SHIPS OF WAR, BUDGETS, AND PERSONNEL.
FRANCE.
The French budget for 1905 consists of the following ships: Edgard Quinet, armored cruiser of 14,300 tons, 40,000 horsepower, and 24 knots; C 17, probably a sister; four destroyers—M 40-43—of 431 tons, 6800 horsepower, and 28 knots; 20 torpedo-boats, 18o tons, of the woo programme-295-369; eight submarines—Q 53-60.—Engineer.
The Moniteur de la Flotte, under date of March 4, states that it has been decided to make the Edgard-Quinet (C-D5) and C-17 sister ships to the Ernest Renan, that is, they will be of 157 meters length, 21.4 meters beam, and 23 knots speed. The intermediate battery of the two new cruisers will consist of 16 164.7 mm. guns instead of the 12 smaller guns carried by the Ernest Renan, and C-17 will have 194 mm. guns of the latest model, equivalent in power to the 240 mm. guns of the preceding model.
The boilers of the two armored cruisers Jules Ferry and Jules Michelet will be of the Du Temple-Guyot type, with small tubes, but the majority of the other vessels under construction will be fitted with Niclausse or Belleville steam generators with large tubes.
It appears that when the battleship Justice was launched by the Societe de la Mediterranee, her hull was considerably strained, and an inquiry is to be held into the manner in which vessels are launched by this company.
The next programme of construction is expected to contain particulars of a new class of protected cruiser, approximating to the scout type of the British navy. They are to be of 3000 tons displacement, with 26 knots speed, and the first batch will probably be laid down in the course of this year.—Page's Weekly.
The Yacht draws the attention of French officers to the intention of the British Admiralty to do away with those vessels which have no fighting value. The writer thinks the French should follow our example. A great many of the torpedo-boats dating from 1876 to 1890, should disappear. Our contemporary would have even some of the seagoing boats which cannot now steam at more than 18 knots removed from the list. Four despatch vessels of the Condor type, eight of the Bombe type, and the Fleurus, Wattignies, Leger, and Levrier would also go. As to some of the cruisers, the Sfax should be struck off the list forthwith, and the Tage, Cecille, Isly, and Jean Bart as soon as possible. In short, it is proposed to do away with, as useless, eighteen various cruisers and about sixty torpedo-boats. In relation to this matter we notice that vessels of better classes are now being attached to the mobile defense stations, the old 35-meter boats being displaced.—Army and Navy Gazette.
LOSS OF THE SULLY.—Officers of the French navy have the complete sympathy of their British comrades in the disaster which has befallen the new armored cruiser Sully. According to the report of Rear-Admiral Bayle, the rock upon which she struck was not in the chart, which seems most probable, the damage done is most serious, and there is little hope of saving her. The Sully has been unfortunate, and it will be remembered that the naval officers at Toulon said she was not in a fit state to leave, and had a serious difference of opinion with M. Pelletan on that matter. The Sully is a sister of the Gloire, Conde, Marseillaise, and Amiral Aube, and her cost approached one million sterling. Her displacement is 9850 tons, and she has engines of 20,000 horsepower, with Belleville boilers, calculated for a speed of 21 knots. The cruiser carries two 7.6-inch, eight 6.4-inch, six 3.9-inch, sixteen 6-pounders, and six 3-pounders. She belongs to a very powerful class and is well protected. We hope she may be saved, and it is at least gratifying that there has been no loss of life. The Sully was built at La Seyne, and was completed only in 1903.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Toulon correspondent of Le Yacht in describing certain exercises of the French Mediterranean Fleets, notes that the two squadrons engaged opened fire at the unusual distance of 7000 meters, upwards of four miles. The writer observes that this extension of the ordinary range may be attributed to the success which has attended the Japanese operations at long range. Not long since Admiral Fournier regarded 4500 meters as a suitable distance at which to commence firing, while the English ships generally opened at 5000 meters.—United Service Gazette.
INCREASE IN THE PERSONNEL—The Officers (Executive) CO/TS, which in 1899 numbered 811, has now risen to 1250, showing an increase of 439 in the five years. During the same period the number of engineer officers has risen from 128 to 223; of surgeons, from 142 to 197; of paymasters, from 104 to 164. Similarly the number of warrant officers has risen from 1058 to 1587; of petty officers, from 4740 to 7111; and of seamen from 17,597 to 24,820. It is contemplated to raise the number of the officers and men to 60,000 by 1817, when the naval programme of 1900 has been carried out.—United Service Institution.
The new first-class battleship Patrie, which is completing at the La Seyne Yard, Toulon, is to receive as part of her armament a new and more powerful type of 17.7-inch torpedo, the pressure in the air chamber being 2133 pounds instead of 128o pounds to the square inch. The new torpedo will be supplied to all battleships following the Patrie, and also to the Jules Ferry and all later cruisers, as well as to the Carquois and all the later torpedo-boats, the submarine Q47, and the new ones to follow. The new torpedo, however, is so heavy that it will be awkward to handle in the smaller boats.—United Service Institution.
NEW TYPE OF CRUISER.—M. Bertin, Director of the Technical Section of Naval Construction, has just submitted for the consideration of the Minister of Marine plans of a new type of scout cruiser of 1600 tons displacement. These new cruisers are of the new English Scout type. They will be 230 feet long, with a 13-feet draft of water. The engines are to develop 3800 I. H. P., which should give a speed of 18 knots, and enable them to run for 7300 miles without having to coal. Their armament will consist of four 5.2-inch quick-fire guns, placed in sponsons, and four on deck. They will also have seven torpedo-tubes, of which two will be submerged.—United Service Institution.
FRENCH SUBMARINES.—The new submarine X was launched at Cherbourg on the 15th ult. She is one of a new type, and with two others, Z at Rochefort, and Y at Toulon, is being constructed for experimental purposes. Of the three X is the smallest, her displacement being only 168 tons, as against 202 of Z, and 213 of Y. Her plans are by M. Romazotti, who designed the Morse and Naiade types. Her dimensions are as follows: Length, 122 feet; beam, to feet, draft of water 6 feet 6 inches. Her motor is to have a power of 220 horsepower, which should give a speed of 10.5 knots, and she will have accumulators and an explosion motor.
Four new submarines are to be laid down at Rochefort, after designs by M. Petithomme. They will be somewhat smaller than the Castor type, and they will only have a displacement of 44 tons. Six of the same type are to be constructed at Cherbourg, and the whole group will be known as Guepe No. 1, No. 2, up to 10.
The submarine Otarie, of the Lynx type, recently launched at Rochefort, went successfully through its trials. 80 feet long, 8 feet broad, with a displacement of 68 tons, the Otarie has a speed of only 8 knots. This altogether inferior speed is the greatest defect of submarines of this type.
These submarines are provided with the Panhard-Levassor petrol motor, which enables them to navigate on the surface and to charge their accumulators meanwhile, till ready to be submerged.
The cruiser Foudre, torpedo-ship, has recently transported to Saigon two submarines of this type.
Trials have been carried out at Cherbourg between the submarine Z and the submersible Aigrette, from Rochefort and Toulon respectively, before a commission presided over by Rear-Admiral Philibert. Submarine Z was built at Rochefort on the designs of M. Mangas, naval engineer. Its length is 142 feet; displacement, 200 tons; I. H. P., 190; speed, 11 knots. It is provided with an explosion motor.
The submersible Aigrette, designed by M. Laubceuf, is 146 feet long, with displacement of 172 tons; I. H. P., 172; speed, 10 1/2 knots; explosion motor.
Called upon by M. Pelletan to confer with him on the important question of increasing the radius of action of submarines, M. Laubceuf, naval engineer- in-chief, to whom we owe the excellent submersibles of the Narval type, which for two years have worked with the Northern Squadron without giving the least trouble, has submitted to the minister a scheme for a new submersible where radius of action will be far greater than former ones, the displacement, however, being equal to those now in use.
Another point is that the time of immersion from the surface to below the surface will be greatly reduced, two minutes at the most, whereas formerly it took seven or eight minutes. It is easy to grasp the importance M. Laubceurs idea is diminishing the time of diving. A submersible can be seen at least three miles by a destroyer, and, going at full speed, it takes five or six minutes for the destroyer to reach and attack the submersible, which formerly had not the time to plunge and shelter itself behind its liquid armor. Now, therefore, the only defect in the submarine has disappeared. The increase of radius of action will be arrived at owing to new motors and accumulators, which, of equal weight, will possess a capacity double of those now in use.—United Service Institution.
THE STATIONS OF THE SUBMARINES—There will be a considerable increase in the number of these stations in 1905; there are only four of these in existence at present, or five, if Indo-China is included, where, however, nothing is ready for the reception of the boats; during 1905 these stations are to be increased to twelve.
1. Dunkirk.—Four submarines, which will be in commission the whole year; two of these, the Francais and Algerien, have been on trial for a long time, and have shown their good qualities; the other two, the Gnome and Lutin, are of a newer type.
2. Cherbourg.—Seven submersibles, the Narval, Sirene, Silure, Espadon, Triton, to which will be added two others, the Aigrette and Cigogne, under completion at Toulon, and two submarines proper, the Morse and X of a new type.
3. Toulon.—In addition to the GymnOte and Gustave-Zede, which were the foundation of our flotilla, there will be in commission next year for the whole twelve months, the small submarines Loutre, Grondin, Anguille, and Y, a large submarine of quite a new type, which is under construction, and one submersible, the Omega, in commission for seven months.
4. Ajaccio.—The two small submarines Alose and Truite.
5. Bonifacio.—The small submarines Souffleur and Dorade.
6. Algiers.—The two small submarines Perle and Esturgeon; the following vessels of the same type will be stationed at the under-mentioned places on the North African Coast:
7. La Goulette.—The submarines Castor and Otarie.
8. Susa.—The submarines Bonite and Thon.
9. Biserta.—The submarines Farfadet and Korrigan, and one of the smaller type, the Phoque, and one of a new type Z, now completing at Rochefort.
There are three other colonial stations, which will each have a group of the Naiade type of submarine, viz.:
10. Rach-Dua (Cape St. James) or Saigon.—The Protee and Lynx.
11. Tonkin.—Oursin, Meduse.
12. Diego-Suarez.—Naiade, Ludion.
Although this long list of forty submarine units seems imposing, they are, however, of various value. To speak the truth, if the five submersibles of the Narval type, the Gymnote, and Gustave Zede, the three submarines of the Morse type, and the four of the Gnome, can be counted on with some degree of certainty, the same cannot be said of the others. The small automobile submarines of the Naiade type have not been altogether satisfactory, and the question has been asked whether it would not be better to remove their explosion motors, and only keep the electric system; to do this, however, is to reduce their radius of action.
The opinion is also freely expressed that the Ministry of Marine has embarked too lightly on the construction of a large number of submarine units, before proper experiments have been carried out, and that it would have been wiser to have limited the number of experimental types, while continuing to construct vessels of the Sirene and Francais class, which, in spite of their imperfections, would prove a real and practical addition to our submarine stations.—United Service Institution.
GERMANY.
The German naval budget for 1905 proposes an increase of 141 officers and 2652 petty officers and seamen, bringing the total numbers to 2040 officers and 38,632 seamen, etc. It is proposed to lay down two new battleships, one large cruiser, and three smaller ones, besides torpedo craft, and a specially designed vessel for service with submarines. The German Navy League is making great efforts to secure a larger displacement and heavier guns for the battleships. The new large cruiser will be similar to one already in process of construction, and will have a displacement of 12,000 tons, with a speed of not less than 22.5 knots.—United Service Gazette.
The German navy estimates for 1905 amount to a total of 232,200,000 marks. Sums are provided for the completion of the battleships Preussen and Hessen, of the armored cruiser York, of the small cruisers Munchen and Lubeck, and of a division of torpedo-boats, as also for the reconstruction of the ships of the Brandenburg class. This reconstruction has proved more costly than was anticipated, and an additional sum is required. The estimates also provide for the laying down of the two last ships of the Deutschland class, Q and R, and of the large cruiser D, the small cruisers O, Ersatz Wacht and Ersatz Blitz, a division of torpedo-boats, a mining vessel, the gunboat C, which has been delayed, a river gunboat, and a surveying ship. There is also a charge of one and a half million marks for the trial or purchase of submarine boats. In regard to the personnel, there will be 100 new officers, including a vice-admiral, two rear-admirals, and four captains.—Army and Navy Gazette.
A mishap has befallen the German battleship Elsass, concerning which not much has been disclosed. She was steaming outside Kiel a few weeks ago, when she lost her rudder. The ship has been built at the Danzig yard of Herr Schichau, and Ueberall remarks that there must have been something very defective in the construction, if it be true that the accident happened owing to pressure of water when the ship was turning. It is understood that the Elsass will be under repair for a considerable time. The coast-defense ship Aegir, which has been lengthened, has recently attained a speed of 15.27 on trial. The battleship Schwaben has also been under trial, as well as the armored cruiser Friedrich Carl, and the small cruiser Bremen. The Friedrich Carl attained a speed of 18.7 knots with forced draft, and the Bremen of 23.29 knots.—Army and Navy Gazette.
Ueberall reports that the German battleship Braunschweig in her trials made an average of 18.43 knots during a five-hours' run. Her contract speed is 18 knots. In an endurance trial of eleven hours her engines developed an average of 11,588 horsepower. The average speed is not given, but with her engines developing 10,270 horsepower her speed was 16.41 knots, and 17.497 knots with 12,730 horsepower. The replacing of the rudder, which the German battleship Elsass lost on her trials, will take some time. The Barbarossa, of the Kaiser class, will be commissioned to take her place while she is in dock. The Barbarossa also lost her rudder in consequence of the breaking of her stern-post, and has been in dock under repair. Both vessels were built by the Schichau firm. At the trials of the German coast-defence ship Aegir after her reconstruction, the highest speed she attained was 15.27 knots. The results of the trials of the battleship Schwaben are still not published, but it is still hoped that she will be able to make 18 knots in deep water. The armored cruiser Friedrich Karl in a twenty-four hours' run averaged about 18.7 knots, her engines developing an average of 17,759 horsepower. The sea ran high and there was a strong wind against her. Later she made 20.5 knots in a six-hours' run, which still leaves something to be desired. The protected cruiser Bremen made 23.288 knots on the measured mile in deep water. In an endurance trial of ninety-three hours her engines averaged 124 revolutions. The speed is not given, but with 120.55 revolutions her speed was 20.327 knots, and with 135.88 revolutions 22.466 knots. In a long run, therefore, she can be depended upon to maintain a speed of from 20.5 to 21 knots; but it is a pity she cannot carry more coal. The sea-going torpedo-boat S 123 made 28.3 knots on her trials. The same rate of speed was reached by S 125, which is the boat fitted with turbines, and built for a 27-knot speed. The armored cruiser Prinz Adalbert, while running under full steam with forced draft, burst the high-pressure cylinder of one of her engines. A new cylinder will have to be put in.—Engineering.
THE BATTLESHIP DEUTSCHLAND.—On November 19, at Krupp's Germania Yard, Kiel, the first ship of the new class, known until now as the N class, was launched, and received the name of Deutschland, by the Emperor, who performed the christening ceremony. The evolution of German naval construction which has led to the type of battleship just launched may be said to have started from the ships of the Kaiser class; these were followed by those of the Wittelsbach class, a much improved edition of which is the series of battleships, Braunschweig (i9o2), Elsass (1903), Lothringen (1904), Preussen, and Hessen. The warships launched in the last financial year are: Battleships, Preussen, Hessen, Elsass; armored cruisers, Roon, York; protected cruisers, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin.
The Deutschland initiates a new series of improved Braunschweigs, though the improvements may be said to concern more details than the basis on which the German Admiralty has founded the solution of the battleship problem.
One improvement is the increase of the battery armor, which in the Braunschweig is 6-inch, and in the new ships will be 64-inch. In the Braunschweig class the four 17-cm. (6.7-inch) quick-firing guns, above the battery, are mounted in turrets, whilst in the new class this installation has been repudiated, and single casemates have been adopted instead of turrets. This is a remarkable instance of the difference of opinions entertained on the subject of turrets versus single casemates by English and German authorities, and it may be of interest here to examine the pros and cons of both systems. The reasons which have led the German Admiralty to adopt single casemates for intermediate-caliber guns are enumerated by Nauticus, and may be reduced to the following: Diminution in weight, greater simplicity in the transmission of orders, and economy; the advantage is also emphasized which is obtained by being able to place the 8.8-cm. (3.5-inch) quick-fire on the top of the casemates, so that these guns are well supported and their ammunition hoists protected. As for the drawbacks of single casemates, the principle is the great reduction of the angles of training, if an efficient protection is to be obtained. In regard to the mounting of intermediate-caliber guns, what has taken place in the British navy is just the contrary of the latest German practice. The system of single casemates is the one which has been exclusively adopted in England up to the ships of the King Edward class. This class and the Lord Nelson class mark a decided improvement on the Queen, London, and Formidable classes, especially on account of the installation of the secondary armament. The British navy may be said to have the best experience as far as single casemates are concerned; in fact, up to the two last classes of ships built and building, the proportion of guns of intermediate caliber mounted in single casemates, turrets, and box batteries, expressed in percentage of the total number of such guns, is:
In the British navy 92 4 4
In the German navy 32 31 37
Now, just when commencing a new series of warships, England is condemning single casemates—in which more than 850 British naval guns are mounted—and adopting turrets, whilst Germany substitutes turrets with single casemates in the new Deutschland class.
The progress in torpedoes and torpedo craft has required an improvement in what the Germans call " Antitorpedobootsartillerie," and this is, no doubt, to account for the increase of 8.8-cm. guns in the Deutschland class. Apropos of the armament best fitted to fight destroyers, the late experience seems to prove the inefficiency of 37-mm. machine guns, and points out to naval designers radical modifications in the choice and distribution of small guns in the battleships of the future.
If that expression, which has had such great success among amateurs of naval problems, that "the microbe will kill the giant" has some particle of sense in it, this is only owing to the fact that the progress of anti-torpedo artillery has not kept ahead of the progress of torpedo armament. Those of the new school who have proclaimed the "banqueroute des grands cuirasses" as they picturesquely call it, have still to reckon with a current of new ideas which will probably revolutionize the whole system of anti-torpedo-boat guns, their caliber, and their installation. No caliber under 3-inch will prove efficient, and instead of scattering machine guns on military tops, or wherever there is room left for them, where they are sure to be swept off by the first shells exploding on the enormous superstructures of the present battleships, a more rational plan must be studied, by means of which it must be possible to concentrate in a few positions the required number of guns which are to do their work throughout the whole naval action in which the ship will be engaged. These guns must have the command of the sea in all directions, within a range of at least 2000 yards, so that any torpedo craft sighted between 3000 and 2000 yards may be annihilated before it gets within a dangerous distance. An inclination to standardize the calibers of the heavy guns and abolish intermediate calibers may be noticed in the ideas lately expressed by different naval critics; if this will mark the new direction of progress in naval design, the new types of battleships will be with great probability based on a heavy gun standard caliber and a standard anti-torpedo-boat caliber, presumably 12-inch guns and 8.8-cm. to 10.5-cm. (3.5-inch to 4 1/8-inch) guns, respectively.
To return to the Deutschland and point out some of her features, which will confer to the whole class of her name a number of valuable qualities, and make it an ensemble of powerful, uniform, and well-protected fighting units. The Deutschland embodies a thoroughly well studied compromise of all the requirements a German battleship must answer to. As it may be instructive to compare the principal data of the Deutschland with those of other types of warships lately built and building, their characteristics have been gathered in the accompanying table. The most remarkable feature of German naval design is the so-called "intermediate displacement," which also in the new class is not surpassed. No doubt there are good reasons to account for conservatism in this practice—reasons of a general kind, applying to the navies of all countries, and others imposed by special conditions which the German navy must satisfy. The advocates of the 13,000-ton displacement say, first of all, that experience shows that it is not prudent to lay too "high a stake on one card"; besides, Germany must reckon with shallow waters, canals, and limited possibilities of docking.
