The following remarks are offered for publication in the Institute with a view of eliciting an expression of opinion from the service at large, on certain points connected with the use and abuse of courts-martial, the administration of discipline in the service and the maintenance of a high standard of service honor.
In connection with the laws and customs of the service bearing on these points there has always appeared to me to be an erroneous sentiment in very general existence among the officers of the Navy; and, so long as this sentiment is accepted as the true expression of the opinion and feeling of the service, there will be no hope of change.
But if mature thought on the part of the officers of the Navy generally should convince them, as it has me and, I have no doubt, many other officers as well, that the sentiment is erroneous, then a general service opinion might be brought to bear that might lead to a change in both the laws and customs of the service, much to the betterment of discipline and the maintenance of a higher sense of duty and greater esprit de corps.
The sentiment I speak of is the universal dread of the officers of the Navy to being brought to trial before a court-martial, a dread which seems to me to be largely due to a misconception of what the proper functions of a Naval or Military Court should be. Such courts are not criminal courts in the sense of the common and statutory law; they are courts of honor and equity as well as of justice, to which the honor and integrity of the service, and the officers thereof, may, or should be, left as safely as the administration of justice and the infliction of punishment. There is no disgrace in the fact of being brought to trial before such a court. The disgrace consists in the conviction of the party tried of the culpable neglect of duty, inexcusable carelessness in the performance of duty, inefficiency, drunkenness, or whatever the charge may have been. An honorable acquittal should, and would, relieve the party concerned from all suspicion of blame, a suspicion that will inevitably attach, under present conditions, to any officer in the service connected with any serious accident, however innocent or praiseworthy his action may have been. The innocent have nothing to fear and much to gain by trial, the guilty should be tried.
In the state of sentiment of the service to-day, one frequently hears the remark that "courts-martial are organized to convict"; and, as the laws and customs of the Navy are carried out at the present time, there is unfortunately a fundamental truth in this saying, hardly contemplated by the founders of such courts. This would seem to be due, partly, to the fact that courts of inquiry largely perform functions that in many cases would be far better performed, both in the interest of the service and of the individuals concerned, by courts-martial; and partly to the very existence of the sentiment spoken of, which causes those in authority to hesitate to bring offenders to trial by court-martial, until the offenses have become so flagrant that any other result than conviction is impossible. These two causes, in both of which are considerable elements of moral weakness, to use no stronger term, tend greatly to lower the dignity and respect in which courts-martial and their judgments should be held; and have, moreover, caused grave scandals in the past, left honorable names under undeserved stigma, and assisted many culpable offenders to escape just punishment.
The mere existence of the feeling that causes officers of the Navy to fight to the end against trial by court-martial, even in questions that would seem to me to directly and vitally affect their personal and professional honor and reputation, where acquittal by a competent court is the only vindication, is sufficient proof in itself that something is radically wrong.
That courts of inquiry, before which there is no accused and no defense, cannot vindicate character in the eyes of the service is self-evident, and has been often proved. That a stigma now re mains in the minds of many on the name of any officer who has been tried, even when acquitted, is too well known to be questioned, and proves clearly that the system, as administered, has undermined the feeling of trust and confidence in the justice and integrity of the various forms of naval courts which is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of military discipline and efficiency.
This condition will continue so long as the service at large looks On a trial per se as a disgrace, refuses to attach the disgrace to those only who are proved guilty, and endeavors to make impersonal courts of inquiry do the duty of courts-martial where the honor and professional reputation of an officer is at stake, a proceeding, in the case of any great disaster or accident, that at best can only leave in the mind of the service the impression of a case of "not proven."
The honor of the service and of the individual officer should be as sensitive as the reputation of a woman, and no shadow of suspicion should rest upon either. Where there is a question, it should be proved beyond the cavil of a doubt, and the person declared innocent or guilty. In every case of unusual failure, great accident or disaster, there is always a doubt; and it is the right of the service and of the officers concerned to have this doubt cleared away.
Responsibility exists always, or naval discipline and efficiency ends. The commander of a fleet, squadron or vessel can no more lay aside his responsibility than he can his commission; and the responsibility for his command is with him always.
In cases of great achievement he alone is held responsible and reaps the reward; and through him only is reward and praise distributed to his subordinates.
In cases of failure, grave accident, or disaster, he is likewise always primarily responsible, though the responsibility may not be culpable; and the facts may even prove him to have been highly praiseworthy. It is due to him that these facts should be brought out and a clear and definite sentence pronounced by a competent court when there is no culpability; it is due the service at large when there is.
If these ideas are based on sound military principle, as they appear to me to be, I would like to condense them in a few simple questions, inviting answers and discussion in the Institute, that service opinion may be brought to bear to correct evils, if they exist:
1. Why should disgrace attach to the mere fact of being tried by court-martial?
2. Does not the disgrace consist entirely and solely in guilt and the conviction thereof?
3. Are there not often cases arising from accident, avoidable or otherwise, in which the professional honor and reputation of one or more officers are attainted in the minds of their fellows, without ever having the question clearly settled by pronounced judgment?
4. Is it consonant with good military principles, and is it just to the innocent, to leave such cases to the indeterminate settlement of courts of inquiry, by which no final decision can be pronounced?
5. Cannot the existent dread in the Navy of trial by court-martial be overcome, and a sentiment cultivated of looking upon such courts as vindicators of innocence as much as punishers of guilt?
6. Is it the sense of the service, or conducive to military efficiency, that the question of the innocence or guilt of officers who are prima facie responsible for failures, accidents and disasters should be clearly and definitely settled for all time by a competent court? and does the naval system of courts as now constituted accomplish that end?
7. If they do not, and it must be admitted that errors and inconsistencies are sufficiently frequent to raise the question, what is the duty of the service at large in regard to endeavoring to correct the evil?