TELEGRAPH CABLES IN TIME OF WAR.
From the French of J. Depelley. Translated by Lieutenant J. Hood, U. S. N.
The first words exchanged between Europe and America by the trans-Atlantic cable of 1858 were the words of peace, which claimed the neutralization of telegraph lines, the President of the United States claiming in his message of felicitation to Queen Victoria that all civilized nations should spontaneously, with common accord, declare that the electric telegraph should be forever neutral, and that the messages Which should be confided to it should be held sacred, even in time of war.
This wish, emitted in the enthusiasm which was born of the first telegraphic communication of human thought between the two continents, was not destined to have a near realization. After forty years the neutralization of cables is not yet recognized. It will, apparently, be a matter of the future; but for the present a submarine telegraph is a Powerful instrument of war at the profit of the country which has had the foresight to assure itself of its services.
As soon as the possibility of corresponding at great distances by means of submarine cables had been practically demonstrated, England understood what a commercial and political preponderance would be given to her by the creation of a grand network of cables under her control. Without being discouraged by the onerous failures at the beginning, with a perseverance that one should admire, she has succeeded in creating and developing methodically, without noise, and without rest, a network of submarine telegraph cables which cover to-day the entire world; enclosing it in an immense net of copper, of which London is the center. It is there that the threads of this net converge; and in the Whole world not an incident occurs, not a political or commercial fact, of which the news is not first transmitted to London. It is a marvelous agent of information and influence that England has in her hands, an agent so much the more redoubtable that other countries are deprived of it.
A simple examination made of a telegraphic chart shows the grasp of cables belonging to the English companies, and explains certain difficulties of our colonial policy, and throws a little light on facts which have sometimes appeared incomprehensible.
In the direction of North America, ten trans-Atlantic cables connect England with Canada and the United States. Further down towards South America, three other English lines traverse the Atlantic and connect Brazil to Portugal and Spain; and, by their prolongation, to London itself. Other English lines extend from north to south along the Pacific coast. Still others develop all the Antilles and Central America and complete its first net, which puts the whole of America at only a few seconds from London.
Towards the east, the English lines which extend in that direction, starting from London, quadrupled at certain points, turn Europe at Gibraltar, touch at Malta and at Egypt, on through the Red Sea to Aden.
At Aden is found what one might call the knot of the telegraphic lines, the importance of which is revealed to-day. From there, in fact, starts the first section of the three cables which extend towards India, and which are prolonged by other lines to China, Australia and New Zealand. Another line starts from the same point, extends along the eastern coast of Africa, connecting it to Zanzibar, Mozambique, Delagoa Bay, Natal and the Cape of Good Hope. This grand eastern network has its central point, where all the lines converge, at Aden.
Towards the western coast of Africa, the same English lines which connect London to Portugal and Spain, extend first to Bathurst below Senegal, then, from there, festoon the coast as far as the Cape, where they rejoin those from the eastern coast, enclosing the entire African littoral in a circle of English telegraphs.
There also, it is necessary to remark, are the complete conditions of control with regard to England, in which this network is constructed. In the same manner as by the east, Aden is the point of convergence of all the lines which spread out towards the Indies, China and Australia, and towards Africa as far as the Cape of Good Hope; just the same on the western coast of Africa, a point of convergence of all the lines exists in English territory at Sierra-Leone, and above all, at Bathurst. Through these English stations necessarily passes all the correspondence of the network which extends along the coast as far as the Cape, and which serves the French and Portuguese territories, which, by the way, largely subsidize them.
The importance of the danger of this organization to all that is not English is immediately apparent as soon as one sees the clauses in the contracts which the English government imposes on its telegraph companies. Here are the principles: They suffice to show in a sufficiently strong manner the political views which have guided our neighbors in the so persevering creation of their telegraph network.
"Article 3. The proposed cable shall not employ foreigners at any station. In like manner, the lines will not pass in any office which could be under the control of a foreign government.
"Article 5. The Government of Her Majesty does not make any engagement, or take any responsibility, in anything that regards the cable beyond the payment of the subsidy.
"Article 6. The subsidy will be given during twenty years, and payable at each complete period of twelve months, under the condition that the cable be maintained in a good state and shall have rendered good service, and that the service between the United Kingdom and its colonies and English protectorates shall not be subject to interruption.
"Article 7. The dispatches of the imperial and colonial government shall have priority whenever it is demanded. They shall be transmitted at half-rates, which shall not exceed a sum to be determined.
"Article 9. In case of war, the Government may occupy all stations in all territories which are English or under English protection, and may use the cable by means of its own employees."
Thus in normal times the British government is especially assured of its despatches, wherever an English telegraph line exists, of a right of precedence which belongs to all despatches which are official according to ,the international conventions. The reservation of this privilege may appear natural; but, in reality, it has for its end and effect, to give precedence to all English despatches over all official despatches of other countries. It is not necessary to search further for an explanation of the difficulties or delays, so favorable to British interests, which certain telegraph despatches are subject to.
But how much more dangerous is the situation in case of war. The events in the Transvaal should open the eyes of all countries to this menacing peril. Not only the English censorship established at Aden refuses cipher dispatches coming from Marques, from Durban and the Cape, but stops also those which come from Madagascar, as well as from German East Africa. What would it be if, instead of war between England and the Transvaal, the hostilities existed between England and France? It is the question of the role of the telegraph cables which is plainly exposed by these facts. What has been this role up to the present? What will it be in the future for a country, like France, which has an immense colonial empire to defend, and traditional interests of influence and commerce to sustain in all points of the globe?
Although of an origin very recent, since it goes back scarcely forty years, the telegraphic cables have already mixed themselves so directly in the colonial and maritime international life of all nations that the interest and importance of their existence can no longer be ignored or misunderstood. Notably in time of war they can be the means of action of such weight that one may justly say, that the nation that could alone control a network of submarine telegraphs, to instruct its squadrons of the movements of forces, and the strength of the adversaries, will be the mistress of the sea.
What is passing at this moment for the correspondence that comes from South Africa marks the dangerous dependence in which all countries are placed by the sole fact of the state of war between England and the Transvaal. The events which developed last year in the course of the Spanish-American war, when two maritime powers found themselves at war, furnish in a still more conclusive manner the demonstration of the influence that telegraphic communication will take in a colonial conflict. It was shown, in fact, that a telegraphic war was engaged in between Spain and the United States from the beginning of hostilities; that it followed on parallel lines to the military operations, where one finds for the first time a collection of facts clearly showing the considerable role which the submarine telegraphic lines may have to play in a great war.
With a want of foresight, which should be a lesson to other countries, Spain had remained, up to the moment of the declaration of war, without the possession of independent telegraphic lines between Madrid and Havana. She had sustained for several years against the Cuban insurrection, a war openly favored by the Americans, and she had no other means of corresponding with Cuba than by American telegraph lines. Her official despatches and her secret instructions arrived at Havana by the lines which connect New York to Florida, after traversing the United States and the American cables of Florida. This imprudence strikes us to-day, after the events which they have revealed, and appears Incomprehensible. However, we must be indulgent to appreciate it; for other countries, among which France is found, are at the present hour just as improvident, and would be, in regard to their colonial possessions, in the same situation as Spain if war should be declared.
It was only at the moment when hostilities were openly declared against the United States—that is to say, at the eve of interruption of communications by way of the north of Cuba—that Spain undertook with some vigor the search for means of correspondence other and more sure than by American lines. It was far too late. It is not by improvised measures that the organization of a telegraphic service can be made for such, a great distance. The other lines which connect with Cuba without touching the United States, come by way of the south, land at Santiago de Cuba at soo kilometers from Havana. These lines were not prolonged to Havana except by land lines, already in the hands of the insurgents, and by cables submerged along the coast and consequently exposed to be cut. From day to day Havana could thus be isolated from Santiago, and Spain was menaced with having no telegraphic communication with the principal theater of war, where its colonial fortune was menaced.
What a difference in the procedure and in the situation on the side of the United States.
On the day that war was declared one of the first acts of the Government was to apply strict censorship on all telegraphic lines that could reach Cuba. The cables from Florida to Havana, belonging to an American company, were seized and controlled by the military. All the American stations where other lines touch even indirectly in communication with Cuba were equally occupied by military telegraphers. A complete prohibition was applied to the Spanish government despatches, to code and cipher despatches for the West Indies; finally, all written despatches having a tendency hostile to the United States. These first measures, rigorous as they were, appeared insufficient. The Americans wished to completely isolate Cuba by cutting all cables which land on the coast of the island, except the cables from Florida to Havana, which were already in their hands, and of which one raised on board of a ship of war put the squadron in charge of the blockade of Havana in communication with The Federal Government at Washington. Three ships were rapidly fitted out for cutting cables, the Mangrove, the Adria and the St. Louis. On the 21st of April, the day of the declaration of war, the Mangrove left Key West for the south of Cuba, with the order to destroy the cables which land at Santiago; that is to say, the English cables from Jamaica and the French cables from Haiti. The Adria and the St. Louis followed several days later, the St. Louis to aid in these operations, in the course of which these ships were always protected by the ironclads. Other ships were equally fitted with tools and special engines for breaking cables. In spite of this display of forces, during several weeks the attempts made were complete failures. The dragging done at some distance from the shore, remained without result. The Cuban coast presents this peculiarity common to all the Antilles, to descend from a peak to a great depth, in such a manner that at a very short distance from the beach a great depth of water is found. Dragging for cables is, therefore, difficult if they are not searched for at the shore ends. It was that, after numerous fruitless efforts, the Americans re solved to do, and even under these conditions they only obtained success by acts of audacity and by running very serious dangers.
On the 18th of May, the St. Louis, wishing to make a decisive effort to cut, in front of Santiago, the cables from Jamaica which it had uselessly hunted for at sea, commenced to drag for it at seven miles from the fire of Santiago. Little by little, not finding the cable, it approached to within a mile of the entrance of the harbor. At this point it grappled a cable, but at the same moment the fire of the Spanish forts began, and the operation became dangerous; the work was hastened; the cable was hoisted on board; it was cut and the ends hastily thrown into the sea. The St. Louis retired, well convinced that it had interrupted communications with Jamaica. The news was given to all the American press. It was a veritable exploit! It was announced at the same time that the French cable from Santiago had been cut near its landing on Haiti, and that, consequently, Cuba was completely isolated.
And the cable raised was only a piece of old cable abandoned in an ancient repair! This old cable, sunk under the sea for many years, hardly expected to see the light of day under such glorious circumstances. None of the telegraphic lines from Santiago had in reality been injured. As to the French cable, it was never touched on the Haitian coast.
Having recognized the negative results of the expedition attempted at Santiago, the Americans did not acknowledge themselves beaten. They wished to cut the cables which connected Santiago to Havana, in order to isolate General Blanco from all communication by the south, as he was already without communication by the north. These cables, which are developed along the south coast of Cuba, have several landing places. At one of these, Cienfuegos, an attempt at cable-cutting was made under conditions particularly daring.
Cienfuegos is situated within a land-locked bay which one enters by a narrow entrance three miles long. At the entrance of this canal there is a lighthouse on a hill 300 feet high, at the bottom of which runs a narrow sand beach. At a small distance from the lighthouse is erected the cable hut of the cable lines, visible from very far at sea. The American forces united before this point were composed of four ships of war. Two steam launches and two cutters were dropped into the water. Each of the cutters had a crew of sixteen armed men and was supplied with tools for cutting cables. The steam launches were to tow the cutters up to the shore, while the ships, placed at about a mile distance, would bombard the lighthouse and the cable hut.
The operation began at daybreak and was carried out rapidly. While the ships directed a very lively fire on the beach, the boats approached the landing within a distance of too feet from the cable hut, already nearly destroyed. The depth of the water was too great to grapple for the cables. To the great surprise of the Americans, the Spaniards did not open fire. The cutters approached to within a few meters of the shore till a depth of scarcely 20 feet was reached, where they grappled first the cable going towards the east in the direction of Santiago. It required 30 strong men from the two cutters to hoist the cable aboard. It was a shore-end cable, thick as the arm of a man, and the weight to be lifted out of the water seemed to be several tons. After putting it on board, it could be cut.
One of the ends, that which went to the cable hut, was thrown into the water. The other was hoisted for a length of about 150 feet, with the intention of carrying it on board of one of the ships to try to communicate with Santiago; but the weight was such that the boat nearly foundered, and it was necessary to rapidly make a new cut in order to throw the cable into the sea, keeping on about 100 feet.
All these operations were accomplished without the Spaniards having seriously opened fire on the Americans.
The same work was immediately undertaken on the other cable going in the direction of Havana. It was only about 6o feet from the shore that the cable was grappled; while the ships redoubled their fire, the shells being fired over the heads of the men working in the boats. The position, however, became dangerous, for the Spaniards commenced to fire vigorously on the Americans. Shot literally rained about the boats, and already several men were wounded. The cable was cut in the same manner as the other and thrown into the sea. In raising it in this small depth a third cable had been seen. The Americans wished to cut this also, and they had already put the grapples into the water to hook it, when the fire of the Spaniards became so lively that the operation had to be abandoned. The cutters were towed to the ships, having lost several men. The ships themselves had been seriously tried by the fire of the Spaniards, since the captain of one of them, the Nashville, had been wounded. But, by happy chance, the Americans had truly cut the two cables which connected Cienfuegos. The third cable which they had not been able to touch simply connected between the hut and Cienfuegos, and had no importance whatever.
The result of this dangerous operation was of capital value. The cutting of the cables of Cienfuegos completely isolated Havana, and completely deprived General Blanco of means of communication with Admiral Cervera. enclosed at this time in the harbor of Santiago.
But in spite of all these efforts, Santiago still remained in telegraphic communication with the outside world by the English cables from Jamaica and by the French cables from Haiti. It was not until the 7th of June that the French cable was finally cut. The news of the interruption was not incorrect this time. The cutting this time had also taken place near the landing end, and in shallow water, and after the bombardment of the coast the Americans had chased the Spaniards into the interior. The Americans landed troops, and it was at this time they commenced to occupy the environs of Santiago.
As to the English cable from Jamaica, it was landed in the mouth of Santiago harbor under the protection of the Spanish fort. It was not cut in spite of several efforts, of which the first produced the amusing error that has been related. All the draggings made in the open sea were made without any result, and as the landing could not be approached, it was impossible to cut the communication, which did not cease to act until the end of hostilities. It appears, however, to have been of very little utility to the Spaniards, and to have annoyed the Americans very little, who had succeeded in organizing under the direction of a man of great merit, Brig.-Gen. A. W. Greely, a remarkable service of surveillance on all the telegraph lines which could reach Cuba. This service was incontestably one of the features of the success of the Americans, who were powerfully aided by the confusion and discouragement thrown among their adversaries, thanks to the absence of news and exact knowledge.
In any case, a lesson is taught in a striking manner from this collection of facts; that is, that contrary to what has been heretofore supposed, the cutting of cables by improvised methods offers very great difficulties. The Americans brought to the work great resources and a considerable force, against a country poorly defended, and succeeded only in cutting some lines, at the expense of very great danger.
Just as easy as it is for a vessel, installed and provided with tools, and with a trained personnel, to pick up and repair a cable, whose position is exactly known, just so difficult is it and little practicable in time of war, to search for cables away from their landing places. It is only at these places that it is possible to arrive at any results; and the recital just made shows how dangerous these operations have been.
It seems, then, that the best plan of defense would be to keep secret the tracks of the cable laid, and to conceal the landing places, instead of making them conspicuous at a great distance by towers and beacons, as is done now. It seems also that it would be easy to select the landing sights in a manner to organize a defense there, which would render the approach dangerous in time of war.
Another lesson shown by the same facts; that is, the interest that telegraphic communications present in time of war. The isolation of Cuba from Spain and from other countries was the aim towards which the efforts of the Americans were first directed in the Spanish-American war. Their first movements were made for the purpose of cutting cables; they were not entirely successful, since the cables from Jamaica remained intact. But who can say that had the Spaniards been better informed of the progress of their own operations, and of the movements of the American forces, they would not have been able to make a longer resistance?
The role of the cable is accentuated, then, in a manner which should engross the attention of all nations. A nation with fleets to move and colonies to defend should possess, if it wishes to keep its rank, "coaling stations and telegraph cables." This is an axiom to-day. A brief outline of the progress made by this idea among maritime and colonial powers, our neighbors and our competitors, will, perhaps, be of some interest.
If in the midst of the weighty colonial problems which trouble a part of Europe, any country ought to be safe from the anxieties which the role of telegraphic cables can create in time of war, assuredly England is that country. We have seen that she possesses, through her cable companies, the largest part of the telegraphic network which furrows the seas; that she has in her hands, with this network of more than 155,350 miles, a means of real dominion over the entire world.
Nevertheless, she is not yet tranquil, because certain of her cables touch in some points of their line on foreign territory. She wishes—and it is well known what the English will is—a network of cables making their landings exclusively on British territory. It is a new expansion of her imperialism, which this time she wishes to extend to the depths of the ocean. One might believe it some odd fancy, if the idea of "imperial" cables was not effectually sustained in England by personages of the first rank, and if projects had not been formed which are in process of realization.
The English government decided some months ago that a subsidy of 500,000 francs should be added by the metropolis to the subsidies, reaching 1,000,000 given by Canada and Australia for the establishment of a trans-Pacific cable, starting from Vancouver, reaching Australia, going by way of Fanning and Norfolk Islands, rocks almost deserted, lost in the Pacific Ocean, but English rocks. This cable is destined to prolong by a line exclusively British the English cables of the north Atlantic and the Canadian lines. The technical study for the line is made. The execution will take eighteen months. Very recently, on the 19th of October last, a propos of this subject, Mr. Chamberlin, exclaimed to the House of Commons, that the direction of the new trans-Pacific line would be entrusted to a board of eight members, whose sittings will be held in London. The government will be represented in this board by three members, one the president; Canada by two, Australia and New Zealand by three. Canada has already designated Lord Aberdeen and Lord Strathmore. The Australian colonies and New Zealand will be represented by the General Agents of New South Wales, Victoria and New Zealand, and negotiations are going on between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Postmaster-General to select the representatives of the capital. This project, endowed, as one sees, with a patronage quite governmental, forms one part of the new imperial cable, which is to make a tour of the world.
