Translated from the Spanish
INTRODUCTORY.
The publication by this office of the partial translation of "Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba," by Lieutenant Müller y Tejeiro, was received with so much interest both in and out of the service that the small edition of 1,000 copies was soon exhausted. The chapters there omitted were:
I. Some Historical Antecedents.
II. The United States and the Maine.
III. The First Shots.
IV. The Scene of Events.
V. Forces of the Jurisdiction (Santiago).
VI. Works of Defense.
VII. Artillery Set Up.
VIII. The Cruiser Reina Mercedes.
XIV. The Volunteers.
XXX. Escario's Column (being a description of General Escario's march across the country from Manzanillo to Santiago).
XXXIII. Suspension of Hostilities.
XXXVII. Traders, not the Spanish People (responsible for the Cuban trouble).
XXXVIII. Gerona and Santiago de Cuba (comparison of the two battles).
These have since been translated, and are given in this edition, excepting Chapters I, II, and III, which are again omitted, as they contain no original or new matter, and have no connection with the subject of the book.
Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the diary of General Escario's march, with 3,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of 52 leagues through the enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering the nature of the country, which forced them generally to march single file, the heavy rains, and the continual harassment by the Cubans, the effectiveness of which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may be classed as one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows what the Cubans did toward the fall of Santiago, and a study of the situation will be interesting, considering what would have been the temporary effect if Escario's march had been unopposed, and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unimpaired a day or two before that critical period—July 2—just previous to the departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet.
Richardson Clover,
Chief Intelligence Officer.
December 31, 1898.
PREFACE.
On the 18th of May, the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day.
On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to replenish.
It did not require great power of penetration to understand that, owing to the scant resources available at this harbor, it would take more days to get the necessary fuel on board than it would take Admiral Sampson, Commander of the United States fleet, to find out that circumstance, and that consequently the Spanish fleet would be blockaded, as indeed it was; and as a natural and logical inference, that the enemy's objective would be the city and harbor of Santiago, where the only battle-ships that Spain had in the Antilles, or at least in the Greater Antilla, had taken refuge.
Thus, the arrival of the fleet gave this city a military importance which without that event it would never have acquired, and changed it to the principal—not to say, the only—scene of operations in the island, the denouement of which would necessarily be of great interest and of powerful influence on the result of the campaign and the war. Subsequent events have shown the truth of my assumption, which was also the assumption of everybody else in the city.
From that time on, I have kept an exact diary, from day to day, from hour to hour, from minute to minute even—and when I say this I am not exaggerating, for it is still in existence and may be seen—of everything I saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy.
When some official duty prevented me, I was ably replaced by my friend, Mr. Dario Laguna, aid of the captaincy of the port (ayudante de la capitanía de puerto), who gladly rendered the service I asked of him, in spite of his constant and manifold obligations.
If truth is a merit, these "Notes" (begging pardon for my want of modesty) possess it, though it may be their only merit. Whatever they contain has actually happened, and those who have returned from Santiago will testify to it. Not a single fact, no matter how insignificant, herein related, is doubtful or hypothetical. Wherever I did not know the outcome of any event, or where its objects or consequences have remained a mystery, I have openly acknowledged it, without circumlocution, as any one may see who reads these notes. There is in them nothing of my own invention, and my imagination has had nothing to do with them, unfortunately, for I do not possess the gift of invention, which I admire so much in others. My work has been confined to gathering data and obtaining as much information as possible, my only care having been to see that everything was correct, and I have made sure of this by comparing the data collected with the information obtained.
Feeling sure that the events which have taken place from May 18 to July 17—hence the true situation in which were Santiago de Cuba and the forces defending it—can not be known in Spain in detail, but only in general, I am desirous of making them known in their whole truth, so that the country, to whom I think that we who were entrusted with defending its honor and interests at a distance of fifteen hundred leagues, owe the strictest account, may be able, with a complete knowledge of the facts, to call us to account, if it thinks that we have incurred any responsibility. Such has been my object, and I trust that my comrades of Santiago de Cuba, both in the Army and in the Navy, will approve of it.
Santiago de Cuba, August 10, 1898.
IV.—The Scene of Events.
In order to be able to form at least an approximate idea of the events which are taking place here, and of which no one knows as yet when and how they will end, it is indispensable to know the location of the places where they are occurring, and for that reason I will describe them as briefly as possible, referring the reader to the sketch at the end of this book and the explanations concerning the different places.
Santiago de Cuba, the capital of the province of the same name, occupying the eastern part of the island, contained at the beginning of the present insurrection about 45,000 inhabitants; but the population has been reduced to about three-fourths of that, owing to emigrations and epidemics. The city is built on very hilly ground, at the head of a bay which is almost entirely closed in and very safe, so that, when seen from the city, it looks more like a lake than an arm of the sea. The distance to the mouth of the harbor in a straight line is about 4 miles.
This mouth, which is extremely narrow, is bounded on the east by the heights of the Morro and on the west by those of the Socapa, both of which are very steep toward the south, that is, where they border on the sea.
At Punta Morrillo, the western extremity of the Morro heights, which latter rise about 65 meters above the level of the sea, is situated Morro Castle, which was at one time a very good fort, well built, but in these days of modern artillery, it is not only useless, but even dangerous on account of the target which it presents, and this was the opinion of the junta of defense when they decided that whatever artillery was to be installed there should be erected on the plateau of the Morro and not inside of the castle. On this plateau are also situated the houses of the governor, the adjutant of the fort, the engineers and gunners, the lookout and the lighthouse keepers, also the light-house itself, which is a white light, fixed, flashing every two minutes, and visible 16 miles. Since May 18, in consequence of the events of that day, it has not been lighted.
The heights of the Socapa, whose elevation is about the same as that of the Morro heights, are bounded on the west, as already stated, by the mouth of the harbor, and contain no fortification nor defense of any kind.
Ships wanting to enter Santiago harbor must follow the Morro shore, which is bold and comparatively clear, while on the Socapa shore is Diamante Bank, consisting of rocks, leaving a channel whose depth varies between 6 and 11 meters. Between the place where Diamante buoy is anchored (in 30 feet of water) and Estrella Cove the channel is not over 50 fathoms wide. At the head of this cove, which only small boats can enter, is the hut of the English cable.
The course to be taken in order to enter the harbor is NE. 5° N.(V.) (true), until coming close to Estrella battery, an old fort which, like the Morro, was good in its time, but is now useless. From this point to Punta Soldado, which is on the eastern shoreof the bay and which, with Punta Churruca, forms the entrance of Nispero Bay, the course is north, leaving to starboard Santa Catahna battery, which is abandoned and in ruins.
From Punta Soldado the course is NNW until coming close to Cay Smith, which is to be left to port; from there the course must be shaped so as to avoid the Punta Gorda Bank, whose beacon, marking 18 feet, is to be left to starboard.
Cay Smith is a small island, or rather a large rock of small surface and great elevation, on the top of which is a small stone hermitage of modern construction; on its southern slope are 111 houses and cottages belonging to pilots, fishermen, and private citizens, who have built them for the purpose of spending the hottest season there. In the northern part there are no buildings whatever, the ground being inaccessible.
After passing Punta Gorda, the course is to be shaped for Punta Jutias, leaving to port Colorado Shoals, containing a beacon, and Cay Ratones. The latter is a small low island devoid of all vegetation. In the extreme north is a powder magazine, and in the south the guardroom of the same.
From Punta Jutias, the course is NNE until reaching the general anchoring place, which is 8 meters deep (oozy bottom).
Santiago de Cuba has, besides many minor piers for boats and small craft, the Royal Pier and the piers of Luz and San José, all built of wood; only ships of less than 14 feet draft can go alongside of these. Between the city and Punta Jutias, at a place called Las Cruces, is the pier of the same name, built of iron with stone abutments, belonging to the American company of the Juragua iron mines; it has a watering place, the water coming from Aguadores in pipes. Ships of large draft can go alongside of this pier. A narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, passing over 26 kilometres of ground, goes to the extreme end of the pier.
Santiago is an open city, with not a vestige of fortification in its precinct (I am speaking of the beginning of the present war), and only at Punta Blanca, situated just south of it, is a battery of the same name, with a small powder magazine, intended only for saluting purposes and to answer salutes of warships casting anchor in the harbor.
From the above it will be seen that the mouth of Santiago harbor is defended by nature in such a manner that nothing is easier than to render it truly impregnable in a short time by installing modern artillery in batteries erected where it would be most necessary and convenient. The heights of the Morro and Socapa have a full view of the sea, and being difficult of access by land, they are easy to defend. Punta Gorda, owing to its admirable location and being high above the level of the sea, has entire control of the channel, and any ship trying to enter would necessarily be exposed to its fire and present her bow and port for at least twenty minutes. The very narrow entrance is well adapted for laying lines of torpedoes which could be easily protected by rapid-fire artillery erected on the western shore, preventing them from being dragged or blown up. Moreover, no matter how large a fleet might attempt to force the harbor, as but one vessel can pass through the channel at a time, and that only with the greatest care and precautions if it is over 80 meters long, nothing is easier than to sink it; and in that event, the channel would be completely obstructed and the harbor closed, until the submerged vessel is blown up.
It is evident, and almost superfluous for me to mention it, that with the same ease that a fleet trying to force the harbor can be prevented from entering, another fleet can be prevented from leaving it. But since Spain, in spite of all that was being done in the United States, never for a moment believed that war would come, it has not occurred to her to fortify this harbor. There were no guns; but on the other hand, plenty of good plans and designs which the military authorities in Santiago have never been able to have carried into effect, for the simple reason that the Government never got around to ordering that it be done.
Three miles west of the entrance of the Morro is the small harbor of Cabañas, which, while accessible only for small vessels, is very safe and well suited for landing purposes. It has 6 feet of water at the bar and 5 fathoms inside. The distance by land from Cabañas to Cabanitas on Santiago Bay is about a league.
Six miles farther west, or 9 miles from Santiago, is Punta Cabrera, the headland extending farthest south and the last one which can be seen. It is a high cone-shaped mountain. As the coast is very accessible, vessels of great draft can approach it. At the small cove of Guaicabón, east of said point, boats can land and communicate with the shore, which, in fact, is being done at this time by a steam yacht of the American fleet, which is probably receiving confidential information from the insurgents. Guaicabón is about 2 leagues from Santiago by land and the road is good.
Three miles east of the Morro is Aguadores Bay; it is crossed by a high bridge, over which passes the railroad of the Juragua mines. Boats can enter the river which empties into this bay; it is an excellent place for landing.
A quarter of a mile farther east is the roadstead of Sardinero, with a river emptying into it.
Three-fourths of a mile from there is Jutici, a small roadstead with a watering place.
Ten miles farther on is Juragua Beach, with a river that boats can enter.
Fifteen miles from there is Daiquiri Bay, with a river and watering places. Boats can enter here. Daiquiri Bay has a very fine stone and iron pier, also a small one for minor craft. Ashore, a short distance from the pier, are the offices of the employees of the mines and railroad for the transportation of the mineral from the mines to the pier, about 6 miles long. Large vessels can go alongside the iron pier.
Finally, 20 miles farther east is Punta Berracos, the last point which can be distinguished from the Morro, and the one projecting farthest south. Although it is possible to land here, with a great deal of work, it is not advisable to do so, there being no watering place and no road.
In all these places, east as well as west of Santiago, vessels can not remain with strong south or southeast winds, but must necessarily put to sea.
Aguadores and Santiago are connected by the Juragua railroad. The road along the coast is bad; it is a little over a league long.
From Sardinero to Santiago there are 2 leagues of good road.
The road leading from Juraguacito to Santiago is the Guasimas road, which is good, beginning at El Caney. It is 4 leagues long.
From Juragua to Santiago is the Sevilla road, which also leads to El Caney. This road and the former meet at a place called Dos Caminos. It is a good road, and about 4 leagues long. Moreover, as has been stated, there is a narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, which passes through Aguadores and terminates at Las Cruces Pier.
At Berracos there are no roads whatever, only paths, over which it is not possible to transport artillery.
The railroad to San Luis, 32,460 meters long, starts from Santiago and passes through the following points: Santiago, Cuavitas (station), Boniato, San Vicente, Dos Bocas (station), Cristo, Moron, Dos Caminos, and San Luis.
From Cristo a branch line of 10,300 meters goes to Songo. Trains are now running as far as Socorro.
These are the different places which form the scene of events now claiming the attention of the island of Cuba, and probably also of the Peninsula; and these events, whatever may be their outcome, will be of great importance and powerful influence on the result of the war.
V.—Forces of the Jurisdiction.
The present insurrection broke out on February 24, 1895, in the eastern provinces, but it soon invaded the western provinces and spread over the whole island from Cape San Antonio to Cape Maysi.
In order to check it, or at least reduce it to narrower limits, General Weyler conceived and carried out the plan of moving his forces from west to east, building trochas to prevent the insurgents from again invading the pacified provinces, or to enclose them between two lines of soldiers more or less difficult to force.
Consequently the greater part of the forces of the army of Cuba occupied the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Las Villas, for the purpose of carrying on active operations there, leaving a very small number at Camaguey, and still less in the eastern provinces. These latter provinces, therefore, could do nothing more than defend the country and the cities and towns and prevent the enemy from entering them. Hence, when the war with the United States broke out, the division of Santiago, consisting of two brigades, had to cover the districts of Santiago, Guantánamo, Baracoa, and Sagua; and it is only necessary to cast a glance at the map in order to understand how difficult it would be to control such an immense territory with such scant forces, which had to garrison many cities, towns, forts, and redoubts, cover four railway lines (from Santiago to Sabanillo and Maroto, to Juragua, to Daiquiri, and from Caimanera to Guantánamo), act as convoys, protect the mineral regions, and provide also for the formation of more or less numerous flying columns to harass the enemy incessantly. Fortunately this division was in command of General Linares, whose energy and zeal can never be sufficiently praised, and whose well-deserved promotion to lieutenant general was learned here by cable about the middle of May.
As the events which I propose to relate are only those directly concerning Santiago de Cuba and its jurisdiction, where they have taken place and which I have had a chance to witness, they will be the only ones that I shall refer to.
The first brigade of the division consisted of the following forces:
Chief of division, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio Linares Pombo;
Chief of staff, Lieut. Col. Ventura Fontán;
Military governor of Santiago and chief of the forces of that division. General of Division José Toral;
Chief of staff, Luis Irles;
Chief of the San Luis brigade, General of Brigade Joaquin Vara del Rey;
Chief of staff, Captain Juan Ramos.
It will be seen from the above that the brigade was really divided into two divisions, one under the orders of General Toral, and the other under the orders of General Vara del Rey. The forces composing both divisions were as follows:
Twelve companies of mobilized troops;
Two squads of the regiment of royal cavalry (less than 200 horse);
Two battalions of the regiment of Santiago infantry;
One Asiatic battalion;
One provincial battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1;
One battalion of San Fernando;
One battalion "Constitución;"
Also half a battery of artillery and a small force of the civil guard and engineers.
To these forces must be added the battalion of Talavera, which General Linares ordered from Baracoa as soon as the present war was declared and in anticipation of coming events.
These forces form at most a total of 8,000 men. General of Brigade Antero Rubín was under orders of General Linares.
Florencio Caula, colonel of the senior corps, was commander of engineers of the city, and Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar commander of artillery; the latter turned his command over to Colonel Ordoñez on April 29 upon being appointed superintendent of the artillery park.
Administrative chief, First-class Commissary Julio Cuevas.
Chief of the civil guard, Col. Francisco Oliveros.
Superintendent of the military hospital. Sub-inspector Pedro Martin Garcia.
Governor of Morro Castle, Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros.
When the first insurrection broke out in the Island of Cuba in 1868, bodies of volunteers were formed which have rendered good services as garrisons of the fortified places. At Santiago, according to official statements, there were the following:
First battalion: Col. Manuel Barrueco, 630 men
Second battalion: Lieut. Col. José Marimon, 485 men
Firemen: Col. Emilio Aguerrizabal, 324 men
Company of guides: Capt. Federico Bosch, 200 men
Company of veterans: Capt. José Prat, 130 men
Squad of cavalry, 100 men
Total, 1869 men
Santiago de Cuba is the capital of the maritime comandancia of the same name, bounded on the south by Junco Creek and on the north by Sagua de Tánamo, and divided into four districts: Manzanillo, Santiago de Cuba, Guantánamo, and Baracoa. The commander of this maritime comandancia was Capt. Pelayo Pedemonte, of the navy.
The prelate of the archdiocese Ilmo was Francisco Saenz de Urturi.
Governor of the province, Leonardo Ros.
President of the audencia territorial, Rafael Nacarino Brabo.
Mayor, Gabriel Ferrer.
The consular corps was represented by the following gentlemen:
Frederick W. Ramsden, England;
Germán Michaelsen, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Italy;
E. Hippean, France;
Pablo Bory, Mexico;
Juan E. Rabelo, Santo Domingo;
Temístocles Rabelo, Paraguay;
Juan Rey, Hayti.
The vice-consuls were:
Jacobo Bravo. United States of Colombia;
Isidoro Agustini, Sweden and Norway;
Leonardo Ros, Netherlands;
Modesto Ros, Portugal;
Eduardo Miranda, Venezuela;
Robert Mason, China;
José J. Hernandez, Argentine Republic.
The United States consul left on April 7 in an English steamer bound for Jamaica, having turned over the archives of his consulate to the British consul.
VI.—Works of Defense.
The governments of Spain have thought more than once of fortifying the coasts of the Island of Cuba, and for that purpose committees have been appointed who have studied the matter and submitted many good, even excellent, plans, which have been approved, but never carried into effect.
There was at Santiago a junta of land and marine defenses of the city, composed of the following persons:
President, the military governor of the city. General of Division José Toral; voting members, the commander of marine, Capt. Pelayo Pedemonte; the commander of engineers of the city, Col. Florencio Caula; the commander of artillery of the city, Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar; and the chief of submarine defenses, First Lieut. José Müller, of the navy.
The latter officer, whose regular office was that of second commander of marine, was only temporarily chief of submarine defenses, in the absence of torpedo officers, he not being one.
This junta held meetings whenever it was deemed necessary, until April 8, when a cablegram from the captain general of the island ordered that it become permanent, and that the commander of marine give his opinion as to the suitability of laying torpedoes. The junta, taking into account the grave situation, the imminence of war, and the scarcity of artillery material and appliances and resources of any kind, expressed the unanimous opinion that the only defense that could be counted on for the harbor were the torpedoes, for which the material was at hand, and consequently that they should be given preference, and everything within human power done to protect them and prevent their being dragged or blown up; in a word, that the torpedoes should be placed as the only veritable defense and everything else subordinated to them.
As early as the second day of the same month (April) the commander of submarine defenses, in compliance with orders received, had already commenced to charge the Latiner-Clark torpedoes, transferring them to Cay Ratones, where the powder magazine was located that contained the gun-cotton, also to place the buoys for the first row of torpedoes, and to carry out other operations in connection therewith.
The junta of defense, in view of the poor condition of Morro Castle and Estrella and Catalina batteries and of the information which the American consul would probably give his Government, decided to remove the torpedo-firing and converging stations from said forts where they were and erect them at places on the bay where they would be protected and sheltered from the hostile fire, and this was done.
On April 14 the second commander of marine turned over the submarine defenses to a torpedo officer, Lieut. Mauricio Arauco, commander of the gunboat Alvarado, who continued the work of laying the torpedoes; the first row, consisting of seven, with their firing stations at the Estrella and Socapa, was finished by April 21, and the second row, consisting of six, with stations at the Socapa and Cay Smith, on the 27th.
By orders of the commander general of marine (Havana), the second commander of marine of the province, together with Colonel of Engineers Angel Rosell and Captain of Artillery Ballenilla, left for Guantánamo on April 21, for the purpose of selecting the most suitable site for planting Bustamente torpedoes in that harbor so as to prevent ships from reaching Caimanera, returning to Santiago on the 25th after finishing the investigation. The torpedoes were subsequently placed by First Lieut. Julian Garcia Duran at the site selected.
On the 23d, the gunboat Sandoval left for Guantánamo, where her crew was to plant the Bustamente torpedoes. She has since remained at that harbor.
Two days before, on the 21st, orders were received from Havana to remove from the interior of the harbor all light buoys and beacons, which orders were promptly complied with.
It was also agreed by the junta of defense to establish at Punta Gorda a battery composed of two 15-cm. Mata howitzers and two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and the corps of engineers at once proceeded to clear the plateau of the mountain, build the road, and do other work preparatory to erecting such a battery. By the 26th, the two howitzers were ready to fire, and the two guns by the 27th, all of them being breech-loaders. This battery, which, as will be seen later, had two i6-cm. Hontoria guns, is the best of all the batteries erected, because it was done with less haste, and perhaps also because the ground was particularly well adapted. It was placed in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas, who had previously had command of the Morro battery.
On April 18 there arrived from Havana three 21 -cm. muzzle-loading howitzers, and a few days later, in the steamer Reina de los Angeles, three more from the same city.
A cablegram from Havana stated that, according to information received, the steamer Margrave would try to cut the cable at Santiago, thereby cutting on our communications, and it was therefore ordered to erect on the esplanade of the Morro two old 16-cm. guns, more for the purpose of making signals than to attack the enemy. They were both taken up there; one of them was mounted on a wooden carriage and the other was not mounted.
On April 21, two short 8-cm. Plasencia guns (breech-loading) were mounted at Estrella Cove.
At the Estrella battery there had been installed some time ago an old 21-cm. rifled howitzer, and another partly installed. In view of the unfavorable location of the battery, it was decided to abandon both; but after the 28th, the second was mounted, also the two Plasencia guns that had previously been erected at Estrella Cove, together with two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns. Not a single one of these pieces was fired. The battery was in command of Lieutenant of Artillery Sanchez of the reserve forces; he was subsequently assigned to the artillery of the precinct.
By May 28, five 16-cm. rifled muzzle-loading bronze guns had been mounted on the esplanade of the Morro.
On June 21, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer was erected at the same place, and another on the 25th.
On the high battery of the Socapa were mounted: on June 13, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer; another on the 16th; another on the 17th.
Résumé.
Punta Gorda battery, in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas:
Two 15-cm. Mata howitzers;
Two 9-cm. breech-loading Krupp guns.
Estrella battery, in command of Lieutenant Sanchez:
Two 21 -cm. old howitzers;
Two 8-cm. modern Plasencia guns;
Two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns (old).
None of these were fired.
Morro battery, first in command of Captain Seijas, later of
Lieutenant Leon:
Five old 16-cm. guns;
Two old 21-cm. guns.
High battery of the Socapa:
Three old 21-cm. howitzers.
It will be seen that this whole artillery includes only six breech-loading guns, four erected at Punta Gorda and two Plasencia guns at Estrella, which latter two, owing to the location of said battery, could not be fired. All the others were old guns, and it is well known that it takes a long time to load them and that their fire is very uncertain.
The dates when these different guns were erected and ready to fire should be kept in mind, so as to know which could answer hostile attacks and which not on the different days when the enemy bombarded the mouth of the harbor and the bay.
VIL—Artillery set up.
It will be sufficient to remember what has been said in the preceding chapter to understand that, in spite of the fact that Santiago has a harbor which is so easy to defend and the possession of which it was so imperative to maintain, in spite of its being the capital of the eastern half of the island and at such a long distance from Havana, there were at Santiago at the time the present war broke out not more than six modern breech-loading guns, namely, two 15 cm. Mata howitzers, two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia guns. That was all the artillery worthy of the name, and even these guns, owing to their small calibers, were useless, or almost so, against armor-clads and cruisers.
The others, as has been seen, were old bronze and even iron muzzle-loaders which could not fire more than one shot to every twenty fired from one of the enemy's guns, and all they sent us from Havana were six 21-cm. howitzers, likewise old muzzleloaders, this being all the material received here to oppose a powerful modern fleet. These facts might appear exaggerated if there were not others that appear still more so, but which are shown in official statements and statistics of forces available, and these can not be doubted. For the service of all the guns, including those set up in the precinct, there were only 79 gunners; of course, it became necessary to complete the indispensable number with soldiers of the infantry.
To mount this artillery, which was defective if not entirely useless, but which was nevertheless set up at the Morro, Punta Gorda, and the Socapa, endless difficulties had to be overcome and work done which only the intelligence, energy, and perseverance of the chiefs and officers and the subordination and good will of the soldiers could accomplish, when resources and aids of every kind were absolutely lacking.
By simply looking at the esplanade of the Morro one would realize the work it must have required to take guns up there weighing three or four thousand kilos, by a road which, I believe, has not been repaired once since the castle was first built.
To install the guns at Punta Gorda everything had to be done from building the pier, where the guns were landed, to clearing the summit of the mountain, where they were set up, and opening a zigzag road by which they were taken there.
To mount the howitzers at the Socapa was truly a piece of work worthy of Romans, and of the six received only three could be set up.
But where the corps of engineers never rested for a moment, and accomplished the most difficult work with the smallest force, was around the city in a line about 14 kilometers long.
Closer to the city three fines of defenses were built, with trenches, breastworks, enclosures, wire fences, and whatever other obstacles the configuration of the ground might suggest; the so-called forts, already in existence, were improved and new ones built; in a word, an open city, which had no fortifications of any kind to oppose to the enemy, was, in the short space of a few days, placed in condition of resistance with chances of success.
From the moment that our fleet entered Santiago harbor, it was not difficult to surmise that it would become the enemy's objective, upon which all his efforts would be concentrated, and it was for that reason, always expecting the landing which was finally effected, that the work above described was carried out, and the rest of the artillery of the city, likewise old, mounted in the following positions:
June 12—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, at Fort San Antonio;
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Inés;
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at Fort San Antonio.
June 13—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, and
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at the entrance to El Caney.
June 14—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun;
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun, and
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Sueño.
June 16—One 16-cm. gun, and
Two short 8-cm. guns at Santa Ursula.
June 17—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Cariadas.
June 25—One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Horno;
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo.
After the battle of July 1 the following were mounted:
At Santa Ursula—Two long 12-cm. rifled bronze guns.
At entrance of El Caney—Two guns of same type as above.
At Santa Inés—One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old). The breech pieces of this latter gun were missing.
With General Escario's column two 8-cm. Plasencia guns arrived from Manzanillo; but, like all those mounted since July 1, they did not get a chance of being fired, the battles having ceased by that time.
Hence the only modern artillery existing in the precinct of the city, namely, one 9-cm. Hontoria, two 75-mm. Maxim, and two 8-cm. Plasencia guns, was not fired.
All the 8-cm. guns had been pronounced useless by the central junta of Havana, and, far from being effective, they were even dangerous.
The 12-cm. guns were mounted in carriages of other guns, and were therefore useless in themselves, without being disabled by the enemy.
VIII.—The Cruiser Reina Mercedes.
It does not require a deep knowledge of artillery to understand that the batteries erected at the Morro and Socapa, and even at Punta Gorda, were powerless, or almost so, against armored and protected ships. As to the Estrella battery, I even refrain from mentioning it, because owing to its location it was not fired at all. Of the only modem artillery, at Punta Gorda, the guns were of small caliber, and the howitzers, owing to their indirect fire, are very uncertain against ships which occupy comparatively very little space. As to the guns of the Morro and Socapa, when I say that they were old howitzers I think I have said enough. Having had no other artillery, it may well be supposed that we, who witnessed and sustained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction and pride in being able to say that we kept the American fleet, notwithstanding its power and the number of its guns, for seventy days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the mouth of the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our batteries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force the entrance.
It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this result is due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, under the command of Captain Rafael Micón, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it.