Considering the displacement, the Deutschland is a capital warship, which reflects much credit on German naval constructors, as she is the happy result of an organic and rational conception of what a fighting ship should be. It might be observed that, since battleships are made to fight battleships, their absolute value is of much smaller importance than their relative value as compared to other battleships, and, once the type is established to which a fighting unit must belong, this must stand fair chances of success whenever engaged in a combat with whatever other unit of type chosen. It is not always practically possible to apply this theory, but whenever one of the fighting qualities of a warship is in a condition of inferiority, some other prominent feature should be so developed as to make up for the one defective, just in the same way as nature in some living beings develops the sensibility of some organs when that of some others is missing or imperfect. To come to a concrete case, if a limited displacement is a condition sine qua non for a given battleship, her speed must be such that in ordinary circumstances she must be at liberty to accept or refuse a battle, and impose the combat and its conditions upon the adversary. Limited displacements and great speeds are only compatible with the sacrifice of protection, armament, or tactical qualities, but in the whole the sacrifice of one of these may lead to a fighting unit of more military value than that in which offensive and defensive qualities are equally distributed.
For the sake of argument we may consider the instance of a modified Deutschland, say with 20 knots speed; she would always be able to get out of the way of a Republique, which, owing to her inferiority in speed, would not get a chance to utilize her formidable armament; such a Deutschland could on the other side inflict severe damage on a Triumph with her heavy 28-cm. guns.
A Deutschland, as she actually is, with 18 knots speed, cannot escape a Republique nor prevent her 9-inch belt armor being pierced by the Republique's 12-inch guns, and cannot inflict any serious damage upon this hypothetical enemy whose armor makes her the most invulnerable ship afloat; the 18-knot-speed Deutschland would not have a chance to engage in a battle with the Triumph, which, conscious of the Deutschland's superiority, offensive and defensive, would have to rely for her safety completely on the evolutionary superiority her 19 knots speed confers on her.
Examining further the fighting qualities of the Deutschland, it may be said that the choice of the 17-cm. guns, as an intermediate caliber, has more enthusiasts than opponents. The latter affirm that all guns above 6-inch cease to be easily handled, and that the rate of fire is much reduced if they are not loaded automatically, and therefore the doubtful advantage of a better protection and of economy in weight is not enough to justify their mounting in casemates.
Regarded as gun target, it may be said of the Deutschland that in this respect she will mark no improvement on her predecessors. But the proportions superstructures have assumed in modern war vessels is no specialty of German ships alone. The amount of deck-houses, bridges, platforms, guns, and other encumbrances crowded in the neighborhood of the conning tower form a characteristic feature in most other navies' ships, and it is inexplicable how this condemnable practice has so many adherents.—Engineer.
GREAT BRITAIN.
PLANS AND ESTIMATES.-A memorandum of the navy estimates just issued shows the estimate for 1905-1906 to be $166,945,000, against $184,445,000 for the current year.
The Admiralty proposes to build during the year one battleship, four armored cruisers, five ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyers, one ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyer of an experimental type, twelve coastal torpedo-boat destroyers, and eleven submarine boats.
King Edward has approved naming the new battleship Dreadnaught and one of the armored cruisers Invincible. The number of men asked for is 129,000, a reduction of 2100.
It has been decided to appoint a rear-admiral to take charge of all the torpedo craft in home waters.
The memorandum says that flotillas of submarine boats are in course of organization.
Since the commencement of the year more than Too vessels have been commissioned in the reserve.
Lord Selborne, the retiring First Lord of the Admiralty, who has been appointed High Commissioner in South Africa, says the fleet was never in a more perfect state of repair than at present. In discussing new construction he says the study of tactical and other questions led the board to the conclusion that two classes of destroyers are required, one for ocean work and the other for narrow seas. They accordingly decided to combine the qualities of speed and sea-keeping power in a special type of ocean-going destroyer, which is expensive, and the numbers of which must necessarily be few, and to design a new type of coastal destroyer which will be cheap.
Between January 1, 1904, and March 31, 1905, the following ships have been or will be completed and available:
Four battleships, one armored cruiser, four third-class cruisers, twelve submarine boats and a new Admiralty yacht.
At the present time the following are under construction:
Eight battleships, fifteen armored cruisers, one second-class cruiser, one third-class cruiser, eight scouts, eighteen destroyers, and eleven submarine boats.
Lord Selborne announces the constitution of the committee on designs to assist the Admiralty Board, with Admiral Sir John A. Fisher as president. He says the work of this committee will enable the board to insure to the navy the immediate benefit of experience derived from Russo-Japanese naval warfare. He asks Parliament for $25o,000 for the commencement of a second royal yacht. The total amount for the commencement of new ships is a little more than $6,250,000.
In conclusion Lord Selborne says it is now certain that oil has taken a place as a fuel for the navy.
THE NEW BATTLESHIPS OF THE LORD NELSON CLASS.—The Admiralty has placed the contracts for the two battleships of the Lord Nelson class, one with Beardmore & Co., Clyde, and the other with Palmer & Co., Jarrow. Had the two lowest tenders been accepted, both would have been built on the Clyde. However, the Government wished to distribute the work. The battleships will be the most powerful yet designed, and will be the highest conception of science as applied to destructive power. They will be 410 feet long, by 73 feet 6 inches, and 16,500 tons burden, or 100 tons more than the ships of the King Edward VII class, while the speed will be 18 knots. In respect of gunpower, the new ships will mark a greater advance than is indicated by this figure. The earlier ships were fitted with four 12-inch guns, four 9.2-inch breech loaders, and ten 6-inch quick-fire, whereas the new ships will have four 12-inch guns and ten 9.2-inch guns, in addition to smaller guns. An increase has also been made in the length of the guns, as the 12-inch weapons in the new ships will be of 45 calibers instead of 40, and the 9.2-inch guns of 5o calibers instead of 45. Thus, separately as well as collectively, they will far excel in power the armament of any preceding ship. In respect of armor, an advance has also been made, for while the maximum thickness of plates on the broadside of the King Edward VII class is 9 inches, the more vital parts of the Lord Nelson class will have 12-inch armor. The engines of the new ships are to develop 16,450 I. H. P., and their cost will be about a million and a half each. They are to be ready for commission in three years' time.—United Service Institution.
MACHINERY OF BRITISH CRUISERS.—The British Admiralty has placed orders for the machinery of three armored cruisers which are to be constructed in the Royal dockyards. One of the ships will be engined by Scott's Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., of Greenock, another by Harland & Wolff, Belfast, and the third by Humphrys, Tennant & Co., London. These cruisers, to be known as the Minotaur class, are of 14,600 tons displacement, and in respect of guns and armor will be the most powerful cruisers in the British navy, having four 9.2-inch guns and ten of 7.5-inch caliber. The speed will be 23 knots, to be attained by machinery of 27,000 I. H. P. There will be four cylinders in each engine, although the triple-compound system will be still adopted. The diameter of the cylinders is 40 5/8 inches in the case of the high-pressure cylinder, 65 1/2 inches in the intermediate, and 74 5/8 inches for each of the low-pressure cylinders, the stroke in all cases being 48 inches. The power is to be maintained with the engines making 125 revolutions. Babcock & Wilcox and Yarrow water-tube boilers will be adopted.—Nautical Gazette.
Considerable alterations and additions are being made to the battleship King Edward VII to fit her for liquid fuel as an alternative to coal. It is anticipated that these alterations, which are being carried out at Devonport, will be completed before the end of February.—United Service Gazette.
To-day (December 10) the sixth Britannia takes the water, Lady Londonderry performing the naming ceremony at the launch at Portsmouth. The old Britannia (late Prince of Wales), which has served as training ship at Dartmouth since 1869, will soon cease to be, the naval college on the hill being now nearly complete. Indeed, by the time the new vessel is ready to hoist the pennant the new institution should be in full working order. The first Britannia was laid down in 1682, and entered into service in December, 1690, as the flagship of Russell. She fought at La Hogue, and later was flagship to Rooke, and to Shove11 during the war of the Spanish Succession. The second Britannia was built in 1715 from the timbers of the first, but in the course of an existence extending over thirty years she never once took part in an action. The third Britannia, "Old Ironsides" of Trafalgar fame, was launched at Portsmouth in 1762, but was not commissioned for some sixteen years. She flew the flag of Darby at the relief of Gibraltar in 1781, of Barrington in the following year, of Hotham in 1792, when she was in several engagements in the Mediterranean, and of Thompson at the battle off Cape St. Vincent. In 1803 she was again commissioned for active service as the flagship of Lord Northesk, and was at Trafalgar. After this she was again laid up, and eventually her name was changed to the St. George. The fourth Britannia was launched in 1820. Her principal service was performed in the Black Sea, when she flew the flag of the commander-in-chief at the bombardment of Sebastopol. Later on she was fitted out at Portsmouth as a training ship, moving to Dartmouth in 1863. Six years later she went to the shipbreakers, and a new vessel, the Prince of Wales, which had never been to sea, took up her name and duties. Such, in brief, is the record of the five predecessors of the vessel which is to be named to-day, and it is a glorious record for her to live up to.—Army and Navy Gazette.
It is said that the handiest ships in the British or any other navy are the biggest and heaviest—namely, the King Edward class. They answer the least touch of the helm, and swing round almost on their bows if the helm is put at all hard over.—Engineer.
WEARING OUT OF HEAVY GUNS.—All the Atlantic Fleet battleships have had their barbette guns changed. In the case of the flagship Caesar, only two guns have been changed, but other ships have had three, and in one case all four guns landed and replaced by others, and considerable pressure has had to be put on the Woolwich authorities to have all the required guns available. Surprise has been expressed that defects should have been simultaneously discovered in so many of the guns, and also at the fact that although the ships have been in port for two months, the work of changing them should have been deferred until the last moment. The defects are all in the inner, or A tube. In some cases it is worn, but in others the evil is much greater, as the tube has developed serious weakness owing to overheating.—United Service Gazette.
On Wednesday, January 18, Messrs. John I. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd., of London, and Woolston Works, Southampton, handed over to the Admiralty H. M. S. Kennet, a twin-screw torpedo-boat destroyer of the latest type, generally known as the River class. She is 225 feet in length by 23 feet 10 1/2 inches beam, with extreme draft of 9 feet 6 inches, and a norma/ displacement of about 580 tons. The contract under which she was built required a speed of 25 1/2 knots on a trial of four hours' duration, with a horsepower of 7500, but the speed actually attained on the four hours' official trial was 23.999 knots, or practically 26 knots, with about 7900 I. H. P. The armament consists of two deck torpedo-tubes, one I2- pounder, and five 6-pounder guns. This is the first vessel to be completed at the Woolston Works since they were acquired by the Thornycroft Company.—Engineering.
H. M. BATTLESHIP HINDUSTAN.—The first-class battleship Hindustan, which was launched from the yard ,of Messrs. John Brown & Co., Clydebank, on December 19, 1903, has just completed her official trials, the results of which are given below. The Hindustan, the third of the modern British battleships built at Clydebank, is of the King Edward VII class, with a total length of 425 feet, and a beam and draft of 78 feet, and 26 feet 9 inches, respectively. Her displacement is 16,350 tons, and her engines, also constructed by the builders of the vessel, are designed to indicate 18,000 horsepower, giving a speed of 18.5 knots. She is fitted with eighteen boilers of the Babcock and Wilcox type, and three of the cylindrical type. Nearly the whole of the broadside is protected by cemented armor, the thickness of which along the water-line is 9 inches, tapering 1 to 4 inches at the bow and stern. The upper strakes are of 8-inch and 7-inch armor. The deck plating varies from 1 inch to 2 inches thick, and the heavy guns are protected by 12-inch armor. The armament of the Hindustan consists of four 12-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, ten 6-inch guns, and twenty-four lesser guns. There are also two torpedo-tubes fitted. Her normal bunker capacity is 950 tons of coal, and the entire complement will consist of 800 men and officers.
The first of the new scouts to complete her trials is the Sentinel, and as supplying the first available data as to performances of this class of vessels the reports of the test are of great interest. Until we learn what the other ships have done, it will be impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion; but it may be said that the trials of the Sentinel show very satisfactory results. Being of a new type, the Sentinel was subjected to rather more severe trials than are sometimes carried out by vessels of known and approved design, and the builders also submitted the vessels to a number of special tests with a view to gathering information for future guidance in the designing of these ships should it be decided to add to the number already ordered. Coming to the actual figures of the trials, we find that by the conditions the Sentinel was obliged to make six runs over the measured mile within an hour and a half, and for the remaining six and a half hours of the full-power trial the average number of revolutions required to give a speed of 25 knots. The vessel was loaded, according to the terms of the contract, with all her war stores for the full-power trial which resulted in an average speed of 25.24 knots, which is a quarter of a knot in excess of the contract speed. The mean horsepower developed was 17,500, and the coal consumption, figures for which were obtained by a separate trial, is stated to have been moderate, each ton of fuel sufficing to drive the vessel II knots. There are five other vessels of this type completing at various private yards, and all of them should be ready to undergo their trials very shortly, while two, the Skirmisher and the Attentive, have yet to be launched.—Army and Navy Gazette.
During the past fortnight we have had much evidence of the great changes which are being brought about by the new scheme of distribution. In all 116 vessels have been put into commission in reserve, comprising nine battleships, twenty cruisers, two torpedo gunboats, forty-two destroyers, and forty-three torpedo-boats, and of these six battleships and six cruisers are on the emergency list. The Admiralty return of last March showed that in all there were fifty-seven battleships which counted as effective vessels. Only two of those vessels are included in the ships to be struck off the effective list, and to-day, including all the King Edwards which did not figure in that return, there are only sixty-five. There is a saving, however, in the annual upkeep of thirteen old vessels, quite inefficient and not included in the return, which could only be regarded at best as forlorn hopes. Thirteen armored cruisers, forty protected cruisers, thirty-six gunboats and torpedo gunboats, and twenty-one sloops, hulks, etc., are also transferred to the sale list, and are being removed from the dockyards to the various mooring grounds which have been decided on. Some forty or more are destined for the Motherbank, a large number also will be taken to the Kyles of Bute, and the remainder will be distributed in various locks and creeks around the coast.
Arguments for and against battleships of moderate dimensions continue to be bandied about, but the fact that no fewer than forty vessels of 16,000 tons and over are building for various powers is sufficient proof that the trend of thought in the Admiralty departments of the powers is not towards the small battleship. The fact that Germany does not build such leviathans is easily explained by the necessity for her vessels to be of moderate displacement for use in the comparatively shallow waters of the Baltic and the North Sea. In the meantime we are proceeding with the construction of large vessels, and last week the keel plates of the armored cruisers Minotaur and Shannon were laid down. The battleship Hindustan, of the King Edward class, has completed her trials, and the Hibernia, which is building at Devonport, is ready for launching. She will not, however, be put into the water until July, and she will then be in a very advanced state.—Page's Weekly.
With the object of having torpedo-boat destroyers of similar build and speed in the same division, the flotilla forming part of the Mediterranean fleet is to be reorganized this month on the following lines: 1st division, Exe, Erne, Ettrick, Itchen, and Dee, 25 1/2-knot boats of the river class; 2d division, Kangaroo, Myrmidon, Peterel, Fawn, and Bat, 30-knot boats built by the Palmer Shipbuilding Company; 3d division, Albatross, Desperate, Stag, Coquette, and Foam, 30-knot boats of the Thornycroft type; 4th division, Sprightly, Locust, Orwell, Griffon, and Seal, 30-knot boats built at Laird's; 5th division, Mallard, Banshee, Quail, Earnest, and Bruiser, a mixed class of 27 and 30-knot boats, to be stationed at Gibraltar. The headquarters of the first four divisions will be at Malta, and to each division there is allotted a reserve of three vessels, to be known as the Malta and Gibraltar reserves, respectively, and an additional "ten per cent reserve," consisting of one vessel for each division. This rearrangement will have the important advantage of enabling the principle of standardization to be adopted by the spare parts of the machinery and boilers of the respective divisions being interchangeable, thus reducing the number of such parts carried by the "parent" ship.—United Service Gazette.
An important naval change is announced. After to-day, February 19, British warships will commission for two years instead of three, and the time officers have to spend abroad will consequently be reduced by onethird. Ships will come home more frequently and be always kept in the pink of fighting condition, no repair work being allowed to accumulate, as it sometimes does at present.—United Service Gazette.
The new training squadron will be composed as follows: St. George, Isis, Gibraltar, Hawke, and Highflyer—the latter carrying naval cadets.
It is rumored that the reconstructed Mediterranean fleet will consist of the two Queen class, three Formidables, three Londons, and the Vengeance. All the Duncan class will go to the new Atlantic fleet, according to service gossip, also the Swiftsure and Triumph. Another rumor places these ships all in the Home squadron. Probably the detail is yet unsettled, but it is apparently established that so far as possible all squadrons will be homogeneous and contain all the ships of any particular type. This is as it should be. Duncans mixed with Londons are wasted, and their speed superiority of no avail. They become transformed into weak Londons.
Stern submerged tubes are to be fitted to the King Edward VII and her sisters. As originally designed, she, the Dominion, and the Commonwealth, were without stern tubes.
The old unprotected cruiser Iris has been put out of commission as a training ship, the Gibraltar replacing her.
A great sale of warships takes place next spring at one or other of the dockyards; three battleships and no less than thirty cruisers will be sold off. The armada thus to be disposed of is understood to be composed as follows: Battleships, Dreadnought, Sultan, Monarch—now Simoon; cruisers, Medea, Medusa, Ringarooma, Pallas, Pearl, Psyche, Marathon, Melpomene, Magicienne, Pandora, Iris, Mercury, Archer, Porpoise, Brisk, Calliope, Cleopatra, Northampton, Barracouta, Barrosa, Blanche, Blonde, Philomel, Mildura, Katomba, Tauranga, Wallaroo, Pomone, Pactolus: and Scylla. One modern cruiser could probably "take on" the lot.—Engmeer.
It is interesting to note that in the 122 warships which have been placed on the non-effective list there are eleven battleships, ten armored cruisers, forty-three cruisers, thirty-six gunboats and torpedo gunboats, and twenty-two sloops, hulks, etc. The cost of these vessels when constructed, giving estimates for those whose actual cost cannot now be ascertained, was:
Battleships £4,861,458
Armored cruisers £3,634,098
Cruisers £6,755,397
Gunboats, etc. £1,611,379
Sloops, hulks, etc. £1,288,245
Total £118,150,577
—United Service Gazette.
Additional important changes in the navy, affecting the officers, will, the Western Morning News is informed, soon be announced by the Admiralty. It is fully recognized that a naval surgeon, after some years in the service, not only deteriorates professionally speaking, through no fault of his own, but is also unable to keep up with the almost daily advances in medical science. A scheme is, therefore, in process of formation by which civil surgeons will entirely supplant the present branch, without, however, entailing any hardship whatever on those now serving, who will, in some cases, be able to requalify under the new scheme, while others will either serve out the remainder of their time or be offered extra compensation for immediate retirement. The new plan has not yet been fully formulated, but it has been decided that an appointment will be for one commission only, it being compulsory after that to spend a certain period at some hospital, and receive specified recommendations before further employment. The uniform of the engineer branch is to be assimilated to that of the executive officers. The prefix " engineer " before their rank-titles is also to be abolished, and an engineer officer will in future be known as captain or commander, etc. (E). The present paymaster branch will also probably be abolished. Office work is to be simplified and placed in charge of executive officers who will be borne specially for these duties, not, however, to the detriment of their other work. These important changes are still under consideration, as there are details connected with each to be settled. The proposed alteration in the paymaster's branch .is meeting with strong opposition, but Sir John Fisher's reasons are obvious, and it is thought that his opinions will eventually be adopted.
The Admiralty has issued a circular dealing with the position of "domestics" in the Royal navy. Commanding officers of ships and naval establishments are asked to express an opinion as to whether it is desirable to abolish "domestics" and to replace them with Royal marines; whether "domestics," if retained, should become continuous-service men; and whether the juniors of the branch should be properly trained either as cooks or servants in a special school. The Admiralty is also inquiring into the rates of private pay given by officers to their servants.—United Service Gazette.
