The first vital point affecting our policy of naval construction is that it should be adapted to the needs of the country. The time long since passed for us to buy plans abroad; we should now stop copying foreign designs. An exhaustive study of all European construction is of course a necessity and details may be copied with advantage, but the general plan of our ships should be not only distinctive, but designed for the accomplishment of whatever ends our navy may be called upon to perform.
While admitting the idea that our naval policy should dictate our construction, there may be much diversity of opinion as to what that policy should be. In the highest sense it depends on the foreign policy of the government, and is therefore beyond the sphere of our discussion as naval officers, but there is still much left to us, as our preparations should be such as to fit the navy in a general way for all eventualities, and we are neglectful of our duty if we fail to note and allow for every advance made by any naval power.
Let us examine the task which war with a first-class power would impose.
The theatre of future warfare between the great powers will be the world. Military campaigns will be carried on, but except on the continent of Europe, where large populations are associated in close contact, it will be impossible to assemble and operate the large armies characterizing the warfare of the last century. The military operations of the future are foreshadowed in the recent fighting in South Africa, China and the Philippines, and problems of transport and subsistence become vital. We should drop forever the old hackneyed idea that the sea separates us from other powers. It does not; it brings us into contact with them. How could England have moved 300,000 men six thousand miles except on the sea? This great international highway, while nominally free to all, is in reality reserved to the strongest, and this question of strength is a purely naval one. A nation may have an invincible army and yet in war be restrained impotent in its own borders, if it has failed to provide in advance sufficient naval force to allow it to assert its claim to free transit at sea.
The events of the last decade have made the United States a world power in spite of itself. Our navy, which formerly had only to protect our coasts from naval attack, is now charged with the vastly more difficult task of keeping open the communications between isolated areas of American territory. As the battle of Manila decided the destiny of the Philippines, and that of Santiago made the loss of Cuba and Porto Rico a certainty to Spain, so a like reverse to our navy in a future war might cause a transfer of any of our outlying possessions to some other power. Military strength would be of no more avail than it was in Cuba in 1898, when, with their communications with Spain severed by the loss of Cervera's fleet, there was nothing in store for the 100,000 troops in Cuba but surrender or evacuation. In such cases military strength is but weakness, and the navy becomes the real support of national sovereignty.
We have seen in late years the transfer of large bodies of troops by sea, but this has taken place only when the transferring power has assured itself that there was no danger to fear in transit from an enemy's fleet. The Japanese landed troops in Korea before the battle of the Yalu, but not before they had satisfied themselves of their power to keep the Chinese fleet out of the way. The defense of a convoy is a matter of so much difficulty, and while inviting attack it is in itself so utterly defenseless, that a military expedition would hardly be sent to sea unless its security were guaranteed in advance by the seclusion or defeat of the enemy's naval force. Naval strength is thus a preliminary to military operations over sea, and must be maintained to insure transit of supplies. If lacking at any time, complete military failure may result.
The preceding arguments may not appeal to some of our citizens, the anti-expansionists, who look upon our stepping outside our continental limits as an error and almost a crime, but even among the opponents of militarism there is a belief in the Monroe doctrine and many of them are earnest advocates of our control of the Isthmian Canal.
If there is any one feature of our foreign policy that has become ingrained in the thought of the nation, it is the Monroe doctrine. It apparently appeals to all shades of political opinion and to all classes of society. Any discussion of the principles of foreign policy involved is of course outside the sphere of this article. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge that the doctrine attracts considerable attention abroad and that frequent references are made to it in foreign publications. Without in any degree accepting or advocating these foreign views, they are necessarily interesting to all Americans, as showing how others see us and our affairs. As an example of foreign ideas on the subject, we find the following in the columns of the conservative London Spectator, of date of January 6, 1900:
The German Emperor is no enemy of America, but he has steadily fixed his mind upon a policy which runs directly counter to one of the chief maxims of American statesmanship, and he is now using the usual German "foresight" in order to make that policy practical. His demand for a fleet, and his insistence upon obtaining it, just as his grandfather insisted upon obtaining an army, is not based upon any vague and shallow idea of having a splendid plaything. Again, he does not want a fleet in order to get anything out of England, for he knows that he has already got out of us most of what he wants, and also that the destruction of our fleet would be too hard a nut to crack. He wants a fleet in order that when he puts his South American policy into operation he will not be made ridiculous by an order from Washington. Mark, he does not want to attack America in the very least, but merely to have the proper physical backing when he asks the United States not to play dog-in-the-manger any longer in regard to Spanish and Portuguese America. He believes that when he occupies the Rio Grande do Sul the Americans will waive the Monroe doctrine if his fleet is equal to or stronger than theirs. Was it not with such an idea in his mind that in his New Year's speech on the need of a navy he declared: "If any thing has to be done in this world the pen will be powerless to carry it through unless backed by the force of the sword?" Germany and the German Emperor want a fleet, then, not for parade or to flaunt in other people's faces, but in order to do something definite with it, and that something is making America give up what the Germans regard as her dog-in-the-manger attitude.
