A great deal has been written of late concerning the training necessary to bring the efficiency of the Navy to the highest point. Most of these articles, however, have dealt solely with that part of the training which might be called elementary, and the writers have confined themselves almost entirely to the training of recruits and to the gunnery training.
It is the intention of this paper to carry this training a bit further and to discuss that necessary for the ship considered as a fighting unit.
The fighting efficiency of a ship consists of so many intricate and delicate problems that it would be madness to expect them to be even adequately mentioned in one paper, therefore only one branch of this efficiency will be considered.
That particular part, which it is proposed to discuss, is fully as important, if not more so, than any of the others. It is fire control.
For the purposes of this paper fire control may be defined as "the direction of the fire of the ship, by the officer or officers directly responsible, so that the guns, as a concerted whole, may be used to the greatest advantage; that is, hitting the enemy as often and as advantageously as possible."
The importance of fire control cannot be over estimated. An efficient system gives the captain of the ship, and, through him, the commander of a fleet, the power to use the armament of his ship to the best possible advantage.
It needs little or no argument to show the immense advantage a ship with a good fire control system would have over one without, other things, of course, being equal.
The great importance of fire control is perhaps best seen when the ship as a whole, and not the individual gun, is considered as the unit. If the guns of a ship cannot be controlled, and the fire of that ship used as a concerted whole, then the value of that ship, in the fleet, is, to say the least, very much reduced, if it is not almost entirely nil. On the other hand an efficient control removes all the elements of uncertainty as to the results of an action except that of the efficiency of the gun pointers. For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that the pointers are properly trained and, if they are furnished with the necessary information to enable them to set their sights correctly, they will hit.
The term fire control having been defined it remains to point out the elements necessary to establish an efficient system.
In any system we may adopt it must be remembered that, to obtain the best results, "the power of the direction of the fire must remain in the hands of the captain." He may delegate the active part of this work to some other officer, and the very nature of things will, in all probability, make this necessary, but the principle remains as hard and fast as ever, that he alone is responsible.
The conditions which must be fulfilled to obtain the full control necessary in action are:
- A good system of communications.
- Good observation of the fire.
- An efficient system of finding the range.
- Logical distribution of the duties among the different officers of the ships.
COMMUNICATIONS.
It needs no argument to make it plain that without communications no attempt can be made at fire control. Not only must there be communications but they must be efficient. The question that naturally presents itself is what constitutes efficient communications? Briefly, they must possess speed and reliability. By reliability we mean that there should be no possibility of the receiver of an order making any mistake as to its meaning. It might perhaps be argued that this is an ideal condition and perhaps it is, but we can examine the means at our disposal and approximate as closely as possible to its fulfillment.
What are these means? They are:
(a). Messengers.
(b). Bugle calls and sound signals.
(c). Voice tubes and telephones.
(d). Automatic indicators. (Electrical or mechanical.)
Of these, messengers are perhaps reliable but they are certainly not rapid, and, if they are used, it is very probable that at the very time that they are most needed, they are not at hand. They can therefore be eliminated from our main system of communications although they might be a most useful adjunct.
Bugle calls might be used for some particular cases but their use is very limited, and they possess the additional disadvantage of being very unreliable and especially so in the heat of an action, where the noise would probably drown the sound.
Voice tubes and telephones are useful in a way and should certainly be fitted for use in the secondary line of communication.
They possess the disadvantage, however, of not being reliable, as they are frequently out of order and the shock of firing is very liable to derange them at the most critical moment. They are also slow, and, as it is necessary to employ an exchange, orders cannot be directly communicated to the guns from the conning tower or central station. There is also no assurance that the orders transmitted have been understood.
The remaining means is the mechanical or electrical indicator.
Let us first see the capabilities of the mechanical indicator. It certainly possesses speed, for the command is registered on the receiver practically as soon as the transmitter is operated. The speed requirements are fulfilled and this type of instrument is quite reliable, but there is one insurmountable drawback, that is, that it is necessary to have a very large number of transmitters to supply an adequate number of receivers, for not more than three receivers can be attached to the same transmitter.
