Lecture delivered at the Naval War College, July 28, 1902
INTRODUCTORY.
The President of the War College has honored me with an invitation to address the members of the class this year on two subjects with which I was particularly concerned during the war with Spain, viz.: scouting and cable-cutting. No very profound investigation is required to show that these two subjects are as closely allied to the general topic of intelligence as the obverse and reverse sides are to the medal which lies between them. I have found it so difficult to isolate them from each other and from the larger branch of naval activity of which they form a Part, that I have been led to pay some attention to them all. The object of scouting is to obtain intelligence, the object of cable-cutting is to destroy or rather to interrupt intelligence. What, then, is intelligence? How may it be secured? And how may its transmission be prevented? It would seem as if the answers to these questions ought to justify some consideration on the part of naval officers.
I purpose, therefore, to discuss in my four lectures of this year, 1st, naval intelligence during war; 2d, scouts, their nature and employment; 3d, scouting as exemplified in history; 4th, cable-cutting.
I beg that you will accept my remarks as suggestive merely. I do not care to dogmatize, nor, indeed, am I always so sure of my conclusions, as to wish to impose them upon others. On the contrary, I shall be gratified if what I say arouses a vigorous discussion even if the result of that discussion be the complete refutation of any or all of my views. We are here to get at the truth, to extract the kernel; each of us must be open to conviction, and ready at all times to admit that through another's speaking, "è l'argomento casso," as Dante says.
I trust you will pardon me if I claim an importance, second to no other among an admiral's concerns, for information, or for what in a general way, is termed intelligence. The Intelligence Department is the eyes and ears of the commander-in-chief. Through it he sees and hears. Without it he would be as one blind and deaf. Nothing becomes clearer as we study the history of maritime war than the admiral's absolute dependence upon correct and frequent information for the right use of his fleet. The wonderful strategic intuition of Nelson is too rare to be counted upon with certainty as in the mental equipment of our flag officers. And it is entirely proper to recall to mind that while, in the two great chases after the French fleet which led to his victories at the Nile and off Trafalgar, he jumped at a conclusion and devined this enemy's objective, he would have been spared many weeks of care and several thousand miles of sailing had his sagacity been supplemented by the accurate knowledge which modern science, skillfully employed, could now place at his disposal. The haphazard methods of former days will no longer serve.
It has been convenient in the preparation of these lectures to assume that warlike operations are to take place within or not remote from our own waters. Under these circumstances, we shall be, naturally, at a military disadvantage through possessing the inferior fleet, and we shall, therefore, be compelled to make the very best possible use of our resources. A scheme which will work satisfactorily under less favorable circumstances may be confidently relied upon when the balance of conditions lies upon our side.
Intelligence in its right development can only be had by selecting for it an officer of sufficient rank and great natural and cultivated aptitude, providing him with the necessary subordinates, clothing him with the requisite powers and then holding him to sharp responsibility. Call him, if you please, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and place at his disposal all the means which ingenuity can devise for ascertaining what the enemy is doing or planning; thus only can be secured a service at once rapid and exact.
Let us enumerate his possible sources of information with a view to establishing methods by which they may be utilized. They are:
- The files and channels of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
- Spies in the hostile territory.
- Agents, either special, consular or diplomatic in countries adjacent to the enemy.
- Casual letters or despatches received by citizens at home.
- Reports from merchant ships.
- Reports from signal stations along the coast.
- Scouts.
- Cruisers.
- Pilots.
- Miscellaneous accessory sources.
It would be a work of supererogation to describe the variety and extent of the information which the Office of Naval Intelligence is in a position to supply. As to the materiel and personnel of foreign fleets its archives leave little to be desired, so complete and fresh are they. For operations restricted to our own waters, the Office of Naval Intelligence suggests itself as filling the want briefly outlined above. In that event, it should be as completely subject to the commander-in-chief as any vessel of his command. For operations abroad, its role would be more or less predominant according to circumstances of time and distance.
SPIES.
By far the least satisfactory will be the intelligence received from spies, for the reason that spies must ordinarily be bought, and persons animated by sordid motives are not over trustworthy. Still if the statements of spies are carefully sifted, regard being had to their questionable origin, and contrasted with news otherwise obtained, they will often be useful; indeed they may prove invaluable at times when nothing else is to be had and when, too, as is possible, the spy is an American or is known to be actuated by covert friendliness to our cause.
