In making the following study of certain attacks upon fortified harbors it was my object to make an analysis of each campaign, and of them all collectively, in order to attempt to derive well grounded conclusions as to future wars.
It is a fact inspiring confidence in tactical conclusions resulting from historical study, that although the deductions presented in this paper were completed before the outbreak of the present war in the East, nevertheless the operations there have not at all shaken them.
By studying the history of a number of attacks upon fortified harbors at various periods in the past we may see the direction that progress is taking, and precisely as artillerymen observe the course of a ship and then, predicting her position at a given instant, aim and fire a gun with reasonable accuracy; so, by an observation of the battles of the past we may expect before a war, to predict within limits the tactical methods which will be adopted to the ships, guns and defences to be employed. At least, if we cannot go very far in this way, there seems no other way in which we can further.
It may be well to say in the beginning that, after studying the operations described and making an abstract of the various accounts of each, a slow progressive change in the tactics of the past seemed sufficiently apparent to indicate grounds for making a correct forecast as to future tactics.
From both the successful and unsuccessful attacks which we shall review it will be apparent that fortified harbors are properly attacked only by joint operations of the army and navy, and we shall see several examples both of the points which must be observed and those which must be avoided in order to secure success.
I shall begin by drawing attention to former operations about Cartagena, United States of Colombia. This place is selected for two reasons. 1. There has been a series of attacks on the place of which the first was over three hundred years ago and we may trace the development of tactics on both sides upon the ground with much profit. Secondly, it is of interest because the imperfect government of the country and the strategic situation of the harbor with relation to the Panama canal combine to render it a position which any great power operating in the Caribbean may find it desirable to hold in alliance with Colombia. It is therefore entirely within the range of possibility that the locality may become one of naval importance, as it has been in the past.
As is seen from the map, the city occupies a low level site directly on the ocean, where the surf breaks heavily on the sea front of the fortifications. To the north and east the beach stretches for miles with a shallow lagoon a few yards behind it, and to the south and west is the magnificent harbor with from 8 to 12 fathoms of water, 10 miles long by 3 to 5 miles wide. The harbor is protected by the island of Tierra Bomba which forms a breakwater with an entrance around each end. The northern entrance, Boca Grande, is wide but has shoaled by nature and by artificial means so that for centuries the main entrance has been at the southern end of Tierra Bomba by Boca Chica, which is narrow, crooked and easily defended.
On the land side the isthmus between the lagoon and the harbor forms the main approach to the city and is controlled by the fort of St. Lazar and the lofty hill of La Popa crowned by a heavily built nunnery. It may be perceived at once how many reasons, military and others, led the besiegers in the past to consider an early and successful surprise of La Popa as most desirable.
The city of Cartagena was founded in 1532 upon a fine harbor site and speedily acquired great importance from its commanding situation with regard to the commerce of the Caribbean. It is near the Magdalena river, which is the great line of trade to the interior of Colombia, and a canal was cut from a point near Cartagena to the river, so that Cartagena became the seaport for the river trade.
Further, the position of Cartagena with reference to the trade winds and the geography of the Caribbean was such that the west coast trade crossing the isthmus at Panama, together with the Atrato river trade, had to work up under the lee of the land as far as Cartagena before it could venture to head off shore to make for the Florida straits. Similarly the trade to Europe from east of Cartagena touched there because it was the last point on the coast at which the trade winds permitted a call before starting for Havana.
Thus all the commerce of Spain with the north and west coasts of South America and the west coast of Mexico was centered at Cartagena, and its wealth became enormous.
The first attack on Cartagena to be examined was that by Sir Francis Drake in 1586. Drake had been urging Queen Elizabeth to attack the Spanish Dominion over seas for several years, but without success until 1585, when captured despatches revealed to her beyond a doubt the King of Spain's intention of attacking England. Thereupon she directed Drake to set out, and he did so in September, '585. His plan of campaign, as shown in papers by himself and his companions, was as sound as if he had studied strategy from a book. He proposed by attacking the principal centres of Spanish commerce in the West Indies to capture their treasure fleets, as he had done before, and to divert from Spain to England the stream of tribute upon which Spain relied to prosecute her intended attack.
The expedition as organized on leaving England in September 1585 consisted of 29 ships and pinnaces, the largest of 600 tons and the smallest of 40 tons, 1300 mariners and ten companies of Soldiers; the whole force of about 2300 men being commanded by Admiral and General Sir Francis Drake, with Martin Frobisher as Vice-Admiral, and Christopher Carleill as Lieut. General, commanding the soldiers. After capturing Santiago in the Cape de Verdes and San Domingo in Hispaniola, and putting them to ransom, the expedition sailed for Cartagena where it arrived February 11, 1586. The town had received notice of his impending arrival both from Seville and from San Domingo, and made preparations, although the vast fortifications now there were not built until later.
Drake himself was his own pilot, since he failed in capturing any local fishermen, and he had to rely on his experience there in his freebooting days when he took shelter in the harbor from a gale and defied the efforts of the city to drive him out.
The Spaniards had collected a force of 50 lancers, 450 harque-bussiers, 100 pikemen, 20 negro musketeers and 400 indian bowmen, over one thousand in all. There were also two galleys in port as guardships, manned by 150 harque-bussiers.
Only the city itself was fortified, except that where Pastellillo now stands an outlying fort controlled the entrance to the inner harbor. This harbor is now silted up, but then a chain under the guns of the fort prevented ingress to it. A peninsula running south from the city reached down to Boca Grande and formed the breakwater both to the inner and the outer harbor. Across the neck of this peninsula ran a stone breastwork armed with five heavy guns and defended by 300 men. The port guard ship with 11 guns and 400 small-arm men lay in the inner harbor upon the flank of any approach along the peninsula.
Drake proceeded with despatch. He ran at once through the Boca Grande and took up a position in the entrance to the Surgidero which left the Spaniards in doubt as to his intentions, and as at that day they were already manana people they probably showed no great activity in any direction. After dark, on the day of arrival, Carleill and his soldiers were put ashore just inside the Boca Grande and marched along on the edge of the surf, until they were near the breastwork, when they entered the surf. The causeway they used was obstructed with poisoned stakes as chevaux de frise and 500 Indians in the marsh on their flank annoyed them with arrows, but nothing checked them.
As the noise of their encounter was heard by the English ships, their pinnaces (light craft) attacked the obstructed entrance and endeavored to force their way through, but the fire of 16 guns from the fort, the narrow shoal, and the chained fairway prevented passage. Indeed this attack was merely a diversion. As the water attack developed, the troops continued to advance and coming under the flanking fire of the galleys they bore off into the surf where they were sheltered by the swell of the land. On reaching the stone breast work with its heavy guns, about dawn, it was found not to reach all the way to the sea, yet the gap was closed by a flimsy improvisation of barrels filled with earth. These were quickly torn down and for a few minutes there was a furious hand to hand encounter in which, like Homer's heroes, the leaders sought each other and crossed weapons. The Englishmen had longer pikes and they wore steel armor, while the Spaniards had adopted cotton quilted jackets on account of the climate, and soon the Spanish leaders were killed and the English entered the city gate with the fleeing Spaniards. Although the streets were trenched and barricaded, there was little further resistance. The galleys were burnt by their escaping crews, and Drake in full possession put the town to ransom.
He had apparently hoped to hold the place permanently as a base from which to disorganize the whole commerce and finance of Spain, but the yellow fever came on board months before he sighted Cartagena, indeed, before he was half way across the ocean, and now, what with pestilence and the capture of three great cities, Drake could muster only seven hundred men fit for duty. So it was decided not to retain Cartagena.
It may be added that at each one of the four fortified cities and roadsteads captured by Drake in this campaign, Santiago, San Domingo, Cartagena and St. Augustine, the plan of attack employed the army as the principal agent while the fleet took a very minor part in the actual fighting.
THE FRENCH CAPTURE OF CARTAGENA IN 1697.