The Admiralty have had under consideration the question of how service in a ship commissioned for service in the reserve shall be treated as regards promotion, allowances, etc., and it has been decided that service shall count as service in a ship of war at sea. Flag and navigating allowances, charge pay, and store allowance will be paid at the rates applicable to seagoing ships. Command money will be paid at the rate of 12s. per day to captains commanding battleships and first-class cruisers. This sum will be increased to 18s. per day in the case of ships whose complements are brought up to full strength.—United Service Gazette.
STEAM TRIALS OF THE CHINA SQUADRON.-The report of the steam trials at sea of the China squadron is just to hand, and on the eight hours' run every ship did well, exceeding the official contract speeds, although most of the vessels have been three or four years in commission. The best cruiser speed was got with the Amphitrite, built by Vickers, which attained a mean on her eight hours' sea trial of 21.39 knots, as compared with the designed speed of 20.75 knots. Next comes the Andromeda, a dockyard-built ship, engined by Hawthorn, Leslie & Co., which steamed 20.1 knots, only 0.15 miles below the contract rate. Of battleships the Vengeance, also a Vickers' ship, takes first place, with a speed on the eight hours' sea trial now of 19.10, against the designed speed of 18.25 knots. The other ships are the Albion, by the Thames Ironworks, which steamed 18.7 knots; the Glory by Laird, which got 18.6 knots; and the Ocean, engined by Hawthorn, Leslie & Co., which got 18.83 knots. The designed speed in these three cases was 18 1/4 knots. Practically all of these ships have the Belleville boiler.-United Service Gazette.
EXPLOSION ON A SUBMARINE.-A serious explosion of gasoline occurred on Thursday morning on board the new submarine A5 at Queenstown, resulting in the deaths of Sub-Lieutenant F. C. Skinner and three others, and the injuring of a large number of men. The operation of charging the tanks previous to going out for a cruise was taking place when the disaster occurred.-United Service Gazette.
THE HEALTH OF THE NAVY.-A blue-book has just been issued containing the statistical report of the health of the navy for the year 1903. It is stated that the returns for the total force serving afloat in that year may be considered very satisfactory. With a personnel increased by 3500 as compared with the previous year, there are decreases in the ratios of cases, invalidings, and deaths. The numbers are, respectively, 85,735, 2478, and 433, in comparison with 85,769, 2985, and 590 in 1902. The aggregate number of cases of disease and injury recorded for the year furnishes a ratio of 831.57 per woo, which shows a decrease of 29.56 per moo as compared with the ratio for 1902, also a decrease of 48.06 when contrasted with the average of the last six years. As mentioned in the reports for the last five years, the ten years' ratio hitherto shown has been discontinued in consequence of changes in classification caused by the introduction into these reports, in 1897, of a new nomenclature of diseases. In the present report a comparison with the average of the last six years has been instituted, and a yearly increment will be adopted in each future report until a period of ten years shall have been again attained.
The invaliding ratio of the total force-namely, 24.03 per 100-shows a decrease of 5.93 as compared with 1902, also a decrease of 6.94 in comparison with the average for the last six years. The highest invaliding rate was on the North America and West Indies stations. As regards the death rate, the ratio per 1000 was 4.19, showing a decrease of 1.73 per 1000 compared with 1902, also a decrease of 1.49 when contrasted with the' last six years' ratio. The highest death rate appears on the East Indies station. The total death rate (4.19) is the lowest recorded since 1856. The death rate from disease alone was 2.79 per moo, which is .72 less than the previous year.
The total force serving afloat in 1903 was 103,100. Of these 60,51o, or 58.69 per cent, were between 15 and 25 years of age; 32,940, or 31.94 per cent, were between 25 and 35 years of age; 8310, or 8.06 per cent, were between 35 and 45 year of age; 1340, or 1.29 per cent, were 45 years and upwards. The total number of cases of disease and injury entered on the sick list was 85,735, which is in the ratio of 831.57 per 1000, being a decrease of 29.56 per 1000 when compared with the previous year. The average number of men sick daily was 3633.54, giving a ratio of 35.24 per 1000, and showing a decrease of .13 per 1000 compared with 1902, and of 1.56 in comparison with the last six years' average. The total days' sickness on board ship and in hospital was 1,326,244, which represents an average loss of service from disease and injury of 12.86 days for each person, which is .05 below the ratio of the previous year. The total number of persons invalided was 2478, which is. in the ratio of 24.03 per 1000, and shows a decrease of 5.93 per x000 when compared with 1902. Of the above total 1757 persons were finally invalided from the service, giving a ratio of 17.04 per moo for the whole force, or 70.9 per cent of the number invalided, thus showing a decrease of 3.7 per moo when contrasted with 1992. The largest increase-namely, 8.23 per moo-was on the North America and West Indies station, but a decrease amounting to 17.23 per moo appears in the invaliding rate of the Southeast Coast of America station. The number of deaths was 433, which gives a ratio of 4.19 per moo, and exhibits a decrease of 1.73 per 1000 in comparison with the previous year, also a decrease of 1.49 per 1000 on the last six years' average. The average number of entries on the sick list for disease and injury per man was, on the Home station, .82; Mediterranean, .68; North America and West Indies, .98; Southeast Coast of America, 1.06; Pacific, .76; Cape of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa, 1.1; East Indies, 1.12; China, .89; Australia, .68; and irregular force, .96. In the total force the average per man was .83, a decrease of .03 in comparison with tom. The Mediterranean station shows the lowest sick rate and the irregular force the highest. The ratio per moo of men sick daily on the various stations was, on the Home station, 3843; Mediterranean, 24.71; North America and West Indies, 37.1; Southeast Coast of America, 41.05; Pacific, 27.52; Cape of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa, 36.05; East Indies, 36.72; China, 32.14; Australia, 30.08; and the irregular force, 43.63. The average ratio of sickness for the total force was 35.24 per 1000, which is a decrease of .13 per 1000 as compared with the preceding year.—United Service Gazette.
One of the first results of the new distribution of the fleet, to which full reference is made elsewhere, is seen in the Admiralty instructions to the newly-constituted Particular Service Squadron. The first cruise of this force will begin early in the new year, most of the vessels starting from Devonport, the base of the squadron, and proceeding to Dominica, where the remainder of the squadron under the flag of the commander-in-chief of the present North America and West Indies station will be met. The vessels which will start from home waters are the Hawke, which has relieved the Northampton as training ship for boys; the Gibraltar, which has replaced the Calliope; the St. George, which takes over the boys from the Cleopatra; the Highflyer and Isis, these two last being, of course, the tenders to the Dartmouth training establishment. The Hawke will be the senior ship of the division, and Captain A. J. Horsley will be in command until Vice-Admiral Bosanquet, in the Ariadne, meets them at Dominica in the second week in February. As we pointed out before, this new Training, or Particular Service squadron, will be a practically homogeneous force, capable not only of taking long cruises, but of being utilized as a powerful adjunct to a battle-fleet in time of emergency.—Army and Navy Gazette.
THE NAVAL MANEUVERS OF 1905.—We have received from the Admiralty the following "General Idea of the Maneuvers of 1905":
GENERAL MEMORANDUM.
Admiralty, January 2, 1905.
It is intended; during the summer of 1905 to carry out a series of maneuvers to represent the condition of affairs which might exist at a period when the relations of this country with some hypothetical power or powers had become so seriously strained that an outbreak of hostilities was possible at any moment.
During such a period, although no general mobilization (including the calling out of the reserves) might as yet have taken place, it would still be the duty of all British squadrons in commission to keep touch with the ships or squadrons of the hypothetical enemy, ready to act at a moment's notice. This touch should usually be maintained by cruisers, which would transmit their information to the battle-fleets by whatever means of communication were available, the battle-fleets themselves remaining in the vicinity of some central strategic position.
To carry out this idea three specially-formed skeleton squadrons and certain single-detached ships will represent the hypothetical enemy under the title of the Red side. Two of these squadrons will carry out a series of movements in European waters or the West Atlantic, while the third will probably make for a more or less remote destination. The single ships will move independently near the trade routes.
All British fleets in commission, with the exception of the vessels detailed to the Red side, will form the Blue side, and, on receipt of telegraphic orders from the Admiralty, will immediately make themselves acquainted with the whereabouts of the Red squadrons, and take the necessary steps for keeping in touch with them and for effectively dealing with them should war at any moment be assumed to have broken out.
The maneuvers will extend to all stations abroad as well as to those near home, and they will continue on these lines until directed to cease by telegraphic orders from the Admiralty.
It is intended that the maneuvers of 1906 shall be a continuation of the above idea, and that they shall reproduce as closely as practicable the strategy and tactics which would be employed after war with the hypothetical enemy had actually broken out.—United Service Gazette.
The Moniteur de la Flotte, discussing the redistribution of the British fleet, says it is impossible not to recognize the importance of the movements contemplated, and of the great precautions we are taking in a time of general confidence. It is pointed out that this change would make it impossible for France, in case of hostilities, to concentrate her Northern and Mediterranean squadrons, inasmuch as we could place sixteen battleships in the Mediterranean, or twenty in the Atlantic. The writer in our contemporary seems not to be aware that the changes which are taking place have no special relation to the events of the present hour, but are the crown and completion of a policy which has been in operation for some years, and which has for its object to place the fleet in the best posture for efficiency. There is, therefore, no aspect of hostility in the changes that are being made. The writer of the Moniteur would, however, like to see the French Northern and Mediterranean squadrons permanently concentrated in the Mediterranean. The present arrangement is pronounced to be strategically unsound. The Yacht is content to regard the redistribution as in harmony with the new conditions of European policy—the entente cordiale between England and France and the weakening of Russian naval power on the one hand, and the rapid growth of the German fleet on the other.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The important step with regard to the submarine defences at the naval ports foreshadowed some little time since by Mr. Arnold-Forster, has, we are pleased to see, been taken. The submarine mine defences at Portsmouth, Sheerness, Plymouth, Queenstown, and Milford Haven will be abolished, and the establishments connected with them will be taken over by the naval officials for conversion into submarine boat stations. The submarine mining vessels and other plant will, at the same time, be taken over by the Admiralty and utilized for other purposes. The minefield at Berehaven is also to be abolished. The result will be a gain all round, and not the least to the army by a saving in useless expense. While the arrangement does not for the present affect any other ports in the United Kingdom and in the Colonies, which include submarine mines in their defensive arrangements, it would be well worth the consideration of the authorities as to whether a further saving could not be effected in the same direction. It is a good principle to act on in this connection that all defence below high-water mark should be entrusted to the navy, or at least, that here the naval view should be considered of paramount importance.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Admiralty has ordered that the battleships of the Atlantic fleet before proceeding on their first cruise shall be fitted with complete installations of wireless telegraphy. The system in the navy has now reached such a state of perfection that ships on detached service will be able to keep in touch with their flagships at a much greater distance than has been possible hitherto, thereby increasing the tactical area of operations. Several cruisers are also to be similarly equipped to add to their efficiency when scouting beyond ordinary signalling range.—United Service Gazette.
THE DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILIZATION OF THE FLEET.
Précis of First Lord's Memorandum and the Circular Letter from the Admiralty to Commanders-in-Chief:
1. THE EFFECTIVE WAR-FLEET.
The whole of the effective war-fleet will henceforth consist either of:
a. The fleet in commission at sea, or
b. The fleet in commission in reserve.
It follows from this broad definition, first, that all ships of little or no fighting value will be put out of commission at once and written off the effective strength of the navy, with the exception of such few ships as may still be required for the adequate performance of the peace duties of Imperial police, though the greater part of these duties, together with that of showing the flag in imposing force on suitable occasion, will henceforth be discharged by some one or other of the powerful cruiser squadrons now to be organized; and, secondly, that a similar policy will be adopted in respect of ships of light character now in the reserve. They will not be repaired nor reckoned for mobilization, but will gradually be disposed of "as my Lords may hereafter determine."
2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET IN COMMISSION AT SEA.
In accordance with the ancient and appropriate nomenclature, the present so-called Home fleet is henceforth to be known as the Channel fleet, and to consist of 12 modern battleships and a sufficient number of attendant cruisers. Its headquarters will be at home, and its station the home waters.
The present Channel fleet is henceforth to be known as the Atlantic fleet. It will consist of eight modern battleships and a proper complement of cruisers. Its permanent base will be Gibraltar, and all its repairs will be effected there.
The Mediterranean fleet will consist of eight modern battleships and a proper complement of cruisers. Its base will still be Malta, and all its repairs will be effected there.
In European and Atlantic waters there will be four cruiser squadrons. The first and second will each consist of six armored cruisers and will be affiliated to the Channel and Atlantic fleets respectively, but will be detachable on occasion for independent exercises and cruises.
The third will consist of the large cruisers on the Mediterranean station, and will bear the same relation to the Mediterranean fleet that the first and second squadrons are to bear to the Channel and Atlantic fleets, respectively.
The fourth will be a "Particular Service Squadron," with the Atlantic for its cruising ground, and its headquarters, when at home, at Devonport. It will be placed under the command of the commander-in-chief of the present North America and "Nest Indies station, and will consist of his flagship together with other "valuable modern ships" allocated in peace time to the training of cadets and boys, but capable in time of war of immediate transformation into effective fighting units by the removal of the cadets and boys under training, and the completion of the crews "with the small additions required for war." The more advanced training services will also be carried on in sea-going modern cruisers affiliated to the Gunnery, Torpedo, and Navigation Schools, and capable of immediate adaptation to war purposes in any emergency.
This completes the enumeration of the fighting fleets at sea in European and Atlantic waters. The South Atlantic squadron will disappear. The North American squadron will be transformed, and its headquarters will be transferred to this side of the Atlantic; but the whole of the North Atlantic, especially its more western and southern latitudes, will be its regular cruising and training ground.
In extra-European waters the present China, Australia, and East Indies stations will be retained, such battleships as are required being allotted, as at present, to the China station, while the cruisers of the three stations, though attached to their respective stations in time of peace, will in time of war be placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the China station, who will be responsible for their strategic distribution: "so that they may at the earliest possible moment deal with all the ships of the enemy to be found in those waters." These three cruiser squadrons will thus form an Eastern group, just as the three extra Mediterranean cruiser squadrons in the Atlantic and home waters will form a Western group. A fighting squadron will be retained on the Cape of Good Hope station, and will form "a connecting link between either the Eastern group and the Mediterranean cruisers or the Eastern group and the Western group." The present Pacific station, already disestablished, will remain in abeyance. Thus the commander-in-chief in China will in effect become the admiral of the whole Pacific.
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE FLEET IN COMMISSION IN RESERVE.
All the effective fighting ships which are not at sea will, nevertheless, be in commission in reserve, and available either for reliefs or for reinforcements. Each ship not undergoing a refit of long duration will have its nucleus crew, consisting of the most important ranks and ratings. That is, she will have a captain, a second in command, and a proportion of other officers, including the engineer, gunnery, navigating and torpedo officers, together with two-fifths of her war complement, including all the more expert ratings, especially torpedo ratings and the principal gun numbers. These will all serve in her when she is ordered to sea, and, with her nucleus crew and permanent staff of officers, she will go to sea periodically for gunnery practice and machinery trials. When mobilization is ordered, she will be completed with a full crew, consisting of so per cent of active ratings and 50 per cent of reserves, but to the latter will be assigned duties and stations which do not demand either the highest skill or the most recent training; they will, in fact, be practically sea-laborers. The ships of this category in each naval port will be formed into squadrons, each under a flag officer who will command them in time of war and be directly responsible for their fighting and seagoing efficiency. Thus, when occasion arises, they will all be ready to go to sea in full organization and efficiency as soon as the crews have been made up to full complement in the manner above indicated.
In addition, six modern battleships and six modern cruisers, two of each in each naval port, all forming part of the fighting reserve, and, therefore, all having permanent nucleus crews as above described, are to be told off as "emergency ships." Provision is made.for filling these ships up at any moment to full complement from the floating surplus of personnel without dislocating the general arrangement for mobilization. These twelve ships would thus be the first reinforcement of the fighting fleets at sea, to be sent to sea at a few hours' notice in case of a sudden emergency. If the emergency became more acute, they would be followed at the shortest possible interval by all the ships in commission in reserve, made up to their full complements by the ordinary process of mobilization. Behind all these there will be nine other battleships in special reserve without. nucleus crews, which, if required, could be manned in due course of mobilization with one-third active service ratings, one-third Royal fleet reserve, and one-third Royal naval reserve. This is the only element of the fighting fleet of the future which will continue to be mobilized more or less after the present fashion. All the rest will be mobilized henceforth on the basis of continuous commissions and permanent nucleus crews.
4. RELIEFS, REPAIRS, AND REFITS.
All ships in commission at sea will be commissioned for two years only, and will retain their officers and crews as far as possible unchanged for that period. It follows that half the fleet in commission will be relieved annually, being either recommissioned with entirely new crews, or relieved by exchange of places with ships in commission in reserve. Ships of the Mediterranean and Atlantic squadrons will return to England to recommission; those on other foreign stations will be recommissioned at some port about midway between England and their station.
Under the system of two-year commissions it is provided that no ship is to be in dockyard hands for more than thirty working days in all in each year. In ordinary circumstances, ships which go into harbor to refit will be subject to the condition that they are to be ready for sea in cases of emergency at fours days' notice. If any longer period is required for refit, the crew may be ordered to turn over to another ship, and will be ordered to do so if the refit will take more than thirty days. In no case will more than two battleships from the Channel fleet or more than one battleship from either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic fleet be permitted to undergo refit at the same time. The same principles are to be applied to armored cruisers in commission at sea. Periodical refits of a larger character are to be provided for, the ships affected being put out of commission for the time and their place being taken in the fighting line by other ships.
5. THE SYSTEM TO BE TESTED.
This scheme of reorganization is to be tested in 1905 and 1906 by a system of progressive maneuvers taking place simultaneously all over the world, in which as close an approximation to the conditions of actual war will be aimed at as is consistent with a state of peace. The commanders-in-chief and other flag officers all over the world will have to act throughout on their own initiative, to concert plans beforehand for mutual support, and to be responsible for continuous mutual co-operation.
6. NEW DESIGNS.
With regard to ships hereafter to be built, the types and classes required, and the features to be embodied in them, a special committee on designs is to be appointed at once "in order temporarily to assist the board and the director of naval construction in the elucidation of the problems involved." The board will first lay down "as a basis what they consider to be the fighting requisites of the desired types of war vessels and the governing features of each type to which the other features shall be subservient."
7. EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.
Finally, the First Lord remarks: "That the scheme will greatly increase the fighting efficiency of the fleet there can, I think, be no doubt; it will also, I am happy to say, result in a very considerable economy on the navy estimates."—Times.
THE FIRST LORD'S MEMORANDUM.
The First Lord's Memorandum, entitled, "Distribution and Mobilization of the Fleet," which is issued as a Parliamentary paper [Cd. 2335], and in which we have inserted cross-headings to facilitate reference, is as follows:
"The Board of Admiralty have decided to make certain changes in the distribution of the fleet and in the arrangements for its mobilization, the nature and reason of which I desire to explain.
A NEW STAGE IN NAVAL EVOLUTION.
"A new and definite stage has been reached in that evolution of the modern steam navy which has been going on for the last thirty years, and that stage is marked, not only by changes in the materiel of the British navy itself, but also by changes in the strategical position all over the world arising out of the development of foreign navies. In the Western Hemisphere the United States are forming a navy the power and size of which will be limited only by the amount of money which the American people choose to spend on it. In the Eastern Hemisphere the smaller but modern navy of Japan has been put to the test of war, and has not been found wanting. The Russian navy has been greatly increased, and (with the exception of the fleet in the Black Sea) has been wholly transferred, or is in course of being transferred, from the Baltic to the Pacific. The navies of Italy and Austria-Hungary maintain their positions in the Mediterranean, but they have not been the subject of such increased expenditure as those of other powers. The French navy stands, as always, in the forefront. The new German navy has come into existence; it is a navy of the most efficient type, and is so fortunately circumstanced that t is able to concentrate almost the whole of its fleet at its home ports.
