Motto: "Be sure you're right; then go ahead."
Note.—[The writer found so much difficulty in coming to any conclusions about many points in naval policy, and discovered such different ideas among the men to whom he talked, that finally, for his own instruction, he adopted the plan of beginning with principles that every one admits, and arguing directly from them; striving all the time to keep an open mind, and allow no previously formed opinions to stand in the way of coming to unbiased conclusions. The most important conclusions he came to were that
(1) The ships of our battle fleet have not been correctly designed from a military standpoint.
(2) The art and the science of naval tactics are undeveloped.
(3) The administration of the navy has not, until lately, given sufficient weight to military considerations.
These conclusions were so unexpected, that the course of reasoning Which caused them is here submitted, with the request that it be examined carefully. The small space available in this paper, compared with the vastness of the subject, is the reason why much of the reasoning is merely outlined, not elaborated.]
GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
The Need for Armies and Navies.--Every individual and every Community needs protection for its life and property; every government also needs protection for its life and property. As a government cannot get protection from another government without becoming dependent, it must furnish its own protection. It usually does this by means of an army and a navy. Perhaps the necessity for this protection is a misfortune: certainly it is a fact.
Armies and navies have existed since the earliest times. It might have been expected that the gradual progress of civilization would be followed by the gradual abolition of armies and navies; but such has not been the case. Civilization and armies and navies seem to have gone hand in hand; and while most of the triumphs of civilization have appeared to be solely the triumphs of peace, each has been made possible by the stable condition of society that was made stable by the triumph of some war. Armies came into effective use before navies; because the mechanisms used by armies are simpler than the mechanism used by navies, and were invented first.
Rising Importance of Navies.—For centuries the principal protector of a country has been its army. But the advance of the engineering arts during recent years, has made navies more available for protecting their countries than they were before, while making more nearly equal the conditions of warfare between the armies of weak and of strong nations, and less nearly equal the conditions of warfare between their navies. In the days not long gone by, the musket of the European was so much more powerful than the weapons of—say the savage—and the methods of discipline were so much better, that the armies of savage nations fought with Europeans on very unequal terms. But the spreading of trade has taken arms and munitions of war to the most distant parts; even the savage has come to have weapons as good as can be made; European officers of experience and skill have taught even savages to organize and maneuver according to the methods most approved in Europe; and armies have resulted which, while they are of savages, are highly trained, equipped and armed; with physique and courage at least equal to that of the European, and with the natural animal instinct of fighting less dulled by generations of activities of the peaceful kinds. But with naval warfare, the comparison of progress must be reversed; the canoe of the savage remains unchanged, but the battleship represents better than any other thing the progress of the ages. The savage, or the semi-civilized, are mentally and financially unable to build, or man, or fight navies of the modern kind; and every day lengthens the distance between the sea-fighters of countries that differ in civilization and in wealth. Warfare on the sea is more closely connected with the progress of the world than is the warfare on the land. This fact explains the other well-known fact, that the navies of countries differ as their countries differ; that national greatness and naval greatness co-exist.
General Consideration Governing Naval Policy.—In considering what any naval policy should be, the truth must be held in mind that a navy must be fitted to cope with the navies of different kinds of people; and in considering what the naval policy of a country so great as ours should be, the truth must be held in mind that most of the countries with which our navy will have to deal have navies so weak that very small vessels will be enough to meet them; but that there are a few countries which have navies so powerful that the greatest navy we can get and the greatest exertion we can make, may not enable us to fight them with success.
Countries that have weak navies are much more numerous than countries that have strong navies; and the difference between weak navies and strong navies is well defined; so well defined that navies may be divided into two classes, weak and strong. Therefore, we may truly say that the work of our navy is of two kinds: first, that related to weak navies; second, that related to strong navies. And this difference is not academic, it is practical; and it is so important that it separates our naval policy into two parts, which it can be shown are wholly distinct, though they are often confused together.
In the days not long gone by, the smallest and cheapest vessel that was big enough to go to sea was not far different from the largest and costliest. Vessels at that time could not be built very large because the engineering arts had not advanced far enough to build them; and they could not be very small because they had to keep the sea; and the result was that vessels just big enough to guard a country's interests in a semi-civilized foreign port, were big enough to engage in battle with most of the war ships of a powerful State. But what comparison can there be to-day between the ill-armed and ill-equipped, little vessels of a West India Republic and the awful battle-fleet of a European power; and what comparison ought we to observe between the vessels of our navy that we use to meet them? Shall we use the same kind of vessel for meeting both? Shall one general policy govern conditions so diverse?
Purpose of a Navy.—To answer this question wisely, it may be well first to reflect a few minutes on what is the purpose of a navy. To do this sufficiently for our purpose, it is not necessary to be in the least profound or learned, but simply to use the common sense we use in daily life. It is a common belief that the purpose of a navy is to protect trade; that the foundations of a nation's greatness are built on trade; that a navy is to guard these foundations; that navies are the police force of the sea. It is also held by some that the purpose of a navy is to form the "First Line of Defence," and there are some who hold that its purpose is to secure "Command of the Sea," in order that our soldiers may go and attack some other country; or else that the soldiers of some other country may be prevented from coming to attack us.
It is plain that the purpose of a navy includes all of these things; but it is conceivable that a country might have very little foreign trade; might have so strong a people that invasion by a foe would be impossible; might never care to invade another country with soldiers and yet might need a very powerful navy. Our own country is so rich inside of its own borders, that it does not absolutely need any sea-borne trade, either foreign or coastwise; it is so strong in men, that no foe successfully could invade it; it sees, at present, no sign of ever wishing to invade a foreign land; and yet it has asserted and must maintain a doctrine, the violation of which will demand a resistance so violent that it will call for every resource within our grasp, and entail a struggle that will end only with the prostration of the beaten country. Japan was in this position. She did not call her doctrine the "Monroe Doctrine"; but she declared that the freedom of Manchuria and Korea from Russian domination were essential. Her war with Russia was fought to save her life, not to protect her trade.
The idea that a navy exists solely to protect trade seems to spring largely from the writings of British men, for to Great Britain, trade is the mainspring of existence. Her merchants have pushed their ventures to the uttermost parts of the earth, and have enriched the mother country with the receipts of the spoils of their peaceful conquests, and the opportunities for sale, in distant lands, of her manufactured goods. With a navy not strong enough to protect her subjects in foreign lands, to guard her trading stations and bases, to assure her merchant vessels safe transit on the sea, to keep away a blockading fleet that would prevent the going out and coming in of the commerce of the world, the people of Great Britain would surely starve. With us it is different, we are self-supporting within our borders; we can live alone; we do not need a navy to keep us from starving. But the fact that a country may not need a navy for precisely the same reason that Great Britain needs one, is not a cause for believing that she may not need one just as urgently for some other reason. The trade conditions of little Great Britain make it a vital point in her policy that she shall have a great navy; but the nearness of the Russians to Korea made it a vital point in the policy of Japan that she should have a great navy. And the fertile parts of the West Indies and Central and South America hold out a temptation to the crowded monarchies of Central Europe not unlike that which the long coast-line of Korea held out to coast-hungry Russia; so that it is not impossible that a war will come between us and some European power, or powers, the cause of which will be like that which brought on the war between Russia and Japan.
To state that the United States can exist without any sea-borne trade, however, is not the same thing as to state that it can live prosperously without it, or that the expenditure of a reasonable sum of money on a navy for assuring it may not be very wise. The statement "'Tis love that makes the world go round" has been contradicted by those who assert "'Tis trade that makes the world go round;" but without weighing the relative importance of love and trade, it maybe asserted that each is important, and each should be assured. Every nation, like every individual, needs intercourse with others and is dependent for wealth on trade with them; and the more wise the policy under which the trade is carried on, the greater the trade becomes and the more money flows into the pockets of the people. Great Britain is an example of this, and China of the reverse.
The greater the trade becomes, the greater the number of traders who will be concerned, the greater the number of transactions, the larger the sums of money involved, the greater the trade rivalries, the greater the number and importance of the chances of conflict, and the greater the need of a navy, to guard the traders and the trade; because, no matter what cause brings on a war, ocean trade is always attacked at once. And while it might be difficult to catch swift merchant ships after they once had got far out to sea, it would be very easy for the country having the stronger navy to make the exit of ships from its enemy's ports so doubtful of success that insurance rates would rise so high, that the business risk in exporting goods would become too great to permit the merchants to compete in foreign markets with the merchants of other countries, both neutral and belligerent. Ships coming to the country, also, bringing imports and the money due for manufactured exports, would be liable to capture. Not only then would the export trade be cut down, but the import trade as well, and the receipts from the diminished export sales. The coast-wise trade would practically be killed.
The evils with which such a state of affairs would begin would increase as time went on. The merchants of the country with the weaker navy would gradually lose touch with their correspondents abroad, which they might never be able to regain. The thousands of people whose wages depend on manufactured exports would feel the loss at once and always, and so would the people with whom they dealt in business. The fact of such a blockade (partial though it would be, and carrying with it no menace whatever of invasion) would mean loss in money, direct or indirect, to every person in the country; and to this would afterwards be added a sum of money that would be exacted by the victor to pay him for his expenses in the war and for the trouble he had been taking. An estimate of how much would be exacted from the United States, for instance, may be gathered from the fact that Germany made France give her $1,000,000,000 and the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine for coming to terms of peace in 1871. This country is very much richer than France then was, and would be mulcted in proportion.
This sketch, rough and brief though it is, is probably sufficient to show us that, while the purpose of a navy includes the protection of her country's trade, it may be broadly stated that its purpose is to enforce the will of its government; to enable it to carry out whatever its policy may be.
Duty of Our Navy.—Obviously the duty of our navy is:
(1) To protect our trade and our citizens everywhere.
(2) To be prepared for war.
(1) This duty we can do very easily. We have been doing it for a hundred years; and as we have grown to be very much more powerful than most of the countries in which our citizens are liable to get unfair treatment, we need feel no anxiety on this score. We have many vessels powerful enough to exert all the force needed. In fact the vessels that we now have doing this kind of duty all over the world, are more powerful than those thus used by most other countries, even countries having navies more powerful than our own. The causes of trouble that usually arise are with people who can show only a small hostile force, so that cruisers are perfectly adequate for the purpose. Sometimes landing forces are needed; and for this purpose our large transports, carrying battalions of marines, landed under cover of cruisers' guns are almost ideal in their effectiveness. We do not need battleships or armored cruisers for this work; except, possibly, in emergencies of very rare occurrences.
(2) This duty we cannot do very easily. Getting ready for war is perhaps the hardest work that man can do. In actual war there is an element of excitement that arouses, even compels, exertion of the most strenuous kind. But the long years of peace, with their endless drills that seem to have no purpose, furnish little stimulus of excitement, or sometimes even interest. Yet no country ever whipped in any important war, without being well prepared; and in almost every war of history, the difference between the contending forces has been greater in preparedness than in any other thing. In mere bravery, there has been less difference than in any other thing, because nearly every one has been brave. A mere glance at the enormous armaments of our possible antagonists, and even a hurried reading about the way they have been drilling for thirty years, are enough to show us that we need to do a tremendous amount of work, to get even nearly ready for war; and inasmuch as the duty of simply protecting our trade and our citizens over the world is easy and we have learned to do it well, we must not allow it to interfere in the slightest with our urgent preparation for war. We must keep our preparation for war as a definite purpose before our eyes all the time; we must make it a specialty.
Proper Strength of Our Navy.—But while preparing for war, it may be well to ask ourselves, "Have we a navy strong enough to go to war?"
In order to answer this question wisely, it may be well first to consider when is a navy—or any military force—"strong enough?" It may seem, at first thought, like a mere juggling with words to say that a force is strong enough when it can do the work cut out for it to do; but this expression points to the fact that we must first decide what work our navy will have to do. For instance, will our navy simply resist the acts of some aggressor, or will it become itself an aggressor? It is plain that if our navy is to be aggressor, it must be stronger than the enemy, so that it can break down his opposition and have something left afterwards. It might seem that if it were to offer a purely passive resistance, it would be strong enough if it were simply equal to the force of the aggressor; which would indicate that passive resistance is better than aggressive resistance. But everyone knows that this is not so. Perhaps it would be if the passive force could tell exactly where and when the aggressor was going to strike; but this is what it can never do. Constant aggression is sure to wear away in time any purely passive resistance, just as in natural science, any force continuously exerted will have an effect; just as "continual dropping of water will wear away a stone." Any resistance is worn away in time, unless it is active. It must be such as to inflict injury on the aggressor, and to follow it up; it must have initiative; it must partake of the nature of a menace. We see that this principle of meeting aggression with aggression, instead of with passive defense, is recognized by all the brute creation. Not one of the brute creation, unless hopelessly overpowered or frightened, will retreat into a corner. He will at once actively attack his aggressor, and make him look to his own safety. Now, inasmuch as our enemy, whoever he may be, will follow this principle, and we will do the same, it follows that our navy will have to fight with all the power and aggression it can muster, an enemy who will do the same. Such a war will be forced to a finish—and a very definite one. It will be shown later that a very slight advantage at the start on either side will, by an accumulating effect, become greater as the fight goes on. Therefore, in order to whip, in order to be strong enough to go to war, our navy must be stronger at the start than the navy of the enemy.
We may accept it as a principle then that our navy will be "strong enough" when it is stronger than the enemy, and not before.
The Folly of Ineffectual Resistance.—A curious and most important phase of this principle is that if a navy be not strong enough, it were better not to use it at all, but to yield to the aggression in the beginning. The evident reason is that if we use an inferior force and get whipped, we not only lose the cause for which we fought, but we also lose more of our fighting force than the enemy does of his, and so we are worse placed relatively to the enemy than we were before. An ineffectual resistance is worse than none; and the longer the resistance is kept up, the worse it is for the weaker party. The evil is cumulative. The effect of our using our navy to repel the aggression of a power or powers having a stronger naval force would, therefore, be simply that those powers would succeed in violating the Monroe Doctrine, would reduce our navy to nothing with comparatively small damage to themselves, and then use the naval force they had left to shut our people within their borders, and make them pay whatever war indemnity they—the foreigners—happened to desire.
Proper Comparative Sizes of American and British Navies.—With these facts in mind, it is interesting to consider the statement often made that Great Britain needs a greater navy than we do, for the reason that Great Britain's life depends on her foreign trade, and ours does not. For without attempting to gainsay the truth of the statement, it is merely necessary to point out that the chance of Great Britain's getting into war with a great power is much smaller than ours, because Great Britain has gone through the turbulent period of her youth, and has reached the tranquil years of middle life, whereas we are at the very verge of budding manhood. Great Britain made her way to her present high estate through terrific wars on land and sea. Every other great nation in history has done the same. Shall not we? If not, why not? Will it be because we are not aggressive? Will it be because we are too poor to tempt the plunderer? Will it be because our system of government is the kind the monarchies of Europe like? Will it be because the American people are afraid of war? Will it be because there are no jealousies felt toward us on this continent, or other continents? Will it be because of any definite reason that can be given? No, there is not a single reason to give, or to imagine, why the American people should not go through the same series of wars that all other nations have gone through. It is logical to assume that any man will pass through the same experiences, in the main, as other men; and the same is true of nations. It may be pleasant to imagine that Providence makes special exceptions in favor of us, but it is very foolish. Bearing this in mind, what definite reason can be given why Great Britain, a country no greater than ours, should need a navy greater than ours? Our chance of getting into war is greater; and while being whipped would not injure us quite so much in a material way, it would cost us, even in a material way, so much that the cost of a very great navy would be trivial in comparison. On the basis that a navy exists to protect property on the sea, perhaps Great Britain needs a greater navy than we, because she has more property on the sea than we; but on the basis that a navy exists to enforce the policy which is necessary to a country's preservation as a nation, and on the basis that "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people must not perish from the earth," we need a navy even larger than Great Britain's; because our policy is more provocative of war than hers, especially with monarchies.
