HONORABLE MENTION
MOTTO: We question the utility of torpedo-boats because we don't know how to utilize them.—W.W. Kimball.
By Navy Department General Order No. 49, of June 8, 1901, it is ordered that a torpedo-boat destroyer shall be commanded by a lieutenant, and that a torpedo-boat shall be commanded by a lieutenant, a lieutenant junior grade, or by an ensign. The Navy Regulations do not require that the officers ordered to torpedo-boat duty shall possess special knowledge, experience or training in such duty, indeed under the conditions that have existed for several years in the naval service such experience or training has been impossible to all but a limited few; it is well known that the need of officers for ships in commission has reduced all assignments to shore duty; one of the results of this has been that but few officers could be spared for torpedo instruction at Newport; another result is that but few of our torpedo-boats have been commissioned, and for much of the time all of them have been hauled out of water and laid up under conditions that caused great deterioration.
The great naval maneuvers of England, France, Russia, and Germany, which yearly hold place for the purpose of facing and solving the problems to be expected in actual warfare, have definitely determined that war squadrons should be, and most Probably will be, composed of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo vessels. These countries have supplied themselves with the number of torpedo-boats demanded by their needs, and much intelligent practice with these weapons is exacted of officers and enlisted men.
From its great coastline and outlying colonies, so much of which is unfortified, and in war time under some circumstances would be inviting to hostile attack, the United States has great need of torpedo-boat defence.
From the fact that the navies of these countries, against whom we are preparing to defend our country in the contingency of war, are equipped with great numbers of torpedo vessels, it must be expected that countries with naval bases near to our coasts and colonies would organize to be employed against us in time of war, squadrons of which torpedo-boats would form a part; we must be prepared for such features of warfare as the employment of these weapons would impose.
As the nation has determined upon a naval policy, it devolves upon naval officers to instruct the law makers of the particular features in technical respects of the best types of weapons, and the best means of using them. It is in this way that the knowledge of naval experts properly influences naval legislation. It is the belief of these experts that, considering the present and not trying to discount the future as to the value of the submarine or other possible weapons, the naval sea strength, that is the battle squadrons of a great power, should, as before stated, be composed of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-boats.
To develop great efficiency in each class for its duties, and in the officers and men who handle them, the battleships for the first line of battle, the cruisers for scouting and other duties, the torpedo craft, when, under favoring circumstances they can be dispatched against the enemy, is the purpose of the great foreign yearly manoeuvres. As used in this paper, the term torpedo-boat is generally applied to either the destroyer or the torpedo-boat proper.
The United States has a glorious naval history, much of which has been of single ship actions; the effect is seen in the efforts made in our service to perfect in fighting ability the units of our squadrons; of recent years the importance of squadron drills has become better recognized with practical results. But in all of our naval policy since 1898 it is apparent that our building programme has been deficient in the construction of torpedo craft, as well as in the proper utilization of those that we already have.
All of our ships of whatever type, when kept continually in commission have within reasonable time attained to the most commendable conditions of efficiency. The ships laid up even in reserve with skeleton crews on board, have invariably deteriorated. The splendid Minneapolis after a short commission was put in reserve in Philadelphia; when called into service during the Spanish war she had deteriorated so badly that her boilers had to be retubed. This lesson is repeated every time a ship is laid up. When the Columbia was commissioned for a receiving ship a board of inquiry was called upon to investigate the causes of her bad condition. The torpedo-boat, which combines great powers of speed with greatest frailty, is the most susceptible of all craft to deterioration; after the Spanish war it was impossible to keep these boats in commission because of the need for all officers and men that could be had, for service in Chinese and Philippine waters; and so all the torpedo-boats were hauled out of water and laid up. The effect of this upon the navy was bad; the boats when again called into service, were unfit for use until extensive repairs had been made. If the torpedo flotilla is to be one of our naval weapons, the very nature of the torpedo-boat, of its powers, of the hazardous duties it is to be employed upon, require, that, to be successfully used, its officers and crew must have much drill at their proper duties. As for most of the time these boats have not been in commission, this necessary training has had but little place in our service.
It is the purpose of this paper to inquire into what is needed, first, to insure that at the required moment the offensive power of the boat may be equal to its designed power; and secondly, to insure that its destructive powers may be intelligently directed.
For the writer's convenience this subject will be discussed under the following headings: (1) The conditions that have controlled our torpedo-boat flotilla. (2) Lessons concerning torpedo craft to be drawn from history and from foreign manoeuvres. (3) Foreign systems of torpedo-boat training. (4) The torpedo-boat training needed by our navy.
PART I.
THE CONDITIONS THAT HAVE CONTROLLED OUR TORPEDOBOAT FLOTILLA.
Since the Spanish war our torpedo-boat flotilla has been largely augmented, and now consists (built and near completion) of twenty-six sea-going torpedo-boats and twenty torpedo-boat destroyers, with a number of smaller boats. The characteristics of these boats, the extremes of speed and destructive powers combined with ever-present vulnerability to overpowering accident from within and without, are well known to all naval officers. But is not this about all that is known of them to most of those officers who never have had experience with these craft?
One cannot dwell with satisfaction upon what, until recently, has been accomplished by our torpedo-boats in peace time; and in the Spanish war they were never in a single instance put to legitimate torpedo-boat work. The Spanish war proved not their destructiveness nor their war time utility, but demonstrated their inherent weaknesses. During this war the tendency was not to test them but rather to preserve them. This was so because there has not existed in this country, either in its legislators or in its naval officers, a well defined, well agreed upon, torpedo-boat policy, either of building, or of exercise with those already built. Naval experts all agree that the country that places any dependence at all upon torpedo-boats needs many of them. They do not admit that the number at present possessed by the United States nearly equals the number required by considerations of sufficient torpedo-boat defense. Believing as he does that in particular cases the torpedo-boat is invaluable to the national defense, and that for these cases our present torpedo-boat flotilla is not sufficient in numbers for such citable instances, the writer would urge the necessity the navy has of demonstrating its ability to utilize for their designed purpose these destructive engines of modern warfare. Until the navy shows that these weapons may be used against us, and also that in war's contingency we might with advantage use them against an enemy, it is not probable that the national legislators will order any more torpedo-boats to be built. During the discussion upon the last Naval Appropriation Bill, the need of torpedo-boats was not considered. It is submitted that in case of conflict with any of the great naval powers that have bases near to our coasts or colonies, there will be need on our Part of torpedo-boats, and that the country should be educated to this need. If the boats are to be hauled out of water and laid up, the country will not appreciate this need until the war is upon us, nor will the navy be trained to handle these boats efficiently.
The history of the torpedo-boat emphasizes in all cases its extreme vulnerability; the practical study of it by foreign navies has developed much knowledge of when and how and where this weapon should be used, knowledge which but a few of our officers have had an opportunity of acquiring. It is not enough that when on hostile destructive intent the boat should be capable of re- Producing her trial trip speed; the knowledge of the proper use of the boat is just as necessary; this requires the practical study of the tactical operations of the boat in section; of what has been accomplished by torpedo-boats in previous wars, and in squadron during the great foreign manoeuvres; and in each case the particular tactics employed.
Used with wisdom the torpedo-boat becomes a most powerful weapon; used without practical knowledge of torpedo-boat warfare the torpedo-boats become useless for offence, and a weakness and hindrance to their own flag, as instanced by the Spanish destroyers, Furor, Pluton, and Terror, during the Spanish-American War.
We have had torpedo-boats for ten years, during which time we have battled on the seas with an European power, and yet, during this time, at peace and at war, until most recently our officers have never had opportunity to exercise these boats under simulated war time conditions. Individual instances may be cited where boats that have been kept continually in commission have attained to a high standard of efficiency as regards their handling and their speeds; but with the exception of the section of boats once commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Kimball, and a later section commanded by Lieutenant Chandler, there has never been in our service, either in war or in peace, a strategical or tactical use of our torpedo-boats. The experts in torpedo-boat warfare all agree in declaring that to be successful the boats must operate in section; the conditions of success for the torpedo-boat section depend upon each boat being at the top-notch of efficiency. Where our torpedo-boat flotilla has been weak is that at no one time have many of our boats been in efficient condition, and but twice have we ever possessed an efficient torpedo-boat section. As successful torpedo-boat warfare must depend upon many efficient torpedo-boat sections, though we possess over fifty of such craft, and though we now have one most efficient torpedo-boat section, our actual torpedo-boat strength measured by what will be war time necessities, is to-day really and actually so small, that it could not be of much effect in bringing a war to a successful termination. This is so because it would take months of preparation to make seven or eight efficient torpedo-boat sections out of our present uncommissioned flotilla.
Let it never be forgotten that, unless their officers and crews are experienced in torpedo-boat duties, the possession of fifty odd craft does not in itself constitute torpedo-boat strength. It may not be necessary to keep constantly all fifty boats in full commission, but that our present torpedo-boat flotilla may be a formidable weapon in case of war, it is respectfully submitted that at all times, year in and year out, there should be some boats in full commission, constantly exercised in section, required not only to develop trial trip speeds, but also regularly to practice at approved torpedo-boat section tactics; and furthermore that those boats not kept in commission should have such constant attention, and be run so frequently, that at all times except when undergoing repairs, they would be ready to be commissioned for offensive work.
The officers and crews attached to these boats should be subject to change after each had received a stated amount of experience with them, thus providing for a healthy interest, knowledge, and experience in such duty throughout all branches in the naval service.
At the close of the war with Spain the torpedo-boats were put out of commission, hauled out of water and laid up. When again called into commission at the close of 1900, it was found that the most extensive repairs were needed by them, and months were consumed in getting the flotilla ready for service. After being commissioned, although the crew of each boat had some opportunity of learning the special characteristics of its own boat, the highest speeds were rarely if ever attempted, nor was there anything in the nature of approved tactical manoeuvres carried out. The mishaps were so constant and so many that each crew was at all times occupied with the interior affairs of its own boat. Real torpedo-boat service was not attempted, and it can hardly be claimed that the commissioning of these boats was of value to the naval service except by the demonstration of needed experience and much drill by those who are to handle them; the boats were so many different units which were not brought together for proper tactical work.
