It is proverbial in our naval service that when an officer is given a vessel to prepare for war, with the idea of fighting her himself, he gets on board as heavy a battery as he can, with as many long range guns as he can obtain, and improvises protection to vital parts with whatever may be available, his limit being whatever he has time to prepare, or whatever will reduce the stability to the lowest safe limit. From our colonial days to the present time, the American has gloried in his heavy batteries and his long range guns.
Today, though war is not imminent and we more than ever desire international peace and the good will of other powers, we do not forget the important end for which our ships and our men are prepared, and we must be no more careless indeed we must be more careful—in regard to their preparation, than if they were intended for immediate conflict.
Personal interest can never be wholly replaced by anything else. No one can ever feel the jealous interest in the efficiency of a vessel that her commander does. It is not practical, nor would it be wise, to place the design of our vessels entirely in the hands of the men who are to command them yet no other person will give the subject such earnest and enthusiastic attention and in some matters no other is or can be so well qualified to decide.
Of the unusually free discussion of the battleship problem that has been going on during the past year, the most noticeable results are the restoration of the superposed turret for the five battleships just laid down and the retention of the 8 inch gun for future vessels.
A result of not less importance is the extension of intelligent interest in the subject with the accompanying crystallization of service opinion.
The subject has become a more open one and notwithstanding the marked ability of the men upon whom rests the responsibility for the designs we are likely to gain thereby. It usually happens that a spread of general interest and enthusiasm is followed by pronounced development. The radical ideas of more or less irresponsible persons frequently become of general use after they have been thrashed out in discussion, and perhaps modified. Those that are weak are more likely to disappear than the better ones and those that are sound are rather more likely than not to prevail.
We have not stopped in the development of our naval power and until we do the design of the battleship remains as full of interest and importance as ever. Indeed while our good European friends are displaying such frantic haste in their naval evolution and England because of the unusually heavy demands on her purse for other expenses, is unable to keep pace with them it is important it is even imperative that we assume the duty of maintaining the balance of power and it is particularly fortunate that we find present conditions so favorable.
Let any European power or a coalition with really common interests attain an unquestionable supremacy over its rivals and we will find that among nations there is a supreme indifference to another's idea of his own rights. We have among nations, unusually deep-seated convictions as to our rights and especially of late years, we have shown a readiness to defend them. I mistake the spirit of the American people if they do not go forward with the development of the power upon which the defense of our rights and our prosperity primarily depends.
Our steel navy is not old and we are gaining valuable experience with it each year. It would be shameful if there should not be material improvement in every new design and unfortunate if any means for real improvement were neglected. The Naval Institute seems to offer the most valuable means for service discussions and it would be conducive to increased influence if the criticism of the various papers published were more general and more rigorous. Adverse criticism seldom finds its way to the place where it can do the most good. "Everybody is wiser than anybody" and the more opinions are carefully presented the greater the chance of the final movement being in the right direction.
PROPOSED TYPE OF BATTLESHIP
While I outline a battleship design it must not be misunderstood that it is intended as a working design for that is beyond my power. It represents instead features of design united as one general design for clearness. The various features are to a certain extent interdependent but most of them can be applied in principle to designs in general. Only men of special training and long experience can work out the details of a design and say definitely what features may and what may not be united in a single type or in a general plan, what modifications are necessary to make the plan practicable.
In the design proposed it has been attempted to provide a sufficient coal capacity for work that is usually relegated to armored cruisers. While we cannot do without the very heavy cruiser, it seems unfortunate and we shall lose nothing if we can readily adapt the battleship to some of the cruiser's work.