When we speak of the German Emperor's South American Policy it must not be considered that we mean to imply that this is to be begun this year, or next year, or even in five years' time. It may be a very long time before the foundations of the new Empire will be laid, but meantime "foresight" is at work, and the work of preparation will be pursued. They will not be provocative, or in any sense essentially unfriendly to America, but they will be absolutely thorough. Now, under these circumstances, we think that America should look ahead, and not copy the policy of drifting which has so often proved injurious to the Old Country. That is, America should make up her mind whether she means, when the time comes, to insist rigidly on the Monroe doctrine. If she does not, and there are many very good reasons why she should abandon it, she need not trouble herself at all about German aspirations, for they will not injure her. After all, as the Germans argue, America does not want Brazil for herself, and therefore she need not mind Germany having it. There is no other point on which the Germans will touch her. Indeed, on all other matters Germany will show the utmost friendliness, not so say compliance, in regard to America. If, however, America really means business about the Monroe doctrine, and really thinks it is of importance to her national welfare to enforce it, she must not go to sleep. She must see to it, that is, that she has naval and military resources equal to the strain of maintaining a policy so tremendous. If not, she is certain to suffer a great humiliation at the hands of patient, efficient, and persistent Germany. Germany, when the hour comes, will not be "bluffed" into respect for the Monroe doctrine. She will "call" America's fleet, and if that fleet is not higher than hers Germany will act. If, however, it is superior America will never even hear of the danger to which the Monroe doctrine is now exposed. Let us say once again, we do not believe for a moment that Germany has any designs against the United States herself or bears her any ill-will. She is merely working steadily for an aspiration which comes in violent conflict with a certain American aspiration—the Monroe doctrine. Hence any one who likes to use his eyes can see that either the Monroe doctrine will have to be given up or its defense properly prepared for. Any halting between these policies must prove either disastrous or at any rate humiliating for the United States.
The same journal in another article on May 5, 1900, again referred to the Monroe doctrine:
Americans must make up their minds, and without delay, whether they mean to keep up the Monroe doctrine or to abandon it. If they mean to maintain it they must supply themselves with the necessary force. And they must remember that the force required will not be of a passive kind. It is no good for the Americans to talk about eighty millions of people, brave and rich and patriotic beyond example, being able to defend themselves against all comers, even without preparation. No doubt they can for home defense rely quite safely upon improvising an army. But this kind of passive power gives no support to the Monroe doctrine. Let America rest assured that no power which wishes to challenge the Monroe doctrine will dream for an instant of invading America. What will happen when the Monroe doctrine is challenged will be something of this kind. Germany, to take a concrete example by way of illustration, will get into a dispute, say, with Brazil, and will prepare to occupy the southern provinces in order to protect her subjects and restore order. America will thereupon quote the Monroe doctrine, and then the Monroe doctrine will be quietly but quite firmly ignored. The next move will be America's. If she is strong enough she must send her Fleet wherever the German fleet is to be found and destroy it. If and when that is done, nothing will be easier to enforce the Monroe doctrine, for nobody can reach, much less hold, a part of Brazil or Central America without having the command of the sea—or at any rate the relative command of the sea. It comes, then, to this, that the Monroe doctrine must be founded on sea-power, and if America means seriously to enforce it against all likely corners, she must have a naval force capable of doing the work. But, clearly, if while Germany is building ships America is doing little or nothing, America will not be in a position to fetter Germany's will, or to tell her she shall not make what terms she likes with the South and Central American powers. And remember that America must do more than merely build. She must engage and train in sufficient numbers the men without whom the best ships are useless. Her present officers and men are as good as possible. They have superiors nowhere, and only equals in the sister-navy of Great Britain. But there are far too few of them, and a naval officer cannot possibly be improvised.
Another point on which there is a strong feeling among our people is that of an inter-oceanic canal. While there is by no means the interest in this that there is in the Monroe doctrine, there is unquestionably a widespread conviction that the United State has a greater interest in the canal than any other nation and should therefore "control" it. Control of an international thoroughfare, such as the canal must be when finished, is a very delicate question. While it might appear perfectly reasonable to us to impose certain restrictions, these on the other hand might be obnoxious or even intolerable to other nations; and in that event they could be carried out only by force. As the canal will lie in foreign territory inaccessible to our army, its defense or control must fall on the navy. It thus becomes another dependency, communications with which must be kept open on two oceans. But these oceans afford ready access to the canal for any power having a naval force, and our control is possible, therefore, only by predominant naval strength, both in the Atlantic and Pacific. This is certainly a very large contract for us to assume "in addition to our other duties," yet current discussion about our control of the canal runs on as flippantly as though it was to connect the Chesapeake with the Delaware.
