The Elements of Fleet Tactics
Lieutenant-Commander A. P. NIBLACK, U. S. Navy.—In correcting the proof of this essay, which was submitted last December (but which represents some years of careful thought and study), it appears that there are several hazy suggestions which need further definition.
It was not, for instance, intended to imply that concentration of gunfire should be on any one ship of the enemy but rather on the nearest portion of the enemy's formation, because the chances of hitting and the damage done are something like proportional to the squares of the distances or ranges. Axiom 9 explains that the illustrations and gunfire diagrams are for the minimum distances at which maximum concentration may be obtained. The fan-shaped areas overlap at long ranges. The illustrations are all for close ranges, but at long ranges all tactical problems are much simpler on account of this overlapping.
Many people will say that the "Special Methods" apparently advocated are dangerous, impracticable, and merely pen sketches. They are at least worthy of trial and are capable of modification. The writer has never taken the course at the War College and is hence untrammeled by official secrets and unrestrained by the blighting fear of revealing anything. For instance, the writer's views on fire control are apparently not in accord with those now officially advocated and in process of application, but as the whole question of tactics begins where the individual ship enters the formation prepared to act in concert with other ships and in obedience to directions from an outside source, it is fortunate that tactical inferences are not vitiated by mere technical details in which the dictum of to-day may be the foolishness of to-morrow. In this case the writer is behind the times.
Many officers disapprove of tactical exercises with boats to simulate fleet evolutions. This I regard as fatal, and the sooner we wake up the better. On page 404 it is stated that "we accept fleet tactical drills as a necessary evil without realizing that there are important tactical problems to be solved which are as vital and pressing as those which brought about the recent revolution in our target practice methods." Now, the game board and tactical game outfits furnished by the Bureau of Equipment are the "dotter," and the boat exercises are the "Morris tube" of the revolution in tactical exercises with which we now stand face to face. Tactical exercises with ships may consist in handling ships so that nerve will supplant nerves, but tactical problems should be such that when a fleet gets underway to go out and spend a lot of time and coal in solving them, their solution should be as capable of being arrived at as it is to test a gun-mount or to test the expertness of gun-captains. In other words it should be a competitive test of captains of ships. Will flag officers and captains submit to this? I think not, but until we do, our ships are as painted things on a painted ocean. This is plain language for a plain issue. Let those who opposed and belittled the target practice movement remember that it is better to blow a horn in the front rank than to be forced into the procession and then have to appear very fond of marching.
Successful signaling is essential to tactics. We have a fine code, except for the foolish hand semaphore code, which I hope to see withdrawn in favor of the regular code. Boat exercises will test and perfect signaling. Let us by all means start up the "dotter "and "Morris tube" in tactics.
Commander BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. Navy.—It is to be hoped that the essay of Lieutenant Commander Niblack will wake us up to the backward state of our tactics, in the same way that the writings of Sims and Alger woke us up to the backward state of our gunnery.
A careful reading of Mr. Niblack's paper shows that his aim is to call attention to a subject that is being neglected. He makes many practical suggestions, and proposes several original plans; but these seem intended mainly as supplementing his criticisms of short-comings by offers of remedies to cure them. He confronts us, not with a theory, but with a condition; and a condition that is dangerous.
The Service agrees with Mr. Niblack that we have no scheme of naval tactics, and that we need one. How shall we develop one? Mr. Niblack suggests that we begin with steam launches; and it seems hard to imagine a quicker and cheaper way. If we do not get a good scheme, and if we fight a navy of equal strength that has one, we shall be whipped. And we shall be whipped in the way France was by Germany.
How did Germany develop the scheme—not only of tactics but of strategy—by which she whipped France? By carrying on for many years a system of sham campaigns and sham battles. Such excellent experience did these give the German generals, officers, and soldiers, that, when the actual war came, although they had had almost no experience in actual war, they went through the actual war with scarcely a mistake.
Because Germany did this with her army, she can do it with her navy. So can we.
Rear-Admiral WILLARD H. BROWNSON, U. S. Navy.—It is inconceivable to me what governed the Board of Control in awarding the prize in the recent prize essay contest to a paper on the subject which the Service at large had decided against, not only many years ago, but many times; an essay written entirely from the standpoint of the officer and absolutely ignoring the interests of the country; and awarding first honorable mention to an essay on the most vital subject before the Service to-day, that of Naval Tactics. It would be interesting to know how the votes of the various members of the Board of Control stood on this important decision. If those who voted for it were attracted by the very scholarly manner in which the writer of the prize essay handled the subject, doubtless they were quite right in assigning the award to him, for the subject certainly was handled in a scholarly manner. If, however, mere verbiage and a skilful use of language is to govern these awards, why not submit the essays to the Department of English or to a board of college professors for decision?
It might as well be conceded that the Navy will not have selection, and Congress stands in about the same position; the former for fear that somebody will be " hurt " or someone's "vested rights" will be taken from them; the latter, with more justice, fearing that they may be annoyed by the importunities of naval officers clamoring for advancement
The whole subject of selection might be summed up in one question. For what does the Navy exist? If for the officer, then we have the most perfect system of selection that could be devised. If, on the contrary, it exists for the country, the question might well be asked if some scheme could not be found whereby the country did not have to accept the "run of the mine."
The paper submitted by Lieut.-Commander Niblack touches upon the most important question now before the Service. The only other question that compares with it in importance is that of gunnery, and this problem has been, I think it is fair to say, practically solved, that is, the rapidity and accuracy of fire of our ships is good. Admitting this, it leaves the skilful handling of our fleets—naval tactics—as the most important subject we have to consider. The question as to whether one agrees with Lieut. Commander Niblack in his views regarding fleet tactics; regarding his method of attack or the unit or disposition of the fleet; whether speed is a desirable quality when obtained at the sacrifice of armor or gun power, has no bearing on the subject. Personally, I disagree with him on many of these points but no one can read his paper without being impressed with the fact that he has presented a very valuable paper to the Navy, on a most vital subject.
I think he is in error in his views regarding the value of speed, when you take into consideration what is sacrificed to gain that speed. I am strongly of the opinion that the Battle of the Sea of Japan was not won by superior speed but by superior tactics and gun-fire. It is not made entirely clear, from the published accounts, that the head of the Russian column was enveloped, "capped," by the Japanese fleet. The reports on this point are most conflicting. One of the most satisfactory reports, to my mind, is that written by a distinguished English Admiral, in one of the magazines for January last, in which he shows clearly, if his data is correct, that speed had little to do with it. The Russian fleet was hopelessly defeated from the very instant they turned the heads of their two columns to the eastward to avoid being capped by the Japanese fleet.
However, I do not intend to enter into any extended discussion of the merits or demerits of Lieut Commander Niblack's essay, but simply wish to extend my thanks to him for having written so valuable an article on so vital a subject to the Service, and at the same time to express my surprise that the Board of Control should have given it second place when compared to an essay on a worn-out subject, whose sole merit consisted in being handled in a scholarly manner.
Commander W. R. RUSH, U. S. Navy.—Perusal of this essay is disappointing, for two reasons: first, and mainly, because there is nothing new in it; and second, because some of the statements therein are not in agreement with fact.
The essay deals with the subject of Battle Tactics of the Squadron from the point of view of about a decade ago; and it is indeed disappointing to find that, an essay which received first honorable mention from so high an authority as the United States Naval Institute is little more than a labored discussion of formations and maneuvers; geometrical solutions of evolutions upon which student naval opinion is already tolerably well agreed. Up-to-date theorists and students of naval battle tactics, who for years have worked together in conference, at a place and at times devoted to this one study, have helped in a great degree to crystallize naval expert opinion on Battle Tactics of the Squadron. An humble follower and pupil of these great lights, I hope to be cleared of the charge of immodesty if I say the lights of instruction in this essay burn dimly indeed; they are not head lights, because:
(a) All the "axioms" are embraced, in substance, in already well known and well-established principles of tactical game-board play with squadrons.
(b) It is well agreed that rectangular movements are the only ones to be considered in squadron battle tactics. There is a very decided value to them, due mainly to simplicity of movement and freedom from speed changes.
(c) No changes in speed are for a moment to be considered in connection with squadron battle tactics. One speed only is admissible, and that is battle speed, which is the highest possible sustained speed of the squadron, with a reserve allowance of two knots.
(d) One helm only is admissible in battle tactics—standard helm. Standard helm is the helm angle which gives the tactical circle of the unhandiest ship of the squadron, i. e., the one having the largest tactical diameter.
(e) There is no comparative value between any of the Special Methods"; they are all alike, complex and confusing, and involve variations in speed and in helm angle which cannot be tolerated. On the tactical game board they never confuse an opponent; on the contrary, they are anticipated and met by simple maneuvers; they all go down before rectangular movements at constant high speed. The fireworks special methods of the essay are not the best known special methods by any means, and are believed to be impossible of execution, with confidence and certainty, in peace time exercises, in fine bright weather and smooth sea.
(f) Line of bearing tactics are dead and gone. There are others, however, on record which are more successful and are hard to beat—on paper. Water work is what is wanted now, if we are to make any solid advance in tactical study; i.e., squadron vs. squadron on the open sea.
(g) The "Lock" is "The Cap" pianissimo.
Success on the game board, as every one knows, is due to superior skill in taking position, and by position is meant the "superior position" of the essay. But on the water, in action between hostile squadrons, success depends upon (1) superior skill in rapid hitting, and (2) superior skill in taking position. I believe the first of these would win alone even when position is bad, but in combination with good position, (1) is certainly invincible. We are striding along toward success in rapid hitting, but are we doing anything towards position getting and position keeping? I think not much. We must learn to turn a corner in column at 300 yards at battle speed. We must learn to turn together, any number of points, with the same turning circle at battle speed; afterwards we must study and practice doing these things at exactly the proper time in order to get position, or to hold it if threatened with its loss. This can only be done on the water and by squadron against squadron. We are at the end of our paper work.
