THE SAILOR IN THE REVOLUTION.[*]
It is not my purpose to recount in detail the naval episodes of the War of the American Revolution, although all are interesting and many thrilling. This work has been too often done by abler hands than mine to call for, or to admit of, repetition. The Pages of Jas. Fenimore Cooper, for example, are a guide to these events whose trustworthiness is beyond question and above Praise.
In reading the history of this struggle, great in itself and greater still in its consequences to mankind, having in view the Obtaining of lessons appropriate to our present needs, I have been much impressed by the absence of those broad generalizations which, alone, bring benefit to the student, illuminating his Path with the lamp of experience. The lamp has always been burning, giving forth its rays in every direction with lavish generosity; but, as far as I am aware, there has been lacking that accurate synthesis which, placing the facts in their true relation to each other, should serve as a lens to bring the rays of light together into one powerful and searching beam. I cannot pretend to have found this lens myself, but, at least, certain deductions from these events have suggested themselves to me as worthy of consideration, if not of acceptance, and to them I ask Your attention for a brief time.
The war in question was a naval war to an extent seldom fully realized and never generally acknowledged. That the war would assume this phase might have been expected on a priori grounds. England was waging hostilities at a distance of some three thousand miles from home. For the maintenance of communication between her troops in America and their base in Great Britain, the command of the sea was an imperative necessity. Let that be lost and her armies in the colonies would infallibly perish; for military stores were not to be had in the theatre of operations, and other supplies were often difficult to obtain in the midst of a population for the greater part intensely inimical. Again, the colonists, settled principally along the seaboard, had been engaged in maritime pursuits to a degree which, proportionally, has not been surpassed in our history. As fishermen and sailors their numbers were relatively vast. Their enterprise and skill brought, indeed, so serious a menace to England's commercial supremacy on the water that among their grievances were measures which sought to restrict this energetic competition with the mother country. As a natural sequence, these men of nautical bent and experience found an appropriate field for activity in attacks on British transports and British merchantmen, provoking, in return, a large display of British naval force. The numbers engaged in these operations afloat were so much greater than those under arms ashore that the latter appear, by comparison, almost insignificant.
In actual organized collision between the King's forces and the colonists, the first blood was shed on the water in the Gaspee incident of 1772. It was also a naval movement that brought the war to a close, for without the help of the French fleet Washington and Lafayette could not have compelled the surrender of Cornwallis, the last important scene in the military drama. Surely these facts justify our looking at this war from the naval standpoint and absolve me from the need of further apology for inviting you to listen once more to a twice-told tale.
The occasion of the Gaspee episode was the attempted enforcement of the odious Navigation Act by British armed vessels, charged with the duty of seeing that all colonial craft were provided with the stamps made requisite under the law. On June 9th, 1772, the Hannah, Captain Linzee, a packet plying between New York and Providence, refused to come for examination alongside a British cruiser in Narragansett Bay, but, profiting by a fresh and favoring breeze, she ran off and stood up the bay. The sloop Gaspee, of 102 tons, a small armed tender to the cruiser, mounting four or six 3-pdrs., was signaled to chase. Capt. Linzee, familiar with the local navigation, led the Gaspee over a shoal where, drawing more water than the Hannah, the former struck, while the latter escaped to Providence. Capt. Linzee's account of the matter so incensed the inhabitants of that town that they planned and fitted out an expedition to avenge the fancied outrage. Sixty-four men, disguised as Indians and led, it is believed, by Captain Abraham Whipple, later one of the first captains to be commissioned in the United States Navy, dropped down the river that night in eight boats, provided mainly with cobble-stones as missiles. At 2 a. m. they reached the stranded Gaspee. They were hailed by the sentry, who received a volley of stones in reply. He rushed below to rouse his mates. Lieutenant Dudingstone, in command, came on deck and fired a pistol at the boats. He was wounded in the thigh by a musket-ball discharged in return. The Gaspee was carried by boarding, and Dudingstone was further injured by a sabre cut that nearly severed his right hand from the wrist. The Gaspee's people were removed and the vessel set on fire. Towards morning she blew up. A reward of a thousand pounds sterling for the leader and one of five hundred pounds for any of the Others in this party were offered in vain by the British government. Nor were the labors of a royal commission that sat from January till June of the following year, attended by better results. The loyalty of the colonists to each other was proof against all temptation. The affair may, with propriety, be deemed the opening act of hostilities between England and her American possessions. Preceding Lexington by nearly three years, it has been lost sight of in the latter's greater renown—a renown based upon the larger numbers engaged, upon a notable loss of life on both sides, and upon the stirring events to which it was the immediate Prelude. I have thought it not improper to describe the taking of the Gaspee at some length, and to claim for the enterprise its due place in the order of events.