We have not yet reached the point of making our foreign trade a national interest. We see other powers intriguing and striving to extend their commerce by all methods, and watch their jealousies and struggles comparatively unmoved. Our trade with North China was larger than that of any other nation, and is threatened with absolute extinction, but it arouses no popular feeling. There is no insistent demand on the part of the nation at large that the Government should take any decisive action in China in protection of our commerce. And yet with this comparative indifference to foreign trade is coupled the fact that in the last fiscal year our export trade was larger than that of any other nation. This commerce has not grown up, however, through any concerted effort either on the part of our Government or of our manufacturers. Like our national expansion, it has come in spite of ourselves. Our manufacturers still look mainly to the home market, and the popular idea of foreign trade is that of selling products for cash rather than of exchanging goods. Reciprocity treaties are at present having a hard time of it, and no legislation is ever obtained directly in favor of our foreign commerce. It is inconceivable, however, that this will continue. Our capacity for manufactures is so greatly in excess of any possible home consumption that we must look more and more to opening up markets abroad. The advances we have made in the last few years show what we may expect when our people really make a business of foreign trade. We shall then find that we are in the thick of the international complications resulting from the struggle for trade, and although we may never go so far as to seize territory in order to monopolize its trade, we are just as likely to get into trouble by advocating the "open door." With the exception of Great Britain, the efforts of European powers are now more generally in the line of obtaining special commercial concessions, and the open door policy is unpopular with all monopolists.
Copying again from the Spectator, we find an interesting review of the question of international trade complications, with their possible consequences in the issue of April 20, 1901. The following is an extract:
The annoyance of the Continent with America, which is very deep, is based upon three reasons. There is first of all, a dread, or rather a conviction, that competition in business with America is nearly impossible. Her wealth and energy are too great, and both are employed, as Continentals think, to monopolize trade, and so control in the end all the wealth of the world, an idea not without advocates even among ourselves. These giant trusts are regarded as enemies, inexpressibly formidable because they do not raise prices, which would to traders be some compensation, but look to monopoly of business as their reward, and because, if the governments fence them off with tariffs, the Americans, being Protectionists, do not scruple to commence quick and severe reprisals. As the governments are always trembling with nervousness lest their industrials, if driven out of work, should turn to Socialism as a refuge, this cause alone inspires them with a permanent suspicion and dislike of American action. Then they see, as yet dimly, but still without doubt, that America will interfere grievously with their plans for securing new and. permanent markets. America does not interfere in Africa because Africa is negro; but the hopes of Continental Chancellors of the Exchequer turn to Asia, and in Asia it is clear that America will be sadly in their way. The whole action of Washington in this Chinese muddle points to a single conclusion, that although Americans took the Philippines, they are unwilling to see any but native powers in possession or control of the richer countries of Asia. They do not much mind England, because she admits all the world to share her commerce, or Russia, because they regard Manchuria as a mere railway route, but they are utterly opposed to a partition of China, or a subjugation of Japan, or any other great change which would place their manufactures at a disadvantage. That opposition is most irritating to men who sincerely believe that open trade is of no use to them because America and England are sure to get it, and who look therefore to conquest in one form or another as the only permanent protection for their industry. The bitterness is all the deeper because it is, in a sense, philanthropic, those who feel it honestly pitying their own people, because they cannot, in the fierce competition which prevails, get enough work to do. And lastly, every State on the Continent feels keenly the dog-in-the-manger attitude of America about the future of South America. She will neither take it nor let anybody else. There lies the vast continent with scarcely anybody in it, with climates, which, though varied, do not prohibit European labor, with sources of wealth in the soil that are practically limitless, and with vast rivers which render entrance into the far interior at once cheap and easy. There is no prize left in this rapidly dwindling little planet like South America. Germany would like the whole of Brazil, in which she is already strong; Italy even now sends her children by the hundred thousand to Argentina; France would feel richer if she could acquire the Hinterland of Guiana; and even Hungary would much rather that her Slav children, who in tens of thousands are doing the hard work of North America, should find acceptable homes under their own flag in Uruguay. All are warned off by the Union in a way which, as she will not annex, or even allow herself to be responsible for these territories, seems to the statesmen of the Continent the very height of selfish impertinence. Why, they think, should their children be shut by a pure caprice from natural and profitable careers? The total result of these feelings, is a bitter dislike of America, mixed with a certain dread that produces the sense expressed alike by Count Goluchowski and Count Canevaro, and not obscurely hinted at by Count von Büllow, that a league of Europe against America will ultimately prove to be "a necessity of civilization."
