I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Next to the necessity for a continuous and continued yearly increase to the number of armored vessels for the fighting line of our navy, it is of prime importance to decide upon the general type of battleship best suited to meet all the requirements of our service, and then to consistently build after that type and thus secure homogeneity in the units of the fighting fleet "A consummation devoutly to be wished," and certainly one not impossible nor impracticable of fulfillment.
The writer is aware that a considerable number of officers in the service rather deprecate the decision to build vessels as large as our newest type of battleship, the Louisiana class; believing—as they evidently do—that our interests will be best served by a smaller class of vessel, something, for example, like the Indiana, or perhaps a little larger! To this the writer's reply would be, "Why build anything less formidable and effective than the best?"; when, with the material interests, reputation and honor of our country always at stake, we not only can but should build the best that genius can design and money provide. Money considerations, too, are all very well in their proper time and place; but, for instance, if we should build and maintain a fleet of even as many as so Connecticuts, the expenditure Involved would not constitute an extravagant insurance on the Material wealth and for the continued peace of our big country.
It is the writer's firm belief and honest opinion that this is one of the cases where "The biggest is the best"; and this is considered especially true of a battleship in which all-around strength (power) is only to be had by making the displacement sufficiently large to accommodate the highest possible values for each of the elements which must be considered and embodied in the design of a vessel intended not only to take and be able to give hard knocks, but which must stand up to such work in a fight to the finish. Again, the writer believes that this is preeminently a case where "The best is the cheapest"; and it is susceptible of convincing proof that this is correct, to the utmost limit, in battleship design and construction.
With these two rather strong assertions kept always in sight, and with the further statement of fact that our possible enemies are continually increasing the displacements of their fighting units to secure greater power, the writer submits his opinions, on this important subject of the size of battleships, to the service solely with an idea to induce that criticism and discussion which is absolutely necessary to an intelligent determination of a question requiring for its solution the highest talent and greatest ability of which our service is possessed; that question is, briefly, "What type of battleships should we build?"
II. How SIZE OF BATTLESHIPS SHOULD BE DETERMINED.
In the absence of a carefully thought-out, well-defined and accurately-adjusted building programme, the above is a matter which should be replete with interest and of deep concern to the entire naval service. It is not a determination which may be left to the individual opinion of even such distinguished and capable officers as may happen to be called before the naval committees of Congress, much less to the chance decision of our national legislature, the members of which may not only not be expected to understand what is needed in this regard, but who are, from their positions, entitled to have and should have furnished to them, by the Department of the Navy, all the considerations, technical, tactical and strategic, which logically govern and finally determine the character of the types of new construction demanded; and these data should be so "boiled down," ready for use, that the framing of the acts for an increase of naval materiel may be readily and intelligently undertaken; and said acts must, in all reason, be formulated in strict accordance with the recommendations so made by the Department of the Navy. The question of the numbers of each type to be appropriated for at any one time must of course rest with Congress, but only after the Department has plainly indicated the necessities in each particular regard.
No one denies, or can deny, in the light of the newly added and enormous responsibilities of our country, that what the navy needs, and must have, is a regular yearly addition to the navy list in the way of armored construction; the writer would say powerful battleships and big, fast armored cruisers. It is, however, incumbent upon the service (and it must not shirk the responsibility) to determine the best types and the numbers of each type necessary to carry out the schemes of offense and defense for which it, its officers, men and administrative organization are maintained by the country. The civilian head of the Navy Department, whatever his attainments, ability and force of character, must largely depend upon the service for intelligent conviction as to the needs of the naval establishments; and to throw upon Congress the burden of determining what can be known only to those whose profession and business it is to know seems to indicate an uncertainty of policy which the best naval opinion does not justify. The national legislature neither has nor seeks for the technically accurate knowledge to enable it to make such determinations, and it is neither fair nor just to the members of its naval committees, but an absolute imposition on their time, patience and good nature, to expect or require them to do work which can only be done practically and rationally by experts.
Perhaps the time will soon come, it may even be at hand, when the creation of a General Staff will, by law, bring to the solution of such problems as this the best genius, highest attainment and most acknowledged ability of the service; and give to the Navy Department a technical advisory staff whose chief duty it shall be to outline the naval policy of the government, advise the Secretary of the Navy on all questions relating to service efficiency, and determine, for the best interests of the navy, all matters demanding purely technical decisions. It is certain that the navy needs, for its proper and most effective administration, the services of such a body of its brightest officers whose sole duty, aim, study, and effort shall be devoted to the broader questions of naval policy and efficiency. From such a staff, we might well expect a convincing definition of the needs of the service both as to materiel and personnel; and we should have confidence that the whole gamut of subjects, relating to the preparedness of the navy for war, was receiving that profound consideration and deliberate, studied attention which its importance demands.