Baron de Pointis, a commodore in the French navy, had long wished to conduct a privateering enterprise in the West Indies, and the King, through the Ministry of Marine, had agreed to lend ships, men and ammunition in return for a share of the profits. However, nothing could be done until 1696 when the Toulon fleet came to Brest and was there put out of commission, releasing ships and men for De Pointis. Subscriptions for stock were thereupon opened to the public and it was being rapidly sold when peace was concluded with Savoy. The public took this to indicate that a general peace must be near at hand, and sales of stock ceased. Thus the size of the expedition had to be curtailed to suit the funds in hand, and in October, 1696, the fitting out of the squadron began.
On January 6, 1697, the expedition was ready except for a large convoy of arms and provisions shipped at Rochelle, but whose arrival was prevented by the difficulties of the blockade. Just as De Pointis was resolving to sail and pick up his stores in order to get off before peace should balk him and waste his investment, the flotilla arrived, and the following day, eluding the blockade, he was off.
At the time the expedition was resolved upon, in September 1696, a letter was sent to Du Casse, Governor of Hayti, informing him that De Pointis was going out with 7 ships, a galliot and 2 flutes with 2000 men as a landing force to capture some coast town, and that the King desired all the resources of the colony should be employed to aid the expedition and that it was hoped not less than 1000 or 1200 men would be ready to accompany De Pointis immediately upon his arrival.
It will be well to sketch here the characters of De Pointis and Du Casse, who took a great share in the campaign.
De Pointis had courage, experience and professional skill. He was capable of forming a great plan and adhering to it, but he was vain, with an idea of his own merits so great as to prevent his perceiving those of others. He had so great a private stake in this expedition that its advancement became a dominant passion, improperly influencing his public conduct.
Du Casse never forgot that his first duty was towards the state and put public matters before his own affairs. He was always ready to acknowledge the good work of others. No misfortune ever found him without resources. His failures gave him reputation as well as his successes.
In January, 1697, Du Casse was ordered to assemble and maintain all the filibusters of the colony until February Is when De Pointis was expected. It was a difficult task that was set him as the filibusters were restive under enforced idleness and De Pointis did not arrive on time. Much diplomacy was shown by Du Casse in holding the filibusters together.
De Pointis arrived at Cape Haitien on March i and found that certain regular forces he relied on had gone back to France. On March 16 De Pointis and Du Casse met for the first time and began their quarrels, which lasted through the expedition. De Pointis was angry that only 1200 filibusters and colonists had been assembled and accused the governor of seeking to delay the expedition, declining to accept the explanation that the colony could not be stripped of men. Thus the expedition was only about half as strong as had been planned before leaving France.
Du Casse as the Governor of the Colony felt obliged to protect the interests of his filibusters, and there was much haggling over the terms for sharing the booty. De Pointis soon offended the filibusters and Du Casse thought that only by going in command of them himself could he assure their good service. He wrote to the Ministry that as his orders did not forbid him to leave the colony he felt obliged to go, however distasteful to himself, as otherwise the colonial forces would be unmanageable by De Pointis and the best defense of the colony would be by making the expedition as great a success as possible. In fact, De Pointis soon perceived that Du Casse's services were essential; for when a riot occurred among the filibusters which De Pointis could not quiet, it yielded immediately to Du Casse. Nevertheless, although Du Casse was the Governor of the Colony and the senior naval officer excepting De Pointis, and joined a great reputation to exceptional experience in the West Indies, yet De Pointis refused him any adequate command in the fleet and he went as a volunteer in charge of the colonial forces.
The expedition finally anchored off Cape Tiburon to select a point of attack. Du Casse preferred Porto Bello, as the Spanish treasure ships were likely to be there or on their way to Cartagena, but De Pointis preferred Cartagena for reasons connected with the trade winds and the amount of provisions on board.
At last they sailed, and anchored 15 leagues to windward of Cartagena on April 6, 1697. Contrary winds detained them here a week and the time was spent in perfecting the organization.
In the home squadron there were seven large ships carrying 464 guns and 2950 men besides frigates carrying 136 guns and 800 men and a couple of light craft. The filibuster squadron commanded by Du Casse included 8 ships of moderate size, besides some smaller ones. Du Casse provided 170 soldiers from the garrison of Hayti, 110 colonists, 180 negroes and about 650 filibusters. Thus there were in all about 4000 men, including 110 officers, 2100 seamen, 1950 soldiers and 55 marine infantry. The troops were organized in 6 battalions and a battalion of 400 blue jackets made a seventh. This was a great reduction upon the original plans which provided 5000 men for landing. De Pointis had originally contemplated landing on the open beach to windward and getting in rear of the city, but with his reduced force this was impossible without stripping the ships of seamen, which could not bethought of in view of the weather at this season, and of the information that the English fleet was aware of their presence in the Caribbean.
At this time the Boca Grande was completely closed by a great earthquake and De Pointis next thought was to force the Boca Chica and afterwards capture the fort there. Then, by bringing the fleet inside, he could hold the entrance fort and so put his ships in security against wind and enemy, thereby releasing a large reenforcement of seamen for the land attack on the city.
This plan was rejected because the narrow, winding channel required warping to enter, and two ships opposing the entrance in addition to the fort could effectually prevent forcible entrance.
It therefore seemed best to land on Tierra Bomba from the sea and by promptly landing the siege batteries with which the fleet was well equipped, and establishing them on the harbor side, any hostile ships would be driven back while the mortar fire would bring the fort at Boca Chica to terms.
After entering the harbor in this way, in case the galleons should not be found, after securing the ships it might be possible to capture Cartagena by landing the seamen to reenforce the troops.
The notes, information and instructions furnished to De Pointis from the Ministry covered several localities. In regard to Cartagena they were much in error, and De Pointis refused to listen to Du Casse who had the best information from spies. Nevertheless the Paris notes were right in describing the convent and hill of La Popa as commanding all the land approaches to the city. By his instructions from Paris, De Pointis was required to seize this hill as his first operation and he determined to commit the enterprise to Du Casse and his buccaneers before attempting to enter the harbor. They were to land N. E. of the city.
The fleet arrived off Cartagena on April 13 and that very night the filibusters expected to land. While preparations were being made, De Pointis, Du Casse and others embarked in a small boat to reconnoitre the beach and were nearly drowned in the surf. The landing was countermanded.
On the 14th the fleet weighed anchor, intending to bombard the city in passing, but it was found that the knowledge of the locality was so imperfect that the day was spent in surveying. A distant cannonade of the city developed the presence of many heavy guns. Late on the 14th the fleet anchored near Boca Chica and sent a detachment to blockade it. On the 15th reconnaissance was made to select a landing and at noon Du Casse landed with 80 negroes, and, finding no ambush, De Pointis landed 1000 men, grenadiers, filibusters and negroes. The negro pioneers cut a path across to the lake side about half cannon shot from the fort on which pickets were placed at each path leading to the city. The troops occupied a strong position hidden in the woods about two gun shots (800 yards) from the Boca Chica fort. During the landing the distant fire of the ships of the line and mortar boats occupied the enemy's attention. The fort's return fire was slow and did little harm. At dark several of the principal officers passed around the fort and observed it closely. During the night and on the morning of the 16th siege material was landed and trenches opened on the sea side of the fort where the wood approached it most nearly.
On the 16th De Pointis sent to demand the surrender of the fort by the mouth of a monk he had just captured in a small boat. This was refused, whereupon the mortars opened fire both ashore and afloat. This day two pirogues containing a reenforcement of 300 men were sent down from the city. On arriving near the fort, the filibusters in ambush along the lake shore left their shelter and ran to the shore to fire on the boats, but thus exposed themselves to the fire of the fort as they ran along the beach. The Spanish boats went back while Du Casse endeavored to get his men under shelter. Some retreated, but others instead rushed to the fort and established themselves at the foot of the counterscarp, which was so badly designed as to give protection against the fire from the rampart. De Pointis came to remonstrate with Du Casse, but was induced to support the filibusters with regular troops. The fire of the fort was silenced. Scaling ladders were brought up and assailing columns formed and then a parley flag was shown by the fort. Good terms were allowed and the governor handed the keys to De Pointis with the remark: "I deliver you the keys of all the Spanish Indies." The French lost so men, while the garrison of 300 lost go men. Thus the entrance was open after two days' work.