Our friends in America, who are incurably optimist, believing that whatever happens all will go well with them, will not credit our description of the situation, or will even imagine that we are only pleading for the Anglo-Saxon alliance which we have so often predicted for the future. They are in error. We have not stated the case against the Continent—and especially in regard to Germany's aspirations and aims—half as strongly as we believe it ought to be stated, and we are entirely at ease about the Anglo-Saxon alliance. That is safe enough in the fullness of time without any help from publicists. Our object is only to waken Americans from an illusion, to induce them to increase their fleet steadily instead of by rushes, and to persuade them, if we can, to think out what they are doing, and not act, as we too often do, upon the spur of the moment. They may rely on it that the Continent will lose nothing for want of planning, and that when the alliance against America of which Count Canevaro talks is transmuted from a hope into a fact, the fact will be full-grown and armed.
These comments of the Spectator are certainly most interesting.
The trade of the future, or at least the trade that is to be developed, will be mainly on the Pacific. Its shores are bordered by nations containing half the population of the world. As yet, these masses are dealing with each other indirectly, China trading, for example, with New York and London rather than with San Francisco, but the next few years will see direct routes established that will make the Pacific the ocean of the world. We are involved in this future development from our position, whether we wish it or not. Back of San Francisco, Seattle and other cities of our Pacific coast, lie the industries, resources and commercial vigor of our nation, and all will come into play as soon as it is evident that there is a new field for them in Asia. We are not seeking this, but it will inevitably come. The future may thus see struggles for trade supremacy in the Pacific, which will be all the sharper and more bitter from the fact that there is so much to be obtained by the first comer or the most unscrupulous.
After this casual examination of the field it is needless for us to select any nation as our special antagonist. We are liable to have trouble from one reason or another with almost any of the powers and must consider war as a possible result. Personally, I believe that we have fought our last war with Great Britain. The numerous questions arising in the future will be settled as their predecessors have been for the last eighty years, by diplomacy and not by arms. If this is admitted, it frees us from the necessity of considering the British Navy in our plans, and materially simplifies matters.
As we analyze the work thus outlined for our navy, we find it almost entirely of a military character. Even maintaining communications with outlying possessions is not a mere matter of policing the sea, but rather involves the destruction or capture of any force by which they are threatened, and this demands two essentials in our ships—speed and fighting strength. Neither can be sacrificed. Without speed and coal endurance we could never catch our enemy; without fighting strength we could do nothing with him when caught. If we had any commerce to protect; if our trade routes were covered with American ships that might provoke attack, we would need fast, light armored ships to overhaul and destroy possible assailants. As this commerce is, however, almost non-existent, it is unwise for US to design special ships for its protection. Even if we were at war with Great Britain it would be unwise to spend money for commerce-destroyers, as they would not earn their cost. Only one thing can break up commerce, which, like that of England, is vital to her very existence, and that is blockade. Privateering, raids, or operations or so-called commerce-destroyers are mere incidents of war, affecting, perhaps, freights and insurance, but not in any way crippling or causing serious distress. Any power or combination of powers that seeks to apply the sovereign remedy of blockade to the British Isles must reckon with the British Navy.
The measure of success we may attain in a foreign war depends, therefore, purely and simply on naval strength, and this means not numerical but fighting strength. Whatever enemies we may meet can be overcome by force alone, and this must be of a kind which will be effective in a modern naval battle. Strategy and tactics are sometimes supposed to atone for want of fighting strength, and so they do to the extent of utilizing to the utmost what strength exists. Napoleon and Nelson, the personification of military and naval science respectively, unite in demanding strength. "Providence is on the side of the stronger battalions," is just as true that "only numbers annihilate." If, therefore, we are to build our navy on true principles, are not the fundamental ideas, first, to have plenty of units, as many as possible, and second, to have every unit endowed with fighting strength. We should allow nothing to lead us away from the cardinal idea that the navy is for battle, as in battle only can the issues of war be determined.