The actual results showed that the great speed Powers placed in the boat were not to be developed except by crews drilled into excellence; to attain this excellence requires constant practice for an extended length of time. Another result burned into the minds of all who had to do with these boats was the certain deterioration that always happens to them when not receiving constant care and attention.
At times there has been much discussion in our service of torpedoes and of torpedo-boats, and but very little discussion of the training needed by those who handle these weapons. The purpose of this paper is to examine into the conditions that have prevailed within our torpedo-boat flotilla regarding its ability to perform effectively its designed duty, to inquire if there has been a lack of needed training on the navy's part to handle these weapons efficiently.
As delivered to the navy the torpedo-boat possesses the extremes of speed, destructive power, and vulnerability. Sir William Laird Clowes has said in the NAVAL INSTITUTE'S PROCEEDINGS that the designed purpose and the legitimate duty of the torpedo-boat is "To strike like a bolt from the blue in the most unexpected quarters, to be always in perfect readiness for a few hours of rough, hard work under extreme pressure." The question to be asked is whether the average condition of the boats of our service has ever been such that one might with reasonable confidence of success dispatch them in war time to do their legitimate work. To answer this question, realizing that at times some boats have been kept in commendable states of efficiency, and that the recent work of the section of boats under the command of Lieutenant Chandler has proved that with opportunity our navy can use these boats intelligently and efficiently for their designed purposes, it must be asseverated that, with the exception of the two sections previously mentioned, our torpedo-boat flotilla has never been in condition for effective work. Although individual boats have at times when long in commission reached commendable states of efficiency, it must be remembered that this is not the final test of their destructive ability. If every unit of our flotilla were in perfect condition, the flotilla would not yet be ready for war, because the torpedo-boat must act in concert with other boats, and much drill and practice is necessary to insure that this will be properly done. As our flotilla of fifty-three boats and destroyers exists to-day, there are but seven, comprising one section, that may be said to be ready for hostile attack. Many more boats could be got ready upon short notice, but officers and crews experienced in torpedo-boat duties could not be found for them; therefore with the exception of one section of seven boats it must be stated that our torpedo-boat flotilla is not in such condition that it could be dispatched in war time on its legitimate duty with reasonable chances of success.
If one examines the history of our torpedo-boats there is at all times evidence that the cause of this is primarily the lack of training in the navy for torpedo-boat work, lack of opportunity for officers and men to learn torpedo-boat duties, and absence of useful torpedo-boat tactical manoeuvres during the short periods of time torpedo-boats have been kept in commission. The chief feature of the torpedo-boat is her speed, which is of prime necessity to enable the boat to get within striking distance of her prey before being discovered and destroyed; that this speed is essential to give the torpedo-boat a chance to escape after she has discharged her torpedoes is of secondary importance; the scope of the torpedo-boat's mission does not include consideration of possibilities of escape after the purpose has been accomplished; yet if the personnel of the boat are to be allowed hope of escape this must depend upon the boat's speed. Thus the possibilities of successful attack and subsequent escape all depend absolutely upon the capability of the boat for speed. All navies realize this, and therefore our boats have been designed with this quality in mind, and before delivery to the government the contractor is required by actual trial to prove the speed of the boat he has built.
Many such trials have been made not by the contractor's own workmen, but by an expert torpedo-boat engineer who for the past eight years has devoted all of his time to superintending such trials; he has an expert crew that accompanies him. When engaged for the trial of some particular boat he first devotes himself to drilling his crew into perfect familiarity with the boat in hand, has as many full-powered trials as he judges his crew need, and upon the appointed day he superintends the contractor's trial to meet the government requirements; these trials have usually been successful. It must be remembered that the great speed developed upon such an occasion is the speed that will be actually necessary when the boat is dispatched upon hostile mission, and that without this speed the boat will be destroyed without having a chance to discharge her torpedoes; and all experience proves that this speed will never be developed except by a torpedo-boat crew each unit of which is an expert in his own particular duties.
Naval officers may, with satisfaction, remember that, under continuous commission, we have had boats capable of developing the speed attained on the contractor's trial trips; but where boats have been commissioned after having been laid up, the history is that before being ready for service they have always needed extensive repairs; furthermore the boats were, with rare exceptions, never long enough in commission to permit the units of their crews to become thoroughly expert in individual duties, a fact well attested by the number of accidents incident to the early steaming of the boats, due sometimes to inexperience in handling the boat, and at other times to inexperience in manipulating the engines. This is not surprising; because a naval officer has been graduated from Annapolis and has had several years of watch and other duty, it does not necessarily follow that, when first ordered to torpedo-boat duty, he is as competent to command the torpedo-boat as is the officer who has already had much experience in such duty; nor are the members of the crew as efficient at first as they will be later in the performance of their duties; this though a truism may be pertinent, for it has been seldom that the officer ordered to command has had any previous experience with these craft; the records show that when a boat remains commissioned for some time the ills and misfortunes that always attend the early commissioning of these boats grow more and more infrequent.
The navy is weak in torpedo-boat experience because our boats have been so little used. Hitherto when the boats have been put into commission for the manoeuvres, before the officers and crews had had sufficient experience to become expert, the manoeuvres were over, and the boats were put out of commission, hauled out and laid up; as previously stated, although the boats are worthless for legitimate torpedo-boat duty unless capable of great speeds, during these short commissions there were too many break-downs at low speeds to justify many attempts at high speeds.
The foregoing remarks apply to the older boats; the faults pointed out are not due to lack of proper spirit on the part of any body, but partly because of the conditions that have existed in the service where there have not been nearly enough officers and men to supply the call from battle and cruising squadrons.
The last addition of these craft to our navy, of sixteen torpedo-boats and sixteen destroyers, are of the latest type, and are possessed of the greatest powers of their class. This addition makes our torpedo-boat flotilla of respectable size and power, although no one would claim that it is as yet sufficiently so for its purpose. But in recent national legislation there has been no apparent tendency to increase the number of torpedo craft.
It is apparent that in the manoeuvres soon to be executed in the Caribbean Sea, torpedo-boats will have far greater place than in any previous operations of our navy; and it is probable that the need of many more boats for such manoeuvres will be actually demonstrated; this would demand that many of both the commissioned and enlisted personnel receive special training, so that when the flotilla of boats is commissioned either for peace manoeuvres or for war, its work will be creditable.
PART II.
LESSONS CONCERNING TORPEDO CRAFT TO BE DRAWN FROM HISTORY AND FROM THE GREAT FOREIGN MANOEUVRES.
During the American Civil War the destructive possibilities of the torpedo received terrible illustration, and since then inventors and scientists have been engaged in perfecting this weapon. To-day the Whitehead torpedo is used by all navies, and the vessels carrying these torpedoes are all built much upon the same plans and considerations. The invention of the torpedo caused the construction of the special vessel to carry it. For many years there was constant study and practice to determine the needed characteristics of the torpedo vessel, and the present form of the torpedo vessel was naturally evolved with the perfection of the torpedo itself and the development of rapid-fire ordnance. The one who studies the history of the torpedo-boat must be greatly impressed by the effect which the great foreign yearly manoeuvres had upon its development in size, speed, and number required. The first idea was that the boat should be small and speedy; the great development of small calibred guns made the extreme of speed of prime necessity; without it the boat would never be able to get near enough to the enemy to discharge her torpedoes. A condition early developed by the great naval manoeuvres was the need of a vessel designed for the special purpose of destroying torpedo-boats, and thus torpedo-boat catchers of various types were built; following manoeuvres proved that all of these types were unsatisfactory, yet in their short-comings was seen the needed characteristics of the boat which was to suppress the torpedo-boat; as a result the torpedo-boat destroyer was built and tried, and has proved to be the instrument needed, and to-day all navies are being provided with torpedo vessels of this class. The development of this weapon has created new problems in warfare, conditions which modern naval commanders must be familiar with, and conditions which are as yet by many officers but imperfectly understood. The foreign naval manoeuvres have contributed largely to the development of torpedo vessels, and we have accepted the results of these manoeuvres and are building our torpedo craft on the lines indicated by them as necessary. Until the present time we have never had any manoeuvres in which the operations of torpedo craft presented any problems or conditions or had the slightest effect. In the British manoeuvres of 1901 sixty destroyers and twenty torpedo-boats took part and were in constant activity. The action of these torpedo vessels presented conditions and problems the like of which has never been seen in our navy; foreign navies are prepared to use torpedo-boats in action, and they have studied the best methods of using them strategically and tactically, and of sup pressing and repulsing hostile boats. As an offset to this, what have we done? Are we to go on, "hoping that when the time comes to beat an enemy we shall be ready and able to do so by the gift of God which comes to us by steady advancement through the grades of the service?" Manoeuvres and torpedo-boat operations have as yet been almost impossible to our service, they will come later; but it is possible to study the foreign manoeuvres and to apply some of the lessons there learned to the needs of our own service. In what follows the writer has attempted to quote what was the accepted lesson at the time of torpedo-boat operations, in war and in foreign manoeuvres. The views that were expressed at the time are given; some were to be modified by subsequent teachings, some to be repeatedly accentuated. Though there are many officers familiar with the lessons that history and the great peace manoeuvres have taught, torpedo-boat operations have been so limited in the past, and are to be so important to us in the future, that it is hoped that the summarizing in one paper of previous torpedo-boat teachings may be of some service. It is not claimed that the views here recorded have other weight than is naturally accorded to capable observers, but it is maintained that these views are those of experts, and that when uttered they were received as correct upon the subject of torpedo-boat operations.
