Motto: Commune bonum.
The navy requires the most perfect organization and administration. Sea power has been, and will continue to be, one of the greatest political factors in modern history, and, since the battle fleet is the embodiment of a nation's sea power, it follows that a nation's place among the world-powers depends largely Upon the strength of her fleet. From considerations of cost, the numerical strength of a fleet must, necessarily, be limited; and no one power, however wealthy, can aspire to the control of the sea simply through numerical superiority in battleships; therefore, each ship should be as nearly perfect as it is possible to make her. The ship will be as efficient as the organization and administration of the navy and the ability of the ship's crew will permit, and, to a large extent, the latter factor depends upon the former.
The perfect naval organization may be likened to a perfect machine in which each part is designed, neither too strong nor too weak, for its particular function; in which no part is unnecessary to the whole; and in which, even under the heaviest working load, all parts perform their work smoothly, automatically, and continuously.
Only through practically perfect organization and administration can the battle fleet be brought to the highest possible state of efficiency and maintained in readiness to strike quickly and surely the moment war is declared. Such is the true meaning of military preparedness, which is regarded by all competent military men, and by all true statesmen, as a national necessity, and which has been advocated by the ablest of our public men from the time of Washington to the present day. It is now well understood that while years are required to build, equip and man a battleship, a war may be finished in a few weeks, or, at the most, a few months. Our national history is the strongest proof of the utter folly of unpreparedness for war. We have never fought a war that could not have been much shortened, and the loss of men and money correspondingly lessened, if we had only been prepared. At the outbreak of the Spanish-American war our navy was somewhat better prepared than is usual with us, but it must be remembered that Spain was a third-class power. Even then, much time was lost in getting ready after war became imminent, and much money was spent in the purchase of a heterogeneous collection of cruisers, yachts, colliers, etc., which, for the most part, but illy served their purpose, and which are of little permanent value to our naval establishment. Had the $50,000,000 hurriedly voted by Congress for national defense at the outbreak of war, been appropriated a few years earlier, eight powerful battleships could have been added to the navy, and with such a squadron ready to sail to the coast of Spain, not one of the enemy's ships would have dared cross the Atlantic. In fact, there is every reason to believe that had we possessed such a squadron, the war itself would have been impossible. Our unpreparedness was the natural result of our lack of naval policy.
We want our fleet to be such a power as the world has never seen. While its true purpose is the preservation of peace and the furtherance of civilization, it must always be ready for the supreme arbitrament of war. An invincible navy would be the most perfect guarantee of peace, since it would make war practically impossible, or it would so easily overwhelm the enemy as to bring a war quickly to a close. In any case, if the nation is to be allowed to work out its high destiny peacefully and honorably, a navy that will guarantee peace is a national insurance well worth the price we must pay for it.
In recent years our Congresses, in deference to the awakened interest of the people, have provided liberally for the naval establishment, and succeeding Congresses may reasonably be expected to foster its growth. It is the duty of the officers of the service to do all in their power to bring into operation the most perfect organization and administration possible, to the end that there may be no misdirected effort and that the maximum fighting efficiency may be attained.
Much has been written on the subject of administration and organization of the navy, particularly in regard to the enlisted personnel, but as yet we are far from having any system that will meet the requirements of the service. If the subject could be handled by a General Staff or by some form of Board of Control, it would, no doubt, be readily solved; but in the absence of such control naval affairs are managed with such lack of continuous policy, such haphazard expedients of the moment, that good and lasting results are impossible of achievement. Indeed, it speaks well for the service in general, that, under such circumstances, it has arrived at a fair state of efficiency. The fault is fundamental, rather than particular, since even the state seems to have no continuous policy.
The navy, as a fighting organization, is not as efficient as it should be, and this fault is due to the absence of proper organization more than to any other cause. This fault, which is apparent in all parts of our present system, may be laid at the door of the law-maker, the administrator, and the naval officers themselves. In fact, the great obstacle to reform is the impracticability of fixing the responsibility for present defective methods; but the service is primarily responsible. Taking, for example, the question of a General Staff for the navy; progressive officers have been advocating for years the creation of a General Staff, but without success, yet its necessity is almost universally recognized. Congress is looked to for the necessary legislation to create the desired administrative body, but Congress cannot be expected to act until the necessity for action is made evident, and until a plan endorsed by the leading naval officials is submitted to it for action. No plan has yet been agreed upon by our naval officials for the very sufficient, but regrettable, reason that any plan that will adequately serve the desired purpose will decrease the prestige of particular bureaus or officials. It appears, therefore, that the efficiency of the service must suffer until, by an Executive order or Congressional action, the much-needed reform may be obtained in spite of its opponents. Necessarily opinions as to what form of General Staff is most desirable vary widely, but the service would be content with any reorganization that would promote systematic and efficient administration. Until we get a General Staff, or its equivalent, no comprehensive system is possible, for the simple reason that, without it, there can be no co-ordination between conflicting interests in the service and no permanent and continuous policy carried out.
ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT FLEET.
The history of the American Navy records not a single fleet action in the true sense of the world. This is the result, not of tactical or strategical considerations, but rather of our own weakness or that of the enemy, which prevented the mobilization of fleets. History of older and more experienced nations teaches us that, in naval warfare between strong forces, vessels must be able to act together in squadrons and fleets, and it is probable that in any great naval war of the future the decisive battle will be between fleets representing the real naval strength of the respective powers. So, in time of peace, we train our officers for the ultimate test by cruising and maneuvering in squadrons, and in war games. Aside from this main object, the division of ships into squadrons undoubtedly has the most beneficial effect on the officers and enlisted men, in that it cultivates alertness and keen judgment, promotes rivalry and emulation, aids in keeping the ships "taut," and in many ways promotes the esprit de corps. This leads up to the question: why not extend this principle to the entire service; why not put all our gunboats and cruisers in squadron; not, as is now too frequently the case, without regard to types, but of similar ships, as nearly as possible?