In battleship construction we are well to the fore. We have to a certain extent been trying to please every one, our seventeen battleships, built or under construction, representing six different types. These are supposed to show a gradual improvement in design, but this has been questioned. As was very aptly said in the discussion of Mr. Taylor's article printed in the last number of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE, we seem to have abandoned the plan of building better battleships than other nations do, and to have substituted therefor the policy of building as good as any. Our first four battleships carried eight 8-inch guns, and were most unfavorably criticized by foreign critics as being "over-gunned." An undue tenderness for the opinions of others must have been operative in the abolition of the eight-inch battery in the Alabama and Ohio classes, and the substitution therefor of fourteen and sixteen 6-inch guns respectively. We copied foreign construction, and as a result have ships as good as any of their type anywhere. In the latest ships we have once more adopted the favorite eight-inch gun, and if we can get rid of the six-inch, replacing them by an equivalent weight of extra eight-inch, would again be building better fighting ships than our rivals. To face the point squarely, what is the reason for installing a six-inch gun in new battleships? Such a ship is designed to give and take hard blows, but the six-inch is not an armor-piercer, and is useless against the Krupp armor of recent ships at ordinary battle ranges. It is not a sound argument to say that the new gun is capable of injuring existing foreign ships, although this fact may be enough to justify its retention in ships already finished. The Virginia finds her contemporaries, however, under construction, and they, with their Krupp armor, are practically invulnerable against the six-inch. Why then install it? An opinion seems to exist in some quarters that a dozen small guns can get their projectiles through armor that no one can pierce singly, but this is pure hypothesis if not humbug. The common-sense solution is to install guns that can put every shot through their opponent's medium armor, and the new eight-inch gun fills the requirements.
The question of battleship speed is the most difficult one to settle in connection with the type. It is hardly right to decry speed as enabling a fleet to run away but not fight. It will enable it to overhaul a slower fleet and bring it to action, and it unquestionably has a distinct tactical value in a fleet action. The old maneuvers of concentration as practiced at the Nile and Trafalgar are now impossible, when every unit of a fleet is highly mobile, and any threatened point of the fleet formation may be quickly reinforced. The principle of concentration remains, however, as true as before, and any fleet that can maintain its force in concentration against an enemy's flank or rear in action for five minutes will gain an advantage that may ensure final victory. This advantageous position may be gained by the bad maneuvering of the enemy, but if he is alert, can be ensured only by superior mobility. Speed is, however, only one factor of mobility, the other, frequently overlooked, but equally important, being handiness. A fleet of fast battleships, the speed being gained by increased length, cannot out-maneuver slower ships with smaller turning circles. If this is true, we certainly want no 21-knot battleships, and may well ponder whether the gain of speed in the Virginia by the increase of under-water length is an advantage. An eighteen- or even a seventeen-knot "turnabout" is unquestionably a better tactical unit than a clumsy nineteen-knot ship. It must never be forgotten that the normal sphere of the battleship is in fleet formation and not on detached service, and that a fleet's maneuvering ability is measured by that of the slowest or clumsiest ship.
One of the most original of recent battleship designs is found in the Vittorio Emanuele III," of 12,625 tons, of the Italian Navy. This is on the principle of high speed at expense of fighting efficiency, but once more illustrates the ability of the Italian constructors in designing efficient compromises, the speed having been gained on moderate displacement without undue sacrifice of fighting power. The battery is to consist of two 12-inch and twelve 8-inch. These ships certainly have good fighting ability, and by abandoning the 6-inch gun for the 8-inch, provide for effective fire against the most recent ships.
The most interesting feature of the Italian design is found in the fact that this fighting battleship has a cruiser's speed, 22 knots, and can apparently overhaul almost anything afloat, while at the same time capable of defeating almost everything, battleships excepted, that it can bring beneath its guns. No protected cruiser or gunboat, and but few armored cruisers, would have much chance of escape if once sighted by a ship of this class. If this type is successfully developed its influence on naval construction will be very marked. All large ships must be given guns, speed and armor to ensure their having a chance of life against it.
The new ships, by means of a most remarkable underwater body, aim to attain high speed while retaining excellent turning power. They are certainly a most fascinating combination and afford plenty of thought to students of battleship construction. A squadron of this type could choose its own time for battle, and if well directed would derive great advantage in action from its speed. Neither speed nor tactical ability could, however, when battle was once joined, overcome heavier guns or better armor, if equally well handled, and in battle only is the real test of battleship construction.
The armored cruiser has always furnished a fine theme for argument. If, however, the idea already presented—that the prime necessity of our navy is for fighting ships—is acknowledged as correct, it limits the field within which our designers must work. No armored cruiser can, of course, have the high speed necessary for cruising purposes, and also sufficient fighting strength to successfully engage a contemporary battleship, single-handed. It should, however, be strong enough to face any vessel of her class in a duel, or to mix in a general action, with and against battleships, under which circumstances individual contests between ships are extremely improbable. The requirements for a ship fit for the above purposes, i. e., general cruising and also fighting in line-of-battle, may be summarized as follows: Speed, 22 knots; length about 400 feet with underwater body cut away so as to promote handiness and turning power; battery to contain at least eight or ten 8-inch guns of latest type, with a large number of 14-pdrs. for use against small vessels; armor, a complete belt of not less than four-inch Krupp armor to keep out high explosives and protect the cellulose against small R. F. projectiles, and not less than six inches of armor over every gun of main battery. This combination is by no means impossible, and can probably be realized on a ship of about 10,000 tons without sacrificing the coal endurance necessary for efficiency.