MODERN BATTLESHIPS AND ARMORED CRUISERS.
"In the British navy all the older battleships have been replaced by modern ones, so that it may now be said that all the battle-fleets in commission are composed of modern battleships. This fact in itself marks a distinct stage in the evolution of the materiel of the navy; but still more significant and far-reaching in its consequences is the fact that this country is now rapidly becoming possessed of a number of modern armored cruisers. When the Devonshire class are completed during the course of next year there will be in commission or in the reserve four Drakes, six Cressys, ten Monmouths, six Devonshires, or in all twenty-six armored cruisers. These are not all perfect ships, and many subsequent improvements can be made in the types represented, but they are nevertheless a great advance on anything which has preceded them, and they bring in their wake a revolution in respect of the composition of our cruiser squadrons.
"The features in these ships, which differentiate them from anything that has preceded them, are their great speed, which enables them at will to overtake any vessel of inferior speed or to escape from any vessel of superior power, their armor, which gives security to the men who fight the guns and to the vitals of the ship, and their armament, which in some cases is as powerful as that of the older battleships. With such ships even the best so-called 'protected' cruisers would engage at a considerable disadvantage, and the slower or smaller 'protected' cruisers and all unprotected cruisers would be hopelessly outmatched; their only hope of safety would be in flight, and they could not flee because they have not the necessary speed. The revolution has come suddenly; four years ago there was not one such ship in commission; within a year from this time the number in commission or in the reserve will be twenty-six.
"The principles, on which the present .peace distribution of His Majesty's ships and the arrangement of their stations are based, date from a period when the electric telegraph did not.exist, and when wind was the motive power, and it is a wonderful testimony to the strategical and political soundness of those principles that they have stood the test of time and met all the needs of the service up to the present moment.
"In the opinion of the Board of Admiralty, however, the new conditions described above have necessitated a review and readjustment of this distribution of ships and arrangement of stations.
PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.
"In the study of this question the board have endeavored to benefit by the experience of the navies of Japan and of Russia in the present war, and by the same light to review the principles on which the different classes of modern warships are constructed, and the features embodied in them. In order temporarily to assist the board and the director of naval construction in the elucidation of the problems involved, it has been decided to appoint a special committee on designs which will be composed of naval officers and scientific and professional experts, and will begin work early next year, the Board of Admiralty first laying down as a basis what they consider to be the fighting requisites of the desired types of war vessels and the governing features of each type to which the other features shall be subservient.
DIFFICULTIES OF MOBILIZATION.
"They have also at the same time endeavored to overcome certain difficulties with which they have long been confronted in matters of mobilization. It will have been noticed that, whenever a portion of the fleet has been specially commissioned for maneuvers, the only difficulties which have occurred during these maneuvers have been in connection with the ships so specially commissioned. The arrangements in connection with the personnel have worked smoothly and quickly, and the ships have been commissioned and have proceeded to sea within the specified number of hours, but during the maneuvers the number of small mishaps in connection with the machinery of the specially commissioned ships has always been much in excess of that of the ships in commission. There has, however, never been any mystery as to the cause of this distinction. During the great expansion of the fleet which has been taking place for the last fifteen years the Board of Admiralty have never been able to retain at home a proportion of the personnel of the navy sufficient to keep the ships of the fleet reserve in such perfect condition that on mobilization for war they could feel confident that there would be no mishaps to the machinery on first commissioning, nor have the newly commissioned crews had sufficient opportunity to acquaint themselves with the innumerable details which go to make up what may be called the individuality of the ship. Year after year the board have endeavored to remedy this evil by proposing to Parliament large additions to the personnel (additions which Parliament has freely granted), but the increase in the number, size, and horsepower of the ships in commission has more than swallowed up the increase in the personnel, and consequently an adequate provision for the ships in the fleet reserve has not yet been made. It is not to be supposed that the importance of this matter has for one moment escaped the attention of the board; the mishaps referred to are almost always such as can be repaired in the course of a few days, certainly always in the course of a few weeks; but it is not possible to exaggerate the importance of having the whole fleet ready for war in the sense of being ready to deal an immediate blow—of having ready, in short, an instrument which in its every part will command the confidence of the admirals who have to use it, and of assuring the admirals in their turn that they have in their hands an instrument which will in no single point fail them. Hitherto, moreover, the firing practice of mobilized ships has left much to be desired; but as the guns' crews had not previously been associated together, more could not have been expected.
"The board have endeavored, and I believe successfully, to deal with these questions simultaneously. The ideals which the Board of Admiralty have always had before them have been that the peace distribution of the fleet should be also its best strategical distribution for war, and that the mobilized ships should be in as perfect a condition of fitness for war as the commissioned ships. They now hope while maintaining the first ideal to realize the second, and at the same time to withdraw as far as possible from peace commission those vessels which, however useful in peace, would in war be found to be of inferior fighting efficiency or even a source of weakness and anxiety to the admiral.
THE CHANNEL FLEET.
"The present Home fleet will change its name and henceforth be called the Channel fleet. It will have its headquarters at home, and will consist of twelve battleships and a sufficient number of attendant cruisers. It will be commanded by a flag officer of the rank of admiral, or, if he has not yet arrived at that substantive rank, of the acting rank of admiral; the second in command will be a vice-admiral, the third a rear-admiral.
THE ATLANTIC FLEET.
"The present Channel fleet will be renamed the Atlantic fleet, and will be permanently based on Gibraltar. It will consist of eight battleships and a sufficient number of attendant cruisers. The flag officer in command will hencefoward be styled 'commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet,' and he will be a vice-admiral or hold the acting rank of vice-admirali the second in command will be a rear-admiral.
CRUISER SQUADRONS.
"Affiliated to the Channel and Atlantic fleets will be cruiser squadrons, each under the command or a rear-admiral, and consisting of six armored cruisers. The first cruiser squadron will be affiliated to the Channel fleet and the second cruiser squadron to the Atlantic fleet. These cruiser squadrons will, however, be detachable from the fleets to which they are affiliated either for special cruiser exercises or for special cruises.
"Under this arrangement the present separate South Atlantic squadron will be no longer required and will disappear.
THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.
"The Mediterranean fleet will consist of eight battleships with a sufficient allowance of cruisers. It will, of course, remain based on Malta, and the commander-in-chief will be of the rank of admiral or hold the acting rank of admiral; the second in command will be a vice-admiral. The large cruisers attached to the Mediterranean station will be known as the third cruiser squadron; they will be commanded by a rear-admiral, and will be occasionally detached for the same special reasons as in the case of the other squadrons.
REPAIRS.
"All the repairs of the Channel fleet will be done in the home dockyards, those of the Atlantic fleet at Gibraltar dockyard, and those of the Mediterranean fleet at Malta dockyard; the aim of the board will be to ensure that in the case of the Channel fleet never more than two battleships, and of the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets never more than one, shall be in dockyard hands at the same time.
COMBINED EXERCISES.
"The Atlantic fleet will be put under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet twice a year, and under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet once a year, for combined exercises.
"I hope to deal with the question of the allotment of battleships to the China station in my memorandum on the navy estimates.
CRUISERS IN EXTRA-EUROPEAN WATERS.
"The cruisers working in extra-European waters will be divided into three groups. The Eastern group will comprise the cruisers of the China, Australia, and East Indies stations. The responsibility will rest on the commander-in-chief of the China station for the strategical distribution of those cruisers in time of war, so that they may at the earliest possible moment deal with all ships of the enemy to be found in those waters. The Cape of Good Hope squadron will be a connecting link between either the Eastern group and the Mediterranean cruisers or the Eastern group and the western group. The Western group of cruisers will consist of the cruisers under the command of the commander-in-chief of the North American and West Indian station and the mobilized cruisers with which he will be reinforced in time of war. At present the cruisers under the command of the commander-in-chief of the North American and West Indian station consist of his flagship, a first-class protected cruiser, and certain second and third-class cruisers. The board have decided to withdraw from the station the less effective of those ships and to add to it the ships of the new particular service squadron which they have decided to constitute, and of which the commander-in-chief of this station will be given the command.
THE TRAINING OF CADETS AND BOYS.
"Up to the present time the cadets from the Britannia in the second-class cruiser Isis and in the old armored cruiser Aurora, the youths in the Northampton and her tenders the Calliope and Cleopatra, and the boys in the Iris, Medea, and Medusa have all carried out their training afloat independently. It has been decided to transfer them all to valuable modern fighting ships, and to combine them into one squadron for training under the present commander-in-chief of the North American and West Indian station. They will make periodical returns to England, but the climate of the North American and West Indian station, extending as it does from the pole to the equator, will give the admiral in command opportunities of organizing their training under better climatic conditions than can be found anywhere else. The particular service squadron will therefore consist of the Ariadne, flagship; St George, Hawke, Gibraltar, Isis, Highflyer, and other vessels not yet appropriated. In time of war it will only be necessary to remove from those ships cadets or youths or boys still under training and to complete the crews with the small additions required for war.
SHIPS' COMMISSIONS REDUCED TO TWO YEARS.
"At present a ship is commissioned for three years, and this system prevails on all stations except those which are under the system known as home sea service. In the present Home fleet, the present Channel fleet, and the present cruiser squadron the ships are not commissioned for any definite period, but being within the category of home sea service are.in a state of continuous commission, twenty-five per cent of their crews being withdrawn every six months, and fresh entries from the depots, generally the youngest and last-entered seamen, taking their place. Even with ships in commission for three years the changes among the officers and men have been a constant and recognized evil, though, owing to the expansion of the fleet, which has rendered it necessary to make constant calls on the ships afloat for ratings to be promoted or to attend the gunnery and torpedo schools, it has hitherto been an unavoidable one. It will, however, be readily believed that these changes have added greatly to the difficulties of the officers in keeping their ships efficient, especially in matters of gunnery. Greater still have been the difficulties which have confronted the officers of the present Home fleet, Channel fleet, and cruiser squadron, where the systematic changes of twenty-five per cent every six months have been additional to the constant changes due to the general causes mentioned above, and the excellent results nevertheless produced deserve public recognition. The board have now decided to adopt a new system, and to reduce the period of all commissions to two years. This system will be gradually applied to all vessels in commission, including the new Channel and Atlantic fleets and the cruiser squadrons. When a ship has once been commissioned under this system no officer or man will be removed from her for any avoidable cause, and the only drafts which she will receive will be those required to make good unavoidable waste. At the same time, the distinction between foreign sea service and home sea service will be abolished, and the only conditions of service which will be recognized are home service and sea service, i. e., service in the home ports or ashore and service afloat.
THE FLEET RESERVE.
"The following is the plan adopted for the reorganization of the fleet reserve. The fighting ships will be organized quite separately from the obsolete or non-fighting ships. They will each have a captain, a second-in-command, and a proportion of the other officers, including engineer, gunnery, navigating, and torpedo officers. They will have a nucleus crew of two-fifths of their war complement, but in that two-fifths will be included all the more expert ratings, especially the torpedo ratings and the principal gun numbers, and each ship will periodically proceed to sea for the purpose of gunnery practice and of testing her machinery. They will be grouped homogeneously at the three home ports according as their destination may be determined for reinforcement in time of war. Each group so formed will be commanded by a flag officer, who will himself take the reinforcements in time of war to the fleet which they are to reinforce, and he and he alone will be held responsible that every possible step has been taken to reduce breaksdown of machinery to a minimum, and that the fighting efficiency of his ships, when mobilized, is without flaw. In addition, there will be a sufficient margin of ratings kept at home to enable the board to commission an emergency squadron without dislocating the schools or nucleus crews or having recourse to a general mobilization.
THE FORTHCOMING MANEUVERS.
"The maneuvers both in 1905 and 1906 will be directed to the testing of this scheme of reorganization. In 1905 movements of the fleet in commission and of a few mobilized ships will take place all over the world in view of hypothetical strained relations with an imaginary power; in 1906 the supposition will be that war has actually broken out some weeks after the period of strained relations, and the reserve squadrons at the home ports will be actually mobilized, and will proceed under their respective rear-admirals to reinforce the fleets to which they have been previously affiliated. The hostile fleets will be represented next year by various big cruisers (as a skeleton enemy), which will start on unknown dates from unknown places to represent the movements of the imaginary power. The commander-in-chief and other flag officers all over the world will have to act throughout on their own initiative; they will be responsible for keeping a continuous touch with the enemy and for continuous mutual co-operation; they will concert together beforehand their plans for mutual support, and the port admirals and other stationary officers must instantly comply with the requests of the admirals at sea. In no case will references to the Admiralty be permitted.
"It has been already stated that the cadets, youths, and boys under training are being transferred to modern fighting vessels. Similar action will be taken in the case of the more advanced training services, where modern cruisers will be substituted for the older ones at present acting as schools for navigation or as tenders to the gunnery schools.
"In order to provide the personnel for all these purposes a certain number of ships of comparatively small fighting value have been, or will be, withdrawn from commission, but care has been taken to leave enough ships on every station for the adequate performance of what I may call peace duties of Imperial police, and the four cruiser squadrons will be employed to show the flag in imposing force, wherever it may be deemed to be politically or strategically advisable.
THE SINGLE OBJECT IN VIEW.
"In the reorganization, a sketch of which I have given above, the board have had but one object in view, and that is that on a declaration of war the fighting efficiency of the fleet shall be complete and instantaneous. That the scheme will greatly increase the fighting efficiency of the fleet there can, I think, be no doubt; it will also, I am happy to say, result in a very considerable economy on the navy estimates."—"Selborne."
THE NEW RESERVE FLEET.-Under the new reorganization scheme, the fighting fleets of the navy are now organized as under:
a. The fleets in commission at sea, including the twenty-eight battleships and eighteen armored cruisers of the Channel, Mediterranean, and Atlantic fleets, and the three cruiser squadrons; the five battleships of the China squadron, and the various "groups" of protected cruisers.
b. The fleet in commission in reserve, comprising the vessels of the reserve divisions established recently, and including the following vessels:
Battleships 9
Cruisers 20
Torpedo-gunboats 2
Torpedo-boat destroyers 42
Torpedo-boats 43
Six of these battleships and six of the first-class cruisers are held in readiness to proceed to sea at once on an emergency, and the others would follow at short notice; in fact as soon as their crews had been completed to war strength.
In addition to the above, a number of less valuable vessels, mostly obsolescent, remain at the naval ports, but not in commission. They could be prepared for sea at comparatively short notice in the event of their assistance being needed.
The new reserve divisions were commissioned on the 3d ult., on which day also the different rear-admirals, appointed to command them, hoisted their flags:
Devon port Reserve Squadron (commanded by Rear-Admiral C. G. Robinson).-Battleships, Barfleur (flagship), Hood, King Edward VII; cruisers, Blake, Niobe, Arrogant; torpedo-gunboat, Harrier; torpedo-boat destroyers, Arab, Avon, Bittern, Blackwater, Daring, Express, Ferret, Gipsy, Leopard, Lynx, Ostrich, Violet; torpedo-boats, Nos. 8o, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 98, 99, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, III, 112, 113.
Portsmouth Reserve Division (commanded by Rear-Admiral R.' L . Groome).-Battleships, Canopus (flagship), Prince George; cruisers, Europa, King Alfred, Powerful, Spartiate, Terrible, Eclipse, Indefatigable, Latona, Pandora; torpedo-boat destroyers, Bullfinch, Contest, Kestrel, Lightning, Recruit, Rocket, Star, Surly, Tiger, Vulture, Zebra, Zephyr; torpedo-boats, Nos. 25, 27, 33, 34, 41, 42, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 78, 79, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117.
Sheerness-Chatham Reserve Division,-(commanded by Rear-Admiral W. H. G. B. Graham).-Battleships, Resolution (flagship), Goliath, Ramillies, Repulse; cruisers, Argonaut, Diadem, Scylla, Pegasus, Pioneer, Pyramus; torpedo-gunboat, Speedy; torpedo-boat destroyers, Charger, Dasher, Greyhound, Hardy, Haughty, Havock, Hornet, Hunter, Opossum, Racehorse, Ranger, Roebuck, Salmon, Snapper, Spitfire, Starfish, Sturgeon, Swordfish; torpedo-boats, Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74.
THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, REDISTRIBUTION OF DESTROYERS.-The destroyers in the Mediterranean have been redistributed this month as shown below, four divisions working from Malta and one division from Gibraltar, as their respective headquarters. The object of the scheme is to have boats of similar build, as far as possible, in the same division, so that the spare parts of the machinery and boilers will be interchangeable, thus reducing the number of parts a parent ship would have to carry for one division.
ITALY.
THE ITALIAN BATTLESHIP VITTORIO EMANUELE III.—On the 5th of October the first-class battleship Vittorio Emanuele III was successfully launched at Castellamare, in the presence of the King of Italy. With the possible exception of H. M. S. King Edward VII, there has not been a more discussed warship within recent years. As her pros and cons were thoroughly gone into in our issue of March 15, 1901, at the time when she was first projected, it will only be necessary to briefly enumerate her special features. First and foremost of these is the total abolition of the 6-inch gun, mounted in all Italian warships up to the Benedetto Brin, its place being taken by the 8-inch gun, with a reduction in the number of 12-inch guns from four to two. The special arrangement of these is something after the style of the Russian Tsarevitch, except that the amidships turret is a deck higher than the others instead of lower. Secondly, she has been given a designed speed of 22 knots, which will probably reach 23 on actual trial. Here we have a factor which at once eliminates the uncertain line between the battleship and armored cruiser. Larger and more powerful enemies like the Connecticut or Lord Nelson she could easily outdistance if unwilling to fight, while very few foreign armored cruisers could show her a "clean pair of heels."
As originally designed she was to have carried a battery of twelve 4-inch guns. These have now been altered to 3-inch 12-pounders, a distinct change for the better, as with practically equal destructive power against torpedo craft, a more rapid rate of fire can be maintained with the smaller gun.
Without a doubt, in the near future other nations will embody the general features of her design in their battleships. Already a monster 20,000- tonner is being projected in the United States of America, carrying only twelve 12-inch and a large number of 3-inch guns, with a speed of 20 knots or over, to all intents a replica of Col. Cuniberti's Ideal—dealt with in "Fighting Ships," 1903—whilst the Lord Nelson, with her four 12-inch and ten 9.2-inch guns, is practically a development of the Vittorio Emanuele on a larger scale.—Engineer.
On December 31, 1903, the active navy list included 21,324 men, the first reserve 25,431 men, the second reserve 8905; altogether 55,660 men.
This year there will be 5000 men less.—Le Yacht.
The Italian budget for 1905-1906 amounts to 127,246,962 francs, of which 9,799,361 francs is for the merchant marine.
The following are the new works to be carried on:
The Regina Elena and Vittorio Emanuele to be completed and commissioned in 1906.
The Roma and Napoli to be launched in 1905.
Two armored cruisers, A and B, of 10,000 tons to be begun at Castellamare.
The submarines Glauco, Squalo, Narvalo, Tricheco, and Otaria to be completed at Venice, and two new submarines to be begun there.
Four destroyers of 380 tons and twenty-seven torpedo-boats of 210 tons to be built.
Furthermore, it seems probable that the Government will purchase the three armored cruisers of 10,000 tons now building at the works of Ansaldo, Odero & Orlando, and which ought to be finished by the beginning of 1906.—Le Yacht.
JAPAN.
It is announced from Tokio that the Naval Commission, basing its views upon the experiences of the present war, has pronounced in favor of the system of battleships of great.displacement armed with heavy guns. The displacement of the new ships is to be raised to 19,000 tons, and the plans for this new type are already elaborated.—Montteur de la Flotte.