It appears to some that naval tactics in its true sense includes: (1) Study of the positions necessary to assume with relation to the enemy in order to obtain an advantage over him; this embraces (a) position to best develop gun-fire, (b) position to best develop torpedo-fire with the least chance of damage from the enemy. In this study, the effect of existing weather conditions must be considered, such as sunlight, wind, and sea. (Game Board Studies.)
(2) Study of the best ways to get into these positions, and to keep in them. (Game-board Play and squadron maneuvers on the water.)
(3) Study of the best evolutions of the individual ships of the squadron necessary to execute with simplicity, certainty, and celerity the maneuvers of the squadron. (Standard helm and battle speed on the water.)
(4) Study of the best ways of communicating the wishes of the commander- in-chief to the individual ships for the performances of these evolutions and maneuvers. (System of signals.)
(5) Formulation of the selected position movements into a clear, comprehensive set of "Fighting Instructions"; assigning to each maneuver and evolution a signal number. (Fighting Instructions.)
From this it would seem that the essayist has begun at the right place in his attempt to point out some of (1) and (2) above, but it must be evident that work of this kind is best done in conference on the game board. And much work of this kind has been done, and the records of such work bring the study of naval tactics with us down to a point where with these records and conclusions therefrom in hand, further study must be done with the squadron at sea.
Captain E. B. BARRY, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant-Commander Niblack is to be congratulated for his essay on the Elements of Fleet Tactics. Particularly is that part of the essay worthy of study which bears upon formation in relation to gun-fire. In the final analysis of any war operation either on land or on water, all other things being equal, success has been gained through (1) advantage of position, (2) making use of such advantage. On the land these resolve themselves into the proper maneuvering of an army before and during a battle, and striking the final blow with a greater force than can be brought to oppose it. On the sea the proper maneuvering of the fleet puts it in the position of advantage and that position when battle is joined is simply a position from which the fleet can concentrate greater volume of fire on a part or the whole of the enemy's fleet than possibly can be returned. This Lieutenant-Commander Niblack shows and his axioms prove it.
When we come to tactical methods and formations I must beg to differ a little.
Drill and preparation in a field with men to represent vessels may be a good beginning but steam-launch drill is better—in fact it is the best fleetdrill preparation that can be devised; it is the ping-pong of the "record" drill and will enable ships later to "keep on the target."
There is only one thing that can be said against steam-launch fleet drill and that is the ease and celerity with which these little boats can be handled. The man that can handle a steam launch to perfection may be helpless when he tries the battleship. Steam launches can be exercised in fleet formation within a few feet of one another but this cannot be done with battleships. Lieutenant-Commander Niblack assumes nine ships at 250 yards interval. The Maine and Missouri are 388 feet long; putting them in column at 250 yards between centers would leave 121 yards from the bow of one to the stern of the other; the distance between a Kentucky and a Kearsarge, each 368 feet long, would be 128 yards; between a Connecticut and a Louisiana, each 450 feet long, this distance would be too yards. At these distances battleships cannot maneuver in safety and it would be impossible for a leader to go from line into column by the rectilinear method without collision; I doubt if a column of battleships at this distance could change course in succession more than four points without collision, while at half these relative distances steam launches would be perfectly safe and at all times under control. A battleship is under control only beyond a certain distance, be it a straight line or be it a curve; inside the distance required she is powerless to avoid a danger. This, of course, is true of steam launches, but with the latter the distances are so small as almost to be negligible.
It is well known that vessels with headway under the action of the rudder do not turn on the arcs of circles nor do they pivot at the center, but the stern is thrown a considerable distance outside the curve. If vessels turned on arcs of circles with their centers tangent to the curve the interval could be reduced still more, but this never is the case during the first 360° turn. When the distance between the stern of a ship in column and the bow of her next astern is so small that the leader's stern overlaps the bow of her follower owing to the action of the helm at the time the follower should put his helm over, collision will occur and manifestly it must occur if the follower holds his course. Intervals then must be such that a ship endeavoring to change course in the trace of the ship next ahead can do so without risk of collision, and this cannot be done unless her leader's stern is clear of her bow on the side toward which the change of direction is taking place. Of course a ship can turn inside or outside the turning circle of her next ahead, with the proviso in the former case that the circles do not cross. I think sufficient attention has not been paid to these facts as they are of great importance and may involve the safety of one or more costly battleships.
The overlapping or dangerous situation can be brought about only in four ways: 1st, when the interval is too small; 2d, when the leader in turning, let us say eight points, left, uses some port helm first and then takes standard starboard helm; 3d, when the follower does the same; 4th, when the follower is not in position. It will be seen that fault attaches to three of these conditions, which of course may be corrected, but the first situation renders large changes of course and certain fleet maneuvers impossible.
I think the essayist has mistaken the method of going from line into column as illustrated by his figure 9. The flank or .guide ship C does not slow but maintains course and standard speed while all the other ships slow to half speed taking up standard speed in succession as they are about entering the column. If this maneuver were to be executed as explained by the essayist there would be general collision.
Turning to figure 10, going from line to column by the "special method," there is another way of doing it that might be as efficacious and certainly much safer. Let the right (or left) division form column by the oblique method and the left (or right) division execute ships right (or left) and takes full speed turning into column and slowing at the proper time.
At a speed of 12 knots and 400 yards intervals eight ships will be in column in about 7 minutes 10 seconds. By the oblique method the leader must advance 18 intervals and 17 minutes 42 seconds will be required for No. 8 to reach the column showing a saving of about 4000 yards of distance and to minutes of time by the other method.
To go from column into echelon the so-called pin-wheel method is not for battleships. All movements forming on the center should be called central formations. A perfectly feasible method of forming echelon, central formation, is for the leader to change course to the line of bearing (presumably four points) and to be followed in succession by the first division. The rear division obliques in the opposite direction taking up full speed and slowing to standard successively when in position. When the rear ship of the first division has nearly attained position from the central ship that division execute ships half left. There is no slowing and no danger.
Referring to the tactical problems I can see no necessity for A to slow forming echelon as illustrated in figure 26. A should maintain standard speed and the other ships take up full speed until in position.
There is no question, however, but that the rectangular method as shown in figure 28 is the better, unless the Admiral does not wish to shorten the range.
Breaking the lock can be more quickly executed by a central formation than by any other method and the return to equality of fire is soonest attained. In figure 31 the D fleet will be parallel to the A fleet by a central formation when D is at E.
With the rest of the essay I can have no quarrel and the remarks on signals furnish food for thought.
It always has been a mystery to me why any attempt to use single-letter signals has sought alphabetical order and not meaning. For example, L never meant left or R right, but if perchance X meant right in some trial code Y always meant left, L usually appeared as form column and R as form echelon or something equally disconnected. Every aid that does away with mental effort in signals is a step in the right direction.
Captain RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant-Commander Niblack's essay on Fleet Tactics will prove most valuable if it provokes discussion on that much neglected subject.
I am sorry to differ with him on some of his points. In his discussion of areas of maximum concentrated gun-fire he has exaggerated its importance. The distance of the area from the line of bearing is so short that at ordinary ranges the enemy, if not too far ahead or astern will be wholly within the area. The study of the gun-fire diagrams tends to the heresy of changing the direction of the line of bearing by direct methods or, what is practically worse, "special methods."
When performing tactical evolutions with many assistants on the bridge and the turret guns secured the direct methods can be executed with precision after a little practice. I believe the "special methods" would require much practice under varying conditions of weather, etc., before they could be executed with sufficient precision; and I am very confident that neither direct or "special methods" could be relied upon under battle conditions when the constant moving of the turret guns would render the compass unreliable and when the captain cannot give his undivided attention to the evolution.
A position might be found where the compass would not be seriously affected by the guns but it would be in a very exposed position and far from the steering wheel. It should be possible to execute battle evolutions from the turret without numerous assistants and with only relative bearings.
There is a serious error in the description of figure 9. The flank or guide ship C must continue at full speed and the other vessels slow down. While the diagonal is longer than the side, the space to be covered by the guide is double the side. As the guide in this case has to travel twice the distance that is travelled in the rectangular method, it takes about twice as long to execute the evolution.
In figure 24 the essayist says, "As a matter of fact ABC has the superior position, but is in a wrong formation." This is misleading, as the formation, column, would be correct provided the distance from D was enough to permit the broadsides of the rear ships concentrating on D. The direction of the column ABC (figure 25) and not the heading of the ships, gives the advantage. The heading may facilitate concentration or change of position. This question includes the most important points of battle tactics as at present developed. Consider the center of ABC attached to D so as to move about it at a uniform distance. When ABC is at right angles to DEF, ABC is in the best position and holds the T. Revolved in either direction until the two columns are parallel, the smaller the angle, the less the advantage of position, and when parallel the positions are equal. Therefore the usual answer of the column, in such an inferior position, is to endeavor to parallel the line of bearing of the column in the superior position. This leads to concentric circles.
I have not attempted to point out all the errors that I believe to exist in this paper and only allude to those that seem to me to be the most glaring; but above all, I do not believe in trying battle tactics with steam launches or pulling boats, unless for the education of officers who are not attached to a battle fleet; and then they should only use evolutions that had been tried out in the fleet. Tactics may be studied with the aid of the game board and possibly with launches, but solid conclusions cannot be reached except with the fleet.
Rear Admiral C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy.—It was but a few days since I made appeal to my colleagues who are interested in, or who entertain novel ideas concerning, the handling of the fleet in action (the subject of this admirable essay) for their counsels and suggestions, as I had made up my mind that the necessity was urgent for a painstaking study of this, the most important naval problem still confronting us and demanding at least a tentative solution. And now comes this paper to blaze the way.