From a military point of view, the position of England on the continent of North America from 1775 to 1782 was alternately offensive and defensive; offensive so long as her command of the sea was practically unchallenged or undisturbed, defensive the moment her communications were seriously threatened or were interrupted. It is these varying phases, presented by the military situation, which so complicate the general question and render difficult a right understanding of the British campaign as a whole. Yet it is evident that just so long as she could safely play the part of aggressor her advance was, on the whole, not measurably checked. When her sea communications were endangered, the movements of her troops became retrograde at once. Thus in 1776 the continued interception of its supplies by American cruisers was of little if any less weight in forcing the British army to evacuate Boston than the increasing pressure of the besieging Americans. Again, in 1778, it was not Washington's army, but the sailing of d'Estaing's fleet from Toulon that drove Clinton out of Philadelphia and back upon his local base in New York.
A year later the mere news that d'Estaing was coming to America was sufficient to cause the precipitate abandonment of Rhode Island by the British.
Arguing from these facts, it becomes at least conceivable that measures directed towards naval control of the coast on our part might have materially shortened the war.
The steps taken by the colonists to prosecute hostilities on the water reflected the lack of organization existing at the seat of the new government. There were privateers, cruisers equipped by individual colonies, and national cruisers. These vessels acted in concert or independently, according to circumstances. Similarly, officers of the regular navy are found serving in each class, passing from one to the other as occasion demanded. A distressing absence of homogeneity is noticeable throughout all the American operations. If the word were permissible, amateurish would appear to be that best adapted to characterize them. Let us review briefly the services performed by each of the above-mentioned varieties of ships.
The old and ever new ignis fatuus of commerce-destroying shed its baleful light over the colonists, luring them on to a false policy. As a subordinate adjunct, prosecuted with a surplus of ships and men, and so controlled as to help and not hinder regular hostilities, commerce-destroying is always useful, while, at times, important. But when, as in the War of the American Revolution, it cripples the crews of national vessels, and through frequent capture by the enemy followed by non-exchange of prisoners, it gradually decimates the seafaring population; when it assumes a magnitude out of all proportion to the more capital operations of the marine, it becomes an evil but slightly, if at all, mitigated by the distress inflicted on the foe. Wars are brought to a conclusion by the defeat of armies and squadrons, not by guerillas, however successful, either afloat or ashore. The damage done to our commerce by the Confederate cruisers in the War of the Rebellion, vast as it was, had absolutely no effect on the issue of the contest. This lesson has never been learned by our people, yet it is as true to-day as it was thirty-five or even one hundred and twenty years ago.
Hutchinson in his diary states his belief that seventy thousand New Englanders were engaged in privateering at one time. According to Edward Everett Hale, the privateer fleet of the port of Salem, in 1781, consisted of fifty-nine vessels, which carried nearly four thousand men, averaging sixty-six men to the ship, and mounted seven hundred and forty-six guns. There seems to be no means of making an exact computation of the magnitude of the privateer fleet at any one moment, but a partial list in the Massachusetts Archives of those commissioned in that State gives the names of two hundred and seventy vessels. The privateer fleets from Rhode Island, Connecticut and Philadelphia were also large. Salem is known to have sent out one hundred and fifty privateers and Boston three hundred and sixty-five. It would probably be fair to say that during the war more than six hundred privateers were commissioned by Massachusetts alone. "The largest of these privateers," says Mr. Hale,[*] "at starting carried one hundred and fifty men. With each prize sent in the fighting force of the captor was reduced, and in such reduction is the reason to be found why at last a privateer captain was not able to fight his own ship and, after he had sent in many prizes, was himself taken. On the other hand, the smallest of these vessels, equipped for short cruises, carried but few guns and few men."