Nothing but an armored vessel or a very small one (e.g. a submarine) can push reconnaissance home to the point where definite information can be had. The armored cruiser can hope to escape by her reliable high speed in a seaway. I have endeavored to outline a battleship that can receive a fairly heavy fire without endangering seriously her power of retreat. It should be remembered that in the ordinary conditions of sea a vessel with unarmored or lightly armored bow, pursuing at high speed, will receive sufficient punishment forward between wind and water to make her give up the chase, so that it is by no means certain that the armored cruiser will be able to capture smaller cruisers when the latter wish to escape. The former can make "reconnaissance’s in force," but are not suitable when opposed by battleships, for they cannot press near enough to get definite information without risking serious bow injury, which implies loss of speed and capture. The proposed type can and one vessel, assisted by a flotilla of destroyers or other fast vessels, could accomplish more in reconnaissance than half a dozen armored cruisers, besides offering better protection to weaker vessels that may be in company. The one great advantage of the heavy armored cruiser is speed; yet except in emergencies their high speed is not available, since it involves greater coal expenditure than a squadron with ordinary coaling facilities can afford. The large ocean ferries can steam continuously at full speed, for they are sure of coal when they need it but no fast cruiser can maintain a very high speed for a week without recoaling and the problem of recoaling is not a simple one. The battleship with a good coal supply and fair steaming qualities can do most of the armored cruiser's work: the latter cannot, however, take the other's place.
We must have some fast seaworthy vessels; we cannot combine great speed and heavy batteries and armor. Since among fast vessels the weaker may prevent the stronger from overtaking her, two 7000 ton cruisers should be more valuable in a fleet than one of 14,000 tons.
Some believe that we must build very large cruisers because other nations do. That is not an evident reason. The battleships can do part of the armored cruiser work and smaller vessels can do the rest then when it comes to a fleet engagement, we shall be stronger than if more of our men and money had been put into cruisers.
THE BATTLESHIP PROPOSED
Displacement, with all ammunition, stores and water and 1000 tons coal, 15,975 draft 26.5'.
With 2500 tons coal, 17,475 tons and 28.5'.
Length 400', beam 80' armored freeboard fd. 17 feet, amids. 15', aftz 16'.
Speed 4 hours 18 knots, with 18,000 H. P. sustained sea speed 16 knots, with 11,500 H. P.
Endurance at 16 knots, over 3000 miles.
Hull armor. Completely armored side, average width 22 feet. Thickness 6" for an average width of 13 feet with a belt at the water line of 8" armor to taper in the last three feet of its depth to 5". Protective deck 1½” amidships and 2½’ inclined at the sides. Main deck 1 ½” (covered with wood). Cellulose, if used, to be allowed for by a reduction in the weight of armor.
Battery protection, Turrets 14" inclined at 45° in front, 8" sides, 4" rear, 3" top. Barbettes cylinders 18" thickness 31½” and 22½”feet external diameter, on supports of same diameter resting on protective deck. Thickness of supports 3" to 8"average 6" and 4¾” respectively. Weight of turrets, barbettes and barbette supports, including bolts and backing and all framing
contained in them 474 tons for each 13" and 256 tons for each 10” gun position. Provision to be made for supplying the forward turret from the after magazine and the starboard turret from the port one and vice versa.
Conning tower to be a cylinder of 9 feet external diameter 12” thick with supporting cylinder of same diameter and 3" thickness resting on the main deck. Tube 30" internal diameter, 6" thick above main deck and 4" thick below resting on the protective deck. Weight 66 tons. Tower aft for signal control and for steering in case of injury to the forward gear 4 ½” feet external diameter, 6" thick on support of same diameter, 1” thick resting on main deck tube, 6" internal diameter, 2" to 3" thickness. Weight of both towers with fittings 79 tons.
The 5" guns and the after 3" guns to be protected by circular shields training with the guns so that the port remains closed when the gun is trained as is the practice abroad; the shields to taper from 6" to 3" in thickness. The mount to be a modification of the Krupp type, described in the Naval Intelligence Office Annual for 1900, pp. 140-141. Gun and shield to be readily dismounted and housed, thus admitting light and air and the side to be free from projecting sponsons.
The outside plating on the bow to be much inclined that on the stern slightly so.
The after side of the forward barbette to be slightly reduced in thickness the support underneath being screened from normal impact, to be reduced to 3" thickness, on the forward side, protected by the inclined bow armor, the thickness to be 5" the remainder to be 6" to 8" thickness. The after barbette and support to be similar.
The outboard sides of the 10” barbette supports to be 6" to 8" thickness, the inboard sides 5" and the forward and after sides to be 3" to 4" thickness.