Spies are by no means invariably of the vulgar, grimy, repulsive type best known through fiction. They may indeed be men in good social standing who have allowed their tastes to outrun their resources and who, too weak to practice the self denial needed by their salvation, are fain to add to their incomes by friendly tips received in exchange for information which comes to them through family or official connection. The progress from telling of things that are not important to divulging secrets of moment is steady if slow.
Their reports should be sent to some inconspicuous individual on neutral territory, preferably by mail, and the gist telegraphed by him to the agent (say in New York) of the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
A separate telegraph code should be prepared for each forwarding agent. A large number of commercial codes are in existence that can be employed to advantage. Each is provided with blank words to which any desired significance may be attached. These codes are abbreviatory only and not secret except so far as special meanings are attributed to special unassigned words. They are well known to telegraph operators the world over and hence despatches sent in their phraseology would not attract attention.
It would be well in the report to convey directions as to an assumed ordinary business transaction and then slip in a few additional words pregnant with news.
If the New York agent were a well known commission house it might receive a despatch of seven words such as this:
Oblivious. Ship us by sailing vessel the number of bales of Sea Island cotton mentioned below and draw on us at 60 days—price and freight rates as per your letter of under-mentioned date.
Smilax. 50
Superior. January 25th.
Pendant. The enemy despatched yesterday a squadron, destination Halifax. It is composed of — battleships, — cruisers and — torpedo-boats as follows, respectively:
Syntax, eight.
Similar, ten.
Standard, twenty.
The operator is accustomed to take every day such messages by the score, where a part of the meaning is open to any one ready to spend a few dollars for the code book and the rest is confidential between the sender and the receiver.
It is lucky for us, by the way, that all submarine cables from the United States to Europe do not land in one country exclusively.
The New York agent would simply forward to the central Intelligence Office the despatch as received. He should not possess the key. It is needless to say that the order for the fifty bales of cotton is apocryphal.
It is difficult to formulate the instructions that should be issued to spies beyond the injunction to report facts that bear on the subject and to pay heed to rumors in only exceptional cases. Much depends upon the individual character, of course. From a workman or draughtsman, in a foreign dock yard, we should expect a very restricted range of news; from a subordinate clerk in a foreign ministry of marine a little more; from an employee of higher grade a commensurately wider range. Definite intelligence alone should be paid for. The newspapers may be trusted to chronicle the current rumors.
There is another class of spies who have, in times both remote and recent, shed honor on the American name and nation. I am sure I but voice the Service's universal sentiment when I congratulate our colleagues Ward and Buck upon not sharing the fate of the no more patriotic and devoted Nathan Hale. Passing from the sentimental to the practical, I need only remark that such spies as these need no instructions beyond the general injunction to see and report.
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS.
A certain amount of useful information can be had through the interest and tactful activity of our consular and diplomatic bodies in countries adjacent to the enemy. The State Department is the channel through which such communications would flow. To supplement these sources the Chief Intelligence Officer might employ directly one or more persons in the localities mentioned. Inquiries emanating abroad would excite less suspicion than those originating at home.
Naturally there will be great multiplication of similar reports, but it will be far better to get too much than to run the risk of getting too little.
CASUAL INFORMATION.
The Fleet Intelligence Officer might cause it to be generally known that persons receiving, through letters from abroad or otherwise, news relating however distantly to the military and naval preparations or movements of the enemy are requested to communicate this news to him without delay as a patriotic duty incumbent on all Americans. Oftentimes people get hold of useful facts but do not know where to send them.
It is not likely that very fresh or very valuable items will be secured in this way, still the chance should not be neglected. We must take steps to guard against the subsequent regret for having omitted any one precaution, however seemingly unimportant and trivial.
REPORTS FROM MERCHANT SHIPS.
The customs officials board every incoming vessel. Where there is no naval patrol, the treasury department would doubtless, on request of the Navy Department, interrogate captains and others on board of arriving ships as to what they had seen and heard both at the port of departure and en route bearing upon the question of approaching or actual hostilities. Even coastwise craft should be subjected to like enquiry.
Should any American vessel sight the enemy at sea or obtain from hailing other ships, or indeed in any manner, information that might be of value, the captain ought to run for the nearest signal station and there report; or else communicate with the naval or customs authorities in the port of arrival.
SIGNAL STATIONS.