What Antagonists Our Ships will Probably Fight.—But whatever the size of the navy, the quality of it, the kinds of ships and fleets, is especially the concern of naval officers. Before coming up to this question, it may be interesting to think about what antagonists the ships will be wanted to fight.
Leaving out the ships used for visiting the ports of countries with weak navies, it is clear at the start that our ships will have to fight forts, merchant ships and war ships. Shall we design them for all these uses, or for one in particular; and, if for one, for which one? A very short consideration of the problem of designing a war ship to fight a modern fort, convinces us of the utter impossibility of succeeding; because a fort can be given as much offensive power as a ship, is not liable to "unforeseen submersion," and is not limited as to the number of submarine mines, submarine boats and torpedoes that she may use, to make her impregnability assured. The progress of the engineering arts has helped forts even more than it has helped ships; and the superior accuracy of gun-fire attainable by a fort caps the climax to an advantage already overpowering. At the outset we see that in the present state of the art, ships cannot fight modern forts successively. The best that ships can do regarding forts is to run by them; but every improvement in torpedoes, submarines, and fire-control makes even this more difficult.
In considering whether the ships of our battle-fleet should be constructed so as to fight merchant ships, we come face to face with the fact, that, in order to fight merchant ships, war ships must be very fast; and this means that they must carry so much weight in motive power that they will not be able to carry so much weight in guns and armor as they would otherwise; so that they will not be able to fight certain war ships that they could fight otherwise. It has been held by some that the best way in which to use a navy is to destroy the enemy's commerce, for the reason that this is the way in which a country can be the most harmed. Without discussing this question, it may be pointed out that, even if it be true, the best way to destroy an enemy's commerce may not be to attack the commerce directly by "commerce destroyers," which would have to play a game of "blindman's buff" all over the ocean. It may be that her commerce can be more effectively attacked by other means. An illustration of this idea may be drawn from the game of chess, in which, although the ultimate end of the game is to checkmate the king of your adversary, it may be (and usually is) the most unskillful plan to start the game by "checking" him. It is best to break through and break down the protection thrown about the king, until the king is exposed. And so, even if the destruction of an enemy's commerce be the ultimate end to be attained, it is considered best first to break down the military defense to his commerce which his navy gives.
No matter, then, what kind of forts and merchant ships the enemy may have, our war ships will be used mainly to fight war ships.
What Kind of Battle-Fleet Do We Need?—Now if this conclusion be correct, and if we assume that our enemy will have come to this conclusion as well as ourselves, it is plain that when we come to war with any great naval p6wer or powers, we shall have to fight a fleet or fleets of tremendous strength; and that this necessity will bring us face to face with a more frightful danger than the country has known since its birth in the revolution of '76. We see plainly, therefore, what we have to get ready to do. We see the reality in all its harshness. What shall we do to be saved? What is the best way in which to meet force with force?
These questions evidently mean "what kind of battle-fleet do we need?"
THE BATTLE-FLEET.
In order to decide what kind of battle-fleet we need, it is plain that we must look at the subject from what is usually called a "military standpoint"; a standpoint from which we can regard the conditions the fleet must be able to meet, in order to prevail in war. To do this, we must first consider what work the battle fleet will have to do.
What Work Will It Have to Do?—We shall not have to think about this very long before seeing that the work our battle-fleet will have to do in war will be of two kinds; first, that done near the shore; and second, that done on the open sea. That part done near the shore may also be divided into two parts, that part which we should do in defending our own coast, and that which we should do in carrying on operations against an enemy's coast.
The work which we should do in our own coast would clearly be of the nature of defense against an attacking fleet or landing force. In this we would probably co-operate with the army; and our own work would be mainly done by coast-defense vessels, such as monitors, destroyers, torpedo-boats, submarines and cruisers.
The work which we would do in carrying on operations against an enemy's coast would probably be, as it has recently been with Japan, in assisting the landing of large bodies of soldiers and marines. The kinds of vessels that we would use for this would be very much like those used in defending our own coast, except that we should probably not use monitors, and that we should use large numbers of transports.
It is true that, in both the defense of our own coast and the attack of an enemy's coast, our battleships might be drawn near the coast; but an enemy can so easily make the coast dangerous by means of torpedo-boats; submarines and mines, that battleships must, as a rule, keep away from it. An important exception to this is the case in which submarines and mines are not much to be feared, and a great many destroyers are available to keep off the enemy's torpedo-boats.
Operations near the coast, will probably be carried on, for the most part, by small ships. Submarines, perhaps, will be used more in the future than seemed probable a year ago; and it is possible that the submarine may gradually do away with the torpedo-boat, or cause it to be greatly modified, for the reason that it can do nearly everything that a torpedo-boat can do and more besides; and while its speed is not so great in smooth water as that of the torpedo-boat, its speed can be increased by increasing its length.
The work done on the open sea would, of course, have to be done by the battle-fleet, and would simply be that of fighting the enemy's battle-fleet.
Now, as it would clearly be impossible for any fleet of small vessels to carry on important operations near a coast very long if the enemy's battle-fleet could at any time attack it, unless it had its own battle-fleet to protect it, we see that, both for work near the coast, and for work on the open sea, the thing that we must rely on in the end is our battle-fleet; the deciding event will be a fight at sea between our battle-fleet and the enemy's battle-fleet.
It is true that a war, even a war in which our navy did important work, might go from start to finish, and yet contain no such battle, but this could only be in case the enemy should fail to concentrate his fleet, as Russia has in the present war. It could not happen with the kind of navy that we must prepare to meet; a strong navy.
Qualities of the Ships of the Battle-Fleet.—The main question before us, then, is what kind of a fleet shall we need with which to fight the battle-fleet of a strong navy; what should be the qualities of the ships comprising it?
Before attempting to decide this, it may be well to picture to ourselves two hostile fleets meeting on the sea in war, each fleet representing everything which its nation can put forth.
Now, when two armies come within each other's presence, before the actual battle begins, there is a great deal of maneuvering for position. Will the same thing happen when two great fleets meet? It may be objected that there can be no such thing as "position" on the sea, because all parts of the sea are the same; without mountains, or woods, or roads, or any of the other things which give tactical positions in battles on the land. But in the days not long gone by, in the days when the great naval battles of history were fought, the weather-gage, or the lee-gage, as the case might be, was a thing strenuously maneuvered for. At the present day, though ships move on the water independently of wind and sea, yet wind and sea exercise an influence which is very important on the gunnery, and so does the direction of the sun; and when everything in the world, so far as the two fleets are concerned, depends on the issue of that battle, the direction of the wind, and sea, and sun, will be taken into anxious account by both the admirals. There can be no doubt, for instance, that the fleet that is to windward, if it can at the same time have the sun on the side away from the enemy, will have a great advantage in gunnery over the fleet to leeward, with the sun in the eyes of its gun-pointers. The importance of this matter will depend a great deal on the strength of the wind and sea, and the altitude and brightness of the sun. But if the sun be very bright, and if the wind and sea be high, and throwing spray over the telescope sights, and blowing smoke back on the guns' crews, the leeward fleet will certainly be at a tremendous disadvantage; especially if its guns be low, like those in our navy. If the direction of the wind and the sea and the sun are not the same, the question what will be the best position will become a little complicated; but, in every case, there will be some position that will be the best, and both admirals will know which it is, and try to get it.
This simply means that the battle will begin with a race between the two fleets, and that that fleet will get the advantage of position which is the faster. We may take it as a principle, then, that the first quality in our fleet to be demanded in a fleet fight will be speed.
Speed.—But it is not only in the struggle for position in the beginning, that our fleet will need a speed greater than the enemy's, but all during the fight; largely because the fleet having thegreater speed can keep a little ahead, near the outer limit of torpedo range, and use its torpedoes effectively, while the fleet with slower speed cannot reach the faster fleet with its torpedoes, unless its torpedoes possess greater range. Besides, if the two fleets run along in parallel columns, which is the usual way in an important fleet fight (because more guns can be used then) the faster fleet can get so far ahead of the slower fleet that it can concentrate its fire on the head of the column of the slower fleet, with a good chance of disabling the leading ships, and throwing the column into confusion; while the rear ships of the slower fleet cannot fire at the faster fleet, except at great range. The average range of the guns of the faster fleet will be less than the average range of the guns of the slower fleet, and its head of column practically safe. The faster fleet may even be able to get across the head of the column of the slower fleet and T it; which is the same thing as flanking in fighting on the land. It is true that the slower fleet may be able to offset the disadvantage in speed, to some extent, by going around in a circle of somewhat shorter radius than the circle which the faster fleet would take up to keep parallel with it, if there be plenty of sea-room on that side; but this will not always be the case.
But the greatest advantage of superior speed is that the faster fleet can increase and decrease the range at pleasure; and even withdraw from, or go into, battle, whenever it thinks best. This puts the slower fleet on the defensive; it has to do exactly what the faster fleet wants it to do, in the matter of how to fight, and even fighting or not fighting. It has to conduct the battle on the terms preferred by the faster fleet. This is true, even on the open sea, but superior speed has a heightened value when the operations take place near land; because the existence of shoals, capes, harbors of refuge, and even of the land itself, which forbids movements in some directions, makes certain position near them of strategic and tactical importance.
It is in attaining positions of strategic and tactical importance, that speed has its crowning value.
We see, therefore, that, if we are to make our fleet successful in war, we must make it faster than our enemy's fleet; and it is the fleet as a unit, that we must make fast; for capacity for a speed in any individual ships that is higher than the fleet-speed will clearly be wasted. And this high fleet-speed is to be held on the open sea, where the water is often very rough.
Now there is only one way in which to get high speed in a rough sea, and that is to use engines of very great power, and put them in a ship that has great length, and depth, and mass; the length and depth are needed, in order to decrease the resistance of the water; and the mass is needed to give the ship enough momentum, to maintain her speed, in spite of the hammering of the waves.
We may accept it as a principle, therefore, that the ships of our battle-fleet must be very long and deep and massive.
Manageability.—But "the race is not always to the swift;" and it may be that some other quality will enter into the question of getting the best position. We know that this is the case when yachts are jockeying for position at the beginning of a race. That yacht will get the advantage of position which is capable of being the best handled, and which is the best handled. We are not thinking now about the degree of skill of the admirals; and we see that if we consider these equal, for the moment, that fleet which can be handled the best, will probably get the advantage of position. In other words, we see that the manageability of the fleet may be the deciding factor, when the two fleets are jockeying for position. The two things which seem to be the most closely connected with the manageability of a fleet are the signalling, and the quickness and uniformity with which the ships turn together.
A very few moments' thought will show us, that other things being equal (which we must always consider to be the case, when comparing any two independent things), that fleet will have a great advantage whose signalling is the quickest and the most accurate. If our signalling is slow and uncertain, our fleet will be at a great disadvantage with the other fleet, if its signalling is quick and sure. In the jockeying for position at the beginning of the battle, or in carrying on the numberless changes that circumstances make necessary, the value of quick and sure signaling may be so great as to decide which fleet will win.
The way in which the ships turn together in making changes of formation and direction, is of importance principally from the fact that, during the interval in which any change of formation or direction is being made, the gun-fire must be carried on at an enormous disadvantage; and in some cases, it must cease altogether, until the evolution is completed. Now if the ships can turn quickly as individuals, and are nearly alike, they can be swung from column into line, and thence into echelon, so quickly and precisely that they can be lined up in the new formation at once; and the fleet will have a tremendous advantage over a fleet whose vessels are unlike, because, even if the unlike ships turn quickly as individuals, and even if the officers controlling them use great skill and care, the ships cannot be gotten into proper positions after each evolution, until after a considerable time spent in aligning and adjusting. The difference between two fleets in this regard, even if the average power of the ships be the same, will be the same as always lies between order and disorder. Perhaps an apology is due for dwelling so long on a self-evident truth; but the fact that a truth is self-evident, is not always a reason against reiterating it, because the most self-evident truths are often those most often overlooked. The importance of being able to swing our ships into various formations with quickness and precision is greater than that of being able to go "fours right" in company drill with quickness and precision, and yet most of us have seen a thousand times as much time spent in exercising men in company drill as in exercising ships in fleet drill. And while the laws of nature prevent our having any great variety in the kind of men that we have in our companies of infantry, the rapid progress in all the engineering arts causes such rapid improvements in ship construction, that it is difficult to limit the varieties of ships that we have in our fleet.
Clearly, we may accept it as a principle, that the second quality in a fleet to be demanded in battle will be manageability.
Offensive Power.—After our two fleets have, after more or less maneuvering, got within effective gun-range of each other, the gunnery fight will begin between them; and it will continue until the battle is decided in favor of one contestant, or until one is able to escape. Supposing the two fleets to be officered and manned by men of equal skill, it is a mere juggling of words to say that the stronger force will win; supposing that neither side has been able to obtain any decided advantage of position.
In an endeavor to get a clear idea of what will happen, the following tables have been brought into being. They do not treat the subject with mathematical rigor, and are, at the best, approximations; but leave is requested to submit them as such.
These tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of two contending forces change as the fight goes on. The offensive power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at 1000 in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at 900, 800, 700, 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and ioo. These values are, of course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical factor is. Two forces with offensive powers of moo and 900 respectively may mean moo men opposed to 900 men of equal average individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting ability; or it may mean 10 ships opposed to 9 like ships, manned by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as moo to goo. It may be objected here that it is ridiculous so to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be so mathematically tabulated. This, of course, is true; but the fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors that go to make them up.
Another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional to the force itself; that a force of 1000, for instance, can do twice as much damage in a given time as a force of 500 can; also that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one hour, provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same. Another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a force equal, say to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under given conditions, moo men can disable mo men, or ten ships disable one ship, or ten guns silence one gun. In the conflicts supposed to be indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. It will be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight.
In Table I, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the penetrability are the same to each contestant. In other words, it is assumed that the effective targets presented by the two forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit at the same instant by like projectile, equal injuries will be done. In other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, say a twelveinch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as that done to the other; not proportionally but quantitatively. For instance, if one force has ten ships and the other has nine like ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one ship will prob ably not hit another, the conditions supposed in Table I, Column 2, are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. Table I supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change until the target is destroyed.
Table II indicates what would probably happen if two forces of equal offensive power but offering different effective targets fought with each other. In each column the forces are supposed to start with the same offensive power but with different defensive powers, except that on Column 1, the offensive and defensive Powers of both are equal. In Table II, Column 6, the targets opposed bear the ratio of 5 to 11); which means not necessarily that one target is 5-10 of the other target in surface, but that the Probability is that, if each is exposed for a given period to a given artillery fire, one force will receive 5-10 as much injury as the other force. In other words, if one force receive an injury that may be expressed by 100, the other force will receive an injury that would be expressed by 50.
The conditions named in Table H, Column 6, may be illustrated in a mental picture of two ships of like dimensions, engaging in a gun fight on the sea, which have the same number and kind of guns in each broadside, and are served by crews of like efficiency, one of the ships being entirely unarmored, and the other armored just enough to reduce the effective hits by one-half, under the conditions of the fight. They may also be illustrated by two ships of equal gun-fire, but of such size and at such a distance apart, that the chance of hitting B is twice as great as the chance of hitting A. Tables I and II, when compared, show that decrease of target does not confer the advantage that proportional increase of effective power confers; that it is better to increase our offensive power by 10 per cent, even if we increase the chance of receiving injury by 10 per cent.
In Tables I and II, the chance of hitting and doing injury is supposed not to change, no matter how much the offensive power of the enemy is reduced, until that offensive power is reduced to zero. It is clear that this condition exists if ships themselves be considered as the targets, but not if their guns and men be considered as the targets. If the enemy's offensive force consists of ships so far apart, relatively to the range, that a shot missing one ship will not hit another, then no matter whether the enemy's force be ten ships or one ship, the chance of hitting and disabling a ship by a lucky twelve-inch shell remains practically constant, so that a force of 1000 can always do 100 units of injury in every unit of time. But if the target considered be guns and men so close together that a shot missing one may hit another, then the chance of doing injury decreases continually after injury begins to be done; that is, when there are only, say, one-half as many guns and men to be hit, a force of woo will probably do only one-half as much injury per unit of time as it would when the fight began; and the effective target will decrease proportionally as the offensive power decreases. If, for instance, during the first period the enemy's offensive power is reduced from 1000 to 900, the injury that a force of moo can do in the next period will not be 10 per cent of 100, but nine-tenths of this amount. Table III is constructed on this principle, and also on the principle that in a fight between ships alike in type, the effective target presented by a ship's offensive power varies with that offensive power; so that a ship of given offensive power will probably do only eight-tenths as much damage per unit of time to an offensive power of 800 as to an offensive power of moo, because there would be only eight-tenths as much probability of hitting a gun or a man.