Owing to the very bad condition of the boilers of the Reina Mercedes, it was impossible for her to proceed to Havana, as most of the vessels cruising in these waters did sooner or later, and it was taken for granted that, in view of her condition, she would play but a secondary part during the events here; it did not occur to any one that the Mercedes might become, if not the salvation, yet the providence, so to speak, of Santiago harbor, and that she was to be of such great assistance to the heroic defense made by the batteries.
Her crew had been considerably reduced by detachments and sickness, but it was well disciplined and enthusiastic, and commanded by chiefs and officers as intelligent as they were energetic and indefatigable. The vessel cast anchor at the Socapa on March 23 and proceeded to send down her yards and topmasts and protect her starboard side (the one she presented to the mouth of the harbor) with her light cables, thereby protecting the torpedo magazine as much as possible from the hostile fire.
On the 26th, in obedience to superior orders, she had to undo everything that had been done and again anchor in the bay, returning to the Socapa a few days later, when she went to work once more sending down the masts, protecting her side, etc.
At the same time one of her steam launches, with a crew from the Mercedes, rendered service at the comandancia de marina, where she became indispensable, and the other steam launch and the boats assisted in laying the torpedoes, towing launches, and did a thousand other things, some of them not properly belonging to vessels, but all equally indispensable.
On May 7 work was commenced on dismounting four of the 16-cm. Hontoria guns, under the direction of Boatswain Antonio Rodríguez Díaz, a derrick having been erected for that purpose, which removed the guns with their mounts from the vessel. The latter now had only the two bow guns left to defend the mouth of the harbor and rows of torpedoes.
All of the four guns were taken up to the Socapa by fifty sailors of the Mercedes and forty of Captain Mateu's guerrillas. One was mounted and ready to fire by the evening of the 18th, the other by the 28th, the engineers having previously finished the trenches and cement foundations for setting them up.
The third gun was mounted at Punta Gorda by a crew from the vessel by June 2, and by the 17th the fourth and last one had been mounted. These two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, erected on the western slope of Punta Gorda, were placed in charge of Ensign Vial, under the command of Captain of Artillery Seijas.
The two Hontoria guns at the Socapa were placed in charge of Ensigns Nardiz and Bruquetas respectively.
The erection of the last gun mounted at Punta Gorda was superintended by Boatswain Ricardo Rodríguez Paz, Boatswain Rodríguez who had superintended the others having been wounded.
These four guns were mounted for the purpose of directly attacking the hostile fleet.
The crew of the Mercedes, besides defending the torpedo lines and preventing the approach of small craft that might attempt to disable them, also mounted at the lower battery of the Socapa, west of the channel of the harbor, the following guns:
One 57-mm. Nordenfeldt gun;
Four 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns;
One 25-mm. Nordenfeldt machine gun.
The latter belonged to the submarine defenses, the others to the Mercedes. Lieutenant Camino was placed in command of this battery.
It seems almost superfluous to state that all the artillery from the Mercedes set up ashore was served by men and commanded by officers from the crew of the vessel and that the same difficulties were encountered in this work as in the land defenses, there being the same obstacles and the same lack of resources and appliances; moreover, two of the torpedo firing stations were manned by officers from the Mercedes; they actually seemed to multiply themselves to be able to render all these services. Words fail me to do justice to the officers and men for the work accomplished, especially while the guns were being mounted in the batteries.
Although it may be anticipating events, I can not help but say that some ships, like some men, seem pre-ordained to be martyrs. When long afterwards the Mercedes returned to the bay, having left the anchoring place at the Socapa on account of the many casualties which she had suffered passively, if I may be permitted the expression, the American ships, by a singular coincidence, threw their projectiles at the very spot where she was at anchor, as though an invisible hand had been guiding them.
Finally, when she had nothing left her but her hull to offer in sacrifice, she went down in the channel of the harbor, in order to oppose to the very last moment, and even after death, an enemy whom she had so fiercely fought during her life-time. Peace to her remains!
IX.—The Two Fleets.
When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is hard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best informed as belonging to the profession and who knew to a certain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battle-ships leaving the Peninsula, to say nothing of the transports, torpedo-boats, destroyers, etc. How much we were mistaken!
On the 19th of May, at 5.50 o'clock A.M., the look-out signaled five steamers to the south; shortly after it was signaled that the five steamers were five warships, and a little later that they were Spanish. So the much wished-for fleet had arrived, which, according to the newspapers, was under the command of Vice Admiral Butler.
At 7.15, the Infanta Maria Teresa, hoisting the rear admiral's flag, was sighted from the captaincy of the port; a few minutes later, she cast anchor in the bay, some distance from the royal pier, her draught not permitting her to go nearer. Then the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Cristóbal Colón anchored one after the other, the last named with the flag of the second-in-command (brigadier); then the destroyer Plutón entered, went out again without anchoring, and returned an hour later with the Furor, of the same class, and both anchored at a convenient place.
The day when the fleet entered Santiago harbor was one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstanding all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity. And I say this and want it understood, because it is the best proof of the sympathies which the country professes for us and of which it gives us constantly unquestionable proofs whenever opportunity offers.
The fleet was under the command of the eminent Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, who, as already stated, had hoisted his flag on the Infanta Maria Teresa, Captain Joaquin Bustamente being chief of the general staff. The second in command was Captain José de Paredes, who had hoisted his flag on the Cristóbal Colón.
The Infanta Maria Teresa, built at the Nervion shipyards, is a ship of 103.63 metres length, 19.81 beam, and 7,000 tons displacement, with a draught of 6.55 metres. Her engines develop 13,700 I.H.P., giving her a speed of 20.25 miles. Her armament consists of two 28-cm. Hontoria guns (mounted in turrets, one forward and one aft); ten 14-cm. Hontoria guns; eight 57-mm. Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns; eight 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns, and two 11 -mm. machine guns. She was commanded by Captain Victor Concas.
The Vizcaya, commanded by Captain Antonio Eulate, and the Oquendo, commanded by Captain Juan B. Lagaza, are exactly like the Maria Teresa and built at the same yards.
The Cristóbal Colón, under the command of Captain Emilio Diaz Moreu, was acquired in Genoa from the firm of Ansaldo. She is 100 metres long by 18.20 beam; her displacement is 6,840 tons and her draught 7.75 metres; her speed is 20 miles and her engines develop 13,000 I.H.P. Her armament consists of two 254-mm. Armstrong guns (in turrets); ten 132-mm. guns; six 120-mm. guns; ten 57-mm. Nordenfeldt guns; ten 37-mm. and two machine guns.
Important note: The last-named ship, her 254-mm. or large calibre guns mounted in turrets not being ready, had to go without them.
The destroyer Plutón was commanded by Lieutenant Pedro Vázquez, and the Furor, of the same class, by Lieutenant Diego Carlier; both of them were under the command of Captain Fernando Villamil.
The arrival of these six ships produced real enthusiasm among the better peninsular element in Santiago, especially as nobody wanted to believe that they were the only ones that Spain was going to send, since they were called the "first division," and at least two more divisions were expected. The only ones who had no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were acquainted with the true condition of affairs, were those who had arrived in the ships. From the admiral down to the last midshipman, they knew perfectly well that there were no more fleets, no more divisions, no more vessels, and that those six ships (if the destroyers may be counted as such) were all that could be counted on to oppose the American fleet, which consists of the following ships, not including those in construction, and taking into account only armored and protected ships—that is, those of the first and second classes:
Iowa, 11,340 tons, steel, first-class battle-ship, 18 guns.
Indiana, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle-ship, 16 guns.
Massachusetts, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle-ship, 16 guns.
Oregon, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle-ship, 16 guns.
Brooklyn, 9,215 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 20 guns.
New York, 9,200 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 18 guns.
Columbia, 7,375 tons, steel, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.
Minneapolis, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.
Texas, 6,315 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 8 guns.
Puritan, 6,060 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 10 guns.
Olympia, 5,870 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 14 guns.
Chicago, 4,500 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 18 guns.
Baltimore, 4,413 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 10 guns.
Philadelphia, 4,324 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.
Monterey, 4,084 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser (with turrets), 4 guns.
Newark, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.
San Francisco, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.
Charleston, 3,730 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 8 guns.
Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.
Amphitrite, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.
Monadnock, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.
Terror, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.
Cincinnati, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.
Raleigh, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.
Note: Before war was declared, they bought of Brazil the Amazonas, a magnificent protected cruiser of more than 6,000 tons, with perfect armament. She was one of the ships that blockaded this port.
It is to be noted that in the first eleven ships enumerated, the number of guns stated is only that of the large-calibre guns, that is, from 16-cm. upward, without including rapid-fire, revolving, machine guns, etc.
The first four, namely, the Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon, have four 32-cm. guns each, that is to say, larger guns than the medium-calibre ones of the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Viscaya, each of which had but two 28-cm. guns. The Cristóbal Colón, as has already been stated, did not have her large guns mounted.
Shortly after the fleet had anchored, the civil and military authorities went on board to pay their respects to Admiral Cervera.
It will be remembered that these ships had been assembled at the Cape Verde Islands and that many notes were exchanged on that subject between the Governments of Spain and the United States, until finally the Spanish Government gave definite orders for the ships to proceed to the Island of Cuba.
They arrived at Martinique, where they left the destroyer Terror, commanded by Lieut. Francisco de la Rocha, for the reason that the vessel had sustained injuries to her boiler and was no longer able to follow the fleet. From Martinique, the ships proceeded to Curaçao, where only two ships could take a small quantity of coal, as the laws of that Dutch colony did not allow any more to enter the harbor. Finally, as stated above, the fleet reached this harbor, without having met Admiral Sampson's fleet, whether accidentally, or whether Admiral Cervera went by way of Curaçao on purpose to mislead the American admiral, I do not know.
X.—Provisions of the City.
So far my task has been, if not easy, at least pleasant, for in honor of the truth and deference to justice, I will say that all persons who have so figured, directly or indirectly, in the events under discussion, deserve praise and congratulations. Unfortunately, I can not say as much regarding the question of provisions, which is of such great importance, and has had so much to do with the capitulation of this city.
It is far from me to want to mention or censure any person or persons in particular. I am citing facts which every one knows, and I believe it to be a duty which I must not shun to set forth everything with perfect impartiality. I am making history, and with that I have said everything.
The city of Santiago de Cuba has never been very well supplied and provisions have never been abundant there.
It is only just to state that the whole military element of the province and also the hospitals were nine or ten months in arrears in the payment of consignments. They had been living on credit for some time, and the firms furnishing the supplies, not being able to order new ones and meet their obligations, had allowed their stores to run very low. We were passing through one of those crises which were so frequent in our last war, and which, unfortunately, are being repeated in this, owing to the parsimony of the Treasury.
But now, under the circumstances in which Santiago de Cuba was, the problem assumed more serious shape, for living became almost impossible. Everything was lacking: articles of food, prospects, money; our credit and purchasing resources were exhausted. And this was the case not only at the capital, but extended to the whole division. What happened at Santiago, also happened at Manzanillo, Holguin, Puerto Príncipe, Ciego de Avila, Morón, Spiritus, and other places of the island, namely, the cities supplied the people of the surrounding country and the latter had no provisions or stores to furnish in return.
Moreover, the merchants of this city, little given to great enterprises and risky speculations, did not have on hand any more than what they felt sure they could sell in a short time. And, therefore, I repeat it, provisions, even those of first necessity, were certainly not abundant, and everybody knew that when the hostile ships should arrive to blockade the city, as must happen sooner or later, these would soon give out. A few families understood it and laid in supplies in anticipation of what was to come, and they certainly did not regret it, for their fears were realized, although, be it said in honor of the truth, there was no motive or reason to justify such a condition of affairs.
War was officially declared on April 21, and until the 18th of May not a single hostile ship appeared in sight of the harbor. There were in it five Spanish merchant vessels, which were prevented from leaving by the breaking out of hostilities, the Méjico, Mortera, San Juan, Reina de los Angeles, and Tomas Brooks. Jamaica is only 80 miles from Santiago, and yet not a single sack of flour entered the city since before the 21st of April, when a small English sailing schooner came from there with a cargo of butter, potatoes, onions, and corn-meal, which she sold for a good price without landing it at the custom-house The example was not followed; everybody saw the possibility of the conflict which had to come without trying to prevent it.
Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer Polaria, which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions, as neither the merchants nor any one else attempted to import them.
The last provisions entering the trading houses were brought by the steamer Mortera on the 25th of April, consisting of 150 head of cattle, 180,000 rations of flour, 149,000 of peas, 197,000 of rice, 79,000 of beans, and 96,000 of wine. Now, without including the forces of Guantánamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tánamo, the needs of the troops of Santiago de Cuba amounted to 360,000 rations a month. Thus it will be seen that the provisions on hand in the trading houses the last days of April were hardly sufficient for half a month.
And this is not the worst; but the merchants, far from contributing to the welfare of the army, which in reality was defending their interests, hid whatever they could and raised the prices in a manner which I do not wish to qualify, taking advantage of the sad stress to which the blockade had reduced the city.
An example will show this better than anything I may say on the subject. The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American company of the Juragua mines, for which the Spanish Government could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Berry's column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says himself, "a better Spaniard than Pelayo."
I do not know what news may have reached the Peninsula about the conditions at Santiago de Cuba. It is possible that people believe there that only certain articles of food were lacking; if that is the case, they are greatly mistaken. People here have suffered from actual hunger, and many persons have starved to death, although the population has been greatly decreased, since whole families had left prior to the 21st day of April. I, myself, saw a man who had died of hunger in the entrance of the Brooks House opposite the captaincy of the port—died because he had nothing to eat.
Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw—this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow—I saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, as will be seen, and the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad, and we should have had that calamity to add to the many that were weighing upon us. But why go on? What I have said is more than sufficient to show the immense responsibility incurred by those who might have supplied the city with provisions, and who neglected and eluded so sacred a duty.
There were orders and decrees published regulating the price of articles of first necessity, but the merchants paid no attention to them, as though they did not concern them, and the raising of prices was the more unjustifiable and inexcusable, as everything that was in the city had been there prior to the declaration of war, and had cost no more freight or duty than in normal times.
If there had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Spanish soldier always has fought. What a contrast between him and the merchant of this city! But there are things which it is better not to air and this is one of them.
XI.—Coaling.
The fleet which left the Cape Verde Islands, which took no coal at Martinique where it touched, and which at Curaçao took on only a few tons in two of the ships, arrived here, as was natural, with the bunkers almost empty. Admiral Cervera prepared to replenish them, and it may be easily imagined how imperative it was to hasten an operation without which the ships were unable to execute a single maneuver, even though their very salvation might depend on it.
Unfortunately, the harbor of Santiago, where there is little movement of shipping, has but very scant means and resources, especially since the breaking out of the present insurrection.
There were only four steamers—the Alcyon, Juragua, Esmeralda, and Colon. The first two do not possess the necessary requirements for towing launches; the Esmeralda does very well when the sea is calm and there is not much head wind; the only one that has all the necessary requirements is the Colon, but the Colón was having her boiler overhauled and it required a week to finish the work, which was indispensable. Unfortunately, the gunboat Alvarado, which might have rendered good services, was in dock renewing her bottom planks, and the work was very slow.
The army, in its turn, also had a great deal of work on hand which it could not possibly leave, such as taking supplies to the Morro, water to Punta Gorda, and war material and ammunition to both of these places and to the Socapa, and the chiefs and officers were needed for directing all the work undertaken.
The only launches and lighters in the harbor were those of Messrs. Ros, some of them useless, others in bad repair, and a few only in condition to be used; besides these there were those of the Juragua Company, which were good but few in number, and, as they belong to American subjects, it was not easy for the Government to get them. With such small resources and with so much that had to be done, it will be understood how difficult it was, not to say impossible, to accomplish everything.
To give even an imperfect idea of the lack of appliances of every description, I will mention that the contractor of water, which latter is very bad and for which he charges exorbitant prices, had, for the purpose of supplying the ships, only two small rudder boats, each with two pipes (about four hogsheads), and there were four ships requiring 1,500 pipes each, without counting the destroyers.
Naturally all the demands, requests, and complaints, everything the fleet needed, wanted or desired, went to the comandancia de marina, the personnel of which consisted of the commander, the second in command, the aide, the paymaster, three enlisted seamen (cabos de matricula), one of whom had charge of the provision stores, and two orderlies, and with this personnel everything had to be done that was asked for and everything furnished that was wanted.
The army wanted a tug, the military government wanted a tug and launches, and the fleet wanted launches and a tug, and all wanted them badly, and all the services were important and urgent, and at the captaincy of the port we constantly had to solve problems that had no solution, and furnish launches that did not exist and tugs that were not to be found.
The coaling, which went on day and night, progressed very slowly, in spite of everything; for at the two piers where the coal was there was very little water, and at the end of each pier only one lighter could be accommodated without danger of running aground, in which case it would have been necessary to wait for high water to float it again.
There is no end to the time and work which it took to put the Cardiff coal of the navy depot on board the ships, and though laborers were hired for the Cumberland coal of the Juragua mines, the ships, which never stopped coaling as long as they stayed at Santiago, never succeeded in filling their bunkers. One detail will show the lack of means available at the port. Although every store in the town was visited and any price offered for baskets, only a very limited number could be found for carrying the coal; it had to be put in as best it could.
There is some work that can neither be understood nor appreciated, that passes by unnoticed and of which people do not even have an idea, because it does not constitute actions of war, more or less brilliant, and which yet can not be kept up nor stood for any length of time. We who belonged to the captaincy of the port finally dined, breakfasted, and slept there—or rather, did not sleep there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or rather cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest. Still it was not the work that made the situation unbearable; what soldier or sailor did not work desperately at Santiago de Cuba? No, the sad, the lamentable thing was that, being so anxious to please all, we were unable to satisfy anybody.
The coal belonging to the navy, consisting of 2,300 tons of Cardiff, was taken on at the piers of Bellavista, situated in the western part of the bay. Besides this. General Linares placed at Admiral Cervera's disposal about 600 tons of Cumberland coal from the Juraguá mines and 600 tons from the Sabanilla railway.
The water had to be gotten by the boats of the fleet in bulk at the piers of Las Cruces and at the faucet near the Royal Pier. Some of the ships got their own water by going alongside the first-named pier.
XIL—Opinions as to why the fleet did not go out.
In narrating the events of Santiago, it was not my intention to to make remarks of any kind on them, nor to permit myself comments thereon, as I consider that I have neither the authority, nor the ability (and this I do not say from false modesty), nor the right to do so. My object has been to give a simple account of what I witnessed, what I saw, and what I heard from trustworthy sources, and of the authenticity of which I am certain, feeling sure that in Spain, though the facts are known as a whole, they are not known there in detail; but in the presence of certain insinuations and certain doubts I can not remain silent and indifferent.
Great was the joy caused by the arrival of the fleet among the peninsular element generally and some of the sons of Cuba who truly love us. But after a few days, a number of intelligent and prominent people, or at least recognized as such, showed great impatience and surprise that the ships should remain in port, and never got tired asking what the fleet was doing there and why it did not go out.
It is easy to answer that question.
If Admiral Cervera can be accused of anything, it is an excess of courage. One need only to read his record of service to be convinced of that, and the third day of July proved it only too well. Admiral Cervera received many cablegrams and official letters; no one knew better than he did what was going on in Spain and in Cuba, and what was then being ordered and required of him, and that Admiral Cervera acted as he should have done admits of no discussion. My only object is to answer the question which so many were asking in Santiago: "What was the fleet doing there?" What was it doing? Well, a great deal.
It is not always great battles or great fights that decide the outcome of a campaign. Napoleon I, by an admirable maneuver, closed in on the Austrian General Marck at Ulm, and the latter had to surrender with his whole army without having fired a single shot.
When Admiral Villeneuve, who unfortunately commanded the allied fleets of France and Spain, learned that Admiral Rossilly, appointed to relieve him, was at Madrid, he preferred to fight with Nelson rather than present himself before Napoleon. So he decided to leave Cadiz, and he called together the commanders of both fleets on the ship Bucentaure. The Spanish objected, on the grounds that, in order to leave Cadiz, they needed time and a favorable wind, that the ships were in need of repairs, had to replenish their provisions and ammunition and complete their crews, that the season was far advanced, and that, if the English were compelled to blockade them in winter, it would be equivalent for them to the loss of a naval battle; that was the opinion of men like Gravina, Churruca, and Galiano.
They added that, moreover, the barometer was very low and that a storm was imminent, whereupon Rear Admiral Magón replied "that what was low was the courage in some hearts." At this insult, the Spanish, losing all prudence and calm, decided to go out in search of the enemy to prove that they still retained their courage. That was all that the French admiral wanted. The combined fleets went out, and what happened at Cape Trafalgar is well known.
Now, then, the question is answered already: the ships were compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should come.
It is certainly true that a victory can be achieved without the necessity of giving battle, so much so that, if it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their narrow entrances, there is no doubt hut that the Americans, who, outside of the ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at Key West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of the number of their ships to understand that they could not successfully threaten so many points; though they only had to deal with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the offensive.
The foregoing shows that ships do not necessarily have to give battle in order to obtain results. Those in Santiago harbor succeeded for forty-six days in keeping before the mouth of the harbor a vastly superior fleet, which performed no special acts of prowess except to throw a hail of projectiles which comparatively did very little damage. One could not obtain better results with less work; and if provisions had not been wanting in Santiago, God knows, if our fleet had remained there, to what extremes impatience and despair might not have carried Admiral Sampson!
XIII.—The Blockade.
As I have already given a description, though very deficient, of the sites and places that were the scene of these events (IV: Scene of Events), and of the miserable resources we had for their defense, it will be easy to understand them by remembering and fixing the attention on what has been said.
I have already stated that on the 18th of May, the Saint Louis, equipped for war, and a gunboat whose name could not be ascertained, fired about 80 shots, which were answered by Punta Qorda, the only battery that was then in condition to answer the attack. If it had happened a few hours later, one of the 16-cm. Hontoria guns of the Socapa could have been fired, but as stated, it was not mounted until the night of the 18th. The hostile ships disappeared to the east. The next day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, coming from Curaçao, entered the harbor and commenced to coal on the 20th.
21 St.—This day, a ship coming from the south came close to the mouth of the harbor, then shaping her course westward. At 10.30 P.M. the Morro telephone gave notice that two ships had been firing on Punta Cabrera for 15 minutes, ten shots in all. Probably they were firing at Colonel Aldea's forces, which covered that part of the coast.
22d.—At 7 A.M. the lookout signaled a steamer to the east and another half an hour later. We learned from the Morro that one of them appeared to be the same that had been sighted the day before; the other was a three-master. Both of them were thought to be hostile vessels because they were going very slowly and reconnoitering the coast. The new one had three smokestacks.
At 11.30 the vessels were south of the Morro (that is, in front of it), proceeding very slowly westward, where they disappeared at half-past four.
23d.—At 5.45 a vessel was signaled to the south and an hour later two to the east. At 9 the Morro said that one of the three vessels had three smokestacks, the same that had been sighted the day before, and one was a battle-ship, and that flag signals were being made.
At 11.30 a vessel was signaled to the west; at 12.30 the Morro said that the vessel just arrived had three masts and three smokestacks.
At 4.10 we learned by telephone that one of the four vessels had disappeared to the south and the others were coming closer to the mouth of the harbor.
At 7 the three ships disappeared, one to the east and two to the south.
24th.—At 2 o'clock the lookout signaled two steamers to the south. The sky was clouded and nothing could be distinguished beyond a certain distance.
At 11.45 the destroyer Plutón went out.
At 12.30 four hostile vessels were distinguished, though with difficulty, owing to the cloudy weather, to the east of the mouth of the harbor.
When seeing the Plutón go out, one of them shaped her course to the westward and passed close to the destroyer without being able to attack her, then proceeded westward. The others started in the same direction, also in pursuit of her, but without success, as the Plutón had naturally eluded meeting them.
The four vessels disappeared to the westward.
At 2 o'clock, the Spanish flagship (Infanta Maria Teresa) started up and went alongside the Las Cruces Pier for water.
At 5.30 two vessels were signaled to the south: they disappeared in that direction after dark.
25th.—At 6 o'clock two steamers were signaled, one to the south and one to the west.
At 7.30 the Cristóbal Colón started up and shortly after cast anchor again.
At the same hour, the Morro reported that one of the two vessels signaled was apparently heading toward the harbor at full speed, and the other seemed to be chasing her. Three-quarters of an hour later it was reported that the vessel appeared to have been captured at quite a distance from the mouth of Santiago harbor, and that both were going south, the captured vessel ahead and the other following.
The Infanta Maria Teresa sheered of? from Las Cruces Pier at 1 o'clock P. M., and the Oquendo then went alongside, also to take water; the former anchored again in the bay.
At 2 o'clock the Vizcaya cast anchor south of Cay Ratones, near Cajumas Bay. The Cristóbal Colón anchored south of Punta Gorda.
26th.—At 2 o'clock P. M. the Oquendo left Las Cruces Pier and anchored again in the bay.
The position of the fleet was as follows: The Cristóbal Colón was at anchor south of Punta Gorda, close to it, presenting her broadside to the mouth of the harbor, in line with the channel to which she presented her guns, so as to be able to attack the enemy in case he should try to force it.
The Vizcaya close to Cajumas Bay, facing the same as the Colón so as to unite their fire in case the enemy should succeed in passing Punta Soldado.
The Maria Teresa and Oquendo south of Cay Ratones, so as to defend the channel of Punta Gorda as well as the general anchoring place and the city. During the day three ships were sighted to the south, and disappeared shortly after in the same direction.
27th.—At 6 the lookout signaled two vessels to the south.
At 11.30 it signaled five more ships. There were now seven in sight.
At 12.15 General Linares went to the Morro in the steamboat of the captaincy of the port.
At 12.30 four more ships were sighted; total, eleven ships.
Of the eleven ships in sight, four are battle-ships.
At 2.30 P. M. another ship arrived.
At nightfall General Linares returned from the Morro. The ships disappeared to the south.
28th.—At 6.15 the lookout signaled a vessel within 5 miles of the Morro, and at noon she disappeared to the south.
At 4.30 P. M. six large ships were signaled, disappearing to the south at nightfall.
29th.—At daybreak the destroyers Plutón and Furor went out to reconnoiter, returning at 8.
During the day they anchored in the bay; at night they cast anchor at the Socapa and at Nispero Bay in order to guard the entrance of the harbor.
General Linares went to the Morro in the tug Alcyon.
At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted reconnoitering the coast, at a distance of about 8 miles; they withdrew to the south before dark.
30th.—At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signaled approaching to within 9 miles of the harbor. It consisted of seven ships.
At noon three others arrived from the south and joined the former.
31st.—At 5.45 the lookout signaled eleven ships to the south.
At 2 P. M. gun fire was heard. The lookout reported that the coast was being fired on.
At 2.40 Punta Gorda battery opened fire, ceasing again shortly after.
The ships of the Spanish fleet hoisted their battle-flags and fired up their boilers.
At 2.30 the firing was quite lively.
By 3 it became slower and ceased at 3.30.
The enemy had been firing on the Morro and Socapa batteries, without any casually in either.
The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark.
Thus end the events of the month of May, insignificant on the whole and only a prologue to those that were to follow.