The other part has gone beyond the state of a simple project, and has already begun, which consists in the establishment of a new line starting from the coast of England, touching at Gibraltar, at Bathurst, at Ascension and St. Helena, and finally at the Cape of Good Hope. From the Cape it goes to Mauritius, where there is a coal depot, and where they wish also to form a great telegraphic center. Finally from Mauritius, a cable will be laid to Australia and will close the circle with which they wish to envelop the world. The first section of this cable has just been sunk and opened to service between the Cape and the Island of Ascension, and in a few weeks it will be extended to Bathurst.
The outlay for this, second scheme, already so far advanced, will be some 125,000,000 francs, but that does not frighten our neighbors. One of the London papers says on this subject: "The sum of 125,000,000 francs demanded for this project would suffice to construct five battleships, but it must be understood that such a network of lines will offer the advantage of making every ship of war five times more powerful and more useful than it is at present." It must be supposed that after the establishment of this great line, England will see herself somewhat reassured and have a moment of tranquillity. But what a lesson for France this is, seeing that the importance of the role of cables in times of war disturbs even the country which possesses four-fifths of the telegraphic network in existence to-day.
Passing to the United States, who have just found out in practical experience with Spain the use which one could make of cables in time of war, it can be said that to-day the same desire to assure oneself of the possession of these means of attack and defense, and the manner in which this desire is manifest, one recognizes the common sense and forethought of these people for whom colonial politics is yet quite new. There is in fact a very striking lesson in the project presented before Congress since the 10th of February, 1899, for the laying of a trans-Pacific cable to connect the Philippines with the United States, even before the occupation had been made effective.
Taking action at once, the American government has already caused to be made, even before the action of Congress, a survey by a war vessel for the location of the route of this new cable. This work is already finished.
In their debut in colonial politics the United States shows by this project the far-sighted comprehension of those necessities which have for so long a time escaped us in France. We have had colonies for centuries. For 25 years we have conquered a vast colonial empire, and the greater part of our possessions are not yet even connected telegraphically to the mother country except by the most precarious means.
Another great nation is also preparing to take a place among the colonizing nations by the laying of a submarine telegraphic cable. Germany herself, notwithstanding her geographical situation, which gives her seacoast on the North Sea only, wishes to have cables which may be independent, and assure to her the security of her telegraphic correspondence, with the United States at least. She is about to carry out a project upon which our attention might well be directed for a moment. It is in effect of French origin and conception. It is a project which has been studied in France under the name of "Project of the Azores," and which has been abandoned. It has been taken up again to-day and is going to be realized from point to point by Germany. It consists in the establishment of new lines which will connect Germany to the Azore Archipelago, and the Azores to North America, and creating in the middle of the Atlantic, the telegraphic center that France should have herself established several years ago.
We have remarked, without doubt, the information published sometime ago by the American journals, announcing that Germany had obtained the authorization to land a cable on the coast of the United States. Equally we have read the friendly despatches which have been exchanged on this occasion between the German Emperor and President McKinley. Hence, this authorization and this exchange of telegrams had regard to this project. In 18 months, or two years at most, a trans-Atlantic cable will be laid between Germany and America, passing by the Azores. It will be established by a German company, with the support of the government, and the enterprise is placed, from the present moment, under the highest and most official of patronages. All these facts will show, if that is still necessary, the importance given in all maritime countries to the question of telegraphic cables.
It would be unjust if, after having indicated what other countries are doing, or wished to do, we passed over in silence what has been realized in France, to commence at least to guarantee our country against certain dangers.
Three years ago there only existed, as a French telegraphic enterprise, a little network of cables joining several of the Antilles among themselves and South America. Since then a single trans-Atlantic line between Brest and the United States without an assured end in America, depending consequently on the English and American companies, and almost entirely served by them.
In the course of these three last years an interesting effort has been made to break the circle of competing hostilities which have paralized, up to the present, all French enterprises of submarine telegraph.
A first cable has been established between Haiti and North America to join the lines of the Antilles to the trans-Atlantic cable which has just been landed at Brest. This trans-Atlantic cable has itself been duplicated by a new submarine line which connects Brest directly to New York. The new line is the longest which exists at present. It is more than 6000 kilometers; its construction and its laying have presented exceptional difficulties, and, for its beginning, French industry has accomplished a daring work, to which its competitors themselves render justice.
To-day a French telegraphic system works, with the resources of its own traffic, with the development of the lines which permitted it to reach North America, all the Antilles, and South America as far as Brazil. This telegraphic system comprises already 23,500 kilometers of cables. It reaches the third rank in importance and extent of line, and alone, at the present time, it is being developed in the face of the enormous monopoly of the English companies. Its point of attachment is Brest. Its employees and its direction are French, and it brings to correspondence with our American possessions the guarantees and the securities that we claim for all our colonial possessions.
Unhappily, it is not the same for Africa, for the east and the extreme east. Towards these regions our correspondence can be transmitted by French lines that only reach Marseilles for the east, or to Algiers or Oran for Africa. In this direction nothing has yet been undertaken and we have all to do.
We have seen that an active movement of ideas and projects is produced in all great maritime countries in favor of the creation of nets of cables. The events of the Spanish-American war have given a vigorous impulse to this movement. The more recent incidents of the war with the Transvaal mark more distinctly the point of danger in allowing to exist the British monopoly which weighs on all nations. France especially finds herself menaced and crippled if circumstances should lead her to sustain a war against England. The single idea that it will be impossible to correspond with her colonies and with her squadrons in he east and in Africa awakens a grave inquietude.
By what means can one modify this state of things? What measures is it possible to take? These questions appear to-day of a most pressing force. They have sprung suddenly to the front in the opinion which, surprised by the discovery of a new insufficiency in our means of defense, it is not far from accusing our public powers of want of foresight.
It is useless to take up again the history of efforts made during the last twenty years to produce a system of French telegraph. Except for the creation of lines which connect France to the United States and its American possessions, they have all lamentably failed, and furnish only one more proof of our ignorance to our own interests.
Some small cables have, however, been laid between Majunga and Mozambique for Madagascar, between Noumea and Australian coast for New Caledonia, between Saigon and Haiphong for Tonkin, between the Canaries and St. Louis for Senegal; finally between Obock and Perim Island for our possessions of the Red Sea. These small cables, of which the most important are exploited by the English companies—that we subsidized—all join the English lines and are in reality only simple annexes. We should all the more point out this situation since it is the result of a mistake which has, up to the present, dominated what we are pleased to call our policy of cables, and which still haunts certain minds. Simply to put off till to-morrow certain inevitable charges on the budget, if one has any care for the future of the country, they have preferred half-measures, so common in France, of placing at the four quarters of the globe little ends of cables to connect certain of our colonies to the general telegraphic network. They forget that this network belongs in fact to the English companies, to whom they have intrusted even the laying and the working of certain of these cables. These, happy for the gift, receive the French subsidies and draw all the benefit of the establishment of a telegraph in the new countries which we colonize. These bits of cables, distant one from the other, without connection between themselves, are, however, a heavy charge, and give no security to our correspondence, and leaves us always tributary to the English system.
It is then an erroneous and dangerous conception of the question of cables that it consists in creating little local lines for our colonies. The true conception, that which alone can lead to practical solution, is the creation of telegraphic systems grouping our colonial possessions by regions, and connecting them to the metropolis by cables independent of the English lines. This is the only means of having cable lines which can become productive at a given moment, and constructing them in such a manner that the telegraphic traffic created by the new line shall not be turned aside for the benefit of the English lines. It is the passage of this correspondence between our colonies and France that will furnish the enumeration of the new enterprise. It was foolish to abandon it to a rival enterprise. It is also on this condition alone that we will avoid English combination, and that we will have in our own hands an agent of information and of defense which is indispensible to us, above all in a moment when we have so many interests to watch in China, Siam, Madagascar, Morocco and all of Western Africa.
It seems, moreover, that we should in the present circumstances and for the future, look at the question of cables with a courageous broadness if we wish to solve it. There exists to-day a chasm in the armament of France for the defense of its interests in the countries beyond the sea; a chasm which it is necessary to close without loss of time, if we wish to be ready for certain menacing eventualities.
It is, hence, necessary to resolve to proceed by measures united, vigorous and rapid as we have done when the lacks and the weaknesses have been proved in our armaments, in the organization of our lines of railroads, and in the construction of our ships. It is at this price that we can regain the time so uselessly lost for several years. The study and the choice of a plan of which the execution will be followed with a continuity of views and of perseverance of which the English give us every day example, will be easy at the present time, for the lessons of the Spanish-American war and of the war in the Transvaal appear to have disposed the government, and public opinion itself, to give its attention and solicitude to this side.
Neither is it a question of the government engaging directly in the expenses of establishing these networks and of burdening the budget with the whole expenses. The intervention of private initiative could furnish in France, as it has in England, the means to realize these enterprises.
Only, it should be well understood, that new telegraphic networks, having no longer the choice of rich countries to serve, must be, at first, and for several years, political instruments, established with a view of defending an interest of general order for the country; they will become instruments of manufacture and of commerce, productive of sufficient resources to be self-supporting, only progressively, in proportion to the development of our colonies, and therefore of telegraphic traffic. Only after some years will they be able to do without the co-operation of the government. This co-operation, whether it is given under the form of subsidies as in England, or as simple guarantees, should be furnished in the beginning, under conditions liberal enough to at least secure the capital invested. The political interest whose importance can no longer be disputed would amply justify this. This interest is of the same nature as that which caused the grant of postal subsidies fifty years ago. To-day the telegraph completes the mail, precedes it in all distant relations; it is a means of indisputable influence, quite as much as its worthy predecessor, and may be called to play a role, active and useful, in the solution of questions which interest our future and our defense in countries beyond the sea. Why not now admit the idea of a liberal co-operation of the state in favor of telegraphic networks for the same reasons which made us inscribe the postal subsidies to the budget and keep them there?
To reassure timid minds, whom the disturbances of the equilibrium of our finances may trouble, let us hasten to say that the share of the state would be probably very far from reaching the figure of the subsidies now attributed to the postal service. More than that, in place of being permanent as the postal changes, they could be made reducible, and to disappear at the end of a fixed time, when, by the normal development of telegraphic communications, the network would have required assured resources of existence. It is our good fortune that these cable lines, demanded for our defense, correspond to economical and commercial needs of such importance that these needs alone would be sufficient in any country less timid than ours, to provoke their creation. The submarine telegraph is a new instrument of labor and progress, which enters into international life, and its application may have unlimited development. It is scarcely forty years ago since the first trans-Atlantic cable was open to service, and last year more than thirty millions of words were exchanged between Europe and North America. It is impossible to appreciate what the development may be in the next forty years, since its use increases every day. It will possibly reach eighty or one hundred million of words between the two continents. France should make herself ready to take her legitimate share of this wonderful expansion of telegraphy. Simply from an economical point of view, it is a new domain opening and inviting French activity, a domain which has already been explored. Great telegraphic enterprises have been established in other countries; in England, to radiate over the entire world and to control it; in Denmark. to serve the north of Europe and Asia. All have had laborious beginnings; yet to-day they have reached a state of powerful prosperity, shown by their annual receipts, exceeding $22,000,000 for the enterprises which have reached a normal development.
The geographical position of France, at the extremity of continental Europe, opposite America, with the seacoasts both on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, lends itself admirably to the creation of these enterprises. If we had a little boldness and perseverance we might have had several years ago cables joining us with our own colonies, as well as several trans-Atlantic cables, and the grand center of telegraphic exchanges between Europe and the rest of the world might perhaps have been Paris instead of London. Would there not be besides an interest in the role for France to take in the movement, which is manifest to-day in all countries, to free themselves from the telegraphic monopoly of England? To destroy this monopoly, to suppress the danger of it, it is sufficient that a non-English network be created to reach all the countries where Europe possesses interests.
It might perhaps be an act of wise and far-sighted policy to associate in this enterprise, in terms reconcilable with the needs of our defense, other countries, unable to have cables of their own, but wishing to escape from the dependence in which they find themselves. The international character thus given to the new network would be its best safeguard in time of war, and if in the future these networks multiply and form in their turn a new web at the bottom of the sea, inoffensive and peaceable, the most decisive step will have been taken towards the neutralization of cables.
Assuredly here is a work for emancipation and of progress of which France ought to take the initiative, and where she would find herself faithful to her ancient and historical traditions.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.
From International Revue, September, 1900. Translated by Lieutenant H. J. Ziegemeier, U. S. N.
In all spheres of industrial activity there are revolutionary changes, in technical as well as in the economical phenomena and the condition of affairs connected therewith; but in no branch is this assertion more justified than in the methods of communication on land and sea and the different industries depending thereon.
Whilst the railroads have revolutionized the communications on land, so also has the evolution of trans-oceanic communications between different countries been put under the dominion of the steamer. The utilization of steam as a motive power created new means of communication, which gave an unheard of development to the relation between countries, which in turn gave rise to technical inventions more and more perfected. This change and perfection in the means of communication at sea, merchant and passenger steamers, gave rise to a great impetus, especially in Germany, to the industry in general, but especially in the shipbuilding yards and naval dockyards as well as in the shipping industry and in the equipment of vessels.
Towards the end of the eighteenth and at the close of the nineteenth century the principal seat of the shipping industry was located on the Baltic Sea. Not only was there a flourishing maritime commerce during these centuries, but even during the Hanseatic time had the shipbuilding industry been installed. Passing over wretched politics which regulated naval construction, it took a considerable development, thanks to the immense quantity of timber in the neighboring countries; and, as far back as the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the prohibition of exporting ships having been abolished and the construction stimulated more than ever by the payment of bounties, the shipbuilders received foreign orders of some importance.
The stagnation of an economical existence in Germany towards the close of the eighteenth century and the formidable growth of error, practiced on marine construction corporations, aided by continental blockades, succeeded in severely shaking and almost in destroying this industry. And, when after the reforms in the interior of the country succeeding the wars for freedom, navigation received a new impetus, creating a great demand for ships, the. elasticity of this industry and the technical capacity which was in part checked showed itself scarcely able to meet the new exigencies.
While the shipowners of the Baltic Sea were left to carry on a sphere of activity by the navigation of the North Sea, especially since the beginning of emigration, and the more frequent trans-Atlantic voyages, the naval shipyards of the .Baltic, which at other times had provided foreigners with their productions, were not able to keep up with this new development.
Again the new sensations coming from England in the shape of iron-built ships it was affirmed with obstinacy: "Iron will not float." Moreover, what could be done with this antique method of building wooden ships, which the son had inherited from his father, who in turn had inherited it from his father, against these new mysterious constructions, requiring scientific calculations as to displacement of water, stability, etc.—and after the introduction of steam as a motive power—the locating of heavy pieces of machinery, of boilers, and the fitting up of immense spaces for coal-bunkers. In Germany there existed no means of preparation for this technical supervision. The school of naval construction, founded in 1830, at Grabow, near Stettin, had no capable professors; it was not until 1861, when a division of naval construction was added to the Royal Industrial Institution at Berlin, that Germany acquired a school for scientifically studying this new problem; a school as had existed for a generation in England, France and Denmark. It is not astonishing, then, that whilst Germany had to content herself in utilizing for the marine construction of iron, the experiences gained in the building of wooden ships, other countries, especially England, had made immense progress, and this owing to the natural resources of coal and iron, which were there side by side, and to the existence of one of the oldest iron industries, with a capacity of production almost without competition, with immense capital and a capacity of production that Germany attained with difficulty after a lapse of time.
Whilst England in 1843 had constructed the Great Britain, and in 1852 the Great Eastern—the new world wonder—the German shipyards had only built a side-wheel steamer for service on the Elbe River, and it was not until 1832 that the shipyard of Furchtenicht and Brock at Bredow, later the "Stettiner Vulkan," launched their first iron ship. It was only little by little that the other shipbuilding firms on the Oder and on the Vistula followed this example; for the fittings of a shipyard required space at that time considered immense, shops complete for the construction of ships, machinery, boilers, foundries, pattern shops, forges and repair shops, and above all, builders scientifically and commercially perfect and with capital.
An old sailing ship from 400 to 500 tons had only cost about 50,000 marks, of which the hull cost about 60 per cent and the equipment 40 per cent, including sails, cordage and English anchors; but modern ships of corresponding dimensions would cost from one to several million marks, whilst to-day the price of the new trans-Atlantic liners reaches 10, 12, and even 14 million marks, of which the hull costs about 4/10, the engines and boilers 5/10 and the equipment only 1/10.
From what precedes it is clearly seen that it was not until after 1873 that the German industry took root and prospered. Towards this time it received a great impulse by the demands for men-of-war. This proved in a way the maxim of Admiral Storch: "Without German naval construction there can be no German navy." Although already in 1869 the imperial shipyards at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven had undertaken the construction of ironclads, a number of private shipyards, "Vulkan" at Stettin, Schichau at Elbing, to which was added later "The Germania," showed an extraordinary activity in the construction of men-of-war; the good reputation of their products soon drew to the German shipyards numerous orders from foreign navies, the first of these being China. Little by little German naval construction learned to conquer all difficulties, so that in 1875 the factories at Dillingen were undertaking with success the manufacture of steel plates, so as to surpass even England In the production of mild steel. It was then also that that body of practical and theoretical engineers was formed which at the end of the century has carried German naval construction to the highest state of perfection.
This development made giant strides. German proprietors of merchantmen, who up to the present had been a little cautious and hesitating, having for a long time been in the habit of having their ships built in England, Scotland, on the Clyde, on the Tyne or on the Baltic, seeing these productions, no longer hesitated in giving their orders to German shipbuilders; especially in 1879, when the duty on all shipbuilding material was abolished, thus putting the German yards in a better state to compete in price with the English ones.
In 1882 the Hamburg-American Line ordered from "Vulkan" and from "Reicherstiegwerft" the large steamers Rugia and Rhaetia, and the "North German Lloyd Co." agreed hereafter to use only Germanbuilt vessels in their voyages in order to obtain the government subsidies.
"Vulkan," who had at the same time an order for six similar steamers, was better fitted for working on a colossal scale, having overcome the losses at first sustained, but losses which served as a lesson, and which enabled them in the future to fulfill all demands. In 1888 the first large trans-Atlantic liner, Augusta Victoria, was launched, followed soon after by the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, thus being able to boast of a production which did not even have its equal in England. The construction and lengthening of three steamers to be subsidized, executed by the firm of Blohm and Voss furnished another proof that German naval construction had likewise reached perfection in the merchant marine construction.
The construction of men-of-war had made equally rapid progress, thanks to the orders for four armorclads of the Brandenburg type and the large cruiser Kaiserin Augusta. The nickel-steel plates produced by Krupp in 1894 furnished an armament that no industry outside of Germany could produce. In the construction of torpedo-boats the firm of Schichau reached a high degree of perfection. The torpedo-boat chasers constructed in 1895 for the Chinese navy attained a speed of 35.2 knots, fulfilling all anticipations.
