See No. 109.
Lieut. YATES STIRLING, JR., U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Fullinwider's essay on "The Fleet and its Personnel," hits a synchronizing cord in every officer of our navy. Every one will say to himself after reading the article, that is just what I have believed for years," or, "that is just what I have advocated since the rehabilitation of the navy," but nevertheless, this subject, so vital to our country which must, in spite of all opposition from dissenting parties politic, maintain the position it has won by the sword among the world powers, has been left to a young but very able officer to state clearly and concisely before the country. The white man's burden of colonization has been securely strapped to our back. We must bear it, and for our self-respect and that of the world, we must carry it without staggering.
(1) Administration and Organization.—This is the deep pit into which our navy has fallen and it looks as if the sides were too high and steep for it to get out without assistance from above.
A general staff, composed of the most intelligent officers of the service above the rank of commander, Lieutenant Fullinwider believes, could get us out of the pit. True, we should have such a staff or body of seagoing officers, who will represent all that is best in the personnel of the navy, whom Congress will have confidence in, and when these men hand In their carefully worked out notes to the Secretary of the Navy, and he goes before Congress to give testimony on the Naval Appropriation Bill, no such discussions as we read in the newspapers would occur. Our Congress is an able body of men, men of all callings. They would say: "This plan has the support of those men of our country who are best able to know what is good for our naval establishment; they have given their life study to this particular subject; they are authorities, quoted all over the world, familiar with every conceivable engine of modern maritime warfare; they tell us we need so many ships of such and such a class and an increase of the personnel to correspond; we know our country needs a navy second to none in the world and a personnel as efficient as our ships are formidable; this is a national issue, local politics should not enter into discussion; we are the guardians of the country's treasury and the nation demands we use it for the common good. We are not naval men. This body of highly trained men show us wherein our duty lies; useless discussions will do no good, this bill as it stands should be passed." If this state of affairs could be brought about, the navy, phoenix-like, would rise from her ashes and the richest country in the world would have a navy that would make our flag respected in every country on the globe and would be an insurance on the many millions of United States gold invested both at home and in our island possessions.
(2) Organization of the Present Fleet.—This plan is practicable and feasible and should be carried into effect at once.
Our prestige abroad has been hurt in many ways by the lack of system of organization of our present squadrons. To a naval eye it is ludicrous to see the many classes of vessels in a single squadron. No battery alike, and of vastly different manoeuvering qualities.
(3) The "Home Base" idea is an excellent one and should prove of the greatest benefit to the service. The only thing to guard against in buying the land will be to see that sufficient ground is bought and that the grog shops and low dives that always cluster about a government reservation are kept far enough away so as not to become a common nuisance. When one of our navy yards was bought the government saw fit to get just as little land as it could, with the consequence that these places sprung up in such close proximity that it has been recommended to buy more land at a tremendous cost in order to protect the water supply and more fully guard government property. The whole peninsular on which the navy yard is situated could have been bought for little or nothing at the time the yard was founded, but this comes from a lack of policy.
(4) Building Program.—This hits the mark exactly. Why not advocate 47 battleships to be named after the 47 states, changing the names of the monitors to Indian names? Why would it not be a good idea for each state to look out for the welfare of its battleship? When it becomes antiquated, then the state's prestige is hurt, and it will use all influence it can bring to bear in the national Congress to have it replaced by a more modern one; however, this brings in local issues into national ones, which in general should be avoided.
The small gunboat proposition is good. They should be kept in hand for revolutions in South and Central America and other times when a single ship only is needed, instead of breaking up a squadron into its units when a demand comes for several ships at different places. At present the cruiser squadron on the Asiatic station, which by order of the department was always to cruise in company, is distributed to widely different parts:
1…Chefoo,
1…Shanghai,
1…Chemulpo,
1…Manila.
If we had gunboats sufficient for this work the department would be able to carry out its own plans. Building ships with no military value is like throwing money into the sea. The time is passed for training sailors. Men of a mechanical education are desired; a slight knowledge of seamanship is required in the way of knotting, splicing and serving, but this can be acquired on a ship with a fighting value just as well.