Let us see what disposition could be made of our present material. Taking into account the vessels now under construction, squadrons of four vessels each could be organized, these squadrons combined into fleets, as follows:
HOME STATION.
NORTH ATLANTIC COAST.
FIRST FLEET. SECOND FLEET.
First Battleship Squadron. First Battleship Squadron.
Connecticut. Georgia.
Louisiana. Nebraska.
Minnesota. New Jersey.
Kansas. Rhode Island.
Second Battleship Squadron. Second Battleship Squadron.
Vermont. Iowa.
Virginia. Massachusetts.
Idaho. Indiana.
Mississippi. Oregon.
Battle Cruiser Squadron. Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Tennessee. California.
Washington. West Virginia.
Colorado. Maryland.
Pennsylvania. South Dakota.
CRUISER (Training) SQUADRONS.
(1) (5)
New York. Albany.
Columbia. New Orleans.
Minneapolis. Cincinnati.
Olympia. Raleigh.
(2) (6)
Chicago. Marblehead.
Baltimore. Montgomery.
Newark. Detroit.
San Francisco. Topeka.
(3) (7)
Galveston. Bennington.
Tacoma. Yorktown.
Boston. Concord.
Atlanta.
(4)
Alert.
Ranger.
Castine.
Machias.
PACIFIC STATION.
ENTIRE PACIFIC OCEAN.
First Battleship Squadron. Second Battleship Squadron.
Wisconsin. Missouri.
Alabama. Maine.
Illinois. Kearsarge.
Ohio. Kentucky.
First Cruiser Squadron. Second Cruiser Squadron.
Charleston. Denver.
Milwaukee. Des Moines.
St. Louis. Chattanooga.
Brooklyn. Cleveland.
Third Cruiser Squadron. Fourth Cruiser Squadron.
Wilmington. Annapolis.
Helena. Vicksburg.
Marietta. Princeton.
Wheeling. Newport.
PHILIPPINE SQUADRON.
This squadron should include all the mosquito fleet of gunboats now stationed in those waters. These little vessels, having no military value except police duty in the waters of the archipelago, should constitute a permanent flotilla, manned largely by native crews. There appears to be no reason for including the Philippine Squadron in the Pacific (or Asiatic) Fleet; indeed, from geographical, political and administrative considerations, it should constitute an independent command. There is nothing in common between it and the battle fleets.
In connection with the foregoing plan, each battleship or battle-cruiser squadron should be commanded by a vice- or rear-admiral; each second-class cruiser squadron by its senior captain, and squadrons of small cruisers and gunboats by commanders. Thus, many officers would get the opportunity to command squadrons years before they do under present conditions. This is very important; the navy cannot have too many officers trained for supreme command.
Fleets, composed of squadrons of battleships, battle-cruisers, destroyers, scouts, and auxiliaries, should have a vice-admiral in command, who, under the General Staff, would shape the work of the fleet, but would look to the squadron commanders for results. He should be relieved of all comparatively unimportant routine work, especially in the matter of correspondence. For some reasons his flagship should be a very fast battleship or the highest type of battle-cruiser, and not included in any squadron. The commander-in-chief in that case would be able to take his place in the line of battle or to remain free to direct the engagement from any position desired. If this idea should be adopted, it should constitute the sole exception in the general plan of squadron formation.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED ORGANIZATION.
Under the proposed organization of the battle fleet we have unusual means of promoting rivalry and emulation, not only among the ships of a homogeneous squadron, but also between the squadrons themselves. Esprit de corps and pride in ship and service would be more easily cultivated. Comparisons and the creation of standards of efficiency would become the order of the day, because the ships of a type, being always in company, and cruising or maneuvering under exactly the same conditions, could be compared more easily. For example, take the comparison of target practice scores; if ships of a type are scattered they are bound to fire under different conditions, however slight, and comparison becomes difficult; and, too, if one ship is in Chinese waters and her sister ship is on the home station, it is impossible to cultivate the intense rivalry that should exist if the results of the practice become known only several weeks after the interest in the practice has somewhat subsided. It can easily be imagined that, in a squadron of four battleships of the same type, the interest and enthusiasm among the officers and men at target practice would approach that shown in the intercollegiate football contests. This would do much for straight shooting as well as for the morale of the men.
At present one of our squadrons is composed of an armored cruiser, two third-class cruisers of very different types, two gunboats of a type, a monitor, and a wooden corvette training-ship. In the squadron of seven ships, therefore, are six different types, all having different maneuvering qualities, different speeds and steaming radii, and different types of guns and mounts. Other squadrons are not much better off. Of course, it is useless to expect the best results in training officers in evolutions with such nondescript squadrons; and there cannot be a keen spirit of rivalry among gun-pointers using vastly different types of guns and mounts, because the man with open sights and a gun carriage that it takes four men to train knows he cannot compete with another who uses a telescope sight and delicate elevating and training gear.
From considerations of economy, also, a squadron should be homogeneous, as the ships could then cruise at their most economical speed, which would be the same for all. Also coal expenditures would, as a matter of routine, be compared daily by signal, with the result that the fire-room forces would soon learn how to get the best results from the coal. Incidentally, if ships of the same type should happen to have boilers of different types, the simple fact of their cruising together under exactly similar conditions would furnish a ready means of determining the better type of boiler.
THE HOME BASE.
With a large fleet divided into squadrons, it would seem important that each squadron should be attached permanently to a base, and that the squadron should always operate from its base except, perhaps, in time of war. In the matter of repairs, especially, it would be conducive to efficiency and economy to have repairs to a vessel always made at one place where her plans, patterns and spare parts are kept, and where the officials and workmen are most familiar with that vessel. To be thoroughly effective and economical, any work must be thoroughly organized. The necessity for efficiency needs no discussion, and, in view of the increase of our fleet, economy is becoming more and more imperative. The more economical we are the more money we will have for new construction, because Congress and the public are more interested in the total annual appropriation than in the number of new vessels provided for.