Table III would indicate that the stronger force will retain the arithmetical advantage that it had at the beginning, but that the ratio of offensive power will increase in favor of the stronger. This case is like the game of checkers, where, if one player gets an advantage of one and then exchanges piece for piece until the end of the game, he will have one piece left, after his adversary has lost his last piece.
But it is doubtful if Table III represents a probable case. Table I is probably nearer the truth; especially if the fire control be good, because the center of impact of a ship's fire can then be directed at one part of a ship until it be put out of action, and then directed at another part. It may be here pointed out that this ability to concentrate on a given part of a target ship until it be broken down, and then to shift to another part, is one of the crowning advantages of fire control.
A consideration of these tables has brought out very clearly to the writer's mind the fact that, in every fighting ship, the thing most to be desired is a maximum of offensive power and a minimum of liability to having this offensive power destroyed. Now if we are to design a ship which will satisfy this requirement, it is plain that we must put on that ship whatever thing it is that has a maximum of offensive power, combined with a minimum liability to being itself destroyed.
Sizes of Guns.—It is evident that the offensive power of a ship's battery is not to be measured by the energy of the projectiles she can throw in a given time, but by their ability to do harm to a probable ship of an enemy, and the offensive power it carries. If the offensive power were measured by the energy of the projectiles her guns can throw in a given time, we ought to put the weight allowed for guns into as many and as small guns as possible; for the reason that the energy of a projectile thrown by a big gun is about equal to the aggregate energies of the projectiles thrown by smaller guns of equal aggregate weight, and the smaller guns can be fired more often. A twelve-inch gun, for instance, weighs about as much as eight six-inch guns, and a twelve-inch projectile has about as much energy as eight six-inch projectiles; but a six-inch gun can be fired also about eight times as often; so, that, in a minute, six-inch guns can fire projectiles having eight times as much energy as an equal weight of twelve-inch guns. They also expend eight times as much ammunition. But if the guns are too small to destroy our real target, which is the offensive power of our enemy (i. e., his turrets with their contents) and his water-line, this energy is wholly wasted. Therefore, our war ships ought not to carry any guns that cannot penetrate the water-line armor and protective deck of the battleships of any probable enemy at the probable fighting range and angle of striking; and as even twelve-inch projectiles, which are the most powerful projectiles now practicable, can barely do this, and cannot penetrate a modern turret at long range, but can give a greater shock than any other guns; and as smaller guns cannot be relied on to penetrate the water-line armor and protective deck we are simply logically restricted to twelve-inch guns.
Another reason for having a few big guns, instead of many small guns, is that the shock of firing even one three-inch gun on board even a battleship is so great as to prevent the use of a range-finder for several seconds; and the smoke given off is so considerable, that, except under very favorable conditions, a ship that keeps firing many guns can never get out of her own smoke, and give the gun-pointers a good chance. But the strongest reason for using big guns is that, at the long ranges at which future gunnery battles will be fought, exact knowledge of the range will probably never be had; and the bigger the gun the less its error, due to incorrect measuring of the range.
The fact that all turrets have ports of considerable size and weak tops, and that the upper decks are necessarily weak, indicates the desirability of having, in addition to the heavy guns, a number of small rapid-fire guns, to attack the target ship with high-angle fire. This attack will be especially valuable, when the target ship is making the bow presentation, and offering a long horizontal target. Since great accuracy cannot be attained, a great number of shots per minute will be needed. This means, of course, that we should use the smallest guns that will insure penetration; not only because small guns can be fired oftener than large guns, but because more can be installed. The penetration will, of course, increase with the range, because the angle of fall increases.
We see, therefore, that there should be two sizes of guns in battleships; the most powerful that can be built and handled, and the smallest that can penetrate a turret-top and upper deck.
Steadiness of the Gun Platform.—But the offensive power of the ship's battery depends, not only on the power of the projectiles themselves, and the accuracy of the gun itself, but on the accuracy with which the gun is fired. Now, as the principal error in firing guns at sea is that due to the rolling of the ship, and is caused mainly by the fact that there is a variable interval of time between the instant when the gun-pointer wills to fire and the time when the gun is actually fired, during which interval the ship is rolling and continually changing the elevation of the gun, we see that the offensive power of the battery of a ship is tremendously dependent on the way in which the ship rolls. If a ship is rolling two degrees per second, Alger's tables show that the vertical error at the target is nearly twice that which it is when the ship is rolling one degree per second; so that, if the target is quite distant, the chance of hitting the target with the ship rolling one degree per second may be said to be practically twice as great as if the ship were rolling two degrees per second; unless the gun-pointer waits an indefinite time, until he can fire with his sights resting on the target. In other words, if two ships fight at long distance on the sea, and are equal in all respects except that one rolls twice as much as the other, that ship's offensive power may be truly said, under those conditions, to be only about half as great as the other ship's offensive power. This means that we must make our war ships to roll as slowly as is consistent with a safe metacentric height. Now as this small rolling must be accomplished in the ordinary conditions we meet upon the ocean, we see that we must make our war ships very massive and broad. The importance of great steadiness may be modified if we ever attain a mechanism and skill that will make "continuous aim" a reality with twelve-inch guns.
Height of Guns.—The inevitable disaster and defeat which would overwhelm a fleet with low guns, caught with the lee-gage in a heavy wind and sea, shows the necessity of having our guns high enough to permit their being fired accurately to windward, under all probable conditions.
We may assume it as a principle, therefore, that the ships of our battle-fleet must be equipped with as heavy guns as can be made and handled well; must be themselves very massive and broad; and must carry their guns very high.
Defensive Power.—It has already been said in this paper that it seems as if our ships should have the maximum of offensive power, combined with the minimum liability to having that offensive power destroyed. This may be stated by saying that the ship should have maximum offensive power and present the minimum effective target. By the phrase "effective target" is meant to be conveyed the idea, not only of exposure of area, but also of penetrability; so that if two ships present exactly the same area to gun-fire, but one of them has her offensive units so disposed and protected that, if both ships were exposed to a given gun-fire for a given time, only one-half as much damage would probably be done to one ship as to the other, that ship may be said to present one-half the effective target that the other presents. The office of armor is clearly to decrease the effective target to an amount that depends on its impenetrability. It is plain that the more and the better armor we can put on a war ship, the less the effective target becomes.
A recognition of the existence of effective targets brings us at once to realize that it is better to use machinery as much as possible in our ships, rather than men; because machinery exposes less effective target per horsepower than men. Not only does it present less area, but it is less easily damaged, is more easily repaired, and can more easily be stowed in a safe place behind armor. And the delightful amenability of machinery to discipline should not be overlooked; machinery has never been known to be out of uniform, or overstay its liberty, or get drunk.
Dispersion of Target—But a slight consideration of the subject shows us that the effective target may be decreased by other things than armor. If a great number of projectiles are fired under ordinary conditions at a target from a gun on board a rolling ship, and if a rectangle be drawn around the points where the projectiles strike, the rectangle will be found to be higher than wide, because the vertical errors of a gun fired on the sea are usually greater than the lateral errors. Therefore, if we wish to make a target of given area that will catch the maximum number of projectiles fired at it from ships, we must make this target higher than wide. Therefore, the worst disposition to make of the important stations on board our battleships, is to place them under or over each other, or nearly so. Placing important stations nearly over or under each other increases the effective target.
The lateral errors of guns fired at sea also are very considerable, especially at great ranges; but they can be made much less than the vertical errors by a good system of fire control. If a ship's battery, fired under given conditions, say at four thousand yards, can put all its projectiles in a vertical area in feet long by n feet high, then any ship that presents that target, and engages with her at that distance, will catch all the projectiles fired at it, after the fire control has put the center of impact on the center of the target. But if this area, instead of being a continuous target which will receive injury if struck anywhere, contains only a few stations whose disablement would cause damage, then the chance of the target ship being damaged will not be the chance of the whole area being hit, but the chance of those stations being hit and damaged. In other words, the effective target presented by a ship can be reduced by dispersion; by breaking the target up into units, separated as far as practicable.
Units of Offensive and Defensive Power.—We see, therefore, that we may assume it as a principle that, in our ships, we ought to use the largest guns practicable; put as many of them in a ship as practicable; armor them as much as practicable, and separate them as far as practicable. In plain language, this means that the offensive power of our war ships should consist of twelve-inch high-power guns, installed in turrets that can keep out twelveinch capped projectiles at battle ranges; and that each turret with its guns should be regarded as a unit. There seems to be no escape whatever from the conclusion that we should recognize this combination as our unit of offensive and defensive power, and that our battleships should be equipped with these units and with these only. This does not mean that there should not be a secondary battery, and as large a one as is practicable, for keeping off torpedo-boats, and for attacking the tops and ports of turrets; but this matter, while of importance, is of secondary importance, and sight should not be lost of this fact.
It is held by some that even the secondary battery guns should be in turrets; that all guns should be in turrets; that whatever line of reasoning leads us to turrets for big guns leads us to turrets for small guns.
Maximum Vulnerability Plan.—Many of our best ships are not designed on this plan, which may be called the "all turret plan," but are designed on what may be called the "maximum vulnerability plan," by means of which it is made impossible for a heavy projectile to hit the ship anywhere between the forward and after turrets, without destroying some part of the offensive power. Instead of having a small number of very powerful, very manageable, and strongly protected turrets, a lot of medium guns are placed very close together, and are served by several hundred men. It is not pleasant to imagine what would happen to those men in battle. And it must be borne in mind that, entirely apart from the question of damage done to men, guns, and mechanism, considered as a part of the offensive power of the ship, is the effect on the morale of the unhit men of seeing their shipmates killed and maimed. Even with the bravest and best disciplined men, the losing force cannot keep on fighting until it has been reduced to zero. No force has ever done so; when the offensive power has been reduced to, say a quarter, the resistance of the personnel has usually collapsed; if, indeed, it has ever held out so long. This is merely because the men not hurt have seen other men killed and maimed, and heard their cries, and smelt their blood. But if they were not brought into contact with them, if the men were segregated in turrets, so that those in one turret which was not hit could not see those in another turret which was destroyed, the ship would be able to keep on fighting until men and guns were well wiped out. This element alone would increase a ship's fighting power more than 25 per cent.
Protection of the Directing Personnel.—Closely connected with the question of target is the exposure of the directing personnel, including the captain, signal corps, and such others as the captain finds necessary to have near him. Our evolutions at fleet drill are always carried on with a great number of people on the bridge. Now where would these people be in a fleet fight? It may be answered that they certainly would not be on the bridge. If this be the case, either their presence on the bridge is not necessary in our fleet drills, or else managing our ships in a fleet fight will have to be carried on without the assistance of some men on the bridge whose assistance would evidently be desirable, and on which we have become accustomed to depend. It would seem as if there had not been any determined effort to make it possible to maneuver our ships in fleet evolutions while under fire; and yet every officer knows that our ships must be maneuvered in fleet evolutions, while under fire. The problem seems to be so hard that everybody has simply recoiled before the attempt to solve it. It is suggested that a determined effort should be made to provide armor for the captain and at least one-half a dozen others, so placed that they can see what is going on, by using vertical telescopes. In the German army, officers are provided with vertical telescopes sometimes called periscopes, with which they can look over armor, and still be protected. It would be easy to adapt this idea to battleship construction. In fact, it is perfectly practicable to use vertical telescopes, not only in such places as conning- towers, but in torpedo-directing stations, and as telescope-sights in turrets; thereby getting rid of the very vulnerable "sighting hoods."
Hull Armor.—The armor on the turrets is for the protection of what may be called the offensive power of the ship, including the guns and men. The armor on the hull, including the protective deck, is for the purpose of protecting the ship as a unit; and, to do this, it is clear that the water-line belt and protective deck, together, must be able to keep twelve-inch capped projectiles out of the ship's vitals at battle ranges. It is clear that we may fire at a ship, and hit her many times, and yet may not do any real damage whatever, so far as lowering her offensive power, or reducing the efficiency of the ship, as a carrier of that offensive power. If the ship is constructed as many armored cruisers are, and as some battleships are, in such a way that a projectile can hardly strike anywhere without killing some men or injuring some guns, that ship will evidently be at a great disadvantage as compared with another ship, in which the offensive units are adequately armored, and have large spaces between them. It would seem that a ship could be so constructed that no harm would really be done, if she were struck by a heavy shell; unless that heavy shell, at close range, hit a turret, the conning-tower, a mast, the base of a smoke stack, or the water-line; in fact, a monitor approaches this condition very closely. In this case, the only external armor for the hull would be along the water-line; and it would seem to be a positive advantage if the rest of the hull were not made very resisting, because many projectiles might pass through the ship, without doing any damage whatever. This would save a great weight of armor that could be utilized in giving substantial protection to the water-line, by a belt extending considerably above and below it. It may be pointed out here that the term "waterline," as ordinarily used, means the water-line of a ship, when lying at anchor in smooth water; but that the water-line of a ship, when she would be fighting in a sea-way, would be entirely different, and would be much higher forward. For this reason, it would seem that the forward ends of our ships are not really protected so much as they seem to be; because a heavy shell, striking even two feet above the belt forward, would probably cause the whole berth deck to fill with water; thus altering the trim of the ship, interfering with her maneuvering power, cutting down her speed, and embarrassing the entire fleet.
The comparison is often made between the battleship and the ancient knight in armor, saying that, as the progress of time caused the knight to give up his armor, so will it cause the battleship to give up its armor. He would be a daring man who would declare whether this prophecy will come true, or not. But it may be pointed out that the carrying of armor by men was discarded because the progress of invention increased the penetrating power of the projectile so much more than it did the resisting power of the armor, that the armor ceased to fulfil the purpose which it had fulfilled before, and which caused it to be used. If the progress of invention in ship armor and ship ordnance follows like paths, so that armor for ships becomes useless, then armor for battleships will probably be discarded.
Protective Deck.—The disaster to any ship that would follow the entrance of a heavy projectile into a magazine, boiler, engine or steering compartment, indicates the necessity for a protective deck strong enough to keep out twelve-inch projectiles, at probable battle-ranges. The plan, now favored by some constructors, of using heavy side-armor instead, must be based on the notion that ships will always fight broadside on, and never receive high angle fire, like the Russian ships at Port Arthur. Of course, a sufficient protective deck and water-line belt will weigh enormously, but we absolutely must have them, or come as near having them as possible.
Specially Designed Flagships.—The battles of Manila, Santiago, and Port Arthur show that flagships will be specially attacked, as is natural, and for reasons that are plain. The same reasons that will lead the enemy to attack our flagships make it necessary for us to protect them; and the only possible way is to keep them out of the battle-line. The necessity is here suggested of making specially constructed flagships, very large and fast, with adequate high belt-protection at the water-line, but very lightly armed; with an admiral's observing station very high up, like Farragut's, and signal masts 200 feet high, well above the funnel smoke; the flagship not ordinarily to join in the battle, but to be to "leeward," like a general in rear of the fighting line. It is silly to suppose that any of our flagships could lead the column in a fleet fight with an enemy of the kind that we must prepare to meet, and escape quick disablement. Will the fleet then stop to be T'd, or will it leave the useless flagship to its fate?
The question of how to provide an admiral with means to fight his fleet, is the most urgent and unsolved question before the navy to-day; and yet, we do not even think about it. We have given every man in the fleet a means with which he can do his allotted work, except the admiral. He has not even a station fitted for him. Dewey stood, absolutely unprotected, in the best place from which to direct the fleet. But it was not the place intended for him. There was no place intended for him!