In 1903 the Parliament voted two battleships, three armored cruisers, and one cruiser. The battleships are the Kashima, building at Elswick, and the Katori, being built by Vickers. One of the armored cruisers should now be building at Kure. Two others would have been given to an English firm. A new program, it appears, is in preparation. It is to be carried out altogether in Japan, and will comprise a battleship of 19,000 tons and 184 knots, armed with four 12-inch, twelve 10-inch, and twelve 4.7-inch guns, at Yokosuka; two armored cruisers with four 12-inch and six 10-inch guns at Kure. These latter ships will displace at least 12,000 tons, and all the ships will carry only large guns of great range. The 6-inch guns, so dear to the English, Japanese, and above all, to the Germans, will be rigorously excluded as too feeble in power.—Le Yacht.
RUSSIA.
"The Emperor has sanctioned the expenditure of £160,000,000 for rebuilding the Russian navy." In these bald words the St. Petersburg correspondents announced the new scheme for the replacing of the squadrons which Russia has lost in the war. The program is to cover ten years, and many of the vessels will be built abroad. The building program is to consist of eight battleships of the Kniaz Suvaroff type, eight of the Andrei Pervosvannui class, six armored cruisers, twelve protected cruisers, fifty destroyers, and one hundred torpedo-boats.
The Third Pacific squadron which is fitting out in great haste at Libau will take practically every remnant of the Russian fleet from European waters, with the exception of the Black Sea fleet, which is penned up behind the Dardanelles. Whether the squadron under Admiral Mebagatoff will be ready to start in another fortnight is doubtful, but urgent commands have been issued for it to do so.—Page's Weekly.
The great gravity of the naval situation having been brought home to the Russian Government, the Czar is stated to have sanctioned a ten-years' shipbuilding program, involving an expenditure of about £160,000,000. A naval committee has been investigating the question, with some procrastination, and it has been decided to build eight battleships of the Slava type and eight of the Andrei Pervosvannui type, six cruisers of the Bayan class, six improved Noviks, and six of the Bogatyr class, besides fifty large destroyers, one hundred various torpedo-boats, ten mining ships, and four floating workshops. The last destroyers built by the Nevsky yard are not at all satisfactory. About thirty destroyers are at present in hand in Russian, French, and German yards, and about twelve others will very soon be begun. It is also stated that the volunteer fleet will undergo a change, its headquarters being removed from Odessa to a northern port, probably Windau.—Army and Navy Gazette.
In view of our investigations regarding the relative advantage of the 25 1/2 and 30-knot destroyers, it may be well to state that the new vessels to be built for the Russian navy—eleven in all, eight by the Societe des Forges et Chantiers, and three by M. Normand, of Havre—will be 28-knot vessels, similar to those in use in the Far East. They will be 196 feet long and of 300 tons displacement, carrying 8o tons of coal. The power of the propelling machinery is 5000 I. H. P. Italy, however, is going in for 26-knot boats of a new class, more resembling the British type, and sixteen of them are to be built by Schichau, of Dantzig, who built the former 30-knot boats for the Italian navy. France's later destroyers are of 28- knot speed.—United Service Gazette.
SWEDEN.
The new Swedish ironclad Manligheten, built at the Kochum shipyard, Malmo, Sweden, had a most satisfactory trial trip in the Sound on November 1. The trial lasted five hours, and the contract speed was exceeded. The highest speed recorded was 17.08 knots, and the average speed of 16.08 knots; the engines indicating 7400 horspower.—Nautical Gazette.
The naval program of 1901, which was to have been completed by next year, has fallen so much in arrears that an increased grant has been asked for 1905, in order that the program may be completed in 1907. The following is the proposed allotment of this grant. The sums asked for are as follows: For completing the ironclad Oskar II, £140,100; first instalment new ironclad of Fylgia type, f123,000 (total cost, £385,700) ; completion of torpedo-boat destroyer, £33,400; two torpedo-boat destroyers, £133,500; first instalment five large torpedo-boats, £55,100; nine small torpedoboats, £99,100; training vessel, i11,600; reconstruction of Loke, £29,800; reconstruction of Hildur, Bjorn, and Gerda, £28,050; three guard boats, £14,100.—Page's Weekly.
UNITED STATES.
SCOUT CRUISERS FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY.—The Board of Construction has recommended that the three cruisers which were authorized at the last Congress be of the following dimensions:
Length, between perpendiculars 420 feet.
Breadth 46 feet 8 inches.
Draft, fully loaded 16 feet 3 1/2 inches.
Depth, amidships. 36 feet 5 15-16 inches.
Displacement, loaded 4310 tons.
Draft on trial 16 feet 10 inches.
Corresponding displacement on trial 3750 tons.
Speed 24 knots.
The battery is to consist of twelve 3-inch guns and two 21-inch submerged torpedo tubes, with 3600 rounds of the 3-inch ammunition, and eight torpedoes. The estimated weight of battery and full ammunition is 140 tons. Over the length of machinery space there is to be worked in an inclined nickel-steel deck 1 1/2inches thick, and a vertical steel protection deck 2 inches thick, extending above the tops of the boiler drums and cylinders of the main engines. At each end of the machinery space a thwartship nickel-steel bulkhead, 1 inch thick, is to be fitted. Nickel-steel armor, 2 inches thick, on the sides and 1 inch on the top, is to afford protection to that part of the steering-gear which is above the water-line. The total estimated weight of the nickel-steel armor is 205 tons.
Four endless-chain electric ammunition hoists are to be installed, two forward and two aft, for supplying the ammunition for the 3-inch guns, while for handling the boats and coaling, etc., it is proposed to install four electric deck winches. The anchors are to be handled by one steam capstan windlass, and the steering-gear is to be of the usual steam and hand type, with steering stations on the forward bridge and in the steering engine-room. The vessel is to be lighted throughout by electricity, which power is also to drive the ventilation fans, from a large central generating plant of sufficient capacity to operate under battle conditions. The other electric equipment includes two large search-lights and wireless telegraphy outfit.
Two alternate proposals for powering the ships will be called for. One, which is according to plans prepared by the bureaus, is to include twin-screw reciprocating engines with necessary auxiliaries, with main engines designed to develop the maximum of about 16,000I. H. P. on trial. Steam is to be generated by twelve water-tube boilers; besides the usual auxiliaries, there is to be an evaporating and distilling plant of 16,000 gallons capacity, a work shop, and refrigerating plant of two tons' capacity. The total weight to be allowed for machinery, including spare parts, is 794 tons.
The alternate proposal will be for a vessel with the general characteristics of hull as set forth, but on the bidders' design of machinery, preference being given to a turbine installation, other things being equal.—Marine Engineering.
Secretary Morton has made contracts with the Electric Boat Company, of Bayonne, N. J., for two Holland submarine torpedo-boats of the latest design. The characteristics of these ships have not yet been finally determined. The aggregate cost will be $400,000, and will use up the last of the $850,000 appropriated by Congress for submarine warfare research, all of which has been spent for Holland boats, of which there are nine now in the service besides four contracted for within a month.—Nautical Gazette.
The U. S. armored cruiser Pennsylvania has made 22.5 knots on trial, thus beating the Colorado by .21 knots. The Colorado, it will be remembered, beat the Virginia. The Colorado has Niclausse boilers, the others have the Babcock. The fight between the American and French type boilers is very keen in the American navy, and "honors are easy," or nearly so, thus far, neither type having proved itself distinctly better than the other.—Engineer.
THE NEW PORTSMOUTH DRYDOCK.—The new stone dry-dock at the navy yard, Portsmouth, N. H., which has been under construction for four years past, has been completed. It is the biggest completed structure of its kind on this continent. Its total length from caisson to top of coping is 750 feet, the length on the floor being 728 feet. It has a width from coping to coping of 130 feet, and a width on floor of 8o feet, or 20 feet wider than the Charlestown dock, soon to be opened. At mean high water there is 30 feet of water over the sill of the dock and 33 feet at extreme high water. The sides of the dock are set against the rock backing, with concrete filling between, and, with the altar stones, are of very heavy granite. The bottom of the dock has a solidity that probably has never been exceeded in a structure of this kind. There are 144 keel blocks, the foundation being masses of granite four feet thick, set on concrete. The bilge blocks, ranged on either side, are seventy-two in number and are likewise solidly bottomed. Granite steps lead to the floor of the dock at various points, and the terraced effect of .the sloping sides is broken by a number of smooth "slides,' down which material may be tobogganed when needed. The steel caisson is of the double-end type, and contains the necessary tanks for its own flooding and raising, together with a 25-horsepower engine, with boiler and pumps. To flood the dock, water enters from the outside through 15-inch valves in the caisson to a sufficient extent to float the caisson, and then, the latter rising, the water comes into the dock from underneath in increased volume. To empty the dock three large pumps throw 43,000 gallons of water a minute and a small one 4500 gallons a minute, making a total of 133,500 gallons a minute. There is also in the pump well a 30-horsepower motor connected with a five-stage centrifugal pimp, for opening and closing the three 45- inch pump valves and the 96-inch culvert gate. The pump well is fitted with two circular galleries, reached by stairways, and has a concrete floor. The motive power for the pump well is generated by a set of three boilers of 500 horsepower each, two 750-horsepower engines and continuous-current generators of 250 volts. Cables laid in concrete conduits convey the electrical power to the pump well. The new drydock was flooded and pumped out on January 20 with the greatest success. The pumps worked perfectly and completely emptied the big basin in two hours four minutes and forty seconds. This is nearly thirty minutes inside the stipulations of the contract.
The collier Lebanon entered the new drydock on January 24 at 8.45 a. m. Everything worked smoothly and at 11 o'clock the basin had been entirely pumped out —Nautical Gazette.
ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY. TORPEDOES.
A new naval gun has just passed satisfactorily through a series of trials at the Government proof-butts, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, and a large number will shortly be manufactured for issue to the Royal navy. The gun will be known as the 12-pounder (18-cwt.) quick-firing wire gun, and will, it is understood, be a great improvement upon the existing 12-pounder (12-cwt.) naval gun. It will fire more rounds per minute with greater velocity, accuracy of aim, and higher range.
Cross-connecting sights are to be fitted to the 6-inch quick-firing guns of His Majesty's ships, both at home and abroad. The work on ships abroad is to be done by naval artificers, and that at home by dockyard workmen. These sights will enable the sight-setter to work on the opposite side of the gun-layer, and will thus admit of both sides being accurately adjusted.—United Service Gazette.
A letter from the China station states that Mr. G. B. Hazell, gunner, of the Astraea, has fitted a sight connection to one of the 6-inch guns, on the central pivot Mark I. mounting. This device enables the 2d captain of the gun to keep the gun on the target without orders from the captain of the gun, and also to see if the captain of gun's sight is aligned correctly on the target, both sides being connected for range and deflection, and, therefore, in the same adjustment. The value of this cross-sighting arrangement was proved during the annual prize-firing, one man making nine hits out of ten rounds at a range of 3000 yards. The target was of the ordinary service pattern.—United Service Gazette.
The report that the King Edward damaged her decks at her gun trials is correct. The deck aft was depressed 5 inches by the fire of the 9.2's.—Engineer.
Two explosions, at intervals of some days, have occurred recently in the magazine compartments of the French battleship Charlemagne. They are believed to be due to the decomposition of the powder, which has been kept in the vessel far beyond the regulation time.—United Service Gazette.
It is reported that designs are now being worked out to mount extra 9.2's in the Britannia class instead of 7.5's, which were ordered to replace the useless 6-inch guns originally intended to be fitted to these battleships. We sincerely hope that the report is true. An earnest of it is that no, work is being done in the batteries at present.
A 1905 model target is about to be introduced experimentally in the naval war game. Instead of the old three-size targets there will be silhouettes for ranges up to 8000 yards. The idea is that it is better to train students of the game to something that looks as nearly as possible like the rear thing. The 4000-yard target will be the same size as the Fighting Ships' ship, page silhouettes, so that the chances of hits at 8000 yards, the targets for which will be smaller in proportion, will be as small as they are in actual practice.—Engineer.
Military tops have been abolished in the battleships of the King Edward class, but gun-directing platforms have been fitted in their place. This change is said to be due to the initiative of Captain Percy Scott. The absence of the weight of guns and the protective plating at such a height above the center of buoyancy and gravity contributes greatly to the stability of the ship, without impairing in any appreciable degree her fighting efficiency, as the machine and quick-firing guns are now in elevated positions on the ship's hull.—United Service Gazette.
The Prince George has had her upper fore fighting top and after main one converted into the new range-finder positions. Small projections have been built out and roofs fitted to the tops treated. The appearance of the ship is correspondingly altered. All the other Majesties are to be similarly treated as they come into dockyard hands.—Engineer.
A new and important fitting is being placed in the battleship King Edward VII for the purpose of developing the rapidity of firing the guns of large caliber. It is practically a dummy gun, with a real breech-block attached and all the mechanism for passing the projectiles into the breech. The invention consists of a stout wooden frame, the breech end being covered with a thick steel plate, having a hole drilled, or, rather cut, out of its center the diameter of the projectile of the gun which it represents. The actual breech-block of the gun is attached to this. The barrel of the gun is represented by a half-cylinder of wood, cased with thin steel, and running at an acute angle from this is a return gutter of wood and steel, which brings back the projectile after it has been rammed through the barrel to the loading position. The projectiles are raised from the deck and placed in position by a whip leading from a radial arm, which derives its motor power from a hydraulic press. The dummies are fitted on the upper deck, and every motion is gone through in exactly the same manner as if the projectile were actually fired from the gun itself. These drills are calculated to bring the guns' crews up to the highest standard of efficiency in rapidity of loading; in fact, it is considered by gunnery experts that by this method of training guns above the caliber of 6-inch will closely approximate to the results obtained from the quick-firing guns. The cost of each dummy is estimated at £1500.—United Service Gazette.
In the 12-inch gun-layers' competition in the Channel fleet, the best shooting has so far been accomplished by the battleship Victorious, which scored thirty direct hits in fifty-six rounds. The Caesar, flagship of Vice-Admiral Lord C. Beresford, has added to her records by taking on board from dockyard lighters at Gibraltar 600 tons of coal at an average of 212 tons per hour. This, it is maintained on board, is the best coaling ever made from lighters. The Mars, coaling from the Admiralty collier Sirdar, took in 700 tons at the rate of 166 tons per hour. The Caesar at long-range firing has made seven hits out of twelve rounds with her 12-inch guns, while the Doris has made seventeen hits out of sixty rounds with her 6-inch guns, both performances being remarkably good.—United Service Gazette.
Lord Charles Beresford recently entertained eighty petty officers and men, the best shots in the Channel fleet, at a dinner at Gibraltar on the quarter deck of the flagship Caesar. Addressing the men Lord Charles congratulated them on their excellent shooting in the gun-layers' competition, saying that the markmanship was a credit to the men and to the country. He alluded to the great improvement in straight shooting in the navy in the last four years, and added that though the ranges were greater this year, the scores were better than in 1903. The officers, gunnery lieutenants, and gunnery staffs had all worked loyally. He had kept a list of the names of all the best shots, and would always be pleased to do anything he could to help them. Subsequently each man's score in the competition was read out. Lord Charles said he thought he was safe in claiming that His Majesty's ship Victorious had this year the best record in the world for 12-inch gun firing. The Caesar was the best for 6-inch, 12-pounder, and 3-pounder. The Illustrious came out second in the I2- inch gun-layers' competition, firing forty-nine rounds in eighteen minutes and making twenty-nine direct hits. She is fitted with the slow-loading gear.—United Service Gazette.
The following results were obtained in a gun-layers' competition in the Channel fleet under Vice-Admiral Lord C. Beresford:
With her 12-inch guns the battleship Jupiter made nineteen direct hits out of fifty-six rounds, and with her 6-inch guns she scored no less than eighty-seven hits out of one hundred and sixty-two rounds. The commander- in-chief signalled his congratulations to the ship on the result. The battleship Hannibal's m-inch gun-firing was disappointing, only nine hits out of forty-three rounds. With her 6-inch guns, however, she did much better, scoring ninety-three hits in one hundred and fifty-eight rounds. The best of the 6-inch guns made fourteen hits during seventeen rounds fired in two minutes, while the best group of seamen fired forty-six rounds and made thirty-three hits. The Jupiter's best 6-inch gun fired sixteen rounds in the time allowed and scored fourteen hits.—United Service Gazette.
The steamer Kashing, bound from Chefu to Shanghai, struck a floating mine at midnight on October 25, off the Shantung promontory, and had to put back to Wei-Hai-Wei. A large rent, measuring m feet by 12 feet, was torn in her port bow, and the deck above was blown up. One Chinaman of the crew was killed outright, another fell through the hole in the bow and was drowned, and three were injured.—London Graphic.
It is announced that the French battleship Patrie, now being built, is to be fitted with a new i8-inch torpedo with greater air pressure than usual for propulsion, whereby both the speed and range will be increased.
The battleship torpedoed with the Hatsuse last June was not the Yoshima but the Asahi, which, however, was very little injured. She was hit in the extreme bow, and patched up within a fortnight. The Yoshima was disabled elsewhere with mines. Altogether the Russians torpedoed two battleships, damaged one battleship and one cruiser with mines, and sank three inferior craft by the same means. To do this cost them six battleships and two cruisers destroyed, one battleship and two cruisers interned, and two small cruisers sunk—Engineer.
Some interesting experiments with live torpedoes have been made in the Mediterranean. These showed that the old 14-inch pattern is of little use. As regards the 18-inch, this torpedo is effective up to moo yards; beyond that it is uncertain. For some time to come, however, it must remain in general use in our fleet, as the formidable 3000-yards weapon is hardly perfect enough yet for general issue.—United Service Gazette.
Much interest attaches to the trials of torpedoes from the under-water tubes of the King Edward VII. The tests were very severe; one screw was worked at full speed ahead while the other was at full speed astern with a view to determining the effect of the currents thus produced upon the accuracy of the torpedoes. It was observed with satisfaction that the action of the gyroscope was all that could be desired.—Moniteur de la Flotte.
A new torpedo-firing method has just been experimentally introduced into the Naval War Game. In substance it compels the firer to do just what he would have to do in war—estimate the speed and course of the enemy. If he guesses right he hits—if he guesses anything more than a knot or so, or a point or so out, he misses. The new method is complicated, but it is certainly better war training.
Training submerged tubes are to be fitted to new German warships. Apparently the new invention is one discarded in the British fleet fifteen years ago.—Engineer.
EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE RIFLE (translated from the Revue d'Artillerie, November, 1904, by Captain D. B. Stewart, R. F. A.).—We believe the Japanese possess the smallest caliber rifle of those in actual use. When war was declared, it was doubted whether, in spite of the trajectory, the immediate effect of the bullet on man was sufficient to fell a man instantaneously, and prevent him taking further part in the action, before being put out of action by the results of the wound.
This question was the special study of Surgeon-General Kikuchi, on the Russian prisoners; and below is a free translation of his work.
"The Russian prisoners who arrived at Matsayama for our care afforded me a unique opportunity to form an exact idea of the qualities of our new rifle, ' Meiji ' now employed for the first time.
"As far as the wounds are concerned, they appear generally of a benign type, which speaks well for the humane qualities of such a powerful projectile.
"I should here state that I was detailed by the Government to study the defects and qualities of the new rifle previous to its adoption. This was not altogether easy, as I could not take into reckoning the effects on living men. We substituted for our experiments the carcasses of animals, as well as live ones, and basing myself on these trials, I was able to strongly recommend this rifle to the Japanese Government as an advance on the old one; I specially stated that any shot, although it might not strike a vital spot, should put a man out of action, and that nevertheless the percentage of recoveries would be higher than formerly.
"Shortly after, the press of our country raised doubts on every hand, on the subject of the efficacy of our small-bore covered bullet, and when some foreign experts appeared in the theater of war and contradicted my advice, I was fearful for my advice. The results of the present war have only overwhelmingly confirmed my observations, for in addition to the enormous penetration of our bullet, it has been proved that the effect produced on an enemy is sufficient, even when the wounds are trifling, to put him out of action at once.