It is believed that the best results could be obtained by the establishment of home bases for squadrons, to be a home in every sense of the word, the home of the ship, the officers, and the men. It should be located near a great commercial and labor center, and should have every facility for docking, repairing, equipping, provisioning, and manning the fleet expeditiously.
To each home base should be attached a battle fleet, which, as described further on, would consist of two squadrons of battleships, one squadron of battle-cruisers, a squadron of scouts, two flotillas of destroyers, and the fleet auxiliaries. There would also be attached to these stations one or more cruiser or training squadrons and sonic vessels of the coast defense fleet. This is a large number of vessels to be attached to one station, but it would have its advantages, as may readily be shown. Primarily, it is a good thing for a commander-in-chief to be always in immediate touch with the vessels of his command; the more fully that principle is carried out the better able is he to keep his forces in hand, especially in matters relating to repairs.
At the home base should be a berth for each vessel of the fleet, and alongside should be a ship house in which could be stored stores and provisions, spare parts of machinery, etc., for that particular vessel. All should be so conveniently arranged that, in case of need, a vessel could arrive at the station and get ready for sea in the time actually required for her crew to put her stores on board. Here, also, should be stored the guns and mounts and all equipment necessary to convert naval auxiliaries of the merchant marine into armored cruisers.
The home base should have barracks for all enlisted men not in seagoing ships, recreation grounds, a club-house for the men, with gymnasium, baths, canteen, etc. There is every reason why the station should be beautified with handsome buildings, well-paved streets, shade trees, lawns, a park, etc. There should be quarters for all officers, and an officers' club. Since the station, under this system, becomes the permanent home of officers and men, it should be made as attractive as possible.
At present all navy-yard employees are civilians; this is all wrong. A large proportion of the positions could, and should, be filled by men who had served a certain length of time on board ship—say three enlistments, or twelve years. In this manner there could be built up a well-disciplined, highly-organized navy-yard force of trained men constituting a really effective Naval Reserve such as we can never hope to have by any other means. There can be hardly any doubt that by holding out this employment at the home base as a reward for service in the navy, continuous service would become the rule, rather than the exception as under the present system. With this inducement to remain in the service and the pension and other advantages there would be not the slightest difficulty in attracting a very desirable class of men to the navy and retaining them permanently, for the simple reason that the men would be far better off in the service than out of it.
Under these conditions the enlisted man would have the opportunity to marry and make for himself a home, which is something that appeals to the average man the world over, and which under present conditions is quite impossible. While it would probably be to the advantage of the service to have only unmarried officers and men, it is an impracticable condition, and any system of organization must take cognizance of the fact.
The duties of the fleet in time of peace are to keep in readiness for war and to show the flag where it is most needed for the protection of national interests. The first duty applies to every vessel in the service. The second duty could most properly be performed by the cruiser or training squadron.
Since the battle fleet is the real strength of the navy, it should be kept in close touch with the home bases and should be kept so tuned up to the highest pitch of efficiency as to be ready for battle at a day's notice. Every ship should be kept in commission. Rather than let ships rust away, it is better to keep them going and replace parts or effect repairs as necessary, as undue deterioration cannot be prevented otherwise. But it is bad business to keep a ship going for years without repairs, and then, when she can no longer be run with safety, when she can no longer steam, or when her battery is worn out, lay her up for two or three years' overhauling. It is bad business because during the latter part of her cruising she is not an efficient ship, and while she is out of commission she is unavailable for war. It would be far better to repair vessels frequently (say once each year) and for very short periods at a time. By anticipating repairs and making preparations in advance of a vessel's arrival at the navy-yard much time could be saved. In other words, system is needed. Under the proposed system it would probably never be necessary to put a ship out of commission or to keep her under repairs for a longer period than a month during her whole lifetime—that is until she became obsolete and in need of rebuilding, by which time, under a national building programme, she would be replaced by a new ship.
Since there are attached to the home base eight battleships, four battle-cruisers, a dozen destroyers, one or two squadrons of cruisers, the fleet auxiliaries, and several coast-defense vessels, repair work could be distributed in such a manner as to give employment to a practically constant number of yard workmen. It is, of course, important that a navy-yard should have steady work. To this end the year's work of each battle fleet might be arranged on some such lines as the following:
First Battleship Squadron.
1st quarter: Cruising in squadron abroad; target practice on return.
2nd quarter: At home base for repairs, small-arm practice, port exercises.
3rd quarter: Cruising in squadron, near home base; record practice.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers.
Second Battleship Squadron.
1st quarter: Cruising in squadron near home base.
2nd quarter: Cruise abroad; target practice.
3rd quarter: At home base.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers; target practice.
Battle Cruiser Squadron.
1st quarter: At home base.
2nd quarter: Cruise abroad; target practice.
3rd quarter: Cruise near home base.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers; target practice.
Scout Squadron.
1st quarter: Cruising abroad with first battleship squadron.
2nd quarter: At home base.
3rd quarter: At home base.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers.
Destroyer Flotilla.
1st quarter: At home base or exercising in vicinity.
2nd quarter: At home base or exercising in vicinity.
3rd quarter. At home base or exercising in vicinity.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers.
Cruiser Squadron.
1st quarter: One month at home base for repairs and port drills; the remainder of the time cruising abroad or where most needed.
2nd quarter: One month at home base for repairs and port drills; the remainder of the time cruising abroad or where most needed.
3rd quarter: One month at home base for repairs and port drills; the remainder of the time cruising abroad or where most needed.
4th quarter: Join fleet for annual maneuvers, if circumstances permit.
The foregoing schedule provides for a very full year's work for all the fleet, and, at the same time, the navy-yard work is distributed quite evenly over nine months of the year; for the remaining three months the yard work could probably be expended to advantage on the coast-defense and other vessels not attached to the battle fleets.
