"It is far better to have ideas of only moderate merit carried out in a continuous manner, than to have ideas of real talent applied in a haphazard fashion."—Le Yacht.
In 1883, when Congress authorized the first steel vessels to be built for the navy, the country had no settled naval policy. We were imitative and receptive, mere lookers-on in the struggle for sea power. This was only natural, for up to that time our lack of experience precluded a bold striking out for ourselves. Young graduates of the Naval Academy had been sent to the best technical schools abroad, and consequently absorbed in a measure the ideas of their instructors. As the naval architects of England and France led the world, we were satisfied to watch what they were doing, and to reproduce, with slight modifications, such of their types as were thought to be best fitted to our needs. As a matter of fact, there were very hazy ideas as to what our needs actually were, but, generally speaking, the field of a new navy was to be confined to showing our flag in foreign waters. Such an unexpected thing as a war was to be met by an improvised defense; the words defensive and coastwise entered into all our plans.
The period from 1883 to 1890 saw our young naval architects, fresh from their studies abroad, working hand in hand with our ship builders, the former bringing the highest standards of foreign practice to serve as a model for the latter in building up a new industry. Furthermore, as our naval architects gained in experience at shipyards, authority was given them to undertake the building of ships at navy yards. This was the great formative period, and while the experience was valuable, viewed solely from the point of materiel, valuable not only to the naval architect but also to the marine engineer, the ordnance engineer, and the electrical engineer, there was no naval policy or fixed building program, around which their efforts crystallized. The result was a multiplicity of types, without any regard to the composition of a battle fleet. A despatch boat, a dynamite cruiser, a solitary torpedo-boat, and a ram, stand forth as minor units from among a heterogeneous collection of "show-the-flag" cruisers and gunboats, but there was an indication of better things in the single armored cruiser. This diversity of types is further explained by the fact that new firms entered the field, attracted by the success of the older shipbuilders; and to foster the industry, ships were authorized, for whose existence there was no other excuse.
In 1890 the first step towards the building of a battle fleet was taken, when Congress authorized three ships of the Indiana class. Ten years' experience had put our naval architects well to the front, and their settled principle seemed to be that for the, same displacement, our ships should be superior to foreign ships in battery power. Unfortunately, our naval engineers at this time were infected with the speed craze, and the Columbia and Minneapolis, so-called commerce destroyers, with their attempts to beat transatlantic steamer records, divided attention with the battleships. In 1892 a battleship and armored cruiser were authorized. Then came two years of economy, with river gunboats, torpedo-boats, and a submarine, until in 1895 a superimposed turret controversy ended with the authorization of two battleships of this type, only to break out again the next year, when the decision was reversed, and three battleships of the Illinois class were authorized.
In 1898, the Spanish war came to test, under most favorable conditions, whether our fifteen years of preparation had been well spent. The defensive idea had sunk so deep in the public mind that there came a cry from all of our seaports for protection, and the true principles of naval strategy were badly hampered by concessions to this feeling of timidity. Nevertheless, three squadrons were mobilized, and a weak and demoralized enemy was captured or destroyed. Such expedients as using harbor defense monitors for battleships, and torpedo-boats for despatch boats, or attacking shore batteries with protected cruisers, and even with torpedo-boats, showed a determination, based upon what seemed contempt for the enemy, to put the material on hand to some use. It is needless to speculate now upon what would have happened had we been opposed by a strong, courageous, and determined foe. Public opinion decided that we ought to be better prepared next time, and Congress responded feverishly by authorizing eight battleships and six armored cruisers. Legislative liberality is never systematic, but may always be counted upon in the hour of danger and on the day of jubilee.
Twenty years have thus passed since the beginning of what has been called the new navy. The position of the United States has changed from that of follower to leader. The foreign technical journals of to-day are full of praise for the inventive genius of our designers and builders. Where we formerly rivalled, we now excel. The word individualism is frequently used in describing the cause of our superiority. It is high time now, however, that this individualism be brought under proper control, and some attention be given to the navy considered as a homogeneous fighting force. In other words, to have a naval policy, with its corollary, a building program, and understand that the individual exists for the navy, and not the navy for the individual.
The four factors that go to make up a naval policy are:
(1) The political factor.
(2) The financial factor.
(3) The strategic factor.
(4) The materiel factor.
Let us now examine these elements in their application to the naval policy of the United States, and see what they teach us as to the need of a building program.