"On the other hand, we must consider the extraordinary speed with which recoveries are made, as a great step on the path of humanity. This is due to the fact that the bullet penetrates rapidly without producing great ravages, or fractures increased by splinters in the part touched. The greater part of the Russians who have fallen into our hands received their wounds in the actions of the Yalu; forty days have since elapsed, and the improvement has nearly everywhere been so rapid, even for those seriously wounded, that they may be considered almost cured, and a great number of them have been sent away as convalescent. Among them there were men very seriously wounded, e. g., one of them had a perforated lung, and a loss of blood which I estimate from three-fourths to one liter. Now this man has been sent away to-day as cured. Another had a dangerous wound on the lower part of the stomach; a third had had the left arm, the lung, and. the right arm penetrated; another had been struck by a bullet penetrating the upper part of both thighs, and many others had received analogous wounds.
"It is surprising that these men are not dead; on the contrary, as I have already said, they are all either on the high road to recovery, or convalescent.
"If these Russian wounded had been struck by our old weapon the Mourata, the cure would have been very long and doubtful. During the Chinese War (1894-95), in which the Mourata was alone used, this class of wound became putrid, and the patient was then lost. Now-a-days the diagnosis is nearly always favorable, for we have not to fear further complications, or at any rate in a very small proportion of cases.
"I might even state, that in spite of its rapid penetration, and the small extent of wounds, the effect is more rapid on the wounded, than with our old Mourata' (an exact copy of the Gras rifle). From my personal observation, and basing myself on my experience of the Chinese and present war, I might even state that the Mourata with its slow penetration, did not clean cut the veins and nerves, which it met, but pushed them aside in dividing them like indiarubber pipes, leaving the veins intact. This does not occur with the Meiji bullet, which penetrates everything which resists it, and ruts clean through the veins, causing of course a great loss of blood, and putting the wounded man out of action. It was noticed that, among the Russian wounded, there were men with as many as seven wounds. This caused me to fear that in many cases the man was only put out of action after receiving several wounds; this fact would have put my adversaries in the right. I set myself to investigate the particulars of these cases, and personally asked the men when and how they were wounded. My enquiry resulted in establishing the fact, that in nearly every case the Russians had been knocked over by the first shot. With the extraordinary trajectory of our rifles, these unfortunate men who found themselves in front, and whom it was impossible to rescue or remove to ambulances, were constantly struck again as our troops approached the Russians; they declared that the Japanese bullets, so to speak, shaved the soil.
"Horrible as these successive wounds may appear, I may say I was pleased with this explanation, as it confirms my first statements.
"Some doubt still exists as to the effects of the Japanese artillery fire. This is due to the fact that the navy still maintains secrecy as to the projectiles employed at Chemulpo, etc. Some qualified gentlemen who saw the Russian wounded at Chemulpo are of opinion that the Japanese only used shrapnel, whilst here in Japan, it is generally believed that shells filled with a high explosive were employed, bursting into thousands of fragments like shrapnel. One fact is certain, that the Russians were quite overwhelmed with wounds, and that from some of them there were extracted over one hundred small splinters. The Japanese have assuredly a powerful explosive in their Shimose powder; it is currently reported that it is exactly similar to that used in the German forces. For the Japanese, the principal (and from a military point of view, sufficient) point is that they have a superior powder, remarkable arms, and that these men know better how to use them than do the Russians.—Royal Artillery Institution.
AUTOMATIC RIFLES.-It is essential that every military weapon should possess the following characteristics:
1. Strength.—To withstand the wear and tear of service.
2. Simplicity.—So that it can be easily stripped to remedy faults, for inspection, and cleaning purposes.
3. Accuracy.—The rifle should be correctly sighted and the sights correctly centered, so as to give the true direction.
4. Lightness.—As light as possible consistent with strength and non-excessive recoil.
5. Handiness—The rifle must come up to the shoulder well and be well balanced, so that the fore sight can be placed on the mark with ease and celerity.
6. Good Ballistic Properties.—The velocity should be high, both muzzle and remaining; the trajectory should be flat, and the bore should be of such a diameter that the bullet will have a favorable sectional density. No. 6, of course, is intimately connected with the bullet and powder charge.
It may be assumed that with a non-automatic rifle the greatest rapidity of fire has been achieved in the various mechanisms at present in use by the great powers. This may be taken at about 20 to 25 aimed shots a minute with a highly-trained expert shot. The only time lost, so to speak, is that required for recharging the magazine and bringing the rifle to the aiming position. The question that we propose to discuss now is the advantages and disadvantages that may be expected from an automatic rifle. In an automatic rifle the force of the recoil or portion of powder gas is used to perform the following motions mechanically: Open the breech, eject the empty case; cock the firing mechanism; close the breech, placing a fresh cartridge into the chamber; and fire the new cartridge or not at the will of the firer.
No automatic rifle is worthy of consideration for adoption as a military arm unless it possesses all the six qualifications already referred to, and also performs the five motions mentioned above with certainty. Moreover, it must be so arranged that, should the automatic action be disarranged and thrown out of action by damage or dirt, the rifle can still be used as an ordinary magazine rifle. These are the difficulties that have to be faced. Now the advantages of an automatic rifle are: A greatly increased rapidity of fire, as the rifle can be fired, if set for automatic fire, at a very high rate so long as cartridges are in the magazine; and if set for automatic feed, but non-automatic fire, as fast as the trigger can be pressed so long as cartridges are in the magazine. Let us now discuss these two advantages. A soldier armed with an automatic rifle capable of developing this very high rate of fire becomes to all intents and purposes a machine gun, combining as he does the power of pouring salvos of rapid fire (up to the capabilities of the magazine) without requiring the services of mules to carry the gun and carriage or a "section" of men to man the same. It is very evident that this one man would be harder to locate and to disable than the machine gun and its personnel. On the other hand, the capabilities of the magazine are limited, and when once it is emptied the soldier is powerless to inflict damage on the enemy until the magazine is replenished. This, of course, holds good in non-automatic rifles, but the quicker the rate of fire the more often will the powerlessness occur. The moral of this is that men must be taught to husband their ammunition, and not to fire unless they can more or less be certain of obtaining a tangible result; in other words, that although quickness of aim and accuracy in snapshooting is essential, yet it by no means is to be deduced from this that an increased rate of fire is desirable. If this is granted, it may be reasonably asked, why put into the hands of the soldier this delicate and expensive weapon? The weight of the Maxim gun and its mounting may be taken at about 130 pounds, yet with this weight of metal and with the addition of clamps and scattering stops it is impossible to keep the aim in rapid fire even. After about 20 rounds, unless fire is directed on a large mass of troops or extensive area of ground, fire must be stopped and a fresh aim taken. No rifle to be carried by a foot soldier should weigh more than 9 pounds, and with this small weight it seems impossible that any accuracy can be expected with an automatic rifle (set for automatic fire) after the first round. The lighter the rifle, other things being equal, the greater the inaccuracy.
On the other hand, every sportsman when big-game shooting will know that so long as the quarry remains absolutely stationary, its location is extremely difficult. The trained gillie or shikari will, it is true, be able to spot the game when motionless, though quite indistinguishable to the ordinary eye; but this is due to training of a lifetime. It follows from this that anything which will tend to lessen the movement of a soldier firing behind cover or in the open will save a great amount of casualties. Armed with an automatic rifle set for automatic feed, a soldier can be practically motionless whilst the ammunition in his magazine lasts, his sole motion being to press the trigger.
It would seem that the whole practical utility of so-called automatic rifles rests with transport and the facilities for feeding the firing line, once committed to the assault. As to the feasibility of feeding this line, opinions differ, but it would seem to directly hinge on the cover and accidents of the ground available. The firing line may be more or less safely ensconced behind individual cover, but between it and the supports lies a stretch of bullet-strewn ground, which must be passed over by anyone attempting to replenish the empty bandoliers of the advanced line. Accidents of the ground may, of course, furnish covered approaches, which will minimize the risk and enable the necessary advance to be made. It is open to doubt whether the possession of a rifle like the Lee-Enfield, capable of firing at the approximate rate of 20 rounds a minute, instead of one round in two minutes, like the Enfield, has emptied the soldiers' bandolier or pouch in a shorter time. Many assert that the difficulty now is to get men to expose themselves so as to open fire; others hold that the men evince a great desire to empty their magazines and bandoliers and then lie passive behind cover. Whichever theory is correct, it would seem that the introduction of an automatic rifle for general use would be a doubtful advantage; for if the combatants prefer to remain inactive behind cover, no gain is obtained by giving them an automatic rifle. If, on the other hand, the object of the attacker is to get rid of his ammunition as soon as possible, so that he can remain in safety behind his cover, the possession of a rifle with great celerity of fire appears also to be a doubtful advantage. A modern battle, lasting perhaps for days and nights, will necessitate very careful husbanding of the ammunition by day, as it is most likely only by night that the bandoliers of the most advanced troops will be able to be replenished.
The great disadvantage of the machine gun in the attack is its large personnel and the transport required for the carriage of the gun, ammunition, and carriage, rendering the gun and its detachment a conspicuous object; but an automatic machine rifle carried by one man on a pony, with another man on another pony as "horseholder" and carrying a reserve of ammunition, would be most useful. Each company of a battalion, each squadron of a cavalry regiment, each company of mounted infantry might have some of these guns added to their establishment, the gun to weigh about 18 pounds. The great utility of these guns would be the protection of flanks, the covering of bridges or fords, across which either the defenders, if in retreat, or attackers must pass, and the defence of angles in squares or zarebas. They would be invaluable in deceiving the enemy as to the number of rifles actually opposed to him, as with their great mobility and rapidity of fire they would be very hard to distinguish from a considerable force widely extended.
Automatic rifles are worked by two methods. The generally adopted method is that the barrel is allowed to recoil a certain distance, and by acting on a lever forces back the bolt after the bullet has left the muzzle, causing the bolt to rotate, thus extracting the cartridge case. The bolt in its backward motion compresses two springs, the "recoil" spring and the "mainspring" or percussion spring. When the bolt has been drawn back to its fullest extent a cartridge is fed up into the bolt way by the magazine spring. The bolt then is forced home by the extension of the recoil spring, carrying the barrel home. The bolt is rotated by a stud working in a cam groove, thus sealing the chamber and causing the locking lugs to enter their grooves. The "mainspring" or "percussion spring" remains compressed, being held back by the sears. There are generally two sears and two bents. One sear and one bent is acted on by the recoiling portion, and is knocked out of action when the bolt goes home; this leaves the mainspring or percussion spring compressed by the trigger sear. On pressing the trigger the sear is released, and the striker flying forward ignites the cap. This is the method employed with "automatic feed" but "hand-firing." If it is desired to employ automatic fire," the continuous pressure of the finger on the trigger will throw the trigger sear out of action, and the rifle will be fired by the "recoil sear." Should the recoiling action break down, a component is generally attached for throwing the recoiling action out of gear, and the bolt can then be worked by hand in the ordinary way. The advantages claimed for recoil-operated rifles are that by employing a certain portion of the recoil to compress springs and overcome the friction of the recoiling parts, the actual recoil to be borne by the firer is considerably lessened, and consequently the "kick" and its consequent strain is reduced. Further, long connecting rods and exterior appendanges to the rifle are avoided; consequently the mechanism can be made more compact, and repairs and cleaning can be more easily carried out, as all parts of the rifle and action are more or less easily stripped and "getatable." Their disadvantages at present are that they are not perfect in their action, since the cartridge-cases in some cases are thrown out into the face of the firer, and the rifle when set for trigger or hand-fire fires automatically and vice versa. Again, with the present small-bore rifles, the force of recoil is somewhat inadequate to impart sufficient momentum to the recoiling position to perform the duties allotted to it, and also overcome extra resistance caused by fouling, dirt, or rust on the recoiling portions. Again, as the barrel is in motion during the passage of the bullet down the bore, the ballistic qualities of the bullet may be impaired, owing to interference with the normal jump and flip of the barrel.
In gas-operated rifles a minute hole is bored in the barrel of the rifle between the chamber and the muzzle; a certain portion of the gas from the explosive passes through this hole, forcing back an armature and compressing a strong spring. This armature drives back a long piston or connecting- rod, which is connected to the bolt by means of a stud working in a cam, causing the bolt to be rotated and driven backwards, ejecting the case and compressing the mainspring. Cartridges are fed up from the magazine. As the rod is forced back, it compresses the "recoil spring," which, on the bolt reaching its farthest limit, forces it forward, again placing a cartridge, in the chamber, and, by rotating the bolt, engages the locking lugs in their grooves. By a system of sears and bents the rifle can be fired either automatically or by hand. The advantages of gasoperated rifles are that the force can be regulated by the size of the hole cut in the barrel, so as to obtain a large margin of reserve force to overcome any increased resistance; also by the adjustment of a screw-plug in the cylinder the amount of gas actually allowed to escape from the hole can be regulated. As the barrel is fixed, the ballistics are not altered by the automatic action. The disadvantages of gas-operated rifles are that, however tight and well-fitting the joints and bearings of the piston and cylinder may be, some gas is sure to escape, owing to the very great pressure it exerts on those parts. This gas causes erosion. As it is necessary to strip the rifle to get at the piston and cylinder, they are difficult to clean. In the present state of manufacture they also share with recoil-operated rifles the fault of uncertainty of action. Whatever disadvantages automatic rifles may possess, either inherent in themselves pr else appertaining to their tactical utility, there cannot be any doubt that their adoption is only a matter of time. With increased experience and improvements in manufacture, an automatic rifle, certain in its action, portable, compact, and easily cleaned, will be patented by some inventor, adopted by some nation, with the usual result that other powers will follow suit.—Army and Navy Gazette.
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.
NAVAL LOSSES OF THE WAR.—The following comparative statement of naval losses during the Russo-Japanese War to date may not be without interest:
BATTLESHIPS. RUSSIA.
1. Tsarevitch Interned at Kiauchau.
2. Retvisan Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
3. Pobieda Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
4. Peresviet Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
5. Poltava Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
6. Sevastopol Fate uncertain.
7. Petropavlovsk Blown up by mines off Port Arthur.
ARMORED CRUISERS.
1. Rurik Sunk in Straits of Tsushima by Kamimura.
2. Bayan Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
1. Variag Sunk at Chemulpo.
2. Pallada Suak by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
3. Diana Interned at Saigon.
4. Askold Interned at Shanghai.
5. Boyarin Blown up by mines at Dalny.
6. Novik Driven ashore at Korsakov.
7. Yenesei Blown up by mines at Dalny.
8. Amur Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
GUNBOATS.
1. Gremiastchy Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
2. Otvajny Blown up by mines off Port Arthur.
3. Mandjour Interned at Shanghai.
4- Koreitz Sunk at Chemulpo.
5. Gilyak Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur.
6. Bobr Blown up by mines at Dalny.
7. Sivoutch Destroyed at Newchwang.
BATTLESHIP. JAPAN.
1. Hatsuse Blown up by mines off Port Arthur.
COAST-DEFENCE SHIP.
1. Heiyen Blown up by mines at Dalny.
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
1. Yoshino Accidentally rammed by Kasuga.
2. Sai-yen Blown up by mines off Port Arthur.
3. Miyako Blown up by mines at Dalny.
GUNBOAT.
1. Kaimon Blown up by mines at Dalny.
In addition to these, the Russians have lost eighteen destroyers and three torpedo-boats; the Japanese, torpedo-boat No. 48, and, it is said, three destroyers. Of the Russians, the Grosovoi is disarmed at Shanghai; the Bezpchchadni, Bezshumni, and Bezstrashni are interned at Kiauchau. The Burni was beached near Wei-hai-wei, the Reshitelni escaped to Chifu, and has since been added to the Japanese fleet, and the Vnimatelni and Lieutenant Burakov were cornered and sunk in Pigeon Bay.
There have been persistent rumors that the first-class battleship Yashima was also, like the Hatsuse, sunk in June by striking a mine near Dalny. It should be noted that Togo makes no mention of her as a complete loss, and all that can be said is that the Japanese authorities have never denied or confirmed the rumor. A telegram, however, published in Rome on the 8th inst., from Tokyo, sent by the Italian agency, throws some light on the matter, for it states that the battleship Yashima, which was sunk by a mine, had at last been successfully raised and brought safely into dock, where her repairs were being energetically proceeded with. This would look as if she had been badly damaged by a mine, but had fortunately only sunk in shallow water or had been beached; and that so long as there was a chance of salving her, the Japanese preserved perfect silence on the matter. The fact that, as is clear now, in the battle of August 10, the Russians had six battleships to the Japanese four, shows the bad handling of the Russian ships in a worse light than ever.—United Service Gazette and United Service Institution.
We find in the Marine Rundschau a very interesting account of the sortie of the Russian fleet from Port Arthur on August 10, from a description of an officer of the Tsarevitch. There is a good deal of information in it, and the details of injuries inflicted on the flagship are interesting and suggestive. One n-inch shell struck the conning-tower on the starboard side, and, taking a deflected course, issued obliquely at the other side. The navigating officer and several others were killed and the compass broken. Another 12-inch shell struck the foot of the foremast between the upper and lower bridges, endangering its safety, and killing Admiral Withoeft and about fifteen men, while Admiral Matusevitch, chief of the staff, and Captain Ivanoff were wounded. Another shell, probably a 12-inch, entered below the water-line under the forward 6-inch turret, admitting water into the space between the outer sheathing of the hull and the continuation of the armored deck, which there took a vertical direction, constituting a bulkhead. The Rundschau has some comments upon the defective handling of the Russian fleet and its tactical failure. No Russian torpedo-boat has so far fired a torpedo, the boats having been used for mining and observation purposes. The Japanese also are not thought to have made the best use of their torpedo-boats, and there was failure on the part of the fleet in not cutting off the ships from Port Arthur. The Rundschau proceeds to argue against the exponents of the "Jeune Ecole" who are endeavoring to twist the lessons of the war to support their own theories. The writer of the article would like to know how Russian ships could have been blockaded at Port Arthur if the Japanese had not had battleships outside, and what would have been the case of Japanese transports if the Russians could have left the port. "The command of the sea belongs, in spite of mines, torpedoes, and submarines, to the powerful battleship possessing sufficient speed."—Army and Navy Gazette.
Experiments were carried out off Yarmouth, on Tuesday evening, to determine whether a fishing trawler would look like a torpedo-boat under a searchlight. The gunboat Hebe turned her searchlights upon a trawler in motion, and simultaneously a photograph was taken, which will be submitted to the International Commission of Inquiry.—United Service Gazette.
NAVAL LESSONS.—In regard to purely naval lessons, the war has been somewhat barren up to the present time, though doubtless we shall learn more when the history is written and material is pieced together by the competent naval critics who, have followed events, more or less, on the spot. It has been held that the inefficiency of the locomotive torpedo has been proved; but, if so, almost the same thing might be said of the naval gun afloat, for the destruction of the Russian ships from the land positions at Port Arthur cannot be considered a naval feat. At any rate, the torpedo first opened the ball by putting out of action two Russian battleships; and though the circumstances were undoubtedly exceptional, it is always wise to make allowances for the chances of war. It was, however, in the menace of the torpedo that its chief effectiveness was found. Admiral Togo had to keep his ships at a distance, finding refuge at a distance from the port he was blockading, and doubtless it was the enemy's torpedo craft he had chiefly in mind, for nothing would have suited him better than for the big Russian ships to have come out to try conclusions.
A result that was unexpected, however, was the small damage done when the torpedoes did get home, compared to what had been anticipated. It has been generally held that a square blow from a torpedo was hardly to be received without mortal damage, but the vessels struck on the night of February 8 were both repaired, and came again into the line of battle. That they were in smooth water and close to port must be borne in mind; but, again, the facilities for carrying out extensive repairs were of a very imperfect nature at Port Arthur, if reports are to be credited. We shall, however, know more about this when the war is over, and fuller details are at command.
If, however, the locomotive torpedo has often failed to score, as is undoubtedly the case, its more inert brother the mine has proved a potent means of destruction. The mechanical mine is, however, as apt to be as dangerous to friend as to foe, and may be equally as destructive to neutral shipping. Whether the powers will, on the latter account, rule it as inadmissible, and pronounce it an act of hostility against all nations to set mines afloat, remains to be seen. Had such an ordinance been in force, and observed, the Japanese would not have lost their great battleship the Hatsuse, and the Russians the battleship Petropavlovsk. The Japanese battleship Yashima was also reported to have been sunk, but this appears to have been an error. At any rate, mines have destroyed of the Russian fleet, besides the Petropavlovsk, one cruiser, a mine vessel, the unfortunate Yenesei, three gunboats, and some torpedo-boats or destroyers; whilst the battleships Pobieda and Sevastopol, and the armored cruiser Bayan, were seriously injured. The Japanese lost by mines the Hatsuse, already mentioned, a gunboat, and a torpedo-boat.