It is quite probable that, in future, a portion of the ship-building will be done at navy-yards, so there would always be plenty of work for the yard force even if work on the fleet came to a standstill.
By having the ship under repairs for comparatively short periods each year, the work would be under the direct supervision of her officers. This is a very important consideration, since the seagoing officers best understand the needs of their ship and are at all times responsible for her condition.
On the score of economy this system would be preferable, since, while parts of the ship are under repairs, all other parts would be kept in good condition by the crew. By keeping a ship in commission continuously, deterioration is reduced to a minimum. This is true not only of ships but of any piece of machinery. It is especially applicable to torpedo vessels.
Unnecessary repairs would generally be avoided, as the commanding officer would best understand the necessity of getting his ship into good cruising condition. At the same time he would see that all necessary work was done, as he would realize that his ship would have to be in readiness for any duty during the following year.
BUILDING PROGRAMME.
In building programmes, the sense of proportion is sometimes conspicuous, and again is almost entirely lacking; in the first case the tactical and strategical importance of the various types of vessel necessary for an efficient fleet are given due weight; in the second case the desirability of certain types either is not recognized or one type is given undue preference over others. It is sometimes a question of cost that does not permit of a fully equipped fleet; sometimes it is a question of policy; or it may result from widely varying opinions of naval experts as to what is required.
It is not surprising that, thus far, in our naval development, we have had no continuous building programme, either as to the composition or the size of the fleet. The reason, of course, is the absence, in our administration, of any responsible Board of Control with powers to devise and carry out a naval policy. This defect in our administration may some time be corrected by the establishment of a General Staff.
In this era of naval expansion by all the leading powers, it is not practicable in outlining a programme to set a limit to the size of our entire fleet beyond the requirements of the immediate future. We can only add to our fleet, from time to time, to keep at or near the front in naval power. In view of the well-known ambitious programmes of other nations, however, it would seem necessary that we should increase our force as soon as possible to forty battleships, with a proper proportion of other types. Such a policy would give us five unit battle fleets, each of the composition shown below. We now have twenty-four battleships built or building, enough for three unit fleets, but we lack a sufficient number of battle-cruisers and the special types necessary to a fleet. Battle-cruisers are almost as necessary as battleships, and scouts are indispensable. Large, fast merchant vessels of the St. Louis class make excellent scouts, but we have not enough of them, and, therefore, must build vessels for that special work.
The unit battle fleet should be composed of:
8 Battleships, in two squadrons; speed 19 knots.
4 Battle-cruisers; speed 22 knots.
4 Scouts; speed 25 knots.
12 Destroyers, in two flotillas; speed 30 knots.
Colliers: number depending upon character of service required.
1 Supply and refrigerating ship.
1 Repair ship.
1 Hospital ship.
From the tactical point of view the proposed unit fleet has a Powerful fighting line of heavy battleships. This type is now a well-established one. It is only necessary to say that in designing battleships the aim should be to make them, not equal, but superior in offensive and defensive power, to any foreign ships of the same class. This, our oft-proclaimed traditional policy, has, at times, been sadly neglected, notably in the design of our Kearsarge, Alabama and Maine types, but, it is comforting to add, has been resurrected in our Connecticut type.
The second type of ship for the fleet is the "battle-cruiser." This term is used advisedly as being more appropriate than "armored cruiser," which, in these days, means any ship of six to sixteen thousand tons displacement with more or less light armor.
The squadron of "battle-cruisers," with a speed of twenty-two knots, and with armament and armor only a little inferior to that of battleships, would be a splendid "flying squadron" and could take its place in the line of battle with a good chance of success against most battleships of older construction. They could scout in force in the vicinity of the enemy's battle fleet; could bring the enemy to action and delay them until the slower battleships could come up—in other words, could force an action. In battle, with their superior speed, they could be maneuvered so as to take positions of advantage not possible for the slower battleships. They could hang on the flank of an enemy's superior but slower force, and, of course, could overtake and destroy protected and so-called armored cruisers. We have an excellent type of ship of this class in our Washington and Tennessee.
The "scout" has not yet been fully developed in any service, but in future warfare it will be a very necessary class of vessel. In some respects no better scouts than the battle-cruisers could be desired for scouting purposes, but as those vessels cost as much or more than battleships, it is obviously impracticable to obtain a sufficient number of them. Another point to be considered is the necessity for very speedy, light vessels to operate against torpedo-boats and destroyers. It is proposed, therefore, to create a type of ship which can do duty as the "eyes of the fleet," serve as despatch vessels, and protect the heavy vessels from the attack of torpedo vessels. A vessel of the general character of the new British "scouts," but with more small guns and more coal-carrying capacity would serve the purpose admirably. Such a vessel would have the following characteristics:
Displacement 3500 tons.
Speed 25 knots.
Coal 800 tons.
Battery 2 5-inch R.F.G., 16 14-pounders, 4 torpedo tubes
This vessel should be able to maintain a speed in a moderate sea that would enable her to overtake nominally faster destroyers, and to escape from heavier cruisers.
The destroyer type is quite indispensable to the battle fleet and should always accompany it. The importance of these swift little craft is so well understood that no discussion of the subject is required here.
Pursuing this policy there would be required to complete the three battle fleets already provided for in part, and for two additional unit fleets:
16 Battleships.
12 Battle-cruisers.
20 Scouts.
44 Destroyers.
This would give the following totals:
40 Battleships.
20 Battle-cruisers.
20 Scouts.
60 Destroyers.
This proposed increase, if made immediately, would place us second in naval rank; but the building of sixteen battleships and twelve battle-cruisers could not be undertaken at once. It would be necessary to spread the programme over a certain number of years, probably four. The laying down of four battleships, three battle-cruisers, five scouts, and twelve destroyers each year for four years would be a reasonable programme, and would give us the full strength of five unit battle fleets by 1912 or 1913. Some such programme is imperatively necessary if we are to hold our own with the rest of .the world.