The extension of armor to the ends with the preclusion of air ports, makes it especially important that the ventilating system be efficient, having in view protracted service in the tropics. It is not thought necessary, however, to have any of the principal bulkheads pierced for ventilating ducts.
Reserve coal to be carried below the armor outboard of the magazines.
Area of water line 25,820 sq. ft., coefficient .8069 tons per inch, 61.25 depth of C. B. 11.6' B. M. 19.22' C. G. above W. L. about 2', metacentric height about 5.6', block coefficient .6595.
In comparing with other designs it should be remembered that "normal displacement" usually refers to trial trip rather than service conditions for example: the vessels of the Virginia class are to carry but 408 tons of ammunition at normal displacement.
A NEW TYPE OF BATTLESHIP
SYNOPSIS OF WEIGHTS
TONS
Hull, steel 4000
Armor decks, main and protective 1600
Hull, wood 140
Hull fittings 720
Outfit, masts, ladders, furniture 100
Equipment 125
Electrical 150
Boats 25
Officers, men and effects 110
Stores 200
Fresh water for drinking 50
Armor, side, with bolts and backing 2431
Armor, battery, with bolts and backing
and framing 1497
Conning tower, supports and tubes 79
Ordnance 1114
Ammunition 994
Engineer’s weights, including water 1640
Coal 1000
Displacement normal 15,975
” maximum 17,475
SPECIAL FEATURES
Perhaps the most important innovation proposed is the reduction in the number of heavy gun positions and the corresponding improvement in the protection afforded them and in their availability on any particular occasion technically in their arcs of fire.
The superposed turret gave a manifest superiority to guns so mounted over those on the side. A more rational means to obtain such advantage is to add a third large gun to each of the principal turrets, one large gun being of more value to a battleship than a pair of 8". The target presented by the turret is then smaller and it can, with the same weight, be given more adequate armor protection. It is decidedly less vulnerable. A third gain is the lowering of the very heavy weight under consideration. These radical advantages offset any possible advantage the superposed turret may have.
Having decided upon two principal turrets with three large guns each, the next question is the secondary turrets. The service has declared itself of the opinion that something more powerful than the seven-inch gun is required and as I understand it, it must be 8" or heavier.
In a battleship of 16,000 tons, which is about as large as it seems worth while building under the present limitations as to draft of water, we can take two turrets of two 12" guns each, two of three 10” guns each or four of three 8" each. In the last case we reduce the arcs of train of both main and secondary turrets considerably and the armor protection must be inadequate. Accepting two broadside turrets, of two 12" or three 10” guns each we can give them arcs of fire of 180° a full broadside train while the forward turret can fire through an arc of 300° and the after one 315° from two points off the bow to the stern. At extreme train it would probably not be advisable to fire the gun nearest the other turrets but the other two could be fired at these extreme positions. For an arc of 127° on each broadside both the principal turrets would be available. The importance of this advantage in a fleet engagement is supreme. The necessary conditions are that there be but four heavy gun positions and that the end turrets be placed as far apart as possible.
Three 10” guns in a beam turret seem to me preferable to two 12” and the weight is somewhat less. The problem may then be resolved into this form: shall we have four turrets mounting three 12” guns each or two mounting 13" and the others 10". In squadron engagements both end turrets will be in action most of the time, both beam turrets rarely. It would seem wise to put the greater strength where it will be best available. The problem of mounting two turrets for three 12” abreast is a very serious one or indeed that of mounting them on the beam at all. The 10” will penetrate nearly all armor afloat up to 4000 yards range, the impact being within 30° of the normal and the 13" is decidedly better than the 12” for carrying heavy bursting charges through armor. I am strongly of the opinion that the battery should be six 13" and six 10".
The extension of the use of 6" armor on the hulls of foreign vessels and the consequent reduction of the thickness of armor on heavy gun positions and water line, makes the 8" and smaller calibers less valuable and invites us to replace them by more suitable guns or to change the form of projectile so that the muzzle energy will be less affected by the resistance of the air.
At present they cannot do the work required. The eight-inch is not powerful enough for the penetration of the heavy gun positions or water line armor, or for the explosion of a shell behind the six-inch armor that in recent types covers such large and important areas. Normal impact is the abnormal case and the gun should have power enough to make every shot count that strikes within say 30° or 40° of the normal.