I do not understand the writer as claiming finality. Such a result would have been impossible in the scant space allotted him. It is only fair to judge his work by his own standard. His "aim has been merely to clear away some of the misconceptions which seemed to shroud the subject of naval tactics and to offer for study consideration the basic elements of fleet tactics." I think we may all congratulate ourselves that he has begun a task which, I am sure, is not to terminate until we know more of what ships are to do in action, why they will do so, and what influence upon their movements will be exercised by a great number of things, such as practicable speed, turning circles, battery and armor distribution, fire control, torpedoes in battleships, torpedo craft available, signals, range finding, internal communications, external conditions (such as wind, sea, and sunlight), proximity to land, etc., etc. I am reminded, as I write, of the instrument for calculating the tides wherein each correction, however minute or irregular, has its weight in the ultimate figure,—and I wish some ingenious fellow would invent its analogue by which an admiral could at any instant read a tape and learn what should be his next order. Unhappily, fleet actions are not to be directed in such a mechanical fashion, so that, in the long run, the best commander-in-chief will be he who combines the three indispensables,—a thorough knowledge of the theory of the topic, based on extended and faithful study, a wide experience in squadron command and maneuvers, and—a rare combination of mental attributes, a cool head and a fearless pluck predominating.
In the way of investigation, Lieutenant-Commander Niblack has certainly evolved a sound method. It is only graphically that any notion can be conveyed of the relative positions of opposing forces and of their respective advantages and disadvantages. If we had more modern engagements, real and simulated, to analyze by means of a drawing board and cross section paper we might tread our path with better assurance that we were going straight. The paucity of experience must, inevitably, introduce a large factor of doubt—still, if there by any other method of solving this equation, wherein pretty much all the quantities are either unknown or, imaginary, I confess that I do not know it. How many ifs and ands and peradventures skip gaily into our statements! Take Mr. Niblack's axiom, — No. 1, for example. There can be no shadow of doubt that it states correctly a desideratum, but—suppose two opposing fleets so placed that concentration on any one ship meant the sacrifice by some vessels of a target close at hand for one quite remote—what then? If tactics were simple we should all be great tacticians. And yet, I accept these axioms frankly and completely, knowing them to be true as abstract propositions and likely to be true in the vast majority of concrete cases. We can deal with the exceptions, if, through much labor, we have mastered the underlying principles. Only, we must not be led into the error of totally neglecting the exceptions.
I should write his axiom II without the word "greatest" before value, thus—" Superior speed is tactically of value in enabling a fleet to quickly assume a superior position." It seems to me that the matter of speed in battleships has not been worked out very completely. Speed, combined with equal or greater powers of offense should spell victory. To obtain speed at the loss of either of these powers does not appear to me prudent. I have a great confidence in hitting and staying capacity. Faulty tactics on the part of Rojestvensky may have had its share in his defeat, as well as his lower speed. I grant the advantage of this superiority if not unduly purchased while I regret that it has not as yet, been evaluated. Until then, I shall prefer the better guns and the thicker armor.
As to movements, I agree with the writer that the best way of getting there should be adopted in all cases, even if we have to learn how. As to battle signals, I am ready to drop symmetry of code, etc., for absolute simplicity. The maneuvers and orders need be few in number, requiring but one flag or one letter displayed and as brief an audible signal as can be devised.
Personally I feel deeply gratified for this excellent and suggestive contribution to our naval literature. That the service will greatly gain through it I have no possible doubt. I hope more members of the Naval Institute will be prompted to join Mr. Niblack in his search for the right way of handling our fleets and that he may do as much for this as Sims has done for our target practice. When this is achieved, our fleet, whether large or small, will be a thing not to be neglected in the world's affairs and we, as naval officers, stealing their glory, will be able to say that we have developed its efficiency to a point beyond which no further progress is possible.
Captain J. B. MUREDOCK, U. S. Navy.—Mr. Niblack's article is important and timely. The interest in tactical questions is growing in the service and such contributions as this are most welcome.
We often hear the old truism reiterated that the basis of tactics is concentration. Mr. Niblack might have added this as one of his axioms without contributing greatly to tactical science, but he has shown a wise discrimination and by modifying the old theorem and advancing the "concentration of gun fire" in axiom 2, has established a sound basis for further study. Mass concentration of vessels which corresponds to the old idea of concentration in the sail period is now neither advisable or practicable. It is inadvisable because it would inevitably lead to a general melée, in which chance becomes a larger factor than skill, and it is impracticable because the high speed of modern ships and their perfect mobility render it easy to reinforce any part of the line against which a mass concentration of ships might be attempted by an enemy. It is questionable whether such reinforcement would take place, however, as if an enemy wishes to mass his ships he should be encouraged, as he thus masks his own gun fire and affords a vastly better target for both gun and torpedo attack.
The true application of the principle of concentration to-day is not in overwhelming an enemy by the physical effect of mass, but by overcoming his opposition by a weight of well-aimed gun fire, which will demolish his defence. If the speed of both fleets is equal he cannot escape from this concentration and must inevitably lose the day unless he can deliver an equally well-aimed gun fire in return. It is admitted that every naval battle must begin with the gun fire stage, but if one fleet has its ships thoroughly trained to accuracy of gun fire, and its commander can concentrate this fire as he wishes, there will be no other stage unless his opponent is equally well trained The probability is very great, as Mr. Niblack points out, that one of the combatants will lose the battle in the first few minutes.
We have been devoting much time, money, and energy of late to the development of the gun efficiency of single ships, and are therefore in a position to make the next step, the development of fleet gun fire. This must be largely a tactical question, and the responsibility rests entirely on the fleet commander He may by false maneuvering neutralize the gunnery skill of individual ships, which has been so laboriously built up, or on the contrary he may by a wise disposition of his force, enable each ship to utilize its skill to the utmost. It is the same question so well defined in the reply of one of the crew of the Constitution to an address made by the captain before one of the engagements of the War of 1812, "You lookout for the quarterdeck and we will take care of the guns."
There is always a tendency to rely on some trick in tactics, which will result in gaining an advantage, and very many such have been proposed. It is not at all impossible that some unexpected movement might demoralize an unskilful adversary, but this system makes a bad basis for the development of tactics. To my mind the true solution is to be found in a principle which fits in as a corollary to Mr. Niblack's axioms 1 and 2. Briefly stated it is: A fleet commander in battle should whenever the enemy is within range so handle his ships as to keep their guns bearing. In short he should try to reproduce target practice conditions as closely as possible, and should avoid as far as possible any movements which suddenly change either the bearing or distance of the enemy. If he has developed the gunnery skill of his crews it owes it to them and to the country to offer the best possible chance he can for this skill to act.
If this view is correct, our tactical movements should become fitted for battle. We might well study battle tactics pure and simple and bar from the tactical signal books all movements which could not or ought not be attempted under fire. It would be easy to improvise a drill simulating battle, in which a squadron commander could test his skill in keeping the guns of all his ships constantly bearing on a ship supposed to represent the head of an enemy's column, which is allowed full freedom of movement. I am satisfied that a few drills of this kind would support the view taken by Mr. Niblack, that direct movements are bad. No squadron commander would ever repeat a direct movement in battle, as he would have sufficient experience in his first attempt to last his lifetime. Officers believing in these movements have generally been thoroughly disenchanted in trying them in the tactical game. I fully agree with Mr. Niblack's criticism of direct movements, and would go so far as to banish them from the signal work, as unsafe in war and consequently unfit in peace.
Personally I can see no better method of testing tactical movements than by their fitness for battle, and conversely I believe that movements meeting the requirements of battle will suffice for peace. The so-called rectangular movements appear to me to be best fitted for meeting the demands imposed by gunnery conditions in battle and if so are the best. We should cultivate the best and not waste time on inferior tactics.
Mr. Niblack's paper suggests a great number of points in tactics, but it may lead to a better discussion and better advancement if we develop the fundamental ideas first, and nothing will, I believe, be more potent in pricking bubbles and in sifting right ideas from wrong than the one principle, that the aim of battle tactics is to keep the guns of all your ships constantly bearing on the enemy.
Professor PHILIP R. ALGER.—Although the essayist appears not to have meant to do so, yet by his diagrams he conveys the impression that in action the gun-fire of a squadron should be concentrated upon a portion of the enemy's squadron. That such a method of using gun-fire would be fatally defective, might seem too obvious to require discussion. As a matter of fact, however, the method seems to have at some time been endorsed by the War College, as indicated by the following quotation from certain "Notes on Naval Tactics," which I have recently had brought to my attention by an officer who collated them from papers issued by the college: "Concentration of gun-fire is practicable, in any formation by directing half or all the vessels of a fleet to direct all of their fire against one of the enemy's ships. This one might be disabled by a total fire which would produce but little effect if spread over the whole of a fleet. When the ship was evidently disabled as a fighting unit, the gun-fire might be concentrated by signal against some other ship."
Very little consideration is needed to show the fallacy of the italicized part of the foregoing quotation. The greatest possible effect of a squadron's gun-fire can only result from directing the fire of each ship at the enemy nearest to herself.
The fundamental end and aim of naval tactics is to so maneuver as to make one of the enemy's ships the best target for several of your own ships; when this has been accomplished, then and then only is it allowable to concentrate your fire.
Promotion by Selection
(SEE No. 117.)
Commander ROY C. SMITH, U. S. Navy.—Whether one agrees or disagrees with the conclusions of this paper, all must admit, as was to be expected from the ability of the author, that it presents a great deal of food for thought. The title is apt to mislead. It is not a paper on promotion by selection, but an argument “Against Promotion by Selection." The arrangement is admirable and the arguments are well advanced. The subject is conveniently discussed under four simple heads, as enumerated on page 2. Nearly everyone will concede the justice of the reasoning under the last three heads, which to the author are the principal ones; though one may be permitted to doubt if the first head, which receives but scant attention, is not really the all essential one of the discussion. It is thus formulated, "Selection is desirable in order to obtain and keep younger officers in the grade of commander and above."
The enunciation of this principle is based on the assumption that it is desirable to have younger commanders. If this assumption is not granted, there is no use in arguing about selection or any other method of bringing about a result that is not desirable. Commander Rittenhouse is apparently satisfied with present conditions and does not believe that we need younger commanders, hence we do not need selection to obtain them; and he shows conclusively that we do not need selection for any of the other purposes; hence we do not need it at all. Now the premiss which the essayist denies expresses in the opinion of impartial critics one of the grave faults of the service as it exists to-day, i.e., the age at which officers reach command rank. He does say that, granting the contention, selection is only one way of many of accomplishing the results, and in this the writer agrees with him.