But it was on the loth of January, 1900, that the German marine celebrated its greatest triumph, and where it entered boldly into a new epoch; on that day the steamer Deutschland was launched; the dimensions of this vessel are: displacement, 23,000 tons; length, 202 meters. This vessel has 33,000 horse-power and is one of the fastest in the world, and capable of carrying 1320 cabin passengers.
The industrial activity has increased likewise. Owing to the immense developments in the shipyards and dry docks, Germany, which as late as 1890 was getting three-fifths of her ships from England, is in condition to build nearly all the ships for which she has need. In 1898 the importation from foreign markets had fallen off one-third. More than 16 per cent of all the new constructions were for foreign orders.
The German shipyards during 1899 furnished in all 468 ships complete, aggregating a total of 250,000 tons; one-eighth more than in 1898, without counting 250,000 tons in different stages of completion. Among these ships completed, 87 were of 500 tons and over, and 87 per cent of all being steamers. For the navy there were only 5 of this number, 6 per cent as against 18 per cent for the preceding year.
In 10 years the output of German naval construction has doubled, being in 1889, £30,000 tons steamers and 20,000 tons sailing ships.
The consumption of iron has likewise increased from 45,000 tons in 1890 to 85,500 tons in 1899.
The proportion of German shipbuilding to the entire world's output has a little more than doubled itself, being 13 per cent to-day, whilst England's proportion has fallen from 81 per cent to 75 per cent.
There are employed to-day in the German shipyards about 38,000 workmen, and adding to this number those working on the necessary accessories—steel, iron, wood, etc.—the number is about 50,000.
Outside of the three imperial shipyards there are 39 large plants for the construction of vessels, 14 stock companies and 25 private shipyards, representing an actual capital of Ho millions. Five of these shipyards are equipped for the construction of first-class men-of-war, 9 can build cruisers, 4 or 5 are in condition to undertake the construction of large trans-Atlantic liners, and 14 can construct first-class passenger ships.
Thanks to its naval construction industry, Germany is able to furnish all the means of transportation that her maritime interests may require, and this not only in a very able way, but also in a most enterprising manner, which can resist the tempests that a coming generation could stir up.
In English naval construction, on the contrary, there has been a remarkable decrease during the last three months. Whilst the total tonnage of ships launched in 1899 was 1,414,000, giving a mean of 360,000 tons for three months, during the first three months of 1900 only 245,000 tons were launched. At the beginning of the year there were 1,260,000 tons in process of construction as against 1,385,000 tons at the beginning of 1899.
The English press actually tried to find the cause of this remarkable phenomena. One particular English journal believes that the actual price of new constructions is too high to give the necessary profits to the shipowners.
To this must be added the advance in cost of coal. Nearly all the steamship companies are complaining at the price demanded for coal, and this circumstance very often offsets the other improvements produced in commercial relations.
It is quite possible that these circumstances have contributed to diminish the desire of English shipowners of having any more ships built than the actual need at present requires; but it can well be believed that there may be other reasons. Besides these unfavorable conjectures about the times, the competition which increases from year to year, and in which, as we have seen above, Germany takes so active and brilliant a part, has contributed to this decrease, which the United Kingdom has had to take notice of during the last three months.
REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.
The report of Rear-Admiral O'Neil, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, states that satisfactory progress has been made in the manufacture of the new long-caliber guns with which our latest battleships and cruisers are being armed; it also shows that the important work of converting the old slow-firing weapons to rapid-fire guns is being carried through as fast as the capacity of the gun shop at Washington will allow.
During the year the last of the 13-inch guns ordered, making thirty-four in all of that caliber, has been completed, while of the twenty 12-inch guns of the new 40-caliber pattern ordered for the ships of the Maine and Arkansas class, one has been tested at the proving-grounds and has given admirable results. The test showed that this weapon is the most Powerful of its type in the world, for under a powder-chamber pressure of only 16 ½ tons, a velocity of 2854 feet per second was developed, with an equivalent muzzle energy of 47,994 foot-tons. The power of this gun is shown by comparison with the 12-inch gun of the Iowa, which with brown powder has a muzzle velocity of 2100 foot-seconds and a muzzle energy of only 26,000 foot-tons; or with the 13-inch gun of the Kearsarge, which with smokeless powder develops an energy of some 2000 or 3000 foot-tons less than the new weapon. Our new ships of the Maine and all later types will unquestionably be armed with the most powerful 12-inch rifle in the world.
EIGHT-INCH GUN.—The mention in the report of the 8-inch nickelsteel gun, 35 calibers long, which has been fitted with a new conical breech mechanism, calls to mind the late lamented Lieutenant F. J. Haeseler, who, like the late Lieutenant Dashiell, was one of the most promising of our young ordnance officers. The breech mechanism of the 8-inch gun mentioned was designed by the former officer. The threads of the plug are continuous and wind about a conical breech block. There are no slotted-out spaces, as in the cylindrical block, and its conical form enables the block to be swung on its hinge immediately into position, a single pull of the lever closing the block, turning the plug 225°, and engaging the thread throughout its whole length. Remarkable results for velocity of fire were shown by this gun at its trial. Beginning with the gun loaded, a rate of fire was obtained of six unaimed Shots per minute.
SEVEN-INCH GUN.—We note with satisfaction that a set of forgings for a 7-inch experimental gun of 45 calibers has been delivered at the naval gun factory. The call for a gun intermediate in weight and power between the 8-inch and the 6-inch is occasioned by the wonderful improvement in armor due to the introduction of the Krupp process. Time was when the 6-inch gun was more than a match for the light armor carried by the cruiser class; but to-day it is questionable whether the 6-inch shell, even when fired from guns of the highest velocity, will have, at the ordinary fighting ranges, sufficient penetrative power to get through the Krupp plates of the modern cruiser. The 7-inch or 7 2-inch gun combines something of the penetrative power of the 8-inch with much of the handiness of the 6-inch weapon, and we confidently look to see it adopted as one of the standard guns of the navy.
SIX-INCH GUNs.—An experimental 6-inch gun of 46 calibers has been tested, and with a chamber pressure of half a ton more than the 12-inch gun, or 17 tons to the inch, has developed a muzzle velocity of over 3000 feet per second. The new guns of the battleship Maine and all later ships are to be 50 calibers long, and this increased length will no doubt enable them to secure the same velocity with a chamber pressure considerably below the specified regulation pressure. These results are, if anything, more creditable than those achieved with the 12-inch gun; for the muzzle energy corresponding to 3000 foot-seconds is over 600o foot-tons. The muzzle energy of our early 6-inch guns is only 2773 foot tons, so that the introduction of its own special powder and improved methods of construction have enabled our Ordnance Bureau to more than double the striking energy of this caliber of weapon.
Good progress has been made with the new 50-caliber guns of 5-inch, 4-inch and 3-inch caliber, and the present indications are that the armament of the many new vessels under construction will keep pace with the progress of the ships themselves.
A most valuable work of reconstruction, of which but little is known, is the task of converting the old slow-firing guns of the earlier ships of our navy to rapid-fire guns, thereby enormously increasing their efficiency. During the year twenty-five 6-inch, 30 caliber guns have been converted, making a total of eighty of this class which have been thus improved, while four 8-inch, 30 caliber guns which were removed from the Chicago to make way for a more modern type have been fitted with new and improved breech mechanism. The time is approaching when the batteries of every ship in the navy will be of the rapid-fire type.
As was recently mentioned in these columns, the Bureau has been successful in securing satisfactory contracts for the armor required for the three battleships of the Maine class, the five battleships of the Pennsylvania and Virginia classes, the six armored cruisers of the West Virginia class and for the three protected cruisers of the Milwaukee class. It is highly gratifying to learn from the report before us that the ballistic qualities of the Krupp plates which have been made by the Carnegie and Bethlehem companies for Russia show that the armor-makers of this country are capable of reaching the highest standard in the manufacture of face-hardened armor.—Scientific American, Dec. 22, 1900.
THE BRITISH NAVY.
On Tuesday the official list of the ships ordered to be commenced was published. It represents an addition of two battleships, six armored cruisers, two second-class cruisers, and a couple of sloops, to the British navy. The battleships are the Queen, to be built at Devonport; and the Prince of Wales, at Chatham. The armored cruisers are the Cornwall, to be built at Pembroke; the Suffolk, at Portsmouth. Orders for the remaining four have been given to private firms. The Berwick will be built by Beardmore & Co., Limited; the Cumberland, by the London & Glasgow Shipbuilding Company, Limited; the Donegal, by the Fairfield Shipbuilding Company, Limited; and the Lancaster, by Armstrong, Mitchell & Co., Limited. The two second-class cruisers will be built in government yards—the Challenger at Chatham and the Encounter at Devonport. The Odin and Merlin sloops will be built at Sheerness. In another page will be found detailed information about the contracts.
While we have in mind the very considerable additions to our naval strength which are being made, and particulars concerning which have already appeared in our columns, we regard the programme of construction just commenced as altogether inadequate to the requirements of the country. The British realm advances in dimensions by leaps and hounds. The growth of the population of the Queen's dominions augments rapidly. The bond between our colonies and the mother country has been drawn closer and closer. These and other considerations emphasize the responsibilities of the government; and accentuate the importance of the command of the seas. We want more ships of all kinds. It is a vain thing to dispute concerning this type or that type. We need ships of every type that is likely to be serviceable. We have no sympathy with hysterical pessimists who run about crying ruin, and denouncing our naval policy; but we have nothing to say on the other hand in favor of those who hold that our navy is quite strong enough. It could only fulfill this condition if our neighbors rested content to let their naval dockyards lie idle. Our existing navy would only suffice if the wealth of our colonies and the limits of our dominion remained fixed. The expansion of the empire must needs be accompanied by the development of the forces by which alone that empire remains ours. It is not necessary even to take count of territory added to our possessions. The increase in wealth is ample reason for the taking of unparalleled precautions to secure it. A Liverpool or a Sydney, poverty stricken, would hold out small temptations for aggression. As they are, Blucher's words when he saw London, may be remembered, "Himmel; what a city to sack!"
It seems to have been admitted by Mr. Goschen and the Government last session that additions to the navy were desirable, but that they could not be made; because, in the first place, all the government yards were full. Secondly, because private firms were too busy to accept orders. Thirdly, because armor-plates could not be had in time. The fallacy of every one of these statements has been demonstrated; at the most they represented half-truths. The precise reason why more ships were not laid down will probably remain a Whitehall secret. Various hypotheses were framed to explain Mr. Goschen's policy. It has been said that no designs for ships were ready; that the Admiralty could not make up its mind how to spend money. On another hypothesis, the ships were not ordered because there were no crews to be had to man them. Lastly, it was urged that such a dearth of officers—and particularly engineer officers—existed that it would have been quite useless to build more ships, because they could not be put in commission. It is noteworthy, however, that in all this storm of surmise and censure, no one ventured to hint that Parliament would not vote the necessary supplies. In point of fact, if an adequate programme were declared when Parliament meets, and the Admiralty asked for £10,000,000 a year for the next five years, the money would be voted without a dissenting voice, save, perhaps, the petulant wailing of the few "Little Englanders" who have found their way into Parliament, and there serve the same useful purpose as the traditional " Frightful Example" at temperance meetings. It is, however, not to be disputed that confidence in the Admiralty has been somewhat shaken; and with every desire to allow for difficulties, we are by no means certain that ten millions would be spent to the best advantage under the existing system.
There is such a thing as a paper fleet, and there are critics—competent critics too—who do not hesitate to say that there is rather too much paper about our fleets. It is useless to possess ships which cannot fight. Unfortunately not a few ships, and these among the latest additions to our navy, have been in plain phrase failures so far. While the Boiler Committee is pursuing its labors, we do not propose to criticise Belleville boilers. But committee or no committee, we cannot shut our eyes, and we do not want to shut our eyes to unpleasant facts. The Europa, a new and so-called first-class cruiser, has been disabled by one voyage to Australia and back, and is now under repair. The Hermes after a disastrous experience is now lying in Bermuda. The Pegasus was disabled after an eighteen months' commission. The Powerful is undergoing heavy repairs at Portsmouth. The difficulties with the Terrible and Highflyer no longer excite attention. The Diadem, the Argonaut, and the Arrogant have all proved unsatisfactory; and all this while our battleships with Scotch boilers keep the sea and do good service. Nor is it the boilers alone which are open to criticism. It seems to be by no means certain that the machinery is not also in fault. When we read of the enormous consumption of steam by auxiliaries, we fancy that old times have returned when six pounds of coal per indicated horse-power per hour was a thing to boast of as representing great economy. Again. it would seem that there is not a cruiser afloat which has a properly made condenser. Nor does the matter end here. In naval circles it is held that we have many fighting ships which would be wholly impossible in action; that, in fact, they would be blown to pieces in five minutes by modern vessels. Care must be taken that nothing of the kind finds its way into the new programme; and it should not be forgotten that the enormous improvement which has been effected in armor, making a 5-inch plate at least as good as one of the older kind of twice that thickness, has given the naval designer scope for providing protection in a way hitherto unknown. It may, however, be assumed that all these points will be fully considered by the Admiralty. But it is once more necessary, we think, to urge the folly of providing Belleville boilers in ever increasing numbers. The last discovery is that if only lime enough is put into them they will no longer give trouble. In a few months it will also be discovered that there is nothing at all new in the use of lime; that it may well prove a remedy worse than the disease; and that it will quickly drop out of use again. In the providing of boilers we counsel patience. It will be well to wait until the report of the committee is laid on the Admiralty table.—The Engineer, Nov. 2, 1900.
TURBINE STEAM ENGINES.
A discussion of some interest has recently taken place between Mr. Parsons and Mr. Thornycroft concerning the relative merits of the Viper, which has attained a speed of 36.858 knots, with turbine engines, and the Albatross, constructed by Messrs. Thornycroft & Co., which has a speed of about 31 knots. It appears that at less than full speed the turbine is not economical, and in practice it is found that while one ton of coal will take the Albatross 22.6 knots, the same quantity will take the Viper a little less than 12 knots, the speed in both cases being 15 knots. For the moment we are not concerned with that branch of the controversy which deals with the merits and demerits of these boats for fighting purposes. It may be argued that, as torpedo destroyers are after all not well fitted for cruising, one with a very high speed for a spurt must be better than the slower boat which can keep the sea longer. Our purpose now is to consider why the turbine engines should be less economical at slow than at high speeds.
In its construction the steam turbine closely resembles the water turbine. There are vanes which move and guide blades which remain at rest. It is important to bear in mind that in both these machines there is at all times a clear passage right through the wheels. There is nothing to arrest the flow of either water or steam through them. The effect of this is that if we block a water turbine so that it cannot revolve, nearly as much water will flow through it as if it was at work. If we block the revolving drums of a Parsons turbine the steam will flow through, almost as fast as if it was revolving. If we take the water turbine and examine it when blocked, with the water passing through it, it will be seen that the water leaves it at about the same velocity with which it entered it. When revolving it leaves it at a much smaller velocity. In some turbines the quantity which can be passed through the blocked wheel is actually greater than that which will pass when the wheel is working. Precisely the same statements hold good of the steam turbine. Theoretically a perfect water turbine would deliver the water at no velocity; of course, such a condition is a practical impossibility. Without touching on the mathematics of the subject, which are of small practical value for our present purpose, it may be said that there is a velocity for the rotating wheel which is better than any other velocity, higher or lower. The greater the head, the faster must the turbines run, and, broadly speaking, it may be said that the best economical result is obtained when the velocity in feet per minute of the revolving wheel is about one-half that of the water. Now, in the steam turbine there is a speed which bears a close relation to the maximum efficiency, and this speed is very high. In order to make the facts clear, we may use a simple illustration. Let us suppose a number of balls to fall from a height on a movable inclined plane. The balls move vertically. If, now, the inclined plane is drawn back, base first, sufficiently fast, the balls will continue to move vertically, and will exert no pressure on the plane. If, on the other hand, the plane is held fast, then the balls will exert an effort on the Plane, tending to drive it back, and they will themselves be deflected toward the toe of the plane and will roll down it. The problem is to take as much as can be taken out of the balls in the shape of the driving effect on the plane; and to this end the plane must move at a speed which bears a definite relation to its angle of inclination and the paths of the balls. We may with strict propriety consider that steam as made up of myriads of little balls moving at a very high velocity, and the inclined planes, or their equivalent the vanes of the Parsons turbine, must also move at a very high velocity in order that the vis viva of the steam may be transformed into torque energy with the least waste. In the steam dynamo there is a constant reversal of the direction of the current, but with this we need not further concern ourselves. In any case, the steam must escape with some remaining velocity and momentum, and this is waste. If the machine runs too slowly, steam will to all intents and purposes pass through it without doing any work. On the other hand, if it runs too fast, the steam will again flow through it without doing any work. We come back to the starting point. There is a velocity which is better than any other, and, indeed, so much better that any departure from it is productive of great loss of efficiency. As the speed depends on the velocity with which the steam moves, it may be thought that by reducing the pressure of the steam, and thereby its velocity, less power can be got without loss. This is no doubt true to a certain extent; but it cannot do much in practice, because the velocity of flow of steam does not vary directly as the pressure, but as given by the formula, v = 3.59531/h, where v = the velocity of outflow in feet per minute for steam of the initial density, and lithe height in feet of a column of steam necessary to give the pressure. To illustrate the bearing of this formula on the question discussed, we may say that, according to Brownlees' classical experiments, while steam of an absolute pressure of 30 lbs. on the square inch flows into the atmosphere at a velocity of 1401 feet per second, steam of ioo lbs. pressure has a velocity of 1459 feet per second. From which it will be gathered that the speed at which a turbine is most efficient is very little affected by the boiler pressure. In other words, the low-pressure turbine will have to run nearly as fast as the highpressure turbine. Certain conditions modifying this come into play, no doubt, but the fact remains unaltered, that any considerable departure from the speed of maximum efficiency results in a greatly increased consumption of steam. This is one principal difference between the engine built by Mr. Parsons and that made by Mr. Thornycroft. Lastly, in this connection we may say that the comparatively moderate consumption of steam in the Parsons engine-2o lbs. or so per brake horsepower per hour—is due to the way in which the steam is used, because of which initial condensation is reduced to a very small amount. In a word, steam remains steam in the Parsons engine to a greater extent than it does in the reciprocating engine.