During the days of May 20th to 22d, the insurgent chief Calixto Garcia, with a numerous contingent of troops and artillery, attacked the village of Palma Soriano on the Cauto river. General Vara de Rey, at the head of 1,000 men and two guns, repulsed the hostile forces, routing them and killing a great many. On our side we had 16 wounded. This operation of the soldier hero, simulating a surrounding movement by crossing the Cauto at three or four fords, and pursuing the rebels 2 miles beyond Palma Soriano, was due to the skilful distribution of the scant forces of the line of observation. This line, as will be readily understood from the chart at the end of the book, was weak, very weak, in almost its whole extent. It was, indeed, work that deserves praise, to guard, patrol, and sustain strategic points, cultivated land, coasts, roads, and railroads, with such a small and weak contingent of troops. And the forces that we were expecting from Havana, and the arrival of which had been announced, did not appear.
As a collier was being expected, it was supposed that the vessel captured on the 25th was the one. It is possible; but, on the other hand, it may not have been. In any event, there was much surprise expressed at Santiago that, since the hostile fleet was not in sight, but only one or two vessels. Admiral Cervera had not prevented the capture, or at least recovered the prize.
The reason why he did not is very simple. Our fleet had taken on board all the Cardiff coal that was at the navy depot, without succeeding, as has been seen, in filling its bunkers, and there remained only the 1,100 tons of Cumberland coal of which Gen. Linares could dispose; this latter coal is inferior to the former, and I believe it is hardly necessary for me to point out how important it is that a fleet should have good fuel; it may be its salvation at a given moment; consequently the fleet, which had the prospect of having extremely difficult maneuvers of the highest importance to execute, could not afford to waste even a single piece of coal to no purpose.
The capture took place a long distance from the mouth of the harbor; before a ship could weigh anchor, clear the channel, get up full steam and traverse that distance, at least three hours must elapse, and where would have been the captor and the prize by that time? And even granting that the former could not bring the latter in safety, would he allow it to fall into our hands? Certainly not. Two gunshots would have sunk her very quickly, especially if, as was believed, she had a heavy cargo; and the Colon, or any other ship that had gone out on that errand, would have consumed, probably to no purpose, a quantity of coal which it was imperative to keep for much more important and less hazardous operations than pursuing merchant steamers equipped for war and taking or recapturing prizes. Moreover, from the 22d to the 28th, the swell of the sea prevented the ships from going out; the pilots of the harbor were not willing to take them out, saying that in view of the state of the sea, they might touch bottom, especially the Cristóbal Colón.
XIV.—The Volunteers.
Although the comparison may perhaps not be considered very apt, I might say that the month of May was the paradise of the blockade, while the month of June was its purgatory, and the month of July its hell.
The appearance of the first hostile ships before the Morro of Santiago, as the natural result of the war decided upon by the Government of the United States and accepted by ours, and the noise of the first gunshots caused both consternation and curiosity among the inhabitants of the city; but as man becomes accustomed to everything, so the situation, which at that time was, if not dangerous, yet certainly very unpleasant and disagreeable, was finally looked upon with indifference.
The boats of the fleet were constantly going back and forth between the ships and the piers to supply the innumerable wants of the former, and gave to the marina an aspect of animation which it never wore in normal times. The Alameda, where the music of the Santiago regiment played, as usual, on Sunday evenings, by order of the military authorities who were desirous of raising the spirit of the inhabitants as much as possible, and the Plaza de Armas, where the drums continued to beat the tattoo every Thursday and Sunday, were always full of people, although so many had left the city. People fond of giving sensational news, especially those who took pleasure in inventing it, had a wide field and plenty material to satisfy their desire; and any one having patience and curiosity enough to collect the news floating through the city might have written a very original and amusing book.
The children were playing war, pelting each other with stones inside and around the city, divided into parties in command of a Cervera of ten summers or a Sampson of twelve Aprils.
The different corps of volunteers were considerably increased by the many men who came to swell their ranks, especially chiefs and officers; the city was full of sabers, machetes, stars, and galloons, and I believe not even in Berlin, the capital of the most military nation of Europe, are as many uniforms seen as we saw in this city, usually so quiet. Even the clerks of the guardhouse and employees of the civil guard armed themselves with carbines and machetes.
And while I am talking of the volunteers I will finish their history to the end, which is not without interest.
After sunset and during the first hours of the night the volunteers would gather at the Alameda, which they filled completely, divided into more or less numerous platoons, which officers of the regular army, or their own officers, undertook to drill, and at the first gun or the first blast of the bugle, they reported promptly, especially the chiefs and officers, at the posts which had been assigned to them beforehand.
Every night a guard of twenty-five men, commanded by an officer, occupied the large shed of the Alameda and placed its sentinels, and from that time until dawn the noise of musket butts striking on the wooden floor was constantly heard, and by many people mistaken for gunshots, and the "Who goes there?" addressed to every moving object was an evident proof of the extreme vigilance observed, and showed that it would not be easy to surprise them.
The firemen were always on hand whenever they were needed at the pier to take the wounded from the Morro and Socapa to the hospital on their stretchers, and their energy, good will, and zeal can not be sufficiently praised.
On the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, as will be seen later, a large number of volunteers hurried to the trenches of the third line, where they fought the enemy like brave men, and where some of them were wounded.
Unfortunately, after that day, with a few honorable exceptions, the spirit animating them underwent a complete change; their enthusiasm became indifference, their valor prudence; they left the trenches to which they never returned, and exchanged the uniform for civilian's clothes and the gun or machete for the measuring-stick or weighing scales.
Why this change? There is an explanation for it. It is an error to suppose that the soldier is braver than the volunteer; there is no reason why he should be; they are both Spanish. But the soldier has military habits and discipline which the volunteer lacks; he has chiefs and officers whom he must needs respect and obey, the volunteer has not; and that is the whole explanation.
As long as the enemy was making attacks which it was necessary to repel the volunteers fought with energy and enthusiasm; but when the battle and excitement were over, when the period of trenches arrived, with the hot sun in daytime and dampness at night, with rains, sickness, privations, and want, in a word, the hour of suffering in silence and with resignation, the hour of subordination, of sacrifice and duty, then, one after another, under this pretext or that, they returned to the city, determined not to go back.
The circle narrowed more and more, the probabilities of capitulation and death increased as those of triumph and success diminished, and then it was that they remembered their families, their own interests, and themselves, that they took off their uniforms, which, in their opinion, might cause them trouble, and, not considering themselves safe in the city, they went to hide at Cinco Reales, Las Cruces, and on board of merchant steamers, or any other place where they thought themselves safe from projectiles, and there were even those who emigrated to El Caney and Cuabitas, occupied by the Americans and the insurgents respectively.
What I relate I do not know from hearsay; I saw it myself at Cinco Reales, upon my return from the cruiser Reina Mercedes, sunk in the entrance of the harbor, where I had gone by orders of the commander of marine in order to report to him on the exact position then occupied by the vessel. At Cinco Reales I found many in hiding, in civilians' clothes, some with their families and others alone.
But while men who had carried the gun did such things, others who had girded the sword, with a show of doing great things, did even worse.
XV.—Waiting.
The events of the month of May, although they are not, or rather do not appear to be, of great importance in themselves, because there were no special movements on the part of the enemy and no casualties of any kind on ours, are in reality of great importance, and their consequences have had great influence and weight on the result of the war, which has been decided, so to speak, in the waters of Santiago de Cuba and in front of the trenches in this precinct.
If we take into consideration the position of Santiago de Cuba, situated at the southern extremity of the island, and therefore at a comparative distance from the United States and Key West, the base of operations of the Yankees; the topography of its harbor, difficult in itself to force; the absence of military importance of the city, which is not a stronghold or even a military city. and the scarcity of roads and railways so that it is almost cut off from communication with any important or strategic point, it is not too much to assume that the Americans had no idea of making great demonstrations or operations, but thought that it would be sufficient to blockade it, and throw in a few projectiles as they had done at other cities on the coast, and a proof of this is that, until the 18th of May, that is, nearly a month after the declaration of war, not a single hostile vessel was seen, and the two that appeared then were a merchant vessel equipped for war and a small gunboat, which, after reconnoitering, disappeared to the east.
But the arrival of the Spanish fleet, though composed of only four battle-ships, but these the only ones of that class which we had in the island, and therefore the only ones that could inspire any fear, the absolute necessity of replenishing them with coal, which took a number of days, because, in view of the scarcity of facilities of any kind it could not be done in less time, compelled the enemy to make the city, and especially the harbor where the fleet was at anchor, their objective, although they had not taken much thought of it at first; to concentrate upon this objective all their forces on sea and on land, and to take for the scene of the war one which was least adapted for their plans and which they had least thought of choosing.
When did they learn that our ships had anchored in the harbor? I do not know; nor do I believe that anybody in Santiago knows it. If the St. Louis and the gunboat which has been mentioned several times returning from Guantánamo on the 19th, where they went presumably to continue the blockade when they left these waters, there is no doubt but that they could see our ships and some people think that they at once notified their admiral, but I doubt it, because it was not until the 27th that ships appeared in such numbers as would make it possible to check or defeat ours.
It might be said in answer to this that the hostile fleet may have had a thousand reasons, which we could not know, for this delay in assembling and appearing at the harbor. It is possible, but in that case, if the enemy knew ever since the 19th, what had happened, why did they continue to appear in small numbers before the mouth of the harbor, exposing themselves to serious trouble? I do not believe that the enemy received any information on the subject, or at least complete evidence, until the 24th, when the vessels which were cruising in Santiago waters, saw the Plutón come out and go back again, for they knew that she accompanied the fleet and formed part of it. It was three days later, the 27th, that eleven ships appeared, four of them, at least, battle-ships. This interval of time was necessary, of course, to advise the hostile fleet, which was perhaps between Cape San Antonio and Havana, or Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos.
In any event, the operations of the month of May assumed great importance, for the harbor remained closed, where since before the declaration of war no provisions of any kind had entered, if we except those which the small English schooner already mentioned brought from Jamaica, and which are hardly worth taking into consideration.
Another problem: Why did the hostile ships which remained all day long in front of the mouth of the harbor disappear at dark instead of continuing to watch it during the night? I do not know that either. The whole coast is accessible and the ground so high that it can be distinguished perfectly even in stormy weather, so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Providence had favored them), and what I say is true, as shown by the fact that afterwards they never left the mouth of the harbor for a single moment, day or night, as will be seen.
Was it perhaps because they had become convinced of the difficulty of forcing the harbor, especially with a fleet inside, and wanted, by opening a passage, to give the fleet a chance to come out in order to take refuge in another harbor less difficult of access? But such tactics might have had fatal results, because if our ships should reach Havana harbor, a few hours from Key West, under the protection of its 300 guns, and united with the other warships that were there, the situation would have become materially changed, and the Americans might have had a chance to regret such tactics. That they should have made such a mistake is not to be thought of; besides, if that had been their intention, they would not have maintained such vigilance during the day. Were they simulating a retreat to return at night to the harbor, without lights, so as not to be seen? That is not probable; in order to see the mouth of the harbor they must have been seen themselves from the heights of the Morro or Socapa, where the strictest watch was also exercised. I suppose, for I can not think of anything else, that, not having been able as yet to unite all their naval forces, they did not want to run the risk of a battle at night with a fleet that had destroyers, the number of which they probably did not know, and did not learn until later, through the secret information which they probably received from the insurgents.
But all this is only supposition and hypothesis, no doubt entirely erroneous. The incontrovertible, undeniable fact is that, on the 27th, the enemy appeared with forces much superior to ours and remained all day long opposite the Morro, retreating at night, or simulating retreat. Thus ended the month of May.
XVI.—The Merrimac.
June 1st.—At 6 o'clock the lookout signaled the hostile fleet in sight, consisting of thirteen ships; five battle-ships and eight merchant and warships, among them one torpedo boat.
At 7 o'clock gunshots were heard.
At 12.30 the fleet started up, moving away from the harbor from which it was about 6 miles distant; half an hour later it reversed its course and came again closer.
At night the Spanish fleet changed its anchoring place.
The Maria Teresa and Vizcaya anchored south of, and with their broadsides toward, Cay Ratones and were forming the first line for the defense of the harbor. The Colón and Oquendo anchored north of the same Cay and were forming the second line.
2nd.—At 5.30 nineteen ships appeared at the mouth of the harbor, at a distance of about 5 miles.
At 7 the Morro reported that they were going to fire a few shots to discharge some of the guns.
3rd.—At 3.30 gunshots were being heard toward the mouth of the harbor and the firing became very lively.
At 4 o'clock it was learned at the comandancia de marina that a merchant vessel had come very close to the mouth of the channel; that the batteries had fired at her and she had not answered; and at that moment she was already inside; shortly after she passed by the bow of the Reina Mercedes, which, it will be remembered, was moored between the Socapa and Cay Smith, with her bow towards the channel which she was defending with her two 16-cm. Hontoria guns and Whitehead torpedoes.
By 4.20 the firing, which had been very violent, ceased.
At 4.30 it was learned that the hostile ship had gone down in the mouth of the channel, close to Punta Soldado, but without obstructing it.
At 5.30, it now being daylight, very slow firing was again heard and ceased at 6.
At 5.30 the commandant of marine went to the mouth of the harbor in the steam launch.
When he returned, we learned that one of the merchant vessels forming part of the American fleet, called the Merrimac, with two masts and one smokestack, larger than the Méjico, had forced the entrance at 5.30; that she had been sunk in the channel close to Punta Soldado, by the guns of the Mercedes and the rapid-fire guns of the battery below the Socapa, and was lying in the direction of the Socapa, without obstructing the entrance or preventing our ships from going out, and that one lieutenant and seven sailors forming her crew had been captured and were on board the Mercedes.
Besides the firing on the vessel from the guns, the Plutón launched two torpedoes and the Mercedes two more. Two submarine mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second.
During the events related above, General Linares was at the Morro, where he had repaired by land on receipt of the first news. At daybreak, General Toral, military governor of Santiago, came to assist the navy with a force of regulars and volunteers.
At 7 a company went to reinforce the forces at the Socapa and the Morro.
At 7.30 the forces that had come to assist the navy withdrew.
At 11 p.m. firing was heard at a great distance in a southeasterly direction; it ceased at 12.15. The fire was extremely slow.
As may have been noticed, on June 1 the enemy appeared before the Morro with thirteen ships, five of them battle-ships and eight merchant and war vessels; that is to say, with forces superior to ours, in number as well as caliber of armament, and also from the fact that they were better protected than ours, as may be seen from the report of the United States Navy, and as unfortunately we found out ourselves later. From that time on the hostile ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as they used to do. Probably they suspected—for they never lacked advices and secret information—that our fleet, for want of provisions, would before very long be compelled to go out, and that is what they were waiting for.
On the 2d, nineteen ships were present.
At daybreak of the 3d, the Merrimac forced the entrance of the harbor, at 3.30, with the result above set forth.
In spite of the time that has elapsed, we, at Santiago, have not succeeded in ascertaining definitely—though it is probably known in Spain from American newspapers that are in the habit of publishing everything—what was the real object that the Merrimac had in view.
She had guns and did not fire; she had torpedoes, though imperfect and primitive, if I may be permitted the expression, or rudimental, which she did not use; if she was trying to explode our mines, she did not accomplish her design; and, finally, she had 2,000 tons of coal on board. The lieutenant who commanded her refused to state the object of his maneuver, saying only that it was made by order of Admiral Sampson; later, he said to Mr. Ramsden, British consul, that if the vessel were examined, it would be found that she carried torpedoes, as indeed was the case. Therefore, it may be reasonably supposed that the object was to sink the vessel across the channel, so as to obstruct it and prevent our ships from going out; and having made sure of that, to use part of their ships in other operations; and if the vessel did not come to lie across the channel and did not obstruct it, it was because she lost control of her movements, her rudder having been disabled by some projectile, so that she went down where it suited her least.
There is another fact in this connection which may and should arrest the attention of experts in that subject: The Plutón launched two torpedoes, the Mercedes two more, all of them Whitehead; two mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second; and yet the vessel was not blown up and passed both lines in safety, which shows that the effect of torpedoes is moral rather than material, and that it is not easy to discharge them at the right moment. To do so requires a degree of experience, a range of sight, and a presence of mind not easily found united in a single man. The occurrence to which I have reference demonstrates this very clearly.
During the day the officer and seven men of the Merrimac, who had first been taken on board the Mercedes, were temporarily transferred to the Morro.
From 11 to 12.30 in the night, the hostile ships were firing, though slowly, outside of the harbor and towards the southeast. The object of this has never been ascertained.
I have several times spoken with General Ros, governor of the Morro, and he has always repeated these and similar words: "From the beginning of the hostilities to the end I have remained in the castle, from where, as you know, everything can be seen and observed. Sooner or later I have always learned the object of everything the enemy has done and the reason for it; but the firing of that night, though I saw and heard it myself, I have never understood. I believe they were firing on some ship they saw, or thought they saw; but it may be that they were firing on the land; but I believe in that case the object and result of the firing would have become known sooner or later."
That same day Captain (General) Parades, second in command of the fleet, disembarked from the Cristóbal Colón and embarked temporarily on the Mercedes, where he remained until the 21st, taking command of all the defenses at the mouth of the harbor.
XVII.—The Blockade Continues.
June 4th.—There were to be seen at the mouth of the harbor seventeen ships: Six battle-ships, five warships, and six merchant vessels.
At 11.30 a.m., the second commander of the local naval forces (being the writer of this book), as judge, accompanied by the aid of the captaincy of the port, Mr. Leguina, as secretary, and the Government interpreter, Mr. Isidoro Agostini, went to the Morro in the steam launch of the captaincy of the port, for the purpose of taking the depositions of the lieutenant and seven men who had been taken prisoners.
The former, Mr. Hobson, 27 years old, born in the State of Alabama, is a lieutenant in the corps of naval constructors, who, in the United States, study in the naval college, and those first promoted are assigned to that corps; I state this so that it may not seem strange that he commanded the Merrimac, for, as they are officers of the Navy, they can build and command ships.
Upon learning the object of the visit, the prisoner, from whose room a great extent of the sea and part of the blockading fleet could be seen, asked why the British Consul, who was in charge of the United States Consulate, was not present when his deposition was to be taken, and he wanted to know whether I belonged to the army or the navy; what might be the consequences of his statement; by whose authority he was being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me. It did not prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. I told him so, asking him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he replied: "By order of Admiral Sampson; the second part I can not answer." I then deemed my mission at an end and had the fact set down.
A few days later, this officer was transferred to quarters on the Reina Mercedes that had been prepared for him, and the seven men to others on the vessel, where they remained until they were released.
As I left the Morro and stood on the esplanade in front of it, I had an opportunity for the first time to admire the spectacle that presented itself to my eyes; I say "admire," for the picture was truly worthy of admiration.
The evening was most beautiful; the sea was as smooth as a lake, there was hardly any wind and the sky was perfectly clear.
At a distance of about five miles, seventeen ships could be seen: eleven warships, among them seven battle-ships and one torpedo boat, and the other six merchant vessels, the nearest one about six miles from the harbor, formed a large arc, one extremity of which was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest and most powerful ships were in the center. Among them were the Iowa, Indiana, Brooklyn, and New York; the latter two may be easily recognized by their three smokestacks. The fifth was presumably the Massachusetts; and finally the Texas and Amazonas. The New York and Brooklyn taking advantage of the state of the sea, had a merchant steamer alongside and were coaling. All of them had their engines stopped and their bows in different directions according to the current. From time to time, one of them would move a short distance forward and then return again to her place. Among the merchant vessels were specially noticeable the Saint Louis (the first vessel that had been seen at Santiago), a huge transatlantic steamer of over 10,000 tons, which looked larger than any of the other ships, including the armor-clads, and a steam yacht of great speed, very small, on the contrary, and which looked like a ship's boat. This is the yacht that was in constant communication with Punta Cabrera. There also was a torpedo boat or destroyer. A few days later, I saw the same spectacle from the high battery of the Socapa, and I shall never forget it.
Before I continue, I will state that on May 26, the cable had been cut at Cape Cruz, so that communication with Manzanillo was interrupted until June 17, when the connection was reestablished.
5th.—The American fleet could be seen at the mouth of the harbor, being the same ships we had seen the night before.
General Linares returned from the Morro at 8 o'clock p.m. and ordered the launches and a tug to be gotten ready to take 150 men to the mouth of the harbor.
At 10.30, a chief, two officers and 120 soldiers embarked and went out in a launch towed by the Colon, assisted by the Alcyon; the tugs returned at 1 o'clock at night.
At 2 o'clock in the morning, through the fault of a collier coaling near the hut of the English cable at Las Cruces, said hut was burned: it was an accident, but none the less deplorable.
XVIII.—The Bombardment Increases.
June 6th.—Eighteen ships were visible at the mouth of the harbor. At 7.30 the lookout reported that the ships were starting up and approaching.
At 8.30 ten ships—the Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Brooklyn, New York, Texas, Amazonas, Minneapolis, and two other warships—forming two divisions, opened fire, the first division on the Morro and Aguadores, the second on the Socapa; one ship was detached from the latter division to bombard Mazamorra and adjoining points on the coast, where the column of Colonel Aldea (Asiatic battalion) had detachments and was operating.
When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms.
By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10.15, and again becoming terribly intense at 10.30.
At 11.2 it ceased.
Punta Gorda battery fired only 7 shots.
At 12.15 intense firing was heard again in the distance to the east; it ceased at 1.45.
At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina Mercedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Mollins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded; their names could not be ascertained owing to the condition of the ship, nor could even the exact number of wounded be stated, as it had been necessary to extinguish two fires on board.
At 2.45 a private boat arrived at the pier, carrying a sergeant and a wounded soldier from the Mazamorra detachment. They were also taken to the military hospital.
There were no more remarkable events during the night.
Ten warships, eight of them battle-ships, divided into two divisions, opened fire shortly after 8 a.m., on the batteries at the mouth, and by elevation on the bay. During the first moments, the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that 6th day of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never forget. I might write pages about it, and even then would probably not give the faintest idea of what it really was.
The hostile ships (see list of ships and armaments) had at least 120 large guns, that is to say, of 14, 20 and 32-cm. calibers, and about 80 small-caliber guns, that is to say, of 57 and 42-mm., or a total of 192 guns, for they fired with guns of all sizes; and as I am far from wanting to exaggerate and since the guns of the two sides of a ship can not be fired at the same time (those mounted in turrets forward and aft can), I will say that 91 guns were firing upon four 16-cm. muzzle-loading guns at the Morro and two 16-cm. breech-loading Hontoria guns of the Socapa battery.
I do not count the guns of Punta Gorda battery, which fired only seven shots; for the Americans, in spite of their enormous superiority, still had the prudence of avoiding it and not engaging it because it was not in line. Before the eloquence of numbers, anything else that I might say becomes unnecessary.
How did it happen that the Morro was not razed to the ground and that its guns and those of the Socapa were not dismounted? How did it happen that those who served these guns were not buried under the ruins? I do not know; that is all I can say; and those who were in those forts may be sure that, since they were not killed that day. They will die of old age.
Captain Concas, who is very clever at computations of a certain nature, counted at different times the num.ber of shots fired in a minute, and his deduction is that about 8,000 projectiles were fired; though this figure may appear exaggerated at first sight, it is not so in reality; the firing lasted 175 minutes, which would give an average of 45 shots per minute. I believe, if anything, the computation falls below the truth.
I have always believed that the hostile fleet, which, by means of the yacht referred to, communicated with the insurgents on the coast by way of Punta Cabrera, knew everything that was going on in Santiago as well as in the harbor and the position of our ships. But if I had had any doubts on that subject, they would have been dispelled that 6th day of June when I saw the aim of their projectiles. Most of them dropped in the bay in the direction of the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, which were covering the first line, and it was a miracle that both of them were not seriously damaged; for the large-caliber shells fell all around them; there were moments when it seemed as though some had hit them, especially the Vizcaya.
They were also perfectly acquainted with the position of the Mercedes, which is proved by the fact that the ships to the east, being the division which bombarded the Morro, were firing their projectiles right at the cruiser, and though protected by the hill of the Socapa, she received in her hull and rigging 35 shells, causing two fires, one of them quite extensive, being in the paint locker forward.
Commander Emilio Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extinguishing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an hour after that and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been a fellow-student of mine at college and our old friendship had always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast; five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died. May he rest in peace, this first chief of the navy killed in this war.
The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond.
Toward evening, the ships also fired twice on Daiquiri, probably at the forts and the detachments in the mineral region and at Firmeza, but without any effect worth mentioning. The high battery of the Socapa (two 16-cm. Hontoria guns) fired 47 shots; that was all they could fire, because during the bombardment the ships were hidden most of the time through the smoke.
The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they had not gone there, most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the dwellings which were located in the southern part suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned and the inhabitants transferred to the city.
Lieutenant Julián Garcia Duran was appointed second in command of the cruiser Reina Mercedes; he had arrived a short time before in command of the merchant steamer Méjico, with torpedo supplies, which he landed at the port of Guantánamo.
Later, after the Mercedes sank, this same officer was placed in command of the naval forces that occupied the Socapa; and, later, of the whole navy encampment, until they were embarked and taken back to Spain.
XIX.—The Firing Continues.
June 7th.—At daybreak nineteen ships in front of the mouth.
At 9.15 the body of Commander Emilio Acosta was brought on shore.
At 9.30 the funeral procession started, headed by Admiral Cervera and Generals Toral and Rubín, and including, in spite of the rain, the civil and military authorities of the city, delegations from all the different divisions, and a great many private citizens. On both sides of the body walked the battalion of volunteers and the company of guides, the only forces that were in the city, with the music of the Santiago regiment.
At 6.30 p. m. the ships increased the distance that separated them from the coast.
The French cable had been cut, and we were not in communication with Guantánamo.
8th.—Nineteen ships were in sight at daybreak, about 6 miles from the mouth.
During the night the fleet had constantly thrown its searchlights on the coast.
9th.—At daybreak eighteen ships, at a distance of about 7 miles.
The steamer Tomas Brooks delivered 25 planks at the mouth of the harbor, which were attached to a steel cable stretched from Cay Smith to Punta Soldado, the object of the planks being to keep it at the surface of the water; the cable was laid to prevent the passage of any torpedoes which the enemy might attempt to send into the harbor with the entering tide.
10th.—At daybreak the eighteen ships of the preceding day were to be seen about 10 miles distant. At 7 o'clock another one, a merchant vessel, arrived from the south.
The Plutón and Furor went alongside the steamer Méjico, one at each side, to rest from the service of the night.
At 11 the lookout made a signal, taking it down shortly after, that fire was being opened. Nothing was heard in the city.
The Morro said that the enemy had fired upon Punta Berracos, but had stopped very soon.
During the night the American fleet continued to examine the coast by means of the search-lights.
11th.—Seventeen ships, some 6 miles distant, others 10.
12th.—The same seventeen ships, from 5 to 6 miles distant from the Morro.
13th.—Fifteen ships, 6 miles from the harbor.
14th.—At 5.15 the enemy opened fire on the mouth of the harbor; it ceased at 6.50.
The projectiles fell toward Cajuma Bay, close to the Vizcaya.
Only one ship kept up the fire on the Morro and Socapa, both batteries answering it.
At the latter battery Ensign Bruquetas and two sailors were slightly wounded.
At 10 General Linares went to the Socapa and the Morro, returning at 12.30.
The enemy continued the fire during the night, aiming his projectiles upon the coast, especially above the mouth of the harbor.
15th.—At daybreak seventeen hostile ships in sight, among them the Vesuvius, this being her first appearance before the harbor.
The Vesuvius is a vessel of 900 tons displacement and of peculiar construction, being very long, narrow, and low. She is the only one of her class in the world, and throws, by means of guns or pneumatic tubes, dynamite bombs or projectiles a distance of about 2 miles; they are probably provided with a screw; nobody knows them exactly. I do not believe this vessel, though it may cause serious destruction, would be able to sustain a fight with another, even though smaller, for the reason that the range of her projectiles is very short and she has no protection.