Now to look a little at the question of age. No one will deny that a man in good health, who has accustomed himself to responsibility at a sufficiently early age, will continue to perform well all the duties that may be imposed on him to an advanced age. The words italicized are the key to the question, and it is a phase not touched on in the essay. A man placed for the first time in command at the age of fifty is certainly not apt to be enterprising; and barring officers who have held minor commands, such is now the condition in our service. The same man, having held an independent command in his thirties, will evidently be a different man at fifty. Commander Rittenhouse points to Farragut and our naval commanders in the war with Spain to show that age is no bar. True, with the proviso that they begin to command sufficiently young. Farragut had an independent command when a boy, and our naval chiefs in the war with Spain reached command rank in their thirties.
The senior officers often make the mistake of thinking that their juniors consider them antiquated and wish to replace them. This is by no means true. The proper attitude is for each officer to compare himself with himself at another age. Take the best of our executive officers, now in their forties, and make them captains of battleships. They might make poor captains, which is doubtful; but if they did, they would make wore ones ten years later.
There is another reason for having younger commanders, which the essayist admits, and that is to give them time to learn the duties of a fleet commander before it is time to go on the retired list. When our captains are promoted to be admirals only a year or two before their retirement, they do not have the opportunity. As a matter of fact, it is bad policy to order any captain to the command of a battleship who is not going to have later at least the chance of commanding a fleet of such battleships.
Assuming then the truth of the premiss that it is desirable to have younger commanders, is selection the best method? Selection uncombined with age retirement in the grades might bring some bright men to the front, but it would not improve the average age, which is what is wanted; and this is the chief and dominant argument against promotion by selection. Age retirement in the grades without selection would result in eliminating all the older men of each naval academy class. It is understood that the plan was actually worked out last winter, unofficially, and the appearance of the resulting navy list of a dozen years hence caused the idea to be quietly dropped. Everybody knows that many of the best men in the service were not the youngest men in their classes at the naval academy, even though an investigation some time ago seemed to show that the younger boys entering generally did better than the older ones.
Selection combined with age retirement in the grades is theoretically the best solution, and would be practically the best could any simple method be devised of selecting fairly. The difficulties of finding any such simple method will probably always operate in our service to prevent the adoption of selection. Is there any other method which will produce the desired result, that is younger commanders, and at the same time avoid the objections to selection? Undoubtedly there is, promotion by length of service and selection out. The essayist would evidently favor this view, though he does not develop it, for he says, page 27, "Thus, promotion by seniority with elimination of the unworthy would seem to be the more natural and logical method."
In considering any proposed, workable system, the first essential is that it shall be absolutely simple. Any application of complicated rules, or reference to fixed numbers in the grades, or fixed annual vacancies for each grade, or resort to actuarial tables, will swamp the system. With this preliminary the following is suggested. Establish a permanent scale of length of service requisite to promotion to each grade and promote when such service has been accomplished. If there result too many incumbents in the higher grade, select out such as can best be spared. Such is the principle, which is simple enough, now as to the details.
We need first some easily applied but perfectly definite sliding scale of numbers in the grades, depending on the size of the navy, just as in the army so many regiments, so many officers. Only in the navy the unit becomes ships instead of regiments, or what is simpler, to allow for different conditions, tons of shipping on the navy list. This idea was fully worked out in an article in the North American Review for September, 1902, entitled "The Navy's Greatest Need." It is sufficient here to assume that in the great reservoir of the navy, that is, the officers of the rank of lieutenant and down to and including the midshipmen at the naval academy, there should be so many per ton of shipping on the navy list. When the number falls below this, the Secretary of the Navy Should have authority to appeal to the President, Senators and Congressmen, in regular rotation without regard to specified vacancies, to designate the numbers needed to keep the reservoir full, such appointees to enter the naval academy the ensuing session. In the grades above lieutenant, the numbers should bear such a relation to each other as the requirements of the service demand, and the total number should be a certain percentage of the number in the reservoir, that is, should depend on the amount of shipping. These percentages should remain fixed, but the actual numbers should be regulated at the beginning of each fiscal year, July I, depending on the shipping on the last annual register, and hold for one year.
Next as to promotion. During the course of the fiscal year all vacancies above lieutenant would be filled by seniority, as at present. On the first of July each year, naval academy classes would be promoted, as a class, to the different grades by length of service, that is, such as had not already been promoted previously to fill a vacancy. The following is offered, but the absolute figures are not essential:
Rank Minimum Service in Total
age grade service
Midshipman 15 4 4
Ensign 19 3 7
Junior Lieutenant 22 4 11
Lieutenant 26 6 17
Lieutenant-Commander 32 8 25
Commander 40 7 32
Captain 47 7 39
Rear-Admiral 54
Thus, 57 years after entry an officer would be promoted lieutenant-commander. During his previous service he would have spent a certain fixed time in each grade, the numbers in the grade being unlimited, as ensigns now do by law; but on his present promotion he enters a grade in which the numbers for that year are limited. If the promotions due to length of service cause the number to be exceeded, a board is convened to select out from the whole grade as many as may be necessary to overcome the excess. The officers so selected out would go on a reserved list for permanent shore duty without future promotion. And so for all the higher grades. A thirty years' optional retirement law is also advocated, which would facilitate the work of the board, as would also voluntary applications for the reserved list, which should be encouraged.
As the navy is now exceptionally short of officers in the lower grades— the reservoir, as it has been called above—any sudden increase in the number required by a normal ratio of numbers to tons of shipping would swamp the naval academy. Hence at the start it would be necessary to limit these large increases to say 20 per cent in any year, which would spread the increase over five years.
It is to be remarked that, in principle, promotion by length of service and selection out differs in no essential from the present actual system. The personnel law requires a certain number of vacancies annually in the grades from captain to lieutenant. These numbers were estimated with the idea of causing a suitable flow of promotion, that is, bringing officers to command rank sufficiently young; and it was to be accomplished by voluntary retirements and selection out. Here we have exactly the same features as in the proposed system, only there is no definite determination of a suitable age for each grade, or what is the same thing, the previous total service; and then an estimation is made of the number of vacancies that will be required to produce this indefinite result. In the proposed system we fix definitely the length of service requisite to promotion, promote when that service has been accomplished, and then eliminate the superfluity, which we then know and do not have to estimate. One method is indirect and devious, and only gives approximate results; the other method is direct and simple and gives at once the very object we seek.
We may assume then that the proposed method will bring men to command rank as early as may be necessary, and in a perfectly simple manner, which is what was set out to be accomplished. There will be three matters to determine at the start, that is, ratio of numbers to tons of shipping, relative percentages in the grades above lieutenant, and length of service requisite to promotion. These matters once settled, the system will work itself. Among its advantages, it will preserve seniority and prevent heart-burnings in the sea-going list; it will prevent sacrificing men who may be above the average age of their classmates; it will offer to the reserved list permanent shore duty as a substitute for future advancement; and on those who are willing to go to sea, as their numbers will be relatively limited, it will impose the penalty of comparatively brief shore duty in exchange for a more rapid promotion. In closing, it may be stated, that in the opinion of the writer a mistake is being made by many persons in advocating reforms because of supposed hardship on the officers in being kept so long without promotion. The hardship on the officers has really nothing to do with the situation. If the conditions are normal, the officers must submit to them. The question is not one for the officers, but for the nation and the people. Under present conditions, are they getting the best worth out of their navy as an investment? In the humble opinion of the writer they assuredly are not, and it is for them to apply the remedy.
Rear-Admiral C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy.—Accepting the Board of Control's invitation to discuss this admirable paper and complying with its injunction not to fill the pages of the Proceedings with reiterations of the essayist's views or mere statements of assent to or dissent from those views, I beg to suggest that, in a late instance of selection in American naval history, well deserved advancement was denied to the ablest man in our service, one who planned and waged a brilliantly successful campaign, and at the same time promotion was generously granted to two fortunate captains, whose unavoidable absence from the action which brought that campaign to a close was not permitted to affect their reward for what every one knows they would have done had they been present.
It may of course be assumed that the advocate of selection approves such measures as are here referred to, incomprehensible as they appear to others.
Captain E. B. BARRY, U. S. Navy.—It is seldom an essay of this character is given to the Navy and it is to be hoped that every one of our selectionists will read it attentively and carefully to the end. Being an anti-selectionist, I suppose I see more in it than will be seen by one of opposite faith, but until one or many of the numerous family of selectionists succeed in refuting the statements and arguments advanced by Commander Rittenhouse in this philosophical document, I shall look upon it as the death knell to selection in the minds of thinking men in our Navy.
Feeling as I do, I am lost in wonder at the calm, judicial manner with which the various points are reviewed, as I generally find it hard to keep my patience when I may be arguing some of these points myself.
The age question got its quietus outside the Navy when the commotion subsided after Dr. Osler's famous statement. The thing was partly refuted and partly laughed away. One comic article represented "our special" at the gates of hell holding an interview with a man sixty years of age dressed as district telegraph messenger. At twenty he had been a bank president and with increasing years had been deprived little by little of trust and responsibility. Would not it be well for our Annapolis graduates to be made rear-admirals upon graduation and grade their service so that at sixty they could make the famous "two years at sea prior (?) to graduation?"
It has been the fashion, at least in the newspapers, to lay great stress on the physical strain thrown upon the captain of a modern man-of-war. This is not true; he is under less physical strain than is the youngest messenger in the crew. That he is under mental strain I grant, but what of it. Has not his whole career been intended to fit him to bear it? I think another myth has been exploded.
On the subject of rewards the essayist is equally happy. It is a new answer to an old question. If "A" distinguished himself while in the grade of ensign simply by an act of bravery, does not it follow that he is a competent admiral? It would seem that an act of heroism of one kind never yet has been separated from the ability to do something else. I think Commander Rittenhouse touches very logically yet tenderly upon this subject. With the Spanish-American War still fresh in our minds, it is difficult to see how he could have handled the subject any better. Even now occasionally a half suppressed sob of Spanish war hysteria can be detected here and there. One thing the war did, for which we should be thankful, it enriched our language by the addition of the word "hero."