In regard to the 3500 ton, 25 knot, scout cruisers, a comparison of tonnage and speed does not show us that they could fulfill one condition vital to scouting; their coal capacity would necessarily be limited, giving then but a small radius of action. A plan which has recommended itself to England, Germany, France, and last but not least, Japan, that of subsidy, should recommend itself to every American and would prove most beneficial to both our merchant marine and navy. Instead of having to build and keep up a large fleet of scouts, vessels with very little fighting value, useful only in time of war, we could rely on the large steamship companies to build a large fleet of fast mail steamers, run and kept in repair by the several companies, on board of which would be trained men, available in time of war, with no cost to the government except the comparatively small subsidy paid each year. These fast steamers could at any time be taken over by the government, crews and all, and we saw, in 1898, how useful they are as scouts.
(5) Enlisted Personnel.—The essayist is right; the apprentice system has of late years proved a failure; the reasons are fundamental and can only be remedied by a change of system. One thing can not be eradicated even by this change, and that is, a mechanical man demands a high price ashore and naval men after one, or at least two cruises, turn out to be good mechanical men, dynamo tenders, mechanics in gun and arm factories, etc. Of late years the demand for such men has been great and there is where our best men are going. Of course they will return in time of public danger, but it is feared that they are lost to us until such time. Maybe, as Lieutenant Fullinwider says, if the navy can be made more attractive to them by the establishment of Home Bases, giving them a taste of domestic life, a great many good men may be spared to us.
Agreed, with the essayist, in regard to using the converted merchant ships as training ships. What an awakening it must be for a young man fresh from one of the Western States where he has been lead to believe that the United States is one of the greatest countries in the world, put on board an old merchant cargo steamer with a few guns, for his first training cruise. He goes into foreign parts and sees fine men of war in homogeneous fleets or squadrons, with flags flying over them belonging to countries he has been told are second or third rate in international affairs. This may not cause many desertions, but it has a bad effect on the recruit. It is, nevertheless a bad policy to keep such ships in commission at a time when there is a demand for more officers and men on ships having a fighting value. These converted merchant vessels mentioned above have been used in our manoeuvres in the West Indies, having been given positions in a paper fleet of battleships and armored cruisers; the manoeuvres were, by many officers participating, likened to playing dolls. If we wish to have manoeuvres, and we all know we need them throughout the service, well! take the tools we have in hand and use them in earnest, relegate the merchant ships to transports and hospitals ships, but do not attempt to give them the traditions of a man of war; they are, using a Jacky expression, "mushroom ships," and their crews, no matter how good the material, are bound to be mushroom crews.
(6) Officers’ Training.—Officers should be trained and encouraged to take up specialties. We have delusioned ourselves into thinking that each man in the navy could do every other one's duty. You can legislate a line officer an engineer officer, but he still remains a line officer or vice versa, and in consequence our navy has come face to face with a very grave peril; lack of engineers and ordnance officers. Three years ago some one woke the Ordnance Department up to the fact that they had been asleep for nearly five years. This Rip Van Winkle policy is dangerous in these progressive days and can be guarded against only by organizing corps of officers to be the watch dogs over their several specialties, and they are to keep the sea going officers informed of what is going on ashore and the sea going officers must reciprocate. They should take their turn afloat, but only on ships where their specialty will be benefitted. There is a subject that Lieutenant Fullinwider does not mention. It properly belongs under the head Building Program. It is this: Our naval constructors have too much power. The advice of those who use the ships is totally disregarded by a body of theoretical men who will believe nothing unless it can be proved by mathematics. If some system could be devised to give the naval officers who go to sea in the ships, a chance to have changes made that they see are necessary before the ships are built, a good deal less money will be spent on changes afterwards.
The present steam launch used in the navy is unseaworthy and unfit to be carried by a large ship. Officers have time and time again recommended a change, but we still have the same unseaworthy article.
In conclusion, Lieutenant Fullinwider does not mention the growing evil of frequent shifting about of officers and men. This is a death blow to the efficiency of the fleet.
The British system of a commission of a ship is the plan that we should adopt at once, keeping officers and men together in the same ship for three or four years.