The battery proposed contains twelve armor piercing guns, of which in squadron action nine will almost always be available and in certain situations all twelve. The same cannot be said of any present type.
To those who object to the dangerous chance of three guns being disabled by one shot, let us say: Take this and any existing or proposed type and compare them. In this, the gun positions being more thickly armored and affording in the aggregate a much smaller target, there is decidedly less chance of a turret being put out of action. Let us assume, however, that one turret of each type is disabled, which vessel retains the advantage? The answer, I think, must be: The one that retains nine well protected guns capable of piercing the other's heavy gun positions, smashing her water line and bursting a shell inside her battery decks and this for a squadron action or for a duel.
RELATIVE INACCURACY
For flatness of trajectory the 6" gun is nearly as good as the 10" up to 2500 yards. At 6000 yards however, the vertical error due to an error of 500 yards in setting the sight is 80 feet for the 6", 57 feet for the 10" and 49 feet for the 13" which would make considerable difference in the number of hits. 4500 yards is about the range of the 6" when accuracy is considered the vertical error due to an error of 300 yards in estimating range being 26 feet.
It may be remarked that we have at sea no such accurate means for measuring range. The accompanying table is based upon ideal conditions. Errors of the gun and the gun captain delay or errors in communicating ranges and setting sights, the error due to rolling, the important variation in the conditions affecting the muzzle velocity and the resistance of the air, all these are neglected. The table represents the vertical error of the gun at different ranges due to the insurmountable error in measuring ranges.
It is assumed that a horizontal base range finder is adopted such as the Fiske Turret Range Finder, with the necessary auxiliary instruments for use when rolling and that the necessary probable error due to concussion, incorrect adjustment, wear and tear and errors of observation is 30" for a base of 30 feet or 5" for a base of five feet, which allowance probably represents a condition not yet attained. This would give a probable error of 58 yards in 2000, or 232 in 4000. We have at present no means of estimating range with one-half this accuracy, under battle conditions. A fair instance of the actual conditions may be referred to when target practice at unusually long range was attempted and the target was not struck.
The accuracy of the large guns has been questioned but the reason has been generally overlooked. In our earlier turret mounts the control mechanism was awkward and the gun pointer was expected to train the turret, elevate both guns, attend to a certain extent to the loading and fire both guns. Under such conditions the guns cannot be worked to advantage. A man cannot fire a gun accurately and attend to anything else at the same time.
In any gun too large for shoulder pointing one man is required to keep the gun trained on the target, another to elevate and fire, a third to observe the effect of fire, supervise the adjustment of sights, indicate the target, superintend the working of the piece and the supply of ammunition and control the crew. By this or similar division of duties and by such means alone, can real efficiency of fire be attained. The fewer the gun positions the better trained can be the gun pointers and gun crews the more simple the transmission of orders and instructions and the more effective the control of fire by the commander.
At short ranges it may be desired to fire all the guns of a turret together for smashing effect. There is no vessel that could withstand such punishment.
A three gun turret should have two officers; one in the training hood in command who may or may not operate the range finder or the training mechanism, the other a trained warrant or junior officer to superintend the working of the guns. There should be three sighting hoods for the gun pointers who have but to elevate and fire.
The loading should be as far as possible automatic, the power being retained in springs compressed by the recoil of the gun, although alternative power must be constantly available. The opening and closing of the breech must be automatic and the more complete the automatic mechanism for loading, the less will be the time wasted and the greater the rapidity of fire. The British have succeeded in firing their 12” gun at intervals of 30 seconds with automatic mechanism this interval should be the usual one instead of a phenomenal one. Machines do not waste time and they can be made reliable and certain of action though they are not always satisfactory when first used.
THE CAP
I do not mean that the guns should be fired with such rapidity constantly or usually but that the time should be taken for necessary sighting rather than wasted in loading and in the transcendent moment when a tactical advantage has been gained and several vessels or all of one squadron are able to deliver their fire at short range, the more reliable speed of automatic loading will insure decisive results. Now a days vessels have so much greater mobility than formerly that a tactical advantage is not so decisive unless the fire be vitally destructive for a position of tactical advantage cannot long be maintained.