Having studied the capabilities of the mechanical indicator and found it wanting, there remains the electrical indicator. It most certainly possesses speed and it can be and is designed so that it is equally if not more reliable than the mechanical type.
On the whole the electrical instruments more nearly fulfill the conditions assumed, speed and reliability, than any other form of communication.
Before leaving the subject of communications the nature of the orders that they are required to transmit should be analyzed. In order to do this the information required at the gun must be stated. This should be:
(a). Ranges.
(b). The target, or, in other words, the particular ship on which it is desired to concentrate the fire.
(c). The bearing of the target.
(d). The speed of the firing ship; also the speed relative to the target.
(e). The nature of the projectiles to be used.
(f). Commands necessary in battle such as "Commence and Cease firing."
(g). Instructions as to whether the fire should be rapid or slow.
(h). The portion of the target it is desired to attack.
It has been suggested, and with reason, that there should be a separate instrument to transmit each part of this varied and necessary information. The great advantage claimed is that there is always one place, and no other, to look for certain information and also that only one command appears at one instrument at a time. This is certainly a very great advantage, but is it not outweighed by the very great disadvantage of having so many to install and also by the increased possibility of their becoming deranged? It is quite possible to so combine the instruments that there should be only three instead of seven. One would show the range, another combines the commands used in battle with the instructions about the projectiles and the rate of fire desired, and the third is available for commands relative to speed and bearing of the target and also the designation of the target. It is very difficult to have an instrument that will designate in more than a general way the target to be used; hence it is perhaps better to leave off this last information and to use in its stead a telephone or voice tube, as with either of these very complete information can be given.
The proper location of the instruments must be considered. It is perfectly conceivable that the orders to be transmitted to the turret guns may differ entirely from those to be sent to the intermediate or secondary battery; hence it is necessary to have a transmitter for each of these different classes. It is also very desirable to be able to give orders to the starboard battery and at the same time to cut out the port battery. This can be arranged very simply by having a switch which throws in any desired group of guns; it is much better, however, to have one transmitter for each side, starboard and port, and one for each group of turret guns. It is of course necessary to have a receiver of each type in each turret and at each isolated gun position, and it would be of great advantage to have one at each gun but this is not absolutely necessary except perhaps in the case of the range receiver. There must, however, be a set of receivers for each group of guns of the intermediate battery.
The receivers must be so fitted that at each change of orders attention is called to it by some means, such as the tap of a bell.
An objection might be raised to such an elaborate system of communication by saying that it would probably be put out of order very early in the action; that objection however, is not well founded, for, as will be shown later, the beginning of an action is the very time when an efficient control is most necessary, and, even if the system is in operation for a very limited time only, it is certainly worth the labor and money expended on it if it will assist, to no matter how small a degree, in establishing a supremacy of fire which is essential to the successful ending of any action.
The transmitters should of course be located in the conning tower, unless it is deemed advisable to have a separate station for this specific purpose. In some respects this latter may be advisable, but on the whole the conning tower is the best location, for there the captain is close at hand to give any orders that he may wish. If the separate station is adopted, then there must be an efficient line of communications from that station to the conning tower.
In the above outline of the system of communications no provision has been made for connecting the observation station with the central control. As will be seen later this is most important, provided the observer is stationed at some place other than the conning tower or control station. It is necessary therefore to have a line of communication through which the range, or else the fall of the shots, can be communicated to the fire control party. It is an open question whether it is better to communicate the fall of the shots or for the observer to set the range directly from his observations. Whichever method is used the necessity for the line of communications remains and it must be fitted. If the ranges are to be communicated directly, then an automatic indicator must be used; if only the fall of the shots, then that instrument may be used but it should be supplemented by a telephone or voice pipe. The telephone or voice pipes must be perfect to be of any use.