I have been unable to gather statistics as to the number of privateers sailing from the Delaware, from Southern waters or from France. As to the national cruisers, history is somewhat more explicit, although doubts arise in certain cases touching the identity of individual vessels, the readiness with which a ship or an officer passed into or out of the general service obscuring the record.
The first effort at securing a navy bears date of October i3th, 1775, when Congress passed a law ordering one vessel of '0 guns and another of 14 guns, to be equipped and sent on a cruise to the eastward to intercept royal supplies. Two months later it directed the construction of thirteen ships, three of 24 guns, five of 28 guns and five of 32 guns. Of these the Raleigh, Boston and Montgomery bore names still to be found on our navy register, from which those of the Warren, Congress and Delaware have but comparatively recently been erased. On October 3, 1776, it authorized another frigate and two cutters, and on November 9, 1776, three 74s, five more frigates, one sloop-of-war and a packet. The need of heavy ships was beginning to be perceived, at least in theory. Practically but one 74, the America, was laid down, and she was presented to France the day of her launching in 1782 to replace the Magnanime of de Vandreuil's squadron, lost while attempting to enter Boston harbor. On the 22d of December, 1775, Congress appointed Esek Hopkins of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief, four captains, each by name, to the purchased vessels, Alfred, Columbus, Andrea Doria and Cabot, together with thirteen lieutenants. Of the latter, John Paul Jones was senior.
The Hornet, 10, sloop, and the Wasp, 8, schooner, were the first regular cruisers to get to sea. As time went on, others were purchased or borrowed or hired. Thus in October, 1776, the list comprised the thirteen building under the act of December, 1775, besides thirteen more otherwise acquired. From the beginning to the end of the war the United States had forty-one vessels in commission, including the Bonhomme Richard and her four Franco-American consorts. Some of these never got to sea.
Cooper says of the vessels of the act of 1775: "The ships ordered were large enough to resist the small cruisers of the crown, and were well adapted to destroy convoys and to capture transports and store-ships. . . . Most of the ships mentioned were armed with nines and twelves, having sixes, or even fours, on their quarterdecks and forecastles. It is thought that there were no eighteen-pounder frigates constructed under the laws of 1775." You will perceive that of the necessity for ships for purely military purposes there seems to have been no conception except as embodied in the three 74's that never materialized. Commerce-destroying and the intercepting of supplies seem, as is our custom, to have controlled the building programme. The fate experienced by the majority of these vessels was abundantly foreshadowed in their light scantling and Fourth of July batteries.
On the British side we see on our coast a rough average of 26,000 sailors in seventy or more vessels of various sizes. Thus Lord Howe had six 64's and three 50's at New York in 1778 before Byron's fleet, which counted 74's among its number, arrived to reinforce him. Howe's ships alone were an easy match for all we could possibly gather under one command.
The comparison by numbers, both of ships and men, employed by the two contestants is greatly in favor of the Americans, but they never had afloat a single vessel able to challenge the British 64's, or even 50's, while the advantages of organization, discipline, esprit de corps and service traditions lay wholly with their enemies. Too often, indeed, our crews were made up in part of British Prisoners, who in return for their release agreed to serve in our navy. The mutiny on board the Alliance in 1779 would doubtless have succeeded but for its timely detection. It was planned by the released British seamen in the crew. The loss of the U. S. S. Trumbull, 24, in 1781 was largely due to the presence in her ship's company of "these questionable materials," to use Cooper's expression, to the extent of more than one-fourth of a scant 200. These men so influenced their comrades that in the confusion of the damage occasioned by a sudden squall and in the darkness of the night the captain could not muster fifty of his men to fight the Iris, 32, and General Monk, 18. The battle might also be said to have been fought by the officers.