III. BATTLESHIPS TO BE REALLY POWERFUL MUST HAVE LARGE DISPLACEMENT.
The modern battleship or fighting unit requires, indeed imperatively demands, large displacement to assure her of being able to carry an effective battery and its protection as that term is now understood; that is, protection not only to hull buoyancy, engines, boilers, and magazines (which same is more extended than ever before), but proper, efficient protection to the battery itself, to its ammunition supply, to the personnel of battery and to interior communication.
To be able to meet, and fight on fair terms, a powerful enemy, our battleship must have equal or, if possible, better speed and good coal endurance, and she must be reasonably handy in order not to lose even a single point in the game. The necessities of modern strategy require that our battleship shall be able to keep the sea in any and all weathers, and be capable of maintaining a selected station for long intervals, and she should house her officers and crew easily and comfortably; in other words, she must be not only ma-going but sea-keeping, and she must be habitable to preserve the health, vigor and efficiency of her personnel.
It goes without necessity for proof, other than most casual observation and examination, that a battleship of small displacement, in which it has been attempted to get a high coefficient of compromise for the various elements of power, may, when everything else has been attended to, find her crew space cut down to very short commons, and, in fact, quite insufficient for even a peace complement and certain to be overcrowded when she is on a war footing. This circumstance, and the attendant necessity to neglect the comfort and health of the personnel, is a distinctly bad feature almost inevitably inherent in such designs, and can but tend to be more or less crippling to efficiency.
Keeping these evident facts constantly in mind, it will appear that the highest type possible will result where each of the main elements of design—viz.: offensive power, protection, speed, coal endurance, handiness, sea-keeping ability and habitability—has its greatest practicable value, or where a compromise amongst these several elements gives the highest final total efficiency; and, if we take our latest class—Louisiana and Connecticut— as a fair exemplar, that is embodying in a high degree all of the above mentioned elements, it will be easy to conclude that powerful battleships—such as our newly laid-down ones certainly are—must have large displacements, such as we have been forced to adopt for this latest class; and it is the writer's belief that the battleship of the future will displace not less than 18,000 tons on full load.
If, then, it be conceded that large displacements are absolutely necessary to give a big fighting efficiency factor, the converse must be true; namely, that the small type of battleship implies and involves serious sacrifices in some one or more, or all, of the elements which go to make up what is known as power—be it offensive, defensive, motive, coal endurance or seakeeping ability.
Of the fact that great power in battleships must be provided for by large displacements we have a singularly convincing illustration in our own navy. An examination of the plans and specifications of the various types intervening between our Indiana class and the Louisiana class, and including those two classes, as they are farthest apart as to time of laying down, will show, in the most forceful manner possible, how the displacement has had to be increased for each and every increment to the Power elements, of the particular design, in excess of those of the preceding less powerful type; or, in a broad sense, every iota of power added has inevitably carried with it an augmentation of the displacement; the principle involved may then be summarized into the indisputable conclusion that great power in battleships demands large displacements; that is, we must pay in weight for each and every gain in power.
IV. GENERAL COMPARISON OF INDIANA AND LOUISIANA TYPES
For the purpose of illustrating what the writer believes to be the unwisdom of a possible reversion to a small type of battleship, it is proposed to contrast, in a general way, the Indiana of 10,300 tons and the Louisiana of 16,000 tons normal displacement as type ships, at opposite ends of the scale as to displacement, time of laying down, and, no one will deny, as to power.
Before proceeding, it is a fact worthy of particular mention that the Louisiana and Connecticut constitute the first and only class of battleships, yet designed for our service, that is denominated, or really entitled to the denomination, seagoing; all others, to date, being very properly called coast-line battleships, which vessels, though entirely capable of going to sea, are not adapted to nor intended for long-continued operations at a distance from our own coasts. They are used for distant cruising, and no one will attempt to decry the wonderful cruising record of the Oregon, nor to derogate from the good performances, in this regard, of the Iowa, Kentucky, Wisconsin. and Illinois; still this is not their proper sphere of action and the reasons for such use of them have been compulsory, much after the manner in which it was found necessary to make use of the torpedo boats during the war with Spain. The fact remains that the low freeboard, entire or partial, of the coastline battleships detracts from their sea-keeping qualities, and, in heavy weather, is believed to constitute a menace of no small proportions to their sea-going integrity; which belief the writer has heard emphasized in no mild terms by officers who have cruised in the low freeboard types, particularly the Indiana class.