It is held that the purpose of the torpedo-boat is, by operating from a base or shelter, to make hostile attacks upon the enemy's ships; and that the purpose of a destroyer is, in addition to its character as a torpedo-boat, to prevent torpedo-boat attack, to destroy and suppress torpedo-boats, to blockade torpedo-boats, to accompany squadrons to sea and to keep up with them at high speeds in all weathers for long distances.
We have made but little use of our torpedo-boats either in war or in the few peace manoeuvres we have had, but we now have a large number of such craft, and we have officers and men enthusiastic of their possibilities; as real earnest intelligent use of them is almost new to all but a few of us, let us see how we can apply to our own circumstances the lessons that have been learned concerning them.
The real conclusive lesson will be taught only when great powers war; still the torpedoes have been used in little wars, and from these we may learn something; and the foreign manoeuvres have developed much knowledge concerning torpedo- boat operations and dispositions.
THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION OF 1891.
The torpedo-boat in its present modern form was first used in hostile attack on April 23, 1891, when the Chilian government vessels, Lynch and Conde11, attacked with their torpedoes the Revolutionary vessels in Caldera Bay; five torpedoes were discharged, only one of which struck its target; this one sunk the Blanca Encalada. The official report of this action said that the lessons this taught were:
"The difficulty of effectively using the Whitehead torpedo save when it is in the hands of people thoroughly familiar with it, and the untrustworthiness of the human element in torpedo warfare.—The usefulness of the Whitehead torpedo when properly employed.—To use any torpedo effectively even in peace time requires not only coolness and self-command, but also great carefulness, and above all, training."
Target practice with the Whitehead torpedo as then supplied, everywhere proved the uncertainty of the direction that the torpedo would take after launching; that one out of five torpedoes discharged should hit its target was at that time to be considered good torpedo marksmanship; during our recent manoeuvres the torpedo-boat section commanded by Lieutenant Chandler, running at full speed discharged 14 torpedoes, 12 of which struck their targets. The invention of the gyroscope has converted the torpedo from a weapon of most uncertain aim to one of gun precision. The certainty of aim with which the torpedo can now be discharged bespeaks for it a far greater field than when, ten years ago, it was so uncertain.
THE CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR, 1894.
The great lesson to be drawn from the torpedo-boat operations of this war is the utter worthlessness in accomplishing results of the weapon when operated by untrained crews. At no one time were the boats operated with the best strategical or tactical considerations. At the battle of Yalu, on September 17, 1894, there were no Japanese torpedo-boats, and the Chinese boats present, if there were any, took no part in the fight. At Wei-Hai-Wei the position of the Japanese invited torpedo-boat attack, but none was made upon it. Here, on January 30, 1895, sixteen Japanese torpedo-boats attacked the Chinese fleet, but failed in accomplishing anything. Later, on February 5, these boats repeated the attack upon the Chinese fleet, then crippled and disheartened, and sunk several ships.
THE BRAZILIAN REVOLT OF 1803-04.
During this conflict torpedo-boat operations had place but once, which was at the close of the revolt. Two separate attacks were made by four government torpedo vessels upon the Aquidaban, on the nights of April 4, and April 5, 1894. On the second night, one of four torpedoes discharged, struck and sunk the Aquidaban.
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898.
There were no torpedo-boat operations worthy the name in this short war. The American boats were used for everything except torpedo-boat work. Apparently the Spaniards had not the faintest conception of the proper use of their destroyers, which were at all times a positive hindrance. In action they were vanquished by a converted American yacht. The attempted attack of the Terror upon the St. Paul was made in the greatest of ignorance, and of necessity ended in disaster.
Let us turn from the limited torpedo-boat operations in warfare to what has been done in the great naval manoeuvres.
The tremendous possibilities of the torpedo-boat has for years appealed to naval minds, and in the evolution of the type it is interesting and instructive, from the point of view of present knowledge, to examine into the expressions of those who had to do with the weapon in its earlier days.
A French student whose views were widely read and discussed wrote in L'Annee Maritime, in 1882, that:
"A condition essential to the success of these weapons is that they should be manoeuvred by bold, well-disciplined crews, free from liability to panic, and composed of men resolutely determined to sacrifice their lives if necessary."
Some features of the torpedo-boat have undergone much development, but the character of the men who are to man them must always be of the nature just quoted; this is accentuated by every employment the weapon has ever had, in peace and in war.
In July, 1879, in the Revue Maritime, Lieutenant Chaubaud-Arnault of the French Navy, presented a paper on the subject of "The employment of Torpedoes in boats against ships." One of the views presented in this paper, drawn from a study of all previous torpedo-boat operations, is:
"An attack attempted by night or day by a well-constructed torpedo-boat presents no exceptional dangers either for the boat or the crew."
This most remarkable statement which to-day is absolutely untenable, is a forcible illustration of the great development of the torpedo-boat and of the means of repelling torpedo-boat attack. In present times attacks from torpedo-boats would never be attempted by day by experienced officers, and an attack by night by single boat would be made only as a last despairing attempt, almost hopeless of success, and entirely hopeless of returning whole from the attack except if the enemy be entirely unprepared.
In Vol. VII, No. IV, of the Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete des Seewesens, is found the report by Lieutenant Witheft of the Russian Navy, of the results accomplished at the Russian Naval Torpedo School, in 1879. Throughout the summer of 1879 twelve Russian torpedo-boats in full commission had been constantly exercised for the purpose of studying and developing the best methods of handling torpedo-boats. The following were among the conclusions reached:
"Boats must be manned by men trained to the hazardous duties expected of them."
"The torpedo and the torpedo-boat should form a single weapon so that the attention of the officers in command may never be divided between the conducting of the boat and the handling of the weapon." Every division of torpedo-boats should be trained to conduct an attack without the support or cooperation of any other naval arm."
"In the Russo-Turkish war almost every attack was successful when undertaken according to a well-matured plan by a group of boats, and no attack succeeded which was made by a single boat."
'Attacks by single boats are only to be attempted as a last resource."
"The attack must be made according to a carefully considered plan."
"The attacks should be made at a signal from the officer in command, simultaneously from several points."
"In order to be able to apply all these rules effectively in war, it is necessary in time of peace to train every torpedo division to act as much as possible under the conditions which would arise in actual warfare. It is only after much practice that success can be obtained in this new method of warfare. Trials with single boats can only be regarded as preliminary to manoeuvres with a whole division. The only way to insure success when a boat is for the first time attached to a division, is constant practice in making attacks of a similar nature in time of peace."
In an essay by Commander Hayes, of the British navy, published in the Journal of the United Service Institution, Vol. XXII, 1878, it is said:
"Torpedo-boats attacking a ship at anchor will probably have to oppose two lines of obstructions, and to engage other torpedo and guard boats; they would also be exposed to a severe fire from rifles, Gatlings, grape, and case, directed by the aid of the electric light; therefore torpedo-boats should attack in numbers and from different quarters."
In a speech in the British House of Commons, in 1877, Commander Lord Charles Beresford said:
"If three or four boats of great speed attacked a ship from different points of the compass, the ship was doomed to destruction. Great Britain might build enormously powerful ships, but torpedoes must be the order of the day."
In his report of 1878-79, Admiral Porter said:
"The history of torpedoes shows a large proportion of failures and the destruction or imminent risk of the boats employed."
In presenting these views of early torpedo-boat students, the writer does not offer them as possessing any peculiar sanctity nor value, except as they applied at the time they were written.
But it is interesting and instructive to know the influences upon our predecessors in torpedo-boats, and where we find certain principles, the truth, the pertinence, necessity, and value of which are constantly and increasingly accentuated, we may with profit study them and apply them to our own circumstances.
Let us follow the history of torpedo-boats in the yearly manoeuvres of the great naval powers.
In the British naval manoeuvres of 1885, twenty-five torpedo-boats took part. That part of the report which concerns these boats states that about half of these became disabled during the passage from their home ports to the scenes of the operations; a great action was planned in which these boats were to have a prominent part in the attack; the report of the attack says that these torpedo-boats seemed to be uncontrollable; many collisions occurred, machinery mishaps, and break-downs of disabling nature were more than frequent, and when the order for the attack was given but few of the 25 boats could take part. The judges reported their opinion of these torpedo-boats to be that in their condition and as they were handled, the torpedo-boats could not have succeeded in any attack.
In 1885, Lieutenant Leroy, of the French navy, brought a section of torpedo-boats from Brest to Toulon; in his report to the Ministry of Marine of this passage, he says:
"That which is wearying on board a torpedo-boat, and is extremely trying to a sensitive nervous system, is the continual vibration and racing of the engines with a violence which almost suggests that the engine must come to pieces. The strain is moral rather than physical, but it tells upon the whole system; after a short time, however, one grows used to it. With the engines all was satisfactory; the engineers were accustomed to torpedo-boats. They were men who had training at Brest. It is absolutely necessary that the crew of a torpedo-boat should be thoroughly accustomed to this class of vessel."—(Brassey's Annual, 1886.)
In Brassey's Annual of 1887, a writer criticising the torpedoboat work of the previous manoeuvres, says:
"The introduction of the torpedo, the torpedo-boat, and the torpedoboat catcher, calls for the creation of a special service for the efficient manning of the coast defence flotilla. A school of training for this Purpose is not less necessary than a school of gunnery."
Torpedo-boats took a prominent part in the French naval manoeuvres of 1886. A very prominent illustration of the character of their service is shown by the difference between the first and the last reports. We find at first that a short cruise of 27 hours so completely used up the crews of these boats that they were reported to be completely unfit for duty.
