Introduction
The following memorandum was submitted to the Navy Department last winter. The general idea it embodied met with approval, and one of its immediate consequences has been the establishment of a Board to undertake General Staff work. The Board is known as the "General Board."
The Department has permitted the ideas contained in this memorandum to be made public, and as some officers have formed mistaken notions of the duties which the General Board is to perform it seems desirable that the original memorandum should appear in the Naval Institute. The suggestions contained at the close of the memorandum were not regarded as final, but were only to serve as a basis for discussion. Some of the suggestions were approved, others were not, and still others were approved but could not at the moment be carried out, owing to a scarcity of officers, or other causes.
The value of the memorandum will be in rendering practical the principle, hitherto vaguely expressed, of a General Staff, the first stage having been reached when the Office of Intelligence and the War College became firmly established. The creation of a General Staff for the navy of a great nation must be like all large movements, of slow growth. Any undue suddenness or jerkiness tends to dissipate the strength of the onward impulse. The Germans took fifty years to perfect their General Staff; we will not probably achieve it in less than twenty-five years. How much of that time we may already have gained in the last fifteen years of the Intelligence Office and the War College, we cannot accurately compute. But in any case we have some years yet of earnest work before we can enjoy the benefits in our Navy, which the German Army only began to reap after 1860.
The reactionary element in the Navy will have its effect upon this development, and for that reason it is not certain that the form the General Staff movement now takes will be permanent. This form is the establishment of a General Board having for a nucleus the War College and the Intelligence Office, combined under the Chief of Navigation. Other methods may be from time to time substituted for these if found desirable, but it is hoped that whatever be the means employed, the end to be attained as shown in the memorandum will be kept constantly in view by the Navy, in order that as our fleet expands to large proportions, its proper disposition in war may be provided for.
Memorandum
The need for a General Staff in our Navy is not unnatural: All military organizations, afloat and ashore, experience the same necessity, as do all large business enterprises in civil life, though under other names than that of General Staff. The regular traffic of a railroad ten miles long, connecting two unimportant villages needs only honest management and some technical skill; but when such a railroad, having grown to thousands of miles of track and drawing its freights from far distant territory, is forced to consider the varying conditions of agriculture, manufacture and navigation upon which its own life is based, it is no longer enough for it to possess skilled engineers and accountants, but there must be a group of men who have, as their principal work, to think for the railroad, to observe rival lines, to consider the local laws of towns and states which their tracks traverse, and above all, to watch the future and prepare their system to draw all possible advantage from events-agricultural, financial and political-as they occur.
These duties, usually performed by Boards of Directors or central committees of management, are similar to those which, in a military force on land or sea, are performed by a general staff, whether called by that name or not.
The functions of such a group of officers are developed usually by the continuance of wars through considerable periods, although there are exceptions, one of which-and the most notable for effectiveness-being the General Staff of the German Army, which attained its excellent efficiency through the half century succeeding the Napoleonic wars, a period of almost unbroken peace in Europe.
It is probably more accurate to say that the necessity for a General Staff is developed and made apparent by long wars, while the proper evolution of its duties and the thorough training of its members is more successfully accomplished during times of peace. Herein, however, lies a danger. The tendency of military bodies in peace is to grow theoretical and unpractical, and the utmost care is needed to combat this mental drift of intelligent officers who study war methods, which a long peace prevents their actively practicing. General Von Oausewitz, himself a veteran Chief of Staff, cautions armies against giving up certain field duties to the General Staff, saying that the higher officers of that corps gain thus an undue mental predominance that leads to an exclusiveness fatal to efficiency. Dispositions of forces he adds, that should be made without previous bias of mind and to suit each case as it arises on the field, are adopted as the outcome of a rigid, narrow plan decided upon beforehand in office or camp.
It is probably with this caution in mind that the Germans have arranged that officers of the General Staff shall alternate their service on the staff with periods of active regimental work in field or garrison. Thus they avoid during peace that condition of "theory gone mad," which some other armies have finally corrected only after serious disasters in war.
The Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870 plainly indicated the value of the German General Staff; and the armies of the great powers, except perhaps the United States and England, have endeavored, with varying success, to imitate it.