So far we have only dealt with the turbine engine as an engine. We have now to consider its efficiency when combined with a screw propeller. It will be readily understood from what we have said that the velocity of the moving vanes in feet per second must be very high. In the United States many patents have been taken out for engines in which a moderate speed of rotation is combined with a high angular velocity of vane, by making the diameter of the wheel large. But this cannot be done in torpedo destroyers with moderate draught, say 7 feet. The result is that the rate of rotation of the screws reaches 2500 to 3000 revolutions per minute. The compulsory result is that the pitch of the screw must be extremely fine. But a fine pitch always means that the surface velocity of the screw must be very high if the boat's speed is high; and another direct consequence is that the loss of power due to the surface friction in the water of the propeller is great. Here, again, we have the peculiar case of a certain velocity of maximum efficiency, to say nothing about cavitation or a cutting of a partial vacuum, so to speak, in the water. We have a speed, and surface, and pitch, which are better than any others; and it is admitted very readily by Mr. Parsons that the surface or blade area of screw which is correct for the maximum speed of boat is much too large for low speeds. It is well known that for all steamships there is a speed of engines and ships which is more economical than any other speed, but with reciprocating engines running at moderate speeds—anywhere, that is to say, between 60 revolutions for a tramp and 300 revolutions for a torpedo destroyer, there are wide margins, variations within which will very little affect the result. Thus, for example, a torpedo destroyer running at 10 knots, will probably burn less coal per horse per hour than will be used when she is running at 20 knots, and a good deal less than when she is running at 30 knots, but even then the differences are not large. With the turbine, however, the case is different. With such a boat as the Viper it is all or nothing. At extreme speed she may beat the reciprocating engine also at extreme speed in steam consumption per horse per hour; but at any other speed the turbine loses, and at half-speed or thereabouts economy goes to Pieces. Not only is the engine wrong, but the propellers are wrong. We do not for a moment contend that this fact is one greatly to the detriment of the turbine engine. Nothing of the kind. The only effect that a fixed and extremely contracted relation between speed and economical efficiency has is that it narrows the limits of application of the turbine engine. Such an engine, for example, might be in every way satisfactory for steamers running between Dover and Calais; Holyhead and Dublin, or even between Liverpool and New York, while they would be wholly unfit for a man-of-war. In the first cases the speeds are always the maximum practically possible, and there would be no difficulty in designing engines to suit. In the navy the speeds are wholly various. and for various speeds the turbine steam engine is not suited. It must not be forgotten, again, that in a large vessel there would be room for turbines of considerable diameter, and so the velocity of rotation of the screw might be fairly moderate. All things considered, we think it by no means improbable that the turbine steam engine will be largely adopted in the mercantile marine for special high-speed services of the ferry type, such as the Atlantic passenger trade, but for warships it is wholly unsuited, the success of the Viper to the contrary notwithstanding, because she is not a warship.—The Engineer, Oct. 26, 1900.
MARCONI'S LATEST DEVELOPMENTSSYNCHRONIZED MESSAGES.
At the annual gathering of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1899, Prof. Fleming of University College, London, addressed the gathering upon Wireless Telegraphy, and incidentally mentioned that while transmitting messages from Boulogne to Dover they were read at Chelmsford, some 118 miles from the point of transmission. This, undoubtedly, was a remarkable performance, but it also emphasized very forcibly one drawback which has long occupied the unremitting attention of Marconi. That is, the possibility of one or more stations reading a message intended for another. Such a circumstance naturally destroys the privacy of the message, and although it is not a very significant matter in the ordinary way, yet it would be a very serious drawback, in case of war, for one belligerent to be able to intercept and to read a message that was being transmitted between the vessels of the other belligerent. Marconi quickly realized the serious nature of this disadvantage, and at his station at Poole, in Dorsetshire, England, he has been endeavoring for a long time past to successfully synchronize his messages; that is, to construct a transmitter, the message from which can only be received by the apparatus which has been tuned to receive it.
He has successfully solved the problem, by means of variable conductors and capacities, by the use of which certain instruments can only receive certain messages. By his latest system, Marconi can dispatch from a certain point any number of messages, and each message will be received only by that receiver that has been synchronized to the transmitter, so that jamming of words and confusion of messages upon the various receivers are obviated.
Marconi has set up his station at Poole because that place is so remote and he is safe from interruption. Twenty odd miles away across the Solent is another station at the southwestern corner of the Isle of Wight. Between these two points messages are being transmitted throughout the day, almost without cessation, and this is how several important discoveries and improvements have been made by the inventor. While experimenting with his synchronizing system, Marconi had several opportunities of proving the capabilities of his device. At Portsmouth the English Admiralty were carrying out experiments with wireless telegraphy in connection with the fleet, and naturally several of these ether waves crossed Marconi's line of transmission between Poole and the Isle of Wight, the effects of which upon his instruments the inventor regarded with the utmost satisfaction, since they proved that he had finally surmounted the most perplexing disadvantage of his system.
Marconi has also made some other important discoveries. He now utilizes cylindrical tin cans, about five feet in height, in lieu of the vertical wires, since they furnish more convenient capacities and radiators. He is lengthening the distance over which messages may be transmitted, and although his experiments at Poole can be conducted only on a limited scale, yet he is confident that when he works upon a larger station they will be equally successful, and there is no doubt but that many important developments in ether telegraphy will be divulged in the near future.
At the present moment Marconi has a sufficiency of work on hand. The North German Lloyd Steamship Company are having one of his systems installed at Berkum (Germany), to be used in connection with their fleet of vessels. Apropos of this, Marconi has been carrying out many experiments with a view to applying the system practically to shipping, so that greater safety may be assured to vessels at sea. Then the International Company of France are having the coast of that country, metaphorically speaking, lined with his installations, so that communication may be maintained between the vessels of the French navy and any point of the mainland, which would play an important part in case of a war between England and France, since by this means the latter nation could manipulate their troops according to the information received from their battleships, and thus be able to work the land and sea forces hand in hand. Then six stations are being set up in the Hawaiian Islands and will soon be in working order. Many vessels in the English navy are also having the system installed.—Scientific American, Sept. 8, 1900.
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN FRANCE.
The constructions to be carried out by the French government during 1901 comprise Hi vessels, and among these figure the battleship Iena, which is already in service, and is only down on the programme to account for a balance to be paid next year. Two submarine boats, the Francais and Algerien, are completed, and will shortly be launched, and three squadron and six coast-defense torpedo-boats will also soon be finished, so that they cannot properly be included in the programme for 1901. Excluding these, there are four battleships, fifteen armored cruisers, a first-class cruiser, twenty-four destroyers, fifteen submarine boats, seven squadron torpedo-boats, thirty-two torpedo-boats, and the unfortunate aviso-transport above mentioned. Of the battleships, the Henri IV and the Suffren, which have been built at Cherbourg and Brest respectively, have been launched, and their armaments will be completed six months hence. Two other battleships will be put on the stocks as soon as the grant voted by the Chamber is ratified by the Senate. One is to be constructed at Brest and the other in a private shipyard. These will be another addition to the multifarious types already existing in the French navy, and were proposed by the Commission of the Marine and introduced by the Minister, who was strongly supported by the naval deputies. The Chamber had so long shown an uncompromising antagonism to battleships, that the approval of the government scheme was a victory for the old school. Each of the battleships will have a displacement of 14,865 tons, and the engines will develop 14,475 horse-power. The maximum speed is to be 18 knots, and steaming at 10 knots the ships will have a range of action of 8930 miles. The armament will be composed of four heavy guns, eighteen guns of medium caliber, and twenty-eight small guns, as well as five torpedo-tubes. Of the fifteen armored cruisers, fourteen are on the stocks, and the Jeanne d'Arc, of 11,270 tons, will be entirely completed next year. The Montcalm, now building at La Seync, will also be finished in 1901. This vessel has a displacement of 9517 tons—the same as the Gueydon and Dupetit-Thouars, which will be launched in 1902. Five other armored cruisers, the Marseillaise, Gloire, Conde, Amiral Aube, and Sully, have each a displacement of 10,014 tons. The two first named will be finished in 1902. and the others in the following year. The Desaix, Dupleix and Kleber, each of 7700 tons, are built partly of wood, and are intended for service in the tropics. All three will be launched in 1902. The Leon Gambetta and Jules Ferry are new types of armored cruisers, with a displacement of 12,550 tons and with engines of 27,500 horse-power, and are expected to attain a speed of 22 knots. These vessels were put on the stocks this year. Two others of the same type will start building at Toulon next year. The Jurien-de-la-Graviere is a protected cruiser of a type which has been abandoned.
The government has given up the construction of small torpedo-boats, but is turning its attention to boats of a larger tonnage, as well as destroyers, which form an important factor of the new programme. Fourteen destroyers are on the stocks, and ten others will be started ttrion next year. So far all the destroyers have been built in private yards, but Rochefort is beginning to give a great deal of attention to them, and orders for ten destroyers have recently been placed at the government shipyard. Three of these will be completed next year, and the remainder in 19o2. Rochefort is to receive orders for two new destroyers. Two others have been put on the stocks at Havre this year, and fourteen are to be ordered from private shipbuilders. The destroyers are taking the place of the squadron torpedo-boats, which are found to lack sufficient sea-going qualities, and it is not likely that any more will be built after the seven now under construction at Havre and Bordeaux have been delivered. Three others mentioned in the programme are already completed. Of the thirty-eight first-class torpedo-boats, two are building at Cherbourg, two at Toulon, and two at Saigon. Private yards have already delivered eleven boats, including a turbine boat, the Libellule, and have ten under construction, while eleven others will be put on the stocks next year. In submarine boats the French navy is not likely to belie its traditions with respect to multiplicity of types, for in its haste to get a submarine fleet the government orders vessels of any type which seems to give fairly satisfactory results. The process of weeding will doubtless take place later on, when experience has shown what are exactly the limitations of the new boat, and under what conditions it can reasonably be expected to be of service. Seventeen submarine boats are provided for in the programme, and eight others will probably be ordered next year, these being all constructed in the government shipyards. All these vessels are more or less experimental, and French naval critics are by no means satisfied yet as to their efficiency.—The Engineer, Oct. 19, 1900.
ARMOR-PLATE TRIALS.
It is perhaps scarcely necessary to state that it has always been a difficult matter, even under old conditions, to meet the high standard armor-plate requirements of the British Admiralty; but since the advent of Krupp armor the task of meeting requirements has been rendered still more severe. To enable them successfully to overcome these difficulties, Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., have from time to time carried out various experiments on lines laid down by themselves with the object of producing armor-plates of the highest quality. Early on in the year they were in a position to submit to the Admiralty two 6-inch plates, produced at their Manchester works by a special process of their own. On July 3 these plates were placed under official preliminary trials at the government testing station on Whale Island, Portsmouth. These plates were of the normal size for trial purposes, viz., 8 feet by 6 feet and 6 inches thick, and were installed in the frames provided in the proof cells Resistance and Thundered. The trials were conducted under the superintendence of Captain W. H. May, of the Excellent, and Lieutenant S. R. Drury-Lowe, R. N., whilst the Admiralty was represented by Lieutenant G. P. Hope, for the Director of Naval Ordnance, and Mr. W. E. Smith for the Constructors' Department. Mr. Saxton Noble (Director) was also present on behalf of Elswick, and Mr. J. M. Gledhill for the Openshaw works. Five shots were fired at each plate with Holtzer armorpiercing shell at the velocities laid down for this thickness of plate in cemented steel. Both plates defeated all the projectiles, and were pronounced as satisfying in every respect the service requirements.
The table given is copied from the official report of he trials.—The Engineer, Oct. 5, 1900.
THE COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE KRUPP, ARMSTRONG AND SCHNEIDER-CANET GUNS.
In determining the relative efficiency of modern guns there are many elements to be taken into consideration, particularly in the case of weapons which are intended for naval service, where velocities are usually much higher than those common in weapons for field service. A comparison of relative efficiency must take note of all ballistic features. As a matter of fact, the methods of designation used are apt to be misleading, for the reason that they make too much of certain elements of efficiency, and too little of others. Thus, we find that, popularly speaking, it has become the fashion to quote the muzzle velocity of a gun in preference to any other of its ballistic capibilities. If the public hears that a gun of a certain caliber is capable of a muzzle velocity of 3000 feet per second, as against velocities of 2600 or 2800 feet per second in other guns of the same caliber, it is apt to consider that the high-velocity weapon is incontestably the most effective. This superiority, however, by no means follows; for the mere statement of the muzzle velocity, unaccompanied by any statement of the weight of the shell to which such velocity is imparted, conveys no information as to the actual hitting power of the gun. Then again the relative efficiency may further be modified by a statement of the weight of the gun itself, for it is evident again that if two guns, one of which is considerably lighter than the other, show the same muzzle energy, the lighter gun is ton for ton a much more effective weapon. A further modification is introduced when the question of the "remaining velocity and energy " is introduced; for although a light projectile, issuing from the muzzle of a gun at an extremely high velocity, may have the same muzzle energy as a heavier projectile with a lower muzzle velocity, the lighter projectile will lose its velocity far more rapidly as the range is covered, and what is known as the "remaining velocity and energy" of the heavier shell will be relatively greater, the greater the distance that is covered. It is mainly for this reason that many of our naval officers regret to see the 13-inch guns displaced by the 12-inch, the hitting power of the 13-inch shell at long ranges being considerably greater than that of the lighter 12-inch shell.
In determining upon the armament of their navy, the Germans have evidently been governed by this consideration; for it is a fact that the Krupp guns, with which their ships are armed, fire projectiles which are considerably heavier for any given size of gun than those used in any other navy. Although the muzzle velocities given in the ballistic tables of these guns are not so high as those of other nations, the muzzle energies are greater and the "remaining energies" are in some cases enormously so. Just how great is this difference is shown in an article which we publish in the current issue of the Supplement, which contains a series of graphical comparisons of the relative ballistic energies of the Krupp guns and those of the great firms of Armstrong and Schneider-Canet.
Thus, in comparing the velocities and energies of the Krupp 9 1/2-inch gun with the Armstrong weapon of the same caliber, we find that, although the muzzle velocity of the Armstrong projectile is 762 meters per second, as against 729 meters per second for the Krupp gun, at 1750 meters from the muzzle the velocities are equal, and at 5000 meters the Krupp has a remaining velocity of 491 meters, as against a remaining velocity for the Armstrong shell of only 448 meters per second. The loss of velocity is due to the fact that the Armstrong projectile, weighing only 159.7 kilogrammes, as against 218 kilogrammes for the Krupp projectile, is more influenced by the resistance of the air, and therefore loses its velocity more quickly. Although the velocity of the Armstrong weapon is 33 meters greater than that of the Krupp gun, its muzzle energy is iog8 meter-tons smaller, and at a range of 5000 meters its energy is still 1012 meter-tons less. Judging the two guns on the basis of the amount of energy developed per kilogramme of weight of gun, we find that at the muzzle it is for the Armstrong 176.8 meter-kilogrammes per kilogramme of weight of gun, and that in the Krupp weapon it is 214.4 meter-kilogrammes per kilogramme of the weight of the gun.
Comparing the guns on the basis of their armor-piercing ability, it is shown that while the Krupp 91/2-inch rapid-fire gun can perforate 30 centimeters of Harveyized armor up to 3100 meters range, an Armstrong gun of the same caliber, in spite of its greater velocity, can do this only up to 1250 meters. Harveyized armor 25 centimeters thick is perforated by the Krupp gun up to 4500 meters, by the Armstrong gun only up to 2400 meters, while the Schneider-Canet 9 1/2-inch gun cannot perforate that thickness at a range of over 2000 meters.
Although a strong case is made out for the superiority of the Krupp guns along the lines referred to, there is one drawback to the use of the heavier projectiles which must not be lost sight of. We refer to the fact that the greater weight of the shell will reduce the total number of rounds that can be carried for each gun; a consideration which is of importance where every ton of the displacement of a ship is valuable when it comes to the question of distribution among the contending claims of armor, engines, stores and ammunition. Furthermore, the increased weight must tell somewhat against the rapidity of handling; and if the ammunition is to be handled at the same speed, it becomes necessary to install heavier machinery for operating the hoists.—Scientific American, Dec. I, 1900.
THE NEW 12-INCH NAVAL GUN.
The new 40-caliber, 12-inch gun, the first lot of which will be mounted on the new monitors and on the Maine class of battleships, and which will henceforth be the standard weapon of this caliber for our navy, has been completed and tested at the Naval Proving Grounds, Indian Head; about twenty rounds having thus far been fired.
With a charge of 360 pounds of smokeless powder, and a projectile weighing 850 pounds, a muzzle velocity of 2854 foot-seconds was obtained with a corresponding muzzle energy of 47,994 foot-tons, the chamber pressure being 161/2 tons per square inch, or a half ton less than the designed working pressure of 17 tons. We are informed that the gun, its mechanism and mount functioned admirably in every respect. The Bureau of Ordnance is to be congratulated in having achieved such admirable results.
The fact that this gun shows 54 foot-seconds greater velocity than it was designed for, with half a ton to the square inch less pressure in the powder chamber, speaks volumes for the excellence of the multi-perforated, all-guncotton smokeless powder which has been adopted by the navy; for unlike the high nitroglycerine powders, such as cordite, which are used by some other nations, our new navy powder achieves these splendid results without any perceptible deterioration of the inner surface of the gun.
It is interesting to compare the new weapon with the 12-inch 35-caliber guns now in service. The new gun weighs 53.7 tons and has a muzzle energy of 893 foot-tons per ton of gun. The present 12-inch gun, which weighs 45.2 tons, has a muzzle velocity with smokeless powder of 2300 foot-seconds, and the corresponding muzzle energy of 31,170 foot-tons amounts to only 689 foot-tons per ton weight of the gun. From the above comparison it will be seen that the muzzle energy of the new 12- inch gun exceeds that of the old by 53 per cent.
If the energy developed by one round of the new gun could be applied as a constant upward thrust beneath a 12,000-ton battleship, it would be sufficient to raise it 4 feet from the ground.
The excellence of this weapon is shown by a comparison with other 40-caliber, 12-inch guns, which are being constructed by the leading gunmakers of the world. At the bottom of the list is the French gun, which, in spite of its high velocity, shows a muzzle energy of only 30,750 foot-tons. the relatively small energy being due to the very light shell, which weighs only 644 pounds. The inferiority of this gun is greater than appears on the surface figures; for the lightness of the shell will cause the velocity of the projectile to fall away far more rapidly than that of the heavier projectiles. We should note in this connection that although the muzzle velocity of the Krupp 40-caliber gun is lower than that of the new United States gun, because of the greater weight of its shell, it will approach it in respect of its remaining energies at the longer ranges. Judged by the muzzle velocity and muzzle energy, the new United States weapon stands easily first; but judged by the standard of energy per ton weight of the gun, it will be seen that the Krupp weapon has a considerable lead. It would be interesting, in this connection, to note how Krupp obtains these results with a gun so comparatively light in weight. It is Possible that this gun is constructed of nickel-steel, and that an abnormally high chamber pressure is allowed.