Were the subject of money reward for good service done to be discussed and debated, the phrase "un-American," which we have heard ad nauseam, and which I doubt any of its users can define, would be much in evidence; yet these same people have no hesitation in depriving of his rank the officer who happens to be doing his duty on the coast of Africa, and giving his rank to some luckier (not more fortunate) officer who perhaps is finishing out a detail made in a time of peace and considered undesirable when no thought of future war disturbed the equanimity of the Navy Department.
The following appeals most eloquently to the student of history. "Does he (the officer) want reward? Does he fear that his name may not survive in the hearts of his countrymen? Indeed it may not. Republics are proverbially ungrateful. Let him then have it carved on a bronze or marble column ---" These words suggest a fitting epitaph to be cast in enduring bronze and placed over the grave of one of our departed great ones: "Done to death by a grateful (?) country."
Two questions of the essayist that easily can be answered are, why so many commanding generals were "selected” only to be displaced during the first few months of our Civil War and why it took so long to discover our great generals? Influence in one case and the absence of it in the other.
Let us pause for a moment and consider a naval service such as ours subjected to a quarterly, semi-annual, or annual selection for promotion. Let us imagine a dashing lieutenant (why "dashing" I know not except that all lieutenants are supposed to be dashing) the observed of all observers, pronounced by various officers and boards (nothing can be done without a board), fit for promotion to the next higher grade. Hardly of 19--) when a second board selects him, owing to the same transcendent merit and the fourth quarter, half year, or year, finds our hero a rear-admiral. This may seem absurd, but it is well within the possibilities and is indicated in the expressed views of some of our selectionist brethren. Truly would the Navy be hoist with its own fetard.
Of the essayist's objections to selection, while possibly they are all well taken, there is but one of them that to me seems pressing, immediate, corrupting and disentegrating and that is what would be the result of personal and political influence. Efforts are made constantly to gloss this over, to say it is all newspaper talk, to fulminate against it, etc., but it will not down. All efforts to the contrary notwithstanding there is no powerful civilian dealing with the Navy not subject to its control or swayed more or less by its use.
For the purposes of such influences the officers of the navy are divided into three classes: First, officers without influence; second, officers with just enough influence to be ignored at times with safety; third, officers whose influence is so great that it cannot be ignored at any time with safety. When an officer of Class I tries for certain duty he gets it if his request is reasonable and if Classes II and III are not trying for it. Usually he is a man of ability and later may make for himself a professional backing which may help him; he may approach Class II but always is excluded from Class III. Where ability only is concerned he will be preferred over Class II, but if he strives for a coveted detail he will never get it.
Class II is ignored only when it becomes necessary to answer the following momentous question: How much influence can "A" bring to bear? Is it going to be sufficient to make it dangerous to refuse him the detail? Class II is the one that is accused constantly of using influence, but no one dares accuse Class III. Lest this may be regarded as fiction let me cite two instances: (I) Some years ago a certain officer (Class III) had occupied an exceedingly "soft” position for a long time in spite of every effort of the naval authorities to send him to sea. His principal backer went North and got out of touch, so to speak. Our friend "X" was ordered, by telegraph, to proceed immediately to a certain vessel south of where he was on duty. Calmly packing a small hand-bag and assuring the previously rejoicing officers of his immediate return he took a northerly train and returned in less than 48 hours, much to their disgust, to his original duty with a telegraphic revocation of his last order in his possession!
(2) "Y" was on duty aboard of one ship and desired to go to another on another station giving as a reason that he was entitled to go there. All legitimate efforts for change of orders proved vain as his services really were needed and the authorities failed to appreciate the cogency of his reasoning. As a final effort, several prominent people known to the newspapers as " statesmen " were enlisted in the cause and "Y's" wishes were complied with. "Y" was also in Class III. Neither of these men ever was censured.
A Class I man always weighs the effect produced on others by a change of his detail. A Class II man frequently does, but a Class III man, secure in his pride of place ignores everything regardless of the injustice frequently brought about except the gratification of his own wishes. If this goes on, as it has been going on for many years, fortunately doing the least amount of harm possible through such corrupting influences, what will be the situation if the field is broadened to include promotion by selection? For one man selected for naval merit there will be two or more selected, or possibly forced, into promotion through influence, and we will be edified prior to each "round up" by the dignified spectacle of a struggle and scramble by the "home contingent" for the selected (?) places. Truly is selection ill adapted to republics.
Speaking generally, the naval officer has nothing to look forward to except the detail and the duty to which his rank entitle him. When that detail or duty is given to his junior of another grade who is not entitled to it, apart from the public announcement thus made that the grade assignment is incorrect, is the cheapening of rank, a serious thing in any naval service—and an indication also that the duty of a certain grade can be performed just as well by the grade below. Here may be noted one of the strongest points in favor of "selection out." When an officer cannot perform the duty of his grade he should be retired and the next man should be given the duty. It is no argument to say that because a certain admiral is incompetent his duty should be performed by an ensign. Yet this is selection logic. If it were possible to pass a bill, general assignment to duty for each grade should be defined by law, with a proviso that no officer of a junior grade could be assigned to any of that duty.
I would recommend to our selectionists a careful study of the essayist's conclusion; by him, motive has not been touched upon, it is possible, even thinkable to believe there may be selectionists that do not expect to be selected; to them I call attention to this important and truthful utterance. "The naval service asks only that to which every individual is entitled, whatever his profession or occupation, common justice and a square deal."
If we "antis" are granted this by our selectionist brethren, selection in future will be but fiction of the brain and no one will have contributed more powerfully to produce that result than Commander Rittenhouse.
Gleanings from the Sea of Japan
(SEE No. 117.)
Commander Z. L TANNER, Retired.—This admirable essay upon the Russo-Japanese War in the East is the result of much careful study, excellent judgment in sifting the multitude of conflicting reports from the field of action, and gleaning from the mass a just and conservative estimate of the events of which he writes. I agree with the conclusions of the essayist to such an extent that there is little left to discuss, hence my brief remarks will be confined largely to bringing out a few of the salient points in a stronger light.
Referring to his statement that: "There were also other factors less generally commented upon though of equal importance to influence the situation," I would add that one of these factors was of vastly more than of "equal importance to influence the situation." I refer to the different types from which the respective governments procure the personnel for their vessels of war.
Russia has no maritime population of sufficient importance to make itself a factor in recruiting for the navy. The men are drafted from the army, few of them having any knowledge of the sea, or adaptability for the service. This method may supply good raw material but it requires long and systematic instruction afloat to make it efficient; and the several actions of the late war demonstrated the fact that they had not attained to any considerable degree of excellence.
The Port Arthur fleet lacked much from being in a thorough condition of preparedness when hostilities broke out: the gun-pointers did not produce the best results, owing largely to the lack of training, although a portion of the shortcoming should be attributed to the fact that the guns were not provided with telescopic sights.
There seems to have been a total lack of torpedo defense, even a picket guard was omitted while they were lying in the open sea exposed to torpedo attack, knowing that war was impending and that the Japanese flotillas were within striking distance. It cannot be claimed that there was lack of time and opportunity to put the fleet on a war footing. Hence we are forced to the conclusion that there existed a laxity in administration of the fleet that invited disaster.
Referring to the fleet of Admiral Rojestvenski, we find that some of his ships were hastily commissioned and sent to sea without having had an opportunity for sufficient target practice to fit them for a place in the line of battle. Other vessels of the fleet had been in commission a sufficient length of time to bring them up to a high state of efficiency, yet the lack of modern sights, upon which the best service of guns is so largely dependent, seemed to cast doubt upon the preparedness of the fleet as a whole. The unfortunate occurrence on Doggerbank was the result of nervous tension induced by lack of sea experience. However ever the fleet were some 15,000 miles from its new base and prospective scene of action and should have improved its personnel during the long voyage in every respect except possibly the gun-fire, and that also should have been benefitted by their detention off Madagascar. The fact that they had target practice but three times must be attributed to lack of spare ammunition.
The detention of Rojestvenski while waiting the arrival of Admiral Nebogatoffi's squadron resulted in the loss of valuable time, and gave Togo an opportunity to refit his fleet, recruit its personnel, and leisurely prepare to meet him upon his arrival. He was thus handicapped without compensating benefits, for Nebogatoffi's coming added to appreciable strength, either moral or material, on the day of battle. It has been intimated, and not without reason, that it would have been better for (Rojestvenski had Nebagatoffi never left Russia.
Admiral Rojestvenski refers to trouble with German colliers, trouble that was doubtless serious and might easily have been worse. The policy of employing alien transports of any description in time of war is bad; it introduces an element of weakness and uncertainty that is bound to be a "thorn in the side" of the Admiral even under favorable conditions, and liable under stress to delay or even thwart his plans of operation.
This handicap would be removed by placing transports under charge of naval personnel, or, that being impracticable, the situation would be greatly improved by detailing an experienced naval officer to each transport, with facilities for making and answering signals; and clothed with authority to direct the movements of the vessel under the Admiral's orders.
In the absence of orders in an emergency, he should have authority to use his best judgment in furthering the Admiral's plans.
The insular position of Japan gives to her a maritime population from which to recruit the personnel of her navy. The Japanese coasts are lined with hardy fishermen and coasting seamen who pass their lives on salt water, accustomed to constant exposure, inured to the hardships incident to service on the turbulent waters surrounding their coasts, and what is of equal importance, they are possessed with the sea habit to such a degree that the transition from their accustomed occupation to the decks of a battleship is not altogether strange to them. Being seamen already, it requires only naval training to make of them efficient men-of-war's men.
Many of Togo's officers were veterans of the Chinese war, and the operation against the Port Arthur fleet afforded war experience that made veterans of them all.
The enlisted personnel of his fleet were also in a less degree veterans of the Chinese war, and upon the outbreak of hostilities with Russia his fleet was thoroughly organized and trained to the utmost limit in times of peace. Operations against the Port Arthur fleet afforded them the great benefit of war service, the prestige of victory, and a self-confidence that made them almost invincible.
His fleet was composed of modern vessels equipped with every known device to increase their efficiency, including telescopic sights, and torpedo defenses. His gun-pointers were perfectly familiar with their weapons.