From the 7th to the 15th the hostile fleet hardly threatened the batteries which defended the harbor, nor the coast either, contenting themselves with watching it incessantly day and night.
In the city nothing appeared to have changed, and yet the situation was very far from being what it was a month ago.
In the stores many articles were wanting, and those that could be had brought fabulous prices. Unfortunately, one of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies. The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea.
Fortunately, the sailors of the ships and defenses, thanks to the foresight of the general commandant of the naval station, were still receiving full rations and had them for some time to come, thanks also to the interest taken in this matter by the Commandant of Marine.
The music continued to play at the Alameda and in the market place, but the people, who had nothing to eat, had no desire to go walking, and the market place and Alameda were deserted.
Horses and dogs were dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more serious every day, and the discouragement was general, for every one knew that if the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city was imminent.
I must state that while the ships of the hostile fleet were firing on Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra on the 7th, 9th, and days following, insurgent bands, commanded by their principal chiefs, sustained a continued musket fire on land. In these attacks they were repulsed with great losses.
XX.—The Landing Expedition Appears.
June 16th.—Eighteen ships in sight.
At 5.45 the hostile fleet opened fire.
At 6.15 Punta Gorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after.
The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish fleet.
At 6.30 the fire became more intense.
At 6.35 smoke was seen for a few minutes issuing from the Infanta Maria Teresa. It was learned afterwards that a fragment of shell had caused a slight injury in the starboard gallery.
At 6.40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots.
At 7 the firing ceased.
At 7.15 the Furor and Plutón, which had their steam up during the firing, went alongside the steamer Méjico.
It was reported from the Morro that the ships which had been firing were eight in number; that the fire had been directed against the castle and the Socapa, both of them answering; that at the Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an officer and five soldiers (all belonging to the artillery) wounded; that at the Socapa two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Bruquetas wounded, the latter for the second time; and that one of the Hontoria guns had been put out of action by debris obstructing it, but that the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun.
At 11.45 the four sailors who had been wounded at the Socapa arrived in a boat at the royal pier and were taken to the military hospital, one of them, who was seriously wounded, on a stretcher from the firemen's headquarters, the other three in carriages.
At 12 a second lieutenant and a gunner arrived from the Morro and were also taken to the hospital.
During the night the ships continued to illuminate the coast with their search-lights.
The debris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was again made ready for firing.
17th.—At 5.30 steady gun fire commenced in the distance to the west. It was learned that one ship was firing on Punta Cabrera. A few minutes later another opened fire on the Socapa.
Thirteen ships in sight.
The ship firing on Punta Cabrera was also firing on Mazamorra.
At 7.30 the firing ceased.
There was nothing further of importance during the day and the following night.
18th.—Fourteen ships in sight at daybreak. The Iowa left and the Massachusetts, which had been absent for several days, took her place.
At 7.45 p.m. gun fire was heard.
It was learned that it was from the Socapa firing at a ship which had passed within a short distance and had answered. About 20 shots were exchanged.
19th.—Fifteen vessels in sight.
At 7 two battle-ships arrived from the south; total, 17.
At 2.30 p. m. General Linares went to the mouth of the harbor, returning at 7 p.m.
During the night the ships were again running their searchlights along the coast and the entrance of the harbor.
20th.—At daybreak there were 21 vessels in sight, 7 of them battle-ships.
The Oquendo changed her anchoring place and went farther to the north.
At 12 the Morro reported that 39 hostile vessels had arrived; shortly after 3 more came, so that, with the 21 that were already opposite the Morro, there was a total of 63.
At 12.05 a loud detonation was heard and a great deal of smoke was seen at the piers of Luz and San José; it came from the schooner Trafalgar, where a shell had exploded while being fired, killing a sailor of the steamer San Juan and wounding three of the Mortera, one of whom died a few minutes later. The schooner had to be run ashore to prevent her going down.
Orders were received for the formation of the fourth army corps, in command of General Linares, composed of the division of Santiago, which was already under his command, and the division of Manzanillo.
Another cable was stretched between the Socapa and Cay Smith, like the one stretched between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, and twelve Bustamente torpedoes were planted, half of them between Cay Smith and the Merrimac, and the other six between the latter and Punta Soldado.
21st.—It was learned that the 42 vessels that had arrived the previous day had proceeded in an easterly direction during the night, leaving only the former 21, most of them warships.
At 2.30 p. m. the Morro stated that the 42 vessels were again returning from the south.
The cruiser Reina Mercedes left her anchoring place at the Socapa and cast anchor in the bay, west of the captaincy of the port.
On the 16th the American fleet had again opened fire on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and although it could not be compared with that of the 6th, either in intensity or duration, yet it had caused us two deaths at the Socapa, and two officers and several sailors and soldiers had been wounded there and at the Morro. A 32-cm. shell, which exploded at the former of said batteries, raised such a quantity of earth that it partly buried one of the Hontoria guns, making it useless for the time being, and came near burying also the men serving it. During the night the earth covering the gun was removed, so that it was again ready for service.
The names of the Morro and Socapa have been repeated many times, and it has been shown that these two poor batteries were the main objective of the hostile fleet and had to withstand the fire of over 90 guns, most of them of large caliber, which they always answered; yet, I cannot help but speak once more of the heroism, truly worthy of admiration, displayed by those who served them, constantly exposing their lives and having to watch after fighting, without a moment's rest or sleep; for the enemy was always on the lookout for the least remission in watchfulness in order to surprise them and attempt a coup de main on the harbor.
Each one of them, and the governor of the castle first of all, earned the gratitude of the country every day for two months. Their self-denial and valor kept a powerful fleet in check for seventy days. The resistance which the Morro and the Socapa offered under the prevailing circumstances is a true feat of heroism.
On the 17th the ships reconnoitered along Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra, firing on the detachments of the Asiatic column.
On the 20th, the day when the 42 vessels of the convoy appeared with the landing expedition, a shell exploded in the hold of the schooner Trafalgar, causing several deaths and injuring the hull of the schooner, which had to be run ashore in order to prevent her from sinking.
I shall not speak at length of a matter which is of no importance, but will mention it briefly, because it gives an idea of the craze reigning at Santiago, to which the frequent bombardments, which must have cost at least a million dollars, gave rise.
Whether by reason of the type of their fuzes, or because many of the shells did not have the requisite powder charge (I have discharged a 57-mm. shell myself, which had only one-eighth of it), certain it is that many did not explode and remained intact as though they had not been discharged; as they were being thrown in such large numbers, many people wanted to keep one as a curiosity or as a souvenir of an event which does not happen often in a lifetime. Some wanted them of small, others of large caliber; others wanted to make a collection of all sizes. I have a friend who called on me one evening to show me a 20-cm. shell which had been discharged and had not suffered the least deformation. The fad had cost him 20 pesos, and he was as happy over it as a child over a new toy. But I was thoughtless enough to tell him that there were 32-cm. ones, and he was inconsolable. It will be understood from the above that the fad was being paid for dearly; and as capital is always made out of everything, many people made a business of gathering up and discharging projectiles and selling them. That was the cause of the unfortunate occurrence on board the Trafalgar; a shell had been discharged without the necessary care, and what happened was but the natural consequence.
Another monomania of this period: As the Americans kept up the bombardments all through the month of June, so that there hardly was a day when gunshots were not heard at a greater or less distance, people were hearing them all the time; the falling of a chair, the closing of a door or window, the noise of carriage wheels in the distance, the crying of a child—everything was taken for gunshots, and gunshots was all that was being talked about. When they finally ceased, Santiago had become so identified with them that people almost missed them and were surprised to hear them no longer.
XXI.—Line of Observation.
We have now reached a period when the events acquire the greatest interest and assume exceptional importance. So far it was only the fleet that had been antagonizing us; and numerous and powerful though it was, it had threatened only one point, which experience showed us it did not dare attack or force. Henceforth we shall find ourselves menaced also on land by an army equipped with numerous modern artillery, which, supported by the ships that had control of the sea and could therefore, without trouble, communicate with their depots and base of operations, and further supported by the insurgents who had control of the field, was constantly receiving reinforcements of men and material and had at its disposal everything which we, unfortunately, were lacking.
From this time on the events are precipitated, so to speak, and lead with dizzy rapidity to a denouement which it is not difficult to foresee. In view of the exceptional location of the island of Cuba, we can not hope for help either from within or without; we can not hope for provisions nor ammunition, and without these the soldier can not be fed and can not fight—a sad and desperate situation for men who ask for nothing else and whom fate seems to pursue.
When speaking of military operations and movements of troops, it is not always possible to give a full account of them as they happen; there is danger that some of the occurrences, the situation of the forces, and the points they defend or attack, may not be known. In order to obviate this, and to give the reader a better understanding of the events that took place later, I will give an outline, though perhaps incomplete, of the distribution which General Linares made of the forces he had at his disposal.
It has already been stated that on the 20th the Fourth Army Corps was organized, consisting of the Santiago division and the Manzanillo division. General Linares was made commander in chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ventura Fontán, who had been chief of staff of the latter division, retained the same position relative to the corps.
General Toral, though in command of the division of Santiago, remained at the head of the military government of the city, with the same chief of staff. It may, therefore, be said that nothing was changed.
From telegrams received, the enemy's plans could be, if not accurately known, at least surmised, and as it was supposed that they might effect a landing at a point on the coast more or less close to the city, General Linares ordered the concentration of his forces so that they might be assigned to convenient positions. First of all, orders were sent from Havana to Manzanillo, by telegraph, for General Escario to proceed with all the forces available, and with the least possible delay, to Santiago de Cuba. Said general left Manzanillo on the 22d with 3,300 infantry, 250 cavalry, two Plasencia guns and 60 transport mules. The infantry was composed of the battalions of Alcántara, Andalusia, Puerto Rico chasseurs and two battalions of the Isabel la Católica regiment. These 3,300 men who, from the time they left Manzanillo, had encounters every day with the insurgents, who killed and wounded 97 of them, could not arrive here, in spite of forced marches, until the evening of July 3; this should not be lost sight of.
At another place I have spoken of the scarcity of provisions in the city. The authorities, in order not to diminish the chances of assistance which they might obtain from the region under cultivation, for the men as well as the horses and mules, combined the operations and position of the troops with the object of attempting to preserve that region and looking out for the enemy in all directions.
With this object in view, a line of observation was established, as follows: To the north, from Palma Soriano through San Luis, El Cristo, and Socorro; to the west, from Punta Cabrera through Monta Real and El Cobre, on the roads which lead to the city on that side, and to the east, from Daiquiri through Vinent and Firmeza to the harbor of Escandell.
On the 22d the first companies of the Spanish fleet disembarked, with a force of about 130 men each, under orders of the third commanders of the ships respectively; two companies were stationed at San Miguel de Paradas, to guard the coast west of the bay and assist the Socapa or the city; the third company at the Socapa, to reinforce that point, and the fourth and last company at Las Cruces, to assist the Morro, Aguadores, or the city.
At night of the same day, the second companies disembarked, including men from the Mercedes and the destroyers, a total of 450, who, under command of Capt. Joaquin Bustamente, went the following day to occupy the line from Dos Caminos del Cobre to the Plaza de Toros; that is, south and southwest of the precinct.
The only forces in the Santiago district prior to the declaration of the present war were nine companies of mobilized troops and two of the Santiago Regiment, to garrison the city and the forts of the precinct, besides a small number of the Civil Guard and a few artillerymen, and as much cavalry as was indispensable for convoy and other services properly belonging to the cavalry.
When war was declared, six more companies of the Santiago regiment came for the purpose of commencing the fortification works of the precinct of the city, under the directions of the chiefs and officers of the corps of engineers; another company was occupying the position of Ermitafio (east of the city) and another was at Socorro.
I believe I have already stated that by orders of General Linares the Talavera battalion had come from Baracoa and was stationed, with three companies of mobilized troops, along the coast to watch the same, occupying Daiquiri, Siboney, the railroads, and the forts.
The Asiatic battalion, in command of Colonel Aldea, took up its position of observation west of Santiago: Four companies, with the colonel at Punta Cabrera, covering the coast road; another, with one mobilized company, occupying Mazamorra, both to be ready to reinforce the former four or the forces at the Socapa, if necessary, and to prevent in due time a landing at Cabanas; another occupied the camp at Monte Real, and finally another, with one mobilized company, garrisoned El Cobre. With these forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be covered.
Gradually, as information was being received concerning the enemy's plans, the available forces of the San Luis brigade, in command of General Vara del Rey, were concentrated in the district.
First, four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico (No. 1) arrived, one company remaining at El Cristo and one at Songo, both of them occupying also the forts on the railroad of both towns. Later came three companies of the San Fernando battalion, one remaining at El Cristo and two at Palma Soriano. Finally, General Vara del Rey, with three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment (Constitución), one company of guerrillas on foot, and two Plasencia guns, occupied El Caney, where there were only 40 men of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, leaving three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment at the towns of San Luis, Dos Caminos, and Moron. Two squads of cavalry were distributed in said three towns.
It is only necessary to cast a glance at the chart, without much study, to understand that the line which our troops occupied was too extensive to be solidly covered and effectively defended by such small forces.
Why did General Linares not limit it and occupy positions closer to the precinct and more susceptible of effective defense? For a reason which outweighs all others. He could not do so without condemning its defenders from the outset to an inevitable disaster.
I will repeat once more—for to this must be attributed the reverses we suffered—that there was nothing left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 cartridges are used up very rapidly. It was the scarcity of provisions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, beginning at Ermitano and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Morón and the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them unfit for the active operations necessary in war.
The Morro and the Socapa had to be not only occupied, but well protected; they were the key to the harbor. If the enemy had taken possession of them, it would have been easy to remove the torpedoes and force the bay, and then the city and its defenders would necessarily have had to surrender.
It was equally necessary to occupy Daiquiri, Siboney, and Aguadores, so as not to allow the enemy to make a landing at any of them with impunity (as they did after all, supported by the warships, at the first-named place) and gain possession of the railroad. For the same reasons also, it was necessary to cover the landing places of Cabañas and Guaicabón (near Punta Cabrera), as also the west coast of the bay, and preserve the railroads leading to the city.
All this proves that it was not only desirable, but absolutely necessary to defend said line. To give it up would have meant to be resigned from the outset to perish from hunger, and perhaps from thirst, which is worse.
If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these two things had to do with later events, and how different the situation would have been without them. Unfortunately the small number of our forces made it impossible to save these positions.
The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone.
Unfortunately the insurgents, firing from ambush, as usual, on General (then Colonel) Escario's column, succeeded in delaying its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the 1st of July. Fate is not always just.
XXII.—Events of June 22d to 27th.
The reader being acquainted with the number of our troops, the positions they occupied and the sites they covered and their object, it will not be difficult to understand and appreciate the operations carried on and the events taking place here.
On the evening of the 21st it was learned, as has been stated, that the enemy was effecting a landing at Punta Berracos.
June 22d.—At 6.30, the usual ships were opposite the mouth of the harbor; in Aguadores Bay there were two yachts and one monitor; at Punta Berracos, the 42 vessels of the convoy, among them the Saint Louis, with the Indiana. A steamer, with tugs, could also be seen. We therefore knew that the landing was being effected. We also saw the house on fire that the English had on San Juan river.
At 8 the enemy opened fire and Punta Gorda answered.
At the same time, one ship fired upon Aguadores.
The Brooklyn, Iowa, and Texas were firing on the Morro and Socapa, and the batteries were answering.
At noon the firing ceased in the mouth of the harbor.
Punta Gorda only fired five shots.
The firing continued on the coast toward the east.
During the day the first companies of the Spanish fleet (4 companies, about 520 men) disembarked. At midnight the second companies (about 450 men) disembarked. It has already been stated what part of the ground they were to cover.
At 11 o'clock p. m. two shots were heard and a loud detonation, followed by a noise resembling that of a screw revolving in the air. Shortly after, another similar detonation was heard.
23d.—Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about 6 miles from it, 8 battle-ships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of the warships.
At 2.30 a yacht, with a white flag, left the fleet and approached the Morro. The tug Colón went out to speak with her. At this time there were 24 ships opposite the harbor.
During the night the enemy examined the coast again by means of search-lights.
24th.—Eight battle-ships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius (which, at 11 o'clock on the previous night, had thrown two dynamite bombs on the port, fortunately without doing any harm) and 12 merchant vessels, are guarding the mouth of the harbor, stretched out from Aguadores to Punta Cabrera. The others, as many as 63, among them six warships protecting them, continued the landing at Daiquiri.
The yacht that came up yesterday with a flag of truce was sent by Admiral Sampson, who inquired whether the lieutenant who had been made prisoner was being kept in the Morro. Mr. Concas, who was delegated to parley, answered evasively, as was natural, that the prisoner was in a safe place.
At 11.55 the Brooklyn opened a slow fire on Daiquiri and adjoining points on the coast.
At 1.30 the firing ceased.
At 1.55 it was again heard in the same direction, ceasing at 2.30.
At night the hostile fleet used the projectors again.
25th.—At 4 a.m. 14 shots were heard in the direction of Daiquiri. It was presumed that they were firing on General Rubín's column.
At daybreak there were at the mouth of the harbor 8 battleships and 12 merchant vessels.
From 12.30 to 2 o'clock the hostile fleet kept up a slow fire on the coast from Aguadores to Daiquiri.
It was noticed that the vessels landing troops or material were going back and forth, so we felt sure that new reinforcements were constantly arriving from the United States.
26th.—At daybreak the New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Oregon, Massachusetts, Texas, Vesuvius, 1 monitor, and 6 merchant vessels were in front of the harbor. To the east, in the direction of Berracos, 11 steamers could be seen, and 8 at Daiquiri, inside of the roadstead.
The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes and a soldier of the garrison.
27th.—The same ships blockading the harbor as the preceding day.
During the night the Vesuvius threw 3 dynamite bombs, doing no damage, as they fell in the water, although inside of the harbor.
The search-lights were going again during the night.
On the evening of the 21st the enemy had commenced to effect the disembarkation of the landing expedition (which according to New York newspapers consisted of 50,000 men), and in order to do so in perfect security, even though they had in all 63 vessels, counting both merchant and warships, they landed them at Punta Berracos, 20 miles from Santiago, in spite of there being no water and no roads, because our troops, few in number, could not cover such an extensive region.
To assist the landing, the ships were firing on the whole coast from Berracos, east of Santiago, to Punta Cabrera, 27 miles west. How could we cover so many threatened points and occupy so extensive a territory? Impossible, even if we had had much superior forces than we did.
The battle-ships, always in imposing numbers, remained in front of the harbor so as to keep our fleet in. The warships were protecting the landing, and as they controlled the sea it was impossible for soldiers with small arms to prevent it.
How many men did the Americans disembark?
As Santiago was cut off from the rest of the world, or almost so, it was not easy to ascertain the exact number, nor was it necessary. The vessels of the convoy, as soon as they had landed men and material, returned to the United States and came back with fresh contingents. But it may be safely stated that the first expedition consisted of at least 15,000 men, with more or less war material.
I base this estimate on the fact that forty-three vessels arrived, including six warships apparently convoying them, and although the latter can, and generally do transport troops, I do not count them, nor do I count five small tugs; hence there remain thirty-two of all sizes, and modern steamers can surely carry on an average not less than 1,000 men each, especially in view of the short distance from Key West to Santiago and the fine weather prevailing. But taking into consideration the circumstance that they had to carry war material as well, I will reduce the figure to one-half, namely, 500 men to each steamer, and there would still be 16,000. There can be no doubt, as everybody will admit, that, if I err in my calculation, my figures are below rather than above the actual number. Moreover, as I have said, this matter is not of great importance, for new contingents kept constantly arriving, and the Americans also knew that the insurgents, who were awaiting their arrival, would swell their forces.
Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usually a battle-ship—for the mission of the Vesuvius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities—and as soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to understand them. Fortunately, they do not appear to be very sure either in range or in aim.
On the sea, matters continued in the same condition. Let us now see the operations carried out on land by the Army forces during this period, the latter events taking place at diametrically opposed points.
On the 22d Daiquiri and Siboney were bombarded by the ships. At the same time the enemy appeared at the former place. As the force guarding it could not cope with the ships, it retreated by way of Vinnent to Firmeza, gathering up all the detachments from the forts.
General Rubín, with three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two artillery guns (Plasencia), proceeded to Siboney. There he received orders to proceed with his column and with the whole force in the mineral region to the heights of Sevilla before daybreak, where they were to take position in three echelons, the foremost one under Commander Alcañiz, formed of the three companies of Puerto Rico and one mobilized company.
On the 23d this echelon alone checked the enemy's advance in the morning, and again in the evening, the echelon having been reinforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.
At daybreak on the 24th the echelon was reinforced by two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat.
In spite of this advantage they received orders to withdraw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been surrounded. In compliance with the order received the column withdrew to the city.
The official report of this battle is as follows:
"General Rubín's column, under orders of the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps, was attacked yesterday at noon and in the evening.
"This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.
"On our side we had in the two days seven dead, José Lances, captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zenon Borregon, second lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly wounded; two privates seriously wounded, two slightly wounded. Various contusions."
Later on it was learned that the forces which attacked General Rubín's column, or rather the echelon of the same, under Commander Alcañiz, were as follows:
The seventh, twelfth, and seventeenth regiments of United States infantry the second Massachusetts, the seventy-first New York, and 16 dismounted squadrons.
On the 26th the following was published:
"General order of the Fourth Army Corps, dated June 26, at Santiago de Cuba:
"Soldiers: We left the mineral region because I did not wish to sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modem and powerful guns.
"The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago.
"The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal conditions.
"Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of success.
"Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels.
"The nation and the army look to us.
"More than a thousand sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain.
"The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us to reinforce us.
"I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie in the defense of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts of the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of saving the honor of our arms.
"I shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with all. Long live Spain!" Linares.
"The foregoing was published to-day, by order of His Excellency, for the information of all.
"Ventura Fontán,
"Lieutenant Colonel, chief of staff."
In order to convey a better understanding of the foregoing operations of General Rubín's column, I will give below a copy of the instructions and orders which said general received from General Linares, all of which were drawn up in camp and written with lead pencil.
They are as follows:
"Pozo, June 23, 1898.
"Civilians have handed to me the paper which you wrote to me, and we have heard firing since a quarter to five, and afterwards gun fire.
"I have impressed upon Colonel Borry to guard well the path or road to the Redonda, where he is encamped, so that the troops of the line, if they should find Sardinero occupied, can take that road to the Redonda.
"I have sent to Santiago for all the transport mules and ten carts, which will be at your camp by 7.30 or 8 o'clock. You will have the sick ready, and also the ammunition, so that they may at once be taken to Santiago, with the same convoy that will go with the mules.
"Make arrangements to have the first mess of the morning taken there and then you will receive further orders.
"Linares.
"To General Antero Rubín."
(Seal: "Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps—General Staff.")
"After eating the first mess you will march with the whole column to Santiago, effecting a retreat from that point by echelons as carefully and slowly as may be necessary, so as to be in good condition to repulse any attack of the enemy.
"The Talavera Battalion will go to Sueño and will there meet the chief of the town, who will indicate to it the points to be occupied.
"The Puerto Rico Battalion, with the two mobilized companies from the mineral region, will proceed to Catiadas and will there receive orders concerning the points it is to occupy, and the San Fernando Battalion is to proceed to Central Benéfico, and will also receive instructions. The section of artillery will go to the quarters at Dolores. The section of engineers will proceed to Cruces, taking quarters in the offices of the mineral company.
"Linares.
"Pozo, June 24, 1898.
"Note: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula.
"To General Antero del Rubín."
(Seal: "Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps—General Staff.")
"You have already received orders to retreat, which is to be done when the convoy of sick has started under the protection of two mobilized companies and one Talavera company.
"The whole train will retreat first, and upon arriving at Santiago, they will go to the points designated, and with the three echelons of Puerto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavera, you will make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that when the forward echelon leaves a position the other two will be in position, until arriving at Santiago. There I shall await you.
"Linares.
"To General Rubín."
XXIII.—End of the Month of June.
June 28th.—The Morro said that the Massachusetts, which had been gone, had returned; that the Iowa had left instead, and that at 7 a.m. a merchant vessel was embarking the sick of the fleet, estimated at about 50, judging from what could be made out with the help of glasses; that to the east, at a distance, the ships were firing slowly.
During the night they continued to watch with search-lights.
29th.—The Iowa returned.
In the evening, firing on Daiquiri was heard.
30th.—The same ships are blockading the harbor.
The Morro said that at 3 p.m. a steamer was sighted to the south; that, when she saw the American fleet, she shaped her course eastward at full speed; that a yacht and a battle-ship went out to chase her; that the latter returned with the steamer which, with the American flag hoisted, joined the convoy at Daiquiri.
At 8 p.m. a few musket shots were heard in the direction of Campo de Marte (east of the city).
Later the sound came from the Plaza de Toros (northeast).
At 9 firing was again heard at the cemetery (to the north).
Nothing further occurred.
The last three days of the month of June are devoid of interest and we enjoyed unusual quiet. So much had the people of Santiago become accustomed to the sound of gunshots that they almost missed them.
But how true it is that when a calm comes after a storm, it is often only the precursor of another storm. The enemy was preparing to begin the month of July in a manner that Santiago de Cuba will remember many a day.
The hostile fleet continued to antagonize the coast as usual. But without neglecting their main objective and their constant care, that of watching our fleet, which, being short of provisions, would sooner or later be compelled to take some decisive action, they were gathering at the entrance of the harbor a large number of their most powerful ships, and the army, no doubt entrenching itself at Daiquiri, so as to have another shelter besides that of the ships, and a safe base of operations, was preparing to attack the city, supported by the insurgents who had joined them in large numbers under their leaders Calixto García, Demetrio Castillo, Cebrecos, and others less known.
This is proved by the musket fire which was heard a short distance from the city, to the northeast, on the night of the 30th.
From the news we had received from the Morro it might have been inferred that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the hostile fleet had captured a merchant vessel, which, after the American flag had been hoisted upon her, joined the convoy; but this is not probable. Aside from the fact that the flag of a ship is not changed as easily as that, the truth would have become known sooner or later. It is more probable that it was a vessel that was not expected and they went out to reconnoiter. That is my opinion about this incident, which, in reality, is not of much importance.
A few words more about the Vesuvius that gave us so much trouble for a few nights—that time, it seems, suiting her best to carry out her exploits. This ship is the only one of her class; her projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and she has made her debut here. One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance of about 20 metres. From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain.
Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. This would seem to indicate that the screw with which they are provided keeps on revolving even on solid ground.*
Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroyers, which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes, anchored at a short distance. I heard this from the commander of the former and the officers of the latter.
The forces of the army which, as has been stated, abandoned the mineral region, not being able to maintain it, concentrated in the city, preserving, as was indispensable, the line from Aguadores to Cruces, after destroying the bridge at the former point. The line (4 kilometers) was covered by six companies of the Santiago regiment and two of mobilized troops, a total contingent of about 800 men.
The advance post of Caney (a league and a half—about 6 miles—from the city), in command of General Vara del Rev, was defended by three companies of the battalion "Constitución" (the 29th), one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men.
The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the seashore, was defended by the following forces:
Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies), 458
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico, 450
Talavera Battalion. No. 4 (Peninsular), 850
Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11, 440
Total, army, 2198
Three companies of mobilized troops, 330
Volunteers, 440
Total, 2968
Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number to serve the guns installed, the number and place of which has been mentioned. It may therefore be said that there were, in round numbers, 3,000 men.