The establishing, equipping and manning of signal stations along the coast should be unreservedly in the hands of persons under the control of the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
It may be confidentially predicted that light-ships will shortly be provided with wireless telegraphic communication with the shore. There is an obvious drawback to the use of light-vessels and light-houses as signal stations; if so employed they take on a belligerent character and abandon all claim to exemption from destruction by the enemy. So impressed was I with the desirability of preserving this neutrality that when, just prior to the late war, I inaugurated the coast signal service, I took pains to locate signal masts and shanties quite apart from the towers of the light-house establishment. At every important headland or outlying island a station should be erected and connected telegraphically with the intelligence centre, of which I shall speak later. A signal mast and yard should be erected and signals, either flag or shape or both, should be provided as well as lanterns for night use. The international code would be used in communicating with merchant vessels, a special private code with men-of-war. The devising of this code should fall to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Every life saving station would be used for observing and reporting.
During the war with Spain, the naval militia manned the Coast signal stations so promptly and efficiently as to earn the admiration of all cognizant of its activity. After establishing the various stations, some thirty odd in number from Monhegan Island, Maine, to Galveston, Texas, I turned the command over to Capt. T. F. Kane, U. S. Navy, and he in turn to Capt. J. R. Bartlett, U. S. N., whose full report may be found in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1898, Vol. I, page 386 et seq., with all correspondence relating to the subject. It is well worth the reading.
It would appear safer to use these coast signal stations as mere transmitting offices whose duty it is to forward the signals as received—the key to the private code not being in their hands. Against this it might be urged that the station would be in ignorance of the meaning of some vitally important message and would be unable to discriminate as to what information it should repeat to war vessels running in for news. But this objection may be met by the central office wiring to each station the signal it should make to communicating vessels either in secret or open code according to circumstances. It is of the most importance to guard the key as closely as possible. It must of necessity be given to every cruising vessel and to the secondary base and central office. As far as practicable is should be withheld from every one else. The enemy will have his spies among us and this key will be greedily coveted. He will spare no pains nor expense to secure it.
In a general way I may remark that it is not necessary to specify the location of these signal stations; they suggest themselves at once.
As to the signal code to be adopted, I have but few suggestions to make. The flags of the international code commend themselves to our favor through their acknowledged visibility. Moreover they can be procured quickly at any large port. If used with a private signification, a predetermined code flag should be displayed.
Hoists should be limited to as few flags as possible. Each signal station should have a list of all vessels' distinguishing pennants. A record should be kept at the signal station of every sail seen, its description, flag and course, and of all messages received and sent. This record should be weighted and thrown into the sea or otherwise effectually disposed of before the enemy can seize it.
To extremely important stations (such as Cape Cod) a naval officer should be attached.
Speaking of the manoeuvres of 1889, a writer in the Ed. Rcv., Jan., 1890, points out the advantage, to the defense, of the possession of accurate and frequent information by telegraph. One squadron of the B fleet had gone around Great Britain but was discovered August 24 from the coast; of outlying cruisers or scouts in that direction there were none. The news reached Admiral Tryon off Falmouth in the evening, and he immediately despatched Admiral Tracey with a force sufficient to give an account of them. On Sunday afternoon, August 25, Tracey passed through the Downs; on Monday morning he was off Spurn Head, being all the time continually informed of the enemy's actions and movements. A few hours later he learned that a powerful reinforcement for the enemy, the Inflexible, had passed through Pentland Firth. This rendered the B squadron superior, and Tracey fell back to wait for reinforcements which he knew would be immediately sent him. They joined him on Tuesday evening and on Wednesday morning off Scarborough, he knew he was close to the enemy, whom he could not see by reason of a fog. * * * Tracey, in fact, not only knew that the B squadron was in his immediate neighborhood, but knew its exact strength and that it was inferior to his own. "When the fog lifted, D'Arcy Irwin, commander of the B squadron, found himself in the presence of a much superior force. He turned to fly, was unprepared and lost two of his best ships." Nothing could more clearly illustrate the enormous advantage which the telegraph gives to the defense.
REPORTS FROM CRUISING VESSELS.
Every ship in commission should have a list of the established signal stations. When running in to report or to obtain news she should display her distinguishing pennant and the code flag. Great saving of time can be effected by the free use of these stations. Thus a scout might report at one station and at the same time ask that further instructions be sent to her at the next station in the order of her cruising. A single flag would ask this question, "Have you any orders for me?" and another would reply, "Instructions received to notify you that your cruising orders remain unchanged."
PILOTS.