The latest type of eight-inch gun may be classed as a rapid-fire armor-piercer, and is effective against the casemates or waterline of the very latest foreign battleships at 3000 yards. With six of these guns on a broadside the cruiser could certainly give a good account of itself, and as nearly all foreign ships have no calibre intermediate between six inches and the large guns in the main turrets, if our cruiser has sufficient armor protection to resist a six-inch shell, it can be injured only by the main battery of its opponent. It is, therefore, effective in drawing the enemy's fire, as well as in directly injuring him. It is noticeable, moreover, that the 8-inch gun can penetrate the turret armor of many late battleships at 2000 yards. A ship of this kind is a “battle-cruiser," not merely an armored cruiser. The latter term may mean anything; the former conveys the idea of a cruiser fit for battle, implying both guns and armor. This type is a fighting vessel and, therefore, in accordance with our necessities. At the same time the ship is as effective for chase, for blockade, for overhauling and capturing protected cruisers as any light armored cruiser could be. Phenomenal speed may well be sacrificed. Twenty-two knots is very high and, probably, all that will be needed ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is unwise for us to design for the hundredth chance, when the resulting ship will be unfit for battle.
The two armored cruisers we possessed in the Spanish war proved to be very serviceable. They are, however, too lightly armed to be duplicated and are also lacking in protection for personnel, which all recent experience shows to be most essential. They were not fitted for service in the line-of-battle when they were built, and are still less adapted for the work of a battle-cruiser today. The new cruisers of the Maryland class have been fully discussed recently in these pages and call for apparently but little commendation from the men who must use them. They are defective in that they do not have fighting strength commensurate with their cost, and are not adapted to any of the demands liable to be made on our navy. Their guns are too small to injure a fighting enemy of smaller size; their armor is inadequate to protect the personnel against his fire. Their high speed is secured by increasing the length to such an extent as to cut down maneuvering power and render it impossible for them to act in company with battleships. Their speed will enable them to overhaul an enemy, but their low fighting power may render this a risky operation. There are very few docks which they can enter, and their operations, whatever they may be, are therefore limited in location. While fulfilling none of our requirements, they cost over four million dollars each and demand the service of a crew of over eight hundred men apiece. Have we either money or men enough to afford six such costly luxuries?
Fortunately, Naval Constructor Taylor's recent article directed the attention of the service to these vessels before they were really laid down, and there is plenty of time in which to change their guns and armor and vastly increase their fighting ability without interfering with their one good quality of speed. Such a change would render them of some practical service to the country, and it is wiser to face the problem now than invite disaster in the future. The country at large will consider these vessels as fighting ships, and will bitterly resent either their capture in war by a smaller but better designed enemy, or their obtaining safety by flight.
The St. Louis type is still more inferior. Her four-inch armor is penetrable by the six-inch gun at 4000 yards, while her six-inch guns are useless against the six-inch armor now so prevalent in foreign navies. There are many vessels of equal or even smaller size that could receive her fire almost unharmed, while their own guns could readily pierce her armor. In a battle of this kind the St. Louis would stand almost as good a chance of winning if she were armed with smooth-bores. The St. Louis is nominally a protected cruiser, and the money allowed is probably insufficient to give her the armor she needs, although she could be given heavier guns.
If we review our naval history since the Revolutionary War, and analyze the cause of the large measure of success we have attained in battle, I think any unprejudiced student will attribute it in great degree to the fact that we have made it a rule to have heavier guns in better ships than our opponents could bring against us. We carried out this idea in the Minnesota class, the most powerful ships afloat in their day. Our first steel cruisers and battleships conformed to the same rule. If there is one principle that we have consistently clung to throughout the life of our navy, it is that of giving our ships the maximum of gun power. Even now, the acts of Congress authorizing construction of armored vessels always demand the “heaviest guns,” or "most powerful ordnance" of the class of ship. Have our old traditions proved false that we are now violating them?
While advocating heavy guns, we must not too fully rely on the theory that a ship's best defense is in its battery fire. So it is within limits. If we believed it absolutely we would not build armored vessels. Santiago and Manila both showed the necessity of protecting the personnel. No amount of personal courage will enable a man to stop a six-inch shell with impunity, and no battery fire, however rapid and accurate, will avail for defense if the projectiles fired are too light to pierce our enemy's armor. The United States ought not to be called upon to pay three million dollars for any ship that cannot face a foreign ship of equal size and cost without a good chance of beating her. Given good fighting ships, it becomes the duty of the naval officer to get the maximum work out of them by training and discipline of personnel, but no effort can get fighting strength out of a ship unless it has been built into her.