It followed, inevitably as night follows day, with ships often hastily improvised, badly manned, poorly equipped, heterogeneous in type and handled without unity of purpose or clear notions of strategy, that there was a corresponding waste of energy and barrenness of result. Individual acts of brilliant seamanship and great gallantry abound. What could have been finer than Nicholas Biddle's behavior in the Randolph, 32, when, finding he had engaged, not an armed merchantman as he supposed the Yarmouth, 64, he pluckily fought his great antagonist until his own ship blew up? To mention John Paul Jones and the Bonhomme Richard is to recall to mind one of the most extraordinary and stubbornly contested naval battles recorded in history. Indeed, with scarcely an exception, the American flag was flown with such credit and defended with such vigor as to compel our adversaries to acknowledge that with equal ships their chances of victory were no greater than ours. I know of no better specific for a relaxed condition of patriotism than the reading of the glowing pages of Cooper which describe these exploits. But ours is a different task. Let us contrive, if possible, to obtain a general view of the naval campaign.
In the early part of 1776 the Commander-in-Chief, Esek Hopkins, with a force consisting of the purchased vessels Alfred, 24, Columbus, 20, Doria, 14, Cabot, 14, Providence, 12, Hornet, xo, Wasp, 8, and Fly, despatch, left the Delaware under instructions to proceed to the southward with a view to act against the naval force, which, under Lord Dunmore, was then ravaging the coast of Virginia. Instead of executing his orders, Hopkins made a descent on New Providence, in the Bahamas, where he captured a number of cannon and other military stores. For his failure to do as directed and for his mishap in engaging without result the Glasgow, 20, on his way home, Hopkins was eventually dismissed the service. In this case it was the naval commander who misapprehended the right use to make of a fleet, viz., for the destruction of the enemy's armed force.
The navy of the United States after this miscarriage, with but rare exceptions, was employed in disconnected cruises against British commerce and British transports. It deliberately declined the purely military role for which its weakness ill adapted it, and sought by desultory raids to compensate for its lack of strength. When a favorable opportunity offered, it did not hesitate to engage the enemy on even terms, but these opportunities were not so much by choice as by hazard. The prizes captured were often a welcome, if intermittent, source of revenue. This is especially true of those taken in European waters by such craft as the Surprise and Revenge under Conyngham and the Bonhomme Richard and her mates under Jones, all fitted out by the American commissioners in France. That British trade was hampered, not to say demoralized, is abundantly proved by contemporaneous reports (the government was even obliged to furnish convoys for the Irish coast trade), but unless the high rates of marine insurance and the alarm of the mercantile community can be shown to have exerted a determining influence Upon the conclusion of hostilities, it is yet open to question whether all these depredations had a direct military value at all comparable with the operations of a squadron of good vessels sailing with a correct strategic purpose.
The progress of the war was, naturally, marked by a steady decrease of our forces and as notable an increase of the British ships employed on our coast. Thus in 1776 we counted twenty-five vessels and four hundred and twenty-two guns to the enemy's seventy-eight and two thousand and seventy-eight respectively. Two years later we had but fourteen ships and three hundred and thirty-two guns; the English, eighty-nine ships and two thousand five hundred and seventy-six guns. Yet, in the meantime, the thirteen frigates and sloops authorized in 1775 had been built, launched and commissioned. The official list sent to Franklin in March, 1780, of the navy of the United States at that time comprises besides the America, 74, Bourbon, 36, and Saratoga, 18, on the stocks, only eight vessels mounting 222 guns. The enemy's command of the sea occasioned the loss of those members of this batch that were constructed in the Hudson and Delaware, with hardly a struggle on our part. When the British in 1777 moved into Philadelphia they first bottled up, then afterwards destroyed or captured the Washington, 32, Effingham, 28, Delaware, 24, Andrea Doria, 14, Sachem, 10, Wasp, 8, Independence, to, Dolphin, 10, a heartrending showing truly, and the most extensive disaster to which our little marine was ever subjected. The vessels built in New England were much more fortunate, all getting to sea with useful and honorable careers. The British investment was less strict off the Eastern coast than at New York and Philadelphia. One is unable to escape the regret that more ships and heavier were not laid down at Portsmouth, Salisbury, Providence, Mystic, and elsewhere in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut.