OBSERVATION OF FIRE.
By observation of fire is meant the ability to see the point of impact of any particular shot.
The difficulties which surround the successful use of this very important adjunct to the fire control are most numerous. With only one gun firing it is a comparatively easy matter to see the fall of the shot; but even then it requires an immense amount of skill to apply the results of the observation, for at best we can only tell whether a shot is over or short and then only if the direction is correct. In action, where all the guns are firing, it is much more complicated, for we can rarely be sure of the gun from which any particular shot was fired, the fall of which we have seen. Again, in action we have not the benefit of knowing that a shot is over, for the target will hide its fall. Shots that are over and shots that hit will look the same unless we can actually see the shot hit, which is most improbable; therefore we have only short shots to guide us.
Granting that we have seen the fall of the shot, it is most difficult to estimate how much it is over or short, and the nearer the water the observer is the greater this difficulty. It is evident that the station of the observer should be as high as possible; it should also be so placed that the view is unobstructed. The top is the best place for this station. This position is necessarily very much exposed and taking this into consideration it is perhaps better for him to transmit the results of his observations to the central control station and there let the necessary changes of range be made. The destruction of this station will not then stop all transmission of the range and it can still be transmitted from the central control station. On the other hand, if the range is transmitted directly from the observer, the destruction of his station will at once make the fire unit the gun, which we have seen is not desirable.
The actual observation of the fall of the shot does not require any great amount of training but making the proper deductions from these observations is not only most important but also most difficult; this cannot be acquired by study but must be learned from experience.
The best training for acquiring this necessary skill would of course be constant practice observing the fire of the guns of the ship. Considerations of cost alone prohibit the use of this method and this training can only be had at the regular target practices.
The next best thing seems to be the use of the sub-calibre tubes fitted in the big guns.
It is not expected that even the most expert observer can supply the changes of range necessary for the sight setters, the most that he can do is to supply the necessary data to find the rate of change and there must be some empirical rule fixed for the use of the sight setters, in other words he is more of a check on the methods in use for keeping the range after it has once been found.
The difficulty of observing, or rather making the value of the observation useful, increases with the range. The accuracy of the observations also depend largely on the height of the observer. This is perhaps best shown by a few figures.
Let us suppose the observer to be one hundred feet above the water line (far higher than most tops), and the target to be ten feet high (far lower than the actual target will be), then a shot which is seen to strike in line with the top of the target will, at 1000 yards, be 111 yards over; at 2000 yards, 222 yards over; and so on up to 6000 yards when it will be 666 yards over.
A very small error in judging whether the shot strikes exactly in line with the top of the target will increase this distance very materially.
It is plain that we must have very careful training to properly interpret what we see, for the angle is so small that shots that are in reality very wild seem to us to be quite good.
On the whole this method is not entirely satisfactory but it seems to offer the greatest possibilities of any that we have. There is a slight modification which may be of value and that is to follow the flight of the projectile in the air. This is quite feasible at short ranges and with only one gun firing, but it is questionable if it can be used in action.
RANGE FINDING.
A most important part of fire control is that of finding the range, in fact without some method of doing this no central control, at least, is possible. In addition to its importance it is perhaps the most difficult problem with which the naval profession has to deal.
Before discussing the question of how best to solve this problem some of the features of it must be stated. What are the ranges that we will have to determine; in other words what are the probable ranges that will be used in action?
The inner limit is easily defined, it is the effective range of the torpedo; it would be simple madness to place a ship so near the enemy that any advantage of gun fire would be nullified by a well directed torpedo. This range may be considered as fifteen hundred yards.
The outer limit is not so definitely defined, but from the knowledge that we have of the trajectories of our guns, we can form some estimate of what it is likely to be.