The essayist comments upon the marked improvement of the gun-pointers between the action of the loth of August and the 27th of May, which speaks well for the system of instruction, and remarkable display of industry, yet the steadying effect produced by the tonic of battle experience upon the nerves of the gun-pointers seems to me to have been a leading factor of the observed improvement.
The Japanese flotillas of torpedo boats and destroyers were a most useful adjunct to Togo's fleet throughout the war. They were well organized and effective so far as training in time of peace could make them so. The attack of February 8 was their first war experience and showed dash and zeal, but lacked that calmness born of experience to insure careful attention to details.
Their performance during the final battle showed that they had profited by their experience during the war; they followed the true method of attacking in swarms too numerous to be beaten off, and no safety plugs were found in floating torpedoes after the battle.
I agree with the essayist that Rojestvenski's formation for the passage of the straits was the best he could have made, so far as the fighting line was concerned; but the cruisers and special service vessels were dead-wood, adding nothing to the strength of the battleship columns, and should have been left at the Saddles; or, such of them as had sufficient coal endurance might have been sent east about to Vladivostok. Despatching them for forty-eight hours or more before the departure of the battleships, and by covering the movement with his scouts, it would have been impossible for the Japanese to determine the lines upon which the division had been made with any degree of accuracy until it was too late.
It would at least have divided Togo's attention, and might have affected, in some degree, the final result.
Rojestvenski's double column formation of his battleships leads naturally to the conclusion that it was his intention to fight the battle in single column forming either to the right or left, dependent upon the direction of the attack. While it is true that Vladivostok was his goal, it seems hardly within the limits of possibility that he would submit to having his best ships destroyed in detail rather than deviate from his course. The disastrous effects of the concentrated attack upon the Oslabia should have been sufficient warning for the left column to form on the right without orders by signal or otherwise; and it is past understanding why the Souvaroff should have held her course to certain destruction having in view the fate of the Oslabia, and the certainty that a similar fate awaited her.
Had it been any other than the flag ship the captain would have been censured for lack of initiative in failing to parallel the course of the attacking fleet at once, which would have placed the contending forces upon practically equal terms as to position. Had this course been taken, the first battle, upon relatively equal terms, between modern battleships, ought have been saved from what the essayist remarks was a debacle.
It will hardly be denied that Rojestvenski ably conducted his fleet, with few mistakes, to the moment of battle. But from that time to the end, Togo was master of the situation, gaining the most remarkable victory of the age through the superior fighting power of the personnel of his fleet.
The value of war experience was illustrated with singular force in this decisive action, and demonstrates beyond question that it must be reckoned with as a principal factor in considering the relative fighting efficiency of opposing forces.
Commander J. H. GLENNON, U. S. Navy.—It seems to me that the question of the calibers of guns to be carried is largely a question of the range at which battles are to be fought, and this in turn depends on the chance of hitting. In narrow waters, and with a distinct objective known to the enemy, which knowledge would enable him to regulate his maneuvers and dispositions, it is quite possible that a fleet might become so bunched by his maneuvers that shots fired at one ship would hit another and that lessons might be drawn from the result that would certainly be fallacious in other cases. To show how different may be the deductions drawn, it is only necessary to consider the various examples we already have. The lesson of the Adriatic Sea, to my mind, is that with both sides using smoke producing powder, close range and the ram followed. This would of course be considerably modified by floating mines and torpedoes nowadays. The lesson of Santiago is that with one fleet using smokeless and the other smoke-producing powder, the small or medium caliber guns win the battle and that at a long range the vessels using the smoke-producing powders have a great advantage, and are practically uninjured. The same is true of Manila, even against a land battery. To illustrate the difference between smokeless and smoke-producing powders, it is only necessary to refer to a case witnessed by a number of naval officers about June 22, 1898, when the Texas made a feint as if to land a force of the army by running towards a small bight about two miles to the westward of the entrance to Santiago. For once one of two 6-inch guns mounted in the Socapa Battery opened fire on her without having been fired at, one shot falling short, another long, and the third hitting her. The Texas fired two shots, the second fired simultaneously with the third from the battery, dismounted this gun, and no further shots were fired from the other gun. A few men were injured or killed on the Texas by the shot which hit her, but because of the cloud of smoke from her own guns, nobody on shore knew that she had been hit, nor did any one in the fleet suspect it except from the obstinacy with which she continued to fire at the battery for long afterwards. Those who have watched a ship firing all her rapid-fire guns. Using smoke-producing powder, under battle conditions, know well from personal observation that in calm weather (and I am thinking particularly of a target practice under such conditions that the Raleigh had in 1897 or early in 1898, off Cape Charles), she is completely enveloped in smoke and invisible to the tops of her masts, only a large cloud moving along, the trucks of a mast occasionally becoming visible. What is the possibility of range finding in such a case with present devices, especially if the topmasts be sent down? A question is pertinent in this connection, namely,—does the target in such a case become visible more quickly from the vessel than the vessel from the target,—owing to some trick of refraction or reflection, the smoke envelope acting as would the walls of a room?
The lesson drawn from the battle of the Sea of Japan is said to be a lesson of large guns. If so, it is a lesson of range finding, and in all probability the Russians could have forced close quarters and small guns by using smoke-producing powders. Right here it may be said that there is no telescopic sight that can overcome an inaccuracy in the range. The accuracy of a sight and pointer only renders certain that the enemy will not be hit if the range is given inaccurately at long ranges.
This is not intended to discredit the accurate sight, but to show its limitations. At close range there is no question as to its value, and it should not be lost sight of, that at close ranges, the 6-inch and 7-inch guns, with their continuous aim, are at least as accurate as the heavier calibers, and with armor-piercing shell which will penetrate the armor of the adversary, are sufficiently deadly for purposes of battle. How, where the armor can be pierced, is a 12-inch gun superior to eight 6-inch which weigh about the same. One 6-inch at sea will probably fire as great a weight of ammunition per 'minute as one 12-inch, and within ranges where it will pierce the armor, which ranges are capable of being brought about (or else the case will be non prossed by an adroit adversary who uses smokeless or smoke-producing powders as best suits his purposes), what advantage will there generally be in a case in which a weight of metal is placed in one locality over one in which it is distributed in a number of different places, one of which may effect vital injury. This, it should be understood, is a comparison at close quarters between one 6-inch gun and one 12-inch, a comparison at the last analysis when using several 6-inch guns as against one 12-inch between a heavy current of metal of a low potential and a light current of heavy potential. It should not be lost sight of that one 6-inch shot may disable two 12-inch guns mounted in a turret, and this may be possible without the shell entering the turret at all, but simply by straining some part that is weak, and the weakness possibly unknown. Those who have handled turrets and turret guns know that provision must be made for everything. They are like babies, and the chapter of accidents that have happened to turrets in the American Navy, immediately before and during the Spanish-American War, and I venture to say, to Japanese and Russians, in the sea battles of the Russo-Japanese War, would make very interesting reading if collated. The prominent naval officer mentioned in the essay, quoted as deducing from the battle the opinion that "in the armament of a battleship there should be not only 12-inch, but also to-inch and 8-inch, with an auxiliary equipment of 6-inch pieces" (see page 84), is, I think, basing his opinion on this knowledge. The fact that 8-inch guns are mentioned afterwards as better is part of a knowledge that so many accidents to such turrets have not happened. The present essayist himself has, I know, the same knowledge of these deficiencies. Since 1898, progress has been made in turrets and their mounts, parts not balanced before being now balanced, doing away with the necessity for such powerful machines to work them. The very weakening of the machines, in case of untoward accident, of which there is likely to be so much as in battle, may prove the undoing of the turrets.
There is another point I think lost sight of in the present tendency towards 12-inch and 3-inch guns, and that is, the value of the medium caliber guns against torpedo-boats. Three-inch guns are probably sufficiently accurate for firing at torpedo-boats up to 3500 yards. Some doubt has been expressed as to their accuracy at 3000 yards, but, granting them regular in their action at moo yards, or 500 yards beyond the latest developed torpedo range, are ships to cease firing at them because they are at 5000 yards, or what gun is to be employed? The 6-inch gun would be fairly regular at all ranges at which any gun would be fired at them, that is, where there was any practical chance of hitting. It would probably be quite as regular, so far as the gun alone is concerned, at 6000 yards, as the 3-inch is at 3000 yards.
Let us consider a hypothetical case where one enemy armed with 6- inch guns picks up in a fog or on a dark night an enemy close aboard armed only with 12-inch guns and 3-inch guns, which latter cannot, under the most advantageous circumstances, pierce her armor. What might be the result? Possibly a disablement of the latter before he got his 12-inch guns going at all, for these large guns and complex engines of war cannot be kept in the same readiness for battle as the smaller calibers without absolutely wearing out the personnel and otherwise seriously affecting the efficiency of the vessel.
Avoiding theoretical cases and getting down to hard facts, the known certain wear and tear of these large guns alone, regardless of mounts, in battle, imagining that they have been fired too rounds each, a thing which might happen, or should be provided for, at the very least must be considered. A navy 6-inch gun has been fired 1500 times and the rifling is practically as good as new. What would be expected of a 12-inch gun that had fired one-eighth of this number?
The lesson to be drawn from the battle off Port Arthur, is, in my opinion, about as follows: When you are otherwise ready, and the enemy is practically blockading you, take plenty of ammunition on board, a double or treble allowance; shorten your coal accordingly; hoist your battle flags; allow him to use his wireless, to come to you and fight him fairly. If you defeat him, as you probably will, if he keeps at long range, owing to the necessary waste of ammunition, which with him must
be inferior in quantity to yours (for he like you must have enough coal to return to his fortified base and he is further away), you can compel him to return to a home port by keeping such company as your slower speed and the necessity for recoaling may allow. If you are of superior speed, you can destroy him while still close to your home port. The Russians should not have attempted to escape from Port Arthur. Defeating the Japanese would have opened the port and cut the Japanese navy and army's real line of supply. It would have put heart into the Russians, and they would have been able, with a definite previous plan, to get reinforcements and necessary supplies, and begin the war anew. It might not have been a Waterloo, but it might very well have been a Gettysburg. The Japanese in this battle must have learned a lesson, and in the Battle of Tsu Shima they must have been well loaded with ammunition, probably at the expense of coal, while the Russians, whose minds had been on coal up to that time because of a wrong objective, namely, one which was not the Japanese fleet, expended probably the last ounce of ammunition on board the ships that really did the fighting, and were then handled by the Japanese with their greater allowance of ammunition, as at close range target practice, lasting probably Only a few minutes, when a final coup de grace was given by torpedo-boats to an absolutely disabled enemy.