The fort was garrisoned by the French in order to protect their shipping during the attack on the city.
On the following day, the 17th, the siege material was re-embarked and the fleet moved close to the entrance, but in spite of De Pointis' anxiety to surround the town before its riches could be sent inland he was afraid to lose touch with the troops on shore and did not permit the regulars who had been landed to abandon their position at Boca Chica until all the shipping was inside. Buccaneers, over 600 in number, however, were pushed across the lake on this date, apparently in local craft, with orders to seize La Popa and cut off the city. After a march of 4 leagues, through the forest, where two ambushes were encountered, La Popa was reached and found abandoned. The filibusters advanced close to St. Lazar on the morning of the 18th and halted there without attacking, to wait the arrival of the regulars.
On seeing the filibusters across the lake the Spaniards burnt three galleons and a pirogue which sunk so as to close the entrance to the harbor at Fort Santa Cruz.
On the morning of the i8th the fleet began to warp in and De Pointis, now sure that he would not be cut off from his ships, started his soldiers to march on the city. He had with him 1700 soldiers, 18o negroes and a few seamen and Ho Haytien colonists. Fort Sainte Croix (or Santa Cruz) was bombarded by the shipping in the morning and when the troops from Boca Chica arrived about noon it was found abandoned with its guns removed, as the Spanish Governor feared to have the garrison cut off from the town.
De Pointis then reconnoitered the approach to the city by way of which Drake had gone, but found the tremendous bastion of San Domingo opposed to him forbidding assault, and although he summoned the governor to surrender, he recognized that the ground was too near the sea level to carry out regular siege operations. Early on the morning of the 19th the troops were ferried across the lake, the negroes reconnoitering and De Pointis joined the filibusters under St. Lazar in time to reconnoiter that post before dark, and to discover that it was so strong as to stop all attempt upon the city until after it should be captured.
In the morning of the 20th a further examination showed that St. Lazar was commanded by the spur sloping down from La Popa and that troops could advance in the wood along this spur close to the fort and then mine it. The negro pioneers were thereupon called to cut a path which, in the neighborhood of the fort, was forked to lead on both sides of it. The troops followed and opened fire while the scaling ladders were sent for; the garrison made no effective return fire, and soon abandoned the fort, fearing to be cut off.
The French then advanced to the bridge and causeway leading to the suburb of Himani where they were sheltered from view by the Hospital of St. Lazar whose high walls with some trees gave concealment. The ships got up this day and opened fire with a mortar boat and galliot, but they were obliged to withdraw.
Everyone was put at work, the soldiers made fascines and gabions, the seamen landed the artillery and the negroes dragged the pieces, while the filibusters reconnoitered and ravaged the country and secured intelligence.
As the ships employed in the bombardment needed full crews there were not many sailors available for disembarking stores, but in six days there were landed and moved half a league into position, 27 guns, six of which were the largest cannon of the day 36 pdrs. and 24 pdrs. and 5 mortars, besides all their supplies. Of these guns 5 were at the foot of St. Lazar, 7 in that fort and 9 on the hill to the right of the fort. The 6 heavy guns were only 120 yards from the gate. On the 28th the siege batteries began to play on the wall, while the ship "Vermandois" and the mortar boat had begun fire even earlier. Upon the 29th three large ships added their fire to that of the siege batteries but could not reach the same bastion as that on which the latter were working.
On the 30th a curious incident brought a great success to the French. A negro, native to Cartagena but coming from Hayti with the French forces, thought proper to advance to the breach with a flag of truce. Fire ceased and the negro was asked his errand. He said he wanted news of his relatives and of the town, and also took the opportunity to advise the town to surrender. Du Casse ran up to see what was happening and met the Spanish senior officer similarly attracted and after conversation the Spaniard asked for an armistice of two hours to confer with the Governor. This was declined by Du Casse, who had seized the chance of examining the breach and thought it practicable. He sent word to De Pointis advising immediate assault and at 4 p. m. the regulars advanced followed by the filibusters. But the regulars moved circuitously to avoid obstacles while the filibusters pushed straight on and arrived first at the beach. Du Casse planted the French flag on the rampart. The Spanish resisted at first, but soon the regulars got forward to support the filibusters and drove the Spaniards through the suburb upon the causeway leading into Cartagena. The Governor refused, however, to open the gate until the fugitives should have attacked the French, so, urged, as De Pointis says, by necessity and the liquor they had drank, they made a little counter attack, which drove back the French who, however, soon rallied and killed all they could without quarter, but this time the Governor admitted the fugitives through a little postern gate.
On May 1st, the siege batteries were moved into position on the ramparts of Himani, after the bridge had been repaired that it might bear the siege guns, and on the 2nd the fleet opened fire. After three hours' bombardment the governor asked for terms, which De Pointis refused. At this instant news was brought of the approach of two relieving forces of moo or 1200 men each from the interior who proposed to get into Cartagena by the Sta. Catalina bastion. Du Casse went out to oppose them with his filibusters, but it turned out that hearing Himani had fallen they did not advance. Still, the news made De Pointis more ready to treat, and on the 3rd a capitulation was signed by which the garrison marched out with the honors of war, while all public treasure and private personal property was to be surrendered as prize.
The Spaniards never once made a sally.
THE ENGLISH ATTACK ON CARTAGENA IN 1741.
Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon was the British Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies in 1740-41. In the fall of 1740 he learned that a large expedition was to be sent to the West Indies from England and the North American colonies, but unnecessary delays in starting caused it to arrive later than was desirable in view of the season of the year. Vernon sailed from Jamaica to meet it in October, 1740, but instead he met only the colonial troops and the news that a Spanish squadron had arrived at Cartagena and a French one at Hayti, each superior to him. France was not known to be at war with England, but there was every reason to fear the instructions which the French squadron brought with it, so Vernon retired to Jamaica.
Rear Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle with a powerful fleet of battleships conveying the transport fleet with the troops under the command of General Lord Cathcart arrived at Dominica on the 19th of December, 1740, where Lord Cathcart died. He was considered a man of great ability and one with whom Admiral Vernon would cordially cooperate. His successor, General Wentworth, was a man of much less ability and far from enterprising, although apparently well disposed. On the other hand, Vernon was a man of ability with a great reputation, yet hot-tempered, overbearing and contemptuous towards his associates. His friends in England had thought wise to warn him against these failings.
On January 7, 1741, Sir Chaloner's fleet arrived at Jamaica. This arrival changed the situation at Jamaica so as to open possibilities of offensive operations.
The orders of the ministry sent out with the troops placed the control of the campaign entirely in the hands of a council to consist of the two senior officers of the Army and Navy to whom should be joined the Governor of Jamaica when his presence could be obtained. It was necessary first to gain some intelligence of the movements of the French and Spanish fleets. Accordingly a scout vessel was sent to windward to examine Hayti and the whole fleet followed, transports and all. On arrival off Port Louis on February 12th it was found the French fleet was absent. As war was not yet declared the fleet watered there and learnt the French fleet had sailed for home, so that all was clear for operations against the Spaniards. Another council was called to select an objective for the campaign. Public opinion at home wished to seize Havana and conquer Cuba, but the council decided for an attempt on Cartagena, and on February 25th it sailed for that place. The force counted 124 sail in all, of which the combatant ships were 29 battleships, 12 frigates, 7 fire ships and 2 bomb ketches, manned by 15,400 blue-jackets. The transport fleet carried 12,000 troops, including 2 regiments of foot troops, and 6 regiments of marines amounting to 8000 men, artillery and detachments 1000, the American regiment 2500 and 500 negroes.
The garrison of Cartagena consisted of 4000 men, besides which there was a squadron present of 6 heavy ships, besides galleons and small craft. On March 4th the entire fleet anchored to windward of Cartagena and the small craft were sent inshore to draw the Spaniards towards them by feinting at landing.