In a few years provision must be made for keeping the fleet up to the standard by replacing obsolete and worn-out vessels with new ones. This should be done by squadrons also, to as great an extent as possible. One ship of a squadron of the same age will, in some cases, outlast her sisters, but there can be no great difference in the life of similar ships if they have been employed under exactly similar conditions and have always been well cared for.
It is a mistake to build ships which have not a real military value, because it is an unnecessary extravagance in money, men and officers. For example, our so-called training vessels are of no use whatever in time of war, and of very little, if any, in time of peace. They should have no place in our organization. Every ship should be of such type and efficiency as to be of material value in action.
Fast, heavily-armed, well-protected cruisers, perfect in their appointments, are better vessels to show the flag in foreign ports, to visit scenes of disturbance, and for training men than the nondescript cruisers and gunboats now employed for such work. The more imposing the type of vessel the better impression will be created in a foreign port, because such a vessel not only represents power but is a power. This moderate-sized, habitable, comfortable and efficient cruiser would be by far the most effective type of training vessel. We might not be able to obtain as many such vessels as of the smaller and inferior types, but each and every one of the former would be worth several of the latter in action.
It is proposed, therefore, that, as we add to our cruiser (training) fleet or replace old cruisers and gunboats, we build squadrons of protected cruisers of moderate size of the very highest type. These, with a few light-draft gunboats, are all that would be necessary as seagoing vessels in addition to our battle fleets. The types suggested are improved Olympia for the cruiser class, and a fast, habitable type of gunboat with a numerous but light battery.
The general characteristics of these vessels should be:
IMPROVED OLYMPIA TYPE.
Displacement 6500 tons.
Speed (maximum) 22 knots.
Battery
4 8-inch R. F. G.
10 6-inch R. F. G.
8 3-inch R. F. G.
2 torpedo tubes, submerged.
NEW GUNBOAT TYPE.
Displacement 1500 tons.
Speed (maximum) 20 knots.
Battery
8 4-inch R. F. G.
4 6-pounders.
The coast-defense squadrons, which will be made up of obsolete battleships, and cruisers, monitors, torpedo-boats, etc., could have little homogeneity and little effectiveness, all of which is a matter of little importance, since the nation's real defense is in her battle fleet, which, if of adequate size and efficiency, would never permit an enemy to approach the coast.
ENLISTED PERSONNEL.
Perhaps no question affecting our naval establishment has been more thoroughly discussed than the recruiting and training of enlisted men, and certainly there is no question on which officers are less agreed than as to the best and most practicable methods for obtaining a well-trained personnel. That the present system is, in many respects, unsatisfactory is evident to all, and that in the present system certain fundamental conditions are lost sight of, is becoming apparent.
Some of the most noteworthy defects of our system are that we find it difficult to enlist desirable men in sufficient numbers to man the fleet; that a large percentage desert; that a very small proportion of those who serve a full term re-enlist; and that we have no adequate facilities for training recruits. Evidently there is something very wrong with the system. Any system that does not insure a full complement of well-trained men for every ship of the navy is unsatisfactory; and any system that does not provide a trained reserve is not what it should be.
In considering this question the political, social and economic conditions of the country must be taken into account; these conditions are vastly different from those obtaining in foreign countries, hence we can get little help from the study of methods employed abroad. We have not even much useful experience of our own service to fall back upon because conditions in America and in our service have changed greatly in late years. We can arrive at logical conclusions only by careful analysis of the present conditions and applying suitable remedies where needed.
That the apprentice training system, on which for many years we have relied for our trained men, is excellent theoretically is beyond question. The claims made for it by its champions are so well known as to render an enumeration of its supposed virtues unnecessary. What we have actually gained, and what we are now getting, from that system is what concerns us. It has been on trial so long as to have established itself as a success or as a failure. If it has proved a failure for practical purposes it should be abandoned. We must be practical at any cost—even the cost of losing a system theoretically perfect. Some of the best men in the service to-day are apprentices or ex-apprentices, but they are very few in number. In fact only seven or eight per cent of the boys trained in our very expensive apprentice system remain in the service. This fact more than any other proves its failure. It is simply too expensive and takes too many officers and men from the general service to justify its continuance. The statement is often made that, in addition to furnishing this small proportion of men to the service, the apprentice system trains a large body of men who, though in civil life, are something of a naval reserve in time of war. This is highly problematical, especially when one considers that men must be kept constantly under training to be efficient. At any rate the government has no real hold on the men who have left the service, and even in the event of war would probably deem it not worth while to compel them to return.
Another strong objection to apprentices on board a regular man-of-war is that for a considerable period of their enlistment they are too young and too undeveloped to do a man's work. It is almost unnecessary to add that in our ships which are, at best, provided with too small a complement, a man or boy who cannot do a man's work is undesirable.
As a rule apprentices have not a strong sense of duty and responsibility, and it is well known that, in proportion to their number, they commit far more infractions of law and regulations than any class of men on board ship.
As stated above, there are some excellent apprentices and ex-apprentices, men whom it is a pleasure to serve with, and it would be manifestly unfair to condemn, in its entirety, the system under which they were developed, but we cannot be satisfied with the general results. There are several good reasons for the failure of the system. The boys are taken into service before they are old enough to know their own mind; they are trained in obsolete ships; many are educated out of the service, that is, they discover that their naval training fits them for more remunerative work on shore; and many others leave the service from sheer restlessness which is characteristic of the American youth.
The "Landsman for Training" system, the newer and only other source of trained men, has not yet been developed, and has thus far been handicapped by inadequate methods and means of training. It would be unfair to criticise a system which as yet has not had time to establish itself. It seems reasonable to expect that, given the same care and attention as the apprentice system has received, it might be much more successful.