If the general proposition be once admitted that all armored ships built for our navy should be designed for fighting in squadron, there still remains the question of the relative number of battleships and battle-cruisers. If fighting power is the prime requisite, why construct anything but battleships? The answer to this question involves the very existence of the armored cruiser. The type is in existence in all prominent navies of the world to meet the demands for work for which the heavy and slow battleship is but poorly adapted. Among these duties is scouting, chasing an enemy's scouts or cruisers, following and harassing a retreating armored fleet, detaining an unwilling enemy and bringing him to battle, chasing enemy's armored vessels attempting to break blockade. If these duties are to be performed against opposition, armor and guns are as necessary as speed. The Italians are attempting to build one type, which will efficiently perform these duties and also have full fighting efficiency, but in all other navies there are two classes. This separation enables the fighting ship, par excellence, to receive the maximum armor and ordnance with moderate speed, while the cruiser should be given as high speed as is compatible with enough gun power and protection to enable it to be classed as an effective fighting unit. If any type is threatened with extinction it is not the armored, but the protected cruiser.
The answer to the above question cannot be given off-hand. Probably all officers would agree that we need more battleships than battle-cruisers. However useful the latter may be, they cannot rank in actual warfare higher than battleships second class, and there must be enough battleships built to meet our requirements for a powerful navy. While battle-cruisers may assist in a line-of-battle in a most material way, they can never take the place of the slower and heavier battleship. They are additional to it, not in any degree replacing it. In view of the fact that we are at present spending millions on armored cruisers of low fighting power, it seems that our immediate necessities are for ships that can fight, and what money may be voted for the next few years should go mainly for battleships. Three of the latter to one battle-cruiser might be a fair ratio for the present.
It is unnecessary to make any reference to monitors, as since the Spanish war naval opinion has crystallized against them. Of undoubted utility in harbor defense, their worthlessness at sea renders them a care and incubus in a fleet, and the best use to be made of them is to send them into port. Still, we can probably find use for those we have, and may even build others, but public opinion should never be allowed to consider them as increasing the fighting efficiency of the Navy. They are more nearly allied, so far as their usefulness is concerned, to permanent fortifications than to battleships, and while making excellent harbor guards, have practically no offensive power that can be brought to bear against an enemy at sea.
In omitting any consideration of the building of other ships for our navy than armor-clads, it is, of course, simply because it is outside the limitations imposed by our subject. A well-digested solution of a general ship-building scheme appeared in the last number of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE. Mistakes are less liable to be made in building small ships than in armored vessels, but the latter are so much more important, more costly, and require so much more time for their construction that we can ill afford to make errors of any kind in connection with them. For this reason, this article is intended only to call attention to what seems to be the most vital point of our policy of construction.
As the final feature in the examination of our naval necessities is the very important question of how large naval forces we may be called on to confront. The general comprehension of the value of sea power, and the illustrations conveyed by the Spanish war of 1898 have led to a great activity in all the shipyards of Europe. Comparatively little attention has been bestowed on matters of military increase, while there has been a general building up of naval strength. It is a matter of comparative indifference to us how large European armies may become, as they cannot act against us, but we cannot remain indifferent to increase of naval force, as that may not only affect our interests unfavorably in many quarters of the globe, but may cause national disaster by defeating our fleet in war, and render possible blockade of our coasts or even invasion of our territory. We must, therefore, study the growth of all foreign navies to keep up a certain relative strength. This may lead to a competition in shipbuilding, but our resources fit us to enter upon this with equanimity, especially as under the law all money for shipbuilding is expended in our own territory, and the building of battleships stimulates many branches of trade and gives employment to thousands of men. The manning of a large fleet is another matter. Experience goes to show that we can obtain all the recruits we need, although at a much greater expense than would have to be incurred by any other country. This condition we must face and accept.
The direct comparison of the fighting strength of different navies is a matter of great difficulty on account of the widely different types of ships between which comparison is impossible. Some ships almost defy classification. The following table is probably approximately correct at least.
Several nations have adopted definite programs for naval increase, while others, like ourselves, vote new ships from time to time. Great Britain, which builds more than any other nation, is apparently still acting on the policy advanced long ago of maintaining her fleet at a strength equal to that of any two other nations, and now has an exceptionally large number of ships under construction. This policy will probably be adhered to, and while it is therefore impossible to predict the size of the navy at any future time, it is safe to calculate on its always being greatly in excess of any other.
The most comprehensive building program is that of Germany.
It is advanced as a well-digested scheme of proportioning naval expenditure to national wealth, and although this involves considerable speculation and counting of chickens before they are hatched, there is but little doubt that the plan of construction will be carried on, whether taxation is increased or not, as the scheme of a large navy has been made popular throughout the country, and any extra burden involved will be cheerfully borne. We can therefore count with comparative certainty on the minimum strength of the German Navy for many years to come.
It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the plan of constriction as it has been published to the world. A digest may, however, be of interest. (See next page.)