This feint was successful, and during it a number of ships were sent to sound along the coast and reconnoitre the shore. From their report it was arranged that Sir C. Ogle with his division should drop down to the harbor mouth.
The following is a contemporary description of the place and its defenses at this time, there having been changes since the French attack:
"The town is directly on the sea, but the water begins to shoal a league off and the surf and rocks prevent landing. The only entrance into the harbor is more than two leagues from the city between two narrow peninsulas. This, called Boca Chica, was defended on the Tierra Bomba side by a castle called St. Louis, which was a regular square with four bastions, strong, well built, mounted with 82 guns and three mortars and was capable of making a stout defense if well garrisoned, and would have been much stronger if the glacis and counterscarp had been finished. To this were added the forts of St. Philip, mounted with 7 guns, Fort San Jago, mounting 15 guns, and a small fort of four guns called Battery de Chamba, which served as outworks to Fort St. Louis towards the sea.
"On the other side of the mouth of the harbor was a fascine battery of 15 guns called the Baradera, and in a small bay at the back of that another battery of 4 guns, and facing the entrance of the harbor on a small flat island stood Fort St. Joseph of 21 guns; from this fort to Boca Chica Castle a boom and cables were fixed across, fastened with three large anchors at each end and just within the boom four men-of-war were moored in a line, the "Galicia," on board which was the Spanish admiral, and three others of 70 and 66 guns each. These spread so far across the mouth of the harbor that there was not room for a ship to pass ahead or astern of them so that it was impossible for shipping to force an entrance to the harbor. Beyond this passage lies the great lake or harbor of Cartagena. Within a league of the city two points of land jutting out form the lesser harbor. On the northernmost of these is the strong fortress of Castillo Grande, about 8 miles up the harbor, being a regular square with 4 bastions, strong and well built, and defended to the land by a wet ditch and glacis proper, and one face towards the sea with a raveline and double line of guns, and though there were but 59 guns in the fort there was room to mount 61. Opposite to this castle was a horseshoe battery of 12 guns, called Mancinilla in the middle between these two forts is a large shoal with not more than two or three feet of water in it, and in the passage on either side ships were sunk across to prevent the fleet getting by. Two miles further up on two flat sandy islands or keys stands the city of Cartagena directly on the sea, with Himani its suburb, back of it (east). Both are irregular figures, but well fortified to the land with strong bastions at proper distances with lakes and morasses running around them. The city was defended with 160 guns and the suburb with 140 and the water shoals on the sea side so as not to permit a close approach. East of the city about a quarter of a mile from the gate of Himani on an eminence about 50 or 60 feet high stands the castle of St. Lazar, which is a square of 50 feet with three demi-bastions with two guns in each face, one in each flank and three in each curtain. Its situation is very advantageous, overlooking all the town, though there is a brow of a hill about 400 yards from it that overlooks the fort as much, and entirely commands it."
The reconnoitering ship advised landing at the same point as De Pointis had done and on the 6th Sir C. Ogle laid three ships of 80 guns each before St. Jago and St. Philip. Another 8o gun ship was placed against the fascine battery which proved to have no guns mounted, and a 50 gun ship against Chamba. Thus the guns opposed to each other were 6 to 1 in favor of the ships.
The Admiral, Vernon, with his division escorted the transports leaving the 3rd division to continue the feint on the other side of the city.
After an hour's bombardment the forts were shattered and abandoned and 500 grenadiers took possession of them, without any resistance. It was not possible to land more troops that night as they could not be brought from the upper side of the city owing to the wind. Two of the three ships off St. Philip and St. Jago suffered trifling losses, but the "Shrewsbury" had her cable cut by a Spanish shot and drifted before the trade wind into the concentrated fire of the main defenses at the harbor mouth besides that of the 4 ships inside the boom. After 7 hours firing, opposing 26 guns to 200, the "Shrewsbury" drew off at nightfall dismasted, with 240 shots in her hull. This does not seem good work on the part of the Spanish.
This same evening the bomb ketches were carried in to begin the bombardment of St. Louis. On the 12th the "Ludlow Castle" opened mortar fire on St. Louis, on the 13th the bomb battery on shore opened.
The army landed on the loth, and till the 15th was occupied in landing tents, artillery stores and provisions so that during the first three days the troops were much exposed to the weather and fell sick. The camp was on low land, so placed as to be unseen by the Baradera battery yet in the line of Spanish fire from it upon the English bomb battery.
The Chief Engineer did not push his work as fast as the Admiral thought possible and thereupon a coolness sprang up between the two commanders-in-chief which spread among their subordinates until its effects on the campaign became very regrettable.
The Baradera battery continued to annoy the camp and it was resolved to destroy it, attacking at midnight with 300 blue-jackets and 200 soldiers. Bad weather delayed the expedition till the 19th at midnight, when it set out. It may be noted that one of the two companies of soldiers was commanded by Captain Lawrence Washington, who afterwards named his estate in Virginia as Mount Vernon, in honor of the naval commander of this expedition. After pulling to leeward to avoid being heard, the boats landed about a mile below the battery and found themselves immediately beneath a 5 gun battery, hitherto unknown to them. After an instant's hesitation the officers carried the men forward and they pushed through the embrasures with very little loss. The Spaniards turned some of their guns in the main battery loaded with grape on the charging Englishmen, but firing high, the defense was ineffective. The guns were spiked, the battery set on fire, and all returned to their ships. The accounts record that "The Admiral was so pleased with this affair that he rewarded the common men with a dollar apiece."
The destruction of this battery gave great relief to the camp and enabled work to be carried on in more security upon the main battery in the wood. Although the engineers had 500 seamen and 250 negroes besides their own men, yet they failed to hurry matters in accordance with the expectations of the Admiral who was very anxious to get his ships inside the harbor, as the weather was very tempestuous and the stony bottom of the anchorage cut the ships' anchor cables. Besides which a French fleet was said to have arrived in the West Indies.
On the 20th, Fort St. Louis began firing against the bomb battery. On the 21st the battery destroyed at Baradera had two or three guns in service once more, greatly annoying the bomb battery and camp. The "Ripon" was detailed to anchor near and keep it quiet.
The Admiral now called a council, which resolved to make a brisk attack on the defenses. On the morning of the 21st, the main battery of 19 guns and the mortar battery of 30 pieces opened, to which the Spanish replied very generally. On the 23rd, Commodore Lestock with 6 ships closed with the fort, and was supported by Sir C. Ogle, who was to come in to replace injured ships, or extend the line if there was room for him. The "Boyne" failed to get her designed anchorage and suffered much, and left at night fall, after which the "Prince Frederick" and "Hampton Court" which had done good service all day caught the fire previously directed against the "Boyne." Before morning it was necessary to order them away also. The other three ships were less exposed, but were called off at night fall. The distance was too great for the ships' fire to be effective, but they drew part of the Spanish fire from the siege works.
The Baradera battery still annoyed the camp and on the 24th three ships were sent against it, while a detachment of sailors was landed and destroyed it again, after which they drew their boats overland and boarded and burnt a sloop that lay in the bight as a magazine for the battery.
By the 24th many guns had been dismounted in St. Louis and a breach well opened. The general therefore wished to assault on the 25th and after consultation with the Admiral it was arranged that the latter should attempt a diversion. The Admiral sent a party of blue-jackets who landed unopposed on the site of the ruined Baradera battery, drawing the attention of the Spaniards. At 5.30 p. m. the storming party advanced against St. Louis, covered by the smoke of the great battery's fire. The attack was successful and the fort was taken with the loss of one man. The whole assaulting force, including the reserve of 500 men, was only 1300 strong. Captain Knowles, in command of the bluejackets at Baradera, observing that the Spaniards were in great confusion, owing to the loss of St. Louis, threw his men into their boats and boarded Fort St. Joseph. The Spaniards attempted to sink their ships, having previously prepared them, but Captain Knowles pushed on so quickly from St. Joseph that he captured the "Galicia," flagship, before she could be sunk.