This was the fighting force. Within the city was the cavalry force (for which the ground, being hilly and cut up by trenches, was not adapted), and a small force of the civil guard assigned to duty in the city, and the firemen with their engines in readiness.
This line is divided into sections in command of colonels.
Of the 3,000 men defending it, two companies, one of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico and the other of the Talavera Battalion, defended the advance position at San Juan, one being assigned to the right, the other to the left side of the road.
Finally, at the Socapa, that is, at points in an opposite direction from that line, there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Punta Gorda. It must be remembered that these three positions overlook the entrance of the harbor, and are its key, and must for that reason be maintained at any cost; and these forces were indispensable there, as the enemy might attack them, as indeed he did attack them the next day.
The same day, the 30th, the following telegram, addressed to the aid of marine (ayudante de marina) of that district, was received at the comandancia de marina from Manzanillo:
"Commander Marine, Santiago:
"Last evening, for about an hour, we sustained in the waters of this harbor a battle against three hostile vessels of medium tonnage, which passed, at a distance of about a mile from the head of the piers, in a northeasterly direction, under low steam.
"The following took part: Gunboats Guantánamo, Estrella, and Delgado-Parejo, under my command, and a group of vessels that were disabled, consisting of the pontoon Maria and gunboats Cuba Española and Guardian. With the former three we arrived in time at the other group, as the enemy passed by, who, finding himself attacked, stopped his progress only a short time on account of an injury which our vessels had inflicted on the second of theirs, which made it necessary for the third one to tow her to windward, and then, with slow speed, though keeping up a steady fire during the retreat, they doubled the headland northeast of the Manzanillo Cays, heading north, and soon disappeared from sight. The city co-operated efficiently with the few guns it has. We had two dead, two slightly wounded, and one bruised, on the Delgado-Parejo; two slightly wounded and two contusions on the other ships; in the city, a few wounded; injuries to all the ships, but not material.
"Barreda."
XXIV.—Battles of El Caney and San Juan.
July 1st.—At 7 gun and musket fire were being heard in the direction of the Plaza de Marte (east of the city).
According to the Morro the Minneapolis arrived to reinforce the hostile fleet.
At the comandancia de marina we could hear a slow gun and steady musket fire in the direction of Campo de Marte.
The enemy had a captive balloon, from which he observed our positions; from the Reina Mercedes headquarters (converted into a hospital) it could be plainly seen. It was in the direction of Sevilla.
The American fleet is firing from Aguadores, the greater part of the projectiles passing over the city. Others fall inside, some exploding and some not. Many have already fallen in the houses, among others a 20-cm. shell, which fell in the house of the chief pilot of the port, but did not explode. The ships firing from Aguadores are the New York and the Oregon.
The streets of the city are almost deserted; only soldiers and volunteers are seen as they go to their posts. As usual, many projectiles are falling in the bay near our fleet.
The firing from the ships ceased at 11.
At 2 intense musket fire was heard in the direction of El Caney; at 2.30 also gun fire.
By 3 o'clock the musket fire became steadier; constant volleys were being heard; at 4 it became less intense.
At 10 p. m. General Cervera left his ship, returning at 12.
On July 1st, at 6 a.m., the nucleus of the hostile army under command of General Shafter, and which must have consisted of at least 15,000 men, with many modern guns, without including the insurgent parties, attacked the lines of the precinct east and east-northeast of the city, that is El Caney, defended by General Vara del Rey with 520 men and two Plasencia guns, and the position of San Juan, occupied by two companies comprising 250 soldiers.
The attack which the Americans made with 12,000 men, as stated by themselves, was commanded by General Wheeler, second in command of the army.
A brigade of 3,500 men, also under the orders of said General Wheeler, and supported by another, directed its efforts upon El Caney, while Colonel Chaffee with 2,000 men attacked the hill and fort of San Juan.
The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any protection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impossible to go near it.
Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his soldiers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle.
General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the handful of lions in these words: "When the American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command."
The fight commenced once more and the enemy attacked again and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two relatives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p.m., the commander being dead and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100 and most of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a bold attack.
Of the 520 defenders of El Caney only 80 returned, most of them crippled and bruised. The Americans acknowledged that they had 900 casualties.
As has been stated, 2,000 men under the command of Colonel Chaffee, well protected, attacked in the morning the position of San Juan with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which Wheeler's men made the attack on El Caney.
Our headquarters were situated in an excellent position, at the crossing of the roads to El Caney and Pozo. General Linares had no available reserves; he therefore formed the echelon close to the positions of San Juan where he could observe the movements of the enemy and assist personally at points where his presence might be necessary.
With him was General Ordoñez with two rapid-fire guns.
In the foremost echelon at San Juan was Colonel José Baquero, of the Simancas regiment of infantry, who had come from Guantánamo with a message, and could not return on account of the blockade. This echelon was two companies strong, and before the Americans opened fire, it was reinforced by another company. It is here that Colonel Ordoñez was, with the rapid-fire division; the position being defended by 300 infantry and two guns.
The echelon nearest San Juan consisted of three companies of Talavera, one company with General Linares to the right of the Pozo road, forming an angle, in order to prevent a surrounding movement on the part of the enemy from the right of San Juan; another at the angle of the two roads referred to, and a third at Veguita toward El Caney, crossing their fire with that of the forces at Sueño.
In view of the small numbers of our forces and the ever increasing numbers of those of the Americans and their war material, we reinforced our positions by some trenches, under shelter of which we might be able to prolong the fight for a longer time.
The cavalry formed the third line at the fort of Canosa, protected by a small hill.
After the cannonade of the morning, in which our guns with accurate aim succeeded in causing the enemy many casualties and silencing the fire of one of his batteries erected at Pozo, and when the Americans had brought together considerable forces of infantry, they attacked about noon with cannon, machine-gun, and musket fire.
The situation of the line commanded by Baquero was critical. Colonel Ordoñez and the commander of the Puerto Rico battalion, Mr. Lamadrid, had been wounded. One-half of the officers had also fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, but Baquero, the brave soldier, who had distinguished himself so highly in the campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated by the clouds of bullets and grapeshot.
At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan.
The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of stafif had to organize the remnants of the first line.
It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Americans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajicara, was one of the most beautiful examples of the army.
While these cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan were carried on the enemy sent forces against our whole line, for the purpose, no doubt, of harassing us and making the attack more general.
The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamente; but the enemy was already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible. Our artillery was steadily firing at many points of the line, loading the guns (old ones, as has been stated) without any protection, but the fire was extremely slow and therefore of little efficacy.
At 3.30 p. m. I went toward the Campo de Marte, impatient to learn what had happened. At the Plaza Dolores I met General Linares. His arm, which had been seriously wounded in the first trenches, as stated, had been dressed at the military hospital and he was now being taken to his house on a stretcher, escorted by a few horsemen.
When I arrived at the end of Enramadas street and was only a few feet from a trench of the third line, covered by a section of volunteers, I saw a part of the battlefield. The musket fire was very slow, and although Santa Ursula fort, situated to the right and somewhat in the rear of the trenches referred to, was firing as rapidly as its muzzle-loading guns permitted, it will be easily understood that there was no new attack that day.
I then went to the headquarters of the cavalry, at the entrance of El Caney road, where a section of the cavalrymen were ready to hasten wherever they might be ordered.
It may be said that the battle was at an end and many commanders and officers were arriving, all tired out and almost dying from thirst. Among others, I saw Commander Irles, of the general staff, who had had either one or two horses killed under him, and there I learned that the number of commanders and officers wounded had been comparatively very large. Mr. Molina, lieutenant colonel of the civil guard, arrived and said that Commander Bustamente of the navy had been seriously wounded and was being carried on a stretcher. My consternation may be imagined. I hurried out to meet him and found him a few minutes later. In spite of the heat, he had been wearing his blue-cloth suit in the fight, by which he could be easily distinguished from all others. He was covered with blood, pale and disfigured, his eyes closed, and without his saber and revolver. I learned that before he was wounded his horse was killed under him and his hat shot through. I accompanied him to the military hospital. In spite of his insignias of a commander, nobody paid much attention to him. This can be readily understood, for that day, in a short time, over 300 wounded had been received, and they were still coming. It was difficult to find beds and the attendant personnel, although increasing, was not sufficient to look after all.
I succeeded in finding Antonio Cañaz, the surgeon of marine, whom I know, and in whom I have unlimited confidence, and thanks to him, the wounded man was placed on a bed and his clothes taken off. They had to be cut with scissors. The wound was in the right side of the abdomen; his legs were covered with blood. The position of the bullet, the aspect of the wounded man, and above all the look with which Dr. Cañaz answered mine, left me no doubt. I knew that he had only a few moments to live and I left the hospital deeply affected.
I will add that, as the hospital was situated in the sector attacked by the enemy and near the trenches, being outside the city, musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof; later on, shells were flying over it in all directions.
As has been seen, two battle-ships from Aguadores were throwing projectiles upon the city and the bay, causing victims among the inhabitants and damages to the buildings. As I went to the captaincy of the port in the morning when the firing commenced, I saw at the ambulance improvised at the Bottino pharmacy, a woman who was having her head dressed, which had been struck by a fragment of shell. The wound, although not deep, was wide, and looked as though made with a razor.
At nightfall the firing ceased along the whole line.
Such were the battles of that day, so serious by reason of the blood that had been shed, as well as by their results.
With the loss of El Caney, we lost the line which it had been so imperative for us to keep, and also the aqueduct and the region under cultivation—that is, provisions and water. We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full well that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, there was no possibility of avoiding it.
Our casualties were as follows:
Killed: Brigadier General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12 officers, and 78 men.
Missing: Colonel of Infantry José Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. The colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified.
Prisoners: Two officers.
Wounded: Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders, 30 officers, and 339 men.
(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel of Artillery Ordoñez.)
TOTAL CASUALTIES.
Generals, 2
Commanders, 10
Officers, 48
Men, 533
Total, 593
Almost one-fifth of the combatants covering the whole line, and the whole line was not even attacked, but only a sector of it; consequently not all of them fought.
The casualties of the enemy, as acknowledged by themselves, were:
In the attack on El Caney, 900
In the attack on San Juan, 432
At other points of attack, 328
Total, 1760*
In these cruel battles the army inspired the enemy with respect and true admiration, perhaps because he had supposed that they fought in the same manner as the insurgents. The foregoing is my firm conviction, because I have seen and observed the events which I narrate and have dwelt much upon them.
On the 1st day of July the Americans fought, as I have stated, without protection and with truly admirable courage, but they did not fight again as they did that day. They entrenched themselves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows.
It was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer possible their admiration had no limits. When they entered Santiago de Cuba, the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the twenty-ninth (the number of the battalion "Constitución," which had defended the city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things.
The men of the twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth doing, were loved and feasted by every one and spent whole hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bright.
Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies, very differently. Besides, I am only citing facts, and any one can construe them to his own satisfaction.
From the foregoing, it is reasonable to believe that when 520 men maintained themselves at El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the whole hostile army.
General Linares surrendered the command to General Toral.
In the battle of July 1, General Rubín, who commanded the forces of San Juan and Portillo del Caney, had his horse killed under him at the latter place at 5 o'clock p.m.
XXV.—Actions of the 2d and 3d.
July 2d.—At 5 o'clock gun and musket fire commenced, well sustained in the direction of the land.
At 6 the hostile fleet opened fire on the Morro and the Socapa. The greater part of the projectiles fell in the bay and on our fleet.
The firing ceased at 8.30.
Punta Gorda, which also opened fire, discharged 8 shots.
The musket fire was intense.
At 8.15 Punta Gorda again opened fire. At the same time the Plutón started up toward the mouth of the harbor. The musket fire ceased.
At 9.30 the military governor said by telephone: "I ask your excellency to send a boat, so that by going as close to the coast as possible, the enemy may be checked at San Antonio and Plaza de Toros." At this time the enemy opened musket fire in the same direction. It ceased shortly after.
The companies of the fleet embarked again. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships.
The body of sailors that disembarked was protected in a line of trenches by Colonel Aldea's column (Asiatic battalion), which withdrew from the coast to the city.
At 8 o'clock four wounded from the Socapa were brought to the pier. A shell which exploded on one of the guns killed three men and wounded six, completely disabling the mount of the Hontoria gun, which could no longer be used. Among the wounded was Ensign Fernandez Pifia, who was in command of the battery.
At 1.30 a slow gun fire was heard in the distance.
The French consul, on horseback, with a flag of his nation on a very long pole, left for Cuabitas, followed by many people.
During the firing several projectiles of all calibers fell on the city.
At 3.15 musket and gun fire was being heard in the direction of Campo de Marte. The line of fire was very extensive and the musket fire intense.
At 4 o'clock the musket fire ceased, only the gun fire being heard now.
At 4.40 musket fire was again opened; volleys could be heard at intervals.
At 6 the firing ceased.
At 7 musket fire broke out again; ceasing at 7.30.
At 8.30 two blazes could be seen at the top of Monte Real to the west.
At 9.45 the enemy opened a violent musket and gun fire from the Plaza de Toros to the Campo de Marte (from east to east northeast). To the left (Plaza de Toros) frequent volleys could be heard.
At 10.30 the musket and gun fire ceased.
The night was extremely dark. From 10 to 11.30 the ships of our fleet spoke by means of the ardois (light signals).
The enemy, during the night of the battle of Caney, and after burying the dead, not without paying due honors to General Vara del Rey, commenced work on the trenches, which they never left again, continued to surround our lines with the new reinforcements constantly arriving, and installed modern artillery and machine guns on the heights. The insurgents were covering Cuabitas and adjoining points, although in second line. We were decidedly surrounded and all our communications by land cut off, as they had been by sea for over a month and a half. Each hour that elapsed the enemy fortified the circle that enclosed us.
During the night the enemy kept up most incessantly a violent musket and terrific gun fire which we hardly answered, so as not to waste the little ammunition that we had left, which was, no doubt, what the enemy intended.
The Asiatic column (Colonel Aldea) arrived from the coast and occupied in line the post vacated by the companies of the fleet, situated on the road to Caney (in the entrance).
In the meantime the fleet was once more bombarding the Morro and the Socapa, where, after killing several men, they finally succeeded in dismounting one of the two Hontoria guns, which they had been constantly antagonizing since the 18th of May. At the same time they were bombarding the city from Aguadores, wounding several persons and ruining several houses.
The cruiser Reina Mercedes changed her anchoring place and remained at the head of the bay as much as possible, awaiting orders to open fire on Quintero Hill to check the enemy if he should appear there.
The French consul was the first to leave the city, which was abandoned by almost the whole population a few days later.
A little before 10 a. m. the enemy, who no doubt intended to surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with great loss.
The events of the second of July may be summed up as follows:
Lively bombardment by sea and land, killing several men and disabling one of the only two guns with which we could attack the enemy from the mouth of the harbor; bombarding with impunity the defenseless city; a battle from trenches, the fire of which we hardly answered, and finally a night surprise that resulted in failure.
The companies of the fleet embarked rapidly in spite of the prevailing conditions. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamente torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about to go out; but when and how?
It occurred to me (and nobody could have dissuaded me from it) that a fleet from the Peninsula was on its way to Santiago; that it would pass in sight of the semaphore of Puerto Rico; that consequently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and the speed of the former and allowing for the difference in time, when it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy it would leave the mouth free, he would go out and the two fleets combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date when those building had been launched. Everything became clear to me. We had ships and they were coming. No doubt they were quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the ships come from? I do not know—from heaven, from earth, from the air, from nothing at all—I do not know. But everything appeared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro.
The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute. I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by means of the ardois were another proof of this. The event announced was near, and we were to see great things happening. At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much desire and imagination can do!
At 1 o'clock at night there was nothing special to be seen, and so, feeling sure that important events were to take place the following day, I retired, not without repeatedly impressing upon the seaman (cabo de matricula) to notify me at once at the first movement of the fleet, or the first gunshot. It would not have been necessary. My impatience and anxiety would have taken care of that much better than the cabo.
The next day it was learned that the blazes we had seen on the Monte Real were from the burning of the forts and the heliograph, which the detachment there had abandoned to hasten to Santiago, in order not to be cut off and surrounded. During the march, which was full of hardships, it became necessary to kill a horse for food.
XXVI.—Sortie of the Fleet.
If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.
Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; motionless on the quiet waters of the bay that reflected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could remain in such perfect safety.
It was 8.30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bustamente, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in doing so. I was agreeably surprised.
Why does one remember things that are really not of great importance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others that are? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember, word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It was as follows:
"Is the fleet not going out?" he asked, without giving me a chance to say anything.
"Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it known when the other fleet will arrive?" I said.
"What other fleet?"
"The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the harbor."
"Don't be simple." (I don't remember whether he called me simple, or innocent, or a fool.) "There is no other fleet; the ships are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so."
I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I knew Admiral Cervera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend to do.
"Do you think he will go out to-day?" I said.
"I thought he was going even now."
I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direction, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.
Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse and rode down the hill at break-neck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to grind to powder.
The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breech-loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the frightful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise of those of the two fleets.
But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink the first right there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of the others becomes inevitable.
To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my opinion, was impossible.
The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. When the first moments of excitement were over and we had somewhat cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other, but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea before it, and this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it formed the second or third, then it was between two fires.
Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escaping and outwitting the hostile fleet? For the present one thing was certain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor, nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the greatest danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing formation and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that day—we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the navy.
I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it already, as every one else did in Santiago. He had been all over the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.
I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it was believed that our ships had accomplished their object, although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which was already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant that it surpassed all reasonable expectations.
How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel López arrive, his appearance changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five shipwrecked from the Maria Teresa and Oquendo, worn out and weak; that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each other west of Punta Cabrera and about 8 miles from the harbor of Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, were on the road.
The Teresa and Oquendo lost, besides the Plutón and Furor! What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port. At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I did not know even then!
But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet was in safety.
XXVII.—Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba.
July 3d.—The hostile fleet in sight, about 5 miles distant.
At 9.45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent bombardment was heard.
At 10.40 the Morro said: "The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The American fleet is composed of the Brooklyn, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon, and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores have come to assist in the battle."
At 11.15 no more firing was heard.
At 12.30 the Morro said: "When the fleet went out it did so slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The other continued to lire and when she saw herself lost she lowered two boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran aground burning."
So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one of the ships, apparently the Teresa, went close to the shore and a great deal of smoke was seen. The Iowa and New York were pursuing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight.
At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.
At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were 24 in all; 15 warships, armored and unarmored; the others merchant vessels equipped for war.
At 6.30 the pilot, Miguel López, said that at his house at Cinco Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the Teresa and Oquendo, and they said there must be others at Cabahitas.
The tug Esmeralda, with the second commander of Marine and Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, López, and ten armed sailors, went out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the steamer Colón to protect those who might be returning by roads and paths along the coast.
At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.
My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio, which is the highest mountain in the bay and overlooks a great part of it. But we must take into account that, as it is I quite distant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it can not be seen. As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without changing anything in this interesting account:
"The Teresa went out first, then the Vizcaya and Colon; after a somewhat longer interval, the Oquendo, then the destroyers. The Admiral passed the Morro at 9.45. A little to windward of the Morro (west) was the Brooklyn. Opposite the Morro another ship, apparently the Massachusetts, and I could distinguish no other warships from the Vigia. When the Admiral passed the Morro the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After passing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on account of the Socapa. The Vizcaya followed, and then the other two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The Spanish ships were now visible again, the Vizcaya in the lead, the Colon, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa in line ahead at a certain distance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly, the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of the smoke. In the meantime the American warships and two yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape. The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, but they appeared again, firing from their stem guns. As long as the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared from sight, at 10.30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smokestacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the New York,; which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed westward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground nor on fire, either Spanish or American."
Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will recall the fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, a stretch of about 6 miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situated Cabañas and Guaicabón; that Punta Cabrera projects: south and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it and close to the coast cannot be seen. It is absolutely necessary to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final result of the battle was not seen.
At 9.30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera's flagship, the Vizcaya, then the Cristóbal Colón, and Oquendo. Behind these the Plutón and Furor. This was the order of sortie as I learned from the pilots, López and Núñez.
The Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon, and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to I arrive was the New York, which, the same as the Brooklyn, has a 20-mile speed.
The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line ahead, received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, consequently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.
Nevertheless they came out without serious injuries and reached the open sea.
The Vizcaya, which was the fastest ship, but had not had her bottom cleaned, was making only 13 miles, and the other ships had to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.
I suppose from what happened and taking into account the order of the sortie that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat of the Vizcaya, accompanied by the Colón (which did not have her turret guns mounted), with the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, and then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former, but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze and went aground on the coast, the Teresa about 7 miles from Santiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the Oquendo. These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had arrived. The fate of the Vizcaya and Cristóbal Colón I will anticipate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the whole fleet as it was told me by an officer of the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa (same name as ours) the next day.
When the Oquendo and Teresa had been lost, two or three American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others prisoners. The other ships continued to pursue the Vizcaya and the Colon. The first of the two also took fire at the stem and stranded at a distance of about 20 miles (toward Aserradero); the second did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran up on the coast about 60 miles distant (off Turquino).
Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records another like it. Not a single ship was saved from the catastrophe. The commanders and officers of all the ships knew well what was going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to the fleet.
A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an event like the one which I have in vain tried to describe, must necessarily be of interest, even though of little prominence and education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel López and Apolonio Núñez, who took out the Teresa and Oquendo respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago harbor was for fifteen minutes.
Miguel López, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as on the sea, said to me about as follows:
"I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and only said these words:
"'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said:
"'Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'
"'I will advise you. Admiral,' I answered.
"A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'
"In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don José, all that passed. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:
"'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."
These were, more or less, the words that Miguel López spoke to me, and which he repeats to any one who wishes to hear them.
Apolonio Núñez, who took out the Oquendo, is very different from López, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were his impressions:
"When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which cannot be compared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me:
"'You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on perhaps will not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine, Don José, what would have happened. I remained on board, and when we had passed the bank I said to him: 'Commander, you can shift the helm.'
"'Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to starboard and shouted, 'Fire!' The noise caused by the big forward gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel López had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which was now outside of the harbor."
These two accounts, which perhaps, do not inspire the interest which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie which had such fatal consequences.
I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Nevertheless, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it. By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade.
It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from the hostile fire much longer, because she "died" later than the others, was not burned; she had a different fate, but not that. I believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been protected like the Colon, they would have outwitted the enemy's pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the situation would have been very different.
A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Colón and were embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Reina Mercedes.
The tug Esmeralda, with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, and the pilot López, went to Cabanitas Cove to gather up shipwrecked; but, although they made a careful search, they found none.
At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the same thing, viz. that they saw our ships run the blockade and disappear past Punta Cabrera.
To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers Furor and Plutón, respectively, who escaped by a miracle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts follow:
Mr. Caballero: "The last ships were already outside of the harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the Furor, which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go east, but when she discovered the Gloucester and other ships which were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the Gloucester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And the Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, and Texas, which we had passed in the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After we had passed Cabanas we commenced to gain on the Furor, and when we came up with her and were about 50 meters to starboard, she listed rapidly on that side, her rudded having been disabled, and passed astern of us at a distance of 1 meter, and sank by the stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera.
"As we (the Plutón) were making a great deal of water we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centimeter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the water and reached the shore.
"I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met—about 20 or 25—and with them went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly direction—some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed—for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant Bustamente with a group of shipwrecked from the Furor (his ship) and some from the Maria Teresa. We saw a yacht with the English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera, as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We made signals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding ourselves as much as possible.
"About 3.30 we reached the harbor of Cabanas, which we had to cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas, who supplied us with what they could."
Mr. Bustamente: "When we (the Furor) reached the mouth of the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet, we thought that by shaping our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish fleet, which was already at some distance, and we maneuvered accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain Duenas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding and destroying it.
Our torpedoes had their war-heads on and were ready to be used, but we did not launch them because we were never at a (convenient distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the commander of the destroyers. Captain Fernando Villamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped into the water, about 3 miles from the coast. In the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship in the meantime, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not here relate them."
To what has been said it is useless to add another word.
XXVIII.—Causes of the Loss of the Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba.
Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under Admiral Cervera's command, and by what I may call the hecatomb of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk in the channel.
The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde Islands to start for Cuba, and the admiral who was in command advised the Government to that effect several times these official communications are still in existence. But it seems that public opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very sensible and logical reasons advanced by the admiral, the Government decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be easily understood from what follows.
The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used up during the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. The three destroyers, Plutón, Furor, and Terror accompanied it and had to be convoyed and supplied with coal, which involved difficulties and delays.
At Martinique (where the Terror was left, being no longer able to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curaçao, in spite of the government's promise that they were to find a ship there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of the ships could get a small number of tons.
The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical thing: go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose, and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its entrance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as ammunition and everything else.
I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior to ours (that is, from the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also because there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them from going out, as was stated by all the pilots of the locality, who said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially the Colon, which drew more water than the others.
We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their speed was therefore far from what it should have been; the Vizcaya, above all, was not able to make 13 miles, and later, after being in Santiago harbor for 46 days, her speed was reduced to even less.
But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone? To Havana by the shortest route? They would have met Sampson's fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just what he wished to avoid. Perhaps he might have succeeded by taking a course which he would have been least expected to take, through Providence Channel, for instance; and this did occur to Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation.
Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody there, as well as in the Peninsula, believed it safe and congratulated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and when I say "everybody" I do not mean the common people only, but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Admiral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government?
The fleet received definite order from the Captain General of the Island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, in spite of Admiral Cervera's remonstrances. After that, what was to be done? Only one thing: go out, as indeed they did, resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for all those who went out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circumstances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seamanship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with great admiration by the commanders and officers of the English corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa, who, it may be said, witnessed the battle.
The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to sustain the battle.
But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater part of which is not known by the people in Spain.
I have already stated that the Colon, the only really protected ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya, which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had been declared useless; and while the Teresa could change hers, the Oquendo and Vizcaya could not do so, and had to fight, the former with one, the latter with two useless guns, as I have stated.
Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was inadequate, and the Teresa had 70 useless charges. The greater part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did not go off. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew out, and from many of the survivors of the Oquendo and Teresa I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships were like the "carbine of Ambrosius," which went off at the breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a danger to those who had charge of faring them.
The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required diameter, and on the Maria Teresa it happened that seven had to be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead converted into artillery—I do not know what to call it, but it was certainly entirely useless.
After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of Santiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have been sent to the scene of war.
It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and whom they never expected to see again.
We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty-two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of Sanitiago, six ships (if the Plutón and Furor may be called such) had to fight against twenty-four* that were better protected and armed. After these figures, anything else that might be added would appear to be useless.
I have never been able to understand the reason why there was sent to the Island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner able to cope with that of the United States and which therefore could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent, without its arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost, as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without resulting in any advantage whatever.
The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well armed, to the commercial ports of the United States and bombard them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the same time, the ports of the island, freed from the blockade, could have supplied themselves with provisions; and although the final result would probably have been the same, it would not have been so immediate.
But all this is nothing more than hypothesis and supposition, and not timely; besides, it was not my object in writing this book. I have told how Admiral Cervera's fleet started from the Cape Verde Islands, how it arrived at Santiago, and how it went out to fight with Admiral Sampson's fleet, convinced that the greater part of the people living in Spain are ignorant of what I have set forth, and also convinced that, when the facts are known, the results will be judged differently.
XXIX.—Sinking of the Mercedes.