Following the table of the 40-caliber guns are placed three guns of 35 and 50 calibers, the first being the type of 12-inch gun at present in use in our navy, and the 50-caliber guns being two of the 1899 Krupp models, which the company state have actually been manufactured and tested with the results herewith shown. The enormous energy of 58,205 foot-tons is obtained in the first of these two weapons with a 981-pound projectile having a muzzle velocity of 2953 foot-seconds, and in the second by a 77I-pound projectile driven at 3330 foot-seconds velocity, the energy of 934 foot-tons per ton weight of gun being, as far as we know, the greatest efficiency yet obtained with any gun, experimental or otherwise. As this gun is over 5o feet long, however, it is altogether too unwieldly for service on shipboard, at least according to the present accepted ideas on the subject. —Scientific American, Dec. 15, 1900.
INTERESTING EXPERIMENTS WITH TORPEDORS.
Some elaborate experiments to test the explosive force of torpedoes have recently been carried out on an uninhabited island in the Trans Sound, an inlet of the Gulf of Finland. The officials in charge of the trials erected a galvanized hut. In this they placed a torpedo-tube charged with a Whitehead torpedo, the nose of which projected from the tube, as it would if placed on board ship in time of war. The idea of this particular test was to ascertain what would occur if a shot was to penetrate the torpedo-tube on. board a battleship while charged with a torpedo. With a view also of obtaining some idea of what effect such an explosion would have on the members of the crew, a number of sheep was permitted to graze in the vicinity of the hut. The air in the air chamber of the tube was compressed to eighty atmospheres. The shot, fired from a safe distance, penetrated the wall of the hut and entered the air chamber of the tube. No explosion resulted, but the imprisoned air rushed through the hole caused by the bullet with a terrific noise, but no damage was caused. The next experiment was to explode 187 pounds of guncotton inside the hut near the head of the torpedo protruding from the tube. The explosion was effected by means of a twenty minutes' time-fuse, so that the officials might have sufficient opportunity to get away from the spot. Some of the officers took up positions upon a small neighboring island. The sheep, as before, were grazing around the hut. The guncotton exploded with a terrific report, and no doubt also fired the charge within the torpedo, since the tube, shed and the sheep near were blown to pieces.
Strange to say, a sheep seventy-five yards from the hut was absolutely uninjured, thus proving that the force of the explosion was local. The officers who watched the operations from the neighboring island experienced a severe concussion of air. The officials now procured a pontoon which they had covered upon the bottom surface with four thicknesses of armor-plate. This was placed in shallow water and a torpedo was fired from a tube so as to strike the protected bottom of the pontoon. The result of the impact was that the pontoon was blown into the air.—Scientific American, Oct. 27, 1900.
GATHMANN AERIAL TORPEDO GUN.
An American contemporary has given us some striking figures and results obtained by the big Gathmann aerial torpedo gun constructed at Bethlehem, which is shortly to be tested by the Board of Ordnance, of which General Miles is president. This weapon is 18 inches in caliber, and is 44 feet in length, yet it weighs only 59 tons. The exterior dimensions so closely resemble those of the 12-inch gun that it can be mounted on the 12-inch gun-carriage. The weight of the torpedo shell is 180o lbs., and it carries 625 lbs. of wet guncotton. The muzzle velocity is about 2200 feet per second when fired with Gathmann's smokeless powder. Engravings accompany the statements, showing, first, an armor-plate after being struck by three 12-inch projectiles, by which it appears that the plate is practically uninjured; and, secondly, the debris of the entire structure plate and backing after the impact of a single Gathmann shell. Mr. Gathmann has been the best part of twelve years developing this gun, and the writer remarks that if the piece "will do half what its advocates claim for it, the ingenuity of man will be severely taxed to invent some system of defense that will successfully resist it."
We agree with the writer in this conclusion, but we think that the "if" should be written very large indeed. Some months ago we spoke of a large-caliber gun being constructed at Bethlehem under the direction of Lieut. Meigs, which, carrying a large explosive at a moderate velocity, might, we thought, for many purposes be a most valuable gun, but we never committed ourselves to such statements and figures as those given above. Without going into actual calculation here, it will be apparent that the above are beset with difficulties. To begin with the gun, it is of the same external dimensions as the 12-inch piece, which is only two-thirds of its caliber. This implies a very light thin breech, for doubtless the breech only is contemplated, and we certainly do not want to increase the difficulties presented to us. It would be supposed that this must be a low velocity gun, yet 2200 foot-seconds cannot even now be called a low velocity. Then the torpedo shell weighs 1800 lbs., as against the 2000 lbs. of the 17-inch zoo-ton gun. The cubes of 18 and 17 are nearly in the proportion of 8 to 7, so that this means that the torpedo 18-inch shell is very much slighter, taking the weight into account—almost a quarter less—solid and strong, even supposing it to be of somewhat similar form. Seeing that it contains 620 lbs. of wet guncotton, however, it must be a projectile of very great length, and consequently its structural strength must be slight indeed, and for the attack of armor practically useless. Wet guncotton is here spoken of as if it almost was a new substance, yet about ten years ago we reviewed results obtained by German artillery against land works with wet guncotton shells, this substance being at that time preferred by Germans to melinite and other high explosives. The effect of these shells was then found to be very great indeed. But mark what follows. General Brialemont then concluded—and we had the opportunity of hearing it from his own lips—that armored defenses were called for to defeat these destructive shells. The fact is that up to the present time explosives have only destroyed armor when carried well into it by a shell with some penetrating power. We admit that we do not know of so large a charge as 620 lbs. being employed, but that armor can be successfully attacked by a very weak shell containing even such a charge has to be shown. Present evidence is against it. Observe that the projectile never strikes direct on service, and the oblique breaking of such a projectile is a very much enfeebled affair. We will, however, go further; we have yet to be shown that the projectile will shoot. Without fully working it out, we can see that it has much against it, and is likely to fail just where all these mammoth explosive torpedo shells have hitherto failed—that is to fail in hitting the mark. The Vesuvius had nothing to prevent her proving the powers of her torpedo shells at Cuba, yet the official Spanish report was that the effect would have been terrible had the shell fallen "near a fort." A fort is a big enough object, and yet all efforts failed to lodge a shell even "near" one. It is never wise to ridicule the possibility of a design being good because inflated accounts are given of it. In this instance we think the accounts decidedly inflated, but what we think may be important as a solid residuum is what we wrote in the spring, namely, that under many conditions in warfare it may answer well to sacrifice high velocity for the sake of a shell carrying a large explosive charge for the attack of weaker structures. We have no evidence to indicate success in the attack of heavy armor. If this 18.-inch gun is treated soberly it may, we think, have a future.—The Engineer, Aug. 24, 1900.
THE NEW FIRST-CLASS AUSTRIAN COASTDEFENSE BATTLESHIP HABSBURG.
The new Austrian battleship which is now in the course of construction at the wharves of the Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino, and which is to bear the name Habsburg, is the first of a series of ships authorized by the Austro-Hungarian government. The Habsburg is a coast-defense vessel of 8340 tons displacement, 354 feet in length and 65 feet 9 inches in beam. She will draw 23 feet, will have engines of 11,000 indicated horse-power, which will drive her at a speed of 18 knots. The armor will consist of a belt of chrome-nickel steel 8.6 inches thick, extending four-fifths of the ship's length. The gun positions are protected by 8.2 inches of armor plating. The deck plating is composed of 2 1/2-inch steel. The armament will be composed of three 9.4-inch rapid-fire guns, mounted in turrets, two forward and one aft; twelve 5.9-inch rapid-firing guns, mounted in two superposed rows so that four guns can be directed aft, four forward and six to each side; and twenty-four smaller guns of various sizes.—Scientific American Supplement, Nov. 10, 1900.
DUTCH TORPEDO-BOAT HYDRA.
The Hydra is one of two similar boats, the other being the Scylla. They are intended to strengthen the naval power of the Dutch authorities in their East Indian colonies. The boats are 130 feet long, 13 feet 6 inches beam, and have a displacement of about 90 tons. The contract speed is 23 knots. The machinery consists of a set of triple-expansion engines designed to indicate Imo horse-power. The special feature of these engines, and in which they differ from those of other torpedo-boats, is the system of forced lubrication which has been adopted, the working parts of the engine being completely enclosed. This plan has been introduced with great success in many types of land engines, and is becoming a feature of modern high-speed engines in small sizes. The great advantage of forced lubrication is that all anxiety on the part of the engineering staff is set at rest as regards this the most important point in the proper working of such fast-running machinery. The auxiliaries include a centrifugal circulating pump with its engine for supplying the condenser with water, an evaporator and distilling plant in duplicate; steam steering engine and air compressor; dynamo for electric lighting; an overhead fan and fan engine in the stokehold between the two boilers for forced draft; also a Worthington pumping engine in the stokehold for feeding the boilers when the main engines are not working. The bunkers hold about 18 tons of coal. The armament consists of three 18-inch swivel torpedo-tubes and two 6-pounder quick-firing guns.
The official trial of the Hydra took place on May 25. A mean speed of 24.37 knots was made for the three hours with 16o lbs. of steam, and a trifle over 400 revolutions per minute, the load carried being 17 1/2 tons.
The official trial of the Scylla took place on June 26, with practically the same results.—Marine Engineering, Oct., 1900.
H. M. S. ESSEX.
The four armored cruisers of the Essex class—Essex, Kent, Bedford and Monmouth—although a good deal heavier than the Bayan and Prinz Heinrich, with which we have recently dealt, are, for reasons stated in a recent number of The Engineer, to be regarded as of the same class.
The principal particulars of the type are as follows: Displacement, 9800 tons; length, 44o feet; beam, 66 feet; draught, mean, 24 1/2 feet. Armament: fourteen 6-inch, 45 caliber; ten 12-pounders; three 3-pounders; and an indefinite number of Maxims, probably eight; torpedo-tubes, two 18-inch submerged.
In the arrangement of her guns the Essex closely resembles the Renown, and bears much the same ratio to the big armored cruisers of the Drake and Cressy classes that the Renown bears to the Majestic class, the only striking difference is that the Essex has the high forecastle common to all our cruisers now-a-days, and that the 12-pounder battery amidships is open as in the Duncan. As for these differences, the high forecastle is absolutely indispensable to a swift cruiser. Earlier cruisers, like the Blake and Edgar classes, suffer a good deal in bad weather from the sea they take in forward; the effect of which is noticeable in two vessels of the class—Crescent and Royal Arthur, which had their forecastles built up to improve their steaming qualities in bad weather.
The more or less open upper decks is, we believe, the result of a report sent in by Captain H. J. May, R. N., who pointed out that the high bulwarks in the Majestic, and later types up to the Duncan, would simply burst shells in the worst possible place, i. e., just in front of men at the guns. We referred to this important question in our "Dockyard Notes" some months ago. The compromise in the Essex design falls a good deal short of Captain May's ideal—which was to have the 12-pounders absolutely unencumbered by boats, davits, stanchions, or anything else—still it is a vast improvement upon the older idea of high bulwarks. Not, however, that the high bulwarks must be dismissed as a mere thoughtless excrescence, for they serve at least two distinct uses. In the first place, many men are put to sleep on this deck in ships thus fitted—in the Essex this would not be possible owing to the low sides; in the second place, there is a theory, now pretty well established and proved, that men shoot better when they have the sense of protection—fallacious though this protection be—that these high bulwarks afford.
To resume the description of the Essex. The 6-inch guns are thus disposed: Two in a turret forward, two in a turret aft, six on the main deck amidships, and four on the upper deck above the forward and after main-deck guns. All these pieces are in armored casemates.
Six 12-pounders are on the upper deck amidships, two under the forecastle forward, two on the main deck right aft.
This is the armament of the Essex in the original design. The usual rumors about a change in her armament are now given currency, chiefly connected with the 7 3/4-inch quick-firer, which rumor has mounted in most of our new ships. Much mystery attaches to this gun, which was first spoken of in connection with the four last cruisers of the Diadem class. It is worthy of note, too, that the four upper-deck casemates in these ships are very large, and apparently designed to take such a gun. Possibly we are waiting for a foreign lead—as usual. In general, naval officers are mostly far from admirers of the cruiser carrying nothing but 6-inch guns. There is a feeling that 9.2 guns are wanted in the Diadem class, which, though much larger than the Elswick cruisers of the Asama type, carry fewer guns and no armor worth mentioning. The same thing applies to some extent to the Essex.
It should be noted that all fourteen 6-inch guns are protected in the Essex, in both the Asama and Diadem four 6-inch guns only have shields. It may be observed that the Diadem class pay heavily in speed, guns and armor for the few hundred tons of coal extra that they carry, and to see their superiority over the Asama class needs a good deal of optimism. Nor, since the Diadem carries no guns capable of penetrating the Elswick cruiser's armor, is.it quite clear how she could do her much harm.
The armor of the Essex is thin and extensive. There is a belt about 250 feet long amidships, of 4-inch Krupp cemented armor, and this belt extends right up to the main deck. It is continued to the bow at a thickness of 2 inches. Aft it is terminated by a 5-inch bulkhead. A curved protective deck runs throughout the length of the ship and reinforces the water-line protection. The space above and below is filled, as usual, with coal-bunkers. The casemates are 4 inches thick, the turrets 5 inches, but for these nickel armor, not Krupp, is employed. It has less resisting power, but is more easily worked. There is said to be great difficulty in using Krupp armor for circular or nearly circular turrets. These turrets have short armored bases of 5 inches thickness, with armored hoists going down the main deck.
The turrets are distinctive and, so far, peculiar to the Essex class. To begin with, the guns in each can be trained together and fired as one piece or else used independently. These guns, their mountings, and so forth, are to be furnished by Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Limited, who have brought out the design. Many details seem to be as yet provisionally decided on only, or were so a short time ago, pending exhaustive experiments. There is a single hoist to the pair of guns, worked by an electric motor. It serves with very great rapidity, and when in full working order delivers every alternate charge to the port gun, which has a special small motor to catch it as it comes up the endless chain. This arrangement can be easily disconnected—the hoist is then made to serve one gun only. This is merely a rough general description of a—for the British navy—absolutely novel form of hoist. It is, presumably for that reason, so far "strictly confidential"—but gunnery officers generally are very pleased with it. It remains to be added that three layers of projectiles are carried in the turret underneath the guns, which can be loaded in any position or elevation. Double hoists, adapted from the same system will, it is said, be fitted to the two-story casemates.
The Essex will have the usual rig for modern British cruisers, a searchlight platform on each top, but no fighting-tops for guns. There will be three funnels. The engines are designed to give 23 knots with 22,000 horse-power. The boilers will be Belleville of the latest pattern, fitted with economizers. We may now proceed to compare the Essex class with the Russian Bayan and the German Prinz Heinrich, the ships with which—bearing in mind that the British custom of building ships 20 per cent or so heavier than foreign ones—they are intended to be on the same level. The difference is not entirely a matter of more coal, spare gear and more ammunition; indeed there is probably far less gain in these things than is generally assumed. This gain seldom seems to match the additional tonnage, and we fancy that the main point of difference should be looked for in increased habitability and seaworthiness, both points that, though they make small show on paper, would, in a war lasting a year or so, probably be more important than an extra gun or two. In the glib comparisons between British and foreign ships that are so often made now-a-days there is a curious ignoring of this very vital point. However, it is hardly one that can be reduced to statistics.
Nothing definite has appeared as yet concerning the coal supply of either the Essex or the Prinz Heinrich, so comparisons as to what the bigger ships may gain in this particular are not possible. But the Bayan is stated to be designed to carry no less than 750 tons normally, and 1100 tons maximum capacity. These figures, however, may not be above reproach. Coal supply, too, is now-a-days becoming one of those items that are much juggled with, and "normal coal supply" may mean more than one thing. In theory it is the coal carried at the nominal displacement, but the nominal displacement is often very nominal. British ships, too, whatever they may displace, invariably carry what is known as the "maximum capacity." All our big battleships and cruisers of the Diadem class take in up to 2000 tons as a matter of course, though this is, on paper, assumed to be a sort of emergency amount. The Elswick cruisers built for foreign powers have never to our knowledge loaded with the "normal" amount; they usually take a mean between that and the "maximum capacity." The lines of British designs admit of this without much, if any, effect on the speed; the lines of some foreign ships certainly will not so easily permit of it. In dealing with coal capacities, therefore, we generally have to deal with a certain amount of the unknown.
Taking these three ships and comparing them, we find that if we arrange them according to their superiority in speed, armament and armor, we get—
Speed. Offence. Defence.
Essex. Prinz Heinrich. Essex.
Bayan. Essex. Prinz Heinrich.
Prinz Heinrich. Bayan. Bayan.
This is very approximate. The only comment to make is that it is highly improbable that the Russians will ever make the Bayan steam so fast as the German ship, in service, the engineering department being the weak point of the Russian navy. On the other hand, our engineers and the Germans are very good.
In offense the Prinz Heinrich is unquestionably first. She is the only ship of the three able to deliver a vital blow. The Essex is sacrificed to a fad about 6-inch guns in this respect.
In defense, the Bayan lacks from, in our opinion, an unnecessary thickness of her belt. She has a protection to her vitals as good or better than that of many battleships. Above, she is not shell-proof. Otherwise, had she had a, say 5-inch belt, and 5-inch, or whatever the equivalent may be, on the redoubts, her defense would have been as good or better than any. We hold that of the Essex better than the Prinz Heinrich's because she does not risk, like that ship, having all her 6-inch put out of action by one big shot.
It is an interesting subject to speculate on, but such speculations must be extremely approximate. The Essex is probably designed with the prime idea of speed, the others with different objects, so that we should be rash indeed to attempt to lay down which is the better ship of the three. What we do chiefly feel is that there is a good deal of room for some ships of both the Prinz Heinrich and Bayan types in our navy— the Bayan especially, as we have nothing at all like her, whereas the Cressy assimilates to the Prinz Heinrich in the matter of carrying armor-piercing guns.—The Engineer, Oct. 12, 1900.