Why lavish brain power and money on every thing except the most important thing of all, the culmination of all; the thing without which no fleet can be a fleet, except in name? Why devote the highest order of constructional and ordnance and engineering skill to developing every detail to the utmost perfection of perfection, and then, when we come to handling the final result in its final test, simply trust to luck? This is exactly what we will do, if we put our admiral up on an unprotected bridge of a flagship on the fighting line. This matter will be considered later in its relation to naval tactics.
Torpedoes.—The recent great improvement of the auto-torpedo in mechanism, speed and range has introduced a very important, and very serious, complication into the question of fights between fleets at sea. The torpedo, like the printing press, has overcome conservatism," and is now an accomplished fact. Its future no one but a prophet can foretell, yet a very ordinary man can truly say that there is more progress in sight for it than for the gun. The gun has not improved very much in the last ten years in comparison with the way in which the torpedo has improved in the same time; and, until some new discovery is made, which is not now in sight, the gun cannot improve very much in accuracy, rapidity or range. But the torpedo seems to be in its infancy. Only a very short time ago, its effective range was supposed to be eight hundred yards; and now two torpedoes are being made which are expected to go four thousand yards at twenty-six knots speed. The torpedo, being simply a cigar-shaped boat propelled by an air engine, can be made to go eight thousand yards at twenty-six knots, if fitted with a sufficient air-flask; or a very much greater distance, if run at less speed. If an automobile carriage can go fifty miles over the ground, an automobile-torpedo can be made to go fifty miles through the water. It is merely a question of energy. Regarding accuracy, we all know that, while the gun has errors in two planes, vertical and horizontal, the torpedo has, practically speaking, only one error; that in the horizontal plane. And while the great enemy to the accuracy of the gun is the rolling of the ship, we know that, practically speaking, this has almost no influence on the torpedo. And when we think about the question of a fleet fight, which is the most important question that the naval officer has to think about; it is fair to say that, if a torpedo is fired at the middle of a fleet, there is about one chance in three of hitting some ship; and that, if it hits some ship, that ship will probably be disabled. This, of course, is supposing the fleet to be in some formation that is close enough for fleet fighting.
It is idle to say that a torpedo will not sink a ship if she has her water-tight doors closed; because the mere disabling of a ship, without sinking her, will cause her speed to decrease very much, and this will affect the whole fleet; because the whole fleet must either slow down, and lose all the advantage that speed gives, or else, must leave the ship behind. This would mean, not only that the ship would be taken by the enemy, but also that the fleet itself would be reduced in numbers.
Therefore, the enormous destructive power of the torpedo, and its extraordinary accuracy, and the almost limitless possibilities of improving it, lead us to accept it as a principle, that the ships of our fleet must be as thoroughly equipped with torpedoes as can be done; and that we must push the improvement of the torpedo to its utmost possible limit.
The importance may be here suggested of keeping the range and speed of our future torpedoes a very strictly guarded secret; so that the enemy will not know how far to keep away to be beyond torpedo range.
Large Ships or Small Ships?—In discussing the events that would occur between our two fleets at sea, it has practically been assumed, thus far in this paper, that the ships on the two sides are equal in size; at least, no mention has been made of any difference in size.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is better to have a small number of large ships, or a large number of small ships; the aggregate tonnage in the two cases being the same. This would amount to discussing whether, in the case of our two fleets, it would be better to have sixteen ten-thousand-ton ships or eight twenty-thousand-ton ships. It is not very hard for us to see, in our mind's eye, sixteen ten-thousand-ton ships, drawn up against eight twenty-thousand-ton ships. For the reason that a ship's tonnage varies practically as the cube of her dimensions, the ships of twenty thousand tons would each be about one and three-tenths times as long and high as the others; thus exposing to gun-fire about one and seven-tenths times as much target, considering the hull as the target, and twice as much target, considering the offensive power as the target. If, however, the important positions were properly dispersed, and the enemy's fire-control good, a ship of twenty thousand tons would present little more effective target than a ship of ten thousand tons. The column of twenty-thousand-ton ships would be about three thousand yards long; and the column of sixteen ships about sixty-two hundred yards long. This is on the assumption that there would be about four hundred yards between the mainmasts of the ships of both fleets, as would probably be the case. The twenty-thousand-ton ships would be more steady as gun platforms than the ten-thousand- ton ships, in most sea-ways; they would carry their guns higher; they would be able to carry more than twice as much offensive power, both in guns and torpedoes; they would have more powerful engines, and they would be faster. That is, the aggregate offensive power of the eight twenty-thousand-ton ships would be greater than the aggregate offensive power of the sixteen ten-thousand-ton ships. The armor protection would be greater also, and in a ratio greater than the ratio of the effective targets exposed. The possession of superior speed would enable the big ships to get the advantage of position, as regards the wind and sea; to begin and end a battle when they pleased; and to keep always near the head of the column of the enemy; so that the statement just made that the aggregate fighting power of the twenty-thousand-ton ships would be greater than the aggregate fighting power of the ten-thousand-ton ships, must be strengthened by the statement that the twenty-thousand-ton ships could take up such a position near the head of the column of the ten thousand-ton ships, that the rear ships of the slower fleet could not use their guns effectively at the faster ships. Should the column of the ten-thousand-ton ships swing into line, the faster fleet could simply T it, (flank it), and disable each of the slower ships, one after the other. The sixteen ten-thousand-ton ships could not help being flanked.
To the advantages just enumerated, must be added one equally important; which is that the big ships could keep a little ahead of the smaller ships, and fire their torpedoes, so that the slower ships would run into them.
In the matter of defense against torpedoes, the bigger ships would have the advantage, for the reason that big ships can be divided into as small compartments as small ships; with the result that an explosion in a compartment in a big ship would not damage the big ship so much as an explosion in a like compartment in a small ship. Furthermore, torpedo armor might be practicable in a big ship that would not be practicable in a small one. It is true that we have not, at present, any real torpedo armor or, in fact, any real defense whatever against torpedoes. But it is inconceivable, that, in the present state of the engineering, arts, some defense, partial though it be, will not be made against torpedoes. This defense, it seems probable, will be of the nature of a sort of outside bottom, not too strong, which will prevent the war-nose of the torpedo from striking the hull of the ship proper. An appliance of this kind, to be efficient, will, of course, require a certain minimum distance to be left between the outside skin and the hull proper, so that there will be a large airspace that will be useless for carrying coal, ammunition and stores. It is clear that this waste space can be better spared in a large ship than in a small one. The necessity for omitting the center-line bulkhead is a little more urgent, the smaller the ship.
It has been said by some that our fleet should consist of battleships of very moderate size, for the reason that a small ship can ordinarily be handled better than a big ship. But two small ships cannot be handled better than one big ship; no ship can collide with itself, nor can a fog be so dense as to prevent signals being understood between the parts of any one ship. The whole effort of fleet drill is to get co-operation among its various units; and the difficulty of obtaining this co-operation increases with the number of units. A "reductio ad absurdum" of this principle would be to declare that we ought to build one battleship so big that it would equal the tonnage of say sixteen ten-thousand-ton battleships. But this would be a "reductio ad absurdum" for one reason only; and that is that such a ship is beyond the state of the engineering arts to-day. But, if such a ship could be built, a ship of one hundred and sixty thousand tons, which would be as perfect as a ship of ten thousand tons, she certainly could whip sixteen ten-thousand-ton ships in an ocean fight. By her superior speed, she could take one ship at a time, isolating the others, and thus disable the sixteen smaller ships, one after the other.
Regarding the economy of the two plans, it is well known that battleships cost less per pound, the bigger they are; so that one twenty-thousand-ton battleship would cost less than two ten-thousand- ton ships; and as one twenty-thousand-ton ship will need fewer men than two ten-thousand-ton ships, we see that economy, both of money and of men, will be promoted by putting our naval force into very large ships.
We may accept it as a principle, therefore, that we should make our battleships as large as the state of the engineering arts permits.
This means that we shall have to keep making them larger and larger, for the present. To do this, it will not, of course, be desirable to depart from standard types; it will, on the contrary, be clearly desirable to decide on a type of ship, and afterwards, from year to year, enlarge and improve it; but making no changes in design that are not sure to be improvements. At the present moment, it seems clear that we should build ships of at least twenty thousand tons, having a speed of at least eighteen knots.
An incidental advantage of a very large ship, manned by a comparatively few men, would be the greater amount of breathing space per man, better opportunity for exercise, better protection from the weather, better opportunity for having dry clothes ready, better health conditions in general. It is a common idea of people who live habitually on the land, and take sea-trips sometimes for their health, that the naval life must be a very healthy life. They do not know the incredibly crowded condition of the places where a man-of-war's-man sleeps; they do not know that he has to spend a great deal of his time in wet clothes; that he is exposed to very sudden and very great changes of temperature; that he spends a great deal of his life in the tropics, in a ship, most parts of which are then about ten degrees hotter than the air outside, and in which the ventilation cannot be made sufficient. But if they did know these things; and if they appreciated the importance of being able to put real gladiators into our fleet fight, men whose physical and nervous endurance had been developed to the highest pitch, they would then appreciate the importance of surrounding them with health conditions of the highest class; and these cannot be attained on board of any but a very large, uncrowded ship.
It may be interesting to note here that the causes which have operated to distribute armies into small units over a long fighting line can operate only imperfectly to distribute naval forces into small units; for the reason that, although dispersion of target has the same value on land and sea, yet the concentration of troops in large masses on the land does not give the same advantages of increased speed, armament, protection and manageability, that the concentration of naval force does in large ships on the sea.
Armored Cruisers.—Regarding armored cruisers, as now designed, it may safely be stated that their place in naval warfare is not accurately defined. It is admitted by all that they have "great steaming radius;" that they can make "reconnaisance in force;" that they can make "raids;" and a notion seems to be held by a few officers that their particular combination of light armor, light armament, and great speed, must result in something very valuable; since they cost as much money as battleships, are more expensive to maintain, and need more men. But this feeling is vague; no one seems able to state the particular probable occasion when that particular combination would be as valuable as the combination found in a battleship. If the United States were dependent, in the way Great Britain is, on an enormous number of merchant ships that it would have to convoy in time of war, the expenditure of so much money, and so many men, on lightly armed and inadequately armored cruisers might be explained. But we have no such enormous number of merchant ships to convoy; the duty of our navy in time of war will simply be to fight. Therefore, the building of ten armored cruisers, like ours, with insufficient powers of both offense and defense, in preference to ten magnificent battleships, would seem to be a mistake. Now, as these ships are exceedingly good as ships, the mistake would clearly seem to be, not an engineering or constructional mistake, but a military mistake. It would seem to be a mistake made by men who had devoted more study to engineering than to strategy.
The value to a fleet of ships having greater speed than the battleships, but with less offensive power, is not to be denied; but it must be clear that such ships must have enough water-line protection, in belt and protective deck, to prevent their disablement by one shot. This can, of course, be given, even to the armored cruisers already building, by taking off the intermediate batteries and side armor, and thickening and widening the belt at the water-line. The expense of the change would be enormous; but this expense should not be charged to the change, but to the original design, which made the change necessary.
Homogeneity and Progress.—It may be pointed out here that, while homogeneity of ships in a battle-fleet is an ideal towards which we must persistently strive, yet we should recognize the fact that, like most ideals, it is unattainable. The enormous speed with which the engineering arts are advancing, coupled with the long time needed to build a battleship, brings about the condition, not only that changes must be made in ships built in a certain year, over those built the year before, but that changes must be made frequently in every ship during her building, no matter how much exasperation and trouble those changes may occasion. We may as well realize the principle that homogeneity and progress cannot co-exist.
We must not forget, however, that the only very important ways in which the ships of a fleet should be homogeneous are equality of turning circles and speed. So long as we can approach satisfactory homogeneity in these two features, we shall probably do well to accept all possible improvements in the details of ordnance, construction and equipment.
Torpedo Vessels.—The fact that the Japanese have had torpedo vessels with their fleet in their war with Russia is a sufficient reason for considering it a reasonable plan. It is apparent that, if the weather be fine, torpedo vessels, even in a fleet fight, could be kept on the side of the fleet away from the enemy, far enough away to be safe; and that, while they might not take part in the main battle, they would be very useful in torpedoing disabled vessels of the enemy which would not surrender; in chasing fleeing vessels of the enemy, in case the enemy's fleet is broken up; or in defending our own disabled vessels from being torpedoed by the enemy. If the weather were bad, however, they could not even keep up with the heavy ships; so, if torpedo vessels are to be part of our battle-fleet, they must be much larger and heavier than destroyers are at present; and as it would not be necessary to have them go so fast in smooth water as at present, their engines may be less powerful in proportion to their tonnage. It may be here suggested that it would be worth while to consider a type of torpedo vessel which would not be so vulnerable to gun-fire as the present destroyer is; which would have the engines and boilers below the water-line, covered by a protective deck; and which would have submerged tubes. It is true that such a torpedo vessel, if made so that it could be relied upon, would have to be of considerable size, at least four thousand tons; but a vessel of four thousand tons could maintain its speed in a sea-way and might be so constructed that its upper works could be completely riddled by gun-fire, and yet the vessel remain as good as ever for its purpose. It has even been suggested that our armored cruisers, now nearing completion, be converted into torpedo vessels, by taking off their six-inch guns and side armor, equipping them with ten submerged torpedo tubes on each side, and say one hundred twenty-one-inch torpedoes each, of great speed and range, and thickening the armor at the water-line to twelve inches. There are now ten armored cruisers building, whose usefulness, as part of our battle-fleet, has long been doubted by Many officers, and has been more doubted still since the fate of the Russian Vladivostock squadron. But ten torpedo vessels with twelve-inch water-line protection, each with ten submerged tubes on the side, each carrying one hundred twenty-one-inch torpedoes that could go four thousand yards, or more, at a speed of twenty-six knots, or more, would have a definite fighting value. With a torpedo squadron of such vessels at each end of the fleet, a commander-in-chief would not have so much anxiety about being flanked, or T'd, as he would without them.
Submarines.—By removing a few six-inch guns from the battleships, where they can do but little good, it would not be difficult to give each battleship a submarine, with proper means to get it in and out. But submarines will have to be longer, deeper, and faster than at present, to do much good in a fleet, except in operations near a coast.
Auxiliaries.—If by auxiliaries is meant vessels that belong to the fleet, but do not take part in the active fighting, they may be said to include scouts, colliers, ammunition ships, repair ships, supply ships, hospital ships and cable ships.
Scouts.—The use of scouts is to get information. It is evidently desirable that the commander-in-chief of our fleet should get as much information as possible; but it may be pointed out that scouts are not so much needed now as they were in the days before cables and fast mail ships and wireless telegraphy were in use; because scouts were then the only means by which information could be got. In nearly every case that would be probable in the near future, when wireless messages can be exchanged between ships two hundred miles apart, the information which scouts can get would be gotten at some time without scouts; so that it may be said truly that the only value of scouts will be to get information quicker than it would be gotten otherwise. It is true that information which is gotten too late may be worth nothing; so, the last statement may be modified by saying that the only value of scouts is to get information that could not be gotten quickly enough by any other means. Now, it is apparent that the information which a scout will get will almost always be gotten by seeing a certain number of the enemy's ships going in a certain direction. In very many cases, this information would be of value; but it may be pointed out that, at the same time that the scout would see the enemy's ships, the odds are heavy that those ships would see the scout; and that the information conveyed to the enemy by seeing the scout, might, in many cases, offset the value of the information that the scout would get; and it is possible that, in some cases, the information given to the enemy by seeing the scout might be of much greater value to the enemy than the information given to the scout's admiral.
It is also to be borne in mind that the scout may make a mistake as to what he sees; that his means of getting accurate information can rarely be very good; and that his report to his commander-in-chief may be erroneous and misleading, and therefore worse than useless. That this may happen is proved by the fact that it has happened.