The failure of the gun to do more damage was owing to the fact that the operations were carried on at long range, which gave an advantage to armor. If we are to accept the fighting that took place as characteristic of what may be expected in future, the inefficiency of a secondary armament of smaller nature, such as the 6-inch guns, must be recognized. Unfortunately, they form no inconsiderable part of the equipment of a large number of our ships. This, however, is a subject recently dealt with in our pages. Even the projectiles from weapons of larger caliber failed to inflict the terrible injuries that all anticipated. The Tsarevitch was often struck—it is said fifteen times by 8-inch and 12-inch shells—and yet she escaped, to ultimately find safety in the German port of Kiachau, where she was disarmed. Until more details of the firing are known it would, however, be idle to draw conclusions from these facts; but armor here appears to have beaten the gun.—Engineering.
ADMIRAL TOGO's DESPATCH.-With the fall of Port Arthur and the complete destruction of the ships in the harbor, the Russian flag disappears, for the time being, from the waters of the Far East. It will be interesting to place on record Admiral Togo's historic but modest despatch to his Government on the 22d of last month, in which he announces the close of the naval operations before the beleaguered port:
"Since 203-Meter Hill was occupied," writes the Admiral, "by the gallant and desperate attack of the besieging army, the bombardment of the enemy's squadron by siege and naval guns has become effective. In consequence, the Poltava and Retvisan were sunk, and subsequently the Pobieda, Peresviet, Pallada, and Bayan were also sunk. The Sevastopol escaped the land bombardment, and left the harbor on the 9th inst., and anchored near Chen-Fao-Shan. She was attacked there continuously by our torpedo-boats and heavily damaged.
"The main strength of the enemy is completely crushed. Only the weak gunboat Otvazhny and several destroyers remain afloat. In the circumstances our combined fleet has removed the unnecessary parts of the blockade, which has been maintained since the 1st of May, and has arranged a closer watch for ships attempting to run the blockade, and a look-out for the remnant of the enemy's squadron.
"During the blockade we suffered from the enemy's mines, both laid and floating, from high seas, and from dense fogs. The Miyako, Yoshino, Hatsuse, Kaimon, Heiyen, and Saiyen were sunk, and many gallant and loyal officers and men were killed; but we succeeded in maintaining the blockade. When the enemy emerged from the harbor our fleet successfully engaged their ships, and finally, by the valuable support of the besieging army, succeeded in crushing nearly all the enemy's squadron.
"Our second squadron so heavily damaged the Vladivostok squadron that it has since been unable to leave port.
"All this success is gratefully attributed to the brilliant virtue of our Emperor."—United Service Institution.
INJURIES TO THE TSAREVITCH.—The following description of the injuries sustained by the Russian battleship Tsarevitch in the action of August 10 last, which has been lying ever since in the German harbor of Tsingtau, is taken from the Marine Rundschau. According to the reports of the Russian officers, the ship was struck by fifteen 12-inch and a greater number of shell of small caliber:
Shot No. 1.—A 12-inch shell forward on the starboard side at the level of the upper deck, striking the hog's-back of the bow anchor. The projectile tore a hole in the ship's side 2 x 2 meters, passed through the bow and sheet anchor chains, but hardly left a trace of its passage in the hold. Both anchors were lost.
Shot No. 2.—A 12-inch shell on the starboard side, level with the upper deck, and just under the forward 12-inch turret. The shell tore a hole in the ship's side 1 x 1 meter, but did practically no damage in the interior.
Shot No. 3.—A 12-inch shell that struck the armor of the forward 12-inch turret. Ineffective.
Shot No. 4.—A 12-inch shell squarely striking the starboard side of the forward conning-tower. Of the persons in the conning-tower, the ship's navigator, a sub-lieutenant, the helmsman, and two or three orderlies were killed, their heads being blown off, while two officers were stunned. Through the falling bodies, the wheel was turned hard to port, the steering- gear being uninjured; the compass was destroyed. The cables running along under the roof of the conning-tower were torn away, and the mechanical connection with the engines destroyed. The head of the shell passed out of the tower and buried itself in the hammock boxes that form the forward bridge rail, and here it was later found.
Shot No. 5.—A 12-inch shell that squarely struck the foot of the foremast between the upper and lower bridges. The projectile pierced the starboard side of the mast and burst against the port side. Toward the bow the iron plates of the mast were entirely torn way. At the back only does a connection between the two bridges remain, but this is not strong enough to bear the weight of the heavy fighting mast. The latter actually rests on the upper bridge only, being joined to this by strong angle irons that were uninjured. The search-light cables in the mast were broken. The shot killed Admiral Witthoft, the fleet navigator, and some fifteen men. The chief of staff, Admiral Matusewitch, and the commander, Captain Ivanoff, were wounded. The officers were probably in the fire lee of the tower.
Shot No. 6.—A 12-inch shell struck the lower part of the forward funnel squarely. The shell penetrated the starboard side and exploded against the port side, which was torn to pieces.
Shots No. 7 and 8.—Two ta-inch shells injured the upper and lower parts of the rear funnel. They struck and burst against the starboard side of the smoke-stack, which was ripped up and torn from top to bottom. The port side shows no injury that can be traced to either of these shots.
Shot No. 9.—Probably an 8-inch projectile fired from a cruiser. The shell penetrated the port side wall of the superstructure below the launch. Several injuries resulted, among them the destruction of the bakery. The shell made a round hole about 1 meter in diameter.
Shot No. 10.—Another 8-inch shell, that penetrated the port side of the forward lower edge of the rear 6-inch turret, leaving a hole 1 x 0.55 meter in the wall. The covering of the lower turret structure in the admiral's mess was torn away.
Shot No. 11.—A 12-inch shell struck the top of the after 12-inch turret near the sighting-board and burst. The top was slightly dented, and some of the rivets of the angles joining the turret and the hood were driven in, killing a man inside of the turret. The man in the sighting-hood was rendered unconscious for a short time only. Pieces from the bursting shell penetrated the after chart room.
Shot No. 12.—A 12-inch shell burst and destroyed the forward chart room abaft the foremast.
Shot No. 13.—A 12-inch shell struck the after 12-inch turret on the port side. The shell probably burst at impact and did no damage.
Shot No. 14.—Probably a 12-inch shell that struck some 2 1/2 meters below the water-line, under the forward 6-inch turret and under the armor belt. According to the reports of divers, the projectile struck the joint of two of the outer skin plates. The plates, frames, and supports are said to be dented and bent, but not torn, for a longitudinal distance of about 3 ½ meters. The covering-strap is supposed to have jarred off, and about 150 tons of water allowed to enter the compartment behind the downward curved armor deck, through the rivet holes. The Tsarevitch entered the harbor with a barely perceptible list to starboard.
Shot No. 15.—A 12-inch shell passed through the port after-deck railing and the upper deck and burst. The bollard was half torn away. The teakwood covering of the upper deck is ripped up for about 4 square meters. The wood did not burn, and the deck planking splintered little.
The following facts may be noted in respect to these injuries:
1. As but part of the Japanese shells pierced the sidewall or did barely perceptible damage in the interior of the vessel, we may conclude that they burst too soon. However, in this respect the shots that struck the foremast and the funnel differ very widely from most of those that struck the hull. Much may be considered due to the difference in the effect of the description of shells used. It will probably not be far from the truth to finally conclude that the Japanese used some "half-armor shells with base fuses."
2. In spite of the wooden deck and of the fact that all boats were on board, the splintering effect was small.
3. The wooden decks did not catch fire as was the case in the Chino-Japanese War.
4. In no place was the armor pierced; all the vital parts lying underneath the upper armored deck were absolutely uninjured. Some pieces of the burst shell fell through the after funnel upon the boilers under it, and damaged a few superheater pipes. The explanation of the ineffectiveness of the heaviest Japanese shells against the Russian armor may be found in the tremendously long range and the apparent non-use of armor-piercing projectiles.
5. The hit below the starboard water-line under the forward 6-inch turret did not perforate the outer skin. The entrance of the water was due to the loosening of the rivets incident to the denting of the outer plates.
6. Both the fore and aft 12-inch turrets were struck without injury to the revolving mechanism of the turret or the ammunition-serving apparatus of the guns. However, according to the statement of a German officer who visited the Tsarevitch, the forward turret shows a large groove on the starboard side.
There is no reliable information at hand concerning the quantity of ammunition used by the Russians. According to one of the officers, the lack of 12-inch shells—it appears 74 to 76 were fired from the forward turret and 40 to 45 from the rear turret was one of the reasons for putting into Tsingtau.—United Service Institution.
TURBINE ATLANTIC LINERS.
There was launched on the 22d inst. from the stocks of Alex. Stephen & Son, Linthouse, Glasgow, the new Allan Liner Virginian, of 11,200 tons, which that firm was commissioned to construct at the latter end of last year, shortly after the order for a similar vessel was placed with Workman, Clark & Co., Belfast. The latter vessel, the Victorian, was sent off the stocks on August 25 last, and is at present fitting out for sea. Both these vessels, as is well known, are to be propelled by Parsons' steam turbines, instead of the ordinary reciprocating engines, and as they will be the first turbine liners to engage in the Transatlantic service, and will thus mark a highly important advance in the application of the steam turbine to ship propulsion, great interest is centered in their progress towards completion. When that is accomplished the vessels will be placed on the Canadian mail and Passenger service from Liverpool; the Victorian sailing on her maiden voyage to Halifax, Nova Scotia, and St. John, N. B., on March 23, and the Virginian for the same ports on April 6.
Although the Atlantic has already been navigated by several turbine steamers—e. g., the Turbinia, built on the Tyne, now engaged in lake service, and the yacht Emerald, built by the Linthouse firm, and absolutely the first turbine steamer to cross—the fact of the Virginian being one of the two pioneer regular turbine liners, and also of the vessel being the heaviest yet sent off the stocks at Linthouse, made the launch one of exceptional interest even on the Clyde, where large mail and passenger vessels being consigned to the water forms no great novelty. A large concourse of spectators watched the event, which was entirely successful, the naming ceremony being performed by Miss Eleanor Allan, Glasgow.
The Virginian's dimensions are 540 feet length over all, 6o feet beam, and 41 feet depth. She has been constructed under the supervision of Messrs. Allan's representatives, Mr. A. M. Gordon and Mr. David Johnstone, to the highest class in the British Corporation Registry, and to the Passenger requirements of both the British Board of Trade and the American laws. She has accommodation for about 165o passengers-470 first-class, 240 second-class, and 940 third-class. The vessel has a poop, long bridge, and forecastle, with large houses in the wells between the hatches, the tops of the poop and houses being II-ranged as promenades for passengers and sheltered by boat .decks, which again form promenades sheltered by awnings. On the bridge deck is a long deck-house containing first-class state-rooms, with a wide alleyway on each side; above is the promenade deck, with deck-houses containing the first-class critic and other saloons, sheltered by the boat deck above, which itself a wide promenade, having the officers' quarters and navigation bridge at the fore end, and on each side a range of boats the full length of the deck. The vessel is specially designed for the conveyance of the Canadian mails and passengers, no fewer than five decks being fitted up for the accommodation of the latter, and that accommodation, it is almost needless to say, is conceived, and will be carried out, on lines which will afford every comfort and luxury that modern skill and forethought can provide. The Virginian has also good cargo space fore and aft, and is divided by bulkheads into eleven holds, and with the subdivision of her water-tight double bottom she has twenty water-tight compartments. Her hull has been specially strengthened above the requirements of the British Corporation in order to make her doubly secure against the heavy weather of the North Atlantic. Every provision has been made for minimizing the discomforts sometimes experienced in this connection, and the cabin accommodation is heated throughout by steam, the pipes being so arranged that each individual passenger can modify the heat to suit himself. The emigrants are kept comfortable by an installation of the thermo-tank system, which combines the duties of heating and ventilation. Electric light is fitted throughout, and there is also an installation of the Marconi telegraph.
The feature of outstanding interest, of course, about the Virginian, as of her sister ship, is the turbine machinery. In the case of the Virginian the turbines are being supplied by the Parsons Marine Steam Turbine Company, Wallsend-on-Tyne, while the boilers—nine single-ended, and worked under forced draft—together with a very complete installation of auxiliary machinery, are being supplied from the engine works of the builders—Alex. Stephen & Sons, Limited—themselves. The propulsive power is to be transmitted through three lines of shafting, triple-screw propulsion of itself being a step almost novel in Transatlantic service, each fitted with one propeller of dimensions which, of course, strike us as puny for their duty as compared with the propellers of ordinary singe and twinscrew ocean liners. The revolutions are, however, abnormal from this point of view, being estimated at 270 and 300 per minute when the vessel is going full speed, which in ordinary service is to be 17 knots, meaning about 18 or 19 knots under trial-trip conditions.
The central line of shafting, arranged as in a single-screw vessel, is worked by a high-pressure turbine, the others, which are arranged as in twin-screw ship, by low-pressure turbines. The two latter have each a reversing arrangement, which enables them to be at once driven astern, either together or independently. The ship will thus be as easily and effectively maneuvered as regards backing or turning as an ordinary twinscrew vessel.
Regarding this reversing and maneuvering power, it is not the case, as has been reported, that the Parsons Company has devised a special arrangement for these liners. The arrangement followed is the same as that adopted with success in the turbine-propelled Channel steamers. The astern turbines are placed in the exhaust casing of each of the low-pressure turbines, and, when maneuvering, steam is admitted into the low-pressure turbines or the astern turbines, for going ahead or astern as may be required, independently of each other and the high-pressure turbine. A noticeable feature in the power of the astern turbines for quickly stopping a vessel was seen when the turbine steamer The Queen was stopped in two and a half times her own length when going at a speed of 19 knots.
Speaking of the importance of great stopping and reversing power for maneuvering purposes in ocean liners of high speed, at the luncheon which followed the launch of the Virginian, Mr. Nathaniel Dunlop, managing director of the Allan Line, said that Mr. Parsons had examined the problem and satisfied both himself and the owners and builders that it could be solved. They had no hesitation in accepting his assurance, and nothing had occurred in the process of construction to disturb their confidence in the system. He made this statement because a paragraph appeared some time ago in the American press, and was reproduced in our own, to the effect that the turbines had not answered the expectations of the Allan Line, and had not come up to the contract power. That statement was actually issued before the turbines were made, and before any trials of their power were possible. The turbine system promised many advantages to travellers by sea, its noiseless and uniform motion imparting a corresponding measure of steadiness to the ship in heavy weather. The speed, too, of these turbine vessels on the Atlantic would reduce the time at sea, and, together with the shorter mileage of the Canadian route and its landsheltered navigation on the Canadian side, should make .it a favorable line to travel by to and from the American continent-Engineer.
MISCELLANEOUS.
On the recent voyage between Vigo and Lagos the combined Atlantic and Channel fleets had some important maneuvers under Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, V. C. The ships were divided into two fleets, B and X. B fleet consisted of a fast squadron, including the Triumph and five vessels of the Duncan class, and a reinforcement which included the armored cruisers Bedford and Good Hope, the cruiser. Topaze, and four battleships of the Royal Sovereign class. The X fleet consisted of seven battleships of the Majestic type, with the cruiser Doris. The maneuvers were conducted on the following plan: X fleet was supposed to be making for a fortified port ninety miles away. B fleet, sighting the X fleet, six miles off, had to bring X into action before X could reach the port. The operations were brief but instructive, and B fleet was successful. Three hours after "war" was declared B's fast division got within range of the X ships, and soon after this placed themselves between X and the supposed port. During the maneuvers the cruisers fired several torpedoes, but only one hit was scored. This was an especially good one, however, the Good Hope getting her torpedo under the fore bridge of the Victorious while both vessels were steaming at full speed. The chief honors of the maneuvers rested with the engine-room staffs, who got some excellent work out of their respective vessels. The Triumph was much the fastest vessel in the whole combined fleet. Of the Duncan class the Duncan and Albemarle Were the swiftest.- United Service Gazette.
TRAFFIC OF THE SUEZ CANAL-A return of traffic for 1904 On the Suez Canal has just been issued. Great Britain heads the list with 1693 merchantmen, 5,516,400 tons, besides 34 or 92,184 tons in ballast; mail steamers 131, tonnage 585,560; warships 26, tonnage 44,189; transports 15, tonnage 71,959; a total of 1899 ships and 6,310,295 tons. Germany comes next with merchantmen 279, tonnage 955,839; in ballast none; mail steamers 112, tonnage 453,812; warships none, transports 6, tonnage 39,131; total 397, tonnage 1,448,782. France is third, with merchantmen 99, tonnage 332,309; in ballast I, tonnage 272; mail steamers 85, tonnage 257,274; warships to, tonnage 11,177; total 195, tonnage 601,032. The Netherlands come fourth, with merchantmen 83, tonnage 221,782; in ballast 4, tonnage 11,582; mail steamers 78, tonnage 203,309; warships 2, tonnage 1663; total 167, tonnage 438,336. The United States shows only war vessels, 15 in number, of a total tonnage of 21,464 ; and the other countries combined for the three months given in the canal bulletin dated December 12, furnish a list of merchantmen 2329, tonnage 7,397,267; in ballast 46, tonnage 110,619; mail steamers 542, tonnage 1,934,336; warships Ica, tonnage 130,955; transports 21, tonnage 111,090; a grand total of 3039, tonnage 9,684,267.—Nautical Gazette.
The Metcalfe system of coaling at sea was subjected to a further test on the loth inst., when the trial was carried out in the Channel. A very considerable swell was running, which caused the Basilisk to dip her hawse Pipes in the water, and left her fore port clear, whilst rolling 15 degrees to one side and 5 degrees to the other. The speed of the vessels during the experiment was m knots, and 100 tons of coal were transferred to the Revenge in 2 hours 16 minutes, when the trial was discontinued owing to one of the 4 1/2-inch hawsers carrying away. During the period of transhipping the coal the ships were continually turning, in order to take the sea in every direction, and so obtain a full test. The bags only dipped into the water twice, and none of the gear of the apparatus was carried away except two clips.—United Service Gazette.
A remarkable performance with a submarine has been accomplished by a few lieutenants and sub-lieutenants of the Thames. They crossed from Spithead to Cowes and back under the water, and did the distance of about 12 knots each way in excellent time. To have navigated a vessel of this type safely across the Solent, with its currents and peculiar set of the tides and its sand-banks, is regarded as extraordinary in modern naval practice, and that it should have been performed by these young officers makes the event additionally interesting. There is evinced on the part of officers and men of His Majesty's navy a marked desire to serve on these vessels, and the volunteers for that purpose are far in excess of requirements.—United Service Gazette.
PROGRESS OF WAR MATERIAL IN I904.—We remarked in these columns, three years ago, that "the development and progress of war material during 1901 had been more noticeable as regards the land service" than in that appertaining to the British navy. Such can certainly not be said as regards the year 1904. Three years ago, when the campaign in South Africa was drawing to a conclusion, it had been abundantly demonstrated that the field artillery of our army was furnished with a weapon which was inferior in many respects to that with which the roughly-equipped Boer batteries did so much execution in the early days of the expedition. This fact being recognized, not only had a large number of genuinely quick-firing 15-pounder field guns been obtained by purchase, which were reported on very favorably after experimental practice with them at Okehampton, but a great quantity of 4.7-inch siege guns, together with a full equipment of 5-inch and 6-inch howitzers, to act as guns of position in field works, with heavy field batteries, were put in hand, and in course of manufacture by the trade and at Woolwich Arsenal. At the same time, so large were the orders given for ammunition and projectiles of all classes, that the magazine accommodation had to be more than doubled to provide for the increased number of rounds which were to be retained in store. But the output of energy displayed during 1901 has been very insufficiently maintained. In the three years that have passed by, ample time has been afforded to rearm our field artillery. Nevertheless, with the exception of the twelve batteries which have been furnished with the German quick-firing 15-pounder, the whole of our field and horse artillery batteries are at this moment provided with weapons which are inferior in handiness, range, rapidity of fire, and accuracy to those of most of the European powers and Japan. This is utterly incomprehensible. Sufficient money has certainly been voted by Parliament during this period, for expenditure has gone up by leaps and bounds; but, so far as regards field and horse artillery guns, we are almost as badly off as when war was declared in 1899. It is true that orders have been given out within the past four weeks for 107 batteries of field guns- 17 batteries for the horse artillery and go for the field artillery-642 guns in all, being at the rate of six guns per battery, or going back to the old scale of equipment again, a most salutary arrangement. But these are all to be paid for by a special vote of two and a half millions sterling, and the question as to where all the extra millions voted for 1902, 1903, and 1904, have gone still remains unanswered.