BRITISH ARMORED CRUISER ABOUKIR.
A fine example of an armored cruiser of a type now building for the British navy is H. M. S. Aboukir, recently launched from the Fairfield yard at Govan on the Clyde. This vessel is a first-class steel, sheathed, armored cruiser of these dimensions: Length, 445 feet; beam, 69 feet 6 inches; mean draft, 26 feet 3 inches; displacement, about 12,000 tons. The Aboukir will be fitted with twin screws driven by triple-expansion engines, with cylinders 36 inches, 59 inches, and (two) 68 inches diameter, and 4-foot stroke, of 21,000 collective horse-power. Steam will be furnished by thirty Belleville water-tube boilers fitted with economizers arranged in four groups, each group fitted in, a separate water-tight compartment. The boiler pressure will be 300 lbs., reduced at the engines to 250 lbs. The estimated speed is 21 knots. For protection the Aboukir will have an armor-belt of 6-inch nickel steel for 230 feet of her length and 11 feet 6 inches deep. Harveyized steel 12 inches thick will be used for the conning-tower, and the barbettes will be protected with 6-inch armor. Bulkheads will be of 5-inch nickel steel, and the protective deck will have a maximum thickness of 3 inches. The armament will include two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, also fourteen 12-pounders, besides several boat, field, machine and automatic guns. There will be two i8-inch submerged torpedo-tubes, fitted broadside. The complement is 750 officers and men.—Marine Engineering, Oct., 1900.
THE ARMORED CRUISER JEANNE D'ARC.
The Jeanne d'Arc, which was successfully launched at Toulon on the 8th of June, belongs to the class of armored cruisers, and is in every respect superior to many of the vessels of this type which still figure upon the lists of modern fleets. Her armor is composed of plates of Harveyized steel, the force of resistance of which is much greater than that of the iron plates which protect very many of the armorclads now in service. Her guns, which are of unusual power, are very efficient, as a consequence of the progress made in the manufacture of ordnance. Finally, the Jeanne d'Arc is a very swift vessel, and made 23 knots on her trial trip, say a little more than 25 miles an hour. Perhaps it will be regretted that an attempt has been made to obtain so great a speed, since this has certainly rendered it necessary to sacrifice many things and to surmount great difficulties, by reason of the immense space required by the engines and boilers that are always required in such a case.
This cruiser is not designed to form part of a squadron for war duty, but has a more modest mission, that of protecting maritime commerce, making raids in distant seas, and destroying the enemy's merchant vessels and swift packet boats. In order to do this a vessel must have a high speed, a sufficiently high-power armament, and a wide radius of action, which is equivalent to saying that its coal supply must permit it to make long trips. To solve such a problem is not easy. Whether the Jeanne d'Arc will solve it, it remains for the future to say.
The armored cruiser is in great favor in all navies, and is now taking the place so long occupied by what are called protected cruisers, that is to say, those that are destitute of side armor. About twenty years ago the English constructed a group of five of these, but went no further in this direction. France, in turn, took up the work and produced an excellent ship, the Dupuy de Lome, which embodies most of the innovations that are now in general use. The Dupuy de Lome was an admirable vessel, and it would have been necessary only to increase her size in order to improve the type. Her armor was a very prominent feature, and the artillery in turrets was perfectly protected; but the French waver in their ideas, and, instead of improving upon this specimen and giving a wider range of action, they reduced the tonnage, the protection, the speed, and the armament of the vessels that followed. This error led them to add to their navy five inadequate armored cruisers of about 5000 tons, which are neither fleet ships nor ships for a squadron and which are now utilized in any way that may be found possible. With the Jeanne d'Arc, France has taken a new departure and is now constructing twelve cruisers, some of 10,014 tons and others of 9500 and 7700, with a speed of 21 knots.
The Jeanne d'Arc has the following dimensions: Length over all, 477 feet; breadth, 63.75 feet; mean draught, 24.75 feet; displacement, 11,270 tons.
She has two groups of three funnels, two protected conning-towers and two masts. The foremost is provided with a military top equipped with 1 1/2-inch rapid-fire guns, designed to repel the attacks of torpedo-boats. The other mast is to be used only for signals.
The vessel has three screws, each driven by triple-expansion vertical engines, each of which is completely isolated and independent of its neighbors. This is the Depuy de Lome system, now applied for the first time upon this vessel.
Steam is furnished to the cruiser's engines by tubular boilers of the Guyot type, and belonging to the general type of what are called multitubular or aqua-tubular generators, and the water in which passes through the interior of the tubes. The evaporating apparatus is to furnish 28,500 horse-power, although a portion of this will be utilized for running the numerous—too numerous—auxiliary engines that operate upon the vessel. The modern ship is truly a huge workshop, in which the mechanic reigns as master.
For feeding the grates, it is possible to stow away upon the Jeanne d'Arc 2100 tons of coal. This supply, increased by several hundred tons of petroleum, will permit of running 4000 leagues at sea at the low speed of 10 knots; and so the Jeanne d'Arc will be able easily to make a trip to China without a stoppage. In order to protect her, there has been established, according to the French system, an armored belt formed of steel plates of 6-inch thickness that surround the entire loadwater line, and, above this, a thinner protected belt of 3-inch thickness. Finally, the armor ascends toward the front, almost for a third of the length, starting from the stem, thins down to 2 1/4 inches, and covers the entire height of the hull. Such an arrangement has been devised because in a swift cruiser the front is the part that is most exposed to the fire of the enemy. The protection is completed by two armored decks.
Let us now pass to the ordnance. The armament is composed as follows: Two 7.6-inch guns in turrets; eight 5.6-inch guns in casemates or in sponsons; twelve 4-inch guns in turrets; sixteen 1.6-inch guns upon the bridges; eight 1.4-inch guns upon the upper deck and in the military top; and two submerged torpedo-tubes. The turrets for the 7.6-inch and 4-inch guns are closed and protected with steel, as are also the casemates and sponsons. The small pieces are sheltered behind shields of hardened steel.
By reason of this distribution of her artillery, the Jeanne d'Arc presents three fine lines of fire: the first consisting of her 7.6- and 4-inch guns in turrets; the second of her 5.6-inch guns in protected casemates; and the third, dominating all, of her small 1.6- and 1.3-inch pieces.
Such is the armored cruiser Jeanne d'Arc, which embodies every progress that has been made in the naval art, and in which electricity plays a leading role both for the driving of machines and external and internal lighting. Let us add that the vessel will cost a little more than twentyone million francs. According to the Navy Department, she will not be available for service until toward the end of the year 1901.
For the above particulars we are indebted to La Nature.—Scientific American Supplement, Nov. 17, 1900.
THE NEW GERMAN CRUISER AMAZONE.
The Amazone is a third-class cruiser of the vedette sort, equivalent to our own Pelorus class. She is spoken of and to some extent is an improved Gefion, but, she resembles the prototype in little save armament.
The Gefion was launched in 1893; it is interesting, therefore, to note that German ideas, which in the Gefion closely followed ours, have since then branched off in an entirely independent direction. In the Gefion coal is the chief consideration, and the guns are secondary. In the Amazone it is just the other way about. The most she can carry is 500 tons.
However, before discussing the ship at length, it may be interesting to compare her with our similar ships, the Pelorus class. In the connection the Russian Novik, with which we shall be dealing in an early number, may also be introduced, as she represents the same kind of sacrifice as the Amazone, only in her case everything is sacrificed for speed.
As the Pelorus is a much smaller ship, her coal supply is proportionately better, nor does she in any way compare badly with the German. It is worthy of note that the Pelorus has 7000 indicated horse-power to make her speed with, while the larger German has to do it with less. Sisters of the Amazone have done their 20 knots on trial, but in a race the honors would undoubtedly go to the Pelorus class.
To return to describing the Amazone. It will be noted that her guns, as in most German types, are placed with a great regard for end-on fire—the theoretical right-ahead fire being four guns, while the amidship pieces have a very large arc. The Pelorus has but two guns that fire right ahead. Actually the German fire would not exceed three—cases in which both end sponsons could fire at the same ship being chiefly theoretical.
The Amazone is to be fitted with the Schultz boiler, which is an adaptation of the Thornycroft, and resembles it very closely indeed.
The protective deck has a somewhat curious form, various hatchways in it being protected with armored coamings. Amidships, too, the deck, instead of being a mere roof to the engine-room, more or less fits closely upon them, and wherever anything reaches high up the deck is there domed up for it. It is at least ingenious. Altogether about eight ships of the Amazone type are built or building. Those launched and completed or nearly so include the Gazelle, Nymphe and Niobe. Another, the Ariadne, has just been launched. The remaining three are not named as yet. Others appear to be projected.—The Engineer, Nov. 2, 1900.
THE GERMAN ARMORED CRUISER PRINZ HEINRICH.
The Prinz Heinrich, at present completing for sea, is apparently intended as a standard type for German armored cruisers. Unlike the Furst Bismark, she is not a merely weak battleship, but a cruiser pure and simple, built chiefly with an eye to cruiser work. Her principal dimensions, etc., are as follows:
Displacement 8868 tons.
Length. 394 ft.
Beam 651 ft.
Draft (mean) 23t ft.
Armament Two 9.4 in. (24 cm.).
Ten 6 in. (15 cm.).
Ten 1-pounders.
Four Maxims.
Torpedo tubes One bow, submerged.
Two broadside, submerged.
One, stern, above water.
The armor is distributed as follows: There is a complete water-line belt of Krupp armor 4 inches to 3 inches in thickness, reinforced by a protective deck 2 4 inches thick on the slopes. Above the belt there is a redoubt about 163 feet long, and of about the same thickness as the belt. Abovethis again is the main deck redoubt, 6 inches thick, in which six of the 6-inch guns are mounted. Both redoubts have 6-inch bulkheads, while screens will be placed between the guns in the upper one. On top of the upper redoubts there will be four turrets, oval in shape, each 6 inches thick, and carrying a 6-inch gun. Forward and aft are barbettes, each mounting a single 94-inch gun, and protected by stout shields. These barbettes will have a total height of about 9 feet, will be 6 inches thick, with armored hoists descending to the protective deck. The conning-tower, which will have a thickness of 6 inches or more, will have an armored tube of communication.
It will be noted that the Prinz Heinrich has little in common with the Furst Bismark. The latter has no protection to the lower deck, and has her armament a good deal more distributed. The Prinz Heinrich, on the other hand, is a direct adaptation of the French Brennus, and closely resembles that ship both in the disposition of armament and in the system of armoring. The high forecastle and the bow submerged tube are the only distinctly German features in the design, and there is nothing of the Furst Bismark about her save in general outline.
Like all German ships, the Prinz Heinrich will have no wood used in her construction, unless the latest discovery, or supposed discovery, that woodless ships are very insanitary, causes some departure from a wellestablished German custom.
The estimated indicated horse-power is 15,000, which is expected to give a speed of 20 knots. There are three screws, and the deadwood aft is very much cut away after the Elswick model, in order to make the ship relatively handy. This, for a cruiser, she should be, as she has a very fair proportion of beam to length. The boilers selected for her are of the Diirr type.
Comparisons between the Prinz Heinrich and other vessels like her in size and metier—the Bayan and the British Essex class—we defer till we have treated this last; but it may be of some interest to compare the Prinz Heinrich of 1900 with the Edgar class of 1890 and the Orlando of 1896, since the armaments in each case are practically identical, though the German 9.4-inch gun is, of course, a far more powerful gun than the old 9.2-inch in the other ships. This, however, is more an accident of date than anything else, and in so far as the modern guns are all heavier, enforces rather than detracts from the point we wish to make—the difference between what was demanded then and now for a ship carrying a more or less standard armament for a first-class cruiser in the way of protection and speed.
The Orlando, the only cruiser carrying belt armor except the Prinz Heinrich, has less than this ship, and is altogether smaller. She belongs to the era of "paper" ships, and to this day, with her 10-inch "armor belt"—all under the water-line, by the way—and heavy armament, is a grand ship for the makers of statistics. The Prinz Heinrich could probably tackle three of her. The Edgar and Blake are more interesting comparisons. All the class are as good ships as ever were built for speed. Although now nearly ten years old, they are all excellent steamers, and in the recent maneuvers kept station at 19 knots without the least difficulty. Ten years have seen far less advance in speed than people are prone to imagine. It is exceedingly doubtful whether there is a warship in the world that could beat the Edgar class in a thirty hours' race. The advance of recent years has been in protection, and the problem to-day is to pile on armor without deteriorating the other cruiser essentials. Of course the difference has to be made up somehow. In the case of the Prinz Heinrich coal is probably sacrificed—though, as her capacity has not yet been announced, it is difficult to speak definitely on this point. The greatest point of divergence, however, tends to be in form, and owing to changed lines more speed is got out of a unit of horse-power to-day than in the past. Still this embraces a wide subject hardly to be discussed in this article, the matter being very complicated. As regards its practical results, mere dimensions of the ordinary sort do not go for much. Though the modern cruiser is, as a general rule, longer and proportionately narrower than her predecessors, we now and again find some of the best steamers short, broad ships, comparatively speaking. Of modern cruisers of moderate size nothing in the British navy has beaten the Vindictive class, and these are only 320 feet long, with a breadth of 57 1/2 feet, dimensions very equivalent to those of the Orlando class, displacement and horse-power being also fairly akin. Yet in the one case the ships never could steam fast, while in the other 19 knots is easily maintained at sea in moderately smooth water. Under-water lines and arrangement of weights—both things too elusive for statistics—are, of course, far and away the principal governing factors in these instances.
However, length is the thing that tells directly the sea gets up, and in a seaway the Prinz Heinrich ought to beat any of the older vessels with which we have compared her, about 400 feet being the necessary minimum of length for any cruiser to maintain speed in big waves. If she is much less than 400 feet long she will be going up and down on single waves, and lose speed accordingly. This fact—that ships cannot maintain speed unless long, coupled with the fact that they cannot steer properly unless relatively short—is one of the worst problems that faces the designers of warships. They cannot eat their cake and have it too; hence much variety and the eternal compromise. But since the present trend of ideas is that a speed-keeping cruiser is better than a handy one, more or less long vessels are now the order of the day. Ten years hence the "agile" cruisers may be in favor again, but at the present time cruisers maneuver about as adroitly as elephants.—The Engineer, Sept. 21, 1900.
THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP MIKASA.
Perhaps the most interesting feature in the design of the Mikasa, the Japanese battleship launched by Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Limited. at Barrow-in-Furness, on Thursday of last week, is in the distribution of her armor, several modifications in recent practice having been made in the design. In giving a brief description we, therefore, give first consideration to this. As in the two earlier Japanese battleships built in this country, the Asahi and Hatsuse, the water-line armor belt extends from end to end, instead of terminating at the ends of the citadel, and thereby leaving about 8o feet from the stern unprotected. The main belt has a width of 7 feet 9 inches, of which 5 feet 3 inches is below the water-line. The main belt armor in the way of the citadel, for 156 feet in length, is 9 inches in thickness, beyond this at either end—to some distance past the forward and aft 12-inch armored transverse bulkheads—it is 7 inches in thickness, assisted by additional VA-inch nickel-steel Plates placed on the slope of the protective deck, so as to make the resistance equivalent to 9-inch Krupp-Harveyed armor, for the whole length of the citadel and barbettes. From the ends of this 7-inch belt to the ends of the ship the armor is 5 1/2 inches and 4 inches in thickness. Athwartship bulkhead of 6-inch armor is fitted at the after extremity of the waterline belt to afford protection against raking shot. On the advice of the Vickers Company, the Japanese government, with their characteristic progressive tendency, have introduced in the Mikasa a departure which must be of interest to all naval constructors, the effect being to increase the area of the armored broadside. Above the main armor, and extending for the whole length of the citadel, there is 6-inch armor up to the level of the upper deck, instead of to the main deck as in previous ships, so that the total width is 21 feet 6 inches for the length of the citadel, and 7 feet 9 inches forward and abaft it.
The two barbettes are 14 inches in thickness, reduced to Io inches where protected by 6-inch citadel armor; while the guns are protected by armored shields. The conning-tower is of 14-inch armor, the screens being 12 inches. The whole of the armor, it is almost needless to say, is constructed on the Krupp principle, and is of a nickel-steel alloy.
The extension of the main belt to the upper, instead of to the main, deck as in preceding ships, dispenses with the necessity for casemates for the 6-inch guns on the main deck; but to insure the same measure of isolation for the ten 6-inch quick-firing guns placed on this deck, as is obtained by the casemate system, bulkheads are placed between the guns, While an armored screen extends the whole length of the citadel behind the guns. These divisional bulkheads and the armored screen are of hardened steel—sufficient to insure that the splinters of any shell which may explode in one compartment will not affect either the gun or gunners in the adjoining compartment. The 6-inch guns on the upper deck, four in number, are within 6-inch casemates.
The protective deck is of a minimum thickness of 2 inches, and extends over the full length of the ship; but is increased to 3 inches on the sloping parts within the citadel, and to 4 1/2 inches in thickness in the wake of the barbettes as before mentioned. In addition to this, the upper deck within the citadel is made of I-inch plates. As usual, there is an ammunition passage under the protective deck with communication, through ammunition tubes, to the various gun positions; while coal-bunkers are arranged above and below the protective deck from end to end of the citadel. There is thus an increased broadside protection to the citadel, as well as in the ends of the ship.
The general dimensions of the Mikasa do not differ materially from those of the British battleships of recent type. The ships of the Majestic and Canopus class were 390 feet long; the Formidable, 400 feet long; and the Duncan 405 feet long—all between perpendiculars. The Mikasa is 400 feet, the length over all being 432 feet. The breadth moulded is 76 feet in the Mikasa, as compared with 75 feet 6 inches in the Duncan, and 75 feet in the Formidable and Majestic. The draft is 27 feet 2 inches, and at this the displacement will be about 15,200 tons.
Like the two preceding ships for the Japanese navy built in this country —the Asahi and the Hatsuse—the Mikasa carries four 12-inch breechloading guns fitted in pairs in the two barbettes on the upper deck, and fourteen 6-inch quick-firers, four placed, as already indicated, within casemates situated on the upper deck at the corners of the citadel, the remaining ten 6-inch guns being placed in the box batteries on the main deck. The auxiliary armament of the ships consists of twenty 12-pounder quick-firing guns, four firing ahead and four astern, the remainder being on the broadsides; eight 3-pounder quick-firing guns and four 2 1/2-pounder quick-firing guns. There are four submerged torpedo-tubes, two in the forward part of the ship and two aft.