The typical example of "the cap " illustrates the decisive advantages of large arcs of fire and the ability to keep up rapid fire for several minutes. It also shows a position where heavy armor on gun positions would be appreciated and where simultaneous fire from three guns would prove decisive. With automatic loading little time would be lost in waiting for a slow one to load.
Though the typical cap be impracticable until we have abandoned the use of smoky powder and may even then remain an ideal condition, yet the actual tactical advantages that may be gained will be more striking rather than less for the longer and more irregular the line of battle the more effective the concentration when you get it and the more smoke there is to conceal the enemy's exact position the more difficult it is to avoid being "capped" and the more important is short range to accuracy of fire, therefore the more important is the power of extremely rapid fire.
TYPICAL SERVICE GUNS (MODELS OF 1899) PENETRATION OF KRUPP ARMOR WITH CAPPED
PROJECTILES. VERTICAL ERRORS DUE TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCURATELY MEASURING RANGE.
The Chief of the bureau of Ordnance in his last Annual Report intimates that heavier projectiles will be adopted.
The turret trainer should keep the firing circuits closed when the train is correct. The gun pointer should have a spring switch which he should close whenever the gun is correctly pointed. The breech closing being automatic, the gun should be ready for instant firing when the closing of the breech is
completed. There may also be a switch near the rear of gun where the circuit may be broken whenever for any reason the gun should not be fired. The turrets proposed are large enough to admit a very long recoil with a view to saving the energy for the automatic loading.
There are many machines in profitable use today where more complicated work is performed automatically with certainty of action and high speed. Such machines are not perfected in a day or a year but it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the mechanism could be developed in the time needed to construct a battleship.
RAPID FIRE GUNS
With a 6" armor coat we might neglect the fire of the enemy's light guns providing no special guns to oppose them but the torpedo and the torpedo boat are being developed as rapidly as ever and are worthy of our most careful attention.
The Whitehead torpedo has now a speed of 20 knots for 2000 yards and makes fairly reliable runs for 1500 yards at a much higher speed. It is important that we have guns suitable for stopping a torpedo boat outside the 2000 yards range. Let us see how much hitting is necessary.
The most reliable data are furnished in the case of the Winslow. This boat engaged a masked battery using smokeless powder, the guns being field pieces of about 3" caliber. Shells exploded in both conning towers (disabling both steering gears) in one boiler (bursting over a hundred tubes) in one of the main engine cylinders and in the cabin (setting it on fire). Many shells striking stanchions, ventilators, smoke stack &c exploded. A piece was torn out of the warhead of a torpedo. The captain and several of the crew were wounded and the other officer and four men of the crew were killed the casualties amounting to 33 per cent.
Had the relieving tackles functioned properly, the boat could have hauled out of action (for she kept one engine in operation) or, if the attack had been upon a battleship, she might have kept on which in an ordinary torpedo attack is the safest thing to do under such circumstances.
The fact is, that she was hit in many vital points, the projectiles exploding with great effect and that she was not entirely disabled. She returned to Key West under her own steam after being towed out of action and patched up.
If we would insure the stopping of a boat, we must hit her with shell carrying enough explosive to produce great structural injury. It is idle to expect to hit enough vital parts with small projectiles. The boats can fly with one wing. They have two heads, duplicate hearts, lungs, &c. and more than one weapon. To begin with, we need to have weapons that will be accurate at ranges exceeding 2000 yards when the range is not definitely known. The alternative is to keep the sights of certain guns set at definite ranges. But it is preferable to abandon the use of guns that do not have flat trajectories for considerable range. A glance at the table will show that the present 3 pdr. is practically useless beyond 2000 yards and the 3" is not satisfactory. By increasing the weight of the 3" projectile to about 16 lbs. however, better results can be attained.