To proceed with the comparison, it is acknowledged that the offensive power of the Indiana class is wonderful for a vessel of that size; but it is a far cry from the almost insignificant auxiliary battery of four 6-inch guns on the Indiana to the twelve 7-inch of the Louisiana, neglecting the 8-inch and heavier calibre guns as practically common to both; and, when it is also remembered that the Louisiana is, in addition, to carry twenty 3-inch R. F. guns with fair protection for nearly all of them, and that all of the 7-inch guns are to be in separate casemates armored all over, the jump-up in displacement of the Louisiana type is readily understandable; and, too, the arrangements for supply of ammunition, where each isolated gun has its own hoist, costs a considerable total in weight, as do numerous equally valuable incidental features of the design for these fine new battleships. Nor must we lose sight of the hull and battery protection of the new vessels, which are not only very much more extended but vastly more efficient than the same factors in the Indiana type.
The small displacement of the Indiana class was secured by a notable sacrifice in the speed element and a vital sacrifice in the matter of hull and battery protection, which latter would not, for one minute, be considered efficient if this class of vessels had to be taken under advisement as a type to be laid down today.
It is neither necessary nor desirable to go into detailed particulars in this comparison, the general characteristics of these vessels are well known or may be readily ascertained, but an examination of the plans and specifications of the Indiana class will fully reveal their defective protection to hull, ammunition supply and the auxiliary battery and its personnel.
It may be urged that if an Indiana were to be laid down today, on the same displacement, a better compromise could be secured amongst the several elements, entering battleship design, than was considered possible at the date she was originally put on the building blocks. This is only barely probable and necessary in a very limited degree, for it still takes weight to get each required element, and even with the tremendous strides that have been made towards securing more resisting armor for less thickness, and the decrease in weights of engines and boilers for same power, it would, without any shadow of doubt, be found, that the new Indiana's final combination of power elements would not be far different from what it is now, assuming that the present powerful battery was retained and given all permissible protection.
If this class (Indiana, Massachusetts and Oregon) is ever rebuilt, and it is to be hoped that it will be, in so far as balancing turrets and isolating and protecting casemate guns are concerned, the small displacement is an effective bar to making requisite protection of hull, battery and ammunition supply entirely efficient.
The comparison, along the same lines, may be extended to include all the classes later than the Indiana; the Iowa of 11,300 tons, sole representative of her class; the Kearsarge class of 11,500 tons; the Alabama class of 11,600 tons; the Maine class of 12,300 tons and the Virginia class of practically 15,000 tons normal displacement, though the Chief Constructor of the Navy reports that the delay in construction work on the Virginia class has afforded an opportunity to considerably increase the military value of the units of same by carefully revising their general plans and bringing them as nearly up to date as, evidently, the displacement will permit.
In these classes, later than the Indiana, the speed element has been materially augmented and we readily note what it has cost in weight. For the Iowa, it took 1000 tons of displacement to get her increased freeboard forward and an excess of two knots in speed over the Indiana; and, in the later ships where the speed factor has been kept high (16-19 knots) and more given also to protection, the displacements show a constant rise roughly proportional to the increase in the various factors of total power; until, in the latest type, the Louisiana class— which, with the high speed of 18 knots, combines in the greatest practicable degree offensive power and protection—we have reached a trial displacement of 16,000 tons that will doubtless eventuate in a deep load displacement amounting to very nearly 18,000 tons.
We have, then, by increasing our full load displacement to approximately 18,000 tons, as in the Louisiana class, gained tremendously in offensive power (compare batteries of the various types from the Indiana to the Virginia with battery of the Louisiana), and we are able to carry a practically efficient protection to hull, battery, ammunition supply and to personnel (which desideratum is impossible on a displacement as small as that of the Indiana), and we have increased the speed three knots over that of the Indiana class, and all with no loss in coal carrying capacity nor, it is believed, in turning and manoeuvering ability; and we also have a type that is habitable and comfortable for its personnel under any conditions of wind, weather and sea, and whose sea-going and sea-keeping ability is an indubitable maximum.
Nor must it be lost sight of that the gain in protection is real protection, and especially is this true of the casemates which are entirely armored isolated compartments where the gun ports are actually closed, by the cylindrical gun shields, in all positions of the gun. In the majority of our former battleships, a great deal of so-called protection is carried simply as dead weight; gaping ports, armored only around their edges, stand invitingly open to the hail of an enemy's projectiles, and the partial splinter bulkheads (affording no segregation to effects of bursting shell) are only a further insurance that no personnel could live at the casemate guns for longer than the first few minutes of an action.