The general appearance of the battleship is indicated by the elevation which we publish, and it need only be added that in her electric and compressed air equipment she embodies the best modern practice, the lighting installation including goo incandescent lamps, with masthead, bow, anchor and other special lights and also six searchlights. The ship will be fitted as a flagship, accommodation being provided for an admiral and 78 officers, the total complement being 935 all told.
The Mikasa is to have a speed of 18 knots under natural draught, and will have a coal capacity of 1400 tons, to give her a radius of action of 9000 sea miles at 10 knots speed. The engines are of the triple-expansion 3-cylinder type, the diameters of the cylinders being 31 inches, 50 inches and 82 inches respectively, the stroke being 48 inches; and it is anticipated that the full power of 15,00o indicated horse-power will be developed with the engines running at 120 revolutions per minute, the steam pressure at the engines being 250 lbs., and at the boilers 300 lbs. Stephenson link motion is adopted for working the valves, which are of the piston type on the high-pressure and intermediate cylinders, and of the. double-ported flat design on the low-pressure cylinders. The engines, as with all warships now, are designed to run the propellers inwards when going ahead, so that the starting platform is in the center of the ship, and here, as is now the universal practice, wrought-steel columns form the front supports of the cylinders which are independent castings. The back supports of the cylinders are of the ordinary cast-iron A-framing. with ample slipper guide surface. The condensers are separate, and placed in the wings of the ship. The total cooling surface is 16,014 square feet.
The bedplate is of cast steel. The working parts of the engine generally are of forged steel, but the crankshaft is of nickel steel, the three parts being interchangeable. The external diameter is 16 1/2inches, with an 8 1/2-inch hole. The propeller shaft is of wrought steel 16 1/2inches in diameter, with 8 1/2-inch hole, while the propellers have four blades, the diameter being 17 feet, and the mean pitch 18 feet. The four blades and the boss are of manganese bronze.
The boilers are of the Belleville type, with economizers. There are 25 in all, of which 20 consist of eight elements of generating tubes and seven elements of economizer tubes; while the remaining five boilers have seven elements of heating and six elements of economizer tubes: The total heating surface is 37,452 square feet, and the grate area 1276 square feet. The two funnels are 14 feet in diameter over the casings, the height from the fire grate being 91 feet. There is the usual complete system of pumps, with blowing engines for the furnaces. The total weight of the machinery is 1355 tons. The machinery is practically completed and ready to be placed on board the ship, which is to be completed for sea in May of next year.—Engineering, Nov. 16, 1900.
THE FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP ALABAMA.
The Alabama, whose record of 17 knots an hour on her recent official trip, places her at the front rank of our battleships for speed, will always be a vessel of particular interest, from the fact that in her we see the introduction of a new type in the United States navy. Comparing her with the Oregon, the Iowa or the Kearsarge, the most noticeable difference is the entire absence of the 8-inch gun. Hitherto our battleships have been distinguished from those of other navies largely by the fact that they carried a much heavier armament, due chiefly to the presence on board of a complete battery of guns which were intermediate in power between the main battery of 12-inch and 13-inch guns, and the secondary battery of rapid-fire guns of 5-inch and 6-inch caliber. The battleships of Great Britain, France and Germany, and With a few exceptions of Russia, have carried no guns of a caliber between the 12-inch and the 6-inch weapons, and in the Alabama we see the first disposition on the part of our naval constructors to follow the European practice. Although the absence of the 8-inch gun is very sincerely regretted by most of our officers of the line, it cannot be denied that in the Alabama the heavy secondary battery of 6-inch guns, on account of its rapidity of fire and the enormous weight of metal which can be thrown in a specified time, goes far to offset the removal of the very popular 8-inch breech-loading rifle.
The Alabama was authorized June 10, 1896; the contract for her construction by the William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Company was signed the following September; the keel was laid the December of the same year, and the vessel was launched on May 18, 1898, and has now been completed about eleven months later than the contract date, the delay being due to the failure of the builders, on account of the armor-plate controversy, to receive the necessary armor during the construction of the ship. The vessel is 360 feet long, 72 feet 2 1/2 inches broad, and has a mean draft, when fully equipped for sea, and with 800 tons of coal on board, of 23 feet 6 inches. Her displacement on the draft given is 11,565 tons. She is driven by twin-screw, vertical, triple expansion engines, and steam is supplied by boilers of the Scotch type. Her normal coal supply is 800 tons and her bunker capacity with nominal loose stowage is 1200 tons, while with close stowage she can hold 1440 tons in the bunkers. As compared with the Kentucky and Kearsarge, she has about 8 feet more freeboard, due to a spar deck which extends from the bow about two-thirds of the way out. Her protection consists of a belt of Harveyized armor of a maximum thickness of 16 1/2 inches, which tapers toward the bow and stern. Above the belt, amidships, side armor of 6 inches is carried up to enclose and protect the guns of the secondary battery. The main battery of four 13-inch guns is carried in elliptical balanced turrets which have 14 inches of armor protection. The secondary battery is extremely powerful and consists of fourteen 6-inch rapid-fire guns, twelve of which are carried on the main deck and two on the boat deck amidships. She is also armored with sixteen 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, four Colts, and two 3-inch field guns. She is fitted with four tubes for the discharge of Whitehead torpedoes.
In various articles on naval matters which have appeared from time to time in the Scientific American, we have described and illustrated, with sectional views, the structural features of the barbette of a modern warship; but we think that the most knowing of the naval "sharps" among our readers will be able to learn something from the accompanying illustration showing the interior of a barbette before the turret was installed. The photograph from which our plate was made is one of a series of photographs which were filed with the Chief Constructor of the Navy during the construction of the Alabama. It was taken from the after end of the superstructure, the deck upon which the people around the edge of the barbette are standing being the main deck.
The barbette is a vertical, cylindrical, heavily armored redoubt which extends from the protective deck to a height of 3 feet 8 inches above the main deck. The duty of this redoubt is to protect the unarmored base of the turret, the mechanism by which it is rotated, and the hoist by which the ammunition is brought up to the guns. Within this cylinder, which is about 12 1/2 feet in depth, is located a circular track upon which is a circle of twenty-one conical rollers, which are held in their proper spacing and radial position by means of two concentric rings, firmly braced together, as clearly seen in the illustration. Upon these rollers is carried the whole weight of the turret, the guns and their mounts, a total of 277 tons. The lower half of the turret is in the form of a circular-inverted cone and is unarmored; the upper and armored portion of the turret is elliptical in plan, and the rear portion of it projects over the top edge of the barbette, enough space being left between the turret and barbette for easy clearance in turning.
The barbette is protected for two-thirds of its circumference with 14 inches of Harveyized armor, the remaining one-third, or the portion which is nearest to the point of view from which the photograph was taken, is protected with to inches of armor, less protection being needed on this portion of the barbette because it is screened by the 6-inch side armor on the hull of the vessel. The armor is bolted to a backing of teak, within which is i inch of steel plating attached to a heavy framing of steel beams, angles and channel beams. The internal diameter of the barbette is 27 feet.
Immediately within and below the circle of rollers is seen the massive circular rack which forms part of the turning mechanism of the turret, rotation being effected by means of two electric motors carried in the base of the turret. The shafts of these motors are connected by suitable gearing with pinions which engage the circular rack; and the training of the great weight of the turret and guns is accomplished with a speed and accuracy which are impossible when hydraulic, compressed air, or steam motors are used.
The after barbette of the Alabama contains altogether 26 tons of armor. The total weight of the installment, including turrets and guns, is 783 tons. The forward barbette and turret, however, are much heavier, the total weight in this case being 978 tons. This increase is due to the fact that the Alabama carries her forward guns above the spar deck, and, therefore, some 7 1/2 feet to 8 feet higher above the water-line than the after pair of guns, the increase in weight being due entirely to the increased height of the barbette.—Scientific American, Sept. 8, 1900.
THE NEW BATTLESHIPS.
The Scientific American published, in its issue of June 9 last, an illustration and description of the three battleships then designated Georgia, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Some time later, after the report of a special board, the Navy Department assigned those names to the three ships that are to carry superposed turrets, while the two vessels appropriated for by the last session of Congress, bearing the names of Virginia and Rhode Island, will be as described and pictured in our issue of last June.
Without going into the merits of the case, the majority decision of the special board in favor of arming three of the five new battleships with superposed turrets followed directly upon the final acceptance trials of the Kearsarge. The object of the board's being was the determining of the better type of ship, all five, of course, to be alike, and the decision or recommendation showed the board to be hesitating in judgment. The result is to miss the prime opportunity of fashioning five ships of absolute similarity, a feature of fighting efficiency in combined operations hardly to be overvalued.
In general dimensions, these ships will be like those described previously. They will have a load-water-line length of 435 feet; an extreme beam of 76 feet to inches; a trial displacement of 15,000 tons; a mean draft at trial displacement of 24 feet; a greatest draught, full load, of 26 feet; a total coal-bunker capacity of two tons; and a trial speed of 19 knots.
The most important difference in hull between these ships and the two of later appropriation is in the wood-sheathing and coppering which these ships will receive. Throughout the bottom and bilges and up to a height of three or four feet above the water-line there will be a thick covering of fine pine carefully tapped to the underlying metallic skin and rendered water-tight and non-galvanic. Over this will be laid the copper. The advantages of this system are too well known to need explanation here; and, in consequence, the ships will prove far more economical in their consumption of coal, readier at all times for high-power service, and able to maintain their speed even after months in the fouling waters of the tropics. Such of our sheathed and coppered craft as have done service in the Far East have proved valuable practical examples of the advantages of this system of bottom protection.
In hull form there will be a novelty, common to all five of the new battleships, in the way the uniform freeboard of 20 feet is maintained from bow to stern. Apart from the military advantage gained in the added height of the guns of the main battery aft, there will be a net gain in accommodations of infinite comfort and healthfulness to both officers and crew. None of them will be shut up behind the blank walls of heavy armor, as heretofore, lighted only by artificial means, but the living spaces will all have air ports and direct access to sunlight. This added freeboard aft, too, will make the ships more weatherly in a following sea.
The armor protection to the hull will consist primarily of an 8-foot water-line belt, 5 feet of which will be below water at load draft. The maximum thickness of this belt is maintained amidships for a distance of 192 feet abreast the engines and boilers. From the top downward 5 feet, this armor will be 11 inches through, and thence to the armor shelf will taper to 8 inches. The belt is continuous from bow to stern in varying thicknesses. For a distance of 6o feet forward and 32 feet abaft the central portion, the plates are to have a maximum thickness of 9 inches and a minimum of 6, the maximum 9 inches ranging downward 5 feet. For a distance of 162 feet forward and aft, the next course of armor will have a greatest thickness of 6 inches and a least thickness of 4 1/2, the limits of dimensions, as in all following cases, being similar to those in the portions already described. Seventeen feet forward and aft, next, the armor will have a maximum thickness of 5 inches and a minimum of 4, while the remaining armor, running forward to the bow and aft to the stern, will have a uniform thickness of 4 inches. This armor will be treated by the Krupp process.
Above the main belt, for a distance of 245 feet amidships, i. e., throughout the position of the main broadside rapid-fire battery of 6-inch guns, the sides will be reinforced by armor of a uniform thickness of 6 inches. This armor will reach all the way up to the main deck, and it will be joined to the barbettes of the 12-inch turrets by athwartship armor of 6 Inches in thickness aft, and by inclined armor of like thickness forward, yielding, in this latter case, the added protection of glacis against the head-on raking fire of an enemy. The after athwartship armor is vertical.
There will be a curved protective deck, reaching from bow to stern, being 1 ½ inches thick on the flat and 3 inches thick on the slopes. A cellulose belt 3 feet in thickness will be worked continuously from bow to stern along the sides above the protective deck. The obturating material will be the well-known cornpith cellulose.
Wood will be used very sparingly, and, where indispensable and not exposed either to the weather or under water, will be fire-proofed. Light metal bulkheads will supplant the usual wooden partitions in the living spaces, some of the furniture will be of pressed metal, the chart-house will be of bronze, and all of the decks under cover will be laid with linoleum. To guard against the overheating of the magazines, there will be a 4-inch air space around them in addition to a coating of some non-conducting material, while certain of the magazines are to be arranged so that they may be chilled by compressed air from the refrigerating plant.
Each ship will be fitted as a flagship, and accommodations will be provided for r flag officer, 1 commanding officer, 1 chief of staff, 20 wardroom officers, 12 junior officers, 10 warrant officers, and 658 seamen and marines; a total complement of 703 persons.
The refrigerating plant on each ship will have a cooling equivalent of two tons of ice daily; and a steam laundry, capable of handling the clothes of seventy-five persons per diem, will do most of the washing and ironing for officers and enlisted men.
The fighting powers of the vessels will be centered in the main battery of four 12-inch and eight 8-inch breech-loading rifles, the main rapid-fire battery of twelve 6-inch breech-loading rifles, the secondary rapid-fire battery of twelve 14-pounders and a dozen 3-pounders, and the auxiliary battery of eight 1-pounders, two field pieces, two machine guns, and a half-dozen 0.3 automatic guns.
The four 12-inch rifles will be mounted in two elliptical, balanced turrets 10 inches thick except for the slanting port plates an inch heavier. These guns will fire through arcs of 270 degrees. Four of the 8-inch guns will be superposed upon these turrets, fixed to move in unison, and they will be sheltered by walls of 6-inch armor increased half an inch on the slanting face plates. The four remaining 8-inch guns will be mounted amidships, two on each side, on the main deck, and will be housed in independent turrets similar to those placed above the 12-inch guns. These 8-inch rifles will have arcs of fire of 180 degrees, ranging from dead ahead to dead astern. This arrangement of the 12- and 8-inch guns gives a bow and a stern fire of six 8's and two 12's, and a broadside of six 8's and four 12's.
The 6-inch guns are arranged in broadside similarly to the ships previously shown last June. Each 6-inch gun, of which there are six on each broadside, has an arc of fire of 110 degrees, and the ports are so arranged that the guns can be turned inboard within the side line, the guns swinging toward one another in pairs; beginning forward, the first gun turns aft while the next one swings its muzzle forward, etc., to the after pair. This arrangement does away with the inconvenience of dismounting the guns to avoid obstructions or to guard them against the stress of heavy weather. Each of these guns is sheltered behind a heavy port shield, and there is a splinter bulkhead of 2 1/2-inch nickel steel between each gun and its neighbor on either side. The 14-pounders, sheltered by local armor of 2-inch steel and shields, are to be mounted on the gun deck well forward and aft, and up in the superstructure on the main deck, forward and aft of the amidship 8-inch turrets. The twelve 3-pounders are to be mounted on the bridges and on the superstructure deck, while the 1-pounders, automatic and otherwise, and the Gatlings, are to be placed in the tops and in the boats.
The submerged torpedo-tubes, of which there are two, are to be placed, one on each side, well forward, and the operator is to control his tube from an armored station on the deck above, sufficiently sheltered to be proof against 6-pounder fire.
The rates of fire given previously for the two other battleships apply in the case of these vessels and will be as follows: With ammunition supplied as fast as the electrical hoists can bring it to the guns, the 12-inch guns will fire once in every 1 1/2 minutes; the 8-inch guns once in every so seconds; and the 6-inch guns three times a minute.
The motive engines will be of the four-cylinder triple-expansion type, actuating twin screws, and capable of developing moo° indicated horsepower. The steam pressure will be 250 pounds, the stroke four feet, and the cylinders will be, H. P. 35 inches, I. P. 57 inches, and two L. P. each of 66 inches. Number of revolutions a minute, 120.
There will be twenty-four boilers of the straight water-tube type, placed in six water-tight compartments. They will have quite 1280 square feet of grate and 55,000 square feet of heating surface. The air pressure in the ash-pits will not exceed one inch of water. On trial, the ships will carry only goo tons of coal, and a reserve of 66 tons of fresh water will be carried either in tanks or in the double bottom during that time. An originally contemplated, one 50-foot steam-cutter or picket-boat was to have been carried by each ship, but since the report of captains of the attacking fleet during the recent maneuvers at Newport, it is highly probable that each ship will be given two for vidette service against torpedo-boats or submarine craft.
Each ship will carry quite 570 tons of offensive ammunition, not counting torpedo outfit.
Thirty-six months is the maximum time allowed for the building of each ship, and the limit of cost is $3,600.000, exclusive of armor and armament.
These ships were authorized by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1859.—Scientific American, Nov. 17, 1900.
THE NEW ARMORED CRUISERS OF THE CALIFORNIA AND MARYLAND TYPES.
No feature of our latest naval programme shows more forcibly the impress of the lessons learned by our late war with Spain than the new armored cruisers now nearly ready for the bidding contractors. Our new battleships are typically fine craft and thoroughly up to date; but it is the armored cruiser that marks most sharply the pace we have cut out for ourselves. The armored cruiser, besides being the eyes and ears of the fleet, will take its place if need be in the line of battle. The New York was an advance upon her British prototype; the Brooklyn was an improvement; but the California and her class are really second-class battleships with armored-cruiser speed, any one of which against the combined batteries now on the New York and Brooklyn could hold its own with a very fair prospect of giving the two other ships a pretty bad drubbing. Such is the rapid rate of naval development to-day. The six ships in question were provided for by the acts of Congress of March 3, 1899, and June 7, 1900, respectively, three ships being appropriated for at each time; and those of the earlier act are required to be sheathed and coppered, while the last three allowed for were not so specified. Should authority be given to sheathe and copper the latter vessels, the contractors must stand ready to do so.
The general dimensions of the sheathed and coppered ships are as follows:
Length on load water-line 502 feet.
Beam, extreme, at load water-line 70 feet
Trial displacement, about 13,800 tons.
Mean draft at trial displacement, about 24 feet 6 inches.
Greatest draft, full load 26 feet 6 inches
Coal carried on trial 900 tons.
Total coal bunker capacity 2,000 tons
Feed water carried on trial 75 tons
Speed not less than 22 knots.
Maximum indicated horse-power 23,000
The only dimensional particulars in which the unsheathed ships will differ from the others are a maximum beam six inches less and a lighter trial displacement by 400 tons; in other respects they are alike.
The ships will have the usual extensive bulkhead system and close water-tight subdivisioning common to all modern fighting ships, and the double bottom will be so arranged that a reserve supply of fresh water may be carried there. The ships will have both docking and bilge keels. The main deck will be the only wooden deck, the others being laid with linoleum; and the use of wood will be restricted to the last degree, all of that within the vessels being fire-proofed.