Some months later these same crews were found to be able to handle their boats for weeks at a time, in even worse weather, without exhaustion. The lesson here portrayed has been emphasized by the history of every torpedo-boat that has ever been put into service. Exhausting though torpedo-boat work is, with a few months of training the crews can accustom themselves to the physical demands upon them without overstraining themselves. In these manoeuvres off Toulon, torpedo-boats at first made themselves notorious because of the number of boats that were sunk by avoidable collisions; also the machinery mishaps were so many that no boat could be depended upon to execute a signal. In an attack upon a hostile fleet that appeared off Ajaccio, of twenty torpedo-boats that were formed for attack but six were in condition for service. Later, at the same place, a fleet of thirteen boats, the slowest of which had made over a trial course a speed of twenty knots, sallied out to attack a hostile squadron, which, after seeing the fleet of boats start out, steamed away at a speed of II2 knots; the fleet of torpedo-boats was not able to catch up to this squadron. After some months of work the troubles that had early beset these boats had mostly disappeared, and the boats were found to be capable of effective service. In the report concerning these torpedo-boat operations is found the following significant statement:
"The experience gained during two months of constant torpedo-boat work was noticeable in the increased skill and endurance shown by the crews of all the boats."
"A special class of men must be trained for service in torpedo-boats, for, with increased experience in the crew the increased efficiency of the boat is very marked." (Brassey's Annual, 1887).
It is certain that, if our boats are to be commissioned only when war breaks out, nothing but misfortune and disaster will attend them ; they will surely suppress themselves without harming the enemy; it is too much to hope that there will be any possibility of practice with them after the declaration of war. To be of any service the boats and crews must be drilled beforehand, must be ready to face the problems and conditions that war brings. All experience shows that torpedo-boats put into service without drill can never accomplish anything, while the possession of numerous well-drilled boats will prevent a possible enemy from ever attempting to sight our shores.
The French navy learned this lesson so well that, previous to their manoeuvres of 1888, forty torpedo-boats with crews numbering 1722 men were kept in commission for a year. The work done by torpedo-boats during these manoeuvres was not entirely satisfactory, but it was a great improvement over what had been done previously. In the French manoeuvres of 1889, the record of the torpedo-boats was marred by collisions with other boats and by machinery mishaps; it was reported that in all of such cases these troubles occurred to boats whose crews had had no torpedo-boat training, and that they were caused by inexperience. The great lesson learned by the French from these manoeuvres was the necessity of previous drill at torpedo- boat tactics; before this each section-commander had used his boats according to his own particular judgment, the best methods of handling a number of boats acting together had not received much study, and the necessity of tactics was but dimly appreciated there being no well-developed agreed-upon system of tactics; each commander used his boats in an attack with but little knowledge of the best methods; confusion always occurred, the attacks were rarely successful, and the boats suffered terribly. The certainty of success by the German method of attack, as recently shown by Lieutenant Chandler, is an illustration of what has been accomplished in the methods of using this weapon by constant study and practice with it. In 1889, there was much difference of opinion of when and how and where this weapon should be used; every year's work since then has thrown light upon this subject, and the yearly operations have worked out many torpedo-boat problems.
The following is an extract from the report to the British Admiralty of the naval manoeuvres of 1888 (Brassey's Annual, 1889):
"Torpedo-boats would be of far more use to the blockaded squadrons than to the blockaders. Torpedo-boats, if not capable of keeping the sea independently under all conditions of weather, would inevitably prove a cause of embarrassment and anxiety to an admiral commanding a blockading fleet, and would be subject to endless casualties."
"The employment of torpedo-boats as an inner line of blockade is not desirable, they being calculated to cause much confusion and embarrassment to their friends; they are admirably adapted for purposes of defense; but even then without a very simple and perfect system of signals they are liable to be mistaken for enemies by their own side. This occurred once at least on each side during the 1888 manoeuvres."
The following is an extract from the parliamentary report of
the British manoeuvres of 1890:
"The radius of action of a torpedo-boat is limited less by her coal and feed water supply than by the physical endurance of her crew, especially her commander." (Brassey's Annual, 5891.)
Criticising these same manoeuvres, a writer in Engineering, in 1890, said:
"We now come to the principal lesson from the naval point of view, and that is the great value for training purposes such service has to Young officers whose future will be entirely cast in steam vessels. It would appear in every way desirable that a certain period in a torpedo-boat should be an essential part of a naval education. To carry this into effect a proportion of the boats should always be kept in commission at the various ports, the remainder to be kept in reserve, and to replace periodically those which require refit or repair." (Brassey's Annual, 1891.)
Writing in Le Yacht of these same manoeuvres, the well-known French critic, M. Wehl, said:
"The English manoeuvres have shown once more that torpedo-boats well handled are formidable weapons at a small distance from the shore."
THE BRITISH NAVAL MANCEUVRES OF 1891.
These are the most important manoeuvres as regards torpedo boats that have ever taken place. The British Admiralty announced to the squadrons mobilized for the manoeuvres the following tasks:
"(a) To ascertain the tactics which would probably be adopted by flotillas of torpedo-boats stationed at several points on one shore of a channel in order to harass or destroy an enemy's ships on the other side."
"(b) To ascertain the measures which should be taken to give security against the attacks of these torpedo-boats."
Discussing the results of these manoeuvres the well-known naval critic, Mr. Thursfield, wrote in the Quarterly Review of April, 1892:
"The bases assigned to the torpedo-boats on this occasion were the Irish ports of St. George's Channel. Their objective was a small squadron of ironclads with cruisers and torpedo-gunboats under Captain Long, with his base at Milford Haven, and a freedom of range throughout the area accessible to the hostile torpedo-boats, Captain Long, himself a torpedo expert of great experience and capacity, resolved to make his defence an active rather than a passive one, that is, instead of entrenching himself behind such fixed and mobile defences as are available when a squadron remains at its anchorage, and waiting for torpedo-boats to attack him, he went himself to attack the torpedo-boats. The result abundantly justified the tactics employed. In no one single instance during the operations was a torpedo-boat successful in its attack on an ironclad. Of the twenty boats engaged, four were adjudged to have been captured, while seventeen separate attacks delivered by the remainder were adjudged to have resulted in the temporary disablement of the boats engaged. Besides this, two of the protecting ships attached to the torpedo-boat bases were destroyed by Captain Long, and the end of the operations left him completely master of the situation."
These 1891 manoeuvres are of especial interest to the student of torpedo-boat warfare because they were, by intent and in act, a direct duel between torpedo-boats and an attacking squadron. Of this, Mr. Thursfield wrote in Brassey's Annual, 1893:
"The object of the torpedo-boats was to harass the squadron, to impede its operations, and to destroy it if possible; while the object of the squadron was, by clearing the sea of torpedo-boats, to recover its freedom of operation, and, in the meanwhile, to take effective measures for its defence against their attack."
The striking lesson taught by these operations is that the best defence against expected torpedo-boat attack is made by assuming the offensive against them, and until in readiness for such offensive action, to keep out of the torpedo-boat's radius of action. If the torpedo-boats are not met with, the squadron should destroy if possible the bases of the torpedo-boats; this will effectively suppress the boats; if these bases are ports that cannot be destroyed, the squadron watching outside will be sure to catch some of the boats attempting to run the blockade, for the torpedo-boat must have frequent recourse to its base. All war manoeuvres have proved that it is almost impossible for torpedo boats to find an enemy's ships that are somewhere at large upon the sea, and also that a squadron can surely find the hostile torpedo-boats by watching their bases; this insures the suppression of the boats though it invites attack from them. In the manoeuvres of 1890 a squadron anchored at a distance of over 100 miles from where there was known to be torpedo-boats; a night attack was made by the latter and four great battleships were destroyed; in the operations of the next year the squadron was constantly on the move, searching for the boats, well prepared for the attack which it invited; seventeen different attacks were made upon it, with the result of the destruction of all of the boats making the attacks, the squadron being entirely uninjured; the report concerning the torpedo-boat operations of these 1891 manoeuvres was (Brassey's Annual, 1893):
"A torpedo-boat attack to be successful must be in the nature of a surprise. The torpedo-boat has a wider range of offensive action than was before believed. Properly handled, torpedo-boat attack may always be frustrated by torpedo-boat destroyers."
In 1890 the torpedo was most uncertain in its aim, the boats were slow compared with those of to-day, the vaguest ideas of best methods of using the boats existed, and yet, though always made in the greatest of confusion, torpedo-boat attacks some times were terribly destructive. Since then the torpedo has become a weapon of precision, the speeds of the boats approach thirty knots; modern warships are specially prepared to repel successfully torpedo-boat attack; all of this imperatively demands from our officers and men a knowledge of these new features of naval warfare.
The British naval manoeuvres of 1892 continued the investigation of problems of torpedo-boat warfare. Here the particular problem was to investigate the effect of torpedo-boat menace or attack under different circumstances.
Two squadrons of the same flag were to meet and effect a juncture in narrow waters; between them was a powerful hostile squadron, accompanied by a formidable force of torpedo-boats. Criticising these operations, in Brassey's Annual for 1893, Mr. Thursfield said the operations showed that:
"The dreaded torpedo-boat can be completely neutralized by a tactical menace analogous to that which it exerts itself; its own menace is nevertheless so potent within its effective sphere of operations as to interpose impediment to the free movements of the immensely powerful squadrons which might completely frustrate the combinations and defeat the purposes of a deep-laid plan of campaign. 'The security of a cruising fleet at night against the attack of torpedo-boats in waters open to their operations lies in its constant movement at a speed and in directions not known to the enemy in search of it. It is certain that the menace of the torpedo-boat operates with immense effect on the cruising fleet. No one who realizes the immense importance of time in the operations of modem warfare will think it a small matter that the junction of two fleets immensely superior to the adversary opposed to them was delayed for 48 hours by the comparatively insignificant force of 21 torpedo-boats, and that this effect was produced although the torpedo-boats never succeeded in destroying a single one of their adversaries."