It now remained only to destroy the boom in order to be able to enter the harbor. This was soon done by the boats and carpenters of the fleet.
The Army had lost 500 men by death from the climate and battle, and had besides about 1500 sick in the hospital ships. The Navy suffered less as not having been on shore. It seems beyond a doubt that it was a great sanitary mistake to land so many men to live in idleness while a few carried on the work against the fort. On the 26th the "Galicia" was towed out of the channel and several heavy ships managed to warp past the sunken and burning Spanish ships. On the 27th two ships got as high as Castillo Grande, while a detachment to Pasa Caballos cut off supplies to the city by that route. By Pasa Caballos was the water route to the Magdalena River by way of the canal, and this was the principal commercial highway. A good spring of fresh water was found which the Admiral took possession of for the use of the fleet only. The lack of good water was largely responsible for the sickness in the army. The Admiral also refused to supply the army with fresh fish and turtle which were caught for the navy only. In short, the public service was sacrificed to the coolness between the two commanders-in-chief, which was imitated by the principal officers of both services.
The greater part of the forces was inside on the 3oth of March, but Commodore Lestock remained with his division to complete the embarkation of the cannon and stores used before St. Louis.
As the English advanced up the harbor, the Spaniards blocked both channels abreast of Castillo Grande by sinking ships, while just inside they anchored their two remaining ships of the line so as to support either Castillo Grande or Mancinilla.
A naval council of war on the 3oth decided that haste was desirable and that the remaining outer defenses of the city should be destroyed in order to land the army as near to the city as possible. As the ships moved to the attack, the Spaniards blew up Mancinilla as they thought it untenable, sank the two battleships and abandoned Castillo Grande.
This was discovered on the morning of the 31st when the Castle was manned by the Navy and an effort made to remove the masts of the sunken ships so as to clear a passage, but the working party found the stern of the "Conquestador" afloat and hove her round clear of the channel. By evening two bomb-ketches with two covering frigates had passed in, and on the morning of April 1st they opened fire. In the meantime the troop transports had come up.
On the 3rd and 4th some of the battleships worked through the obstructed channels into the Surgidero and arranged themselves so that the troops might land behind them. A fire of grape shot from these ships lasting all night drove the Spaniards from Pastellillo and cleared all the country side for the landing of the troops on the 5th. It is to be remarked how much the abandonment of Castillo Grande facilitated the work of the English army, as otherwise it would have been landed further from the city.
On the 5th of April at daylight 1500 troops were put ashore at Texar de Gracias (or Gratia), and marched through a narrow way between the shore and the tropical woods. They were opposed by 700 Spaniards, but the English drove them back and seized La Quinta (a country place) as a camp. La Popa was found unoccupied and was seized. On the 6th all the troops were landed, but for three days they were exposed to the weather without tents. General Wentworth reconnoitered St. Lazar and the city, and on his return a military council was held as to the propriety of attacking St. Lazar before some new Spanish works should be finished on the hill adjoining it. As no stores had yet been landed from the ordnance ships, no attack was made. In the meantime the Spaniards completed a four gun battery, and entrenched themselves in lines thrown up around the Castle (St. Lazar) itself. The guns of a fascine battery on the north point were also mounted in this new battery.
On the 7th another military council again decided not to assault St. Lazar without having first raised a battery, and requested the navy to send the bomb ketches (mortar vessels) and a ship of the line against the fort to facilitate its reduction. Admiral Vernon replied expressing his disapprobation of waiting to raise a battery, sickness was increasing, the rainy season was approaching, the Spaniards would not stand an assault, but their engineers were better than the British, wherefore Vernon and Ogle urged immediate assault, and sent ashore the marines belonging to the ships' complements, besides some American troops, bringing General Wentworth's force up to 5000 men.
Supplies and provisions continued to pass into the city from the north along the sea beach and this was a subject of dispute between the commanders-in-chief. The general could not send a detachrnent there, as he was without boats for supplying them, and the admiral promised, but did not send, frigates to lie off the strip of beach and control the passage.
On the 8th the military council again assembled and the engineer reported that in the circumstances of the army no time was available to carry on siege operations and that an assault must be made or the army should withdraw. The troops were paraded for an assault in two columns at 2 a. m., April 9, but in the darkness one column lost its way and assailed the most difficult part of St. Lazar, the other column lost its commanding officer and the guide, and stopped in consequence. Spanish reenforcements poured out from the city, but no ships were placed where they could command the bridge head behind St. Lazar, so that the result to the English was only a loss of 650 men. On April 11th two mortars began to fire from the advanced guard, and on April 14th two ten inch mortars, landed and manned by the navy, opened fire from Manga Island. On the 11th another military council had decided that without a large reenforcement from the fleet nothing could be done. Sickness continued to increase while the water supply in the cisterns began to fall. The admiral treated the military council with rudeness and a general council was held on the flagship on the 14th. The admiral showed great heat and passion towards General Wentworth and the navy would not consent to land the sailors of the fleet, as Admiral Ogle said they could not be kept in hand, so it was resolved to reembark. The soldiers were now reduced to about 3500 men, many of these very feeble.
On the 15th the stores were embarked, followed by the troops on the 16th, but this day was selected by Admiral Vernon for an attack on the city by the "Galicia" prize armed with 16 12-pdr. and 18-pdr. guns. She did not get close to the city and after 7 hours was reduced to a wreck. She hauled off and got on a shoal to avoid sinking.
From this date, for over two weeks the bluejackets were occupied in destroying all forts, batteries, lime-kilns, etc., that had been captured. On the 6th of May, as an old historian puts it, "Vice Admiral Vernon very civilly left the harbor, not having injured any of their dwelling houses or given the least loose to any of those rapacious practices of war so often committed." On the 8th, the expedition sailed for Jamaica.
In reviewing this unsuccessful expedition the following points may be noted with advantage:
1st. More troops than were needed were landed at Boca Chica, causing sickness to be general when the final operations before the city were undertaken.
2nd. The general commanding failed to recognize that the climatic conditions were such that he could not save the lives of his troops by delaying for siege operations. The most bloody assault would cost fewer lives than a fortnight in trenches. This was clearly perceived by the admiral and his insistence upon the point caused bitter ill feeling between the military and naval officers of high rank.
3rd. The general did not push the Spaniards in haste, as is the proper way to deal with Spaniards. If be and his brigadier had been enterprising, Lazar could possibly have been taken on the day of landing. Similarly, an error was made in landing all the troops before landing any stores, whereby the whole body of troops was exposed to the weather for several days.
4th. The admiral got into the lake on the 26th of March, but did not attempt any operation till everybody was in on the 30th. It is probable that the troops could have landed two or three days earlier if arrangements had been made to attack Castillo Grande with the first ships of the line to pass inside.
5th. The main cause of failure was the utter lack of cooperation between the army and navy after getting into the lake. The admiral thought, probably with reason, that the general was not doing as well as was possible and thereupon failed to cooperate with him, threw obstacles in his way and treated him with such rudeness that success was impossible.
In comparing these three attacks on Cartagena we shall perceive several particulars in which the operations were alike, and we may fix certain points in regard to tactics at that period, and later we shall see how time and progress have affected these matters.
In regard to the defense, we see that in each case fortified artillery positions to destroy the lives of the attacking forces are combined with channel obstructions to stop the advance of the ships (in the French attack the natural difficulties of the channel were thought sufficient to prevent passage under fire).
In regard to the attack:
In each case the main attack was made by a body of soldiers attacking the shore defenses of the place by the ordinary military methods of the time, and the navy supported the land attack without greatly risking its ships under the fire of the forts.