It is also quite true that a certain number of coast batteries have been partially rearmed, and the work that has been accomplished in this direction during the past year and a half noticeably has furnished a substantial increment to the permanent defences of the United Kingdom and of our coaling stations, as well as towards the strength of Hongkong, New Zealand, Bombay, etc. But expenditure upon the last two places is met locally, so our armament estimates are recouped as regards these items, and, indeed, many others of similar character. The naval works vote has also made expenditure which was virtually for land purposes appear against naval funds. How, then, have all the extra millions been expended?
Let us, however, dwell for a moment upon what has been done, rather than upon what has been left undone. Unquestionably the efficiency of our siege train and batteries of position has been raised to a high standard. The new guns and carriages, or mountings, are of the most powerful and trustworthy type; and a remarkable contrast to the siege equipment of the German army, the smallest 12-centimeter howitzer of which requires six horses to drag the gun and limber, the ammunition wagon being still more cumbrous. Moreover, the 10-pounder jointed screw mountain gun, which has just been issued for hill service, has proved a very useful weapon in Thibet, and will doubtless be increased in caliber for future hill warfare. The latest 6-inch Mark III quick-firing gun of 7 tons, which occupies the Position of the antiquated 7-inch and g-inch muzzle-loaders, in all of the lately rearmed coast batteries, has an initial velocity of 2154 foot-seconds, and an extreme range of 10,900 yards. The latest 9.2-inch, Mark X, gun, Which is practically a quick-firer, is of 46.66 calibers in length, and has a muzzle velocity of 2800 foot-seconds. Its perforation of Krupp steel at 3000 yards is 10 inches, with an uncapped projectile. The cap would increase the perforation about 25 per cent. Most of the 9.2-inch guns have been mounted this year.
Perhaps in subsidiary elements of war material the greatest progress has been made on shore during 1904. The system of position-finding by night has been brought to a very high degree of perfection by means of an improved arrangement for search-light details. The large and important positions in our coast fortresses, which have several groups of guns, each worked by their own position-finder, are now fitted with three separate search-lights. One of these has a fixed beam, stretching across the estuary or roadstead, through which an enemy must pass in approaching the fortress, thus indicating the exact locality of the hostile vessel for a moment, which is at once covered by a second, or fighting light, and then kept in the beam as it approaches the defending batteries; the third light is for prospecting outside of the fixed beam, and for giving notice of the approach of the enemy, whilst still at a considerable distance. The movable search-lights are so arranged, with a see-saw apparatus guiding the sweep of the beam in front, that, as they revolve, they clear the site of friendly works, and do not expose them to the observation of the foe. Whilst this illumination of the hostile vessels is in progress, the control of the positionfinders keeps the guns of the various batteries ever laid upon them; and actually, in some cases—where automatic hydraulic gear is employed to elevate and train—following the path of the ships as they approach. It is needless to say that night attacks are those which require the most skillful forms of defence. In the daytime, a trial shot or two will be of as much service very often as a position-finder. Singularly enough, the exact site of a search-light in the darkness is very difficult to spot. The fort or position which contains the projector is not illuminated by the light itself. So the working of search-lights does not help the enemy. It was, indeed, made abundantly clear, during the search-light experiments which were conducted in the summer of 1904, whilst torpedo-boat attacks were made upon the large naval ports at night, that the highest speed was unavailing to enable those vessels to evade their exposure to the continuous beams of the fighting lights, and to avert their inevitable destruction by the countless groups of 12-pounders and Hotchkiss guns which bristle around the openings to all of these ports.
Let us turn now to the development of naval war material. Upon looking at the "Lists of Service Ordnance" which are supplied both to naval and military departments, we observe, with a sense of surprise, that it has not been found necessary to print a fresh set since June, 1900! Not that, in any sense, it is deemed that finality has been reached by the Royal gun factories. But the fact is that the lists of June, two, were compiled somewhat in the future tense. The Mark IX 12-inch, steel-wired so-ton gun, 496.5-inch in total length, of 40 calibers, which was foreshadowed only in those lists, is now an accomplished fact upon vessels of the King Edward VII type; and, as each of these huge battleships approaches completion, the four 12-inch wired guns are to be found lying upon skids in the naval ordnance yards, waiting for the ships—not ships for the guns, as was the case in 1887. When it is considered that each of these weapons takes three years to build, it is clear that the naval artillery authorities have not been backward in their warlike preparations for the past year or two. For let us bear in mind that, whatever may be the ordnance tables published by manufacturers, and the flights of fancy for the future from across the Atlantic, the King Edward VII type is far away the most powerful type of battleship actually afloat; and the Mark IX 12-inch and Mark X 9.2-inch wire guns upon that type, are the most powerful ordnance hitherto mounted as service weapons. It is the practice of other naval powers to talk of experimental weapons as though they were illustrative of service armament. We do not. The 12-inch gun has a muzzle velocity of 2750 foot-seconds, developing an energy of 44,662 foot-tons, with a penetrative force of 15 1/2 inches into Krupp cemented steel at a distance of 3000 yards. This is with an uncapped projectile. With a capped projectile of armor-piercing character, having a small internal capacity of about 2 1/2 per cent of the entire weight, the penetration would be 18 inches into Krupp cemented steel plates at 3000 yards. As it is doubtful whether battleships will be again loaded with armor plates of this prodigious thickness, it seems unnecessary, for the present at least, to aim at increased penetrative power. The same argument holds good with the 9.2-inch and 6-inch guns. The gun, with its improved muzzle velocity and penetration has beaten the armor plate, provided that the velocity is well over 1800 foot-seconds, the degree required to develop the usefulness of the soft metal cap; so we may stand easy for a time. Expert writers in some of last year's annuals have severely criticized our last-mounted 12-inch guns, because they are only of 40 calibers, and assumed to be inferior in range to other visionary weapons intended for foreign powers. It is remarkable how quickly experience gained is lost sight of. It is only from ten to fifteen years ago that both France and Great Britain built a number of heavy guns which were so unduly elongated that they drooped during practice with battering charges. Yet we are urged to repeat this unhappy and expensive experiment.
The discussion of the gun naturally leads us to that of the armor which it is designed to attack. We are indebted to Messrs. John Brown & Co., Limited, of the Atlas Works, Sheffield, for much valuable information on this head, showing recent progress in the improvement of armor plates. Krupp cemented plates are still the most advanced form of thick armor plate protection, although it is unusual to apply cementation to plates of 4 inches and under in thickness. We say this last with a certain amount of reservation, for as we shall presently see, the Hadfield Company appears to have made this year a specially hardened 6-inch plate which breaks up 6-inch armor-piercing shells, and it could probably repeat the process of manufacture with a 4-inch plate. The steel for Krupp cemented plates—and indeed for all the special plates which are now being made—has a high tensile strength, approaching so tons per square inch, and contains small proportions of nickel, chromium, and manganese. Cementation, or carburizing, is carried out in the same manner as was the practice observed in the Harvey process; that is to say, animal charcoal is placed between the faces of two plates laid together, face to face, which are run into a furnace with a bogie bottom, and bricked up for two or three weeks, seven days being allowed for cooling. In this way the proportion of carbon in the face is increased, and the front is then capable of being hardened. Seven days are allowed for cooling, which has to be a most gradual process, in order to prevent the plates flying to pieces by cooling too quickly. In the final face-hardening the plate is subjected to heat graduated from the face to the back. After this heating the face is placed under a coldwater douche, from a series of pipes pierced with holes and containing water at a high pressure, which sprays with such violence as to prevent the formation of bubbles of steam on the surface. Messrs. John Brown & Co. afford, as a recent instance of the strength of these Krupp cemented armor plates, an experiment made with one of 5.9-inch in thickness, supported by an oak backing and 14-inch skin plate. Four uncapped shots were fired with a 6-inch gun at energies of 2664 foot-tons, which would represent an average range for attack. In no case was penetration effected or even of an important character. The equivalent resistance of Krupp cemented steel to that of wrought-iron is from 2.3 to 2.8. The armor plates now being placed upon the Britannia and the New Zealand are not trimmed and planed so extensively as was the case formerly by Admiralty instructions. Those near the water-line are made smooth so as not to create unnecessary friction, but the barbettes and turrets are left untouched upon the surface—a much less costly and more advisable plan. The less the skin surface is touched the better.
We must now turn to the question of projectiles. We have received from Messrs. Hadfield's Steel Foundry Company, Limited, much valuable and recent information on this head. That company has had very important experience during the past year with its cast-steel projectiles, none of which have undergone the forging process observed by other manufacturers. Hadfield's capped " Heclon' projectiles have given the following results, which are summarized from a long report: A 4.7-inch capped shell, with a striking velocity of 2100 foot-seconds, perforated a 6-inch K. C. plate; a 6-inch capped shell, with striking velocity of 2000 foot-seconds, perforated the same; a 7.5-inch shell, with velocity of 198o footseconds, perforated a 7-inch plate; a 9.2-inch shell, with velocity of 2033 foot-seconds, perforated 9-inch plate. These figures speak for themselves. All the shells had a bursting capacity of about 2 1/2 per cent. They perforated the plates and oak backing, and were afterwards found in condition for bursting, several practically undeformed. The result of these experiments demonstrates, without a peradventure," as they say in America, the value of cast-steel of suitable quality for projectile manufacture, and the influence of the soft nose or cap.
The Hadfield Company has also made important strides in the improvement of 6-inch armor plates, these being also of cast-steel of special character, and called "Era." A shield of this material 6 inches in thickness resisted a 4.7-inch armor-piercing shell fired at 2100 foot-seconds velocity, and a lyddite 6-inch shell fired at 2035 foot-seconds velocity, the striking energy being 2875 foot-tons. This measure of resistance was, we should say, quite unique.
Some naval officers in this country are disinclined to view favorably the capped projectile, as its usefulness is not maintained below 1800 foot seconds of velocity, and at sharp angles of inclination it does not act well. But we should say that its usefulness under normal circumstances far outweighs any defects that low velocities and oblique firing might create. The Hadfield Company has just executed a very extensive order for Spain for capped "Heclon" projectiles of large caliber-28, 24, and 14-centimeter—this being probably the first order for large-caliber capped projectiles made commercially in this country. The execution has given entire satisfaction.
The Hotchkiss Ordnance Company, Limited, has made considerable progress during 1904 in the development of its own special types of ordnance. The latest Hotchkiss 6-pounder, 57-milimeter, 58-caliber high-power semi-automatic gun, of which we shall later on give a full description, is a very remarkable weapon, and of greatly increased powers of range and accuracy. It appears to contain the fewest number of separate parts that could be made sufficient for the mechanism of a semi-automatic gun, and yet all these can be separated by hand. Its simplicity and lightness, yet extraordinary length, make it one of the most effective quickfirers that we have seen. It possesses the following advantages: Greatly increased rapidity of fire. NQ danger of hang-fire, the automatic opening of the breech not taking place until the gun has been fired. One man less in the gun-crew.—Engineer.
THE DISPROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF REED OR REDFIELD ROCKS (by G. W. Littlehales.—For fifty years mariners continued to believe, or to be unable to disbelieve, in the existence of dangerous rocks in the Pacific Ocean, in a position about seven hundred miles westward of San Francisco. In 185o Captain Reed, of the brig Emma, reported that he had seen two rocks, measuring from six hundred to nine hundred feet long, and from two hundred and fifty to four hundred feet broad, and having a depth of about three fathoms of water over them, in latitude 370 24' north and longitude 1370 22' west of Greenwich; and in 1851 a report came from the U. S. sloop-of-war Falmouth confirming the existence of rocks in this geographical position. Captain Redfield, of the whaler Susan Abigail, also reported in 1856 that he had discovered some rocks, with about ten feet of water over them, in a geographical position eleven miles to the northward of the geographical position stated by Captain Reed; and in 1866 rocks were again said to have been seen by Captain Cave, whose report assigned to them a position One mile to the northward and five miles to the eastward of the geographical position agreed upon by the original authorities. Commander Franklin, of the U. S. S. Mohican, reported in 1870 that the office of the harbor-master at Honolulu contained records showing that the ships Kuttosoff and Eliza Kimball had found these rocks, which by that time had come to be known as Reed or Redfield Rocks, and that the latter ship had anchored in five fathoms of water there, and described three of the rocks as extending considerably above the surface of the water.
In the meantime the bark What Cheer had, in 1858, passed over the locality in which the rocks were reported to exist, and her master stated that he could discover no evidence of their existence, and in 1863 the master of the bark Live Yankee had made a similar report; and, although it was well understood, on account of the uncertainty in the reckoning of these vessels and the margin of error inherent in the positions assigned to the rocks, how slight a foundation these reports afforded in disproof of the existence of what had been seen by six apparently reliable and careful ship-masters, and by five of them examined and described, yet they served to stimulate investigation. So that in the years immediately afterwards we find that searches were made by the U. S. sloop-of-war Kearsarge in 1870, the U. S. Coast Survey schooner Marcy in 1871, the U. S. Coast Survey steamer Hassler in 1873, the U. S. S. Narragansett in 1875. All of them, however, employed the inconclusive method of proceeding to the reported locality of the rocks and cruising back and forth over the region, with lookouts posted aloft and a certain amount of deep-sea sounding-line hanging over the side of the ship. The four vessels just named must have spent altogether 31 days in this way, and the total distance which they cruised back and forth over the locality is about 2800 miles.
The reconnaissance made by the Kearsarge took place on a beautifully clear day in September. The ship had proceeded from Honolulu, where the chronometers had been verified, and had every facility for determining the accuracy of her position in the field of search; but, although the range of view extended to a radius of ten miles around the ship as she steamed back and forth, visiting in turn each of the positions in which the rocks had been reported, the observed conditions did not reveal the slightest indications of the proximity of shoals or rocks, either by the breaking of waves or by the presence of birds or fishes.
The examination made by the Narragansett took place on a day in June which was most favorable for the work, as the atmosphere was remarkably clear, and there was a heavy swell that would have caused the sea to break in a depth of five or six fathoms; but the lookouts that were posted aloft and on the deck of the vessel during the day's search could discover no indications of the reported danger.
In the search by the Marcy the surface conditions were examined in great detail from July 23 to August 5, under favorable circumstances of wind and weather, and with a swell large enough at all times to cause the sea to break in a depth of three fathoms. During this search the distance run by the vessel was one thousand and fifty miles, of which seven hundred and seventy miles were made in daylight, when breakers or any discolored water should have been visible within at least one mile. A constant lookout was maintained from the masthead, but no breakers were seen, nor any indications of shoal-water, such as the presence of gulls, seals, fish, or kelp. The water was uniformly of a deep blue, and at various places the deep-sea sounding-line was lowered to depths varying from three hundred to eighteen hundred fathoms without touching bottom.
The site of the reported dangers was again and still further examined between the 24th of May and the middle of June, 1873, by the U. S. Coast Survey steamer Hassler, but without finding any feature corresponding to Reed or Redfield Rocks. The steamer ran fourteen hundred miles in traversing the region in the vicinity of the reported geographical positions. Lookouts were constantly aloft, but no indications of shoal-water could be discovered.
It is plain that the force of the evidence in disproof of the existence of the Rocks, proceeding from these four searches, rested almost altogether upon the result that the observers did not see them; and it was not until the year 188r that the first positive evidence was contributed toward the settlement of the question. In August of that year the U. S. S. Ranger sounded down to the bottom with pianoforte wire at thirty stations, whose geographical positions were accurately established within the area bounded by the parallels of 37° 20’ and 37° 40' of north latitude and the meridians of 137° 20f and 1370 40' of west longitude. In the light of a mathematical investigation undertaken at the Hydrographic Office to determine the forms and dimensions of isolated submarine formations in the open ocean, these soundings afford positive proof of the absence of Reed or Redfield Rocks from the area which was sounded out.
Isolated formations occupying comparatively limited areas at the bottom can and do occur in deep waters. The minimum radius at the bottom which a dangerous shoal can have must vary directly with the depth of the surrounding sea, but, on the average, in a sea of 2500 fathoms in depth, it may be stated as ten nautical miles. An interval of ten miles coupled with an interval of two miles and employed systematically in sounding would be sufficient to prove the existence or absence of any formation rising close to the surface. Of all the possible ways in which a ten-mile interval could lie with reference to a submerged peak, that which would be most advantageous for a prompt discovery of its existence is the condition in which one end of the interval is at the bottom of the slope and the other near the apex, and that which would be least advantageous is the condition in which the interval is bisected by the position of the apex. In the latter case there would be nearly equal soundings at both ends, but the soundings at the ends of the adjacent two-mile intervals would immediately disclose the slopes.
Although the exhaustive examination made by the late Admiral Philip in the U. S. S. Ranger was conceded to have disproved the existence of Reed or Redfield Rocks within the area that was searched by him, a doubt remained, owing to the imperfect determination of the geographical position assigned, as to whether the rocks might not be within reasonable limits outside of the field of his inspection, notwithstanding the curious accordance among the reported positions, which only range seven minutes of arc in longitude and seventeen minutes in latitude; and this doubt was strengthened from time to time by the accounts of incoming mariners, who asserted that they had seen these dangers. In 1888 the master of the ship British Yeoman reported that he had seen these rocks in passing them; and in 1889 the master of the schooner Una reported that he had observed a peaked rock standing four feet above the surface of the sea in latitude 370 24' north and longitude 137° 26' west, saying, 'There is not any room for doubt as to this being a rock, but the position may vary a little on account of the sights not being extra good."
The whole question was finally set at rest in the early part of the year 1901, when the U. S. S. Wheeling, under instructions prepared by the Hydrographic Office, searched the area marked out by assigning extreme errors of ±- 60' in longitude and ± 40' in latitude to the average of the reported geographical positions, by sounding down to the bottom of the ocean at intervals so closely spaced that no formation composed of the materials which constitute the earth's crust and shaped with sufficient strength to resist crushing under its own weight and the weight of the superincumbent body of water could rise from a depth of 2600 to 3000 fathoms to the surface of the ocean in the interval between any two of the sounding stations.
The area in the immediate vicinity of the reported geographical positions of the danger, bounded by the parallels of 37° 20' and 37° 40' of north latitude and the meridians of 137° 20' and 137° 40' of west longitude, which was searched by the U. S. S. Ranger in 1881, was not entered by the Wheeling. The Ranger obtained twenty-nine soundings, ranging in depth from 2776 to 3097 fathoms, and the Wheeling fifty-nine soundings, ranging in depth from 2850 to 3352 fathoms. Numerous specimens collected by both vessels indicated that throughout the combined extent of the searches there is a sameness in the characteristics of the bottom soil.
The chart of the soundings that were taken demonstrates that there is no submarine mountain culminating near the surface of the sea in this region, and shows with equal force that there never were any rocks here nor any shoal upon which a vessel could have anchored.
This is not a locality in which the floating things of the ocean are apt to collect, and it will perhaps ever remain a mystery as to what misleading appearances of the surface of the sea could have given rise to the reports which caused the representation for fifty years in the charts of all the great maritime nations of a dangerous feature which had no real existence.—Bulletin of the American Geographical Society.