An inspection of this table shows that in the next four years (1902-1905), Germany will lay down eight new battleships, which, with the eleven now finished and the ten under construction, will give her a total in 1908 of 29 completed battleships, all but five of which are of steel. In addition to these, there are eight coast-defense vessels which are being reconstructed to fit them for general service at sea, making a total of 32 modern steel ships, and five additional ones of iron. This is practically the full numerical strength of the proposed new fleet which is to include 38 battleships, and it is attained in 1908, instead of 1920, as the scheme pretends. In the next three years (1906-1908) four more battleships are built to replace an equal number of the iron vessels now in service. In 1909 there is one more new construction, bringing the total up to the figure of 38. The next six years see 13 new battleships built to replace old constructions, but some of the ships replaced are contemporary with the Oregon in our navy, and others are improved coast-defense vessels, and although obsolete in the eye of the law, will undoubtedly be serviceable in some way.
Battleships. Coast Large
1st class. 3d class. Defence. Cruisers.
Finished Fleet, 1901 6 5 8 4
Under construction, 1901 10 3
To be laid down, 1902 2* 1+
1903 2* 1+
1904 2* 1+
1905 2* 1*
1906 2+ 1*
1907 1+ 2*
1908 1+ 2*
1909 1* 1*
1910 1+ 2+
1911 2+ 1+
1912 2+ 1+
1913 2+ 1+
1914 2+ 1+
1915 2+ 1+
1916 2+
*New ships in addition to present fleet.
+ New ships to replace others legally obsolete.
The increase in armored cruisers is uncertain. The law calls for "large cruisers," and these may be armored or not as circumstances demand. Thus far good fighting ships, battle-cruisers, have been laid down. A point of interest is that during the years above noted (1901-1906), in which the greatest addition of fighting strength is made by the construction of new battleships, only one large cruiser is laid down each year, but when the battleship total is reached, two large cruisers are built annually. The first aim of the whole scheme is to get the fighting ships in service as soon as possible. After that old vessels can be replaced, the legally obsolete vessels being frequently serviceable. It is interesting to see on the list of vessels replaced in 1915 and 1916 the Furst Bismarck, Victoria Louise, Freya and Hansa, which have just been finished, and will undoubtedly be fairly efficient ships at the above dates.
The German scheme is an admirable one, and will give the nation a fleet which at all times will be in excess of the nominal figures. Unless Germany is to attain a predominant strength on the ocean, other nations, ourselves included, must build steadily. An average increase of two battleships and one battle-cruiser to our navy annually will preserve our relative standing; while two battleships and two battle-cruisers, or three battleships and one cruiser, laid down each year will keep us ahead in fighting strength. If we do not build we must, of course, accept any consequences that our naval inferiority may bring upon us.
The French have had one or two programs. The one now in force is designed to give France in 1907 a force of 28 modern battleships and 24 armored cruisers. This scheme does not involve a very large amount of construction. In 1901 the estimates are for two battleships and one armored cruiser. The French seem to be greatly enamored with the submarine boat and are laying down a large number.
Italy has evolved a plan extending up to 1910 for new construction. This provides for ten new battleships of about 10,000 tons each, besides the reconstruction of the Italia and the Lepanto. It is doubtful if this plan will be carried out. The latest ships designed are of 12,600 tons. The finances of Italy are not in such a condition as to warrant a very long look ahead in designing a plan for naval increase.
Japan has practically completed her building program of 1895 so far as large vessels are concerned. One new battleship and two armored cruisers are said to be projected.
Russia's program of 1898 provided for the building of eight battleships and eight "large" cruisers by 1904. Some of the latter were unarmored.
The following résumé shows the probable number of modern armored ships, excluding harbor-defiance vessels, ready for service in 1905:
United Great
States Britain Germany Russia France Italy Japan
Battleships, 1st class 17 44 16 14 13 9 7
Battleships, 2nd class. 11 11 10 5
Battleships, 3d class 1 10 5 1 11 2 1
Total Battleships 18 65 21 26 34 16 8
Coast Defense Vessels 10 9 8 4 8 3 1
Armored Cruisers 8 40 8 16 24 5 9
Total Armored Vessels 36 114 37 46 66 24 18
Here our program ends, while that of other nations continues. Our Navy will probably be strong enough in 1905 to enable the foreign policy of our Government to be carried into effect, but not in 1908 unless further increased. It seems as though the country was confronted with the choice of two alternatives. One is to give up the Monroe doctrine and all plans for controlling an inter-oceanic canal, the other to increase our armored fleet at a minimum rate of four vessels annually, with proportional increase of personnel. If the second alternative is chosen, the contention held throughout this article, that all armored vessels built by the United States should be designed for place in the line-of battle, is once more reiterated.