With navies it has not been regarded as so essential, many naval officers of all nations having failed to perceive that the underlying principles of a military force are the same afloat as ashore. It is to be noted, however, that the Board of Admiralty in England satisfies many of the conditions of a General Staff, at the same time that it controls the material construction and manning of the fleet.
Let us now consider what are the real functions of the General Staff of an army or a navy.
Its duties, as generally understood, are to gather information concerning foreign navies or armies, and to measure and correctly appreciate their military value; to consider the probable aims and purposes of those foreign services in case of war; to gain a knowledge of their strong places and of the strategic centers they are likely to occupy at the opening of hostilities; the relation of their force and its strategic center of action to our territory and force in its probable area of action; finally, a careful comparison of our own strength with that of other nations.
Based upon the above examinations, plans are made for the various warlike contingencies likely to occur. These plans are based, primarily, upon strategic and tactical principles, and later, worked out with a detail that grows more minute as information increases and deliberations mature. These plans which, in the Navy, concern themselves at first with our regular force of battleships and auxiliaries, will gradually include Naval Militia and Reserves, merchant vessels, the naval defense of anchorages unprotected by the army, the provision of additional men for emergencies, and finally, after frequent consultations with the army chiefs, they will provide for that exact cooperation of the army and navy so important to success.
It will often occur that the Secretary of the Navy, when these war plans are before him, will find certain changes expedient in the peace policy and establishment, as natural deductions from the war preparations, and one effect of this work will be to recognize that the Navy is a war machine with incidental purposes of peace. When this principle is acted upon, the Navy will become both economical and efficient.
The above making of plans is the first element of General Staff work, and is generally, though vaguely, recognized as being its proper duty.
The second element, though rarely recognized in a formal manner, is by far the more important of the two. It is the mental training of officers engaged in this plan-making, and their consequent readiness to confront warlike situations in general. It does not equal the school of actual war, but it is only second to it and there is no third method. This trained readiness of officers' minds, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, constituted the essential value of the diligent staff work done by the Germans during fifty years of peace. What the world at large saw were the plans of work perfected in all minutiae, railroad cars numbered for special work, arriving near battlefields on schedule time, bringing guns or men, pontoons or hospital beds. This it was which, being so admired, gave to the Staff its reputation among nonprofessional people, and it was, in fact, a most valuable aid in the battle and campaign; but far greater, as a factor of efficiency, was the state of mind of German officers-from Generals down to Majors-that familiarity with war situations, acquired in the staff work of peace, which enabled them to confront all emergencies of the campaign with ready energy and composure of mind.
Such, then, are the purposes of a General Staff. The American Navy has for some years felt instinctively that this, or something like this, was needed for future efficiency. Evidence of this is apparent in the creation, many years ago, of a War College at Newport and an Office of Intelligence in the Navy Department. In those two institutions are to be found many of the elements of a General Staff, requiring only a slight drawing together by a common head-such as the Assistant Secretary or the Chief of ' ·Navigation-to create a nucleus of effort around which would form a body of great usefulness to the Navy and the country. It would grow of itself, needing but one care and precaution on the part of the Navy, namely that of selecting always for that duty officers best known for their practical success in the handling of ships and command of men, and forbidding any continuous staff duty, in order that frequent tours of active service afloat, alternating with the General Staff work ashore, may prevent that over-theorizing in which exists always the initial germ of decay for any practical calling, and especially for a profession of arms.
In the development of the Intelligence Office and War College the Navy has been unconsciously forming the elements of a General Staff, until now the time has arrived when, much of the work having been done, the Navy can decide whether it shall give life to these elements, by providing a concert of action for them, by adding to them such minor work as may be fitting, and by assigning the whole to the charge of some official, such as the Assistant Secretary or the Chief of Bureau of Navigation, who, by the nature of his present duties, is already prepared for their superintendence.
The representative form of our government causes a tendency in the executive branch to lean somewhat upon Congress and to ask its action, before any decided movement or change is undertaken in any of the Departments. This tendency, proper in all representative governments up to a certain point, has at times been carried too far, and projects still crude and requiring years of trial and examination by the executive, have been placed before Congress,. with requests for legislation, which have resulted in measures not always satisfactory in their operation to the very persons who have asked for them.