Now, if before the war, we allow our ships, and squadrons, and fleets, and auxiliaries, to become widely separated, and then try to get them together, information of what the enemy is doing may be of the very first importance; but if we get our entire fleet together before the war begins, and drill it until it can be handled as a unit, which will probably be the case; and if our enemy does the same thing, which will probably be the case, it is apparent that the value of scouts will not then be so great. Their principal value then will be in bringing the two fleets to battle before they would otherwise be brought to battle. This is because no great fleet will waste its energies on anything less than the other fleet.
In the case that one fleet is gotten together before the war, and the other not, it is clear that scouts will then be of more value than if both fleets had already been formed. In this case, scouts will probably be more used by the concentrated fleet than by the disconnected squadrons; for the reason that each disconnected squadron will be so fearful of being caught alone by the concentrated fleet, that it will keep its ships together and try to sneak along to the rendezvous, taking up as little space as possible.
Scouting, therefore, while important, must be considered as one of the minor operations of naval warfare. If this be true, it follows that we should expend as small a part of our naval force as possible in scouts. And for the reason that scouts must, of necessity, be able to stay a long time at sea, and go fast from place to place, they must be massive and carry a great amount of coal. In our war with Spain, vessels like the Yale and Harvard made excellent scouts. Their great mass enabled them to keep up their speed in any kind of seaway; their large bunkers enabled them to stay long at sea; they could always be relied not to break down, and the fact that they looked like merchant ships masked somewhat their identity. It would seem, therefore, as if our ordinary scouts should be vessels like the very large Atlantic liners. But, as they must be under the orders of the commander-in-chief afloat, and as they must be able to make and read signals of all kinds, it is clear that it will be necessary to put on board, say two officers, and a few naval signal-men, in addition to the regular merchant ship crew. The merchant crew and captain can be enrolled as part of the Volunteer Navy.
The fact, however, that the enemy will seek to prevent scouts from getting information leads us to see the value of what may be called "military scouts;" vessels which are so strongly armored and armed that they cannot easily be driven off. Therefore, in addition to the ordinary scouts, we need a few military scouts.
As the first requisite of all scouts is that they shall be able to see, it is clear that special attention must be paid to constructing observing stations, where telescopes can be mounted. Inasmuch as the worst enemy to seeing by telescope is vibration, we see that it is absolutely essential to a good scout that her observing stations shall not vibrate when the scout is going at the speed at which she will probably be going when doing her destined duty. To accomplish this, it is clear that the observing stations should be very substantially constructed, that the ship should be very strongly built, and that the engines should be balanced with exceptional care. This point indicates at once the desirability of using turbines.
Colliers, etc.—If one of the two fleets went into battle with a great deal more coal than the other, and if the operations lasted a long time, say several days, it is possible that one fleet might get practically out of coal, while the other had plenty. What would happen to the fleet which ran out of coal may be imagined. It is apparent, therefore, that our fleet should keep as full of coal as possible. The only way to accomplish this is to have colliers with the fleet all the time.
The same reasoning applies to ammunition ships, supply ships, and repair ships.
Inasmuch as these auxiliaries must accompany our fleet, and inasmuch as it would be foolish to build a fast fleet of fighting ships, and then hold it back by slow auxiliaries, we see that these auxiliaries must be so large and so well-engined that they can keep up with the fleet in all kinds of weather.
It may be objected that the presence of a lot of helpless auxiliaries would only embarrass the commander-in-chief, who would have enough to do to look out for his fighting ships. Their presence would undoubtedly embarrass him at times; but some one must look out for the coal and supplies that the fleet will need, and the officer who has our entire fighting force under his command can do it better than any one else; and he can do it well, in. proportion to their nearness to him; and their nearness to him will be at its maximum when they are actually with him, and in sight from his flagship.
It may further be objected that our various shore bases and coaling stations are arranged to furnish our fleet with supplies and coal, and that other means would be unnecessary. This argument is powerful and some shore bases must be had; but the commander-in-chief cannot always go instantly to a shore base or coal pile; and he cannot be assured that, when he gets there, he will find any coal; he cannot be assured that the enemy will not have set fire to everything in the place.
This suggests the curious fact that any shore base, not protected so well that it can withstand a probable enemy, is an element of weakness and not an element of strength. The reason evidently is that men must be taken from our fighting force to guard it; our plans of war must be complicated by the necessity of including it; our naval force cannot always stay in sight of it; and, therefore, there will always be an element of doubt introduced by our own fear concerning it, and doubt carries with it uncertainty in planning; and finally if the enemy attack it, we shall lose something on which we relied, and in which the enemy will find something that he wants. Besides, there will follow the depressing "moral effect" that always follows any loss in war.
NAVAL TACTICS.
Naval tactics may seem, at first thought, to be unconnected with naval policy. But a little reflection suggests that no naval policy can be wise unless it takes into very careful account the tactics that ought to be used in war; in order that the proper kinds of ships may be built and the proper kinds of organizations, drill and discipline be devised, to carry those tactics into good effect.
Returning to our mental picture of two hostile fleets, operating in each other's presence on the sea, it is easy to imagine the intense feelings of every one; especially of the commanders-in-chief.
Each commander-in-chief will feel that his country has placed in his keeping the final result of all that it can do; that his fleet cannot be drilled any longer; that the courage and skill of his men are fixed quantities which cannot be altered now; that, although the skill, or lack of skill, of one or more of his subordinates may make a considerable difference in some emergency, yet, nevertheless, the final thing upon which the glory of his country will depend that day will be his skill. Surely, no matter how skillful he may know himself to be, in that grand, but neglected art of handling fleets upon the sea; no matter how well coaled and provided are his ships; no matter what confidence he may feel in his captains and their crews; the infinity of possible combinations of position and formation, of gain and loss, that the battle may assume, each requiring that he shall wisely act, will thrust upon his mind the awful question, can he rise to that sublime occasion?
It is clear that the aim of his tactics may be divided into three parts:
(1) To get his fleet into a favorable position.
(2) So to dispose his ships that he can direct his gun-fire and torpedo-fire most efficiently at each instant, at the enemy, as disposed at that instant.
(3) To put his fleet into such formations as to present the least possible effective target to the gun-fire and torpedo-fire of the enemy.
(1) If the fleets are on the ocean so far from land that the tactical problem is free from complications caused by it, the question of a favorable position is one that depends almost wholly on:
(a) The relation of the longest line that can be drawn through the vessels of one fleet to the longest line that can be drawn through the vessels of the other fleet; and in this regard, that fleet will have the advantage of position whose "longest line" is the nearest to being perpendicular to the direction of the middle of the other fleet. If both fleets are in column, or in line, or in echelon, for instance, the "longest line" in each is, of course, along the column, or the line; and if the two fleets are parallel, and bear from each other in a direction perpendicular to those lines, neither has, in this respect, the advantage of position. But if the A fleet is in column, or line, or echelon, and the B fleet is in the same formation, but with its column or line, perpendicular to the direction of the A fleet and along the A fleet's longest line—prolonged—the B fleet clearly has the advantage of position; because all its ships can fire the guns and torpedoes of one side at the A ships, while only one A ship can fire all the guns and torpedoes of one side at the B ships. In this case, the A fleet, of course, is flanked or T'd; and the advantage of the B fleet is at the maximum. But it is clear that, in between the two cases just cited, there is an infinity of other probable cases, in which the gun-fire and torpedo-fire of the ships of one fleet is less obstructed by friendly ships than is the gun-fire and torpedo-fire of the ships of the other fleet.
(b) The strength and direction of the sunlight, wind and sea.
If the sunlight is very strong and the sun is low, it is apparent that, if one commander-in-chief can so dispose his ships that his gun-pointers have the sun behind them and illuminating their targets brightly, while the enemy's gun-pointers have the sun directly in their eyes, he will gain an advantage that may decide the fight. The higher the sun and dimmer the sunlight, the less, of course, will be the value of this factor.
If the wind be very light, its influence on the question of position may be small; but if the wind be strong and one commander-in-chief can get his fleet to windward of the other, he will score an important point; because there will be a great deal of smoke given off from the guns of each ship; and this smoke will be blown away from the weather ships, and blown back into the eyes and throats of the men in the lee ships. The lee ships will be very greatly embarrassed, and delayed in firing also, by spray thrown on the object glasses of the telescope sights; and, in some cases, they may not be able to use their weather guns at all. Especially will this be the case with our ships, many of which have their guns near the water.
The direction of the sea is important, both by reason of its effect in embarrassing the fire of weather guns, and by reason of its effect on the steadiness of the gun-platform. As is well known, a ship pitches less than she rolls; not only through smaller angles, but with a smaller angular velocity. And since we know that the error of the gun-pointer is mainly due to the angular vertical motion of his gun during the interval between the instant when he wills to fire and the instant when the gun is actually fired, we see that the direction of the sea must be an element in the calcu lations of the commanders-in-chief of the very first importance. For instance, if our commander-in-chief can get his fleet into column head to a heavy sea, with the enemy on his beam in line; or, if he can get his fleet into line, head to a heavy sea, with the enemy's fleet in column rolling in the trough, he will have a distinct gunnery advantage.
It may be objected that perfectly continuous aim would make the motion of the gun-platform an unimportant matter. This clearly is true; but while it is extremely probable that aim practically continuous with turret guns will some day be attained, it seems probable that until perfectly continuous aim is an established fact in all our ships, we ought not to disregard the advantage of a steady platform.
If the fleets are so near the land that its nearness must be taken into account, the problem may become complicated in the extreme. If the land be friendly, if his own harbors and monitors and submarine boats and forts be there, the commander-in-chief might not hesitate to get between it and the enemy, if it were not that he would heartily desire to get the enemy between it and him. But each fleet will try to be the offshore fleet; and this will clearly be the case, even if the land be neutral. An exception to this case would, of course, exist if either side wished to have a harbor of refuge under its lee.
The best position will evidently be gotten by the fleet that is the faster, unless the other fleet be the better handled; and even this rough sketching of the situation shows that, in the handling, there will be need for skill of the highest order on the part of the commander-in-chief, either in utilizing superior speed or in preventing the enemy from utilizing superior speed.
(2) In order so to dispose his ships that he can direct his gunfire and torpedo-fire most effectively at each instant, at the enemy as disposed at that instant, the commander-in-chief, it is clear, must take into principal account the strength and direction of the sunlight, sea and wind, as just discussed; but this part of his endeavor has to do less with the relation of his entire fleet to the enemy than with the relation of his individual ships to each other. And while it is clearly true that he must consider his whole fleet as a unit, it should not be forgotten that no commander-in-chief will probably ever have a fleet made up of units so perfectly homogeneous, that he can allow himself to neglect the peculiarities of individual ships. And, even if he could do so at the beginning of the fight, it is sure that he could not do so after ships here and there had begun to get injured and disabled, both in his own fleet and in the enemy's fleet. Here will be room for admiralship of the highest order. How shall he strengthen his line, where it is beginning to waver? Shall he stop his column, because the Kearsarge is disabled; or shall he leave her, or shall he send the Kentucky to her aid, or shall he send a flotilla of torpedo-boats? What formation shall he direct, if about to be flanked or T'd; shall he change front or charge through the enemy's column, or try to ram? Shall he try to fight at long range or at short range? Shall he concentrate on individual ships, or allow each ship to fire at her opposite? Shall he use ahead fire, or beam fire or bow fire? Shall he dare to retreat a moment, if he thinks it would be wise; or shall he refrain, lest he be court-martialed afterwards for cowardice?
Although the commander-in-chief will have many formations at his command, in which to advance, retreat or jockey, there are only two in which he can fight with full battery power, and these are column and echelon, or line of bearing; and only one in which the gun, ram and torpedo can act together, and this is line.
Column is, of course, the easiest formation, and the one in which the most guns can be used. It has the disadvantages that the ships are helpless against the ram, unless they turn, and thereby destroy the column; and that, if the enemy be abeam, as it probably would be if the fleet were in column, each ship exposes the maximum length of water-line to the gun-fire and the maximum target to torpedo-fire. Now, if any ship in a column gets hit by a torpedo, or by a twelve-inch capped projectile at her water-line, her injury will probably affect not only herself, but the entire fleet; because the entire fleet will either have to abandon her, or slow down for her, or detach other ships to help her. In other words, a serious injury to the water-line of any ship, while it may not injure the offensive power of that ship so much as would the hitting of one of her turrets, may damage the whole fleet more than would the entire destruction of two of her turrets.
Echelon has the advantages that the guns and torpedoes can be fired nearly as effectively as if the fleet were in column, and that the fleet can, at the same time, close in or withdraw. For the sake of brevity, which is necessary in an article so short that attempts so much, echelon is here intended to mean any formation in which the ships are not in either line or column, but are on a line of bearing different from the course that they are heading. The main disadvantage of this formation is the difficulty of maintaining it; but it is clear that this trouble can be overcome by the simple expedients of practicing it, of taking careful note of compass deviations, of taking careful note of any changes in the speed curves, and of regulating the engine speeds to the necessary fraction of a revolution per minute.
The ideal fighting formation would be line, because the advance is in the direction of fire, and gun, ram and torpedo all can be used; were it not for the presentation of the long horizontal target of thin decks along the line of the enemy's fire; for the fact, at least in our service, that the ships do not have much fire ahead; and for the additional fact that the movement of the ships, if it be not directed at the enemy, gives the enemy a chance to flank; while if it be directed at the enemy, it will be apt to precipitate a melee, in which, both fleets having got close together, their guns, rams and torpedoes will combine in an indiscriminate slaughter of everybody.
If both fleets are nearly matched in speed and manageability and in the personal skill of the commander-in-chief, it would seem probable that neither fleet will be able to get a distinct advantage over the other in position. This being the case, and it being also the case that both commanders will recognize the loss in gun-hits that would follow every change of formation, or even turning of a ship, it seems probable that both fleets may "line up" in parallel columns, head to sea, just outside of effective torpedo range, and steam ahead as fast as they can; and that each commander will approach or withdraw, as seems best to him, from time to time, by changing the course very slightly towards the enemy, or away from him, but not the line of bearing.
As this operation, if gently done, will not interfere perceptibly with the gun-fire, and yet will give perfect opportunity for gradual advance, or retreat, and as it is a very difficult thing to do, even on drill, and with the officer of the deck on the bridge where he can see everything; and as the officer of the deck could not stay long there in battle, we see that our battle-fleet should practice thoroughly at steaming in this formation, with the same officer controlling the ship who would control her in a fleet battle, and occupying the same place that he would occupy in a fleet battle. There is only one way in which to get ready for any performance; and that is to rehearse it before hand, under conditions as nearly as possible like those under which the performance will eventually be given.
It may be pointed out here that the range and speed of the torpedo are about to be increased enormously. And, as it will be possible for nations to keep secret what they are doing in this way, there will be interjected into naval tactics a new complication, caused by lack of knowledge by an admiral as to how far he must keep away from the enemy, in order to be beyond his torpedo range. This factor is sure to become very important in time.
(3) In order to put his fleet into such formations as to present the least possible effective target to the gun-fire and torpedofire of the enemy, it is clear that the commander-in-chief must refrain, so far as the desirability of attempting to get certain advantages will permit, from presenting the whole length of the water-line of his ships to the gun- and torpedo-fire of the enemy; and especially must avoid disposing his ships in such a way that a shell or torpedo fired at one ship will have a good chance of hitting some other ship.
Admiralship.—As the opposing commander-in-chief will try to force him into positions which he ought to avoid; and as such endeavors, if skillfully made, will not be apparent to an unskilled person until too late, we can easily see how wary and keen our admiral must be, not easily deceived by any feint; how well he must know every move on the ocean chess board; how familiar to him must be the peculiarities of every ship and every captain, not only in his own fleet, but, if possible, in the enemy's fleet; how he must think in fleets, and guns, and torpedoes, and turning circles, and range, and coal, and ammunition, and wind, and sea; in order that all mental operations involving them will be quick and sure; in order that he may handle his fleet with the same degree of quickness and accuracy as that which each gun-captain handles his gun.