The fighting positions and the "vitals" will all of them be sheltered behind walls of Kruppized steel, and the arrangement of armor protection will be as follows: First, a water-line belt 7 feet 6 inches wide extending from bow to stern. The belt carries its maximum thickness 4 1/2 feet from the top down, whence it tapers to the armor ledge. For a distance of 244 feet amidships, the armor will have a maximum thickness of 6 inches and a minimum of 5; thence to the bow and to the stern the belt will have a uniform thickness, top and bottom, of 3 1/2 inches. For a distance of 232 feet amidships, above the water-line belt and up to the main deck, the sides will be reinforced by 5-inch armor; transverse bulkheads, turning inboard at the ends of this side armor, will complete the central casemate housing the ten 6-inch guns. These transverse bulkheads will be 4 inches thick. The protective deck will be continuous from bow to stern; on the flat it will be 1 1/2 inch thick and on the slopes 4 inches thick. Above this protective deck a cellulose belt 3 feet thick will be worked along the sides from one end of the ship to the other. It is required that the water-line armor belt be so placed that at least a foot of it will be out of water at deepest draft.
The armament will consist of: A main battery of four 45-caliber, 8-inch breech-loading rifles and fourteen 50-caliber, 6-inch breech-loading rifles; and a secondary battery of eighteen 14-pounders, twelve 3-pounders, four I-pounder automatic guns, four I-pounder single-shot guns, two 3-inch field guns, two machine guns, and a half a dozen small caliber pieces for boat service. There will be two submerged torpedo-tubes, to be placed on the broadsides pretty well forward. The 8-inch guns are to be mounted in two balanced elliptical turrets on the main deck forward and aft of the superstructure. These turrets will be generally 6 inches thick with slanting faces ½ inch thicker. The turrets are to be controlled electrically, and are to fire through arcs of 270 degrees. The rate of ammunition supply is one complete round of powder and projectile to each electric hoist every fifty seconds.
The four 6-inch guns mounted on the main deck are to be placed in sponsons at the four main corners of the superstructure, and are to fire through arcs of 145 degrees—the forward ones from dead ahead aft, and the after ones from dead astern forward. These guns are protected by 5-inch armor. The ten other 6-inch guns, five on each broadside, are to be placed amidships on the gun deck—the forward ones firing dead ahead, while all the other guns on each side will have arcs of fire of no degrees, and will be arranged to house within the side line. These guns will be separated by 2 1/4-inch splinter bulkheads. The ammunition hoists will be run by electricity, and are to supply each 6-inch gun with three complete rounds every minute. The 14-pounders will be mounted on the gun deck and up in the superstructure, two forward and three aft of the 6-inch battery on each side, and four on each broadside between the 6-inch guns up in the superstructure. The 3-pounders are to be mounted on the superstructure deck and on the bridges, while most of the 1-pounders are to fill the military tops. Each 14-pounder is to be supplied six rounds a minute, while the 3-pounders are to have ten.
The firing stations for the torpedoes will be sheltered from the reach of 6-pounders and lighter pieces, and are to be located above the torpedotubes. The conning-tower, located at the fore end of the superstructure, will be of steel 9 inches thick, and the signal tower, located at the after end of the superstructure, will be of steel five inches thick. The pilothouse will be of bronze. All magazines are to be carefully insulated, and certain of them are to be chilled by the refrigerating plant. All are also to be easily susceptible of instant flooding.
Because of the extensive application of electricity, the ships will carry pretty large generating plants, having a total output from the seven units of 6250 amperes at 80volts—power enough to run all the ammunition hoists, work the turrets, drive some of the ventilating fans, run the machine shop, and furnish power for the steam laundry which is to do the major share of the officers' and crew's washing. Owing to the high freeboard of the ships and to the fact that it is carried uniformly from bow to stern, very excellent accommodations will be provided for the officers and enlisted men, of which the complement will consist of: 1 flag officer, 1 commanding officer, 1 chief of staff, 20 ward-room officers, 12 junior officers, 10 warrant officers, and 777 enlisted men, a total of 822 persons.
The ships will have twin screws, driven each by its own triple-expansion engine of the four-cylinder type. The high-pressure cylinders will be 36 inches in diameter, the intermediate-pressure cylinders will be 59 ½ inches in diameter, and the two low-pressure cylinders of each engine will be 69 inches in diameter. They will have a common stroke of 45 inches, and the engines will make about 133 revolutions when developing the maximum indicated horse-power of 23,000. Steam will be supplied by 30 boilers of the straight-tube water-tube type placed in 8 water-tight compartments. They will have a combined grate surface of at least I590 square feet and a total heating surface of quite 68,000 square feet. The four funnels will rise 100 feet above the grate bars. The normal reserve of fresh water will be 150 tons—just half of that carried on trial, and, excepting coal, the trial displacement will call for two-thirds of all other stores.
The ships will carry ammunition enough to put up a good long fight; 500 rounds being allowed the 8-inch guns, 2800 rounds for the 6-inch guns, 4500 rounds for the 14-pounders, 6000 rounds for the 3-pounders, and a pretty liberal supply for the rest. Provision is to be made for closing many of the water-tight doors automatically, i. e., from a single controlling station, and every care has been taken to minimize the consequences of accident or injury. Three years is the maximum time limit for the construction, and the maximum limit of cost is $4,000,000 in the case of the ships of 1899 and $4,250,000 in the case of the ships provided for during the present year.
We have ample reason to be proud of these latest products of our naval designers; and in either peace or war they are bound to command a wholesome respect. —Scientific American, Dec. 1, 1900.
LAUNCH OF THE MONITOR WYOMING.
The Wyoming was launched at the Union Iron Works, San Francisco, on September 8, in the presence of His Excellency the Governor of Wyoming and an enormous crowd of spectators. While a powerful vessel, the Wyoming is considerably less in dimensions compared with the Monterey, though both are practically of the same type. The Monterey is 255 feet in length, and is 59 feet beam, with a depth of 14 feet 10 inches. The Wyoming's dimensions are: Length, 252 feet; beam, 50 feet; and mean draught, 12 feet 6 inches. The side armor of the former vessel is 13 inches in greatest thickness, tapering to 8 inches at the ends; of the latter, 11 inches, tapering to 3 and 5 inches. Displacement: Monterey, 4084; Wyoming, 3235; horse-power engines, 5244 and 2400 respectively; speed, 13.6 and 12.
The armament of the Monterey consists of two 12-inch and two 10-inch main battery, six 6-pounders, four I-pounders, two Gatlings. Of the Wyoming, two 12-inch, four 4-inch rapid-fire, two 6-pound semi-automatic, four 1-pound automatic, and additional four automatic 1-pounders have been authorized.
Although the Wyoming will carry only two heavy guns, as compared with four carried by the Monterey, the increased power of her two 12-inch rifles, due to greater length and smokeless powder, is such that one round from them will have 12,800 foot-tons more energy than one round from the four guns of the larger vessel.
The keel of the new monitor was laid in October, 1899, and her completion is promised in six months.—Scientific American, Oct. 13, 1900.
THE PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE ST. LOUIS CLASS.
A point has been reached in the development of the new United States navy in which we not only have ceased to follow the lead of other navies, but are producing original designs of ships and novel details which are being followed by foreign constructors. It is true that in size the United States navy stands fourth among those of the world, but in design, material, equipment and efficiency it is the equal, if not the superior, of any other navy. This result is due largely to the ability and energy of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which, under the Chief Constructor, Rear-Admiral Philip Hichborn, has been responsible for the design, construction and maintenance in a state of efficiency of our new navy. The latest products of this Bureau are fourteen vessels, whose construction has recently been authorized, namely, five battleships, of about 15,000 tons displacement, six armored cruisers of about 14.000 tons displacement, and the three protected cruisers which form the subject of the present article, of a little under To,000 tons displacement.
The protected cruisers, to be named the St. Louis, Milwaukee and Charleston (the latter to continue the name of the 3700-ton vessel wrecked November 2, 1899, off Kamiguin Island in the Philippine group), compare favorably with their class in other navies. In fact, so closely do they approach the type of second-class armored cruisers that they might easily be mistaken for such. In an engagement they would prove themselves a match for some of the armored cruisers of other navies. A comparison of their principal data with that of the British Monmouth class will demonstrate their value.
The act authorizing the St. Louis class states that these vessels shall carry "the most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, and have the highest speed compatible with good cruising qualities and great radius of action"; all these qualifications have been embodied in the design for these vessels.
The main deck of these cruisers is supplemented amidships with a covered superstructure, within which are located four 6-inch rapid-fire guns and six 14-pounder rapid-fire guns; outside the superstructure are two more 6-inch rapid-fire guns, located on the center line, one forward and the other aft. Located on the gun deck is the greater portion of the battery, consisting of eight 6-inch rapid-fire guns, twelve 14-pounder rapid-fire guns, and four I-pounder rapid-fire guns. Sixteen rapid-fire guns are stationed on the superstructure deck and bridges, and the remainder of the battery is located in the fighting tops of the two military masts. Additional platforms are built upon the masts to accommodate the two searchlights. Electric ammunition hoists are designed to supply the guns with the greatest rapidity, making it possible to hurl against an enemy a broadside of about twelve tons of metal per minute.
The four lofty smokestacks, extending to a height of 76 feet 6 inches above the normal load water-line, provide draft for sixteen straight water tubular boilers located in four water-tight compartments, which, together with the engines, are protected by the side armor, sloping deck armor, and a 12-foot coal-bunker.
The inner bottom of these vessels extends to the under side of the protective deck; above the protective deck a cellulose cofferdam. 30 inches wide and 41 inches above the normal load water-line, extends throughout the length of the vessel.
In the construction and equipment of the St. Louis class, as small a quantity as possible of wood is to be used, and wherever it is used it will be electric fire-proofed. Each vessel of this class is fitted to accommodate a flag officer and staff in conjunction with the regular complement. In commission the number of officers will be 39 and the crew will number 525 men, for which are provided 16 boats, ranging from a 36-foot steam cutter to a 16-foot dinghy, and in addition to these two 12-foot punts and two life-rafts will be carried. These boats are stowed in chocks on the superstructure deck and swung out by four cranes.
All the latest and best improvements in construction and equipment are to be provided for the accommodation and comfort of the officers and crew.
The water-line belt, 4 inches in thickness, extends in the wake of the engines and boilers and magazines for over one-third of the vessel's length, and reaches from several feet below to about 3 feet above the normal water-line. Side armor of the same thickness is carried up amidships to the main deck, and extends between and includes the forward and after 6-inch guns on the gun deck. The 6-inch guns at the four corners of the superstructure are also protected by 4-inch armor.
While we greatly admire these vessels, we must express a regret that the water-line armor was not carried up to the bow, even if some compromise had been necessary in the matter of coal or armament. This is an age of armored cruisers (i. e., ships with a complete water-line belt), and it is regrettable that these vessels should fall short of the requirements for want of the 120 feet of 2- to 3-inch armor necessary to complete the belt to the stem.
The corn-pith cellulose cofferdam at the water-line, with its waterexcluding properties, will safeguard the trim and stability of the St. Louis against all but the smaller 6- and 14-pounder shells about as effectively as if the 2-inch belt were extended to the stem; but it will be just these very small caliber guns that will be used to search out and cut to pieces the unprotected ends of an enemy's water-line.
It must be admitted that the new ships, although they are not quite in the class of the armored cruisers, are nevertheless more than a match for any protected cruiser afloat.—Scientific American, Dec. 22, 1900.
THE FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP WISCONSIN.
The first-class battleship Wisconsin, recently completed by the Union Iron Works, possesses interest for our readers from the fact that she was built in the yard which turned out the famous battleship Oregon. The latter vessel, like the Wisconsin, is one of a class of three ships, and like her she is the fastest in her class. The Alabama, the Illinois and Wisconsin were authorized on June 10, 180. The first-named vessels was allotted to the Cramps, of Philadelphia, and has already undergone her trials with great success, achieving a speed of 17.01 knots an hour. The Illinois is approaching completion at the yard of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company, and the Wisconsin has recently completed her official trials, on which she made an average speed of 17.17 knots per hour. The principal dimensions of the vessel are as follows: Length, 368 feet; beam, 72 feet 2 1/2 inches; mean draft, when the ship is fully equipped ready for sea, with all stores on board and a normal coal supply of 800 tons, 23.6 feet. The displacement of the vessel with two-thirds of ammunition and two-thirds of stores on board is 11,565 tons. Her bunkers have a maximum coal capacity of 1440 tons. She is propelled by twin engines. They are of 10,000 estimated indicated horse-power, although this was considerably exceeded on the trial trip, when the maximum indication reached 12,322. They are of the inverted three-crank, triple-expansion type, and while they conform broadly to the specifications drawn up by the Naval Bureau of Engineering, the builders have introduced specialties of design, which they have already used with marked success in other naval vessels built for the government. The most noticeable of these is the framing of the engines, which is formed of forged built-up columns at the back, and turned columns for the front side of the engine. The forged column is of a type which was first used by these builders in the engines of the Olympia, and later in those of the battleship Oregon. It is built up of forged plate sides, on which are flanges for securing the column to the bedplate and to the cylinder bottoms. Between the sides is bolted in the casting which forms the main guides, and below the guides the sides are spread, and a webplate is worked in, the lower half of the frame being thus in the form of an inverted Y. It is claimed by the builders that this type of frame provides unusual rigidity, and the forged iron is more reliable than the material of the usual cast steel frames. The high-pressure cylinder is 33 1/2 inches in diameter, the intermediate 51 inches, and the low-pressure cylinder 78 inches in diameter, the common stroke being 4 feet. The crank shaft is made of three interchangeable and reversible sections; the crank pins are 14 1/4 inches in diameter by 17 inches long; and there is a 7 1/2-inch hole axially through the shaft and crank pins. The thrust shafts are 14 inches in diameter, and the propeller shafts 1434 inches in diameter, with a 9 3/4-inch axial hole throughout their entire length, except in the after section, where they pass through the hub of the propeller, in which portion the hole is tapered.
The engines are fitted with straight-push, reversing gear, and the air pumps are independent of the main engine. The main circulating pumps, which supply the condensers, may be used to empty the bilge of the ship, for which purpose they have a capacity of 12,000 gallons per minute. The screw propellers are three-bladed and are made of manganese bronze. They are 15 1/2 feet in diameter and the pitch is 17 feet 6 inches. Steam is supplied by eight single-ended steel boilers in four compartments; the boilers are 15 feet 6 1/2 inches in diameter and lo feet in length.
The Wisconsin is a fine, seaworthy vessel with a good freeboard of about 20 feet forward and 13 feet aft. Her main battery of four 13-inch breech-loading rifles is carried in two barbette turrets; the barbettes are plated with 15 inches of Harveyized steel, and the turrets with 14 inches. She has a water-line belt from 7 to 8 feet in depth, which varies in thickness from 16 1/2 to 9 1/2 inches at top and bottom respectively amidships to 4 inches at the stem. This belt extends as far aft as the after barbette. With this armor is associated a steel deck 2 4 inches in thickness on the flat, 3 inches in thickness forward, and 4 inches from the after end of the armor belt to the stern. The main rapid-fire battery consists of fourteen 6-inch rapid-fire guns, ten of which are carried on the main deck and four on the spar deck. Of these on the main deck, eight are carried within a central citadel, which is protected with 6 inches of Harveyized armor, the armor extending in the wake of the guns and running across at the ends of the battery diagonally to a junction with the 12-inch armor of the barbettes. The two other guns on the main deck are carried well forward in sponsons armed with 6 inches of Harveyized steel. The four guns on the spar deck are carried immediately above the central rapid-fire battery and are likewise protected with 6 inches of armor. The secondary battery is made up of sixteen 6-pounders, six i-pounders, four Colts and two 3-inch field guns. There are also four Whitehead torpedo dischargers. The total complement of officers and men will be 493. Considering that the keel of the vessel was not laid until February, 1897, it is evident that improved facilities are enabling our shipbuilders to turn out these big vessels more rapidly than they could when earlier vessels of the Oregon type were built.—Scientific American, Dec. 8, 1900.
U. S. TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYER DALE.
In Marine Engineering for August brief mention was made of the launch of the torpedo-boat destroyer Dale on July 24 at the yards of the Win. R. Trigg Co., Richmond, Va. The following particulars will be of further interest.
The Dale is the first of the sixteen destroyers now building for the government to be launched. As it was a side launch, unusual interest was created and upwards of 5000 people witnessed the scene.
Miss Mary H. Wilson, of Philadelphia, a descendant of Commodore Dale, after whom the boat is named, acted as sponsor and succeeded very well in breaking the bottle of "yellow label" over the bow of the destroyer as it took its initial plunge. The boat glided smoothly off the ways without a hitch of any kind and came to a standstill after having gone not more than 30 feet, resting gracefully on the water, with every line showing the fineness that will permit the high speed it is designed to make. The dimensions and particulars of the launching ways were as follows:
Groundways, 12 inches by 12 inches, yellow pine.
Groundway shoes, 12 inches by 1 1/2 inches, oak.
Slidingways, 5 1/2 inches by 12 inches.
Length of slidingways, 23 feet.
Inclination of ways, 2 inches to 7 feet.
Number of ways, 10.
Bearing surface, 230 square feet.
Number of triggers, 5.
Launching weights, 593 tons.
Pressure per square foot, .839 ton.
A preparation of No. 1 Albany grease and beef tallow was applied about one-half inch thick on the ways and then covered with soft soap. Owing to the heat, considerable more tallow was used than is usually required.
The dimensions of the Dale are as follows:
Length over all 245 ft.
Beam 23 ft.
Depth 14 ft. 3 in.
Draft 6 ft. 6 in.
Normal displacement 420 tons.
I. H. P. 8,000
Speed - 28 knots.
Thornycroft boilers, Daring type 4
Total grate surface 315 sq. ft.
Total heating surface 17,768 sq. ft.
Steam pressure, boiler 300 lbs. per sq. in.
Two four-cylinder triple-expansion engines. Diam. of cylinders, 201. in., 32 in., and two 38 in., each with a common stroke of 22 in.
TORPEDO-BOAT BARNEY.
At the yard of the Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me., on July 30, was launched the U. S. torpedo-boat Barney. This boat is one of the number authorized by Congress in 1898. Her dimensions and chief particulars are as follows: Length, 557 feet; beam, 57 feet; depth amidships, so feet 9 inches; mean draft, 4 feet 8 inches; displacement, 160 tons; speed, 28 knots; cost $170,000. The armament will consist of three pairs of R. F. guns and three tubes for short 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes.—Marine Engineering, Sept., 1900.