This evil is not a necessary one. The scope of the executive power is quite sufficient to permit such testing of new methods as may be needed to convince us of their efficiency, before submitting them to Congress. In the case of a long-established military service such as the American Navy, the creating of a General Staff should be a gradual evolution, carried on under the eye of the Department and continued until, when satisfied with the result, the Department asks Congress to pass a measure which solidifies into law, and sanctions the continuance of a condition of things already in fact existing.
Up to the point where the money is needed and the legislative function is thus encountered, there seems to be no reason why the Navy Department should not develop a system of General Staff in the Navy, though it need not have that title. Later on, when some years of trial, change and modification shall have perfected the system, the formal sanction of Congress can be asked, and such moneys appropriated as may then be needed for its maintenance.
It appears from the annual report of the Secretary of War for 1899, that he has in view a General Staff for the army, under the name and form of a War College, and the ideas embodied in that report being sound and practical, there seems no question that, with certain modifications, they will gradually establish themselves as the foundation of a military structure worthy of the learning and gallantry of the army officers. The movement will, perforce, be slow in armies or navies, being obstructed continually by those tendencies to stagnation which lie hidden under the disguise of "military traditions."
From the naval point of view, this project of the army's is an excellent one. A more definite embodiment of the Military Intelligence Office in their work seems to us desirable, and it is very expedient to insure the students of the War College being principally of and above the grade of Major, leaving the schools of ·application at Monroe, Leavenworth, Reilly and Willets Point to engage the attention of the more junior grades. Experience will doubtless instruct the army officers to make any such changes as may prove desirable.
This memorandum has been written in reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Navy as to what concrete things should be done at present in the development of a General Staff.
If, in response to this inquiry, we should submit a complete plan covering many years, elaborate in detail and precise as to dates, we would by this only indicate our own ignorance of the true nature of the project; but we may with confidence suggest some measures whose necessity is now plainly apparent. At present, we perceive certain things: 1st, that we have established a War College and Office of Intelligence; 2nd, that these two are essential elements of a General Staff; 3rd, that the Department appointed a War Board when the late war began, indicating by such action the need of General Staff advice. Let us base present action upon these facts with the following suggestions:
a. The Secretary to issue an order to the War College and Office of Naval Intelligence that their work shall be regarded as directly connected and interdependent, and that the chiefs of the two institutions and their first assistants and the Chief of Bureau of Navigation shall constitute a permanent board of five members, who shall meet frequently and consult as to war plans and information. That one-half the Intelligence Office force shall pass four months of each year at the War College, and one-half the War College force four months at the Intelligence Office.
b. An order to the Chief of Bureau of Navigation and others concerned, that their Board of five shall meet, in November of each year, the Senior Officer of the Navy and the officer commanding the North Atlantic Fleet and their Chiefs of Staff, and this board of nine shall consider the war plans and other data that have been devised and arranged during the twelve months preceding; and this board may be convened at other times, in addition to the November session, when thought desirable.
c. That the approved plans be in the custody of the Chief of Bureau of Navigation; that the combined work of the College and Intelligence Office be under the general direction and orders of the Chief of Bureau of Navigation; and that the Secretary receive, through him, the war plans as completed, and such suggestions as to the fleet and its disposition as may from time to time result from the discussion of the plans.
d. When matters of constructing, arming, equipping or manning the fleet are necessarily deduced from the War Plans, and require action of the Department and its Bureaus in supplying ships and their accessories, they shall be submitted to the Assistant Secretary, who shall consider them and transmit them to the Secretary of the Navy.
e. A Department Order that the staff of the Intelligence Office be not less than ten officer; , of whom one-half be above the grade of Lieutenant, Junior Grade; and the permanent staff of the War College be not less than eight officers, of whom one-half be above the grade of Lieutenant.
That the number of officers taking the course at the War College each year be not less than thirty, of whom ten may be, when desired, of the Marine Corps, Army, Revenue, and Naval Reserve or Militia services. Of the officers of the Navy, three-fourths must be above the grade of Lieutenant.
At the close of the course, the names of those desirable for future work in the War College or Intelligence Office will be submitted to the Chief of Bureau of Navigation, in his capacity as Chief of General Staff, and will be chosen for this work whenever sea duty permits.