The accounts that we read of the final naval battle between the Japanese and Russians are so meager that one may easily become confused if he tries to make out exactly what things happened, and the succession in which they happened. Most accounts seem to show, however, that the two following conditions existed:
1. The two forces were so nearly equal in material, that whatever difference there was may be neglected in this inquiry.
2. The two forces were so nearly equal in bravery, that whatever difference there was may be neglected in this inquiry.
The cause of Togo's victory, therefore, was not the superiority of his forces in material or bravery. What was it?
Two causes stand out plainly:
1. The Japanese fleet handling was better than the Russian.
2. The Japanese gunnery was better than the Russian.
Of these two causes, it is clearly impossible to decide which was the more important. Good gunnery is of little use, unless the fleet handling be so skillful as to keep many guns bearing on the enemy; and good fleet handling is of little use, unless the guns which it keeps bearing on the enemy are accurately fired. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide which of the two was the more important, because excellence in either is not gotten at the expense of excellence in the other.
The fact that the Japanese excelled the Russians in both fleet handling and in gunnery, combined with the fact that the contestants were practically equal in material and in bravery, seems to explain Togo's victory so completely that the stating of it as a cause seems like the stating of a platitude. But platitudes have sometimes a great advantage over more interesting statements,—the advantage of being true.
But, even if the better fleet handling and gunnery of the Japanese be accepted as the causes of Togo's victory, it may be well to remind ourselves that they were the immediate causes, and that immediate causes are often intermediate causes ;—the mere results of more important causes.
We may now seek, therefore, for the causes which made the Japanese fleet handling and gunnery better than the Russian fleet handling and gunnery.
A comparison of the two fleets shows us at once two important points of difference:
1. The Russians went into battle for the first time. The Japanese had been in battle on August 10, only ten months before; and many of the officers and crews had served in the war with China, ten years before.
2. The Japanese fleet had been in existence longer than the Russian fleet, and had, therefore, been drilled longer as a fleet.
Probably nine men in ten would declare, at once, that, of these two factors, actual experience in battle was the more important, in preparing the Japanese for battle.
But why is experience in battle a better preparation for battle than mere drill in peace? What is the definite reason?
Is it not simply because drill in peace is lacking in certain elements of realism? Is it not because mere drill is, at the best, an imitation? Is it not because the best way to prepare for any performance is to rehearse it, under conditions as close as possible to the conditions under which the performance will eventually be given?
Of course it is. In Togo's case, however, even the maneuvers and drills of his fleet during several months before the final battle were held under the conditions of absolute war, and, therefore, under conditions of the most intense realism. This realism could not fail to give definiteness to the maneuvers and drills, and to inspire in every man that genuine interest which every man feels in what is really real.
It may be stated, therefore, that Togo won because he and his fleet had been trained under conditions which were more realistic than those under which the Russian admiral and his fleet had been trained; and that the result of the battle, though infinitely more important than the victory of a properly trained foot-ball team over an improperly trained foot-ball team, rested on the same principles, and could have been as easily predicted, had the facts been known.
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Now human nature is so selfish that the past has little interest for us, unless we can find in it some guidance for our own future.
If Togo won because he and his fleet had been prepared for battle by experiences more realistic than the experiences which the Russian fleet had had, does this not guide us to the conclusion that our own drills and maneuvers should be made as realistic, as much like battle, as possible?
If so, does it not follow that every element should be introduced into our drills and maneuvers that can make them more realistic? And does it not also follow that every contrary element should be left out—every element of mere show, prettiness, and spectacularism?
Furthermore, since the naval profession has become a profession rapidly expanding, a profession in which an increasing amount of time is needed for study, thought, discussion, and observation, does it not also follow that every useless custom, ceremony, and piece of uniform should be discarded;—to the end that the work of every man, like the work of every well-regulated engine, shall be economically expended, and as little as possible frittered away in "losses"?