There is at present too little in the life of the enlisted man to appeal to the wide-awake, ambitious American youth. There is no very bright future for him. Many young men of good character do enlist, usually with the idea of seeing the world, for the benefit of the training, or from some romantic notion of going to sea. He quickly loses his illusions; he may see some of the world, but it is usually at long range, through a port-hole; the romance soon wears off, he becomes dissatisfied, homesick, discouraged. Let us consider the case from his point of view. He enlisted with the idea of going to sea in one of the splendid battleships or cruisers. He is sent to a training station for several months; this preliminary training course is necessary; he is well taken care of, and he accepts it cheerfully, but looks forward to the realization of his ideals. Next he is drafted to a training-ship (?) and it at once dawns upon him that something is wrong; he finds that the ship is obsolete; that she in no way resembles the modern man-of-war; the ship is overcrowded and uncomfortable, poorly lighted. The main idea of the cruise appears to be to keep as far as possible from attractive ports. The routine is irksome. He has little shore leave, and very little spending money. Next, if he has refrained from running away, he is drafted to a gunboat, a cruiser, or a battleship; his previous experience has been so unsatisfactory that he is now prepared to be dissatisfied with any ship, and, although he is at last in a regular vessel, he is now beginning to realize the disadvantages of life in the navy. He falls into the habit of comparing his lot with that of his brother in civil life who is in the employ of a great corporation; his brother's pay is five times his own; his brother enjoys the comforts of home and has sixteen hours each day during which he is his own master.
Of course, the foregoing is only the view of what is generally termed a disgruntled youngster whom we are often pleased to say is far better off in every respect in the navy than before he enlisted; but it is a view to be considered, nevertheless, and, if we stop to consider carefully, there is much to be said for his view. With all his preconceived ideas of personal liberty, he cannot tolerate dull routine and the discomforts of ship life indefinitely with no prospect of improving his condition. He will not be content with a "few hours" liberty once or twice a week. If he is the average American he prefers to enter into the strife of the industrial and commercial world, in which he feels that he has a fighting chance to rise to fame or wealth. The peculiarity of our political and industrial system is that the best man wins regardless of his antecedents and every American feels that he has a chance. There are exceptions, many of them, but these exceptions constitute a class of men that, in a majority of cases, we cannot but believe is undesirable for the handling of the delicate and complicated mechanism to be found in the modern ship.
There is another feature of naval life seldom, if ever, considered in relation to the enlisted man, but which is an important factor to be taken into consideration; and that is, that the average man looks forward to the time when he may have a home and family. This idea is as old as the history of man and it is not to be lightly set aside, and yet it is almost an impossibility for an enlisted man to fulfill this law of nature.
In short, Americans are too prosperous and too contented with their lot on shore to feel the necessity, or the desirability, of going to sea in a service which, however favorably it may compare with foreign navies, offers many discomforts and few inducements. Furthermore, Americans do not generally recognize the necessity of a peace armament, though they are ready and eager to rally in defense of the flag when war is upon them; they are not a military people in the sense that they are willing to remain in service during the better part of their life.
How different are conditions abroad. England has her class distinctions and social barriers which operate to deaden ambition in her lower and poorer classes, with the consequence that her humble young men, with no hope of rising in the world, are willing to go to sea, realizing that they are better cared for in the British navy than in their own sphere at home. France and Germany have no difficulty in manning their fleets for the reason that they have conscription, a condition that can never obtain in America. In autocratic Russia nearly all eligible men are either sailors or soldiers.
Only America, with her eighty millions of people and her great national wealth, finds difficulty in enlisting and retaining the men required for her comparatively small fleet, and a careful analysis of the subject shows good reasons for this condition.
The question of early training of men for the navy always evokes much discussion as to ways and means, and the opinions advanced by officers are always very positive. It is probably owing to this fact that we are now building two cruising sailing ships with which to carry out one method of training, and a type of training brigantine, new to our service, in deference to the ideas of another faction. These will add two new types to our so-called training squadron. What can be more futile than a policy of expediency which apparently endeavors to please all and, as we are beginning to realize, serves no useful purpose. In short, there is absolutely no system, and conditions are going from bad to worse as our navy expands.
A simple problem in arithmetic will show the impracticability of training our recruits in sailing ships. By the time all ships now under construction are authorized, we will need about 30,000 men of the seaman branch; the average term of service at present is about three years; therefore on that basis we must train at least 10,000 men per year to keep the fleet manned. With a better system the number of desertions and discharges would probably be reduced very materially, but for the purpose of this discussion we must start with existing conditions. In the new 1800-ton sailing ships we cannot hope to accommodate more than 250 recruits at a time. Supposing that each training ship could make two cruises each year, taking a new draft of recruits each cruise, it would require twenty ships to give 10,000 recruits a short training cruise. Taking into account the desertion of men under training, and other contingencies, it would probably require twenty-five ships to carry out the system. This represents not only a large initial outlay of money and a large annual expense but it means also that at least two hundred line officers, and twenty-five hundred enlisted men (petty officers, drill-masters, and the nucleus of the crew) must be withdrawn from the regular fleet. Furthermore these twenty-five ships would be of absolutely no value in time of war. It seems almost beyond belief that such a system could be seriously considered in a country which prides itself on its good business sense.
Men for the navy should be enlisted between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. It makes no difference whether they come from the interior or the seaboard as long as they are sound mentally, morally, and physically. It is not a question of enlisting sailors, for there are no longer many American sailors whom it is desirable to enlist. It is as well that they should be the bright, wide-awake young men of the cities or the sturdy youth of the country. A mechanical turn of mind is more desirable in the recruit for the modern navy than an indifferent knowledge of seamanship—if these two very important qualifications are to be compared—because modern seamanship and gunnery are decidedly mechanical, just as different in character from the older seamanship as the steam engine or the electric motor is from sails or hand-power.