I. THE POLITICAL FACTOR.
Commercial rivalry is the order of the day. Willingly or unwillingly, the United States has entered upon a course of trade expansion. The acquisition of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. the regeneration of Cuba, the expedition to China, and the scheme for an Isthmian Canal, mark this course, along which the country, with little foresight, has been hurried. Pan-Americanism, Monroe Doctrine, Territorial Expansion; these and other political phrases are the outgrowth of trade expansion and not of philanthropic ideals. Our captains of industry have taken the offensive, and national self-assurance has asserted that we are destined to be great. A strong navy is a necessity when we begin to rub elbows with our commercial rivals over seas, and public opinion has been fairly awakened to the reality of "The American invasion."
Unfortunately, the provisions of our Constitution make it difficult to record the will of the people in the form of laws. Congress is an unwieldy body, and by its very composition unamenable to strong central control. Broad policies of the executive branch are frequently stifled by legislative trifling. Take for example the two agitations for tariff reform, which resulted in two victories and one defeat, in a period of twelve years. To-day there is no record on the statute books to show that anything was accomplished, and a celebrated soldier who dubbed the tariff question a "local issue" came very near to the truth. Similarly the navy, to the average legislative mind, is a local issue. The site of a navy yard and the employment of labor therein, or the geographical distribution of contracts for ships, excite far more interest than any executive demand for a strong and homogeneous navy. The reason for this is not difficult to find. Professor Bryce, in his "American Commonwealth," attributes it to a lack of legislative responsibility. In England the Administration stands or falls on the adoption or rejection of its measures, and appeals to the country are frequent. In the United States an unchangeable legislative body exists for two years, a time too short for new members of a lower house to get beyond the local needs of their constituents, and to give their attention to national questions. The result is, government by Committee, and policies are formulated by chairmen, who are selected by seniority, but at the same time the responsibility rests with the committee as a whole, each of whom must be converted, so that the general unwieldiness is not modified. Under existing conditions, therefore, it is very difficult to carry out a continuous naval policy, or to make the building up of the navy steady and progressive. The only remedy is a campaign of education, and in this campaign the navy has a strong ally in the press. Unfortunately, a partisan bias seems to be a first requisite for maintaining a successful newspaper. In endeavoring to cover the whole field of human effort, and to harmonize information from so many sources, this bias frequently leads to the ignoring of broad principles, and the magnifying of petty details to furnish sensational headlines. In foreign countries naval leagues have been organized for the purpose of constantly agitating questions of naval policy, and educating the mass of the people. A movement for the organization of a United States Naval League has been begun in New York, and if it spreads to other states, especially those in the interior, a wholesome influence upon legislation will undoubtedly be created.
II. THE FINANCIAL FACTOR.
A German privy counsellor of commerce, who spent some eight months studying the industrial and commercial conditions in the United States, records his impressions as follows: "The land of unbounded possibilities! The inhabitants of the United States, including Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands, number about 88 millions. That is barely 5 per cent of the total inhabitants of the world, according to its highest estimate. This 5 per cent has at present taken possession of 25 per cent of all cultivated area of the earth; namely 407 million acres out of 1629 million of acres." Statistics, to the lay mind, are dry and uninteresting, yet the most cursory inspection of the debit and credit sides of the public ledger shows an enormous excess of receipts over expenditures. In appealing to the business sense of the nation for the maintenance of an efficient navy, the statement is frequently made that the expenditure represents so much insurance. If we follow this analogy, and wish to insure our "25 per cent of all cultivated area of the earth," it behooves the government to set aside each year a certain specific sum for the building up of the navy, this sum not to be based upon the exhibit of one fiscal year, but rather to extend over a period of years, the period to be determined by our national aims, so far as political acumen and foresight can determine them. To make this point clear we will again refer to the fact that after fifteen years of naval construction, and an expenditure of $123,987,263.00, the Spanish war found us so poorly prepared that a quick and progressive campaign against Havana was impossible. Congress immediately appropriated 50 millions for national defense, and out of this and other funds, the navy expended $17,325,054.00 for the purchase of vessels. Adding this to the amount previously expended, we have a grand total of $41,322,316.00. Taking the average cost of a battleship as $6,000,000.00, this total represents 23 battleships. A more instructive deduction, however, is that this sum could have been expended for the completing of a homogeneous fleet of 8 battleships, and still left in round numbers, over $92,000,000.00 for armored cruisers, protected cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo-boats. The nation that uses to the best advantage the money that has been voted for naval construction, by keeping in mind the military value and economical efficiency of different types, will be best fitted to succeed in the supreme test of War.