The danger space at the various ranges is perhaps our best guide in this respect. The following table gives it to us very closely:
6” Gun 13” Gun
1000 yards 982 yards All
2000 yards 414 yards 466 yards
3000 yards 228 yards 285 yards
4000 yards 138 yards 259 yards
5000 yards 90 yards 144 yards
6000 yards 62 yards 110 yards
7000 yards 45 yards 86 yards
The target in this case being thirty feet high, which is somewhat higher than most of the targets that we will have to shoot at. The guns are the service guns of 40 calibres length for the 6" and 35 calibres for the 13".
An inspection of this table shows us that as the range increases so must the accuracy with which it is determined.
There are two possible methods that are available for range finding:
(1) By mechanical means.
(2) By the observation of the fire and the use of the armament itself.
The requirements for mechanical range-finders are such that only a very few instruments can be used. They must indicate the range mechanically and must be capable of being operated by one man. A limit must also be placed on their size. Horizontal base instruments capable of recording the ranges constantly are found to be the most suitable for all purposes.
The limits we are compelled to place on their size make the base very short and consequently the instrument is very inaccurate at long or even medium ranges. No makers claim a much greater accuracy than ten per cent for their instruments. From the table of danger spaces given above it is seen that the limit is reached somewhere between 2000 and 3000 yards for both the six- inch and the thirteen-inch guns. Again, the necessarily exposed position in which we must place these instruments renders them very liable to be placed out of action. On the whole not much reliance can be placed on them.
This unreliability renders it absolutely necessary that the instruments be supplemented by the second method, namely, the gun. Here also we are confronted with the difficulties of observation, but the possibilities of this method are greater than those of the mechanical means of range finding.
The use of the gun is very simple in theory but it is the practical application of this theory that is difficult. The method is to establish what is variously called a "fork" or a "bracket."
The range must not only be found but it must be kept during an action.
The problem divides itself into two phases, for both of which the details have to be worked out.
The first phase is at the beginning of the action when it is necessary to determine the point at which to begin firing and this may be called the preliminary range finding. Before the action the range of opening fire will probably have been decided upon so that we will only have to determine when that point is reached. For this purpose a single gun may be used. The use of a single gun permits the observation to be more accurate and consequently the results should be better. When the ship has approached the Opening range fire should be opened with one gun, the sights being set at the opening range. The observer notes the fall of the shot and communicates the results of his observations to the gun. Firing is continued slowly until the observer reports the shots hitting. In this manner the opening range is correctly established. In the meanwhile the rest of the battery has been kept informed of the results, so that when the point of opening fire is reached they are ready. This preliminary ranging not only gives the opening range but also gives data which is available for finding the rate of change, which is a most important factor in keeping the correct range after it is once found.
As soon as the firing becomes general the use of a single gun, or group of guns, becomes well nigh impossible. The observer must now use the fire of the ship as a whole. For this to be of any advantage all the guns must be using the same range on their sight bars.
From the theory of probability we know that if all the guns are fired at the same instant, with the same range on the sight bars, and all correctly pointed, the shots will not fall in the same spot but will fall in an ellipse the center of which is the mean point of impact. In other words some of the shots will fall short and some over. The observer must use this fact, and if the shots are about equally distributed in "overs" and "shorts" he knows that the range is about correct. If none of the shots are short or none over then the range must be corrected accordingly.
The fact that one gun cannot be used in action to keep the range, but the fire of the ship as a whole must be used, is one of the greatest arguments in favor of central control.
There is a time, however, when it may be necessary for what might be called independent ranging; that is when both sides are engaged. In that event the attention of the observer must be given to the most important side and the other must rely on their own observation. This will probably not be so difficult, as the ranges will probably be quite short and the projectile can be followed in its flight.
In conclusion it must be said that neither method is entirely satisfactory but the use of the gun seems to offer the greatest possibilities; it requires, however, a large amount of training on the part of the observer. The fact that independent ranging must at times be used does not condemn the system of central control but merely shows that all the officers should have this training in observing and controlling the fire.
DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES OF OFFICERS.