The British naval operations were confined principally to guarding the over-sea communications and to containing, as military men say, the French squadron in Newport after the formation of the alliance. They were usually characterized by a want of energy, which is in striking contrast with the bold and masterful movements of England's later fleets under St. Vincent and Nelson. Lord Howe rose superior to the emergency of 1778, when d'Estaing arrived off Sandy Hook, but this instance of skill and vigor did not redeem a generally weak policy. For our part we could not have asked for poorer men in command of the British fleet than Howe's successors, Arbuthnot and Graves. It seems incredible that so careless a watch should have been kept over the harbors of New England with their potent menace in ships, sailors and shipbuilding facilities. In this neighborhood ingress and egress seem to have been only less free than in times of peace. We wonder whether this could have been the same navy which twenty years afterwards held Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and indeed the whole coast of France in the relentless grip of a blockade which remains to this day the model of what such a measure ought to be.
The number of seamen voted by Parliament for the year 1775 was 18,000, but the figures rose by leaps and bounds as the war progressed until it reached the astonishing development of 90,000 in 1781.
When Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves arrived at Boston in June, 1774, to take command of the British naval forces on our coast, he found there no less than seventeen ships and vessels exclusive of his flagship, the Preston, and three divisions of transports.[*]
Beatson says, vol. IV, p. 47: "When Admiral Graves was under a necessity of recalling some of his cruisers, the better to block up the port of Boston, in terms of the act of Parliament, the Americans availed themselves of the weakness of the squadron and procured supplies to an astonishing degree; so that it required more ships than the Admiral could spare to carry the Boston Port Act into execution."
It was to this locality that the early activity of the British fleet was mainly confined. Besides the interception of ammunition and other stores, Graves took a prominent share in the military Operations during the siege of Boston by the Continentals, covering with the Somerset, 64, the retreat through Charlestown from Lexington, guarding with his ships and boats the principal waterways, defending the British hay and cattle on the different islands in the harbor from destruction and raiding by the Amerieans, and especially lending valuable assistance on the day of Bunker Hill.
"The Lively, Falcon and Spitfire (on that occasion) anchored abreast of and below Charlestown, covered the landing of the troops and kept up a well-directed fire, as long as they could distress the enemy, without too much endangering their own people." (Beatson, IV, 76.)
During the fight the ships threw red-hot shot into Charlestown and burnt the town.
It was during the autumn of this year that Falmouth (now Portland) in Maine was burnt by a detachment under Mouat sent out by Graves in the ship Canceaux, the schooner Halifax. the sloop Spitfire, each mounting 6 guns, and the 18-gun armed transport Symmetry. What is not so generally known is that this was but one of a series of similar measures contemplated. Gloucester, Beverly, Marblehead, Salem, Newburyport, Portsmouth, Ipswich, Saco and Machias were ordered to be dealt with in this same brutal manner and in the order named. The wind prevented the British from reaching those highest on the list, so that the first blow fell in Maine. The outrages so aroused the Whole coast that Mouat, the commander of the expedition, unable to go elsewhere, returned to Boston.
On the shores of Virginia Lord Dunmore was playing a similar Part. He and Mouat appear to have been worthy apostles of the doctrine of harrying and ravaging with which Benedict Arnold, after his treason, is most particularly identified. Well may the British chronicler write (Beatson, IV, p. 99): " . . . . the progress which hostilities had now made, aggravated by the occurrences of a predatory war, had inflamed the vindictive passions and carried both parties beyond the bounds of reconciliation."
In the meantime, through the vigorous and incessant intercepting of British transports and supply vessels by American cruisers and privateers, together with the wiser strategy attending Washington's assumption of general command on shore, the British garrison and fleet in Boston found themselves in a position which may, with moderation of expression, be termed precarious. On the 17th of March, 1776, the town was evacuated and Rear- Admiral Shuldham, Graves' successor, escorted and conveyed General Howe to Halifax, whence three months later they sailed for New York.
In the movements that eventuated in New York's falling into their hands, the British navy took a full, eager and creditable share.
With the exception of what, for want of a better term, may be vaguely called blockading duty, the British navy seems to have acted largely as an auxiliary to the army until the advent of the French squadrons. It is needless to enter into the details of the numberless minor joint enterprises that were undertaken. The raiding and burning of towns along the Sound in particular and the coast in general may be recalled in illustration.