July 4th.—Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, one yacht, and seventeen merchant vessels.
At 7 an English corvette arrived and asked for a pilot.
At 9 the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa arrived.
The boats of both ships entered the harbor.
At 4 they departed with subjects of their respective nations.
At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Alercedes started up.
At 11.30 two gunshots were heard in the entrance at the foot of the Morro; afterwards many more.
At 12.45 the fire ceased. It was answered by the Socapa.
There was hardly a day when the hostile fleet and the Morro and Socapa did not exchange shots, or when some information was not received of injuries to one or more of the hostile ships, even of their having been burned and sunk, but as this has never been proved I have said nothing on the subject, being resolved to say nothing except what has been positively proved and what everybody knew who remained at Santiago during the time when the events that are the object of these notes occurred. It is natural that the ships which sustained the fire so many times (the opposite would be improbable) should have suffered some damages and casualties, although they were stationed at a considerable distance, but there is no doubt that they were not serious; if so, they would have been clearly seen.
On the day of the battle of the two fleets I was assured by sailors from the Socapa and by those shipwrecked that they had seen such and such a ship sunk, or such other one on fire, and such and such a tug had taken off some other ship. It seemed probable, but nothing of the kind happened. The next day the ships that had fought with ours were all at Daiquiri, at Aguadores, or opposite the mouth of the harbor; that is the reason why I have never spoken of the damages done to the blockading ships.
The English corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa could, of course, not enter the harbor, because we had planted Bustamente torpedoes (although only a part of them) and stretched wires across. The tug Colón went out with a flag of truce to notify them to that effect, and they sent in their boats, towed by steam launches.
From the Austrian officers it was learned at the comandancia de marina what had happened to the Vizcaya and Oquendo in the battle of the preceding day, for they had arrived just in time to hear the gunshots and to see the ships stranded and lost on the coast. All agreed, of course, that our fleet had fought admirably, and, above all, that the sortie of the ships from the harbor under the circumstances under which they executed it, showed a courage, skill, and practical seamanship truly admirable. It is always a comfort to see that justice is being done, and that comfort I had at that time.
As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of his opinion—to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently, the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Méjico, which had been converted into a hospital and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and the most necessary things, were taken of the Mercedes, and at 8 p.m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Núñez and Miguel López, started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready.
At 11.30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with searchlights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very difficult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire, as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can ever again be used.
And since so much has been said of this ship, I will give an account of all the victims of her crew, some on board, some at the Socapa, Punta Gorda, and the Morro, from the beginning to the end of the war.
Commander Emilio Acosta, second in command, was killed. (Here follow the names of the killed and wounded. The list includes 5 dead, 11 seriously wounded—two of them fatally—16 slightly wounded.)
The enemy cut off the aqueduct so that there was no water left in the city, except in the wells and cisterns.
The shipwrecked, who have arrived from the fleet, are Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers, respectively; Midshipman Navia; several engineers and about 150 sailors.
Many were murdered by the insurgents with guns and machetes. I say murdered, because I believe there is no other name for killing with guns and machetes men who were not only disarmed, but almost naked, sick, and many of them wounded. I realize the seriousness of such an accusation, but it is the statement of all who have succeeded in escaping.
XXX.—Escario's Column.
As the column which the commander-in-chief had ordered by telegraph from Manzanillo took such an active part in the military events from the time of its arrival at Santiago on July 3, it seems proper that I should give an account of its difficult and laborious march, covering a distance of 52 leagues over territory which had been abandoned two months ago and was in the hands of the enemy and where no help or support could be looked for anywhere.
In order to give an idea of this march, which reflects great honor on the general at the head of the column, the chiefs and officers accompanying it, and the patient soldiers, I will state that of the 52 leagues the only distance where the column could march two abreast was from Almirante to Santa Rita; all the rest of the distance they had to march single file, opening the road with machetes as they went along, as everything was overgrown with manigua. In order that the reader may better understand this march, I will copy the diary of operations of the column.
This diary is as follows:
FROM MANZANILLO TO SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY LAND.
[Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the Manzanillo division from June 22 to July 3, 1898.]
"FROM MANZANILLO TO BAYAMO.
"In compliance with orders from the lieutenant general, commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram of the 20th instant, ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Federico Escario, for the time being commanding general of said division, having made the necessary preparations for such a long journey, properly equipped the troops and rationed them for six days, commenced the march on the 22d at the head of a column composed of the first and second battalions of the Isabel la Católica regiment of infantry. No. 75; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment. No. 52; the Alcántara Peninsular battalion. No. 3; the battalion of Puerto Rico chasseurs. No. 19; the second section of the first battery of the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the first regiment of sappers; mounted guerrillas from Calicito, Bayamo, and Manzanillo; five medical officers and thirty men of the medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the tenth company of the transportation column in charge of 13,000 rations of hardtack (galleta), and 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148 mules, and 50 private beasts of burden properly loaded.
"This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men. left Manzanillo at 5 o'clock p.m., and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas, where its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, which, however, did not afford the soldiers the rest that it was intended it should, owing to a steady downpour, so that only a few could lie down.
"The 23d dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the camp was struck, the column reorganized, and the difficult march continued at 5.30; high weeds had to be cut down to open a road on the left bank of the Yara River, which route the commander chose in order to obviate passing through towns which might be occupied by the enemy, thereby complying with the order to avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the 20th, above referred to.
"The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and arrived at dark at the ford of the Yara River, near the town of the same name. Orders were given to encamp here. The column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing to occupy the camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one of our men and wounding three. The fire was answered by the vanguard of the column. The usual reconnaissance having been made by the mounted force, which reported that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the night was spent without further events and under more favorable conditions than the previous night, for a clear sky and a dense grove allowed our soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the 24th, when the column, rising at the sound of the reveille, and after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by 6 o'clock, when it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana López, and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes, in which the column had one man killed and one wounded. The column encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River.
"On the 25th, at the usual hour, the camp of the preceding day was struck and the column reorganized while heavy showers were falling; the march was continued through Las Peladas, Palmarito, and across the Buey and Yao rivers. The camp was pitched at Babatuaba. The same as yesterday, the column was harassed all day, always repulsing and dispersing the enemy. One man was killed during the skirmishes.
"The night passed quietly, and at 6.30 a.m. of the 26th the march was recommenced. The day was eventful and of excellent moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as will be seen from the fact that our forces entered the city of Bayamo after a long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through the heights of San Francisco, Peralejo, across the Mabay River, and at Almirante, where the camp was pitched, not without some resistance from the enemy, who was severely punished by the accurate fire of the column, without causing us the least damage.
"The diary of those days would not be complete without an account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. This maneuver was undertaken, contrary to the orders to avoid encounters contained in said cablegram of the 20th from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, for the reason that the commander of the column thought it would be discouraging to the soldiers to be so near said city without entering it, and that their spirits would rise, on the other hand, if they were allowed to do so and show the enemy and the ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were still Spaniards left in Cuba, and to disperse the enemy, for which purposes there was strength and time enough left that day. The commander therefore decided to explain these reasons to the commander-in-chief and ordered that Colonel Manual Ruiz, second commander of the column, should occupy the city with the cavalry and 600 infantry, the latter to be divided into two columns and the cavalry to form the third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders of Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 3 o'clock p.m., after the troops had taken their first mess, and divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself taking command of one of the groups of infantry, placing the other in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón, first commander of the Alcántara battalion, and the mounted force in charge of Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la Católica regiment. These three columns of attack, advancing steadily on three different points, succeeded in approaching the city without disturbance or interruption. Evidently the enemy was desirous of saving his fire, for alarm signals were heard and groups were seen running from one place to another of the precinct, leaving no doubt that the enemy was near.
"The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle, and thus they arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile forces tried to check them by a steady musket fire from the city. But this attempt became futile when the signal of attack was given, at the sound of which our soldiers, arms in hand and without firing a single shot, crossed the river at a run; with only one casualty and without further resistance, they triumphantly entered the stronghold of the enemies of Spain. In disorderly and precipitate flight that savage tribe retreated. Our forces went to occupy the forts and principal avenues, and in separate groups they reconnoitered the whole city, gathering up at the military comandancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and correspondence, and the station and part of the telegraph line which the rebels had established with Jiguani and Santa Rita were wrecked.
"No information concerning the enemy could be obtained from the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few only opened their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing in their faces the disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish soldiers on that soil where it had been believed that they would never again set foot.
"Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The result of that day's work was not known at first, but it was afterwards learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed and 9 wounded. The night at Almirante passed without further incidents, and thus ended the first part of what may well be called the glorious march from Manzanillo to Santiago.
"FROM BAYAMO TO BAIRE.
"At daybreak of the 27th the camp at Almirante was struck and the column continued its march across the plain of Guanabano, through Chapala and across the Cautillo River, destroying on their way the enemy's telegraph line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where the camp was pitched for the night, which was spent without any further incidents.
"At 6 a.m. of the 28th the march was resumed, the column proceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguani River, Upper Jiguani, Piedro de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey, and Salada. The enemy, in greater number than on preceding days and in control of the heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguani River, tried to prevent our forces from crossing; but their intention was foiled by timely flank attacks ordered by the commander of the column, protected by accurate artillery fire. After the river had been forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del Yarey, where the rebels appeared again, offering less resistance, and we defeated them once more. They seemed inclined, however, to continue to impede the march, which was apparent upon the arrival of our column at the ruins of what was formerly the town of Baire; they were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced by the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to retreat in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter Colonel Manual Ruiz, second commander of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him; four soldiers were killed and five wounded. The column encamped and spent the night at Baire.
"The high weeds which during almost all those days completely covered the soldiers and hampered their progress, causing at the same time a suffocating heat, which made it almost impossible to breathe, and cutting off the road, which had to be opened by dint of hard work, rendering the march extremely laborious and often making it necessary to proceed in single file; the frequent rains, which not only soaked the clothing, but also the ground, making it slippery and difficult to walk on for such large numbers; the sickness caused by the inclement weather and the hard work of these operations; the ever-increasing convoy of stretchers; the consideration that one-half of the journey had been accomplished, and the further very important consideration that the column had arrived at a place where it would be easy to throw the enemy off the track, as they would not know what direction our forces might take, there being three roads leading from here to Santiago; all these were reasons which the commander of the column took into consideration when he decided to suspend the march and rest during the day of the 29th. It was so ordered owing to fatigue; but the enemy kept harassing us and we had three more wounded.
"LA MANTONIA.
"At daybreak of the 30th the camp at Baire was struck and the column proceeded to Palma Soriano, where the wounded and dead were left, and continued its march via Ratonera, Doncella Creek, and the Contramaestre River to La Mantonia, where the camp was pitched and the night spent.
"Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, the enemy from entrenched positions opened fire, which was answered and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. The commander of the column foresaw that such attack would be repeated, and in order to obviate casualties, thus further complying with the order of the aforesaid cablegram from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, he changed the route, and our forces, thus eluding the ambuscades, arrived at the slopes of Doncella Creek, the ford of which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult ravine. The rebels occupied positions here; our vanguard brought them out without answering their fire. When the column had been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared to ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us, which fact they had announced themselves by written challenges and threats which they had left along the road. Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón, of the Alcántara battalion, who since Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one-half of the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect order of battle and advanced resolutely. Commanding positions overlooked the clear and unobstructed road which the column had to follow after coming out of the mountains through the narrow valley of the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and tortuous ascent of the opposite bank. Without other shelter than the high weeds which, as usual, impeded the march, without other trenches than their own hearts, these brave soldiers, with their commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The enemy had told the truth; there they were in large numbers occupying those favorable positions which would have been impregnable if they had been held by any one who knew how to defend them; but not expecting that we would accept the challenge, they allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively musket fire and effective artillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and the rapid advance of our forces rushing upon them arms in hand did not give them a chance to rally. The enemy, being unable to do much firing, retreated with little resistance and having suffered a number of casualties, leaving the field and their positions to those who, understanding the sacred duty imposed by honor, had known how to pick up the glove that had been thrown to them, and regardless of danger and without measuring their strength had marched on unflinchingly in search of the death with which they had been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre and passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a farm (Unca) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts of all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first forces of the vanguard had entered that large encampment, the enemy tried to check our advance by a galling fire from the slope of a mountain where they were entrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters, through which it was necessary for us to pass unprotected, as the high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of cavalry impossible. By order of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón, the two companies of the vanguard of the Alcántara battalion, in command of Francisco Gonzales, who rendered himself an exact account of the hostile position, advanced steadily and without answering the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy by repeated discharges crossed with the few that the column was able to fire, to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammunition, mostly of the Remington type.
"In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of the Alcántara battalion, and 9 privates were wounded and 5 killed.
"AGUACATE.
"At daybreak of July 1 the column resumed the march and reached the ford of the Guarinao River, after passing through Las Lajas, where the enemy held advantageous positions from which our vanguard routed them without much resistance. After crossing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambuscades; the column sustained insignificant skirmishes with outposts and small reconnoitering parties, which indicated that large hostile forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory was correct. When the column arrived at a rugged place dominated by steep heights forming an amphitheatre, they discovered in its center a camp of recent construction, sufficiently large to accommodate 2,000 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the site was specially adapted for an ambuscade. Colonel Escario, realizing this and taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for the column to proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take positions. The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive entrenched line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery and skillfully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry "Long live Spain!" and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they might belong to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the commander becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken. To do the enemy justice it must be stated that they defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead and 1 lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield showed the severe chastisement which the enemy had suffered at our hands. When the column had been reorganized, the march was continued to Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent.
"FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO.
"From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had camped during the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the enemy all along the road, on both sides of which the latter occupied good positions and endeavored to detain the column at any price. Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, a passage was forced and the column reached Palma Soriano at 3 o'clock p.m. The battle of that day caused us 4 dead and 6 wounded.
"From Palma Soriano the commander of the column, by heliogram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and in reply he was notified that large United States forces had landed and were surrounding a part of the city, and that it was, therefore, of urgent necessity to reinforce the place, the defenders of which were few, and to force the march as much as possible. Desirous of complying with this order, Colonel Escario, who realized that the soldiers must be prepared to accomplish the rest of the journey with the greatest possible speed, had the following order of the column, dated at Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies:
"'Soldiers: We left Manzanillo because the enemy was threatening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assistance of our comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our fathers, calls us there.
"'I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in these days when our country requires of us twofold energy and courage, address these few words to you in order to tell you that I am highly pleased with your behavior and to point out to you the necessity of making a supreme effort to save the honor of our beloved country, as we have done so far.
"'Then say with me, 'Long live Spain!' and let us go in search of those who are desirous of finding out what each one of you is worth. The victory is ours.
"'Your Colonel, Escario.'
"After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were ordered to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was sounded, and the column, organizing immediately, resumed its march, which the soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus than that imposed by duty, of which they were constantly reminded by the cannonades that could be heard in the distance in the direction of Santiago. With slight skirmishes, and without eating nor resting, these brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where they had the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the channel, which was blockaded by the American ships, had gone out in search of death, which is the fate reserved for heroes.
"It was now between lo and ii o'clock in the morning of the 3d, and when Colonel Escario noted the intense cannonade in the direction of the city, he organized a flying column which was to march as fast as possible, leaving the rest of the column with the train, in command of Colonel Ruiz Rafioy, to follow at once.
"The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the Isabel la Católica regiment, in command of Commander Torrecilia, with 30 of the strongest men of each company, the whole cavalry, and the two artillery pieces. The command of this column was placed in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón of the Alcántara battalion.
"This column advanced toward Puerto Bayamo, from which point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cavalry, arriving there at 3 o'clock p.m. The rest of the flying column reached Santiago between 4 and 4.30, and the nucleus of the column with the train between 9 and 10 o'clock p.m.
"Those worthy chiefs, officers, and long-suffering soldiers, that handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy who persistently tried to check them, rising superior to the inclement weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble hearts.
"The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers, and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used and 38 rounds of artillery fired.
"At 10 o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from that time on they formed part of the forces defending the city.
"Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898."
The column went to occupy the following positions:
Canosa: Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón at the most advanced point; the Alcántara battalion which relieved the Asiatic battalion.
Match factory: The Isabel la Católica regiment, under Commander Luis Torrecilla.
Campo de Marte: The other battalion, under Commander Eugenio Briceno.
Dos Caminos del Cobre: The Puerto Rico chasseurs, under Lieutenant Colonel Arana.
Plaza de Toros: The Andalusia battalion, under Commander Julian Llorens.
9th.—The Alcántara battalion was relieved from the difficult position it occupied by six companies of the Isabel la Católica regiment, one of the Asiatic regiment, one company of guerrillas, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón. On the morning of the 10th this line was reinforced by two companies of the Alcántara battalion.
10th.—The Puerto Rico chasseurs receded to the city.
XXXI.—In the City and in the Bay.
July 5th.—The usual ships blockading the harbor.
The greater part of the population has left the city, fleeing from the bombardment.
The merchant steamers are firing up.
The Morro says that there are 28 merchant and war vessels in sight. The Oregon and Brooklyn are missing.
In the city the streets are deserted and nearly all the houses locked up.
6th.—The two 9-cm. Krupp guns at Punta Gorda were taken down to be installed in the precinct of the city.
A German warship was signaled to the south.
Mr. Mason, with a flag of truce, went out in the tug Colón to communicate with her. When he arrived at the mouth of the harbor the ship had already left.
At 5 General Toral was advised by General Shaffer that the suspension of hostilities was at an end.
Lieutenant Hobson, of the Merrimac, and the seven men were exchanged.
In the American fleet there are 1,100 Spanish prisoners, among them over 300 wounded.
7th.—It was learned that the prisoners of our fleet are being sent to the United States.
The two 42-centimeter guns of the Méjico were disembarked for the purpose of being erected in the precinct of the city. Forty Mauser guns were also taken off the ship. They could not be set up.
8th.—The hostile fleet continues the blockade.
Orders were given by the comandancia de marina to the captains of the merchant steamers to sink their ships.
A private house was prepared to receive the sick and wounded of the fleet. The convalescents were sent to the quarters of the firemen.
9th.—The hostile fleet in sight as usual.
Order of General Toral to have the merchant vessels refill their bunkers at the piers of Las Cruces and the Railway.
The wounded and sick of the fleet were transferred from the Méjico to the house fitted out for a hospital by the Navy.
On the 4th General Shafter notified the consuls that the city would be bombarded, so that all those might leave who did not form part of the garrison. At their request for more time in order to take away their families, the term was prolonged twenty-four hours.
The panic became general, and at daybreak of the 5th the population almost en masse left in the direction of Caney, so as to avoid a bombardment which all supposed would be horrible and not leave one stone upon the other.
The steamers, full of people, were ready to proceed to Las Cruces, Cinco Reales, and all the coves on the eastern coast of the bay, where they thought they would be better protected and safer.
All along the coast regular camps were established within the shelter of the mountains. It may be safely said that there were not 5,000 inhabitants left in the city. All the windows and doors were closed, and Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was open, not even the drug stores. The desertion and solitude were complete.
A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs are staying at the entrances of the houses, which their masters have abandoned, without having anything to eat, nor anything to drink, which is worse. At night they bark incessantly, which makes the scene still more impressive. I have several times gone from the captaincy of the port to the military hospital, that is, across the city from one end to the other, without seeing a single door open or meeting a single person in the streets or public places, except a guerrilla or one or two couples of the civil guard. The solitude and the silence were absolute.
At night the city was truly impressive. The streets, the lamps not being lit, were as dark as wolves' dens, and it was not possible to cross them without being in constant danger of stumbling. A few guerrillas, taking advantage of the circumstances, were breaking into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked; for instance, the house of my friend. Commander Ros, governor of the Morro. situated in San Tadeo street, which I saw with my own eyes. They left nothing whole, and him only with the clothing he wore and 20 pesos which he had with him. The criminals, who were caught in the act, were four guerrillas. I speak with a perfect knowledge of what happened, and, as will be seen, I cite examples of well-known persons.
There is no excuse for such actions, and I shall not try to extenuate them; but it is also just to say, in honor of the truth, that the soldiers, who had hardly anything to eat and little water to drink, and who spent day and night in the trenches, were not to be found in the city, and when on rare occasions one would go there to see whether he could not get a glass of water or buy a box of sardines or a piece of hardtack, which the merchants were hiding, the latter asked him six times what it was worth, and fleeced him (I find no other word for it) without shame or compassion.
I must also add that such abuses, which were repressed as soon as they were commenced—thanks to the civil guard and patrols, who walked through the city day and night—were not committed by the troops, except in isolated cases, as in that of Mr. Ros. They were committed by citizens, although they were imputed to those who knew how to enter the houses without forcing the principal door. I might cite a thousand examples which would convince the most incredulous and which I omit for the sake of brevity. Thanks to the energy displayed by General Toral, the street lamps were finally lighted, so that it became possible to venture into the streets at night. As a proof of the proportions which this plundering reached, I will copy a decree which the General found it necessary to promulgate. The decree was as follows:
"I, José Toral y Velázquez, General of Division, Commander General of the Division of Santiago de Cuba, and Military Governor of the City and Province.
"In view of the frequent robberies which are being committed in this city, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which it finds itself, in order to repress them, and by virtue of the authority vested in me under Article 670 of the Campaign Regulations, issue the following:
"DECREE.
"Article 1. All soldiers who, in disobedience of this decree, shall destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice.
"The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing soldiers for this purpose.
"Criminals caught in the act of committing these offenses shall be summarily judged in conformity with Article 649 of the Code of Military Justice.
"Article 2. Civilians who shall commit the same offenses shall be adjudged in conformity with the Civil Code in force in this island, and the law shall be applied in its whole rigor by the respective Council of War.
"Article 3. Any one surprised in the act, who shall not give himself up at the first intimation, shall be fired upon.
"José Toral.
"Santiago de Cuba, July 16, 1898."
As it is my object to relate everything that happened at Santiago de Cuba, without omitting even the most insignificant events, so that an exact idea may be formed of everything, I must also state that, as I was told by Mr. Romero, captain of the civil guard, who was wounded at Caney on the evening of the 1st, where he had arrived in the morning to take charge of the military comandancia of that place, and taken prisoner by the Americans, he was nursed, attended, and treated with all the attention due to his rank and condition, as also others who were in the same case. This proves that only the Government of the United States and the jingoes are the authors of the unjust war that is being carried on, but not the people in general, and still less the Army, which, as its own officers and soldiers have assured me, is desirous of having it terminated as soon as possible.
XXXII.—Battles and Bombardments of the 10th & 11th.
July 10th.—The usual ships opposite the harbor. The general staff of the fourth army corps has asked for a statement as to the personnel and armament of the navy, which was forwarded to him.
General Shafter gave notice that hostilities had again broken out since 4 in the afternoon.
At 3 the hamlet of Dos Caminos was burned.
At 5 a gunshot was heard which had been fired by the fleet; immediately after a sustained musket fire, which became very intense.
The artillery on land is firing, ours is answering.
At 5.15 the fleet opened fire on the coast.
At 6.30 the firing ceased by sea and by land.
The enemy has abandoned two trenches.
11th.—The fleet is guarding the harbor and Aguadores.
At 6 a slow musket fire commenced on land; a few volleys are heard.
At 8.30 two ships opened fire on the city from Aguadores. A few projectiles fall at the head of the bay, where the Alvarado is at anchor.
During yesterday 46 wounded were received at the military hospital. There were seven dead.
At 2 p.m. the bombardment ceased.
At 2.30 firing ceased in the precinct.
At 5 the enemy hoisted a flag of truce on the Fort San Juan.
At night many fires were seen on the heights near the cemetery and at the head of the bay (to the northwest).
The gunboat Alvarado asked for permission to fire; it was denied on account of the truce.
On the 10th the enemy, already in the trenches and being in possession of all the adjoining heights where he has installed numerous modern guns, opened a lively musket and gun fire, at 5 p.m., upon a great extent of our line. The artillery answered firmly, but there was hardly any musket fire, because orders had been given and complied with to economize ammunition at any cost.
Two hours previously, our advance forces had withdrawn to the city, abandoning the foremost position at Dos Caminos del Cobre, first setting it on fire.
The fleet at the same time opened fire on Aguadores and surrounding points on the coast, and on our lines. The battle was limited to firing from the trenches. Nevertheless, as the enemy was very numerous and his lines only a few meters from ours, we had 7 dead and 47 wounded. During the engagement the Americans abandoned two trenches which they could not hold because they were flanked by ours.
At 8.30 the following day the fleet bombarded the city from Aguadores, having given notice to that effect as early as the 4th. As I said, the ships of the fleet, taking turns two by two, fired rather slowly, and only until 2.30 p.m., but notwithstanding, there were 59 houses that suffered considerable damage. One shell went through a foundation in San Basilio street, where it dropped and exploded, and a shell cut an iron column of a provision store in two, penetrating into a house in Marina street, after piercing the wall. Another shell penetrated at No. 9 Santa Lucia High street, destroying the hall and one room. In the provision store of Messrs. Brauet, in Fundicion street, two 20-meter shells (nearly all were of this caliber, or of 16 centimeters) fell; one only exploded, causing great havoc. The most remarkable case of all was Mr. Marcané's house, in Santo Tomas Place. A single shell ruined it completely. It is hard to understand how a single projectile can do what that one did.
Between the garden of the Alameda and the railway station, being a distance of about 800 meters, 23 projectiles fell. Many of them did not explode. One of them went through a tree, as though it had been a gimlet. At the ice factory two fell, and three at the railway station. A great many fell near the piers, and still more near the place where the gunboat Alvarado was at anchor.
As the city was almost abandoned, there was no loss of life.
In the meantime the enemy continued to antagonize our lines in order to compel the soldiers to consume the scant ammunition that remained, but orders had been given not to answer the fire, and so there was hardly any musket fire. Gun fire only answered very slowly, as is necessary with antiquated guns. The enemy, on the other hand, was constantly receiving modern guns and I setting them up rapidly. We were within a circle of fire, and although that phrase has been somewhat abused, I find no other that better describes the situation.
At 5 p. m. the enemy hoisted a white flag on Fort San Juan and a spokesman was received.
Though this may not be the right moment, I want to make an observation. It has been asked many times why Admiral Cervera's fleet, whose object was to run the blockade and elude the hostile fleet, did not go out at night.
Of course, the Admiral did not tell me his reasons, but it is easy to understand them.
The hostile fleet was constantly watching the entrance of the harbor with its search-lights, making it as light as though it were day. There the ships would probably have been seen just the same. On the other hand, the sortie, which even in daytime is extremely difficult, would have been short of impossible at night, when blinded by the search-lights, and would necessarily have resulted in a catastrophe. The sortie at night was impracticable. It was absolutely necessary to effect it in the daytime; at least, if the enemy saw us, we also saw him, and the chances for not running aground in the channel were much better. From the foregoing, I believe that any one, even though not acquainted with naval matters, will understand why Admiral Cervera did not go out at night.
As a proof of this, I will say that on the night when the cruiser Reina Mercedes was sunk the hostile ships fired upon her with the same accuracy as though it had been daytime.
For a better understanding of the events and engagements of the 10 and 11th of July, I will copy below the official report of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón and that of Lieutenant of Artillery Moreno to General Escario, as also a statement of the shots which our guns fired during those days. One need only glance at the statement referred to, to see at once that on the first day 167 shots could be fired, and the next day, being the 11th, only 35, because the enemy had dismounted and disabled some of our guns. A simple calculation is sufficient to understand that the following day not a single gun could probably have been fired. Before such proofs, comments are unnecessary.