We have seen that the efficient use of the armament of a ship is in a great measure dependent on the amount of supervision and control given the fire of the individual guns, and all through this paper the effort has been made to work out plans for making the various parts of the ship's battery into one great effective whole. The necessity for communications, observation of the fire, and range finding, have been shown and plans outlined to obtain the desired results. No mention has been made of how to adapt these plans to existing conditions, in other words nothing has been said about the duties of the various officers who make up the ship's complement.
The ideal condition suggests a gigantic machine all the parts of which have been carefully fitted and adjusted and such should be the ship. There must be one difference, however, for our machine must be a thinking one and the personnel are all more or less important parts, each having his distinct function and duty. All training should be towards this desired end but we must recognize the fact that some parts of our machine may be broken and we cannot afford to allow a small break to wreck the whole structure; therefore, in our training, we must not only aim to get this machine-like precision but we must have our parts interchangeable, that is, if one link in our chain is broken, the two links on either side must be capable of closing up the gap thus left.
With this idea always in view let us see how we can best arrange the duties so that we will have our thinking machine.
The captain, as we have seen before, is alone responsible for the efficiency of his ship and must come first in all our considerations. What should his part be in our machine?
If in a single ship action, he must place the ship in the most advantageous position. If in a fleet action, he must keep his ship in the position assigned by the admiral and carry out all the orders that he receives. He must designate the target and the method of attack, that is he must decide upon the proper time to open fire, also the proper projectiles to be used by the various classes of guns. Briefly he must control the fire. It is evident, however, that he cannot actively exercise this control and at the same time attend to the other duties which devolve on him in action and his control must be through the staff which he would have to assist him. This staff should consist of the observation officer or officers, and the central control station officer. The captain's duty then will consist in designating the target and the method of attack and the details must be left to his subordinates, the observer and the officer in charge of the communication system.
The gunnery officer is the most natural selection to be put in charge of the communication system. His duties would be to supervise the transmission of the ranges and orders to the various gun positions and to set the ranges from the reports received from the observers. In other words he is responsible for the execution of the orders of the captain in regard to the designation of the target, the projectiles to be used, the part of the ship that the various classes of guns are to attack, the ranges, and the corrections that are to be made for lateral errors.
The observer, as the name implies, must note the fall of the shots and generally observe the result of the fire of the ship. He must also transmit the results of his observations to the gunnery officer so that the latter may have sufficient data to keep the range intelligently.
The divisional officers are responsible for the execution of the orders conveyed to them. This is not all, however, for in case of a breakdown in the communication they must be able to take up the duties of the control and make the fire of their battery as efficient as the conditions will permit. They are also responsible for the proper handling of the guns in their divisions by the guns' crews and must be at hand to supervise them in case of accidents.
The question of centralization, as opposed to diffusion, of control once more comes to the front. Claims have been made that once the action is begun no central control is possible; therefore, it is better to have the gun as the unit instead of the ship. This view does not seem entirely sound, and surely, with efficient communications, there is no reason why proper control should not obtain.
It has also been maintained that the communications will be broken so early in the action that our central control will become inoperative. It must be admitted, however, that the efficiency of the fire is enormously increased while the communications are intact; is it not better to have this greater efficiency for a time, even if we do have to abandon it later on? Again it may readily be the means of winning an action, for it is quite possible that while it is in use a supremacy of fire may be established which cannot but be of the greatest advantage. Another argument in its favor, if more are needed, is that at the beginning of an action when the ranges are long the fire cannot be observed with any degree of satisfaction from the gun positions (which is necessary in case our system of control is discarded).
To carry out the simile we have adopted, that of a machine, we may assume the division of the work to be as follows:
The captain is the operator, the rest of the complement the working parts. The gunnery officer having charge of the communications and therefore the fire control, another officer observing the fire, the divisional officers their divisions, and the guns' and ammunition crews the firing of the guns and the supply of ammunition.
TRAINING.