We may feel satisfied that a larger shell is required to stop a torpedo boat but the problem of mounting a larger gun on high bridges or platforms is so difficult that we will find it necessary to adopt the 3" for a part, at least, of our torpedo boat defense. The necessity for guns mounted high is emphasized by the successful development of the submarine boat. Vessels of this type, while they may seek cover under water, will usually operate in the awash condition and guns to hit them should be mounted high. The 3 pdr. and 6 pdr. especially the low velocity weapons, cannot get the range accurately enough to hit them. The automatic 1-pdr. directed like a hose, is an effective weapon but it must be remembered that great skill is required to play a hose upon a small spot, perhaps a mile away, especially from a rolling platform.
To settle these questions or rather to gain information upon which a decision may be based, the following exercise is proposed.
Construct rafts carrying cylindrical muslin-covered frames backed by wire of 2” mesh, the size and color of the target to represent the bow view of torpedo boats of different classes.
Anchor these targets in some little-frequented place, and take means to warn approaching vessels. Then at night let a battleship (or other vessel) approach from some distance at speed, having a small anchor and buoy ready for slipping at the stern. When she sights one of the targets, let her open fire at it, slipping the buoy at the same time and keeping up full speed. At the end of a definite interval, say three minutes, if the distance be over 3000 yards or two minutes if less, let her cease firing or attack another target, a buoy being always dropped to mark the opening range. Next day, the number and character of the hits can be investigated. It is believed that the target representing the submarine boat awash will not usually be sighted at a sufficient range or hit with sufficient certainty also that after sighting one target and opening fire great difficulty will be experienced in seeing others that may be in the vicinity.
THE PROPOSED NEW MODELS OF RAPID FIRE GUNS AND PENETRATION
OF KRUPP ARMOR (CAPPED PROJECTILES)
With systematic variations of this exercise we can gain much valuable information. If regarding the submarine boat as a scarecrow, we make no endeavor to provide defense against it, we shall be morally and actually responsible to the country for any disaster we may encounter through that agency.
Without more definite information upon which to base opinion, we can say that the 4" gun of 6o cals. firing a long, heavy projectile seems the most suitable for torpedo boat defense our type an carry eighteen such guns on the gun deck protected by six inch armor. The muzzle velocity with a 52 lb. projectile should be 2540 f.s. and the penetration of modern armor at 4000 yards, normal impact about 5" using a projectile of special form.
The superiority of eighteen 4" over twelve 5" of similar type, is not so great as to prevent consideration of the latter. If as I believe, a penetration of 7 inches of modern armor at 4000 yards can be attained with a 5-inch gun suitable for mounting on shipboard then I prefer the twelve 5".
Many years ago extensive experiments with projectiles of different forms developed the fact that the ogival projectile of present use experienced about half as much air resistance as a similar one of flat head. The spheroidal head of one caliber was found equivalent to the ogival, and the projectile having a spheroidal head and taper rear with a length of three to four calibers was found to be superior to all others. Quoting Sir J. Whitworth, "No alteration of this form can be made without producing an inferior result." He also said and it has been found generally true, that the flat base "is a better form for shell as the projectile holds a greater bursting charge of powder."
Bashforth, from whom we take most of our data concerning the resistance of the air, says that at very high velocities the effect of the form of projectile is greater. Velocities high in his day are very low velocities today and I think that the form of projectile best suited for armor piercing shell is important enough to receive thorough investigation at once.
If tapering the base is as effective as changing the form of head, then we should get a penetration at 4000 yards with the proposed 5" gun of 6o calibers of 7.5-inches modern armor. If it produces no material effect we should get 7.5 "penetration at 2000 yards using a projectile weighing 100 lbs."
If we get the center of gravity of the shell abaft the center of lateral resistance, we shall reduce the tendency to tumble and may actually overcome the drift of the projectile to leeward. If we desire to use flat-base shell with large bursting charges against torpedo boats and tapered-rear armor piercing shell against battleships, we can make sights adapted to both kinds of ammunition. But this would not be advisable for guns of less than 4" or more than 6" caliber and of doubtful advantage for the 6".
