The Naval Institute does well to invite discussion of the status of petty officers, for it is the one most important subject in connection with the personnel of the navy to-day. This is not putting it too strongly, because it is like a knife that cuts both ways. To elevate the petty officer will not only have the inevitable effect to uplift the bluejacket and improve discipline, but it will so relieve commissioned officers of many little harassing duties that they may be free to devote themselves to the important work that now presses hard upon them.
It is absolutely necessary to push the petty officer forward at a time when the demand for officers cannot be met. It is perfectly possible that the proper development of the petty officer and his assignment to more important duties afloat and ashore may enable us to get along with fewer commissioned officers—particularly in the case of certain shore stations, and many of our small ships which have often been over-officered. By doing this and by increasing and properly utilizing the warrant officers we may hope to successfully tide over the next few years and prevent the much-to-be-dreaded expedient of attempting to fill the commissioned grades with ne'er-do-wells or inexperienced appointees from civil life.
There is something quite misleading in the word "training" as it is now applied to our petty officers. Their improvement and the much-to-be-desired change in their status is far less a matter of training than of employment. They have not lacked training in most respects, but they have seldom been properly employed, even when their training has been perfect! It would be disgracefully humiliating for naval officers to admit that with all our schools and ships our enlisted men have not been properly trained or taught in the details of naval drills and exercises! On the contrary our men have, in many respects, been more thoroughly trained from boyhood than the men in any other military branch of the government. But, though quite inexcusable perhaps, it would be nearer the truth to say that we have not properly employed or utilized our petty officers. We have followed too closely the custom of olden times which gave them a very low status in drill and discipline, and the navy has habitually required commissioned officers and midshipmen to perform many duties which properly belonged to petty officers. It is only necessary, therefore, to free ourselves from a very bad custom or habit—to get out of a rut which has brought us to a condition no longer to be tolerated.
To illustrate this point—that it is in the employment rather than in the training of our personnel that we have been neglectful—it is proper to cite the case of midshipmen who, after years of training, have often been restricted to "picayunish duties" which had a stunting effect upon their development after graduation. And only recently I have known instances of warrant officers who after rising through all rates from that of apprentice, graduating from all the "schools" that we have in the navy, might yet be seen standing idly while a lieutenant instructed his division, taking no part in the work and aiding the divisional officer, little, if at all. In one instance a chief warrant officer asked to be relieved from all duties at drills in order, as he said, that he might devote himself solely to the work of his department! In these cases there was no lack of training, but these warrant officers had not been properly employed and had contracted habits which made them unwilling assistants in carrying on the most important exercises on board ship. Their status and the manner of their employment had been fixed by past "customs of the service." They possessed all the qualifications of good drill-masters and instructors, but they were the unfortunate victims—like the midshipmen—of a very faulty system of employment.
Under the press of necessity we are now beginning to employ midshipmen and warrant officers more actively in important duties, thus freeing the commissioned officers somewhat. The junior officers will rise to the emergency if we call upon them. So, also, will the petty officer. The latter will reach any standard that is set for him—high or low. The time has now come to set his standard high—as high as possible. This is all we have to do. It is not so much a question of training. We have simply to make better use of him—employ him properly. He is very well trained now, but we have failed to utilize good material by a system which has invited the petty officer to stand listlessly behind the line while the commissioned officer vainly attempts to instruct his men—even recruits—in the rudiments. But now we must stop short. The continuance, or perpetuation, of this system, which has refused to properly employ trained men, would be nothing short of criminal.
I wish to dwell upon this distinction between training and employment, because it is most important. We may train men to perfection, but if after assignment to a ship they are not properly employed, their training goes for naught—they sink to a condition of comparative and willing uselessness—they might as well be untrained. Such has been the case, more or less, in the past with officers, petty officers, and men, for the manner of employment of one class affects that of the others—all have been pulled down. A "strenuous" epoch is now upon us. All hands must turn to—officers and enlisted men—and every individual must do double duty for years to come. Every muscle, every mind, must be properly employed. There must be no prostitution of talents, no neglect to utilize and direct intelligence.
The danger to be apprehended from a misconception of our present condition and of the remedy for it will become real if we do not grasp the substance of this matter. If the service imagines for one instant that "schools" will be sufficient to secure trained petty officers—if we rely upon schools—we will fail miserably. The graduate, however competent, will remain at the same old level of comparative uselessness unless the ship in commission, the service at large, gives him the proper employment. Thus the school would do more harm than good by giving us a false idea of having accomplished something. To be sure, the petty officer's school at Newport is doing good work. It is an excellent thing and should be maintained, but we must remember that it is in the daily routine of the ship that we have the one great opportunity to employ and develop petty officers. If we neglect this the school will be of little account. It was always silly for officers to criticize the Naval Academy for the shortcomings of midshipmen. The academy did its work well—far better than the ship, and still better than the critics on board. The training of the midshipman was not neglected, but his employment afloat—the system forced upon him by the officer who contented himself by damning the Naval Academy—was simply stupid and its effect was fatal to the development of the midshipman. Similarly, the petty officer's school at Newport may do its duty to the utmost, and the navy may benefit but little. The service must do its duty. These five words, italicized, cover the whole question. The routine of the ship from all hands in the morning till tattoo, the manner of employing men during that time and in the night watches, will alone determine whether or not our petty officers are to be developed.