An effort has been made, under the heading "Observation of Fire," to show how difficult it is to make the correct deductions from these observations, and also the necessity for a large amount of experience in this important duty.
As has been shown, the best way to obtain this training is in observing the actual practice with the guns themselves. We have also seen that, with the limited amount of ammunition allowed, some means must be devised to supplement this practice in order to bring the officers who are to be entrusted with this work up to the highest state of efficiency.
The most natural solution of this problem seems to lie in the use of sub-calibre tubes in the great guns. These tubes should be at least one pounders. They are already fitted in the turret guns and could be very easily fitted in the 6", 5" and 4" guns. One pounder tubes are suggested for the reason that the ammunition for them is comparatively inexpensive; three pounders, or better still six pounders, could be used and the training derived therefrom would be of greater value for the simple reason that the ranges used could be longer.
Using the one-pounder the fall of the shots can be seen up to about 2000 yards. It might be said that this range is very short and that little difficulty would be experienced in keeping the shots on. A little investigation will show, however, that the conditions approach very closely long range firing, with the single exception that the observer can at this practice tell more about the fall of the shots. The sights of a 13" gun, with 2100 f. s. muzzle velocity, would have to be set at 5350 yards, and with sights graduated for 2350 f. s. initial velocity, the velocity this gun gives using smokeless powder, this sight bar range will be something over 6000 yards, or about equal to the outer limit of range that we have established as being effective. The sights would then have to be changed in a similar manner to that used when firing at long range with the guns themselves, which is the practice we desire.
If it is admitted that we have a means of developing our system of observation, by the use of sub-calibre attachments, let us consider the training to be used.
Like any other training this must be progressive, and we cannot hope to find ourselves proficient at once.
As a first step send out a target and anchor it at some unknown distance, within the outer limit of our range (2000 yards). When the target is planted and the observer is ready, commence firing, the ship remaining at anchor. It must be remembered that at this range instruments are fairly accurate, but at the ranges this practice is to represent, say 6000 yards, they are of little value, hence their use should be forbidden. Another reason for not using range finders is that the practice is to give the observers experience in finding the range with the gun alone.
Let us assume this problem: To find the range with the gun alone.
Following out the proposed system the observer assumes the range to be say 4500 yards, which of course should be as close to the actual range as possible, preferably a little short. Orders are given to set the sights at this range; one shot is fired from the battery or from a number of guns. The "bracket" is at once put into use and the firing continued until the range is found. This practice is continued until a fair amount of expertness is obtained.
The next step is to anchor the target as before and to get the ship under-way. Steam towards or away from the target at a known speed. This allows the observer to know the rate of change of the range. Continue this practice until the observer becomes expert not only in finding the range but in keeping it.
Then comes the final step, which is made to approximate, as closely as possible, the conditions of battle, namely, where the speed is not only known but also varies from time to time. The bearing of the target should also be changed for this will give practice in correcting for lateral errors.
In action a knowledge of the relative speed alone, of the ship and the target, and not the actual speed is necessary. From this it is evident that the method of range finding is the same and it is only the execution that is more difficult; it is not at all necessary to have the target moving, for the conditions may be simulated by varying the speed of the ship and changing the bearing of the target.
The target used in this practice should be a regulation great gun target or even larger, so that we may not be dependent on the fall of the shots for our knowledge of the expertness of the observer but can count the number of hits on the target and thereby tell positively.
LONG RANGE FIRING.
In another part of this paper a table has been given which shows the danger space, for the 6" and 13" guns, at the various ranges from 1000 to 7000 yards, for a thirty foot target. The term "danger space" may be expressed in different words by saying, that in order to hit the target, we must know the range within certain limits.
Looking at our table we see that for a six-inch gun, at four thousand yards, this is 138 yards, and at five thousand yards it is 90 yards.
With a ship steaming towards or away from the target, at ten knots, the range changes about six yards per second.