In each successful attack, there was a single commander-in-chief in charge of all the forces and their operations. In the unsuccessful attack there were separate commanders-in-chief for the army and navy, and to the lack of harmony between these officers the failure was directly due. It is therefore proper to examine how this divergence of views arose and what lessons may be drawn from it. The first difficulty arose before Boca Chica when the admiral told the general in a very disagreeable manner that the engineers were not pushing their siege works as fast as they should and that an early assault was necessary. The general resented this reflection, and cordiality and cooperation between the army and navy were lacking more and more as the operations were prolonged. The general was unable to see that under the unjustifiable form of a rude and contemptuous criticism upon the engineers the admiral was really making a report upon the condition of affairs as affecting his own ability to support the besieging army. The general looked upon the arrival of the French fleet and the approach of the bad weather season as difficulties which should trouble his colleague only, and refused to admit that they concerned him as seriously, if not as directly, as they did the admiral and that they were the factors which gave the admiral the right to urge the early assault. Of course, after the two commanders had lost their tempers and refused to aid each other success could not be hoped for. But in the beginning both had been desirous of the success of the national arms, and if they had had a good understanding of each other's situation the operation would have had every chance of success. Unfortunately the general's lack of acquaintance with the science of war caused him to be unequal to the practice of its art so soon as he found himself confronted by a situation beyond the limits of his previous personal experience.
For the United States army and navy, it is only reasonable to believe that a study of previous campaigns and a general knowledge of each other's situation and requirements will enable our commanders-in-chief, in joint operations, to perceive in each case which should take the lead, and which should follow suit, and so to play a united and successful game.
ATTACK UPON THE FRENCH FLEET IN BASQUE ROADS IN APRIL, 1809.
To illustrate the turning of a fortified position, regarded by Napoleon as impregnable.
Late in February, 1809, the French fleet at Brest eluded the British blockading fleet, with the intention of operating against the British colonies in the West Indies after uniting with several small detachments. The French squadron went to L'Orient and picked up the ships blockaded there, and then made for Isle d'Aix to liberate the Rochefort squadron. They made a junction with the latter, but finding Admiral Stopford in the vicinity with 4 ships of the line, the French fleet put into Basque Roads and later withdrew into Aix Roads where Stopford blockaded them with 7 ships. On March 7th Lord Gambier, commander-in-chief, with 5 ships of the line, joined Admiral Stopford, so that the British force was now superior.
In this state of affairs the British Ministry was very anxious to gain some advantage over the French fleet, but Lord Gambier did not care to attack. He wrote home that the fortifications on Aix were no obstacles to bombarding the enemy's fleet if the admiralty wished to destroy it. He further said: "The enemy's ships lie much exposed to the operation of fire-ships; it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attack hazardous if not desperate, but we have plenty of volunteers for the service. If you mean to do anything of the kind it should be done with secrecy and quickly."
Hereupon the First Lord of the Admiralty sent for Captain Lord Cochrane and showed him the Commander-in-Chief's letter, saying that the ministry was unwilling to order an attack by fireships. In other words, the Ministry wanted a victory, but required a scapegoat in case of defeat, and invited Lord Cochrane to submit a plan.
Lord Cochrane thereupon submitted a plan which the First Lord approved, and asked him to carry out. Cochrane declined to do this on the ground that being a very junior officer and an outsider, it would excite much jealousy in the fleet, and moreover Lord Gambier might not be satisfied to put another's plan in execution. The First Lord then endeavored to find some one else to execute Lord Cochrane's plan, but the next day told Cochrane that he should go to Basque Roads and that "the Board of Admiralty would so manage with Lord Gambier that the amour pro pre of the fleet should be satisfied."
On March 19th the Admiralty notified Lord Gambier that it was sending out 12 fire-ships besides rockets and a detachment of marine artillery, and suggested that the admiral attack the French fleet offering him all reenforcements and facilities he might wish.
On March 26th Gambier replied describing the position of the French fleet:
"The enemy's ships are anchored in two lines very near each other in a direction due south from the Isle d'Aix and the ships in each line not further apart than their own length, by which it appears, as I imagined, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the shoalness of the water as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are within point-blank shot of the works on the Isle d'Aix; such ships therefore as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by red-hot shot, etc., from the island, and should the ships be disabled in their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy's fire until they are destroyed—there not being sufficient depth of water to allow them to move to the southward out of distance. The enemy having taken up their position apparently with the view not only to be protected by the strong works on the Isle d'Aix, but also to have the entrance to the Charente open to them, that in case of being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that are favorable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy serve equally to carry them up the river."
The letter concluded with the information that the Commander- in-Chief was ready to execute any plan of attack that the Admiralty might direct.
It is to be noted that the admiral had changed his opinion as to the obstacles offered by the Aix defences.
Upon the arrival of Lord Cochrane on April 3rd with orders to Lord Gambier to permit him to carry out his plan, the ill-feeling in the fleet became very great and Admiral Harvey used such language in public to and of the Commander-in-Chief that he was afterwards court-martialled and dismissed from the navy, but was immediately restored in consideration of his previous good record.
However, Lord Cochrane urged the Commander-in-Chief not to wait for the fire-ships from home to fit out others in the fleet. Three explosion-vessels were also fitted out, this being a novelty introduced by Lord Cochrane. These ships contained 1500 barrels of powder covered over with several hundred shells and three thousand hand grenades.
On April 10th the fire-ships from England arrived so that there were available 20 fire-ships, and three explosion-vessels. The situation occupied by the French may now be described.
The Ile de Re and the Ile d'Oleron form between them a deep arm of the sea whose entrance is about 7 miles across. At the bottom of the bay is the entrance to the Charente river, on which, several miles from its mouth, is the city and naval arsenal of Rochefort. The Ile d'Aix, off the entrance to the river, affords a site for an outwork to defend the river entrance and at the same time protects the anchorage of Aix Roads. Ile Madame is on the other side of the entrance to the river, 2 miles from Ile d'Aix. The tides run strongly and rise at springs to a height of 21 feet.
The English fleet w- as anchored within the shelter of the islands in Basque Roads, but at a respectful distance from the fortifications, while the French fleet had taken a position as far to the front as it dared, in order to lose no time in warping out of the river should bad weather drive away the blockading force. This position was taken by the personal order of the Emperor Napoleon, whose opinion as to the locality had been expressed 4 years previously to the Minister of Marine as follows:
"You may quiet your apprehensions that the enemy will attempt something against Ile d'Aix. Nothing can be more insane than the idea of attacking a French squadron at Ile d'Aix. I am annoyed to see you with such notions. What on earth do you imagine is to be feared by a squadron of 5 ships of the line, with plenty of powder and supplies, well protected, and ready to fight lying at Aix?"
The French fleet moored in three lines with their heads northerly, the lines resting on Ile d'Aix and running south therefrom. The lines extended far enough to rest on the Palles Shoal.
In the two inner lines were the battleships and one frigate, 6 ships in each line, and the third line had 3 frigates about 750 yards in front of the battleships. About one-half cable's length in front of the frigates was a floating boom of very unusual size and strength about 1600 yards long. Ile d'Aix had several batteries whose strength is not exactly known. It is probable that not more than 30 guns covered the French Fleet, but they were 36 pdrs. (large guns then) and there were several mortars of the largest size. The N. E. side of the island had only a few guns and those in poor condition. The garrison consisted of 2000 recruits.
On the Ile d'Oleron were three or four gun and mortar batteries, one of which could almost intersect its fire with Aix batteries. The Boyart shoal reduced the area available for maneuvering ships. The batteries on the Isle Madame, at Fouras and elsewhere did not come into action.
The arrival of the English fire-ships was a warning to the French fleet that an attack was to be expected. The French admiral therefore issued a general order covering the preparations for defense. The battleships sent down their light yards and unbent all unnecessary sails so as to have as little inflammable material aloft as possible. The ships' soldiers were also to be ready to land on Ile d'Aix in case the English should try to take possession. Moreover, the boats of the fleet, 73 in number, in 5 divisions, were ordered to assemble at the boom each night to board and tow away the fire-ships and engage any British boats supporting them.
On the afternoon of the 11th of April the English fleet began to take up positions for the attack. The line of battle remained at anchor about 8 or 9 miles from Ile d'Aix and the attacking force moved up. It consisted of the 20 fire-ships, 3 explosion-vessels and a supporting division of 4 frigates all under the command of Captain Lord Cochrane.