By fixing the minimum age of admission into the navy at eighteen years several advantages are obtained over a system in which the age limit is lower. By the time the American youth has reached the age of eighteen he has not only had a fair amount of schooling but has seen something of the practical hardships and difficulties attending life on shore. He has had enough experience to enable him to realize the benefits and advantages of life in the navy, and he goes into his new life without regret at shaking off the old. He is more amenable to discipline and, being able to do a man's work, is a valuable man from the very beginning, even while under training. Being more mature, he has lost the childish traits so conspicuous in apprentices, while he is not yet beyond the receptive state. There can be little doubt that a young man of eighteen to twenty will advance much more quickly in his work than a young boy.
In connection with the recruiting of new men, it is very important that the recruit should enter the service with his eyes open. At present too many enter with false ideas of life on shipboard and their future status, with the result that they are dissatisfied from the beginning. This is undoubtedly the cause of a large number of desertions. The remedy for this is greater care on the part of recruiting officers, and in a widely disseminated literature on the subject of life in the navy. It would seem advisable that booklets, clearly setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of the life of the enlisted man, should be put into the hands of would-be recruits. Perhaps fewer enlistments would be made, but, in the end, the advantage would be with the Government, for it is a useless waste of money, time, and trouble to pay and train men who, dissatisfied from the beginning, leave the service at the first opportunity, many of them by desertion.
All recruits should be given a preliminary training on shore of at least four months and not more than six, the training to consist principally of discipline, setting up, gymnasium work, care of person and clothing, and the rudiments of the duties of the branch in which they enlisted. In this connection no instruction can be of greater benefit to the recruit than infantry drill; it is one of the best setting-up exercises, and better still, inculcates a strong sense of discipline and smartness.
From considerations of economy, administration, and facilities for instruction, the training station should be at the home base. This being the place where the recruit gains his first impressions of his new life, every comfort and indulgence consistent with strict discipline and efficiency should be provided. The recruit must be made to feel the advantages of his new life.
There should be commodious barracks, well ventilated, well lighted, and constructed with a view to convenience, comfort, and a proper enforcement of military discipline. Near by should be athletic grounds, a gymnasium, swimming pool, baths, reading rooms, and canteen. All parts of the station should be as attractive as possible, with a park, shady walks, music during recreation hours, and boats for the use of the men.
Athletics should be encouraged, especially boat racing, football, baseball, field sports, and other games inculcating a spirit of emulation. The young man who is kept constantly employed, at work or at play, with not too much of one or the other, is the healthiest and most contented, and he will not chafe at strict discipline and hard work if he has compensations.
The process of weeding out the undesirable men should begin as soon as possible after the recruits are received at the station; it is very necessary that no undesirable men should ever get into the regular vessels of the navy, where they are nothing more or less than a contaminating influence on the rest of the crew. If we can get rid of the vicious, the immoral, and the drunkard, we can soon raise the status of the enlisted men to the position it should occupy; the higher his status the better will be the class of men seeking admission into the service.
For the purpose of teaching the recruit the rudiments of seamanship there should be attached to the station a number of steam vessels of small size. The smaller converted yachts would serve the purpose very well.
Assuming that 12,000 recruits must be drilled each year at six stations, and that there are half that number at the station at one time, the maximum number to be drilled in seamanship each day (two days' drill each week) would be 400. Four vessels could easily accommodate this number, and these four vessels would constitute a miniature squadron in which the recruits would be given individual instruction in steering, signalling, the compass, the use of the lead and log lines, anchors and anchor gear, etc., and such instruction would be carried out in such a manner as to stimulate the interest of all hands. For such drills each vessel might well be under the command of a young officer who himself would derive the greatest benefit from the experience thus afforded. The instruction of the men should be supervised by drill-masters and responsible petty officers. In addition to this instruction in vessels underway, recruits should, of course, be given frequent instruction in boats under oars and sails, and work in the rigging loft.
Preliminary instruction in gunnery should be had on shore at a well-equipped battery composed of the types of guns in use on board ships of the cruiser squadron to which the classes under instruction are to be drafted. In this work there should be no tedious oral instruction. The idea should be at first to get the men interested in the use of the guns, and the best way to do this is with sub-caliber practice, first at a stationary target and afterwards at a moving target. To teach the men the nomenclature of guns and mounts each part might be marked conspicuously with its name; men may be trusted to pick up quickly the names of tools with which they work, especially if they are kept interested.
The mistake should not be made of expecting too much of the recruit, but in a four months' course of training the average man will readily acquire sufficient knowledge of the duties of a seaman to make him a useful man on board ship.
Attached to the home base should be squadrons of regular cruisers to which the recruit is drafted on the completion of his preliminary training. The complements of these cruisers should be made up half of well-trained men and half of men under training. With efficient officers and petty officers these vessels would undoubtedly prove to be the best school for the seaman; there is no school equal to that of precept, and in a taut ship half of whose crew are competent seamen, the newer half would necessarily be very quick to learn.
The cruiser squadron should always remain attached to its home station, but, of course, would be called upon to cruise to any part of the world. It is not necessary, however, that such squadrons should remain permanently on foreign stations, but at the end of a year's cruise they should return to the home base and, after transferring half its crew to the battle squadron, take a new lot of recruits and make another cruise.
Under this system, therefore, a man serves four to six months at the training station, one year under training in the cruiser squadrons, and is then transferred to the battle fleet. He has had a pleasant schooling at the training station, an interesting cruise abroad in a regular ship of the navy, and has been promoted to battleship duty.
The training of the seaman is only a part of the system; petty officers must have advanced courses of training; firemen, machinists, electricians, and others of the artificer and special branches must undergo instruction.
At the training station should be a school for petty officers. This is for men who have completed their battleship cruise and have been selected on their merits as candidates for permanent appointment as petty officers. At this school, they should be made to acquire a certain class-feeling as well as greater knowledge of their duties, so that when they go to a ship they will bear themselves with a certain dignity, pride of position and authority in dealing with their subordinates. The petty or noncommissioned officer should be the backbone of the service. At present we have few capable petty officers and it is all the fault of our lack of system.