Torpedo-boat operations formed a part of the French manoeuvres of 1892; it was reported that the great lesson taught by them was:
"The absolute inefficiency of torpedo-boats as auxiliaries to a sea-going iron-clad squadron." (Brassey's Annual, 1893.)
Both the French and Russian manoeuvres of 1891 consisted of attacks by hostile squadrons upon the coasts defences, among the latter being many torpedo-boats. The lesson taught by these operations was the intimidating effect upon an admiral by the presence of hostile torpedo-boats. The apprehensive watching for them proved to be the most wearing strain that had ever been imposed upon the officers and crews of these ships. A few days of it used them up. If this is so in peace manoeuvres, What is to be expected in war? If it be imperative that a squadron gain foothold on a hostile shore, the torpedo-boats of the latter must first be suppressed, and all experience shows that the squadron should assume the offensive against them rather than wait for attack; these manoeuvres again proved that, though the torpedo-boat under proper convoy can make long voyages, in war time it is not a sea-going instrument of naval warfare.
As these yearly manoeuvres proceeded, it is seen that each year questions concerning the possibilities of torpedo-boats and the best means of repelling attacks from them formed the great problem; on the part of Great Britain we always find great squadrons opposed to each other, and great numbers of torpedo vessels present. The simulated conditions generally are those of Great Britain opposing the combined forces of France and Russia. Great Britain is more powerful in battleships and cruisers, while France and Russia possess a far greater number of torpedo-boats. Naturally the purpose of many of the foreign manoeuvres has been to decide to what extent the opposing superior force of torpedo-boats counterbalances the inferiority in fighting ships. In investigating this question all sorts of problems connected with torpedo-boats have been met with, and much knowledge has been gained which we can apply to our own necessities.
Many of the French and Russian manoeuvres consisted in attacks upon their coast by superior squadrons, to be opposed by inferior squadrons accompanied by great numbers of torpedo boats.
In the British manoeuvres of 1893, two powerful fleets in a narrow channel were opposed by a slightly inferior fleet, but which possessed a far greater force of torpedo-boats. The particular question laid down by the Admiralty was to ascertain to what extent this great superiority in torpedo-boats redressed the slight inferiority in fighting ships. During these operations there were fleet actions and constant torpedo-boat attack. The latter were handled by determined officers and experienced crews, ambitious to prove the decisive value of the torpedo boat as a weapon; they properly took great chances. As a result of all of these torpedo-boat attacks, one battleship and four cruisers were sunk, but this was at a cost of five cruisers and twenty-seven torpedo-boats, in five and a half days. The results of these operations are summed up in Brassey's Annual, 1894, by Mr. Thursfield, as follows:
"Thus the continued experience of three years' manoeuvres, those of 1891, 1892, and 1893, would seem to show that the sea-going torpedo boat is an overrated weapon of defence. In 1891, the late Admiral Long showed that an active defence, adequately organized and skillfully disposed, must in the end completely neutralize the offensive capacity of the torpedo-boat. This demonstration was reinforced by the manoeuvres of 1892, which also showed further that the extinction of the torpedo-boat menace follows immediately on the destruction of the shelter provided for the hostile torpedo-boats, and on the surrender of the sea-going squadron to which they are attached as auxiliaries. Lastly, the manoeuvres of 5893 completed the demonstration, showing that, even in default of an active defence adequately organized and skillfully disposed, torpedo-boats are very apt to suppress themselves and to attain a very high rate of extinction in the normal course of their attacks on a powerful and vigilant sea-going adversary. The truth seems to be that a torpedo-boat ought properly to be regarded not as an independent sea-going unit of naval force, but as a peculiar and very destructive kind of projectile with a very extreme range which varies according to circumstances, but is by no means unlimited in any circumstances, and with an intelligent power of altering its direction in the course of its flight, but also with a considerable liability to be destroyed or intercepted before it attains its mark. As such its menace is tremendous, and its influence upon all strategic dispositions within its range is dominant and decisive so long as its menace is unabated. But experience, now repeatedly tested in our own and other navies under conditions as closely analogous to actual warfare as peace manoeuvres can be made to afford, would seem to have shown that its strategic menace is far more formidable than its real offensive capacity, and that regarded as a projectile it is endowed with a really remarkable capacity for hitting wide of the mark, and destroying itself before it has delivered its blow, to say nothing of its very awkward habit of occasionally mistaking a friend for an enemy."
TIIE BRITISH NAVAL MANOEUVRES OF 1894.
The following is an extract from the official report made of these manoeuvres. It is found in Brassey's Annual, 1895.
"The torpedo-boat operations were upon a too-restricted scale to supply much valuable instruction, but, as far as they went, they tend to confirm the view that the most effective employment of the torpedo boat in war will be limited to sending her to attack an enemy's ship in a known position within the torpedo-boat's range of action, and that tile whereabouts of the enemy must first be ascertained and communicated to the commander of the boat."
“The necessity of combining with torpedo-boats, vessels of other and larger classes to scout and discover an enemy, where exact information as to his position can not be obtained by other means, seems to be established, and if so, it carries with it the obligation to consider a mere flotilla of torpedo-boats by themselves as a belligerent factor of distinctly imperfect efficiency."
The effect of these manoeuvres was to make the British naval officer more familiar with the limitations of torpedo-boats. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that unless the torpedo-boat knows just where to find the enemy it will probably miss him. Torpedo-boat attack can be successful only in the darkness of night, and for the boat, time is a most important factor. These boats have repeatedly mistaken friends for foes with disastrous results to their own side.
THE BRITISH NAVAL MANOEUVRES OF 1895.
The manoeuvres of 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1894, dealt mainly with strategical questions; in these years torpedo vessels were assigned most prominent parts; in some of these manoeuvres the main problem proposed concerned the proper disposition and use of torpedo-boats. During these operations the need of tactical torpedo-boat exercises became more apparent each year, and as a result the manoeuvres of 1895 were entirely tactical in nature. The torpedo-boat squadron was organized, and the boats comprising it carried out the following tactical manoeuvres (Brassey's Annual, 1896):
(1) Ordinary cruising at various speeds with tactics, to accustom officers and men to the handling of their vessels and boats and their armaments.
(2) Spreading for scouting work and reforming.
(3) Target practice at high speeds and special targets.
(4) Torpedo practice at high speeds.
(5) Tests of capabilities of destroyers in blockading torpedo-boats.
(6) To ascertain how far the best torpedo-boats could prevent modern ships of war from using a channel with the opposite coast in the enemy's hands, and the value of destroyers as a protection to such ships.
(7) To ascertain to what extent it would be desirable to use destroyers as sea-going boats.
THE BRITISH NAVAL MANOEUVRES OF 1.899.
One of the objects of these manoeuvres was announced to be:
"To obtain information relative to the workings of Destroyers and Torpedo-Boats."
Twenty-eight destroyers were assigned to one of the fleets and twenty-four torpedo-boats were assigned to the opposing fleet.
The results of these manoeuvres are summed up in Brassey's Annual of i9oo, as follows:
"The chances of a torpedo-boat finding a single ship or even a fleet in the course of a roving search have been proved over and over again in manoeuvres to be exceedingly small, and they are reduced almost to zero by the presence of a vigilant and active flotilla of destroyers within the area of search."
In these manoeuvres the squadron that was the inferior persistently avoided action and its opposing squadron could not find it. It was held that during the manoeuvres the torpedo craft were not strategically placed, and no great lesson concerning them was to be drawn from these operations.
THE BRITISH NAVAL MANCEUVRES OF 1900.
One of the three objects of these manoeuvres was announced by the Admiralty to be to obtain information relating to:
"The power which cruisers may or may not possess of hunting down and driving torpedo craft into port."
The following are extracts from a criticism of these operations, to be found in Brassey's Annual, 1901:
"The destroyers proved singularly useful as scouts for certain purposes, such as the examination of the enemy's anchorages and possible shelter places, and as fast messengers. As a menace the destroyer is exceedingly formidable, indeed against torpedo-boats its menace is little short of a positive deterrent; as a messenger and for certain purposes as a scout, it is within certain limits almost invaluable."
THE BRITISH NAVAL MANCEUVRES OF 1901.
These were the first manoeuvres in which many destroyers were assigned to each of the opposing squadrons. One of these squadrons was composed of 12 battleships, 25 cruisers, 32 destroyers, and lo torpedo-boats. The opposing squadron was composed of 8 battleships, 24 cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 10 torpedo-boats. The number and the power of the torpedo craft engaged in these operations illustrates the increasing importance attached to this weapon in naval operations. These torpedo craft were in full and constant activity, attacking and eluding Ships. Mr. Thursfield criticises these operations in Brassey's Annual, 1902, as follows:
"Of the manoeuvres as a whole it may be said without hesitation that they were full of pregnant instruction and fuller still of not less significant warning. The question was asked in The Times at the close of the manoeuvres. 'Have we nothing to learn about the art of scouting, about the strategic planning of a campaign, about the true relation of the destroyer to the battleship, alike in attack and in defence, in a word about the training of the naval officer for battle?' In the handling of destroyers and other torpedo craft, again, it cannot be denied that our admirals and senior officers have a great deal to learn. They must make up their minds as to what these vessels can do and what they cannot, how they can be employed to the best advantage, whether they are to be scouts, or commerce destroyers, or torpedo craft proper. Above all they must learn to establish some rational relation between the menace they can properly exert and the injury they are likely to inflict. It is hardly too much to say that the menace of the torpedo craft opposed to him was at the bottom of all Admiral Noel's dispositions, and indirectly the cause of his discomfiture. The actual injury they inflicted upon him was the loss of a single second-class cruiser. On the other hand, it is not perhaps hazardous to conjecture that the employment by Admiral Wilson of his destroyers in the rather burlesque performance of pretending to stop the trade.' was the veil of a crafty tactical purpose. By keeping them behind him he prevented their attacking him by mistake, and could safely open fire on any destroyer he saw, with little or no fear of her turning out to be a friend. But this is as much as to say that the destroyer as an element of naval force has not yet been co-ordinated with other elements, a practical proof that the true relation of the destroyer to the sea-going ship has not yet been determined. There is perhaps no outstanding problem of naval organization and tactics which presses more urgently for solution than this, none of which the solution is fraught with larger or more momentous consequences."