The primary lesson of Tsu Shima is the same as that for Port Arthur, one of ships sallying from their own port against an enemy nearby, and fighting a teasing, long range fight until his ammunition became low. The Japanese, unlike the Russians in the previous case, had provided a reserve stock of ammunition and well knew that the enemy must be suffering from what they must have been suffering while compelled to keep the sea, and use coal in the neighborhood of Port Arthur. They probably kept enough coal on board in this case to steam to Vladivostock fast, and slowly back to some coaling station nearby and hung on to their base with bunkers so filled to the last minute. After the destruction of the first three or four vessels, this battle became a flight, the Russians trying to escape in various directions, those going northward being dogged determinedly, while those to the southward, and who might be expected later to the northward, were not followed. But the mere gathering of the fruits of victory is not the battle itself, and the subsequent annihilation was simply a result of the previous battle. There is a great deal of difference as regards the feeling of the personnel of a ship when the enemy is approaching and when he is running away. In the former almost anything may be expected to happen, in the latter target practice is going on, which you can stop at any time you choose. The first requires bravery, the second Persistency. A reading between the lines as to what followed the battle of Port Arthur, shows a lack of persistency on the part of the Japanese, who had already shown themselves brave, that might have readily been interpreted by a Russian Paul Jones as defeat, and justify a further trial of a few rounds with them for possible results.
Relative to torpedo attack at night, the value of a defense that will keep out a torpedo when the ship is immovable in the water, not one for full or reduced speeds or for any other condition, should not be lost sight of. Such defense should be understood to be for the simple purpose of preventing surprise.
I desire to express my obligation to the essayist for his very interesting and instructive paper and to say that I take no exception to his conclusions So far as the values of the Japanese maneuvers in that battle are concerned. The method of capping or preventing capping is presented in a clear and forcible way that should be taken to heart. The question of numerous small battleships or a few large ones is not, I consider, definitely settled at all. It is a very intricate question solved ordinarily by consideration of the concentration of guns, which affects only the offensive power of the fleet. The smaller defensive power of four ships as against six ships Where, as he states in his opening sentence, "the forces of nature are so potent for good' or ill," is rarely or never taken acount of, and it should be remembered that the value of a vessel or a combination of vessels Is approximately the product of the offensive and defensive powers. Without attempting to solve this riddle I will close by expressing the opinion that the best battleship to build at present is one which can fight the best at close and fairly close quarters, with sufficient engine power ordinarily to get there, and with obscuring devices either in the form of smoke-producing powders, or smoke-producers of any kind, to prevent an adversary from choosing or using the long range if he desires and is able through his engines so to do.
The following points should be remembered in this connection:
(1) Assuming that a battleship can be built in such a manner that she will have nothing to fear from anything smaller than 12-inch guns, the best ship to build is one having only big guns. A ship with these defensive properties has yet to be designed, and no present design of sea-going ship even approximates to such qualities.
(2) You cannot be accurate if you fire through smoke even if it is thin enough to see through. The same is true of the hot gases from smokeless powder, which are there in equal or greater quantity, and the same error exists unsuspected. Is it the gas or the solid which causes the refraction?
(3) We need fire control (by spotting, by splash) because range finders at the best give only true range ; besides, they too are disturbed by refraction, and in any event we want the pointer's range for the gun he is firing under the given conditions, atmospheric and otherwise. A fire control system can be devised that will work for 12-inch and 6-inch guns together.
(4) In clear weather, it will require time to get to close quarters, plenty of time for a 12-inch battleship to destroy one armed with 6-inch guns only. As a consequence, big guns must be installed. It is only the proportion that is in question. Wasted ammuniton at long range can come from 6-inch as well as from 12-inch guns.
(5) With the advent of torpedoes and mines, and the demise, so to speak, of the ram, speed has ceased to be a great determining factor in battle proper. Good maneuvering qualities are still necessary for the protection of your friends from yourself and vice versa; for the ram is still deadly if applied. Is there any lesson to be gathered from this? Speed is still necessary after battle either to avoid annihilation in case of defeat or to gather the fruits of victory.
The Alarming Condition of the Navy Personnel
(SEE No. 117.)
Commander Roy C. SMITH, U. S. Navy.—This article gives the present writer considerable satisfaction, as it is based on identically the same principles as his own scheme contained in a discussion of Commander Rittenhouse's prize essay of this year (see elsewhere in this number), which discussion was written without any previous knowledge of Lieut-Comdr. Key's article.
The two plans are so nearly alike that a comparison of the differences will not be uninteresting. Both are based on an age in grade or length of service qualification for promotion, with a reserve list for shore duty made up by voluntary applications and selections out from the excess of the sea-going list. A comparison of the ages in grades and corresponding lengths of service in the two schemes is as follows:
Lieut.-Comdr. Key Present writer
Rank Minimum Service Total Minimum Service Total
Age in grade. service age in grade service
Midshipman 15 4 4 15 4 4
Ensign 19 3 7 19 3 7
Lieutenant, J.G. 22 3 10 22 4 11
Lieutenant, 25 11 21 26 6 17
Lieut.-Comdr., 36 7 28 32 8 25
Commander, 43 4 32 40 7 32
Captain, 47 7 39 47 7 39
Rear Admiral, 54
Vice Admiral 54 } 7-9
The present writer did not take into account vice admirals, but he wishes to commend most heartily the whole of Lieut.-Comdr. Key's argument on that subject. The ages in the two schemes, as shown in the above table, are merely a detail. The final ages would have to be arrived at after full consideration by a careful board. It may be .stated that in foreign services, notably the English, the ages are materially lower than in either of the two schemes above.
The other point of difference is this. Lieut.-Comdr. Key fixes his ages, then he computes the average vacancies that will be required in the grades of captain, commander, and lieutenant-commander, in addition to casualties and age retirements, in order to cause the necessary flow of promotion to produce the desired result. Now this method would give correct results when applied to large numbers of men under similar conditions, numbers running into thousands, but when applied to the limited numbers on the navy list, it would only prove correct on the average, or in considering a great many years together. In individual years, from accidental causes, the variations might be so considerable as to deprive the result of all value. Now we know perfectly well what we want* We want to have commanders, and lieutenant-commanders, and lieutenants, and so on, of a certain age, with variations no greater than are to be found in the same naval academy class, that is, we want promotions after a certain length of service. Then why not promote after such length of service, and select out the excess afterwards? This accomplishes directly and without the least complication what the other method accomplishes indirectly and approximately and with considerable complication.
In conclusion, proportion the total list to the tonnage, and make the numbers in the grades percentages of the whole, and promote after a required length of service, with selection out of the excess, and the whole object is accomplished absolutely directly and with no complication whatever.
Purchase System of the Navy
SEE No. 117.)
Pay Inspector T. H. HICKS, U. S. Navy.—It is somewhat difficult to comment upon an article with which one is in absolute agreement in its entirety, and it is in this position that I find myself in regard to "The Purchase System of the Navy."
There is one point, however, which might perhaps be more strongly emphasized—the exaction of penalties by the government for supplies not delivered within the time specified by contracts.
Before the institution of this system, the navy was absolutely at the mercy of unscrupulous contractors in purchasing articles necessitating manufacture by outside parties. Let us suppose, for example, that the government was in need of a certain article which could not be manufactured in less than thirty days. After advertising and issuing proposals, it made a contract for delivery within that time, and so informed the general storekeeper of the yard at which the supplies were to be delivered. In the contract was inserted a clause to the effect that if satisfactory delivery were not made, the government might purchase the supplies from other merchants, charging the increase in cost, if any, to the delinquent contractor. At the expiration of the thirty days, when the government had a right to expect the delivery, the contractor would call upon the general storekeeper, or at the bureau, and, with many protestations of regret, relate a calamitous tale of unforseen acts of God which had prevented his delivering on time; and would request an extension of two weeks, adding an assurance of delivery within that time. That extension was usually granted, the only alternative to the government being a cancellation of contract and the placing of the order with another merchant, thereby necessitating a delay of at least thirty days for manufacture. At the end of the two weeks, another week or ten days would be extracted by the same means, and the government was lucky ordinarily if it obtained delivered within sixty days, double the number in which delivery was originally promised. And. its troubles were not usually ended with delivery. A rival bidder frequently appeared, and entered a charge of bad faith 'against the government, saying in effect, "you stipulated that delivery should be made within thirty days, and I made a bid upon that condition, expecting to work my factory overtime perhaps, to comply with the requirements. Had I known that you would allow sixty days, I could have underbid my rival by a thousand dollars."
The above exemplifies a very common occurrence in former days, and so well was the government's position understood, and taken advantage of, that conditions became well nigh intolerable and the penalty system was devised. A liberal provision for the remission of penalties on account of delays caused by strikes, riots, fires and other disasters, and delays on the part of transportation companies was inserted, and this provision was construed in the most liberal manner; that is, if by any possible conception the delay could be attributed to one of the above causes, penalty was always remitted; if it could not be so attributed, never. And from this position the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts never budged, no matter how great was the political influence brought to bear.
The result was a healthy understanding between the bureau and its contractors, which resulted in deliveries almost satisfactory. Personally I find it difficult to understand how a penalty could ever be remitted upon the ground that no damage has been done to the government, since I am of opinion that one of two contracting parties is always damaged when the contract is violated by the other party; and the actual damage to the government due to retardation of its work on account of delayed deliveries, is but a lesser one.