The frigates anchored near the head of the Boyart shoal a gun shot and a half (about a mile and a half, or three quarters) from the French. Here they were to wait to receive the escaping crews of the fire ships.
The "Etna" carrying a 13 inch mortar, the only bomb vessel which had arrived, took station N. W. of Ile d'Aix and was covered by two light craft. Five gunboats were stationed to make a diversion at the east end of Ile d'Aix and two brigs with lights screened from the enemy were stationed as markers to guide the attacking vessels. At 8.30 p. m., the fire-ships got underway with a strong flood tide and a N. W. gale. Many of them were fired and abandoned too soon, before they had even passed between the mark boats.. The boats of the fleet had been ordered to assemble alongside the Caesar ready to support the fire-ships, but the weather was so bad that they did not leave her. For the same reason the French boats could not get at the boom.
Lord Cochrane personally conducted an explosion-vessel which blew up against the boom about 100 yards from the frigate "L'Indienne" and soon after a second one did the same, and several fire-ships then pushed on to the French anchorage. On seeing the flaming ships coming on, the French fleet opened fire with little regard for its own frigates in the outer line which had to slip their anchors. It was disputed whether the explosions destroyed the boom by the great wash they raised or whether a very heavy fireship tore it adrift, but, however that may be, the boom disappeared, while the explosions threw the French ships into panic as every fire-ship was thought to be an explosion-vessel.
The Frenchmen cut their cables in a wild effort to get into the Charente River and avoid the five or six fire-ships which had been well handled. Two French ships were fouled by the fire-ships although their crews saved them. But the French had unbent their sails and the night was dark and stormy. By midnight all the French ships except two were aground and some were much damaged by the bottom and by fouling each other.
In the morning at daylight Lord Cochrane signalled the condition of the French fleet, but the admiral 12 miles off made no move to destroy the helpless enemy who were seen to be making great efforts to get afloat. At 10.45 the English fleet got underway, but anchored out of gun fire of Aix. But Lord Gambier ordered the mortar vessel with a couple of supports to take position to bombard the French ships while he sent a division of three ships of the line to move into a position of readiness, so these ships advanced a mile.
This induced the two French ships not aground to get underway for the mouth of the river, where they also got ashore. Before high water 4 ships got afloat and moved towards the mouth of the river, but all grounded again in the mud.
Hereupon Lord Cochrane about 1 p. m. made a series of reports by signal; but as they produced no movement by the British Admiral, Cochrane lifted his anchor and allowed his ship, the "Imperieuse," to drift upon the French fleet with the idea of forcing his chief to support him and destroy it. After getting within range he signalled "this ship is in distress and needs assistance immediately." Shortly after he anchored and opened fire on three ships. A little later Lord Gambier sent in the frigates; and in explanation at his court-martial testified that it was "unnecessary to run any further risk as the object of their destruction seemed to be obtained."
At 3.30 p. m., two ships of the line reported to Cochrane and a crescent line of English frigates was formed around the grounded ships on the Palles Shoal. The "Valiant," one of the ships of the line, signalled to the admiral "No doubt 5 more may be destroyed tonight." The answer was a recall. Three ships captured and one burnt was the result of the day's work
Three transports were hastily converted into fire-ships and with Rear Admiral Stopford on the "Caesar" they ran under the fire of the Oleron batteries late in the afternoon. The "Caesar" and "Valiant" grounded on the end of the Boyart shoal but got off as the tide rose and then the division got into Grandes Trousses anchorage. It was midnight before the fire-ships were ready and then the wind shifted so as to prevent attack and Stopford went out again, leaving Cochrane in the "Imperieuse." The captured ships were set on fire at this time, so that they were mistaken for a new attack of fire-ships and the French opened fire on them and one captain even set fire to his own ship and abandoned her, but such was the excitement that it was badly done, and the fire went out, so in the morning he and his crew returned to her.
At 8 a. m. Cochrane with the small craft present renewed the attack without orders, but he could not get his two frigates up on account of the wind and tide. On the 14th four French ships got up the river beyond all danger and Lord Gambier sent Lord Cochrane to England.
Thereafter, to the great astonishment of the French, no further efforts were made by the English. On the 17th only one French vessel, the "Regulus," remained outside and she was near Fouras, in a position easy to attack. On the 20th a newly arrived mortar vessel attacked the "Regulus," but she soon burst her only mortar. On the 29th, that is on the second spring tides since the disaster, the "Regulus" got inside and Lord Gambier sailed for England. Napoleon's opinion on the matter was that "the French admiral was a fool and the Englishman just as bad. Had Cochrane been supported he would have taken every one of the ships."
The spirit of the French navy which was just beginning to revive after Trafalgar was destroyed by this affair, and in the opinion of some French officers this was its most serious effect. Until the end of the war five years later no important movement was undertaken by the French navy after this crushing blow.
The lesson of this operation is the great use which may and should be made of auxiliaries. Although the particular method used is no longer applicable under present conditions, yet we should spare our battle ships now, as Gambier did then, but not as he did, when the time to use them had arrived. In this case, the French were anchored in a carefully chosen position, flanked by shoals and an island, so that only a frontal and disadvantageous approach was possible for the enemy. In front of the French line, the boom prevented the English ships from coming to close quarters and boarding.
By the attack of the fire-ships and explosion-vessels, the French defensive formation was completely broken and the individual ships exposed to destruction.
Lord Gambier's unenterprising character deprived him of much of the fruits of success, but the whole affair is not the less instructive.
THE EXPEDITION TO FLUSHING IN 1809.
A MISTAKE AS TO THE KEY OF THE SITUATION.
In the spring of 1809 France was engaged in war against Europe and was carrying on two principal campaigns, one in Spain and one in Austria.
The Emperor of the French was desirous of re-establishing his navy in order to break the continental blockade maintained by England. He had established a great naval dockyard at Antwerp on the River Scheldt, and forced Holland to cede to France by treaty the port of Flushing and the mouth of the west branch of the Scheldt. This gave him a harbor of refuge at the mouth of the river whence his fleet could depart without delay and besides it offered the advantage of an auxiliary dockyard in an advanced position. After the disaster of Basque Roads, the only active French fleet lay in the Scheldt where it was a menace to the English West India trade. In this condition of affairs the English Ministry planned a combined operation against the French fleet in the Scheldt, hoping to accomplish two objects, that of relieving the West Indies from all fear of attack and thus easing the work of the blockading squadrons, and that of requiring the Emperor to despatch French re-enforcements to Belgium instead of to Spain and Austria.
But the very fact that a powerful English army was maintained In Spain rendered it difficult to arrange for the Netherlands expedition; and owing to the consequent delay and newspaper publicity the expedition was as closely followed in Paris as in London. The French successes in Austria, releasing the armies there, rendered the expedition to Holland unadvisable, as no Dutch uprising in its aid could then be expected; but obstinacy decided the Ministry to persevere and the expedition, whose organization began early in May, sailed from its rendezvous in the Downs on July 28, 1809, consisting of 37 ships of the line, of which four fifths had their lower deck guns out and their holds prepared as horse transports, 88 frigates and smaller craft, 120 hired armed vessels and 400 transports measuring 100,000 tons, carrying 39,000 men, including 3000 cavalry, under the commands of Rear Admiral Sir Richard Strachan and Lieutenant General the Earl of Chatham.
The instructions to the expedition were to capture or destroy the whole of the enemy's ships afloat in the Scheldt or building at Antwerp, to demolish the dockyards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse and Flushing and if possible to render the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war.
In the summer of 1809 there were at anchor in the West Scheldt above Flushing ten French seventy-fours, under Vice Admiral Missiessy. There were also several ships of the line building in various degrees of completion at Antwerp. Since the disaster at Rochefort, the Ministry at Paris had urged Missiessy not to lie off the entrance to the Scheldt, but to retire to Flushing. Missiessy dreaded the certainty of the annual outbreak of fever in the island of Walcheren more than the possibility of fire ships and received permission to manoeuvre in the Scheldt in case the English should approach.