PART III.
TORPEDO-TRAINING IN FOREIGN NAVIES.
Torpedo instruction in the British Navy.
The following is learned from the publication entitled
"Course of instruction of officers and men in the torpedo schools. By authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty."
The instruction in torpedoes and torpedo-boats in the British Navy is most elaborate. It includes seven different courses for commissioned officers, four for warrant officers, nine for artificers of various grades, four for petty-officers, and two for seamen.
These seven courses for officers are as follows: The first course is the "Special full pay torpedo course." It is for officers who have already qualified as Gunnery or Torpedo Lieutenants. It is an advanced course for officers who have been especially selected to take it. This course of instruction lasts for sixty-five working days, twenty-five of which are completed before the yearly manoeuvres, and forty after them.
The first twenty-five days is devoted to what is known as the "Whitehead Course." This is subdivided into two parts, the first part of seven days is devoted to theory, and the second part of eighteen days is devoted to practice. The mornings of these first seven days are spent in hearing lectures on the torpedo armaments of vessels in the navy, and on torpedo mechanism. The afternoons following these lectures are spent in making the various adjustments to the torpedo mechanism to prepare the torpedo for a run. After these seven days comes the practical course of eighteen days, which consists of running torpedo-boats and destroyers, exercising them in different ways, with constant torpedo target-practice at moving targets, combined with practice at such tactical maneuvers as would be used with these craft in war time.
After this Whitehead Course it is probable that many of the officers taking it command the torpedo craft that take part in each year's manoeuvres.
At the conclusion of the manoeuvres the second part of this "Special full pay torpedo course" takes place. This is known as the "Electricity and mining course;" it lasts for forty working days. For the first twenty-two days, each day's work commences with a lecture, which is followed by practical work for the rest of the day. The lectures of these twenty-two days are devoted to the instruments of various kinds used in torpedoes, in gunnery, and in electricity, to their use, manipulation, care, and repairs; to cables, detonators, fuzes, primers, tubes, and dynamo exploders; to explosives and defensive mining; to attacks on harbors, sweeping and countermining, and to blockade mines; to wireless and submarine telegraphy; to defense against torpedoes and torpedo-boats, booms, nets, obstructions, etc.; to dynamos, motors, and. search lights. Immediately after each lecture the officers present engage in practical work upon the subjects that were under consideration in that lecture. After these twenty-two days come eighteen days of practical work in which harbors are mined and countermined and cleared, impromptu defenses against expected attack are set up, different problems incident to this subject being worked out.
This course of sixty-five days is intended to be an advanced course of instruction of the highest character in torpedoes, electricity, and mining, for a few officers specially selected to take it.
The second course for commissioned officers is known as: "Special course of instruction to qualify as torpedo lieutenants." This course lasts for twenty months. The officers who after undergoing this course pass the required examinations are said to qualify as "Torpedo Lieutenants." The first eight months are spent at the Greenwich Naval College, studying principally the theory of electricity and chemistry. The remaining twelve months are devoted to studies supplemented by practical work in torpedoes and torpedo-boats, electricity and wireless telegraphy, gunnery and marine surveying. It is intended that at the end of these twenty months the officers who have undergone this course shall have become expert in all torpedo adjustments, in handling the torpedoes and torpedo-boats, in the knowledge of when and how and where to use them; in electricity as applied to naval purposes, in the knowledge of explosives, and of the various subjects necessary and akin to the proper use of the torpedo. The intent and effect of this twenty months' course of instruction is to prepare young officers for their duties aboard torpedo-boats and destroyers during the manoeuvres and at other times, and in charge of the torpedo equipment aboard warships so provided. The Torpedo Lieutenant ordered to a ship has charge of all torpedo equipment and fittings, and all electrical generators and motors and fittings, and is responsible for their condition. He carries out the various torpedo exercises ordered by the admiralty; he gives every opportunity for instruction in torpedoes and electricity to untrained men; he acts as adviser on torpedo subjects to his captain; he must keep informed of foreign and home methods of harbor defense, and have a knowledge of the mine fields of British harbors. Before action he advises the captain of how the torpedoes should be worked, and he personally fires the torpedoes.
The next course is the "Course for Senior Officers." This is held in the spring of each year, and lasts for twenty working days. The first nine days are devoted to the study and consideration of service torpedoes, to making the necessary adjustments, to launching the torpedoes from destroyers underway, and to net-cutting experiments. The following nine days are spent in hearing lectures on electricity in its different naval applications, including wireless telegraphy, in naval mining, on the defense and attack of harbors, and in practical work in connection with these subjects.
The next course is the "Lieutenants' short course, and Officers R. M. A." This is for officers of the Royal Navy, The Royal Marines, The Royal Naval Reserve, and the Royal Indian Marine. The course is for forty working days, in which the torpedo is studied, and the adjustments are made, and torpedo target practice is had from destroyers underway at moving targets. Harbors are mined and countermined and cleared; the naval applications of electricity are studied practically.
The next course is the "Course of instruction for Retired Officers." This course consists of twenty-five working days, and is the same as that for Senior Officers, with the addition of two extra days for running Whiteheads and three days Practical Mining.
The next course is the "Course for Acting Sub-lieutenants," and it consists of twenty-five working days. The instruction is divided into two parts, the first lasts for ten days, and is devoted to "General Torpedo Work," in which the young officer is made familiar with explosives, and methods of detonating. The time is principally spent in making tests, in looking for leaks and faults of the electrical connections and in repairing them. The second part of this instruction is called the "Whitehead Course," where the young officer is made familiar with the torpedo and all of its adjustments; he is practiced at running torpedoes from destroyers, and in the management of torpedo-boats. In the latter practical instruction is given in the use of the helm, steering, leaving and coming alongside a dock, handling the boat in confined waters, picking up buoys, methods of attacking ships at anchor and underway, and making attacks in company with other boats.
The next is the "Course for all Engineer Officers" which lasts for seven weeks, five weeks of which are spent in studying and adjusting and practicing with the Whitehead torpedo, and the two weeks following are spent in studying and practicing with the electrical instruments used for naval purposes.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION FOR WARRANT OFFICERS.
Candidates for Gunners, who are already Torpedo Instructors, are required to go through what is called the "Special Torpedo Course for Gunner (T.)." Men who are not Torpedo Instructors When selected to qualify for Gunner (T.) will be required to qualify for that rate, and, if considered suitable will be allowed to go on with the Gunners' Special Torpedo Course.
This course lasts for 100 working days, the first 60 of which are spent in studying mensuration, logarithms, and trigonometry; the next 40 days are spent in working with electricity, torpedoes, and signals. On completing this Torpedo Course candidates are required to go through a Gunnery Course lasting 126 days.
Candidates for Gunner (G.) are required first to take the course of 60 days to qualify as Seaman Torpedo Man, unless they have previously qualified in this course, and then they proceed with the "Special Torpedo Course," which lasts for 8o days, and which is principally devoted to practical work with torpedoes, electricity, and signals.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION FOR ENGINE ROOM ARTIFICERS.
Men of these ratings are required to go through an eight weeks' course of practical instruction in the torpedo shops, making adjustments and repairs, followed by five weeks' practical work in the electric light shop, doing such work as is incident to the naval use of electricity.
In the British Navy there is a special rate called "Torpedo Instructor." Men holding this rate are carefully selected by the Captain of the Torpedo School, and must qualify in a prescribed course of studies and practical work that takes 167 working days, 40 days of which are spent in studying arithmetic, and the remainder of the time is devoted to torpedoes, electricity, and signals.
To qualify as Chief Armourer the candidate is required to undergo a course in studies and practical work in torpedoes and electricity that lasts for 155 working days; before a man can be rated "Armourer," he must have had special instruction for 30 days in torpedoes and electricity, and the workshop.
TORPEDO COXSWAINS.
Coxswains of torpedo-boats are selected from Petty Officers (1st class) who are Seaman Torpedo Men. They are required to undergo instruction for 85 working days in torpedoes, management of torpedo-boats and destroyers underway, torpedo target practice at moving targets, internal organization of torpedo-boats; the care and maintenance of such batteries, circuits, and searchlights as are found in torpedo-boats, messing, accounts, etc. Of these 85 days, 30 days are spent in the handling of destroyers under varying circumstances.
COURSE OF INSTRUCTION TO QUALIFY AS LEADING TORPEDO MEN.
A certain number of Seaman Torpedo Men are selected to undergo instruction to qualify as Leading Torpedo Men. This course lasts for 86 working days, in which the following subjects are studied: Torpedoes, theory, adjustment, and use. Practical work with the electrical fittings to be found upon torpedo-boats. Signals.
COURSE FOR QUALIFYING AS SEAMAN TORPEDO MAN.
Likely men are selected to qualify as Seaman Torpedo Men, and are required to undergo a course of instruction in torpedoes and electricity which lasts for 30 working days.
In the British Navy besides the destroyers assigned to the torpedo and gunnery stations for practicing the classes under instruction, three flotillas, each composed of eight torpedo-boat destroyers are kept constantly in commission; these flotillas were organized primarily for the instruction of the engineer's force which is changed each month; the first week of instruction is spent in headquarter waters, where these crews are drilled into knowledge of their duties. Then each flotilla makes an independent sea cruise of three weeks. The purpose of this month's work is to give the men of engine room ratings instruction in their duties at firing, tending water, oiling, and in the various engineering duties incident to the work of destroyers. It should be remembered that these men are already picked because of their ability as firemen, oilers, etc.