Far more important is the fact that it may be charged with bad faith by a merchant, who proposes to deliver within the specified time at a certain price—high perhaps, because of the short time allowed—and who sees his rival obtain the contract, take double the time for delivery and reap the fruits of a failure to abide by an agreement.
It would appear to be only fair, therefore, to all concerned, for the government to exact the penalty to the uttermost cent, in every case for which remission is not provided in the contract; or else to abandon the penalty system entirely.
Paymaster DAVID POTTER, U. S. Navy.—In Pay Inspector J. A. Mudd's very instructive article in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE, On "The Purchase System of the Navy," the last part of his remarks is headed "Honesty of Purpose," and that section opens with the following sentences: "But with all the laws and amending of laws, with all the reforms and studied organization, nothing will avail unless we have the constant honest endeavor, the patriotic striving of the human element of the purchase and general store systems. Honesty, thoroughness, and constant endeavor will sow the seed of ability in the most barren soil, and in time, promote efficiency." By these words Pay Inspector Mudd rightly broadens his argument from facts to ideals, from the physical to the ethical. It is, then, the ethics of the "human element" working toward efficiency that I purpose to discuss here.
It has somewhere been finely said that all acts are of three kinds: "Some things we do because we must—they are our work; some things we do because we ought—they are our duty; some things we do because we like—they are our pleasure." It is evident that to reach the perfection of endeavor, so far as obtainable, the characteristics of all these three should unite to form one resultant—thus only (as Pay Inspector Mudd aptly puts it) we will "have inside as much or even more than we paint on the outside."
Work, duty, and pleasure, if rightly considered in our special view of it, are the same thing—qualities so interwelded and interdependent that the test of any one of the three is the test of the others, the absence or presence of one of them the absence or presence of them all. Esprit de corps is a proper part of this resultant also; soldierly alertness and appearance; a fixedness of opinion on matters of right conduct, and ability to state ground for that opinion; resolution, unaggressive but active; knowledge— all these it is believed are a part of an ethical equipment to the full as necessary to the pay-officer as to any other.
It is incumbent on a pay-officer to be even more solicitous as to his Professional ethics than an officer of any other corps. The men who have to do with the "purchase” of articles meet with temptations utterly unknown to the men who use those articles "in being." Some of these temptations are woefully gross, some are appallingly subtle, but all are alike insidious—all alike require ethical character to withstand. This is no idle remark—in every harbor from Port Said to Zamboanga, and from New York to Callao, the pay-officer of the smallest gunboat has met and— thank Heaven! with the rarest exceptions overthrown!—the lion in the path. The ethical standard of the pay-officer must be as constant as the stars—must be almost acutely puritanical—if he would emerge unscathed from such encounters.
Yet with such a standard of ethics knowledge must be incorporated or he will be fit only for the cloister, not for the world of men. I refer not only to the understanding that gives power to do a particular thing in the best way; but to that finer knowledge that gives tact in the handling of men, sympathy and comprehension of those about him, tolerance of the views and actions of such as differ from him. Without this form of knowledge all other forms can avail only for reflection, never for effective execution.
Pay Inspector Mudd in his fine figure of a sideshow presents a truth, the applicability of which to the navy, however unpalatable, cannot be altogether denied. Not long since I heard the same truth put more bluntly by a recent graduate of the Naval Academy: "Before" (he said) "before I entered the service I thought all naval officers were honorable." The conclusion to which he had since come is obvious. It is obvious but lamentable. No group of men can be perfect but—and it may be said with boldness—it is possible for officers of the navy to be more nearly so than any other group of men who work for a living. Naval officers work for the Government; they work, therefore, without the hideous stress of industrial competition; without the false incitement of material advantage; without undue anxiety for their present or future livelihood—they can follow the path of work, duty, and pleasure, in all honor, to the desired resultant—efficiency.
Is Amalgamation a Failure?
(SEE No. 116.)
Lieut.-Commander G. KAENIMERLING, U. S. Navy.—There is probably no profession in which there is more conservatism than that of the sailor, as we have known him in the past, this even to the extent of being hide bound.
In the original article this is touched upon in reference to older officers not being in accord with the present law. When speaking of older officers this should include officers of all branches.
It is easy to recall the time when some of the old school would not accept gracefully the fact that coal was dirty and that it was necessary to have a dirty ship when coaling. That wonderful progress has been made in the right direction is evident when coaling ship has come to be one of the principal drills in which everyone on board ship participates, and has obtained such prominence that a healthy rivalry to excel in this 'respect has sprung up between ships, as also a rivalry between various sections on board ship.
The writer of this, being not one of the older officers, at least as regards rank, and having been one of the reformees during all the radical evolution periods of the service, beginning with the act of August 5, 1882, as a member of the class of '81, exactly on the dividing line of what was and what was to be, feels justified in giving his views, as he certainly has had evolution experience.
He has, so to speak, been repeatedly operated upon. As one receives Positive and lasting impressions during times of upheaval, as in war if actively engaged, so the experience in the midst of these service upheavals must leave a strong impression, if one is devoted to his work, has an interest in the service, and is ambitious.
The article under discussion may be generally divided into the following leading captions:
1st. The necessity for the present law.
2d. That the law if carried out will provide what is needed, the course of engineering instructions being better now than it has ever been.
3d. That the line officer must be a good all-around officer, but there should be a limited number detailed to specialize not only in marine engineering, but also in ordnance and electricity.
With reference to the first caption, I am not in exact accord with the reason given for the existence of the law.
Though agreeing on the second caption, it is believed that too much reliance is generally placed on the schooling at the Naval Academy in itself making an officer.
It would seem that no argument can be advanced against the scheme of the third caption, referring to specializing, unless it is the details of accomplishing this.
Engineering should be the foundation of a naval officer's training of to-day, as it is now in our service. The law was a natural sequence, and forced itself on the service because it was a development of the times. It was not so much foresight which planned the law, as it was a necessity because engineering asserted itself.
If the law had been accepted in good faith at the beginning, much better results would have been attained by this time, notwithstanding the dearth of officers, which was of course a very great impediment. Many of the officers, especially those of higher rank, did not consider the law a true solution of the real demands of the service.
Many commanders of ships, being well versed in their profession but having had no engineering training, were not inclined to give the engineering the consideration it should have on board ship. With the rising of the younger officers to the higher rank all this will be corrected and it is believed much better results will be obtained.
Although the engineering course at the Naval Academy is an excellent one, that in itself does not make the graduates engineers, nor does the course necessarily make efficient line officers.
Because a man takes a course in medicine he is not necessarily an efficient doctor; though he studies law he may still not be a capable lawyer; nor does the study of painting ensure a good painter. For the same reason the schooling at the Naval Academy does not necessarily make a good naval officer.
The schooling in all professions, though so necessary, is after all only the foundation, the man's hardest work and what really determines his success being his application after he leaves school.
It is for that reason that unless after leaving school an officer has an opportunity to develop because of the duties assigned him, his schooling counts for little.
For that reason, after graduation, though the officer may not be subjected to a regular course of instruction, a close record should be kept as to his capability, which means primarily his application. The scrutiny, then, which is supposed to be exercised at the Academy, should not be relinquished in the lower grades.
Though everyone knows that anybody's place can be filled by someone, it does not follow that it can be filled by anyone, not even if they all have had the same schooling and subsequent training.
On that account the personal factor should have more consideration, and it is believed there is now a decided tendency in that direction.
This is mentioned because since the passage of the personnel bill and until recently this has not been the case.
It is noted that in war times much attention is given to special fitness. Special men are selected for specific duties.
In other words, during peace times the human and personal factor is not given enough consideration, an officer on the round peg and square hole principle being frequently assigned to a duty for which he is not especially fitted, though sometimes to his liking because of personal considerations. In such cases the office and government naturally do not profit much.
It is especially the round peg and square hole procedure more than anything else which makes the promotion by seniority a necessity during peace times.
War, if it lasts long enough, develops the right man, and sometimes he comes to the front from obscurity.
The only difficulty of to-day is that the initial blows in wars count for so much, and that the wars are not likely to be of such long duration as formerly, so that we should not have to wait for the development of the right man.
This makes thorough training all the more necessary, and should require not only a severe course at the Naval Academy, but also a severe supervision of the lower grades when as in civil life a man really establishes his position in his profession, rather than by his school standing.
The suggestion that a limited number of specialties for various branches of the service be selected from the lieutenant grade when coming up for promotion to lieutenant-commander, does not seem to meet the requirements, in so far that one's promotion to any particular grade is a decidedly variable factor as time goes on.
One's special development should be effected at a certain age, not when one has a specific rank with which, as the law stands, age has nothing to do. For instance, the writer was promoted to the grade of lieutenant-commander when he was 45 years old, hardly an age for him to await until he should be allowed to select as a specialist.
A much more desirable arrangement would provide for the selection of the specialists at the expiration of a fixed number of years after their leaving the Academy, the number of years to be made as small as possible.
The fact that, under the old law, engineers had a special training, did not make them all designing engineers because of this, as in all professions, the real development of professional qualities depended upon the application of the individual after graduation.
Foreign services, it is believed, not only permit but encourage officers by special consideration in assignment of duties and allowances to develop themselves in specific directions for which they have a leaning or talent. The dearth of officers has prohibited any such consideration on the part of the department, but when officers are capable such ambitions should be encouraged when admissible, as it would accrue to the interest of the service.
The only branch which has this privilege now is the construction corps, where it is done invariably and most extensively, each officer being given a long special course.
As each bureau is responsible for its particular work, it should have something to say about the officers selected as specialists coming under the profession of that particular bureau.
This also, it is believed, is the invariable rule with the construction corps.
In conclusion, the writer believes that, above all other things, we should not have another service upheaval. We have had an illustration from results and the extant discussions of the personnel act, how long it takes after such an upheaval to come to a fairly smooth working condition.
ough slight modifications as above suggested, as to specialists, etc., are desirable, the fundamental purpose of the law should not be changed. Much can be done at once if the best use is made of the authority given by the present law, and it should not be difficult to obtain legislation allowing a fixed number of specialists in each branch. In the meantime, as the law stands, a disposition to specialize, where there is an evidence of ability in the right direction, should be encouraged.