Concentration and Isolation.—If one of the hostile fleets is concentrated and has an offensive power that can be called boo; while the other fleet is in two parts of 500 each; and if the large force concentrate on one of the small forces and isolates it, Table I shows that, under the conditions named in Table I, it will have 841 left when the first small force is reduced to zero, and will have 841 ready to engage the other force of 500. But if it does not isolate one, but simply concentrates on one, while both fire at him, the result will be as indicated in Table V; showing that the aggregate of the values of .the smaller forces will always remain equal to the larger force in this case, and that there is no advantage in concentration alone.
We may accept it as a principle there, that concentration without isolation is nil.
Attention is here invited to Table VI.
Undeveloped State of Naval Tactics.—A little reflection may lead us to believe that our ships which have been built, and which are building now, are such that they can be used pretty well to carry out any probable scheme of tactics. Many officers think that armored cruisers, as at present constructed, are not worth much, and that the changes back and forth in our ideas about battleships show that our policy has not rested on strategical principles, but on the personal "opinions" of men who have happened to come into power from time to time. This matter will be referred to again; but meantime it can be stated with truth that most officers believe that our ships, as merely ships, are very good; that the constructors and engineers have done their part well. If it be assumed that the ships, as ships, are good, we may inquire whether we have given sufficient study to the question of handling them in fleets; whether we have given sufficient study to what may be called "admiralship."
One could write a long book, and it would be a very interesting one, on the requirements of the officer who will handle our battle fleet in the war that is to be. Even a brief abstract of such a book cannot be attempted here; though the rough sketch just given of two hostile fleets in each other's presence on the sea must suggest, not only that the infinity of possible situations and changes give opportunity for very great skill in admiralship, and that no more sublime field for exercising skill can be opened up to mortal man; but that, if we are to whip in our fleet fight, and not be whipped, we must develop admiralship to its highest attainable point.
Now there is no such word as "admiralship." There is such a word as "seamanship," and we hear it often in the navy. There is also such a word as "generalship;" and no word in the English language conveys a nobler thought; no word expresses a higher idea of the power a single man can wield. Surely no thoughtful officer can feel that the admiral who will command our fleet in war will have less need for skill in fleet handling than a general has for skill in army handling, or that fleet handling is easier than army handling. And while one may feel that the essential qualities and principles of admiralship are the same as those of generalship, he will recognize the fact that the conditions of handling fleets are so different from the conditions of handling armies, that the science and the art of admiralship must be developed as entirely distinct from generalship; just as distinct as they are from seamanship.
When one considers the enormous amount of literature that exists on the subject of military tactics, and compares it with the meager lot of literature on the subject of naval tactics; and when he contrasts the assured position that the principles of military tactics enjoy with the vagueness within which the principles of naval tactics seem to exist, the feeling must come to his mind that the science of naval tactics is in its infancy. And when he compares the vast mimic battles undertaken to practice armies in war, with the relatively pitiful little drills and search problems in which fleets engage, he must feel that the art of naval tactics has hardly yet been born. The comparison is nowhere clearer than in the way in which military men protect the general, compared with the way in which naval men expose the admiral. Military men recognize the fact that it would be absolutely impossible to replace a disabled general in battle without tremendous loss; that he, and only he, has the battle in hand; consequently they put the general in a place of comparative safety, from which he can exercise control of his forces as a whole. But naval men put the ship of the commander-in-chief and all his staff in the place where it has the maximum chance of being disabled and left, helpless and useless, behind the rest of the fleet, which must continue to advance, or be flanked.
Reasons for the Present Undeveloped State of Naval Tactics.—The reasons why the development of naval tactics has lagged so far behind the development of military tactics are not hard to find. A short reflection shows us that they are:
(1) The fact that the conditions of warfare on the land have changed very much less than the conditions of warfare on the sea. The principal factors in warfare on the land are the ground, the men and the weapons; of these, the ground and the men have remained the same, and the weapons have not changed very much. The principal factors in warfare on the sea are the water, the men and the weapons; of these the water and the men have remained the same; but the weapons have changed so much and so fast, and continue to change so much and so fast, that naval tactics have not, thus far, been changed nimbly enough to keep up with them.
(2) Military tactics are so much more easily understood by civilians than are naval tactics, that military tactics have been assisted more in their development by men not soldiers than have naval tactics by men not sailors.
(3) Both military tactics and naval tactics need, for their systematic development, a good deal of writing; because, at the present day, no art can be developed without the co-working of many people. And writers on military tactics, being for the most part together on the land, have better facilities for formulating their systems than have writers on naval tactics, who have to be, for the most part, widely separated on the sea.
(4) The mental work required of army officers in the exercise of their ordinary duties is so much less than that required of naval officers in the exercise of their ordinary duties, that they have more time and energy left for the study of tactics. The duties of army officers below the rank of brigadier-general are very simple; so simple that they have often been exercised with splendid skill by men of very little military training, or even common education. But the duties of naval officers, of even the earliest ranks, call into constant exercise mental activity of the most rigorous kinds, involving often momentous results.
(5) In most navies, and especially in our navy, the responsibilities of an officer are mostly limited to one part of one ship, until he reaches command rank. In our navy, command rank is attained, on the average, at about the age of fifty-one. Up to this time, the officer's responsibility is fully occupied with questions minor in general importance to tactics, but not minor in importance to him personally; because his personal responsibility, and even his life, are concerned in them. Between the ages of fiftyone and sixty-two, the responsibilities of an officer are usually limited to one ship, unless he is promoted to flag rank. This rank, if attained at all, is attained at about the age of sixty; so that between the ages of fifty-one and sixty, the responsibilities of most officers are limited to one ship. Since officers of our service retire at the age of sixty-two, we know that only from the age of sixty to the age of sixty-two, if ever, shall we have any responsibility connected with naval tactics, except in managing one ship in obedience to signal. Now, we all know that the admirable automatic mechanism put inside every human being by nature may be relied on to regulate his life in ways where his own responsibility and safety are concerned; but that it does not make him do much work, either physical or mental, that does not have some close relation to his own personal life.
(6) In the case of the American navy, the ships and methods were allowed after the Civil War, not merely to cease to keep up with the advance of civilization in other arts, but actually to revert to more ancient conditions still. The result was that, when reconstruction began in 1881, we were so far behind, that we have not even yet succeeded in getting our ships to equal those of nations who always kept up in naval matters; and the changes in ships and mechanisms have been so rapid and tremendous, that officers, especially officers of the flag rank and command rank, whose professional education was almost wholly confined to sails and spars, have had all they could do to learn to manage the ships and their mechanisms, and have had to leave the larger, but less urgent, questions of naval tactics to those who should come after. And let this not be laid to their discredit. The elaborate scientific mechanisms of a battleship may seem easy to learn to the young officer educated specially and directly for it by the Naval Academy; but he cannot even imagine the efforts that have had to be put forth to master them by officers, already mature, whose minds at the receptive age were filled with sails and spars, and whose total education in electricity was comprised in a few chapters on frictional machines, the voltaic cell and the Leyden jar.
(7) But the main reason, the all-sufficient reason, why there is almost no such thing as naval tactics, is the persistence of the idea, which comes from barbarous times, that the commander-in-chief should be on the fighting line. Armies got rid of this idea long ago. In barbarous times, a general used to lead a charge or an assault; but, even then, when the direction of large forces was required, custom put the general where he could exercise the functions of a general, and direct. Why do not we put the admiral where he can exercise the functions of an admiral and direct, or at least, see? Armies have had ten thousand times as much experience in fighting as navies; why cannot navies learn from them? There is absolutely no use in trying to learn how to direct a fleet in battle so long as the admiral is put where he cannot possibly direct. Farragut had to be lashed aloft, in order to direct. Yet, in forty years, we have drawn no lesson from this well-known fact. And there is no difficulty whatever in putting the admiral where he can direct. We have simply to give him a ship like the Colorado, made into a proper flagship by the simple plan of putting into her lofty signal masts and observing stations, and securing on her water-line a belt of twelve-inch armor. The weight can be made permissible by taking off the six-inch guns and side armor. The expense will be considerable; but this expense ought not to be charged against this beneficent change, but against the original plan of the ship, which made the change necessary.
It may be argued that our forefathers got along very well with the flagship on the battle line. True; but they got along very well without the sewing machine or the telephone.
Development of a System of Tactics.—If this is to be carried out successfully, it is clear that the problem of how to carry it out must be attacked as a definite thing; on the principle that it is really the naval problem, par excellence, and that all details of drill and discipline must be directed to carrying it out; not that it shall be directed by details of drill and discipline. Without any intention of criticising the policy that has directed the navy until recent years, and recognizing fully the enormous work that had to be done in building up the "new navy," it does seem that, in many ways, our policy has been shaped along the line of the least resistance, and has been made to conform to old ideas of drill and discipline, instead of modifying old ideas to conform to it. In Germany and Japan, on the contrary, the "new navy" started on broad principles that had been proved to be good, and was really new; old customs and ideas that were not of practical use, were ignored, and the "new navy" went ahead unfettered. In the British navy, there has never been any dividing line between the old navy and the new navy; because the British navy was always kept moving along a healthy line of progress, and ships and ideas that had become obsolete were replaced continually by ships and ideas that were not obsolete. But even in the British navy, there has been a continual warfare between the conservative and the progressive men; and a very healthy effect it has had, in preventing the bad effects of extremism on both sides. But the British navy has, nevertheless, been handicapped by obsolete things; and it is, in this way, at a disadvantage with the navies of Germany and Japan, who were able to start fresh with everything new. In our navy, we have been just as much handicapped by tradition and custom as the British navy; and our predecessors in office, assisted by Congress, after the Civil War and until 1881, let the navy get into such a miserable state, not only in ships and guns, but in professional aims and standards, that we have had a hard time to breathe into its nostrils the breath of life. This idea is not presented with the wish of criticising the motives, or spirit, or patriotism of the gallant officers who fought and suffered in our Civil War; but to lead up to the declaration, which is made here in all sincerity, that the main reason for all our backwardness has been too great a leaning on the past, too great a respect for "the traditions of the service." Now, let not this sentence be interpreted as showing a lack of due respect and love for "the traditions of the service," or as recommending that we be no longer influenced by them. There is a glamour about them that enthralls; and they come to us laden with the romantic associations which gathered about our boyish enthusiasms, when we read of Decatur and John Paul Jones; and it will be bad for the country when they cease to fill us with dreams of glory. But the trouble is to separate the traditions which have lived because officers love noble deeds, from the traditions which have lived because they have been too conservative and resisted change too much. Is it not to be expected that we, of a country of eighty million people, the richest and grandest in the world, whose system of government, whose machinery, whose inventions are the greatest the world has ever seen, should have a navy that truly is on a level with this greatness? Now is our navy on a level with our machinery, or our statesmanship, or our wealth? If not, whose fault is it? Of course, the fault lies directly with Congress, because Congress would not give us proper appropriations. But was it not with naval officers primarily? The Phoenix, in June, 1809, went under her own steam from New York to Philadelphia, by sea. The Fulton the First, with thick wooden armor and many valuable new appliances, went from New York to Sandy Hook under steam in 1815. Soon after the war ended. Did naval officers say to Congress "this is the kind of ships we need to fight with?" No; they concluded that, because the war was over, there was no longer need of such a ship! Such an account, startling as it is, is nevertheless true. But worse was to follow. In the War of the Rebellion, not a single action was fought under sails, and only one action of moment was a duel; all the important actions were fought by fleets under steam. At the end of the war, did naval officers say to Congress, "we need steam ships, and large fleets, and plenty of armor?" No! The navy returned to the sailing ships of John Paul Jones, and sent them, singly, on lonesome cruises all over the world, following "the traditions of the service."
It is clear that there are three important ways in which we have already broken away from too rigid an adherence to "the traditions of the service:"
(1) We have broken away from obsolete types of ships and guns, and have in use new types of ships and guns that are fitted, in a measure, to fight against the ships and guns of probable enemies.
(2) We have an improved morale: a spirit in officers, in men, that takes an interest in the service as a living thing; a spirit that makes officers and men take pride in their ships and guns, and feel the brotherly spirit which always exists among men who are working together to a common end; a spirit that recognizes the fact that, barring occasional lapses, nearly every officer and man in the service, no matter what his station, really wants to do his duty well. This improved morale is largely due to—
(3) The healthy and exciting emulation in gunnery brought about by Sims, supported by the President, and the amazing practical improvement that has resulted.
But, has our system of tactics improved as much as our ships, guns, morale and gunnery? It is not necessary to answer this question aloud; but let each officer who can remember a time so long ago, recall the fleet maneuvers under Admiral Luce in 1889, and compare them with those of the present time; let him compare the signal books used then and now, and answer the question, very quietly, to himself.
There may be some officers who think that our system of tactics has not improved so much as these other things. Assuming, for the sake of the interest of the subject, that they are right, the question comes up at once, how shall we improve it?
Having had so recent and startling an instance of improvement as our improvement in target practice, the answer at once suggests itself that, because Sims improved our target practice by concentrating our energies on it, perhaps we can develop a system of naval tactics by concentrating our energies on it.
Assuming that we are to concentrate our energies on the development of a system of naval tactics, it would seem that the things to do are to:
(1) Form the battle-fleet.
(2) Organize it into sections, divisions and squadrons, with appropriate auxiliaries.
(3) Drill it--first, as individual ships; second, in sections; third, in divisions; fourth, in squadrons; fifth, as a unit fleet. It is plain that 1 and 2 can easily be done, because the only thing needed is an executive order. But in order to carry out 3 wisely, many obstacles must be overcome. The most difficult obstacles, perhaps, are:
(a) The long intervals during which battleships are kept in navy yards for repairs, during which intervals officers and men get out of practice.
(b) The fact that some ships begin to show defects in boilers, engines, or other mechanisms, after being a few weeks away from the yard; thus handicapping the entire fleet.
(c) The difficulty of keeping up the interest of officers and men in any mere drill, combined with the fact that no good scheme of naval tactics can be developed without their interest.
These difficulties seem very big; but it may be pointed out that the great ocean liners go regularly across the ocean, year after year; and that, if we could find out how they do it, we might entirely avoid obstacles (a) and (b). Now, every one knows that these liners make repairs at the end of every trip. The thought suggests itself, "suppose that we used our battleships as hard as possible for one week, then repaired them for two weeks; then used them for another week, and repaired them for two weeks, and so forth. Could we not keep them always in repair, always ready, for ten years continuously?" Of course we could. Then why not do it?
A ready answer would be that such a plan would be "impracticable." Perhaps it would, unless we determined to carry it out; but then it would not be. The principal difficulty would be in providing that the ships should always be near enough to repair shops to get needed repairs done at once. By keeping our battle fleet always on our Atlantic coast, by having it always anchor at the end of its week's work off places like Tompkinsville, and by having a repair ship for every squadron, it should never be too far from a repair shop to get what repairs it might need; for the reason that nothing would ever be allowed to get so badly out of repair as to need actually going alongside a navy yard dock, barring accidents. The ships could take turns going into dry- dock. And if they went into drydock regularly every six months, and did not lie at anchor in tropical waters, but kept moving in waters of the temperate zone, two weeks, twice a year, would be enough. The causes that lay ships up at navy yards for long intervals are keeping the ships going after they need repairs, and the necessity of limiting the repairs on them, when they finally go to yards, lest they stay there most of the time. The bottom trouble is the former, and it is caused primarily by the long absences from the repair shop.
The idea now struggling for utterance is largely an amplification of that outlined by Lieutenant Fullenwider in his admirable prize essay of 1904; and it would seem not difficult of execution. Without pretending to have worked the idea into practical shape, it may be suggested that the weather near New York during the months of April, May, June, July, August, September, October and November is admirably fitted for fleet maneuvers. In these eight months, the fleet could concentrate for maneuvers at a place about fifty miles southeast of Sandy Hook, clear of the ordinary steamer routes. Here it could drill for five days and five nights at fleet maneuvers of all kinds, including wireless telegraphy with the shore. At the end, the squadrons could disperse; the first squadron of battleships going, say to Tompkinsville, the second to Hampton Roads, the torpedo flotilla to Newport, the cruisers to Boston, the auxiliaries to the mouth of the Delaware, and have two weeks clear for repairs and coaling. On the first of December, the entire fleet could go south, and make Pensacola, New Orleans, Key West, Tortugas and Galveston their home bases, assembling in the Gulf of Mexico for their maneuvers as the war-fleet for five days every three weeks.