PROTECTION
The weight assignable to armor and its supports being limited, the most careful economy is required and internal armor should be reduced to a minimum. Where armor may contribute to the structural strength, it should do so in this respect the two complete armor decks are important and the bow armor stiffens the ram. In general, the 6" and 8" armor can be worked in larger plates than thicker armor and this is an important item. The use of 6" armor on large areas has inevitably followed the extension of rapid fire mechanism to larger guns and the development of the high explosive shell. Heavy transverse or diagonal bulkheads are no longer advisable they might better be applied to the outside, particularly at the bow, which will bear the brunt of the fire in the first part of an engagement, when "bow presentment" is particularly advantageous to a squadron of well protected vessels.
With bow presentment, the hull being protected by 6" side armor inclined at 45° with 8" armor at the water line, few projectiles will get through, normal impact being impracticable. The fire at three points off the bow is the full broadside six 13", three 10", six 5" and at least ten 3". Compare with vessels having unarmored bows and internal diagonal armor. The 3" guns are much exposed but that is so in all types and they are where they will be most available in case of torpedo attack. If it be advisable to withdraw the crews temporarily, armored positions are at hand where they can await orders. The protection afforded to other guns is unprecedented. The battery being better adapted for disabling an enemy's guns, a vessel of this type should be less vulnerable to torpedo attack at the close of an engagement than an adversary of equal strength.
Looking abroad, we find usually four 12" guns and a number of 6" and smaller calibers, none being supposed as powerful as our new model guns of similar caliber. None of their 12' guns are markedly superior to our new 10" and few are equal.
There are few guns now mounted in foreign ships that could penetrate the proposed heavy gun positions or the barbette supports. The foreign six-inch guns, if we can believe the reports, are unable to penetrate the six-inch armor at ordinary ranges but we must look to the immediate future as well as the present. It is practically certain that a few years hence more guns capable of penetrating six-inch armor will be carried, we may then be forced to build vessels of low freeboard.
Considering the fact that only large projectiles and few of them will penetrate the 8 inch armor at the water line, the use of cellulose is not considered so advantageous as a careful disposition for closing shot holes. The Colome leak stopper seems effective.
THE FORM OF HULL
A rather full water line is proposed with correspondingly fine vertical sections. The bow underwater is a modified ellipsoid and offers comparatively little resistance in turning. The sharp low prow is considered an absurdity in a large battleship of considerable speed. There is no question of being able to crush the side of an opponent and the problem is to avoid injury to oneself, the sharp beak being inevitably wrenched off or bent back. Why sacrifice other important qualities for a form that viewed from any standpoint is of questionable advantage?
The stern should be of such form as to give solid water to the propellers and to bring the center of turning well aft. Triple screws seem to be economical at cruising speeds, and it will probably be found necessary to keep vessels underway most of the time in future wars and blockading fleets at some distance from the enemy's coast. We will never again have an enemy so little disposed to do us injury as in '98 and the simple close blockade as instituted at Santiago will not be practicable. Anyway, the development of the wireless telegraph makes it less important to keep the battle squadron in close touch with the blockaded harbor and the time required for coupling up may not be so important. Keeping steam on the central engines and in special cases keeping the outboard engines warm, will suffice for a blockading vessel one set of engines being sufficient for a speed of about 14 knots. Triple screws may be again used and we have not ceased to look for something more satisfactory than the reciprocating engine.
A vessel seldom burns all or nearly all of her coal. It is intended that the reserve bunkers be placed below the armor outboard of the magazines and other vital parts.
The proposed battery and armor could not be carried on a less beam than 8o feet without increasing the fullness of the water line. If greater metacentric height is desired, the water line may be made fuller without reducing the speed below 18 knots. If 19 knots speed is desired, it may possibly be attained on the form and weight proposed but the cost would be greater considerably and the engines would not retain their high power long unless unusually well cared for.
A final word about the ram and the torpedo. It is usually easier to disable a battleship's battery than to sink or stop her and in a squadron engagement the ram may well be the last alternative to defeat. A weaker vessel, sighting a battleship in a fog or a slower vessel in ordinary weather, will find the same alternative. Nothing can stop an armored vessel with such certainty as a torpedo I can see no sufficient reason why a battleship should not have them. There are other reasons why she should. The battleship's torpedo should have a range of 2000 yards and she should carry at least a dozen of them, though four tubes seem sufficient for all practical purposes.