III. THE STRATEGIC FACTOR.
When the statesman has outlined his country's aims and the financier has prepared his estimates and made his allotments in conformity therewith, the naval officer's work begins. Considerations of strategy and tactics are of paramount importance, but as we have shown in the brief summary of twenty years' naval construction, they have been a small factor in our naval development. True, we have had policy boards, advisory boards, and the like, intermittent in their existence, but their influence has never been great, and their recommendations, have been considered as more academic than useful.
There was never a more pressing need than there is at the present time for a General Staff,—a staff of officers to form ulate strategic plans; a point d'appui, behind which should be massed the whole weight of naval influence in public affairs. We already have the basis of such an organization in the General Board, the War College, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The grand old pioneer, the War College, has survived attacks from within the navy as well as from without. The General Board depends for its existence upon departmental regulation. A consolidation of all these offices under one head, brought about by legislative enactment, would provide that central naval control so much needed in the building up of a fleet, and the carrying out of a consistent naval policy.
IV. THE MATERIEL FACTOR.
Although the element of materiel has been placed last in relative importance, the history of the development of our modern navy has always shown that it has wrongfully held first place. This has been due to the faulty organization of the Navy Department, which has a system of independent bureaus. each struggling to leave its individual imprint upon the units of the fleet. It is not unusual, too, to find that some of these bureaus often wander beyond considerations of materiel, and furnish political, financial, and strategic arguments to strengthen their position. Congress is therefore often confused by a multitude of counsellors, and does not always increase accordingly in wisdom. The part has frequently been treated as if it were greater than the whole.
The true position of this element of materiel is readily deduced. Political and financial considerations having determined the extent to which our sea power is to be developed, it is the duty of the sea officers to solve the strategic problems involved, and to make an estimate of the numbers and types of ships necessary to secure the desired end. Then, and only then, should the inventive genius, the technical skill, and the material industry of a country, step in to work for one common cause; namely. the creation of homogeneous groups of ships, each unit of which represents the highest attainable efficiency. Uncontrolled and misdirected individualism never has and never will be successful in any military organization.
LESSONS FROM ABROAD.
In 1897, an agitation for the increase of the navy began in Germany. Statistics, showing the growth of maritime interests, increase of population, and increase in foreign trade, were published and spread broadcast, while on the other hand, special pamphlets called attention to the fact that Germany was behind all the other great powers except Austria and the United States, in naval strength, and that the expenditure for this purpose was very low in comparison with that of foreign countries. This campaign of education resulted in parliamentary action, and a law was passed in April, 1898, which established a definite shipbuilding program, extending over a period of 6 years, and provided for a total strength of 17 battleships, 8 coast defense vessels, 9 large cruisers, and 26 small cruisers,—these constituting a fighting fleet,—while in reserve there were to be 2 battleships, 3 large cruisers, and 4 small cruisers. Another feature of the bill was the provision for replacing old ships by new ones and the principle was laid down that the life of a battleship was to be taken as 25 years, of a large cruiser 20 years, and of a small cruiser 15 years. In 19oo a more ambitious program was decided upon, and a law was enacted fixing the ultimate strength of the battleships at 4 squadrons of 8 battleships each, with 2 battleships for flag ships, and a reserve of 4 battleships—a total of 38. Besides these there were to be 14 large cruisers, 38 small cruisers, and 16 divisions of torpedo-boats, 6 boats to a division. This program was to extend over a period of 16 years, but as it would be impossible to foresee the political. financial, and technical changes which might take place in that length of time, provision was made for decreasing or increasing the time limit according to these conditions. The result has been marvelous. The program will be complete in 1908, or ten years after the passage of the first act.
England recognized long ago the merits of the group system, and has consistently adhered to it in building up her magnificent battle fleet. Up to 1889 political expediency, and the fancied dictates of economy at any cost, had led to a dangerous complacency, but the "Russian War Scare," and public agitation, aroused the nation in that year to a sense of her true destiny. Small groups of ships gave way to large groups, the two power standard was adopted, and since that time England has gone steadily on, providing for a homogeneous fleet, by a liberality of appropriation that arouses the envy of continental nations. As England is a leader, with the strongest fleet in the world already established, her building program now depends upon the program of other nations. Nevertheless, the annual additions to the fleet, no matter how small, are based upon the principle that her fleet must be superior in power to the combined fleets of the two strongest foreign navies.