The officer in command of the flotilla exercises his commanding officers in handling the boats under varied conditions, and in tactical drill.
COMMENT ON TORPEDO INSTRUCTION IN THE BRITISH NAVY.
In considering these different courses of torpedo instruction, one must believe that they were brought about and developed as a direct result of the extensive work with torpedo-boats during the yearly manoeuvres and at other times. The use of torpedo craft has constantly emphasized their liability to accident from being operated by crews inexperienced in such vessels. In the British service likely men are selected to qualify as Seaman Torpedo Men, and the best of these are later given extensive instruction to enable them to qualify as Leading Torpedo Men. Those of the latter who show particular aptitude are specially selected to qualify as Torpedo Coxswains. It thus results that every man performing important duty aboard these torpedo-boats has received most careful instruction in those duties. The custom of the survival of the fittest holds place. The Leading Torpedo Man is the best of a hundred Seaman Torpedo Men. The Torpedo Coxswain is the best of a hundred Leading Torpedo Men. The commissioning of great numbers of torpedo craft each year, supplements to these various torpedo courses the necessary practical work with these boats, of tactical manoeuvres, and the actual war use of the torpedo. The officers on this duty have all been specially trained.
The grand result is that Great Britain's torpedo-boat flotilla is efficient. But this is not all. There exists throughout the British Navy, in both enlisted and commissioned personnel, a comprehensive knowledge of torpedoes and torpedo-boats; when not in commission the boats are kept in efficient condition; when called into active duty valuable time is not lost either in making needed repairs, or in whipping the officers and crews of the boats into knowledge of their duties.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION IN EUROPEAN CONTINENTAL NAVIES.
In all European continental navies the details of torpedo instruction are kept as secret as possible; nothing official concerning such information is published; but in different ways facts have come out which tell something about it. It may be said that the torpedo officers of these navies are given much instruction with torpedoes and electricity, and that this is followed by much practice in the handling of torpedo-boats underway, and in torpedo marksmanship at moving targets.
The following is taken from different foreign service publications; if there are any complete descriptions of the continental system of torpedo instruction, the writer with much search has been unable to find them.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION IN THE FRENCH NAVY.
Officers desiring to have instruction in torpedoes are first required to qualify in electricity; after which for six months they are attached to the torpedo school at Toulon, where every morning they first listen to lectures and then do practical work with the torpedo mechanism, and with the electrical instruments used with torpedoes, and every afternoon is spent in running torpedo-boats with torpedo target practice at moving targets; the purpose of this six months' course is to familiarize each student officer with every adjustment required to the varied mechanism of the torpedo, and with the best methods of handling the weapon. After this course at Toulon sonic of these student officers take part in the constantly recurring torpedo-boat attacks, and thus receive much training in handling the boats. In the yearly manoeuvres scores of torpedo-boats take part and torpedo-boat attacks always form a prominent feature of the manoeuvres. It is the well-known preparation of the French for an offensive torpedo-boat warfare that has compelled Great Britain to an equal amount of work with the weapon.
Torpedo-boat men of the French Navy are specially selected for their duties. The most intelligent are picked out for special instruction in torpedoes and electricity, and in this way, as in the British service, superior classes of men are developed for this particular work.
A certain proportion of all the boats are kept in continual commission; each boat in commission is always accompanied by a number of other boats kept in reserve with skeleton crews. The boats in commission are constantly exercised, the regulations directing that they shall make two night sorties every month, and that at least once a quarter they shall undertake systematic manoeuvres against a skeleton enemy; each boat in commission is required to fire a torpedo at least three times a month, the boat being underway, and at least twice a month the boat must be travelling at a high rate of speed and the target must be moving. The boats in reserve are at all times kept in efficient condition; at least three or four times a year every boat in reserve is put in full commission and is required to perform a stated amount of regular torpedo-boat duty. When one considers the fact that France possesses several hundred torpedo- boats and destroyers, and that each of these is systematically exercised, one appreciates the great amount of practical experience in handling them that the officers and men of the French navy receive.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION IN THE GERMAN NAVY.
A Rear-Admiral is designated as "Inspector of Torpedoes." He has charge of all matters technical or otherwise, connected with torpedoes; he is directly in charge of all torpedo-boats and their personnel, organizes and directs their exercises, and is responsible for their efficiency.
There are at all times in existence six "Torpedo-boat Divisions of the Reserve," three of which have headquarters at Wilhelmshaven and three at Kiel. Each division consists of one "Torpedo Division Boat" which is permanently commissioned as a depot-ship, and eight torpedo-boats. There are also at each of these stations two instructional torpedo-boats which are permanently commissioned; these are used to train the personnel.
In the Autumn of each year a division of boats is commissioned at Kiel and another division at Wilhelmshaven; these are kept in constant torpedo practice until late in the year; early in the following April these divisions continue their practice and later are assigned for work in the autumn manoeuvres; besides these, other torpedo-boats are commissioned for the autumn manoeuvres, and are given three months' training beforehand; by much instruction and continual change of officers and men the German navy may be said to be efficient at torpedo warfare; indeed the tactics of torpedo-boat attack at present practiced by most navies were originated and developed by the Germans.
TORPEDO INSTRUCTION IN THE RUSSIAN NAVY.
The Russian Naval Torpedo School is situated at Kronstadt; the number of student officers here undergoing instruction is limited to twenty-four, who are chosen from a number of officers that have undergone extensive study and practice for the purpose of entering this school; the course of study is limited to one year, which time is devoted to torpedoes and electricity. In conjunction with this Kronstadt school there is an instructional torpedo-boat flotilla in the Baltic Sea, and an evolutionary torpedo- boat squadron in the Black Sea. The instructional torpedo- boat flotilla of the Baltic Sea is commissioned every year for three months; the time is spent in exercising the officers and men in various duties pertaining to torpedo warfare; the evolutionary squadron for training is commissioned every year in the Black Sea. It consists generally of twenty torpedo-boats, and for several months is exercised for the purpose of training officers and men.
PART IV.
THE TORPEDO-BOAT TRAINING NEEDED BY OUR NAVY.
All great naval powers possess torpedo-craft and all are prepared to use them. We have seen that in European countries much instruction is given in torpedoes and torpedo-boats to those who are to handle them. In our navy such instruction has been limited to but a few, and even to these few the time for such instruction has been much. restricted. If all of our torpedo-craft were now to be commissioned for war service we would have to hope that the general excellence and zeal of our personnel would make up for the special instruction that we lack and which other services have had. But how much more formidable our torpedo-boat flotilla would be if its entire personnel were composed of officers and men all trained and experienced in their duties, and possessed of a confidence that comes from skill!
An intelligent appreciation of this weapon and of its possibilities, combined with a knowledge of when and how and where to use it, is necessary if it is to have effect in bringing war to a successful close. This requires on the part of the operators knowledge of the torpedo's mechanism, skill in making adjustments and in making repairs, and in the use of all instruments used with torpedoes and with torpedo-boats; the torpedo-boat officer should possess much experience in handling small frail craft of great vulnerability and of tremendous engine power; he should be a practical engineer, and he should have a knowledge of the best methods of torpedo-boat attack under various circumstances. The enlisted men should be picked men who have received special instruction for their particular duties.
It is not probable that our entire torpedo-boat flotilla will ever be commissioned, but in order that it might be mobilized for immediate effective service it is essential that special torpedo instruction should be possessed not only by a few, but by many throughout the service, so that to commission many boats would not be an embarrassing matter to the Navy Department.
Besides the ability to make destructive torpedo-boat attacks, our navy must be prepared to repel such attacks when made against us. Sincere as is our friendship with foreign powers it is still an armed friendship, and we are preparing to defend ourselves against any attack made by the navy of any foreign power; most European navies possess hundreds of torpedo-boats, and we must contemplate attack not from battleships alone, but also from these torpedo craft; officers who have had practical experience with torpedo-boats and who understand them in all respects, in their possibilities and in their limitations, are surely best qualified to repel attack from such boats.
It is apparent that our government has embarked upon a policy of yearly naval manoeuvres on a scale commensurate with our necessities; torpedo-boat attack must always form a prominent part of the manoeuvres; the education and training received both by the officers and crews making such attacks, and by those repelling them will be most valuable if our torpedo-boats are handled by experts.
It seems that every possible consideration of our naval needs imperatively demands that torpedo instruction become important in our navy; it must be agreed that at present such instruction is open to but very few, and to these few it is limited in extent. With all of its capabilities for instruction, the Newport torpedo school had but three officers receiving instruction last summer, and each of these three officers was detached and ordered to other duty before much instruction was received; this of course is caused by the scarcity of officers; but it is certain that the personnel will soon be largely increased, and if our naval officers will consider the importance of torpedo instruction a policy instituting such instruction will surely be adopted and carried out.
At the present time our navy is not entirely without torpedo instruction; a small part of it is receiving training of the highest character in torpedoes and torpedo-boats; the trouble is that this part is so very small; the instruction should be so very general, that, should it be necessary to mobilize a flotilla of torpedo-boats, it ought not to be difficult to commission them with officers and crews already experienced in torpedo-boat work. This torpedo instruction at present existing in our navy may be divided into three parts, each of which has grown up independent of the other two. The first part is the instruction given at the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport; the second part is the instruction received by the officers and men in charge of the torpedo-boats in reserve; and the third part is the instruction received by the officers and men attached to boats in regular service commission.
The first of these, at Newport, provides instruction for officers and men.
The regular course of instruction for officers is limited to 29 working days; this time is devoted to 'lectures and to practical work; the subjects considered are electricity, torpedoes, and torpedo-boats, and instruments and implements used with them, to explosives and to mines; this course includes the torpedo adjustments, the handling of torpedo craft, and torpedo target practice at moving targets from boats underway; this instruction has not been regular because no policy of ordering officers to undergo it has ever been adopted and then carried out; this year it has not been given because no officers have been ordered to take it. Last summer some of the officers attached to the North Atlantic Squadron received torpedo instruction at this station; this special course lasted for six weeks; the time was devoted to lectures and to practical work; the subjects under consideration were the assembling and disassembling, the installation and the adjustments of the various parts of the torpedo mechanism; to torpedo target practice from boats underway, to air compressors, electric attachments, mines, and explosives.