The habitual monotony of the British operations was broken on several occasions. In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker made his attempt on Charleston, wherein he proved, for the hundredth time, the inferiority of ships to forts under ordinary conditions of direct attack, and wherein Moultrie and his palmetto logs won the lion's share of glory. The reverse had no appreciable effect on the general course of the campaign, for it merely put a stop to a movement which Lord Cornwallis subsequently demonstrated to be strategically unsound. In December of the same year Newport was occupied by Clinton under escort of Sir Peter Parker in a small squadron of frigates.
When the British army moved on Philadelphia in 1777 a portion of the fleet, now under Lord Howe, aided in its transportation to the head of the Chesapeake, while another portion ascended the Delaware, to be followed shortly by Lord Howe in person. The fortifications and obstructions in the river below Philadelphia were reduced and overcome at the price of considerable loss in ships and men—a loss that was more than counterbalanced by our own disasters, elsewhere mentioned.
How seriously was regarded the naval task assumed by England on our coast is shown in the statement at this time by the First Lord of the Admiralty that " in America there were ninetythree ships and vessels of war, of which six were of the line" (Beatson, IV, 291). It naturally suggests itself that the all-important purpose of cutting off the colonies from their source of warlike supplies abroad would have been better served had fewer of these ninety-three vessels been employed as an adjunct to the British army and more set to guard the approaches to our ports. That the British naval force was misused was Washington's firm Opinion, confirmed by an episode immediately following the arrival in Newport of the French squadron under de Ternay.
Eighteen years after this time Nelson, at the battle of the Nile, demonstrated the entire practicability of crushing a fleet at anchor by the rapid and well conceived attack of another fleet under way and entering the roadstead from the sea. A similar opportunity was enjoyed by Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot in 1780. De Ternay lay in Narragansett Bay with the Duc de Bourgoyne, 80, the Neptune and Conquerant, 74's, the Providence, Eveille, Jason and Ardent, 64's, seven ships of the line and two frigates, the Surveillante and Aniazone. The English admiral appeared off the port on the 21st of July with eleven ships of the line, one of 90 guns, six of 74, three of 64 and one of so, a force ample to overcome the French vessels had their commanders Possessed the energy of Nelson. Besides this possible and most desirable result was the strong military necessity of dealing with Rochambeau before he could effect a junction with Washington, to which end Sir Henry Clinton had embarked a large body of troops in transports at Throg's Neck in the Sound. Unable to make up their minds to risk the passage into Narragansett Bay, Graves and Arbuthnot turned back. Clinton now found how intimate was the connection between the integrity of his over-sea communications and the operations on shore, for Washington had profited by his absence from the city to make a threatening demonstration on New York.
In 1780 a second combined expedition against Charleston resulted more favorably to the enemy. The town was reduced after a long siege, and our navy lost the Providence, 28, the Queen of France, 28, the Boston, 24, the Ranger, 18, together with several small vessels.
On the American side the only instance of strategic use of sea power is found in the Penobscot affair, where we failed miserably through neglect of tactical precautions. As this ill-fated attempt illustrates, to an exceptional degree, certain principles of coast defense, it is proper to recite briefly the initial situation and the succeeding events.
The enemy possessed, near what is now known as Castine, a local base for operations in Massachusetts Bay. This post was fairly well fortified and garrisoned. The State of Massachusetts determining to break it up, organized in 1779 a land force of some 1500 men under General Lovell, also a fleet of three colony cruisers and thirteen privateers. To these were added three United States vessels under Captain Dudley Saltonstall. Allen, in his Battles of the British Navy, gives the following as the list of American vessels present at Castine: Eleven ships, viz. one 32-gun frigate, one ship, 22 guns, six of 20 guns, three of 18 guns; seven brigs, one of 18 guns, one of 16, four of 14, and one of 12, together with nineteen transports. After much delay the works were assaulted, but not taken. Reinforcements were sent for. Pending their arrival, Sir George Collier appeared in the offing with the Rainbow, 44, Raisonnable, 64, Blonde, 32, Virginia, 32, Greyhound, 20, Camille, 20, Galatea, 20, and Otter, 10. A precipitate flight on our side ensued up the river. The Warren, 32, Diligent, 14, and Providence, 12, were run ashore and burned to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The colonial cruisers and privateers either shared the same fate or were captured. The sailors and soldiers that escaped made their toilsome way back to the settlements through the wilderness of Maine after prolonged and severe suffering.