V. CONCLUSIONS AS TO DISPLACEMENT.
In conclusion of the writer's views as to the absolutely unqualified necessity for battleships of large displacement, the question 'naturally suggests itself, " Have we exceeded reasonable and practicable limits in demanding such a displacement as that of the Louisiana, if we take into consideration that we have developed a type of ship that combines reasonably high Speed with offensive and defensive power of the very highest order and does not sacrifice any of the remaining important elements of design, viz.: coal endurance, handiness, sea-keeping ability and habitability?"
It seems to the writer that there can be but one answer to this question. We have seen that each attempt to improve on the design of our various types, from the Indiana to the Virginia, has resulted in an increase of displacement, and inevitably so to carry the increasingly powerful batteries and to properly and efficiently (as it was understood at the time) protect the hull, armament, ammunition supply, interior communication and the personnel. We have finally evolved a very powerful type of ship in the Louisiana class, and such ships we must have, and in considerable numbers, if we mean to be even fairly prepared to match our ships-of-the-line against those of a strong antagonist. We should, therefore, not neglect to watch what our possible or probable enemies are doing in this regard, and we must be able to meet any enemy if we propose, which we do, to defend our national honor, uphold our national policies, and maintain our national existence unimpaired.
Every first-class naval power (with the sole exception of Italy, and she is making what the writer believes to be an expensive experiment) has already—or is being rapidly forced to do so by the logic of the situation—adopted, as a battle unit, vessels of nearly or quite the displacement of our latest type; and we are in a position where we cannot afford to be only good in this particular, we must be very good; and it would be wise and prudent to stand always just a little better than the "other fellow;" and by him I mean the possible, even probable, next antagonist.
Taking it all in all, then, the design of our latest battleships would seem to fully and abundantly justify its existence, and it challenges comparison with the best that is being done, in the same line, abroad. Certainly there is no doubt in the writer's mind that our type battleship should be both large and strong.
VI. OBJECTIONS MADE BY OPPONENTS OF BIG BATTLESHIPS.
The main objections, which the writer has heard brought forward as arguments by the opponents of the policy of building large battleships, are as to their alleged lack of handiness; their deep draft and great beam which are said to render it difficult and dangerous to bring them into even our principal harbors and will preclude their using many of our good harbors; and, on account of their draft and beam (principally the latter), that it is a serious question to find docking facilities for them; finally, their great first cost has been particularly insisted upon as a factor in opposition, the contention being that we may have many more of the small battleships for a given number of the powerful large ones. Let us examine these objections and meet them as far as may be.
Handiness.—As to the alleged unhandiness, in manoeuvering of war vessels as large as the Louisiana, it is not believed to exist in anything like the degree that is claimed. Arguments, pro and con, as to the turning qualities of these new vessels, and their general handiness, must as yet be based only and entirely upon conjecture. Certain it is that everything that could be done by their designers has been done to insure their having the proper form and balance so necessary to facility and certainty in handling. Bad steering and turning qualities are not imperatively inherent with vessels of the size of the Louisiana class, and the model tank experiments prove that an unusually excellent form of hull has been obtained; we may therefore expect these large vessels to prove all that could reasonably be desired in this important particular. However, nothing is certain, in this regard, until these vessels have been actually tried. Experience abroad has shown that numbers of vessels of supposedly good design as to handiness have turned out to be brutes under the helm; while others, that were not expected to have good turning qualities, have shown surprisingly small tactical diameters and proven more than fairly easy to steer. The actual difference between the qualities of handiness in two such vessels, for instance as the Indiana and the Louisiana, cannot be very considerable, when, as ships go, both may be classed amongst craft known as "large" and "unhandy."
With all faith in the designers and the design, we can only wait until it is demonstrated that these new vessels are the unwieldy, unmanageable monsters that their opponents assert them as likely to be. The writer, for one, is not inclined to doubt that they will prove as easily handled and quite as easily steered as the Indiana class, the units of which have given many a helmsman, deck officer and captain the scare of his life by "taking the bit in her teeth" at a critical moment.
Draft.—Attention is particularly invited to the mean draft of the various classes of battleships already completed, and especially to the draft of the Indiana class, the pioneer type of our battleship fleet. Reference to the actual data on this subject will conclusively demonstrate that the objections to large displacement on the score of draft are not tenable; as it transpires that the mean draft of the Indiana class of 10,300 tons displacement is only six inches less than that of the Louisiana of 16,000 tons displacement; and, what is more and worse, that the mean draft of the Indiana class is greater than that of any of the later battleships—until we come to the Louisiana—with the sole exception of the Iowa, which vessel, by the way, is only an improved Indiana. The argument, then, that abnormal deep draft must necessarily result where we have large displacement is found to be singularly in error; as we discover the two smallest types of battleships in our Navy actually drawing more water than any of their successors until we come to the Louisiana, whose displacement is nearly or quite half again as much as that of either of the two types just referred to. Moreover, it is believed that the Indiana's maximum draft of 27 feet will prove to be in excess of the full load draft of the newest battleships, which are designed for a gross draft of 204 feet. Therefore, any harbor that the Indiana, our smallest type, can enter or use is equally available to the Louisiana class. It may be explained that the constructors have put a lot more of the displacement into beam and length; very well, the draft objection disappears just the same.