At the Torpedo Station there are classes of enlisted men receiving instruction; this is shown in the following which is an extract from the Annual Report of the Naval Torpedo Station for 1902:
SEAMEN GUNNERS' CLASS.
"There are accommodations for a class of about fifty seamen gunners and nearly double this number could be graduated each year were it Practicable to have that many sent here. The facilities and work required for a large class are but little greater than for a small one, particularly if a number of men or even a whole class could be sent at the same time. The total number under instruction during the last year has been 33, of which number 20 have received certificates of graduation, one failed to qualify, nineteen have taken the course in diving, and ten are at present in the class. The full course embraces the following subjects, covering six months' time:
Electrical work (instruction) 2 weeks.
Electrical work (practical) 2 weeks.
Dynamo room 4 weeks.
Explosives and torpedo material 4 weeks
Torpedoes 4 weeks
Torpedo-boat work 1 week
High speed engines, steam 3 weeks.
Diving (optional) 3 weeks.
Review 1 week.
Owing to the great demand in the service for graduates of this course of instruction the Department has had to resort to the expediency of shortening the course to three months, and the time has been allotted in accordance therewith as follows:
Electrical instruction and practical work1 week.
Explosives, torpedo material and mines 3 weeks.
Torpedoes 4 weeks.
Running air compressors 2 weeks.
Diving 2 weeks.
It will be seen that the full course gives 11 weeks to electricity, dynamos and high speed engines. The new rate of electrician, with the electrical school at New York, no longer renders this extended instruction necessary for seamen gunners, and it has been limited to practical work with batteries, electric firing circuits, wiring, splicing, and testing circuits in connection with firing devices, mining, etc.
ENGINEERS' CLASS.
This class was established January 1, 1902, for the purpose of training machinists and firemen to perform the duties of their ratings on board torpedo-boats, and the course was limited to three months. The requirements of the service, however, have shown an even more urgent demand for water tenders and oilers for these boats. It is found practicable to train a second class machinist to be an oiler in three months, but only in rare cases can a new recruit be made a water tender in the same time. It is to be remembered that on a torpedo-boat even more than on a large ship, the water tender is the back-bone of the fire-room force. Not only must he be a man with a thorough knowledge of the boilers, piping and pumps, but he must have besides this the faculty of the control of men, the quality of coolness in emergency, and a keen sense of responsibility. Things happen quickly in the fireroom of a torpedo-boat and a moment's hesitation may mean a new boiler. The men to discharge the duties of this rate cannot be developed in three months, but should be carefully selected from the best firemen in the service and then given at least six months' instruction in the particular duties of their rating.
The boats used in training this class are the Morris, McKee, Dahlgren, Craven. Winslow, Stiletto, and 3rd class boats Nos. 1 and 2. The variety of types is advantageous in that the men become acquainted with the different boilers and engines used in the Navy.
The course of instruction is given under eleven subjects for machinists and eight subjects for firemen and coal passers, as shown by the following schedule:
ENGINE ROOM.
(1) Main engines; arrangements and sizes of cylinders; valves; shafting; propellers; etc.
(2) Condensers, construction and purpose; how tubes are packed, plugged or withdrawn and replaced; how to test a condenser. Air and circulating pumps and all attachments.
(3) Auxiliaries; dynamo engine; steering engine; blower engine and compressor.
(4) Piping, leads of and purposes; situation, construction, and manipulation of all valves and their purposes. Situation of water tanks, connections and capacities.
(5) The particular duty of each part of the main engine. How pistons and valves are made steam tight.
(6) The purpose and general construction of the throttle valves, reversing gear, valve shaft, pass overs, drains, relief valves and traps.
(7) How to grind in and reseat valves; packing of glands and joints; different kinds of packing.
(8) Oil and water service. Difference in character of various oils.
(9) Bearings; construction, adjustments, cooling.
(10) Indicators and counters, and indicator cards.
(11) Keeping the log; overhauling engines; adjustments.
BOILER ROOM.
(1) Construction and distinguishing features of the Thornycroft, Mosher, and Normand boilers.
(2) Boiler fittings.
(3) Feed pumps and their operation, derangements and remedies.
(4) Tending water.
(5) Tending fires under varying conditions of the forced draft.
(6) Care and preservation of water-tube boilers; cleaning boilers.
(7) Repairs to boilers; fitting man-hole gaskets; plugging and replacing tubes; repairing brick-work.
(8) Drainage and syphon systems.
For practical work the McKee, Stiletto, and torpedo-boats Nos. z and 2 go out twice a day, forenoon and afternoon, for two-hour runs and manoeuvering, in charge of gunners and gunners' mates. The Winslow and Morris or Dahlgren and Craven go once a day or as often as officers can be spared to go in charge.
The machinists, upon arrival, are first assigned to the fire room of one of the small boats for a week, and then are transferred to the fire rooms of the larger boats for a week and later to the engine rooms. In a similar manner, the firemen, after three weeks in the fire room of each class of boat are given one week in the engine room."
The contrast between the torpedo instruction given in our navy and that in the British navy is striking; the reason that our navy has received so little is not because it is believed that this little is sufficient, but partly because until the present our torpedo flotilla has been feeble in numbers, and also because it has been impossible to spare officers and men for extended instruction.
The second part of what may be called our torpedo-boat system consists of the boats commissioned in reserve at Norfolk and at Mare Island. At Norfolk there are ten or more boats commissioned in reserve, to which are attached three commissioned and one warrant officer, and a few enlisted men; the duties are to keep these boats in efficient condition, ready for service; to exercise the different boats occasionally at high speeds; to have torpedo target practice from boats underway; and to train the enlisted men in their duties. In connection with these duties there is much repairing and overhauling of machinery which would afford excellent instruction in engineering to young officers; though the extent of space devoted to machinery in a ship might within limits determine the number of the engineering personnel, yet it is the horse power that must measure the talent required; this is recognized in the British service, where we find that the engineer officers attached to destroyers are generally Chief Engineers in rank. The engine power of our new destroyers averages nearly 8000 horse power more than that of most of the British destroyers; it approximates to the engine power of the Newark and Philadelphia, of about 4500 tons displacement; surely engines of 8000 horse power should be in the charge of an experienced engineer rather than in the charge of a novice; if we are to have a torpedo flotilla it is absolutely essential that young officers should be prepared for such engineering duties; the duty of the torpedo-boat is to bring the torpedo within striking distance, and this demands that the boilers and engines of the boat be in most efficient condition. The constant running of the torpedo-boats commissioned in reserve at Norfolk, with the consequent overhaul and repair of machinery, offers excellent opportunity for training intelligent young officers in the practical care and repair of machinery.
The third part of our torpedo-boat system is that of the cruising section; this must always remain the capping stone of all torpedo-boat instruction; the section at present in commission consists of one destroyer and six boats; these are in constant activity in all ways that would tend to make these craft efficient for what might be expected of them in war service; the boats are exercised separately and in section; the exercises that are followed are designed to give the personnel of the section practice in handling the boats under various conditions, and also in handling the torpedoes. It will be agreed that torpedo-boat attack upon modern warships will not be successful unless the boats making it have had much drill in torpedo-boat tactics; as a result of such drill it is confidently believed that an attack by Lieutenant Chandler's section upon any warship would doom that warship to destruction. This section uses the German tactics; the section approaches at full speed, the boats grouped to form a wedge; when at a desired distance from the point of attack the boats disperse, fire their torpedoes, and endeavor to get away; to show how well the personnel has been trained in handling the boats it may be stated that when making these attacks the boats while travelling at full speed are held so closely together, the bow of one boat touching the quarter of the one just ahead, that a person can easily walk from the leading to the rear boats; when the signal for dispersion is made there is no collision, no confusion; and nine of every ten torpedoes discharged would destroy their targets.
From what has been done by this section it is believed that our navy has great torpedo-boat possibilities; the great desideratum is that the entire flotilla might be mobilized, if desired, by an efficient, trained personnel; that this might be systematic, instead of desultory and uncertain, instruction should be inaugurated in our navy, of a nature that would insure that throughout the service there would be many officers and men trained and experienced in torpedo-boat duties. It is probable that the Personnel of the navy will soon be increased, and that time for such instruction will be possible, it is suggested that something of the following nature would produce the desired results:
(I) Three months instruction for many officers and men at Newport in torpedoes and electricity.
Following this for some specially selected for torpedo-boat work:
(2) Six months duty and instruction in connection with the boats commissioned in reserve at Newport and Mare Island, Where the instruction would principally be in engineering; the duty of keeping the machinery and boilers of these boats in efficient condition would of itself be instruction of the highest and most useful type, and, as all line officers must be practical engineers, such instruction could be made most valuable to the general service.
For some of the officers and men who have had this Newport and engineering instruction:
(3) Duty for six months or longer aboard destroyers and torpedo-boats in commission, with drills and exercises modeled from those used at present by the torpedo-boat section commanded by Lieutenant Chandler.
In 1898 Lieutenant Commander Kimball said:
"If we are ever to have use for a navy of fighting ships we must have an efficient torpedo-boat service to supplement the fixed coast defenses, or our fighting ships will surely be deflected from their legitimate off-shore work to the in-shore defense of our posts and coasts."
"From the extent and condition of our attackable coast, and from the fact that torpedo-boats are the only craft (bar armorclads) that can check raiding armorclads, we should lead the world instead of lagging behind it, in the development of torpedo-boat efficiency."
"We question the utility of torpedo-boats because we don't know how to utilize them."