Objections may be made that this would neglect the various Caribbean and West Indian ports; but to this objection, it may be replied that the work needed in them can be done by independent cruisers and transports, detailed for the purpose; that our battle-fleet will have all it can do to get into trim as a fighting machine; and that it will be tremendously handicapped if it is to continue to be bothered by little matters in the Caribbean Sea. As pointed out in the beginning of this paper, we have got to recognize the fact that the work of our navy is divided into two parts, that related to weak navies, and that related to strong navies; and we cannot get our battle-fleet ready to fight a strong navy successfully, if we do not concentrate its effort on that definite purpose.
Coming to the third possible difficulty in developing a scheme of tactics for our war-fleet, that of combining enough drill with a maintenance of interest by officers and men, the suggestion at once comes to the mind that the only thing necessary to do is to have sham battles between the squadrons. The experience of Sims with target practice shows, not only that it is merely necessary to arouse emulation, but that it is very easy to arouse emulation. Officers and men used to hate target practice. Now they like it; and they take that pleased interest in it that everyone takes in a game of skill.
Some years ago, a gentleman, a Jew, who had just returned from a vacation of a year in Europe with his family, was met by a friend. Knowing that he was an active man of large interests, his friend said to him, "Well, Mr. Morgenthaller, I suppose you have come back all ready to get down to hard work again." Mr. Morgenthaller smiled in a thoughtful way, and gave an answer that greatly surprised his friend. "'Well, no," he said; "I do not believe in hard work; I believe in good ideas. I'm going to wait for good ideas. One good idea is worth a year of hard work." Mr. Morgenthaller's career since that time has been one of continuing and increasing prosperity. A contrary example comes to mind of another man who has been working very bard all that time, and has been extremely unsuccessful. It is not necessary to describe this case; because everyone who may read these lines can supply like cases from among his own acquaintances.
So, with our fleet, the way to develop a system of tactics is not to "work hard," but to get good ideas. Why not make the fleet work seem like war? Everyone in the world is interested in war. If we fight our squadrons together in sham battles, the stimulus of competition will bring out good ideas automatically. A system of tactics will develop itself; it will simply grow. Every officer will take the joyous interest in the battles that he takes in a game of football or a prize-fight.
And the enlisted men will be interested too; every man will feel that he is immediately concerned, one of the players; that he, Charles Noble, contributes something of his own personal skill and prowess to the result. There is no trouble in making men work if you can make the work interesting; but you can never make men do the best that is in them at mere drudgery. Now drudgery is not necessarily manual labor; manual labor, even shovelling coal, is not drudgery if the men doing the shoveling are trying to beat some other men, or trying to accomplish anything that they know about; and work of the most refined and artistic kind is drudgery if it is done without interest. Interest makes the difference, and the only difference, between pleasant occupation and drudgery.
Now, interest is a powerful factor in making men work; but it is a much more powerful factor in making men think. Who has not noticed that it is easier to teach children things that interest them than things that do not? A man can be compelled to do drudgery; but he cannot be compelled to think. He will, however, think unconsciously, if interested.
How interesting and thought-inducing it would be, if our fleets should be practiced continually in team work, and the practice be of a kind that would show every one exactly what its meaning was! While the carrying out of any maneuver, even of the simplest kind, requires technical skill, the bottom principles of warfare are very simple, and are curiously like those of baseball and football, and other games in which pluck and drill are needed. The most ordinary "rooter" knows which side is playing a baseball game the better, though he may himself be unable to hit a ball, or catch it.
So, if we fight our fleets in mimic fights against each other, every officer, and seaman, and fireman, and ward-room boy will understand enough to become interested. What we need more than anything else is to make our people interested. Any one who is interested is very close to being happy. And certainly no profession gives the opportunities for continued interest that ours does. No profession equals it in dramatic situations and picturesque scenes. Yet is there anything more heartbreaking in its dullness than a man-of-war is often made to be!
If, then, it be found practicable to form a battle-fleet and drill it on our coast in the way outlined, we see that the following advantage will result:
(1) A system of naval tactics will be developed at sea; not in an office.
(2) Engines, boilers, and other mechanisms can be kept in constant repair.
(3) Suggestions for improvements in mechanisms and methods can be tested at once, reported on at once, and adopted at once, if good.
(4) Nearly every question of drill, policy, strategy or tactics can be tested and decided correctly, instead of being merely talked about and written about. We shall cease to hear long disputes about the tactical value of speed, because we can actually test the tactical value of speed; or as to how many ships can be handled together, or as to the best formations for attack. We can see all these things tested with our own eyes; and this is necessary, because most of us have not much imagination; we are like the old gentleman in one of Dickens's works, who could not talk about—was it Pip?—unless the child was brought into the room, and put directly in front of him.
(5) The fleet will, after—say a year—of systematic maneuvering, constitute a fighting force that can be handled like a unit.
(6) When it finally goes into battle, not only will the fleet be handled well, but the officers and men will be able to recognize the various phases the action will take on, by identifying them with similar phases that have come up in the sham battles; and will act with preparedness of mind, and therefore with presence of mind.
(7) Officers and men will lead a life of the greatest professional interest.
(8) The greatest disadvantage of naval life, the long and distant absences from home, will, so far as the great majority, the people in the battle-fleet, are concerned, entirely be removed. Instead of interminable months in bad climates, with no mail, and nothing to do or think about, officers and men will be able to have occasional diversion, to be with their wives and sweethearts from time to time, and live like other men.
(9) But the main advantage, the all-sufficient advantage, will be that our battle-fleet will really be always ready. There will be no mobilization needed. There will be no sudden question about the Kearsarge's boilers, or the Alabama's forward turret, or the Missouri's engines. There will be no doubt about coal; no need for hasty action; no delay. A telephone message from the Department to the commandant of a certain district, a wireless message from his office, and the fleet will instantly be on a war footing.
Preparedness of the Commander-in-Chief.—The fleet includes, of course, its commander-in-chief; so that everything said about getting our fleet ready- for war includes getting our commander-in- chief ready for war. It is clear that, no matter how thoroughly other things may be decided on, no matter how well the gun-pointers, and quartermasters, and signal corps, and division officers, and navigators, and executive officers, and captains, and division commanders, and squadron commanders, be drilled, all the skill of the subordinates cannot fully be utilized, unless the commander-in-chief be well drilled too. This, of course, does not mean that he shall have been well drilled as a captain, or as a division or a squadron commander; but as the commander-in-chief of the actual fleet that he is to handle. There is no art in the world so simple that one does not need a great deal of practice, in order to be its master; and this means practice at that particular art, not practice at some other art that may be somewhat like it. An officer may be a most admirable captain, or even division commander; but without a great deal of practice in handling a big fleet no man can handle a big fleet well. Only by long application of the mind to a certain problem can thorough mastery of that problem be attained. Even genius of the highest order must obey this law. Perhaps no man ever lived who seemed to be so independent of it as Napoleon. But Napoleon was not independent of it; he thought about wars and battles all the time; and his first and most amazing successes in Italy, were in executing plans that he and others had worked out when he was in the Council of War in Paris, two years before. He went to Italy thoroughly prepared; and his marvellous "coup d' ceil militaire" was largely due to his intimate knowledge of all the features of the ground, and his recognition of the bearing of each one on the problem. An admiral needs a like acquaintance with his problem, but in a somewhat different way; he does not need the accurate topographical knowledge that a general needs; but, on the other hand, he needs personal skill in the actual handling of his forces even more than a general does, for the reason that ships go faster than men, and events follow each other more quickly; and for the reason that his forces are more directly under his eye, more immediately under his own control than are the forces of a general, which extend for miles beyond his vision.
Loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief.—But there is one element of success in a commander-in-chief which is a very important one, and which is, in some measure, beyond his own control, and that is the loyalty of the Department and of his subordinates to him. If the Department and his subordinates adopt a critical attitude, if they show a disposition to make him a scapegoat, not only will the commander-in-chief devote a lot of time and brain power to protecting himself from those who ought to be his friends, but his plans for whipping the enemy in front will be complicated by his plans for whipping the enemy behind. How much more efficient will be the commander-in-chief who goes to war knowing everybody will be loyal to him, and that even his mistakes will be looked at calmly. Of course, it is possible that an officer who might do well even in fleet handling during peace, might not do well in fleet handling during war. But we have no real reason for expecting this. The fact that many officers who had little reputation in peace have come to the front in war, is not the proof needed; for the reason that the factors of opportunity, and what we call "chance" aided them, while many excellent officers got no opportunity whatever. If we had data proving that officers who had been efficient in peace had shown cowardice, or disaffection, or inefficiency, in war, the case would be different; but we have no such data. It is true that many officers have lost fine reputations in war, and in many cases, have been thrown into disgrace; but in nearly every instance, in our country, the officer himself was not in fault, but was the victim of excited people who were in fault, and who judged him without sufficient knowledge of the facts. The most notable case was that of Fitz John Porter.
Note.—It is frankly admitted that the suggestion regarding the special designing of flagships savors of novelty; and it is also admitted that only a minority of officers believe that the flagship should keep off the fighting line. But why cannot the idea be tried in fleet maneuvers? It can do no harm to try it, and it may lead to something. It is absolutely sure that no great improvement, or extension, of naval tactics can be made, so long as the flagships are on the fighting line. One of the first things taught a youthful officer of the deck is that he must not get mixed up with the men on deck. Even a file-closer keeps clear of the ranks. And yet we put the commander-in-chief right in the midst of all the noise, and smoke, and excitement, arid danger.
It may be suggested, also, that no matter how strenuously we insist on beginning the fight with our flagships on the battle line, the enemy will see to it that they do not stay there very long. By the word "enemy" is meant, of course, the only kind of enemy we need to prepare for; an enemy such that our very maximum of skill will be needed to defeat him.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY.
If one should attempt to organize the ships shown in our Navy Register into a battle-fleet, he would be impressed by three important facts:
(1) The excellence of the ships as ships.
(2) Their heterogeneity.
(3) The extraordinary obsoleteness of some, notably of the ships propelled by sails alone, completed so late as 1904.
(1) Our ships are good, of their kind, and they have always been good; and so, in the main, have been the appliances of all sorts on board. The great engineering and constructive genius of the American people has shown itself in their ships; and it is inconceivable that it should not be so. In view of the magnificent development of all the industrial arts, as shown in our railroads, steamships, business edifices and factories, how could it be possible that our war ships should not be strongly constructed, and fitted with good engines and good guns?
(2) A glance at the Navy Register, supplemented by a mental comparison of some ships that are grouped together there, shows that hardly two of them are alike. It has always been known to military and naval men that forces which act together should be made of units as nearly alike as possible; and yet the navy of the most enlightened country in the world is made of units which differ from each other in the most amazing ways. Railroads, like navies, need a few different kinds of units; but can any one imagine a railroad owning a thousand cars, comprising nine hundred and ninety-seven different kinds?
(3) The obsoleteness of some of our ships can hardly be paralleled in any other walk in life. Is there any locomotive, or printing press, or telephone exchange, or electric-light station, or factory, or department store, or hospital, so perfectly ill-adapted to its work, by reason of obsoleteness, as was the Mohican to the work of the navy, when it was in commission in the early part of 1904; or as the Intrepid, Cumberland and Boxer, now nearing their completion?
The excellence of our ships, as ships, considered in connection with their heterogeneity and the obsoleteness of many; and these facts considered in connection with the additional fact that, within the past two years, the most obsolete ships have been retired, at the same time that three absolutely new, and yet absolutely obsolete, ships were approaching completion; and these facts being considered in connection with the additional fact that, only within the last few years has there been any attempt to concentrate our fleet, indicate that our policy has been wavering, uncertain, indefinite and unmilitary. And it suggests the thought that perhaps we have never until recently grasped the military idea; that we have built ships of certain kinds, because other nations did; and have built them in exactly the same way that other nations did; with a good understanding of the mathematical, constructional and engineering principles involved, but with no clear comprehension of those strategical principles by which alone can the application of mathematical, constructional and engineering principles be directed to the building of good fighting ships.
That this perhaps is true, is indicated by the incredible slowness with which novel appliances and methods were adopted. The most notable instance is that of steam. The Phoenix, a river steamboat built by John Stevens, went from New York to Philadelphia under steam alone, by sea, in June, 1808! Eleven years later, the paddle-wheel steamship Savannah went from Savannah to Liverpool in June, 1819, eighty hours of which were done under steam. She visited many ports in the Baltic, and returned to Savannah in December of the same year. Did the navy see steam's military value, and take immediate steps towards its adoption? No; its slowness in taking up steam can hardly be described by any other word so good as "disgraceful." Many other things equally valuable to the navy had to force themselves on the navy, not only against its will, but against its determined resistance. It would take a very large book—and a most interesting one—to tell about the struggles of these pioneers of progress. Such a book cannot be included within the limits of this paper; but any one can read a substitute for it, by looking up the history of steel for ship construction, sailless ships, turrets, twin-screws, compound engines, rifled guns, breech-loading guns, telescope sights, submarine mines, electric firing of guns, range-finders, rectangular correction of compasses, torpedoes, continuous aim, the Naval Academy, the War College, the Training System, the NAVAL INSTITUTE and the General Staff.
Now why did our naval service, the naval service of the most inventive, most enterprising, most progressive people who have ever lived fail to adopt these things quickly? There must have been some very powerful reason, some very definite reason; why anything so extraordinary occurred. It was not because naval officers were more stupid than other men; we know they were not. It was not because they intentionally kept the service back; we know that all their interests were on the side of pushing it ahead. It was not because they could not get the money; we know they did not try. Why was it?
Four reasons suggest themselves:
(1) The naval profession is different radically from all others, in the important fact that the members of all others are gathered together in cities, in such close association, both in personal inter course and by means of their periodicals, that the best possible conditions exist for discussion and the interchange of views, and information; whereas we are dispersed all over the world, and spend much of our time in places where, not only is there no mental stimulus, but almost no mental employment, and no chance for interchange of thought; where the narrow limits of the ship and of experience, some times protracted over months, produce an inelastic contraction of the mental view. Many years ago, an old sailmaker said to a midshipman, "Why is it, sir, that, while the army has produced many eminent men, our navy has never produced one master mind?" The midshipman made the astute reply that he did not know; and the old sailmaker went on to say that he thought the reason was that, before an officer got to command a ship, he filled subordinate duties so long that he never learned to think for himself; and that, after he got to command a ship, he had to spend nearly all his time alone; so that his mind rusted. At that time, the conversation made no impression on the midshipman that he was conscious of; but it must have made a very great impression, because he has never forgotten it, and has come to regard it in later years as one of the most suggestive remarks he ever heard. And it may help to explain the little influence on public life, which naval officers have, even in their own profession; the fact that the country trusts Congress, not only to decide how many ships we are to have to fight with, but even to decide their technical and military features. It may help to explain why, after the war with Spain, the views of naval officers had almost no weight whatever in deciding what ought to be done in Cuba or the Philippines, though naval officers had had more practical experience in such countries than anybody else.
The fact that naval officers are separated so much and so long from each other and from other men, must tend to lack of unity of purpose, and therefore to lack of influence with the public. The only remedy would seem to be a greater use, by naval officers, of such beneficent means of information as the War College and NAVAL INSTITUTE, and more mingling with men of other professions. It may be objected that we should not go far outside our own profession, lest we lose our grip on it. This is true; but why should naval officers confine themselves more strictly to their own profession than army officers and lawyers do? We lose by doing it. With what astonishing velocity we dropped out of public sight, as soon as the strictly naval fighting in the war with Spain was finished! The same thing happened, in even greater degree, after our Civil War. The navy's part in the Civil War was important and glorious in the highest degree; and, at the time, was warmly appreciated by the people. Yet no sooner was the war over than the people forgot that naval officers existed. Was it so with the army? Why, the Senate, the House, the Presidential Chair, the Cabinet, the Judiciary, and all the places of influence in the country were alive with generals! Now it may be granted that naval officers do not belong in such places, that we belong out on the ocean. Nevertheless, it does seem that if naval officers, after the Civil War, had kept a little more in touch with the people, and had had a little more concensus of Opinion and purpose, our navy would not have become quite so dead as it was in 1882; and we should not have had such a hard time, the last few years, in breathing into its nostrils the breath of life.