Docks.—To the contention that docking facilities are difficult to command for vessels of as large dimensions as the Louisiana class, it can be well answered by a statement of the fact that we are building, and hope to soon complete, a number of large graving docks capable of accommodating the increased length, beam and draft of these new ships; and these docks, or most of them, will certainly be ready for use before the ships can be completed. Then, too, the general tendency, the world over, is toward an increase in the size and capacity of both the government and the private docks; so that the objection to the size of the Louisiana class, on account of our alleged inability to dock them whenever necessary, is fast disappearing if not already out of sight. However, to guard against the possibility of finding ourselves crippled, as in time of war, from the lack of proper docking facilities wherever we are likely to need them, it is more than evident that we must have docks, capable of taking the largest vessel we are ever likely to build, at Olongapo, Honolulu, in Porto Rico or vicinity, and one on the south coast of Cuba, Guantanamo is an ideal place.
Cost.—Now let us come to the question of first cost, this having been made a particular point by the opponents of big battleships and the advocates of and for small ones. The Louisiana is to cost, for hull and machinery, approximately four million dollars; and the units of the Indiana class have each cost a little upwards of three million dollars; so, unless the difference in cost of armor and armament for the two vessels is enormous, it is not unfair to regard the relative first costs as four to three. The main argument, in favor of smaller battle: ships, has been that we could have many more units for a given sum of money, when, as matter of indisputable fact, we may only have four Indianas, for instance, to three Louisianas; and, to the rational, practical, unprejudiced mind, there can be no possible doubt as to the result of an action between two squadrons, one composed of four Indianas and the other of three Louisianas. It is patent, on the very face of things, that the three big powerful battleships could easily and handsomely destroy the four small ones, especially as the latter are vulnerably deficient in all-around protection. Let us suppose, further, that the numbers in both instances are doubled, and that one Commander-in-Chief has six Connecticuts and the other eight Oregons; what is likely to be the outcome of an encounter between two such forces? For every reason of which the writer can think or conceive—taking it for granted that the ships are handled and fought with equal skill and ability—he would expect every one of the Connecticuts to survive and all of the Oregons to be either sunk or totally disabled. The matter of first cost, then, is not so clearly or evidently in favor of a smaller type of battleship, and certainly in nothing like the degree often claimed; and, if there be any advantage at all in this regard, after giving due weight to all of the attendant considerations, inherent and collateral, the writer is of the opinion that same rests strongly With the vessel of powerful type having the great displacement. Certainly if fighting efficiency alone is to be considered, the larger vessel is vastly the more economical. In the question of maintenance, too, the ratio of four to three would appear to be Still a fairly accurate relative expression of such expense. The Indiana's complement is put down at 32 officers and 470 men. On a war footing she would, undoubtedly, carry as many as 100 more men, or 570. The rated accommodation of the Louisiana Class is for 40 officers and 761 men, and we find that 761 is to 570 Just about as 4 to 3. The relative cost of coal, stores and miscellaneous supplies necessary to the upkeep of the two vessels will doubtless come to very nearly the same ratio, hence the comparison (as to expense) on a basis of first cost may reasonably be carried along into the life of the ship, even possibly, to docking and repairs, and same plainly appears to constitute a refutation instead of a proof that we may have many more of the smaller units for an equal expenditure of money. Nor are the reasons for the existence of a fleet of relatively small and necessarily inferior battleships either logical or at all convincing; and there is no apparent justification, beyond mere assertion, that we should be in more formidable fighting condition if we were even possessed of the (permissibly) greater number of smaller battle units.
NOTE.-It is the writer's intention to follow this paper with another, now in course of preparation, relative to Proposed Armament for Type Battleship of U. S. Navy; and, as the questions of displacement, battery power and protection are so interdependent, the writer begs to request that the two papers may be taken together as representing the whole expression of his convictions, view-point and opinion on the important subject of the best type of battleship to adopt and build after, in augmenting the number of units for our first line-of-battle, in order that all our future battleships may be, as nearly as possible, absolutely homogeneous in character and quite as powerful, in every respect, as any similar vessels they may ever be expected to engage.