Although the expedition was known to be fitting out, the authorities in Paris and in the Netherlands had made few preparations. When the English forces were sighted the country was very weakly garrisoned, a few hundred only for the great and powerful defenses of Antwerp, 4000 in Walcheren and as many more in Bruges and Ghent, cities 20 miles south of the Scheldt. Everything therefore was for the moment in favor of the English, but the French peace with Austria rendered the utmost haste imperative to insure success.
On the departure from England it had been arranged that the left wing of the army, 13,000 strong, covered by a division of ships of the line should land on the sea side of Walcheren and take possession of the sea coast forts at Flushing. Another division, 5000 strong, was to land on Cadsand and take the battery at Breskens. When the entrance to the West Scheldt should be safely held the bulk of the expedition expected to sail up the river and land near Santfliet above the junction of the two branches.
On the 29th the English fleet was seen by the French lookouts, the French fleet lying at the time behind Flushing and word being telegraphed (semaphore signals) to Paris and Vienna, conscription was made for new levies and the country was stripped of troops to provide a garrison for Antwerp. The English troops could not be disembarked immediately on account of unfavorable weather, so the expedition waited for a change. But as the weather did not change and as it was learned that the French fleet had not retired to Antwerp, it was decided to send the main body to turn the position at Flushing by proceeding as far as possible up the East Scheldt and then landing on North and South Beveland, they were to march to the East end of South Beveland and seize Bathz, thus cutting off the French fleet. At the same time, the Walcheren force was sent into the channel east of Walcheren to land in quiet waters. All this took time, and after landing, Veer was bombarded by land and sea, and it was August 3rd before Flushing was invested.
The French general on the south side of the Scheldt had 300 men at Cadsand and he ran them about like stage soldiers to impress the English imagination while he summoned his troops from Ghent where they had been cantoned to avoid fever. That night the French troops all got drunk and the general and his staff were the only available force, but the English had been alarmed by his display and could only land 700 troops at a time, so they unwisely waited for more boats which were needed elsewhere also, and could not come. By noon of the 30th, French re-enforcements of 1500 men had arrived from Ghent, and on August i the English force off Cadsand, which foolishly had done nothing, moved around Walcheren and followed the rest of the army. The general commanding at Cadsand, being relieved from fear of debarkation in his neighborhood threw all his re-enforcements as they arrived across into Flushing, doubling its garrison. Although some disconnected attempts were made by junior English naval officers to cut off the passage of these re-enforcements it was not until the 6th of August that Flushing was finally cut off from its communications with Cadsand; yet the cordon of English ships around the island had been complete for several days before, except at the most important point abreast of Flushing.
While half the English army prosecuted the siege of Flushing the rest spread over South Beveland and seized Bathz, closely supported by the naval light craft. The Dutch forces had little interest in supporting Napoleon, and retreated without resistance. The French fleet which the English troops hoped to cut off at Bathz easily moved up the river before them and when the English took Bathz on the 2nd, the French fleet had retired behind the fort and boom at Lillo, leaving a flotilla of light craft to annoy the English at Bathz.
On the 9th a light division was sent to sound in the West Scheldt off South Beveland where it arrived by following the channel east of Walcheren, and on the nth a re-enforcement of ten frigates ran in between Flushing and Cadsand but, although under fire for two hours owing to the light wind, the squadron lost only 2 men killed. During this time, the French garrison at Flushing had kept up a very active defense which cost it severe losses and did not much delay the construction of the English batteries. On the 13th the English batteries of 52 heavy pieces near Flushing opened fire, on the defenses, supported by two divisions of bomb and gun vessels, one on each side of the town. The wind prevented the line of battle ships from getting up till the next day, when two of them grounded. The others hauled off and those aground followed them as soon as they could get afloat. The French fire ceased on the 14th, but the English continued theirs and the next day terms were arranged, but on the 16th the surrender was completed.
The English army and navy had a total force of 80,000 men and their aggregate loss by battle had been 112 killed and 500 wounded. On the 18th of August the French had at Antwerp 12,000 troops with 4 field pieces, but the fixed defenses of Antwerp were still without ammunition.
Although Flushing surrendered on the 16th, Lord Chatham remained there till the 21st of August, when he crossed to South Beveland. On the 19th the local fevers developed in the army. The Commander-in-Chief decided to leave 10,000 men in Walcheren and thus had 28,000 available for the execution of his instructions, namely to reduce Lillo, Liefken-Shoek and Antwerp, and then seize the French fleet. He now learned, however, that the garrison of Antwerp had been re-enforced to 35,000 men and that the French fleet could proceed 5 miles above Antwerp to Ruppelmond and by removing guns and stores there they could go 15 miles beyond that to Dendermond, a fortified town. While Chatham, in conventional fashion, had been knocking at the front door the French had been pouring troops into Antwerp by the back gate. On August 26th a council of war decided to withdraw, and on September 4th all the English forces withdrew below Bathz. Flushing was garrisoned and retained and the rest of the forces withdrew. In December, 1809, as the healthy season began, Flushing also was abandoned, obliging the blockading squadron to face the winter gales outside of the fort instead of at anchor off Flushing, where fire ships would have been the only danger and might have been guarded against.
This expedition was ill planned, because it was started without sound information as to the navigation of the river or the state of its defenses. It was ill timed, as taking place during the sickly season which prostrated 14,000 men. It was ill managed, as being placed under command of a general who thought more of his own dinner than anything else connected with the expedition, and was of a very dilatory disposition, devoid of ability. The navy, better led, seems to have supported the army as well as could be expected, and its delays at various critical times are attributable to the weather.
Let us now examine what might have been done. Sir E. Codrington, a distinguished British naval officer, who was present, in a letter of August 20th, from Bathz, says:
"Had a small force been left to invest Flushing while all the rest of the army accompanied by all the flotilla of gunboats pushed on to Bathz, crossed there and reached Antwerp immediately, they would have been before Antwerp on the 4th of August when no more than 4000 French troops were there. The English fleet could only advance as fast as the army occupied the shores."
On the other hand, a French military writer points out, that in his opinion
"Blankenburg, 8 or 50 miles below the entrance to the Scheldt, was the proper place to disembark and take the great paved road for Antwerp, 26 leagues distant, passing through the cities of Bruges and Ghent, and throwing a heavy outpost to Courtrai southwest of Ghent. In this way the English might have appeared in great force opposite Antwerp at the fort known as Tete de Flandre in three days after landing and without having met any opposition and there is no doubt that the city would have fallen immediately. In the meantime the navy could have seized Cadsand batteries and entered the river at its leisure, chasing the French fleet up the river, where the army would have met it and prevented it from escaping up the Scheldt. The presence of the navy and the reduction of all defenses on the river would have secured the retreat of the army in the face of the gathering French forces, after the accomplishment of the objects of the expedition."
In reviewing this expedition, it is first to be noted that the Ministry was wrong in directing this great force upon Belgium. For a year past, England had been making great effort to sustain the insurrection in Spain, and the troops diverted to Belgium would have served to double Lord Wellington's forces present at the victory of Talavera, fruitless owing to lack of men to extend his line of operations. Putting this point aside, and considering the conduct of the Walcheren expedition it is apparent how entirely Lord Chatham misconceived his task. The object was to destroy the French fleet. The actual destruction was the proper duty of the English fleet, but the army should have prevented the French fleet from escaping. This should have been done by seizing two points, the great stronghold of Antwerp which might shelter the fleet, and the town of Ruppelmond where the river shoaled. As the ships had to take their guns out to pass Ruppelmond, it is obvious that a field force could retain them at this point. Instead of pursuing this course, Lord Chatham besieged Flushing, a point which was no real obstacle to the joint pursuit of the French fleet. By the time Flushing yielded, Antwerp had made good her powers of defense, fever was destroying the English army, and the French fleet was safe behind Antwerp.