France has dallied so long with different policies that there is confusion in the public mind as to just what position on the sea she aims to maintain. Rational building programs have been proposed only to be abandoned. New designs for ships follow one another in rapid succession, and the idea of a homogeneous fleet seems foreign to the French mind. The political and financial conditions are so fluctuating that the effort to select a moderate type as a compromise with the two so-called schools of naval architecture, seems impossible, and France is drifting towards the condition in which England found her at the outbreak of Napoleonic wars.
Russia has followed the example of England and Germany in bringing forth a building program, and in 1898, after several changes, it was decided to build in 6 years, 8 battleships, 8 large cruisers, and 20 destroyers, but a radical departure was made from the practice of other European nations, in that several contracts were placed abroad, in order that the fleet might be brought up to the desired standard within the limit of time set.
Finally Japan, the new ally of England, set about, in 1895, to provide herself with a homogeneous fleet of 4 battleships, 4 first-class armored cruisers, 3 second-class armored cruisers, 2 third-class armored cruisers, besides numerous destroyers and torpedo-boats. This program has been practically completed, and already Japan is busy with plans for new construction, that contemplates the building, between 1904 and 1907, of 4 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 4 protected cruisers, 15 torpedo-boat destroyers, and 50 torpedo-boats.
THE FACTORS COMPARED.
The unmeasurable resources of the United States give her an enormous advantage over other nations, in so far as the financial factor governs the systematic development of a navy. Already England is doubtful of her ability to keep up the two power standard, and in Germany there are constant complaints of the financial burden imposed upon the country by an ambitious naval program. France always pleads poverty as a cause for calling in halt a naval expenditure, while in Russia and Japan the difficulties that beset the ministers of the treasury in complying with the demands of the naval authorities, are constantly referred to in the press.
With us it is not so much a question of ways and means, as it is one of the systematic allotment of a fair share of the unbounded wealth of the nation to naval expansion. According to the budgets of 1901, tile costs of the different navies, per capita of population, was, for England, $4, France, $1.75, United States, $1.10, Germany $0.90.
Similarly the materiel factor need cause us but little concern. Other nations marvel at the industrial progress of the United States. England has been told by an observing member of the royal family that she must "wake up." German methods are proverbially slow, and France will always be erratic. In ship design, engineering skill, and shop practice, we have shown the world the highest results of our tireless will and great capacity for work.
When we come to the political and strategic features of the situation, which from their interdependence may be discussed together, we must part company with the van, and admit that we are far in the rear. Germany stands as the best example of what strong central control can accomplish. The dominating personality of the Kaiser, drawing inspiration from the labors of his General Staff, forces upon the legislators the recognition of the country's naval needs. In a republic this central control is lacking. France has the advantage of a General Staff, but their recommendations are frequently pressed aside by the quarrels of political rivals. Conservative England, with a Board of Admirality that is both strategic and political in character, plods along on the principle that "Evolution and not revolution" is the safest and most lasting method of progress. To England and Germany, then, the one the pioneer and the other the stripling in naval development, we must look for what experience teaches is the proper combination of the political and strategic factors in a naval policy, and only by pursuing a similar course, so far as our form of government permits, will we be able to utilize our financial and technical superiority in building up a homogeneous fleet.
PRESENT NEEDS.
Since the past twenty years have not given us that position among naval powers to which our industrial and commercial progress entitles us, where does the fault lie, and how can it be remedied? From the considerations enumerated above it is plain that there has been a lack of organization and central control. The remedy is the adoption of a carefully prepared building program, to accomplish this the following summary of present needs, which, while not categorical, covers the more important points:
(1) Strengthen the hand of the executive branch of the government by the creation of a General Staff to study the strategic needs of the country, and to estimate the number and types of ships necessary to carry out predetermined national aims.
(2) Subordinate the technical bureaus and industrial interests to the proposed plans of the General Staff, so that there may be a continuous building program carried on in an orderly and progressive manner, instead of the present haphazard, spasmodic, individual effort.
(3) Excite a keener sense of legislative responsibility to executive demands, by a campaign of education among the people, through the medium of naval leagues and press agitation, which have proved so successful in England and Germany.
(4) Apportion a proper share of the estimated revenues of the Government to naval expansion, and expend it systematically, the period of construction, for political reasons, to extend over 4 years as the minimum, and 8 years as a maximum.