A few officers, a few ships, can do very little toward bringing about a reform of this kind. As in the case of the school their efforts will be abortive if not sustained by the service. The men regard with no little irritation the attempts by individuals to change the time-worn "customs of the service." They will seek transfer to ships where such "hobbies" are not forced upon them—where their duties are easier, their responsibilities lighter and their pay the same. All ships and all officers must work on the same line if anything is to be accomplished. The change in the status of the petty officer can only be brought about by a general order from the Navy Department, and the regulation must be enforced everywhere. The effect of such an order would be electrical. Let the petty officer see that we are in earnest—that a new era has dawned. Let it be required that he shall be pushed forward to more important duties; that he shall have the same general status as the non-commissioned officer in the army; that he shall assume an important role in drills and in the maintenance of discipline. Do this—employ him properly—and the petty officer will at once reach the standard fixed for him.
It is unnecessary to go into details regarding the functions of the petty officer. Officers will know how to utilize and develop him when they get the order to do so. The Bureau of Navigation has in view the publication of a Petty Officer's Drill Book, which will give the men access to all drill regulations, and which will contain much useful information bearing upon their duties afloat. These books should be widely distributed and kept in the canteens of all ships to be sold at the lowest possible price, in order that men may buy and consult them. The drill book will be attractive in form and profusely illustrated. Divisional officers throughout the service should require their petty officers to inform themselves thoroughly upon all points in the drill regulations and should give them every possible assistance and encouragement.
In the case of training ships it is suggested that the squad system of instruction be generally followed—the divisions being subdivided into squads, each in charge of a petty officer or seaman who shall be required, under the direction of the divisional officer, to instruct his squad in the rudiments of seamanship, gunnery, signals, etc., and to actively assist the divisional officer at all times. A plan of this kind has been tried, and its success was only limited by the fact that the petty officers, as a rule, had never been so employed before, and for that reason were not up to the standard in all cases. Their improvement was marked, however, and the result was better than that of the system that requires the commissioned officer to do everything—or to vainly attempt to do everything.
The training of the petty officer, as distinguished from his employment, must begin, and indeed be practically finished, before he gets his rate, for the same reason that the training of an officer begins before he gets his commission. The petty officer's training begins when he is an apprentice, or landsman, and it continues while he is a seaman. If the apprentice and seaman have been properly trained the petty officer, when he gets his rate, will be well trained; it only remains to employ him properly. Of course, he may need some little extra instruction, perhaps, but the statement stands that he simply needs experience and intelligent employment. It is most important, therefore, that we should look to the training of our men as the surest means of securing trained petty officers. This is the foundation. We should not attempt to build upon the sand—pin our faith to a school after school days are over, progress backward. Generally speaking, our enlisted men are pretty well employed, but not so well trained. The man needs better training; the petty officer needs proper employment. Each will help the other. These two conditions are mutually dependent. If the man is required to be quick, respectful, exact, and attentive, the petty officer will have been brought up the right way—he will have been properly trained. And if the petty officer is made an important factor in the ship, the men brought up under such a system will have the right idea of a petty officer's position, and they will reach a higher standard when they in turn are rated.
There is no little criticism nowadays of the training of our enlisted men. They are not quick enough. The modern ship with its many compartments makes it more difficult to control men and keep them moving. Hence the necessity for good petty officers in all parts of the ship. Our boats are not used enough, and the men do not pull a very good oar. In this connection I wish to quote from a recent letter received from a brother officer who discusses this question and compares the activity of our men with that of the crews of certain foreign men-of-war with which he has been in company. He says: "Every boatswain's call is answered by all concerned on the run and instantly. A boat is called away, and before the pipe is done you can see the crew all on the run. They jump to their thwarts, and before they have well sat down the boat is dropping. It is little over thirty seconds from the call until the boat is pulling off around the ship, and this in a heavy swell. Their boats are wider, heavier and better rigged than ours. They are constantly at work under oars and sail." It will not be denied that men trained in this manner are likely to make good petty officers. After such training an intelligent system of employment will secure efficiency.
There is no duty which tends so surely to cultivate in men a high sense of responsibility—to make them strict, attentive, and military—as guard and sentry duty. It is most remarkable that the enlisted men of the navy have been deprived of this valuable experience by their own officers, who fully realize, or should realize, its importance. We talk of training our men, of their faults and shortcomings, and then we deliberately refuse to give them the work in naval routine which would most surely correct their faults! If it is possible to give both men and petty officers any experience in guard duty it should be done by all means. If we are interested in the training of our men, let us train them.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon this subject. All officers are agreed upon it, and have been for years. There is nothing new in this paper—little that one does not hear every day in conversation. The only reason or excuse the writer can give for assuming to discuss the matter is that three years' experience recently in the training service teaches the more plainly our great need of good petty officers, for without them our enlisted men cannot be brought to the proper standard of efficiency.
Enough has been said; enough has been written—too much, in fact. It remains to—do something.