The object of this expedition was in all ways laudable. The existence of such a secondary base within easy reach of our shores was a serious standing threat to our operations as well as a convenient point d'appui for the enemy. To destroy such a base and to remove the attending threat were objects that justified the attempt, provided the defense could be assured of either one of two things: the command of the sea or a strong harbor of refuge close at hand. By the terms of the case the former condition was absent, the enemy being stronger afloat than we were. The latter condition might have been secured after the expedition had successfully made the dash across from Boston. On the other side of the Penobscot River was an excellent anchorage, sheltered behind an island with two entrances, both capable of defense. I may remark that such refuges are indispensable for the weaker fleet in all coast operations. Had Saltonstall devoted a few of the days lost in idle discussion and waiting to making his Ships safe in the not improbable event of Collier's arrival, the attack could have been delivered with the comforting reflection that interruption would not, of necessity, imply ruin. It does not seem that the panic manifested by the American naval commander was at all warranted, nor that some show of resistance was not obligatory in view of the very respectable force he had In hand, as exhibited in Allen's list, quoted above. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Saltonstall's flight was a necessity through the sudden appearance of superior force, all the greater Was his duty to provide a suitable refuge. It was this defiance of the dictates of tactics which brought such a crushing blow to our already slender naval power.
Three months before Washington had expressed his views on the subject of this contemplated expedition. They exhibited a sagacity bordering on prescience. Writing to the President of Congress on April 17, 1780, he said: "Circumstanced as we are, I do not see how the attempt can be made with any prospect of success. A naval co-operation seems to be absolutely necessary, and for this we do not possess the means. We have no fleet, and the enemy has a respectable one on the coast, which they can at any moment employ to frustrate our measures. . . . The operating force, I am informed, must depend on supplies of every kind by water. This communication would be liable to be interrupted at the pleasure of the enemy and the situation of the troops would be alarmingly precarious. . . . Indeed, considering the Position of these States, a fleet is essential to our system of defenses, and that we have not hitherto suffered more than we have for want of it is to be ascribed to the feeble and injudicious manner in which the enemy have applied the means in their hands during this war" (Sparks' Writings of Washington, vol. VII, P. 21).
The error committed by Congress in not providing for a navy competent to wage serious war was, in a degree, repaired by the fortunate alliance with France, through which we obtained the presence of a French fleet in our waters and of French troops on our soil. Not having done for ourselves what should have been done, if humanly possible, we were obliged to find friends ready and willing to help us. On February 6, 1778, was concluded a treaty of commerce between France and the United States of America, together with a second and secret treaty in which the contracting parties agreed to unite their efforts against their common enemy, England. The news of the open treaty— a recognition of the independence of the colonies—was followed by the recall of the British ambassador at Paris and the outbreak of hostilities. On April 13, 1778, Count d'Estaing sailed from Toulon for America with eleven ships of the line, one of 50 guns, and five frigates. The English at this moment had six 64's and six 50's on our coast, nine of them being at the mouth of the Delaware under the Commander-in-Chief Lord Howe. It was hoped and expected that Howe would be overpowered before he could be relieved. D'Estaing was ordered to attack the English wherever he could do so with advantage. Should Howe be so much strengthened as to possess the superiority, the French fleet was to retire on Boston and thence proceed to the West Indies. D'Estaing spent so unconscionable a time on the passage that Howe was able, after receiving intelligence of the sailing of the Toulon fleet, to take on board the heavy stores and siege train of Clinton's army at Philadelphia, to consume ten days in getting out of the Delaware, hampered by calms, to reach New York, land his soldiers and their impedimenta, station his vessels in the main channel and erect works on shore for defense, before his rival appeared in the offing. D'Estaing touched at Cape May on July 8th, three days after Howe had transported the army from Navesink to the city. He then proceeded to the entrance of New York. A little more celerity on his part and the British fleet would have been caught on the Jersey coast. As it was, the pilots declared the water insufficient for the heavy French men-of-war, d'Estaing was afraid to cross the bar against the pilot's advice, and an earlier battle of the Nile was not fought. D'Estaing went first to the southward, then bore up for Newport, where the English destroyed a number of their vessels, 5 frigates and a sloop, to prevent their falling into his hands. In the meantime the British reinforcements had begun to come in—scattered liners of Byron's command sent out from England and others. Howe with admirable industry and vigor hastened their repairs, put to sea and arrived off Point Judith but twenty-four hours behind d'Estaing. A strong northerly wind springing up that night, the latter left his anchorage and stood out to sea. The next day was passed in fruitless manoeuvres on both sides. Then came a heavy gale which dismasted his flagship, damaged some of his other vessels and so discouraged him that he went to Boston, refitted and eventually sailed for Martinique. A more pitiable instance of great power in feeble hands is seldom recorded. Of results, he achieved none directly. The burning and sinking of the British ships in Narragansett Bay and the withdrawal of Sir Henry Clinton from Philadelphia were caused by his movements and not by his fighting, his strategy rather than his tactics.