Pilots enjoy unusual opportunities of gleaning intelligence from incoming craft. For this reason, if for no other, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, either in person or by deputy, should be on intimate relations with their whole body, and every pilot should be requested to report at once such news as he can gather.
It should be the duty of the Fleet Intelligence Officer to have on record an accurate description of every licensed pilot with a full account of his knowledge of his own port and the adjacent waters, with, and especially without, aids to navigation. Additional lists should be made of various localities, that might be sought by the fleet or by single ships, and of the men whose local knowledge might be useful in navigating those parts.
In spite of the general bad reputation borne by pilots—with us largely due to d'Estaing's experience at New York in 1778, and to Nelson's scathing strictures—I think that some of the Pilots whom we had occasion to employ during the Civil War and, lately, in Cuban waters, have earned their title to respectful consideration for bravery under fire and for knowledge of affairs in their locality as well for readiness to impart that knowledge.
Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-Commander) Jas. H. Sears makes the pertinent suggestion that "pilots and persons available for pilot work should be placed under surveillance." This should be the care of the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING AND TRANSMITTING INTELLIGENCE.
In military operations on shore, a captive balloon is sometimes used as a lookout station. That the range of vision is greatly increased by elevation, it is needless to state. A balloon might be employed to advantage by our naval signalers in certain localities. Indeed it has been suggested to fly one from a ship at sea. Personally, I fear that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. It is possible to imagine, however, a driving in of our line of scouts, in the case of our standing on the defensive and in home waters, leaving the balloon as the only remaining resource. If sent up to a couple of thousand feet and ill clear weather, with not too much wind, and connected with the ground by telephone, it would enable us to observe and report the enemy's approach at a great distance.
Wireless telegraphy is fast assuming the place of the carrier or homing pigeons once recommended for taking despatches to a point on shore from outlying vessels. The usefulness of this wonderful method of talking through space has passed beyond the point of speculation having been fully demonstrated on many occasions. I am strongly in favor of fostering such a service. It must not be forgotten that intelligence exists in three phases: First the seeing and ascertaining, second the reporting to the central bureau, third the transmission to the commander-in-chief. It appears not unlikely that wireless telegraphy will become so valuable as to displace all other methods of conveying information across water. To this reflection I shall have occasion to revert in speaking of scouts.
ORGANIZATION.
We are now in a position to suggest the outline of an organization for the Intelligence Staff.
First is the Fleet Intelligence Officer on board the flagship and his immediate assistants—one or two junior officers and a writer.
Second, especially in case of a defensive war, his principal assistant in some great commercial centre with aids and a sufficient clerical force. This assistant should have an office directly connected with the great telegraph and telephone systems of the country. He should have independent lines to the secondary base, if the war is to be carried on in home waters. To him would be sent all reports and despatches coming over wire for condensation and collation and for transmission to the flagship.
Third, an officer especially charged with the establishment, equipping, maintenance, and inspection of the coast signal stations. In certain cases he would require subordinate officers, one over each of the districts into which the entire system might be divided. The experience gained in the Spanish American War under this head will be invaluable.
The Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence should be ordered to correspond directly with the Fleet Intelligence Officer or his principal assistants and to answer promptly all questions addressed to him by either of them.
The distribution of scouts, that is to say, their cruising orders should emanate from the Fleet Intelligence Officer and be signed by him, with or without the Admiral's countersign as the latter should determine. Personally I incline strongly to the belief that the admiral should be spared any and every detail which can properly be turned over to a subordinate. Nothing so tends to produce successful results as grave responsibility accompanied by adequate power. Given these, it is the man's own fault if he fails to meet the demands made upon him.
The Fleet Intelligence Officer will furthermore prepare and Modify from time to time forms of reports from cruising vessels and instructions touching upon the particular kind of information he desires. It will be his duty to see that every possible aid in the shape of photographs, plans, and descriptions of the enemy's ships, both regular and auxiliary, are in the hands of the captain of every cruising vessel of our fleet. Doubtless many useful notions will occur to him and his subordinates which have escaped my attention. He must be governed by his sense of the great responsibility resting upon him and in no case can he expect to be pardoned if he fails to secure and place before the commander-in-chief information essential to the latter's needs and schemes. This is no light task, but upon the execution, however difficult, depends the right strategic and tactical employment of our too scanty naval resources. I can not better close this brief and imperfect presentation of the subject than to paraphrase the saying of the present Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and contend that "The way to have enough information is to have too much."
(To be continued.)