"Having been placed in charge of the forces on the right hand of the plantation called El Sueño, on the heights and in the glens which border on the avenues of Caney and Canosa, and the roads of Pozo and San Juan, composed of six companies of the Isabel la Católica Regiment, two of the Alcántara Battalion, one of the Asiatic Battalion, and one of guerrillas as stretchermen, I have the honor to report to you that at 4.30 a. m. yesterday the enemy opened machine-gun and musket fire on our positions, without daring to make any forward movement; such prudence being founded, no doubt, on the respect inspired by our sepulchral silence before the thunderous noise of their many guns, for only 10 marksmen, in convenient positions, had orders to fire on a trench which they attacked on the flank and dislodged at the end of 15 minutes. At nightfall, 7.30 p.m., the enemy ceased firing.
"To-day, at 6.30 a.m., the enemy again opened fire, while our side did not waste a single cartridge, the enemy continuing with the same activity as yesterday, without coming out of his trenches, until 4.30 p.m., when he ceased firing and asked for suspension.
"The casualties on our side were, on the 10th, 6 dead and 29 wounded, and to-day, one dead, 5 wounded, and one bruised; total casualties during the two days, 42.
"You will see from the above that I have exactly complied with your orders not to fire until the enemy should come out of his trenches to attack.
"I only need add that all the forces without exception did their duty as brave men, full of enthusiasm, and I had to recommend repeatedly that they should conceal in order to avoid needless casualties, which seemed difficult, and there is nothing strange about it, as our men, for the first time in three years of campaign, were enclosed in trenches and on the defensive.
(Here follow special recommendations for bravery of three officers, being 1 commander and 2 lieutenants.)
(Signed) "Baldomero Barbón."
"Santiago de Cuba, August 11, 1898."
Copy of the report made by the first lieutenant in charge of the artillery of the sector:
"Artillery, City of Santiago de Cuba,
Sector from the Portillo del Caney to San Antonio.
"Honored Sir: Fire was opened by the enemy yesterday at 4.45 p.m., and the batteries of this sector made it their business to silence it, or at least diminish it as much as possible, given the limited effectiveness of the guns which formed them—most of them muzzle-loading—and the reduced caliber of the only four which are of modern types, and can therefore keep up an accurate and rapid fire. The enemy's batteries, as has been observed on previous days by means of glasses, and as we have experienced practically to-day, are quite numerous, very well installed without leaving any space uncovered, and occupy positions overlooking ours, and are for that latter reason well adapted to train successfully, and to be of great moral effect on our troops, who are harassed almost vertically by the grapeshot (shrapnel?) inside the trenches. The guns of these batteries are of small and medium caliber, as may be seen from the size of their projectiles, and the shape of the latter shows that they are breech-loading guns, and for that reason alone, of the greatest advantage over ours. A few fire dynamite projectiles, but it was noticed that they are of little accuracy, although very effective when they explode. At the same moment when the musket and machinegun fire was opened, which was hardly answered from the city, gun fire also commenced, and as the effect of the shells began to be felt at the first shots, it became necessary for us to do what we could to decrease the cannonade. Firing was commenced on the whole sector at the same time and with such rapidity as each gun permitted, except the Plasencia guns, for if we had continued to fire them with the same rapidity as the gunners, anxious to injure the enemy, had commenced, we would have consumed the whole of the ammunition in two hours. All the shots were made under the action of a constant musket and machinegun fire, aimed particularly at the batteries, for the apparent purpose of not allowing us to come out of the trenches to load and train our guns. In view of the sustained artillery fire from the city the enemy moderated his somewhat, especially in the sector between Nispero and San Antonio, and by 6 p.m. the only guns that were doing any firing worthy of mention were those installed opposite the Portillo del Caney. This circumstance was very favorable for us. The ostentatious artillery fire which we did during the first moments checked the enemy's rapid fire along the greater part of the line, and if this had not been the case we should have been compelled to keep silent before his batteries, for of the 12 guns of different calibers of the batteries of Nispero, Sueño, Santo Inés, and San Antonio, we had left at the hour mentioned only three 8-cm. and two i6-cm. guns; the others had been put out of action, the carriages of most of them having been disabled. The batteries of Portillo del Caney continued to answer the fire, which was aimed at them particularly without a moment's cessation, and in one of them I was an eye witness of an incident worthy of mention. A training gunner of one of the 8-cm. Plasencia guns, whose captain had been previously wounded, was shot through one arm, and he continued to train, for fear that there would be no one to relieve him, until, a relief having been effected, he was obliged to go to the nearest hospital. At the same moment an artillerist came out with a mule and ran in the direction of the headquarters at Concha, passing through the musket and machine-gun fire, shouting. 'Long live Spain!' through the streets. He was on his way to get another supply of common shells for the gun, its supply having been consumed during the first shots. These incidents, and similar ones which no doubt occurred all along the line and in the trenches, show, honored General, that while the enemy had succeeded, owing to the superior position of his batteries, in acquiring greater accuracy of fire, he had not been able to quell the courage of our soldiers, always cool-headed before the greatest danger, even to the very last moment.
"At 7 p. m. the firing ceased, leaving us in bad condition for to-day, because, as I have already stated, only two 16-cm. and three 8-cm. guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia, and two rapid-fire Krupp guns, are all that are available for the defense, and the majority of the mounts for the old ones are somewhat defective.
"At 5.30 a.m. to-day fire was opened by a few musket shots, and a few minutes after the artillery battle commenced. The batteries with which the enemy fired yesterday are not the only ones he has; he also has large-caliber guns, or perhaps howitzers which, being installed at a considerable distance from the city and covered by the hills, keep up a constant fire upon us, which we are not able to answer. Yesterday we could distinguish the flashing from the batteries erected between the Portillo del Caney and San Antonio, and to-day we can see only three opposite the said Portillo; the others were firing completely under cover, and we were not even able to disturb the composure with which they were trained. It is known that we did them some damage yesterday, and that is perhaps the reason why they have taken this position to-day. Only two shots were fired in the morning at Santa Inés and two more at San Antonio. And the rest of the day we have been able to fire only from the 8-cm. Plasencia battery and the 7.5 rapid-fire Krupp battery, erected at the Portillo del Caney and Palomar, respectively, which had opposite them three 9-cm. batteries of the enemy at a distance of 1,100 meters from the former and 1,600 meters from the latter. From the first moment it could be seen that the enemy's objective was to bombard the city, and his fire was aimed entirely at that target. Yesterday they took the exact distance from their batteries to the principal points of the city, and to-day, making use of yesterday's notes, they put the shells just where they wanted, and the trajectories of those from the same battery were almost identical. I repeat that there were only three in sight, and upon these three we opened fire at 6 a.m. with the rapid-fire guns. When the first shot was discharged the enemy partly changed his objective, and soon the battery mentioned and one of the hidden ones aimed their fire at Palomar, but were not able to hit the rapid-fire guns until 10 a.m., because these guns, being of reduced dimensions, in sunken battery, and with hardly any smoke from the discharge, were hardly visible to the enemy. For four hours we fired without knowing where we were, but very slowly, because the number of ordinary shells and grapeshot for the guns referred to is already very small. After these first four hours were over, the enemy answered each shot with 8 or 10 of his, which, with almost mathematical precision, were aimed at the battery. About the same thing, but on a greater scale owing to the proximity of the opposing batteries and the good target formed by the smoke which developed at each shot, happened at the Plasencia guns. Since 8 o'clock in the morning, when the fire was opened, until 3 in the afternoon, the places where the guns were erected were veritable centers of impact, since we had only two batteries and the enemy a great many. And when a shot was fired, all concentrated their fire on the one that had discharged. In order to fire at all, it was necessary to make the enemy believe, by using artificial means, that the gun had been put out of action. When this did not succeed, the gun fire aimed at the battery was incessant, and made it impossible for us to load and train. As I have stated, at 3 p. m. the firing ceased, and yesterday as well as to-day I noticed the greatest order among the officers and men in charge of the different batteries. At the Plasencia guns, the second gunner, Antonio Escriba Escriba, belonging to the 2d section of the 1st battery of the 5th Mountain Regiment, was wounded. The total number of shots fired yesterday and to-day is as follows: 16, with the rapid-fire guns; 33, with the 8-cm. Plasencia guns; 29, with the 8-cm. guns; 63, with the 8-cm. short breech-loaders; 10, with the i6-cm. and 10 with the 12-cm. bronze guns.
"May God guard your excellency for many years.
"Juan Moreno,
"First lieutenant,
"Commander of artillery of the sector.
"Santiago de Cuba, July 11, 1898."
The guns which the Americans had in the batteries of the circle, were all of modem type, with calibers of 8, 9, 7, and 7.5 cm. They fired mostly grapeshot (shrapnel?) with 10 per cent ordinary shells. They also made use of dynamite shells, but the number of these projectiles did not exceed 5 per cent of the total number thrown upon the city.
The batteries that were most persistent in firing on the 10th were those erected in the vicinity of the Caney road, and they fired only about 150 shots, with an average rapidity of 14 or 16 shots per hour and battery. The others, which ceased firing an hour earlier, discharged about 100 shots.
On the 11th the gun fire was more sustained, but slower. All the batteries fired about alike and discharged in all about 700 shots.
Batteries and guns. | No. of Shots. | |
| 10th. | 11th |
Fuerte Nuevo: |
|
|
One 12cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 1 | . . |
Cañadas: |
|
|
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 2 | . . |
Santa Ursula: |
|
|
Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. muzzle-loading bronze guns | 10 | . . |
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns | 8 | . . |
Battery No. 3: Two 9-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns | 16 | 6 |
Portillo Caney: |
|
|
Battery No. 1 : Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns (Plasencia system) | 25 | 10 |
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns | 24 | . . |
Nispero: |
|
|
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 1 | . . |
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 2 | . . |
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns | 30 | . . |
Sueño: |
|
|
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 3 | . . |
Battery No. 2: One n-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 2 | . . |
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loaders | 25 | . . |
Santa Inés: |
|
|
Battery No. I: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 2 | 2 |
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 4 | . . |
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading guns | 10 | . . |
San Antonio: |
|
|
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun | 2 | 1 |
Palomar: |
|
|
Two 7.5-cm. short breech-loading rapid-fire Krupp guns | . . | 16 |
During the firing on the 10th, the following guns were put out of action: The gun of the battery of Fuerte Nuevo; one of each of the Santa Ursula batteries; the two of battery No. 2 of the Portillo del Caney; those of the Nispero batteries Nos. 2 and 3; those of batteries Nos. 1 and 2 and one of battery No. 3 of Sueño; and that of Battery No. 2 and one of Battery No. 3 of Santa Inés.
To sum up, there were disabled: four 12-cm., one 16-cm., eight 8-cm. guns, old systems, and one 9-cm. breech-loader.
The 9-cm. gun was disabled by the enemy, as also one of the 12-cm. guns of Sueño, the cause being that the 12-cm. guns were mounted on "skeleton" carriages that did not belong to them, and broke at the first or second shot, and that the 8-cm. old guns, although mounted in their own carriages, these being of wood and in bad repair, they had the same fate as soon as a few shots were fired. The 16-cm. gun was disabled by the cartridge sticking in the chamber.
XXXIII.—Suspension of Hostilities.
July 12th.—The hostile fleet is still in sight.
The archbishop, escorted by a detachment of the mounted civil guard, left the city, returning soon after.
General Linares has forwarded to the commander-in-chief and to the minister of war the following cablegram, which I copy literally:
"OFFICIAL CABLEGRAM, JULY 12.
"To the commander-in-chief and the minister of war:
"Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these longsuffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of affairs.
"Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by nature of ground; ours spread out over 14 kilometers; troops attenuated; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches incessantly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food; cannot change or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in critical moments. Under these circumstances, impossible to open passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency. In order to go out under protection of Holguin division, it would be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a number of rations which they are unable to transport. The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy.
"Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city enclosed by walls, on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence, while awaiting aid which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials, with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remain, and they intend to leave to-day headed by their prelate.
"These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of enthusiasm and energy; they have been fighting for three years with the climate, privations, and fatigue; and now that the most critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. The ideal is lacking; they are defending the property of people who have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes, the allies of the American forces.
"There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the Government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.
"If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the denouement anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of national interests.
"Linares."
13th.—The ships are still blockading the harbor.
By order of the commander of marine, I went to the cruiser Reina Mercedes in order to ascertain her exact position.
In crossing the channel we saw two hostile ships, but at a great distance.
The cruiser which I visited is aground on the Morro shore. The port side is completely under water, the starboard side above water; here the effects of the hostile shells may be observed. She lies in the line of the channel, and therefore does not interfere with the entering or going out of ships. I do not believe that the enemy will be able to use her; besides the injuries caused by the shells, the sea has commenced to destroy the bottom.
Upon returning I saw and spoke to many volunteer officers who have taken refuge there, dressed in civilians' clothes.
The conferences with the enemy have come to nothing, and it was decided that the suspension of hostilities and the armistice should cease and the bombardment be continued.
The sailors from the fleet, 98 in number, who were at the firemen's headquarters, have gone, under the command of Ensign Gomez, to protect the match factory near the gasometer.
There was a suspension of hostilities during the days of the 12th and 13th, and conferences were held with the enemy, which evidently have come to nothing, and from General Linares's eloquent cablegram, setting forth so graphically and accurately the true state of affairs in this unfortified city and the situation of its defenders, it may be inferred that the capitulation was objected to, although it was absolutely necessary and further resistance impossible.
14th.—The chief pilot of this harbor, Apolonio Núñez, was taken prisoner by the insurgents at Rente, situated west of the bay. The commander of marine at once notified General Toral, and as the suspension of hostilities had been extended, the latter, in his turn, advised General Shafter, commander-in-chief of the American forces operating at Santiago.
15th.—Pilot Núñez was delivered up and escorted to the city by American soldiers.
At night the chiefs of the army assembled in the apartments occupied by the staff of the division, and as a result of the meeting the following memorandum was drawn up:
"On the 15th day of July, 1898, in the city of Santiago de Cuba, the following-named persons assembled, previous notice having been given of such meeting: General of Division José Toral y Velázquez, for the time being commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, as president; General of Brigade Federico Escario; Colonel Francisco Oliveros Jiménez, of the civil guard; the following lieutenant colonels of the different battalions: José Cotrina Gelabert, of the Asiatic battalion; Juan Puñet, of the battalion 'Constitución;' Pedro Rodríguez, of the Talavera battalion; Ventura Fontán, of the staff; Baldomero Barbón, of the Alcántara battalion; Segundo Pérez, of the San Fernando battalion; José Escudero, of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico No. 1; Luis Melgar, of the artillery; and Ramón Arana, of the Puerto Rico chasseurs; Julio Cuevas, commissary of war; Pedro Martin, sub-inspector of the medical department of the army, and Juan Díaz Muelas, captain of engineers, all as voting members, and the last named as secretary.
"The president stated that although he did not consider Santiago de Cuba a stronghold of war, and though he was in direct communication with the commander-in-chief, from whom he received precise instructions, so that it was not necessary to proceed to the convocation of the council of defense referred to in Article 683 of the Regulation of Campaign, he desired nevertheless to learn the opinion of said council, constituted in accordance with the provisions of the regulation referred to, and of the lieutenant colonels of the battalions, as to whether, in view of the condition of the forces defending the city, it would be advisable to prolong the defense, or, on the contrary, to capitulate on the most favorable terms obtainable.
"The junta, considering that Santiago has no other works of defense of a permanent nature than a castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts in the precinct, none of them substantial, so that its only real defense consists in the trenches which have been dug in suitable positions in the circuit of the city, and other earthworks in said circuit and in more advanced positions, all effected hurriedly and with scant resources;
"Considering further that for the defense of this line of trenches, about 14 kilometers long, not continuous, there are available only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom have been doing constant service in the trenches, with hardly any troops to support them and without any reserves of any kind, the rest of the forces (the total forces consisting of about 11,500 men), belonging to other arms and garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of Socapa and Punta Gorda, or being assigned to other services, such as supplying all the posts with water, patrolling the city, etc., which service would have been rendered by the inhabitants if the city had remained loyal, but which must now be performed by the army, the inhabitants having abandoned the city;
"Considering further that, in view of the great extent of the line referred to, the position of the forces on the same, the difficulty of communication and the proximity of the hostile positions to ours, it is difficult for the troops stationed at one part of the line to render prompt assistance to those stationed at another part which might be more seriously threatened;
"Considering further that at the present time the only available artillery of the precinct consists of four 16-cm. rifled bronze guns, one 12-cm., one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 8-cm. rifled bronze guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Plasencia and two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 12 and 16-cm. guns, according to reliable information, are about to give out and will admit of only a few more shots, and that the 75-mm. Krupp guns have hardly any ammunition, and that the above is all the artillery we have to oppose to the enemy's numerous modern guns;
"Considering further that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges, being the total available, counting those at the artillery park and the spare cartridges of the troops, will be used up in two or three attacks made by the enemy; that the Argentine Mauser cartridges can hardly be used, and the Remington only by the irregular forces;
"Considering further that, owing to the failure of the commercial element to lay in supplies prior to the blockade which had long been foreseen, there is a great scarcity of meat and of all other articles of food for the troops, it being necessary to reserve for the military hospital the few heads of cattle now on hand, so that the only available food for the soldiers consists of rice, salt, oil, coffee, sugar, and whiskey, and this only for about ten days longer;
"Considering further that, if the food of the 1,700 sick at the hospital is inadequate, the food furnished the soldiers is still more so, and yet they have to spend night and day in the trenches, after three years of campaign, the last three months without meat except on rare days, and for some time past reduced to the rations above enumerated;
"Considering further that with such inadequate rations the soldiers, whose physical strength is already considerably shaken, far from being able to repair their strength, must necessarily become weaker every minute, especially since, in spite of their poor nourishment, the greatest fatigues are required of them;
"Considering further that there is an ever-growing contingent of soldiers among the troops who, though not in hospitals, are sick and who are enabled to remain at their posts only by their superior courage, which circumstances, however, cannot fail to weaken the resistance of the only line of defense we have;
"Considering further that, since the cutting of the aqueduct, great difficulties are experienced by the small forces available for furnishing water to the majority of the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially those near the coast, which difficulties must naturally increase when the city is bombarded by sea and by land, so that there is well-founded fear that the soldiers who are unable to leave the trenches may find themselves without the water of which they are so much in need;
"Considering further that, in view of the location of the hostile positions, mostly in the immediate vicinity of ours, completely surrounding the city and in control of all the avenues, there is no possibility of abandoning the city without a fierce battle under the most unfavorable circumstances for us, owing to the impoverished condition of the soldiers and the fact that it would be necessary to effect the concentration of the forces in sight of the enemy;
"Considering further the great superiority of the enemy who, besides a contingent of men said to exceed 40,000, possesses 70 pieces of modern artillery and a powerful fleet;
"Considering further that no supplies can reach the city except by sea, and that there is no prospect of receiving any as long as a powerful hostile fleet completely closes the entrance of the harbor;
"Considering further that, under these circumstances, to continue so unequal a fight would lead to nothing except the sacrifice of a large number of lives;
"And considering, finally, that the honor of our arms has been completely vindicated by these troops who have fought so nobly and whose behavior has been lauded by our own and other nations, and that by an immediate capitulation terms could be obtained which it would not be possible to obtain after hostilities have again broken out:
"The junta is of unanimous opinion that the necessity for capitulation has arrived. In witness thereof they sign these proceedings."
(Signatures of members.)
XXXIV.—Capitulation.
July 16th.—The people have returned from Caney.
Negotiations for the capitulation having been opened, we think it proper to give the following important document:
"Neutral Camp near Santiago de Cuba,
Under the Flag of Truce, July 14th, 1898.
"Recognizing the nobleness, valor, and bravery of Generals Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned, officers of the United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended.
(Signed)
"Joseph Wheeler,
Major General U. S. V.
"W. H. Lawton,
Major General U. S. V.
"J. D. Miley,
First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, Aide."
Under a giant cotton tree the following capitulation was signed:
"1st. The hostilities between the Spanish and American forces shall cease absolutely and finally.
"2d. The capitulation shall include all the forces and war material in said territory (territory of the division of Santiago).
"3d. The United States agree to transport all the Spanish forces in said territory to the Kingdom of Spain with the least delay possible, the troops to be embarked, as early as can be done, at the nearest ports they occupy.
"4th. The officers of the Spanish army shall be permitted to carry their arms with them, and officers as well as men shall retain their private property.
"5th. The Spanish authorities agree to raise, or assist the American Navy in raising, all the mines and other obstructions to navigation now existing in the bay of Santiago de Cuba and its entrance.
"6th. The commander of the Spanish forces shall deliver, without delay, to the commander of the American forces, a complete inventory of the arms and munitions of war in the district above referred to, as also a statement of the number of troops in the same.
"7th. The commander of the Spanish forces, upon leaving said district, shall be authorized to take with him all the military archives and documents belonging to the Spanish army now in said district.
"8th. All that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mobilized troops, and guerrillas who may desire to remain in the Island of Cuba shall be allowed to do so, on condition that they will deliver up their arms and give their word of honor not again to take up arms against the United States during the continuation of the present war with Spain.
"9th. The Spanish forces shall leave Santiago de Cuba with honors of war, afterwards depositing their arms at a place mutually agreed upon, to await the disposition which the Government of the United States shall make of them, it being understood that the United States Commissioners shall recommend that the Spanish soldiers be permitted to return to Spain with the arms which they have so gallantly defended.
"10th. The clauses of the foregoing document shall go into effect immediately after having been signed.
"Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions of their respective commanders- in-chief, and with the approval of their respective governments.
"Joseph Wheeler, Major General U. S. V.
"Federico Escario, Brigadier General.
"W. H. Lawton, Major General U. S. V.
"Ventura Fontán, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff.
"J. D. Miley, First Lieutenant, Second Artillery.
"Robert Mason, Interpreter."
The reason why the archbishop went out of the city on the 12th was to ask General Shafter to permit him and thirty priests to leave Santiago. The American general refused to grant this request as long as the negotiations were pending.
XXXV.—The Emigration to El Caney.
I will here speak of a matter which, though not directly related to the military operations, nor the movements of troops, nor the attack or defense of positions, is yet so graphic and typical and so remarkable and far-reaching in the consequences which it entailed and still entails, that to omit it would be to omit one of the most important episodes of this eventful period, an episode that has been much commented upon and discussed. I have reference to what may well be called the emigration to El Caney.
At daybreak of July 5, a compact crowd, composed for the greater part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men—some of them volunteers, now in civilian's clothes—were not wanting, started from the city toward El Caney, about a league and a half distant, where they were going on foot, there being no carriages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses, which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to pass. All these people were crossing the ditches and trenches by which the whole road was cut and obstructed, all anxious to escape from the dangers of a bombardment of which notice had been given to the consuls.
Many of those who emigrated were people of wealth, women not accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror alone enabled them to bear.
Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy hours at most, the majority of them had nothing with them but the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no provisions except what they could carry themselves.
I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many who were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many as two hundred. As in the cemetery, each person had no more space than he or she occupied; and thus they were housed together, men and women, children and old people, white persons and black.
The provisions which were calculated for three days at most were naturally soon exhausted, and this is probably the only instance in the nineteenth century when money was looked upon with disdain and when gold was of no value. Trading was going on, it is true, but it was exchanging rice for coffee, hardtack for beans, or sugar for codfish.
The bodies of those who had been killed on the 1st of July had only partly been buried, and the houses in that portion of the town which had been shelled were riddled with bullets and therefore leaking everywhere. Carcasses of horses and other animals, even corpses of persons, were thrown into the river, and people washed their dirty clothes and bathed in the water, which was all there was to drink. Most of the people lived on mangoes and mamoncillos, and it is no wonder that malaria, fevers, and dysentery broke out and assumed alarming proportions.
The houses had no sanitary provisions of any kind, and as the doors were kept closed in order to prevent new invasions, the atmosphere was terrible. The children, sick from lack of nourishment or from taking food which they could not digest, were crying day and night, and quiet or rest became impossible.
The faces of those who died were covered with a sheet or handkerchief, and the living remained by the side of the dead bodies, knowing that, if they should leave their places, others would come to occupy them.
Why go on? I might write a hundred chapters and still not give an idea of the suffering during those days; suffice it to say that El Caney, which was a town of 200 houses, was invaded by 20,000 people, who had counted on being there two days and who remained eleven, namely, until the 16th.
Those eleven days at El Caney have caused more victims in Santiago than the three years of war; for the epidemic that broke out still continues. When the inhabitants of the city numbered 45,000 there were, on an average, not over five deaths a day; and now, that the number of inhabitants is reduced to 30,000, there are not less than fifty a day. The house that does not contain one or more sick is an exception, and people who are well and hearty one day are buried a day or two later. The physicians cannot attend all the sick, and the dead are carried to the cemeteries by members of their own families. The city wears that stamp of sadness and absence of life which is the mark of great calamities, and we hear nothing but wailing and sobbing.
A bombardment of course, inspires women with the greatest horror, and yet, they preferred its dangers and consequences to the sadness and miseries of El Caney and asked, as the greatest of blessings, to be allowed to return to Santiago, and to that end they signed a petition drawn up by the British consul, Mr. Frederick Ramsden, a literal translation of which follows:
"We, the undersigned women, in the name and at the request of all the women and children who are staying in this town without food or shelter, set forth to your excellency as follows:
"At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3d instant, the consuls of Santiago de Cuba were notified that your excellency intended to bombard the city the following day at 10 o'clock in the morning, unless the Spanish army should surrender by that time, and that your excellency had ordered that the women and children should leave the city prior to that hour.
"The same evening, at the request of the consular committee, your excellency consented to defer the bombardment until noon of the 5th, and it was agreed upon that the non-combatants should proceed to El Caney, Cuabitas, and other places on the line of railway.
"In conformity therewith, the civil governor of Santiago de Cuba issued a decree permitting all non-combatants to leave the following morning, between the hours of 5 and 9, on foot, and without vehicles or beasts of burden. Consequently, old and young, rich and poor, sick and invalid, went out in confusion, without extra clothing and with only the food they could carry themselves, fleeing from certain death, and firmly convinced that the city would be bombarded that same day, and that in two days they would be able to return to what might be left of their homes. Far from this being the case; it is now ten days since they came here; many are without a roof over their heads and the others housed together like hogs, without even having room enough to lie down on the floor, which is all the bed they have; the scant supply of food is exhausted and no more can be had at any price. The praiseworthy efforts of the army and of the Society of the Red Cross are inadequate to better the situation; they are perishing themselves of hunger; the old and the sick are dying for want of care and medicines and as a result of so much suffering. And still the city has not yet been taken or bombarded, except a partial bombardment last Sunday and Monday, by which no result appears to have been attained, nor does there seem to be any probability of a change in the horrible situation for the near future.
"They now invoke that same humanity which has been the motive of this war, to ask that something be done as soon as possible to put an end to this terrible state of affairs, or that arrangements be made with the Spanish authorities permitting us to return to the city, where we would rather die from the shells or be buried under the ruins of our homes than perish slowly from hunger and disease, and the privations we are suffering.
(Here follow signatures.)
"Caney, July 14, 1898.
"To His Excellency General Shafter,
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army."
This document, remarkable under all aspects, describes the situation better than anything that I might say.
XXXVI.—Surrender of the City.
July 17th.—In conformity with the terms of the capitulation, the surrender of the city to the American army took place to-day.
At 9 a. m. the Spanish flag was hoisted on Punta Blanca Fort and saluted by 21 guns; shortly after it was lowered.