Recruits of the artificer and other special branches should be trained in courses parallel with that of seamen. Coal passers, firemen and machinists should have their four months at the training station, getting instruction in their particular work in the station training vessels and in the shops of the home base.
Electricians could put in their four months to advantage as assistants in the electrical plant of the station. Yeomen should have a preliminary training as assistants in the station offices, and so on throughout the special ratings.
The training of men of all ratings should be under the administration, first of the particular part of the General Staff having cognizance of the personnel, and second, of the superintendent of the training station, in order that all training stations might have the same methods and the same standards.
Any system of naval organization should include the means for the thorough, progressive, and systematic training of the officer. From the time he enters the Naval Academy until he arrives at flag rank, the modern naval officer must be a student as well as a thorough practical seaman if he is to keep pace with his profession. There is no class of men in the world which is called upon for more diversified knowledge than the officers of the navy of to-day; and all this knowledge must be combined with great resourcefulness, energy, and address, to enable them to meet all the requirements of the service.
Present conditions leave much to be desired. The navy is very short of officers. In consequence, selection at the Naval Academy cannot be carried out as thoroughly as might be desired; many midshipmen go direct from the Academy to duty as watch and division officers without adequate training for the responsibilities thrust upon them. From this point onward, there seems to be no system whatever governing the assignment of officers to duty.
The urgent necessity for an increase in the number of officers for our growing fleet has been tardily recognized by Congress, but years must elapse before the bad effects of the present shortage can be eliminated.
Under any rational scheme of naval expansion the addition of a ship to the navy list would carry with it a proportionate increase of officers and enlisted men, to be trained and ready for service by the time the new ship was commissioned. But we have no naval policy and the efficiency of the service must suffer; and right here let it be predicted that when our under-manned, under-officered, unprepared fleet goes into action against a highly-organized enemy, the blame for defeat will be laid on the officers themselves and not on those whose duty it is to give us officers and men and adequate preparation. Public opinion is elemental and not analytical in approval or condemnation.
Under an effective organization and administration of the navy, a system might be worked out somewhat on the following lines:
The age of admission of midshipmen to the Naval Academy should be lowered and the course lengthened to five years. The present course is too crowded, yet we cannot afford to omit any of it. The naval officer must be a well-educated man and the groundwork of his education cannot be too thorough. There should be a three-months' practice cruise each year, so planned and carried out as to give the midshipman the greatest amount of practical training.
Upon graduation the midshipman should be commissioned as an ensign and assigned to junior officers' duty for one year in the battleships or battle-cruisers. These ships, being of the very highest type, and the best disciplined, furnish the best possible school for the newly-commissioned officer who is now receiving his first and most lasting impressions of the service, its discipline, and the art of commanding enlisted men.
Having served a year as a junior officer of a division in a battleship, he should be qualified for duty as a regular watch and division officer in a gunboat or small cruiser. He has had, by this time, sufficient experience to fit him to command men and gain their respect and ready obedience, without which no officer can be successful.
The young officer's next duty should be instruction at the torpedo school followed by a few months' work in torpedo-boats. The torpedo is becoming a very important weapon and its use should be thoroughly understood by all line officers, while the torpedo-boat is one of the best possible schools in seamanship for the officer. When champions of the old system of training lament the passing of sails and spars, they forget, or do not realize, that in the torpedo flotilla we have a new school superior to the old in every respect, one requiring the greatest possible nerve, skill, resourcefulness and energy, combined with alertness, keen judgment and knowledge of one's crew and vessel. There is no more necessity for the sailing ship, to train officers, than for a Phoenician galley, but we have been many years working towards that idea. In this connection it may be explained that it is not to be expected that every officer can be a good torpedo officer, but every officer should have a reasonable knowledge of the usefulness and the defects of this important weapon.
The experience and skill acquired in all this preliminary training has made the officer eligible for watch and division duty in the larger cruisers, and in battleships. There is no more important duty in the entire service than the command of a gun division in a battleship until the officer reaches command rank. It is he who trains the men of the real fighting ship, the ships of the line of battle, upon which may depend the result of a war. It is at this point in the career of the officer that a process of selection might well be adopted to secure the very best officers for especially important duty. The difficulty of putting such a system into effect would be great, but not insurmountable. There would seem to be nothing more reasonable than to select officers for duty according to their qualifications. The advancement of the naval officer should be in accordance with the principle of the survival of the fittest. Promotion by selection in our service is quite generally believed to be impracticable, but selection for particular duty should be possible.
The subsequent career of the officer should include duty as gunnery officer, navigator, and executive before reaching the command of a large and important ship.
As regards shore duty, there are many important posts on shore which can best be filled by naval officers as being the only ones qualified for the positions. Our present system of alternating shore duty with cruises is a good one, and, from the officer's point of view, the only one bearable, as naval officers are only human and cannot entirely cut home ties; but, under the foregoing plan for the organization of the fleet and the home base system, shore duty will be much less sought after than at present, for the reason that during six months of the year the squadrons (except the cruiser or training squadron) would be at, or near, the home base, and the desirability of shore duty would not be so real.
In the preceding pages it has been both impracticable and unnecessary to go into details showing the need of organization and in outlining a systematic naval policy. Many of the ideas expressed are familiar to every officer; many of the statements made are self-evident truths; but the attempt has been made to gather these ideas together into a composite whole, forming a system at once practical, harmonious, and efficient, and easily applicable without violently disturbing the present organization. Given the co-ordinating power of a General Staff, the change to the new system should be gradual and easy.
Undoubtedly many officers will disagree with the writer on some parts of the proposed system. If so, it is hoped they will respond to this mild challenge of their views, to the end that a wide discussion of this broad and important subject may be awakened. It must be recognized that we are getting to be too great a world-power and our navy of too great importance to permit of the continuation of haphazard policies of expediency. We must bring every ship and every gun to the highest possible state of efficiency, and only by organized and systematic effort can this work be accomplished.