What is there in the naval profession, properly considered, that makes it impossible for naval officers to exert the same public influence, in matters connected with their profession, that physicians, lawyers, engineers, architects, clergymen, journalists and diplomats do, in matters connected with their professions? There is nothing; and if proof be wanted, to sustain this assertion, it is the career of Vice-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford. This officer has been member of Parliament twice, and a recognized factor in the national public life of England for many years. He was sent to China in 1898, on a mission connected with the English trade; and he has long been a national figure; a man among men. Do these things make him less efficient as a naval officer? Let us put this question in other words and ask, "Does the contact of Vice-Admiral Beresford with the brightest minds of Great Britain, and the necessity he has so often met of replying to criticisms and questions by thoughtful men concerning the British navy, and the constant activity of mind engendered; do these things make him less efficient than he would have been, if he had spent the time he spent in doing these things, in dozing in tropical ports, in.spinning old-time yarns, and in devoting the energies of his mind to matters of detail? These things are what most of us do; we spend too much time in our little shops; we need to be broadened. When we go to clubs we ought to go to clubs where we can meet lawyers and men of affairs, where we can get a new idea once in a while; not to army and navy clubs.
It is a common belief that, if a man is to do anything well, he must do nothing else well; but one can easily dispel this illusion, by reminding himself that Disraeli was a brilliant novelist, as well as Prime Minister of Great Britain; Gladstone a scholar; Salisbury an experimental scientist; Balfour a metaphysician; Hay a poet; Roosevelt and Thiers historians; Cxsar and Napoleon lawgivers; and Leonardo da Vinci, everything. It may be objected that these men were geniuses, and therefore not to be taken as examples of anything except of genius. Then let any officer recall his last ship; and he will remember that the fact that Jones was a good quartermaster was thought, as a general rule, a good reason for concluding that he would make a good something else; and the fact that Smith was a bad coal-passer was thought a good reason for concluding that he would make a bad something else.
(2) The fact that our system of naval administration has, save in exceptional cases, and until very lately, ignored individuality, and discouraged initiative. When it is recalled that Bell invented the telephone when he was only twenty-nine, and that most of Edison's great inventions were made before he was thirty-three, right in our own country, our policy of avowedly discouraging officers from taking up special subjects in their profession seems hard to understand. The great difficulty of keeping officers in the strait and narrow path of discipline, and of preserving a strong military organization, while giving, at the same time, an opportunity to officers to develop individuality and initiative, if they have any, may be admitted at once. But the most liberal allowance for this difficulty would hardly seem a sufficient reason for the existence of the system in use not many years ago. By this system, not only were an officer's duties at sea regulated exclusively by his position on the Navy Register, where a "first-come, first-served" system put him; but the very fact that he showed an interest and capacity in any branch of his profession operated as a reason for giving him, not only at sea but even on shore, not duty in this branch, but duty in some other branch! This system has been abandoned; and the desirability is now seen of encouraging initiative and individuality, so far as it may be practicable. The evil results of the system, however, in removing from the lives of officers all personal interest in their profession, are still felt, and will be felt for many years to come. The interest of officers in their glorious calling must be guarded as "the immediate jewel of their souls." This can be done only by making them feel like living, thinking men; not cogs in the machinery.
(3) The fact that, saving the case of deeds of extraordinary heroism in life-saving, the special rewards given by the Department to officers have been given only in war. The wisdom of giving special rewards in war is evident. But almost all the officers who have ever been in the American navy have gone through their entire careers without ever seeing any war. Therefore, our system has so arranged matters, that nearly every officer who has ever been in the navy has gone through his entire career, without that special and powerful stimulus which the hope of reward unfailingly gives, and which most men urgently need!
(4) We have never, until lately, employed a body of officers to study the application of strategical requirements to the construction of ships and the composition of fleets; we have never until lately employed a body of officers to study and apply the principles of naval science to the administration of the navy. Individual officers, principally at the War College, have studied naval science; but their conclusions have been so lightly regarded by the service, even the military branch of the service; and the War College has been so much contemned, that military considerations have had, until lately, almost no influence whatever, in shaping the naval policy of the Government. Incredible as it may appear, it seems nevertheless to be a fact, that our naval establishment, enormous as it is, and the guardian of the wealth of the wealthiest country in the world, has simply been put together piecemeal, and has never been directed by a policy based on fundamental principles. It has never had the advantage of such direction as has been given to commercial organizations by men who made a special study of the policy that should direct them; by boards of directors, led by men like Scott, Westinghouse, Rockefeller, Huntington, Carnegie and Cassatt. These men devoted their lives to furthering the aims of their respective companies; and they understood the aims of their companies from a standpoint so far removed from the details, that they were able to direct the details, instead of being directed by them. They divided their respective companies into departments; but they directed the departments; the departments did not direct them. Had the various departments directed the companies, no one can reason out what would have happened, because no one can find any data to start from; for the reason that such a way of directing a company is unknown. It may be asserted with confidence, however, that a company directed in its operations by its various departments would not be directed with as much unity of purpose as if it were directed by a board of directors, who made a specialty of directing it.
Bureaus or General Staff?—This leads us naturally to inquire whether it would be better to have our navy directed by the bureaus or a general staff; whether, if our navy had been directed by central " Steering Committee," in accordance with the principles of naval science, it would have been directed along lines having such curious side-steps and reversals, as those along which it has drifted in times gone by; or whether it would have gone along a straight, well-planned route, like a piece of material in the works of the New York Shipbuilding Company.
In order to decide whether it would be better to direct the navy by means of some body like a "Board of Directors," "Policy Board," "Steering Committee," "Thinking Committee," or "General Staff," it may be well to consider:
(1) Is it the practice of other countries to direct the navy by a special body, or to direct it by the heads of the various departments?
(2) Is it the practice of other countries, and of ours, to direct the army by a special body, or to direct it by the heads of the various departments?
(3) Is it the practice of large organizations, such as railroads, steamship lines, industrial companies, and banks, to direct the organization by special bodies, or to direct them by the heads of the various departments?
The same answer must be given to all these questions; showing that it is a world-wide policy, in large organizations of every kind, to direct the organizations by special bodies; not by the heads of the various departments.
We see, therefore, that our navy is administered by a policy which is the reverse of that of every other large organization in the world.
It may be objected to this statement that our navy is directed by the Secretary, and that he is the "special body" in the sense in which this phrase has just been used. To answer this objection, it may be sufficient to point out that the Secretary is the assistant and representative of the President; and that the President holds the same relation to the navy as does the President of any organization to that organization. He is the President; not the Board of Directors.
Now if our navy is directed by a policy the reverse of that by which all other large organizations in the world are directed, it follows that, either our policy is right and the policy of all other large organizations is wrong; or else, that our policy is wrong and the policy of all other large organizations is right. As our navy is only one organization, and as the other organizations are numbered by the ten-thousand, it is clear that the burden of proof is on us; and that, in order to prove ourselves right, and all the others wrong, we must prove that our navy has been directed more wisely than the other organizations.
Now, it may be that our navy has been directed more wisely than the Standard Oil Company, or the Bell Telephone Company, or the Pennsylvania Railroad; but it might be difficult to prove it to the Boards of Directors of those companies; especially in view of the fact that our navy existed before they did, and has not progressed so fast.
It may be objected to this mode of reasoning, that it is based on an unjustifiable assumption; the assumption that the conditions under which the United States navy exists are like the conditions under which other great organizations, military and civil, exist. To this objection it may be replied that the conditions seem to be alike, and that no difference has ever been pointed out; also that, when any great departure from standard practice is found, the burden of proof as to the wisdom of the departure rests with the advocates of the departure; not with the advocates of standard practice.
It may also be objected that the application of strategical principles to naval matters is so simple that it does not need special study. To this objection, it may be replied that no subject has ever yet been discovered, so simple that it does not need special study to master it; the very fact that a man thinks a subject simple, is proof that he is ignorant of it.
To this reply, it may be objected that, even if its truth be granted, it may be granted only as a general statement; that, in a practical sense, there are many subjects that do not need special study to master them sufficiently for the purpose in hand. This objection is plausible; but it may be answered in rebuttal, that the only reason why special study of a subject is not needed, is because the results of special study would be too trivial to pay for the time and energy consumed.
The gist of the question, therefore, is "would the results of special study of the application of strategical principles to naval matters be too trivial to pay for the time and energy consumed?"
Surely no thoughtful man can believe that the results would be too trivial. And how can he avoid the conclusion that special study is needed now? An examination of the ships shown in the Navy Register discloses the fact that, while the officers who built the ships, engines and guns, built them well, according to the mathematical principles of ship construction, engineering and ordnance, the efforts of those officers were not directed aright by the military branch of the profession. Despite the fact that the only important thing to be done was to develop a fleet which could whip any probable enemy in a fleet fight, we find that there is no such fleet; only a heterogeneous collection of vessels, which comprises battleships at one end and sailing ships at the other. Now, if sailing ships are needed, battleships are not; and if battleships are needed, sailing ships are not. No navy that has a definite end in view can possibly need two things so utterly diverse. And it is no small thing to build sailing ships, if we do not need them; they distract our attention, and dilute our purpose; and there is such a tremendous amount of work to do to get our fleet ready to fight, that the attention and purpose of every officer and man must be concentrated on that one thing. Would the attainment of this concentration be trivial?
Now, why has our engineering and constructive work been so well done, and yet directed along such wavering lines? Is not some type of battleship the best? Has the progress of invention in the mechanic arts, has the coming of wireless telegraphy, improvements in steel and smokeless powder, necessitated such astonishing reversals of plan as we have followed? Why did we abolish torpedoes from our navy and then re-adopt them? If the superposed turret be good, why did we abandon it; and if it be bad, why did we go back to it? Why have we built all these armored cruisers, with weak armor and weak guns, in deliberate preference to the same number of battleships? Why have we always been so slow in adopting improvements? The reason is easy to find: we have never, until lately, employed a body of officers to make special study of the real requirements of our navy. Not until lately, have we realized that a navy is useful for one definite purpose, and that purpose purely military; not diplomatic, or educational, or philanthropic, or beneficent, or charitable—but military; to exert force, that is all.
Now if it is to exert force, in what way is it to exert force? One might reply that the force it is to exert is mainly moral; that it is a potential force, rather than kinetic; that its usefulness is to maintain peace rather than to prevail in war. But even if this be true, it is obvious that the only way in which it can exert any force is by using, or threatening to use, its destructive power.
Now will any one say that to manage any destructive power well is a trivial thing? Surely not; and the greater the destructive power is, the more important it is that it be managed well. A little destructive power may perhaps be left to itself in a measure, because it can do little harm; but the destructive power of the American navy will soon be describable by no other word so good as "awful;" and the very best possible system must be devised, so that we can direct it aright.
But is there any urgent need for making the directing of this power a specialty in time of peace? Does the directing of the navy need any special organization in time of peace? The ready answer to this question is that whatever reasons make it wise for us to perfect the military organizations of one ship in time of peace, make it wise to perfect the military organization of the navy in time of peace. The pages of history are full of the achievements of great commanders, whose work brought them more of human glory than men in any other walk of life have ever got. And the work of these commanders was wholly in directing military force; not in construction work, or engineering work, or ordnance work; but in exercising a purely military control. Will anybody say that work of such grandeur and importance is not a specialty, does not need a special organization? Surely not. But if this special organization is to be made, when shall it be made? When war comes it will be too late. Therefore, we must make it in time of peace. We must get our roof ready before it begins to rain, not after. Our history proves that, in actual war, our army and navy have always fought well; but that serious failures have occurred, which were due wholly to lack of preparation in time of peace. Our national military vice has always been lack of preparation in peace for war.
Co-Operation of the Military and the Engineering Arts.—It is earnestly to be hoped that what has just been said will not be construed as belittling the art of the constructor or the engineer. It is intended merely to point out that the military art is a specialty, just as much as is the art of naval construction, or mechanical engineering, or ordnance. To get a good navy, the various arts must work together, each directing and assisting the others. In the same way that the State Department may have to modify its desires, at times, by the limitations of military and naval possibilities, so will the military controllers of the navy have to modify their desires at times by the limitations of technical possibilities. The technical arts and sciences are now tremendous in scope, and their greatest achievements are in the construction of ships of war. The scientific construction of ships, ordnance, engines and equipments is just as important as ever; in fact the increasing acceleration in these arts, due to the invention of new methods and appliances, makes the technical arts more and more important every year, even to a military navy. The very highest technical skill is needed; and the proper influence of technical men should not be gainsaid or resisted. But the very fact of the tremendous importance of technical matters is the greatest reason why they should be directed aright, to get the military results we need.
Urgent Need for Action.—Now this is an urgent matter. The Isthmian Canal is begun; the Monroe Doctrine has been asserted; and it has been approved and adopted by the deliberate consensus of the American people. Soon the ships of every nation will throng the waters of the Caribbean and Bay of Panama; soon the people of every country will crowd the shores of the countries of Central and South America, whose governments are weak. Is it absolutely sure that no dispute will arise between some of them; or between a European power and one of them? Will the European powers gladly acquiesce in a wholesale application of the Monroe Doctrine to all cases? It is very improbable. Now we know that we shall have no trouble in getting brave officers and men to fight; there never has been any trouble, and there never will be. But mere bravery, if directed unwisely, causes mere useless slaughter. All history is full of the horrible experiences of people who tried by bravery to make up for the unwisdom of their superiors; the unfortunate Russians in Manchuria and Port Arthur are trying to do that now.
A definite responsibility rests on every officer, with a weight proportioned to his rank, to think and study about the best policy for our navy, and throw his influence the right way; so that, when war comes, the sacrifices of brave men may not be made in vain. Let us remember that the naval defense of our country is our profession, not that of Congress; and let us study its military features as thoroughly as our constructors have studied its constructional features. No more important duty has ever come to men than will come to us within the next few years. In order to prepare to do it well, the first thing needed is a definite military—or rather naval—policy.
To formulate a policy that will be the best, will clearly need the closest study, the most original suggestion, the most careful thought, and the most logical decision, of a special body of officers.
Need for Executive Authority.—It may be objected that, no matter how able such a body may be, no matter how wise and urgently necessary the policy it may formulate, all its work may be set at naught, either by intention or by negligence, unless some machinery be devised to insure that its recommendations be carried out.
This objection seems good; it seems as if the special body, or general staff, if it is to be of sufficient value to warrant its existence, must have the same authority in its line of work as each chief of bureau does in his line of work, or as the admiral of a fleet does, in his line of work; and for exactly the same reasons.
The chance that such authority, given to a general staff, will lessen the power of the Secretary, is the same as the chance that the authority now given to a bureau chief, or admiral of a fleet, or any officer, seaman, or marine, will lessen the power of the Secretary. No authority given to a subordinate can truly be said to lessen the power of his superior.
But some system, different from the old, is clearly needed now. To devise it will require much candid thought and singleness of motive, especially to those in high position. But there is an example close at hand, to guide and strengthen them; the example of him who, though he attained the highest position a naval officer can attain in peace, was always loved and known as "Harry Taylor."
ADDENDUM.—The writer respectfully requests attention to the fact that news received after this essay was submitted to the Board of Control indicates that his prediction concerning the fate of a flagship on the fighting line in a modern battle was fulfilled with extraordinary completeness, at the naval battle of Port Arthur, on August 10, when the Japanese concentrated their attack on the Russian flagship and speedily disabled it, thereby, and at once, demoralizing the entire Russian fleet.