
The "Reflections" clearly outline the evolution of the battleship. Starting with the low freeboard and all heavy guns, to the modern battleship with high freeboard and large secondary battery. The better gun platform and better sea-going qualities forced the high freeboard with soft ends and other vulnerable spaces. This led to the introduction of a large secondary battery. Then came a continuous increase in size of battleship with no increase in primary battery. Increase in number and caliber of the secondary battery and increase in speed absorbed the extra displacement. The present increase in size of the Dreadnought without a secondary battery is a logical step in the evolution of the battleship. The 12-inch gun was very slow in firing and the methods used were so inaccurate that very few hits were made with large guns in turrets. First came the telescopic sight, but with brown powder it was clouded after a few shots and was soon thrown out of adjustment. Smokeless powder, improved sights, improved methods of loading, and turret gear, with improved training and fire control has changed the position of the heavy gun.
There is another change in the battery that has shown some progress since the battle of the Sea of Japan, the guns carried for torpedo defense are increasing in caliber. The 3- and 6-pounders are being left out very generally in the new ships. Some nations are using the 3-inch, as said to be the case in the Dreadnought; while others are mounting still larger calibers. The 6-inch gun has even been suggested as the proper topedo defense gun. Such is the number of hits per gun now possible with the 6-inch, that the question resolves itself into one of weights. The secondary battery may return as a torpedo defense gun; but it will be placed in the open, without defense, as light armor would only add to the danger of destruction from heavy shells.
I believe that Captain Mahan is correct in decrying an increase in size for speed alone. To be logical the increase in size should give corresponding increase in offensive gun power. If other valuable qualities also can be obtained, there is so much more the reason for the increased size. The advantage of ten 12-inch guns over eight, is more difficult to show. As in speed, advantage in bow fire might not appear in a game-board battle, fought out by experts, where neither side made mistakes; but mistakes are the rule in all combats, land and sea, and superior speed and bow fire may help you to take advantage of your enemy's mistakes or to prevent a serious disaster overtaking you because of your own errors. But even on paper one advantage of the ten-gun vessel can be shown, that is the advantage of the ability to close in with the vessels having strong bow fire. I believe this proportion of bow to beam fire fixes the limit of size of the battleship at the present stage of the development of its various components, as any increase in size at present possible will only increase the beam fire without increasing the bow fire, thus destroying the proportion. The displacement necessary to carry ten or twelve 12-inch guns, well protected and mounted at a sufficient height, with the present form of vessels, gives the proper relation of bow to broadside fire if ten are carried; and gives equal bow and stern fire if twelve are carried. The last two guns may not be worth the increased displacement required to carry them. It would seem, that until some great change or improvement was made, that no increase in size beyond that necessary to carry ten or twelve 12-inch guns would prove advantageous. Larger guns have been proposed; but the slow loading of the guns, their rapid deterioration, and the shock to the main structure are a reasonable bar to their use. And there appears to be a limit to increasing the thickness of armor; for if not penetrated it would as at present attached be dislodged by shock of the projectile. It even looks possible that in the dim future, should the ballistic properties of the big gun be improved, armor might be omitted.
There is one point in which the advocates of big ships still seem in doubt. Shall all the big guns be of one caliber or shall there be a mixed battery of 12-inch and a smaller gun of from 9.2 to 10-inch? All the arguments against the secondary battery apply to the intermediate gun and the great advantage of fire control held by the all big-gun must always be of great weight.
It is claimed that at the present stage of development, a vessel sufficiently large to carry ten 12-inch guns is the logical size for the battle line; and that the increased speed that can be reasonably obtained with the increased displacement, especially with the use of turbines, is a distinct advantage both strategically and tactically. Not to run away, nor to overcome unconquerable obstacles; but upon occasions to bring more guns to bear upon the enemy than would be practicable with slower vessels. Not for the battle to be waged at great distances; but to permit closing in without incurring too serious risks.
The advantages of big ships will make them economical to build. They will carry more destruction to the enemy for the same number of dollars than the smaller ship. It is folly to talk of antiquating our smaller ships because we build bigger ones. It is the possible enemy who antiquates the small ship when he builds the more powerful instrument. The smaller ship can still be fought, and the American naval officer will not be the one to refuse the job because his tools are not of the best. The question is, What will the nation say? Are the best ships too good for the American Navy?
In building our battleships it would be well if we always kept in mind the maxim of Captain Mahan: "First of all, it must be remembered, and repeated, that no one maintains that increase of speed, even a quarter of a knot, is not a desirable thing; or that greater speed, even to a small amount, is not of value, strategically and tactically. What is contended is that speed at its best is a less valuable factor in a battleship than fighting power is; and that for those reasons—original inferiority of value and greater uncertainty of maintenance—it must be kept severely in its proper place of subordination in the design of battleships." We want the best fighting machine, and as in a factory, so in a navy, the best machine is the most economical.