From this it is easily seen that, at five thousand yards, if the gun is not fired within fifteen seconds from the time the sight is set, a hit cannot be made. At six thousand yards the time in which we have to fire, after the sight has been set, is even less.
From the above the natural conclusion to be drawn is that, at ranges of four thousand yards and above, we must have our sights correctly set at the moment of firing or at least they must be correct within the limits of the danger space at the firing range.
It is evident then that the sights must be set at frequent intervals, and, in order to do this correctly some empirical rule must be established which can be followed closely. The observation of the fire will serve to correct this.
The means which suggests itself of having the correct range on the sights at the moment of firing is to have the sights set at given intervals of time, say every fifteen seconds, and allowing the pointer to fire only during a given period. This plan necessitates some method of keeping time so that the sight setter will know when to set his sight. Time keepers could be had at each gun and their duty would consist in notifying the sight setter when to set the sight, but such a scheme would be most cumbersome. A better one seems to be to have the time kept at the central station, and, by means of electric bells, marking the time.
The practical working of this plan is that an automatic timekeeper would ring bells at the various gun positions. It would consist of a clockwork arrangement which could be made to make the signals at fixed intervals and for certain periods of time. When the bell stopped ringing, this would be the signal for the sight setter to change the sight.
This system might be carried a bit further and the bell be rung for a certain period of time, depending on the range; this would then be a signal to the pointer that his sight was correctly set and that he could fire during the time that the bell was ringing. As stated above when the bell stopped the sight setter would at once make the change and the sights would then be correctly set to commence firing at the next signal.
At three thousand yards it requires thirty-eight seconds for the ship to run a distance equal to the danger space; hence if the sights were set every thirty seconds they would be sufficiently correct, during the entire interval, to ensure a fair percentage of hits and it would only be necessary to give the time signal.
As the ranges decrease this interval becomes longer until we reach the short ranges when it is desirable to deliver the greatest volume of fire.
THE PROPOSED AND PRESENT SYSTEMS—A COMPARISON.
The essential features of a proper system of fire control having been pointed out, let us now see how this compares with the methods now employed in our ships.
The centre about which the whole scheme, as outlined, revolves is communications; if they are lacking the whole structure falls.
At present our system of communications consists of telephones, voice pipes, (both of which have been shown to be entirely unsuited to our purpose), and what are called "battle order" and "range" transmitters and receivers.
These transmitters and receivers are electrical, which is considered the best type, but they are not entirely satisfactory in their design. For example the range receiver shows no range less than one thousand yards and the smallest division that can be indicated is two hundred yards, which we have seen is barely small enough for the very moderate range of three thousand yards.
Again one transmitter serves for all the receivers and no provision is made for sending discriminating orders to the different types of guns.
On the whole our present communications will not permit our using the system of fire control which we have outlined, and some improvements must be made.
This improvement is more a question of amplifying the present system than of changing it completely, although the design of the instruments needs changing.
CONCLUSION.
In this paper an effort has been made to show some of the advantages of an efficient control of the gun fire of a ship. With that end in view the conditions have been discussed and the means of fulfilling these conditions have been outlined.
The most important part of the whole system is undoubtedly efficient communications and next to that observation of the fire.
All the officers of the ship should be given the necessary training to be able to fill this most important station with ability but if Other conditions make it impracticable for all to be so trained, then it is essential to have certain officers become proficient in this branch.
Looking at the subject of naval warfare from a general standpoint, it seems that most of our thought and energies have been directed towards the improvement of the mechanical side of the question and too little thought has been paid to developing the personal element which must in all cases be the deciding factor in any action in which the engaged forces are at all equal from the mechanical side.
The ultimate end of the establishment and maintenance of a navy is to be in a position, when the occasion arises, to deal a death blow to the enemy. To do this we must rely on our gun fire, as that is our principal weapon of offense, therefore let us bend all our energies to developing to the greatest extent this weapon. In other words let us make each ship an efficient whole by welding together the units with an efficient system of fire control.