At 9.30 Generals Toral and Shafter, commanders-in-chief of the Spanish and American forces, respectively, the latter accompanied by his staff and many of the commanders and officers of the American fleet, witnessed the marching by, under arms, of a company of the former, representing all the Spanish forces, as it was difficult to assemble them. The American forces presented arms and beat a march.
The heights of Conosa were the theater of this sad scene. The morning was very beautiful, and the clearness of the sky formed a singular contrast with the gloom that enwrapped the spirit of our troops.
When the march was ended, the American forces remained at their posts, while ours left the trenches and proceeded to the city for the purpose of depositing their arms.
The forces of the Socapa and Punta Gorda were taken by sea, in the steamer Reina de Los Angeles, to Las Cruces pier, and from there they marched to the Artillery Park, where they delivered arms and ammunition. Without them, they proceeded to the camp outside of the city, where all the forces were to assemble until the arrival of the vessels which, as agreed upon, were to convey them to Spanish soil. The other troops did the same thing, after depositing their arms at the points designated beforehand.
The troops having evacuated the city, 1,000 men of the United States Army entered it, hoisting the Hag of that nation at the Palace and Morro Castle. It is the only flag that has been raised in the city. No insurgent forces, nor individuals belonging to the same, have entered the city with arms. The situation remained the same till the day when the army embarked for Spain.
As the operations at the Park lasted several hours, it was curious to see the avidity with which the Americans were looking for numbers worn by the 29th battalion (Constitución), sabres, buttons, and decorations of our officers and soldiers. It was noticed with what satisfaction they kept whatever articles and arms they could gather. Some of them put on the crosses, covered with dirt and blood, that had adorned the breasts of the Spanish. There were so many incidents on the same order that it would really be tedious to enumerate them. They showed the high conception which the American forces had of the valor of our army.
One incident, in conclusion, relative to this matter: When Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. "There they are," said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe him; personally they went all over the place in search off guns and more important works of fortification. And when they had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed: "That fleet" (pointing to Admiral Sapmson's) "has no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so many days."*
The Commander-in-Chief of the American Army is General I Miles. (Here follow the names of the different commanders-in-chief of the United States Army and Navy.)
At 10 a. m., an officer of the American Army, delegated for that purpose, took possession of the comandancia de marina and captaincy of the port, which were surrendered to him, after we had gathered up such documents and communications as should be preserved, and destroyed the others, or made them useless.
The forces are still depositing arms and ammunition, preserving excellent order, which has not been disturbed for a moment. Then they march to the camp outside the city. The arms were all deposited at the park, and not surrendered to the enemy. In order to form an idea, though only approximately, of the number of the forces defending the city, I give below a statement which gives the number at the hospitals, several having been fitted up. On the 17th of July there were—
In the military hospital 800 sick and wounded.
At the Concha headquarters 500 sick and wounded.
At the Mercedes hospital 500 sick and wounded.
At Barracones 300 sick and wounded.
Total 2100 sick and wounded.
Note 2: At the hospital, only the seriously wounded and sick were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor physicians to attend them. Therefore, the number of sick was in reality much greater than shown by the statement furnished by the hospital.
The soldiers had but little to eat, and that little was bad, and not enough water. The latter was scarce, and means were lacking for transporting it to all the points on the extensive line they covered and which it was indispensable to maintain.
The horses of the cavalry, as well as the animals of the artillery and military administration, had had no corn to eat for a long time, and the hay, their only food, was very difficult to get and caused sickness, which was worse.
In conclusion, I will give a statement of the stock on hand which the artillery park turned over to the American officer commissioned to receive it:
ARTILLERY PARK OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Statement of the stock on hand in arms and ammunition, of which the officer of the American Army, commissioned to receive, it, takes charge.
Kind. | Number of arms. | Rounds of ammunition. |
Mauser guns, Spanish mode, 7-mm., No. 1893 | 7,902 | 1,500,000 |
Mauser guns, Argentine model, 7.65-mm., No. 1891 | 872 | 1,471,000 |
Mauser guns, Turkish model, 7.65-mm., No. 1892 | ||
Remington guns, 11-mm., No. 71 | 6,118 | 345,000 |
Remington guns, 1l-mm., No. 7189 | 1,335,000 | |
Mauser carbines, Spanish model | 833 | 1,200 |
Mauser carbines, Argentine model | 84 | |
Remington carbines | 330 | |
Revolvers | 84 | |
Sabers | 267 |
|
Machetes | 692 |
|
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July —, 1898..
LUIS MELGAR
Lieut. Col., Commander of Artillery.
Found correct by the officer commissioned. Errors and omissions excepted.
A. D. Borup,
Lieut. Col U. S. V., Chief Ord. Officer.
It will be seen that nearly the whole armament with which the Spanish army was equipped consisted of Mauser guns, Spanish model (the Remington was that of the volunteers and a few mobilized companies); hence the ammunition for those was all that could be used and should be counted; the rest was useless. Therefore, the number of cartridges on hand and surrendered was 1,500,000, and the number of guns 7,902. Hence there were 191 cartridges for each soldier. Every army man will know the time it takes to use them up.
Here end the events and military operations that took place at Santiago de Cuba, and which are the subject of these notes. I should therefore stop here, but I do not wish to do so without venturing a few ideas suggested to me by certain scenes of which I was an unwilling witness (for I have naturally avoided sights in which there could be nothing pleasant), and without making a comparison between two sieges, upon one of which judgment has already been passed and which has become a matter of history known to every one, and upon the other of which judgment can not yet be passed because we are not as yet in possession of the necessary data and information which would make a just and impartial sentence possible.
I give below the official statement of all the casualties sustained by the forces of Santiago de Cuba in the different bombardments and battles from the 18th of May to the date of the signing of the capitulation. Those caused by sickness are not included.
DATE. |
| KILLED. | WOUNDED. | PRISONERS AND MISSING. | ||||||||
| Generals. | Commanders. | Officers. | Men. | Generals. | Commanders. | Officers. | Men. | Commanders. | Officers. | Men. | |
June 6— | Morro | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 2 | . . . . | 1 | 4 | 25 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Estrella | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . |
| . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Cay Smith | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 2 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Socapa | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 8 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Mazamorra | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 11 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Cruiser "Reina Mercedes" | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | 5 | . . . . | 1 | 1 | 10 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 14— | Socapa | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | 6 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 16— | Morro | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | 10 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Socapa | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 2 | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | 6 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 21— | Morro | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 3 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 22— | Socapa | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Aguadores | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . |
| . . . . | . . . . | 1 | 6 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
| Daiquiri | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 5 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 23 and 24 | Sevilla | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 9 | . . . . | 3 | 24 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 25— | Aguadores | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 2 | 1 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
June 26— | Morro | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 8 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
July 2— | Morro | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | 1 | 31 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
July 1, 2, 3 | Caney and Santiago | . . . . | 3 | 12 | 78 | 1 | 6 | 30 | 339 | 1 | 6 | 116 |
July 10— | Santiago | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 6 | . . . . | 1 | 2 | 45 | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
July 11— | Santiago | . . . . | . . . . | . . . . | 1 | . . . . | 1 | 16 | . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . | . . . . . |
Total |
| 1 | 4 | 12 | 107 | 1 | 9 | 49 | 556 | 1 | 6 | 116 |
RECAPITULATION
| Generals. | Commanders. | Officers. | Men. |
Killed | 1 | 4 | 12 | 107 |
Woundned | 1 | 9 | 49 | 556 |
Prisoners and mising | . . . . . . . . . . | 1 | 6 | 116 |
General Total | 2 | 14 | 67 | 779 |
XXXVI.—Traders, Not the Spanish People.
I was sent to the island of Cuba for the first time in 1868 and have remained there, if not constantly, yet quite long enough to understand, even though I am but a poor observer, that one of the most important causes which have led to the deep aversion which the sons of Cuba generally show for the mother country is the conduct of a certain number of people who come from the! Peninsula with no other object in view than to accumulate afortune in more or less of a hurry, the majority of them having no education or knowledge of any kind.
In order to better attain their desires and ambitions, they incessantly boast of everything Spanish, whereby they must necessarily come into conflict with the Cubans, whose feelings and dignity they hurt and offend. When they have acquired money, they aspire to lucrative and important offices, which they obtain, because they are Spanish, to the prejudice of others, who by their intelligence and ability are better fitted to hold them; and the aversion is intensified into hatred, which, always latent, though concealed, was only waiting for an opportunity to break out openly. This opportunity presented itself for the first time in 1868, and the battle cry of Yara became the signal of vengeance and extermination, to which these Peninsulars responded by organizing the corps of volunteers.
To deny that they have since rendered important and constant services to the cause of Spain, would be both unjust and useless; but it must also be acknowledged that they have committed many serious errors, often becoming overbearing and having compelled more than one captain general to resign his command—a fatal example which hurt us in our country and impaired our reputation in other countries.
The first Cuban insurrection and all those which we have had to fight since have acquired that stamp of cruelty and extermination which is a characteristic of savage people, but not of civilized nations, and the war has given an opportunity to satisfy vengeances, which have given rise to reprisals and furnished the Government of the United States with a pretext—both unjust and hypocritical, as I know only too well, but still a pretext—for deciding on armed intervention, in the name of humanity, or which is the same, on war, which could not help but be its natural outcome.
If all those errors and offenses which have been attributed to Spain and the country had really been committed by them, such intervention would have been justified and even worthy of commendation. But events have shown very plainly that to them (the Peninsulars referred to) the nation was but a pretext and that the object was quite a different one, namely, the attainment of their aspirations and the realization of their desires. And this is further evidenced by the fact, previously mentioned, that, taking advantage of the scarcity of provisions, the natural consequence of the blockade, they hid such provisions as they had on hand or asked exorbitant prices for them, without any reason to justify such proceeding, after taking good care to place their funds abroad, in anticipation of what might happen. I need hardly state again that those who were so enthusiastic and loyal in normal times were the first to strip off the uniform and hide where they believed themselves safest. Finally, when they became convinced that the sun in whose light they had been living, and in whose rays they had thrived, was yielding his place to another sun, larger in size, but not in luster, they sought its protection and benefits, without remembering any longer the one which their eyes had seen when they opened them for the first time. "The King is dead—long live the King!"
They advertised their merchandise in "The Times," of Santiago de Cuba, a newspaper of recent publication, printed in Spanish for the information of the Cubans, the hatred of whom does not prevent their fleecing them, and in English for the purpose of doing the same thing with their new masters, whom they did not hesitate in recognizing. And so great is their love and affection for Spain, of which they were so proud, that where they ask one dollar of American silver they require two in Spanish coin of the same metal. They consider the latter worth one-half of the former. Perhaps this may seem exaggerated, the same as many other truths contained in my "Notes;" but a letter signed by a Peninsular, published in number 7 of said "Times," of Santiago de Cuba, of August 8, will convince the most incredulous. The following is a literal copy of the letter:
"EMIGRATION AT PRESENT IS FOLLY.
"Your southern race has many vices, but it also possesses great virtues. Its weak point is that it is extremely impressionable. Any orator speaking to you carries you completely away, and with childlike weakness you accept everything just as it is painted and described to you.
"During the six months last past the Spanish race at Santiago de Cuba has lived in this fictitious atmosphere; I say 'fictitious' because the bitter reality has not realized our patriotic and enthusiastic aspirations.
"How many useless sacrifices! How many illusions destroyed! But that should not discourage us, because history, when dealing with the events and the suffering of this poor people, will take good care to transmit them to posterity with impartial rudeness.
"At present, as long as we are acquainted only with the occurrences that have taken place in this province alone and know absolutely nothing of what is going on in the rest of the world, including our mother country, why do we not wait until the black clouds hanging over us have passed away and until the horizon has cleared up so that we may be able to judge of our true situation and decide what is to be done? Be calm, very calm, peninsular residents of this city; let us condemn right here the voluntary desertion which prejudices your sacred interests, and whose current you have followed without considering whether it would lead to your happiness or to your ruin. However much you may think about the extremes which I have just pointed out to you, it will still be little enough.
"Let us suppose for a moment that the dismemberment of our poor Spain becomes a fact, a thing which we do not know. Whitt painful scenes are you going to witness? What business will you resort to, to recover from the ruin of your interests? Unfortunately none, for your long absence will keep you in ignorance of everything, and the radical change of climate, when winter almost at hand, will affect your health and that of your families.
"If you remain here, in this locality which is occupied by soldiers of a strong nation, until we shall learn definitely what has happened, you will lose nothing either in your business or your independence.
"The noble and farsighted chiefs who are at present ruling the destinies of this country have shown you plainly that all they wish is that peace and order may reign in all the branches of our ' public administration;
"That they have called upon you as well as the industrious Cubans to co-operate in the work of progress and social reconstruction;
"That they have neglected nothing in order that the inhabitants may have cheap and wholesome food;
"That they have established banks for the development of our agriculture and commerce.
"They have also shown us, and have so far proved it, that they have not come here in the interest of any faction or political party, but are desirous only of promoting the progress of this island and the well-being of its inhabitants.
"Since the situation which I have just described to you is the undeniable truth, why should you want to join this insensate and shortsighted emigration which can cause you nothing but expense?
"Do you not understand that by remaining here where you are well known by the people and the local trade, you have an ample field for rebuilding your deteriorated business and provide for your families and secure for them a bright future?
"Whatever may be the final fate which Providence reserves for this country, whether we remain Spanish or pass over to foreigners, our hard-working and honorable race will always remain deserving. There are instances in the Spanish-American Republics of fellow-countrymen of ours who are holding the most prominent places in those nations and who have been honored by their governments.
"If all that I have set forth is tangible truth, why should you abandon the field, why flee from this beautiful country where you have spent the years of your youth, raised families and acquired a good standing? If you consider my disinterested advice you cannot help but become convinced that, as matters now stand, your voluntary emigration is an absurdity.
"A Peninsular."
I have copied the letter literally, and it must be admitted that it is remarkable in every respect for diction, aspiration, and intention. I believe this example is quite sufficient, so I will refrain from citing others.
Those who to-day call and sign themselves Peninsulars, who have always called themselves Spaniards, what will they call themselves to-morrow?
XXXVIII.—Gerona and Santiago de Cuba.
When sieges are spoken of in Spain, those of Numancia and Sagunto, Saragossa, and Gerona are always mentioned specially as instances worthy of imitation.
As twenty centuries have elapsed since the first two took place and I do not know what happened there, and am not sufficiently acquainted with the facts to venture on a comparison, I will leave them entirely out of the question; for since the customs and usages of warfare, as well as international law, and the rights of the people were, and could not help but be, very different from those of our days, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that as capitulations were not respected, people should have preferred to die like lions rather than be butchered like sheep.
Therefore I shall refer only to the siege of Gerona (no doubt quite as glorious as that of Saragossa) of which all Spaniards, myself included, are justly proud; and judging from General Linares's telegram, somebody had evidently had that siege in mind as a pattern or model to be followed here at Santiago de Cuba.
Everybody is acquainted with the circumstances of the siege of Gerona, but probably no one in the Peninsula with those of the siege of Santiago. All that I am going to say concerning it is pure truth, as can be testified by the 30,000 inhabitants of the city and the 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents who laid siege to it.
It is true that Gerona in 1809 was far from being a Metz or a Sebastopol; but after all, it was a city surrounded by walls, with forts and redoubts on the outside communicating with the main precinct by open roads. For that reason the city could not be entered by surprise, but had to be regularly besieged, which made it necessary to construct parallel lines, set up batteries, cut off communications with the outside to prevent assistance from reaching the city, open a breach, or determine upon the assault, all of which costs time and lives.
Great was the anger caused in Spain by the invasion of Napoleon the First, and especially by the means which he employed to effect it. The Spanish believed their religion and independence threatened, and like one man they rose up in arms with an enthusiasm and energy not often paralleled in history.
Thus it was that the garrison of Gerona, which at the beginning of the siege consisted of about 6,000 men, enthusiastic as well as being Spanish, was not the only garrison that did the fighting. For all its inhabitants fought as well; the young and the strong with arms, the old and the weak by carrying cartridges and ammunition, the women by gathering up and caring for the sick and wounded, the clergy by absolving the dying, burying the dead, and stimulating the zeal of all. There everybody fought, everybody toiled, all were heroes, because it was their own property they were defending, their own hearths, their families, the soil where their forefathers were buried, their religion, their independence—in a word, their native country, and that is saying everything. They well earned their country's gratitude, from Mariano Alvarez de Castro to the last woman, the last child.
The troops which surrounded the city under Verdier and the Saint-Cyr troops protecting them and occupying the roads which lead to the city did not exceed in all 30,000, and although their artillery was more numerous and better manned, Gerona had artillery of the same caliber and the same range; that is to say—and this should be well borne in mind—that the Spanish projectiles carried as far as the French projectiles.
The firearms of that time are well known; the small arms were loaded in eleven movements, and I do not know how many it took to load the guns; the effect of the bombshell was moral rather than material, for it will be remembered that, in order to avoid them as much as possible, men were stationed in church steeples and other high places where they indicated the direction of such bombshells by prearranged signals. Besides it was easy to elude them in caves and cellars. If the powder gave out, the supply could always be renewed by burning a few doors and windows to obtain charcoal and mix it with a little saltpeter that could be found in any damp place, and a little sulphur. Any blacksmith could make cannon balls, and so on. Such were the firearms at the beginning of this century and their effects were accordingly.
Moreover, Gerona was aware that all Spain looked upon her with admiration and compassion; that each month, each week, each day that the resistance was prolonged and the French were kept outside the walls of the city, armies were being organized, regiments improvised, and armed bodies raised, and that there was but one idea and one desire in Catalonia, namely, that of helping Gerona, as, indeed, it had been helped once by getting in a convoy with provisions and over 3,000 men, and a second was ready. The city also knew that all assistance which it could get did really help to prolong the resistance, and the garrison was well aware that, if it should go out en masse and break through the hostile circle at any time, they would be safe and free, on their own soil, where they would have found all the resources and supplies they could wish for.
When they were not fighting, and did not have to be at the breach to repulse the columns of attack, or at the walls to force back an assault, they stationed their sentinels, guards, and patrols to keep watch, while the others could go where they were under shelter from the sun, the rain, and the dampness; in a word, they could take turns about in the service, and although they did not have much to eat, they could at least rest when the enemy permitted. Finally, Gerona preserved the remembrance and the pride of two former sieges which those same French forces had been obliged to give up, and there was well-founded hope of similar success if they received reinforcements, which was not at all improbable.
At the end of a six months' siege Gerona had to capitulate owing to starvation, but capitulate after all; and that capitulation, far from causing us to blush or be ashamed, is one of the most brilliant pages in our history, of which we are justly proud.
Those were the conditions of Gerona during that famous siege; now let us see the conditions of Santiago de Cuba.
Santiago de Cuba, as has been seen, is an open city, without forts, redoubts, or walls—in a word, without defenses of any kind. At the time the present conflict was declared the precinct of the city was surrounded by a wire enclosure which had been deemed sufficient, and indeed had proved so, to check the insurgents; but any one not acquainted with Santiago and the kind of warfare we had been sustaining, would have laughed at it, and with good reason.
Then the war with the United States broke out. I will not again mention the work effected for the protection of the precinct by the corps of engineers, without resources and appliances and with a scant personnel, which, though both enthusiastic and intelligent, had to confine itself to constructing trenches and protecting by earthworks the forts surrounding the precinct (if the name of forts can be given to a few blockhouses, but with a view to resisting musket fire, but surely not gun fire), erecting palisades and obstructions of every nature, for which purpose all the sinuosities and windings of the ground were utilized with remarkable skill. But all these works were only works of campaign, and left the soldiers exposed to the rays of the July sun of the Island of Cuba, to almost daily torrents of rain, and at night o heavy dew; any one acquainted with the island would know that, if these conditions had continued for a month, not a single soldier could have remained in the trenches.
Here at Santiago, as well as in the rest of the island, the soldiers, poorly clothed and still more poorly fed, had been sustaining for three years a fierce and thankless war, fighting with the enemy, the climate, with sun and dampness, with sickness, with the roads (or rather for want of them), with rains and drouth, with the mountains and plains—in a word, with everything, for [here in Cuba everything is hostile to the army. Besides, there !was more than eight months' pay due the soldiers, and I believe is still due them.
Before the destruction of our fleet, and still more so after it, the enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, consisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to even think of receiving reinforcements or help of any kind, unless it were from the interior of the island.
After the arrival of General Escario, who might perhaps have checked the progress of the enemy for a little while longer if he had reached here prior to July 1, though he could not have changed the final result, provisions and ammunition, already scarce, became still more so, because there were twice the number of mouths to be fed and twice the number of muskets to be supplied.
Eight or nine thousand men, many suffering with fever and all of them tired and exhausted, who had been day and night in the trenches, which they could not leave for the simple reason that they were far from the city, with water reaching up to their waists whenever it rained, who for only food had rice bread and rice boiled in water, and for only artillery a few muzzle-loading guns, had to resist 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents, with machine guns, also entrenched, and 68 breech-loading guns in advantageous positions and well manned.
The inhabitants, far from helping the soldiers or encouraging them, had left the city as soon as notice of an intended bombardment had been given, and the few who remained closed their doors and windows, even at the drug stores. The merchants, far from furnishing provisions to the army, or even to the hospitals, which stood so much in need of them, hid them carefully and official searches had to be made, the result of which was as I have stated above.
The situation of Santiago de Cuba from a military standpoint is probably unique in history.
Without any prospect of receiving help by sea, which was in control of a powerful fleet, the city was surrounded on land by an army five times as large as ours in numbers, with excellent artillery, which was increased every day and was constantly receiving provisions and war supplies.
Our forces, being without these latter, have no longer even the pleasure or comfort of fighting, for the enemy knows their situation better than they do themselves; knows that they have no food left but rice, and but very little ammunition, which they dare not use up for fear of becoming entirely disarmed and placing themselves completely at the mercy of the victor; knows that they can not expose themselves to another fight like that of July 1, which they remember with fear and terror; that they will be compelled to capitulate, and that it is only a question of days. Knowing all this, the hostile forces entrench themselves, train their artillery on the city, and also prepare to bombard it with their ships, which, from Aguadores, more than 4 miles from here, will soon reduce it to ashes and ruin, hurling upon it a hail of 16, 20, and 32 cm. shells, the effects of which will be seen only too well, even though we may not be able to see where the projectiles come from that are causing the ruin.
The enemy, as has been stated, had cut the aqueduct, thus depriving the city of water. There were a few wells and a number of cisterns, it is true, but the transportation of the water to the Socapa, Punta Gorda, and especially the blockhouses on the line from Las Cruces to Aguadores (4 kilometers), was not only extremely laborious and difficult, but quite inadequate.
But what makes this siege an exceptional one more than anything else is the fact that the reinforcements which could only have come by land would have had the opposite effect of what they were intended to have, as I will demonstrate.
Where could such reinforcements come from? From Holguin, Manzanillo, Guantánamo, or Havana. Holguin could have furnished five or six thousand men under Colonel Luque, but with only rations enough for the march, for there were no more at Holguin, nor means for transporting them. From Manzanillo all those who could come had already arrived in command of General Escario. From Guantánamo none could come for lack of provisions. That left only those from Havana.
But I will go even further: I will suppose that all the reinforcements, including those from Havana under General Pando or any other general, had arrived, and that there had been forces enough at Santiago to rout the enemy, which is the most that could be conceded. What would have happened then? The enemy would have receded as far as the coast in less than an hour and their armor-clads and other warships would have checked the progress of our army and would have made its victory and efforts useless, leaving it in worse condition than before the arrival of such reinforcements, since there would be many more men to feed; and everybody knows that the fields of Santiago have produced nothing during these last three years of warfare.
Some may say that there was one last recourse left: to force a passage through the hostile lines and march to Holguin. That is more easily said than done.
One cannot break through lines and walk over armies equipped with modern muskets and guns. Metz and Sedan have proved that, and it must be admitted that the French did fierce fighting at these places. We had to reconcentrate at a given point all our forces, scattered along an extensive line, and how could that be done without the enemy, whose lines were only a few meters from ours, seeing it all?
But I will concede even more: I will concede that it had been possible to accomplish the reconcentration; that the cavalry had been able to make a successful charge, which I do not believe would have been possible, for the horses were starving; I will grant, for the sake of argument, that the mules, which were in the same condition as the horses, had been able to transport the spare ammunition, provided there was any left, and the supplies of rice required for the march. Let us suppose that, after leaving two or three thousand dead and wounded on the field, the others had opened a road to Holguin; how could soldiers who were weak and sick accomplish the forced march which would have been absolutely necessary in order to escape the enemy's pursuit? It was an impossibility. The insurgents would have harassed us on the march, fighting for every inch of the ground, and would have wounded a more or less considerable number of our men, thereby delaying a march which it was so imperative to hasten, and the Americans, who would no doubt have followed our tracks, would thereby have gained time to overtake us with overwhelming numbers, and we should have been compelled to surrender to them at their pleasure for want of ammunition, or to perish to the last man, and such a sacrifice would have profited Spain no more than had the sacrifice of the fleet, and would have deprived the nation of 8000 soldiers who by three years of fighting had become inured to war.
If the hostile fleet had bombarded the city, as it doubtless would have done, it would have reduced it to ruins and ashes in a short space of time, and while, from a military standpoint, such a consideration should not influence a general and impel him to capitulate on that account alone, in this case the ruin of the city meant also that of its defenders; for if it was difficult to supply enough water in normal times it would have become altogether impossible under such circumstances; the soldiers, exposed to the sun all day, would have been without anything to drink, which is worse even than being without anything to eat.
Finally, what and whom were we defending in Santiago? The Cubans, after three years of fighting, preferred to become Yankees rather than remain Spaniards, and the Peninsulars, far from assisting the soldiers who were defending them, took advantage of the situation to raise in the most outrageous manner the price of all articles, even those of first necessity, or hide them, giving the impression that they had been confiscated, and when the time of danger arrived they left the city, taking off the uniform of volunteers, in which they had always taken good care to shine at reviews and in processions, and went to hide at El Caney, in merchant steamers, and at Cinco Reales.
Such were the situation and circumstances which, at Santiago, led to the signing of the capitulation, by virtue of which we Spaniards, who happen to be here, are to return to Spain.
I do not wish to make comparisons, nor express my opinion on events in which I have taken a more or less direct and active part, as such opinion might appear impassioned or dictated by interest or egotism. I have stated what happened at Gerona and what happened here, like Bertrand du Guesclin, without omitting or adding anything. Now, let the country, knowing the circumstances, judge us. With a calm mind and a clear conscience I await its sentence.
* The reference to the "screw" in this paragraph probably refers to the vanes or feathers on the rear end of these shells. They are for the purpose of giving the shell rotation in its flight, and being fixed to the shell they have no independent motion.—O. N. I.
* This is the figure of the original Spanish, but is probably inended for 1660.—O. N. I.
*The writer makes a strange error in the number of the American ships engaged in this fight. He has evidently counted all those enumerated in Chapter XI. Those ships, however, were scattered among the fleets at Manila, Havana, Key West and Santiago. Those actually engaged were as follows: Brooklyn (flag), Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, and yachts Gloucester and Vixen. The flagship New York, with the torpedo-boat Ericsson, took part toward the latter end of the engagement, the battle being practically fought by the six ships first named. Counting only numbers of ships, therefore, the Americans had five fighting ships against the Spanish four, with two armed yachts against the two Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers.—O. N. I.
* On July 2, Admiral Sampson wrote General Shafter: "It was my hope that an attack on your part on these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes."—O. N. I.