D'Estaing paid us a brief visit the following year, 1779, on his way back to France. He tried to capture Savannah, then in the hands of the English. This was one of those bits of soldierizing so fascinating to the sailor. It resulted in failure and much loss of life. The French historian Chevalier,[*] however, remarks: "In spite of the check we suffered, the presence of the French squadron on the coast was not without value to the American cause. The English, ignorant of the point which we proposed to strike, were everywhere on the defensive. General Clinton, fearing that New York would be attacked by land and by sea, concentrated his forces in that city. By his order, Rhode Island was evacuated, and such was the precipitation of the retreat that the Americans found in the place provisions, munitions of war and Pieces of artillery which it had been forgotten to spike." The quotation will serve to recall the suggestion already made as to the close relation that existed between the military strategy of the British and the integrity of their over-sea communications. It is proper to remind you that it was during this time that John Paul Jones was harrying her commerce within sight of England's shores.
On the 12th of July, 1780, the Chevalier de Ternay anchored in Narragansett Bay with seven line-of-battle ships and two frigates. Accompanying him were thirty transports carrying six thousand French troops under the Comte de Rochambeau. This squadron became but a passive menace to the English, for it played no part in active operations during many months, being either closely blockaded or contained by Arbuthnot at Gardiner's Bay. Admiral Rodney, though in command in the West Indies, left his own post to bring a powerful fleet to North America. Here are his reasons in his own words, which deserve quotation if only for ' the lesson they convey: "Having received certain intelligence by my several correspondents of the arrival of M. de Guichen at Cape Francois with the French fleet in very bad condition.. . with a certainty of a convoy . . . destined to sail from San Domingo to France under the protection of the French fleet, I had not a doubt but that part of that fleet was intended to reinforce the squadron under M. de Ternay, of whose arrival and taking possession of Rhode Island I had been assured by a captain of an American vessel. As it plainly appeared to me that His Majesty's territories, fleet and army in America were in imminent danger of being overpowered by the superior force of the public enemy, I deemed it a duty incumbent upon me to forego any emoluments that might have accrued to myself by the enterprise intended by General Vaughan and myself, . . . therefore, without a moment's hesitation, I flew with all dispatch possible to prevent the enemy's making any impression upon the continent before my arrival there." For this readiness to go without orders to a place where he knew he was needed he received the encomiums of the Admirality. The First Lord, Sandwich, wrote him: "It is impossible for us to have a superior fleet in every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions as under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere and carry their point against us." In Marshall's Life of Washington we read: "This reinforcement not only disconcerted all the plans of the allies and terminated the sanguine hopes which had been formed at the opening of the campaign, but placed it in the power of the British to project in security further expeditions to the South." Mundy, in his life of Rodney, states that "it appears from a private letter addressed by Washington to a friend at this period that he was in despair at Rodney's appearance on the American coast and at the non-arrival of de Guichen, the co-operation of whose fleet he had long been most anxiously expecting."
On sailing for Barbadoes late in the year, Rodney left with Arbuthnot enough vessels to make him superior to de Ternay.
The presence of the French squadron in Newport brought about a lasting change in England's naval position. From being free to act on the offensive, whenever and wherever it suited her Purpose to move, she was at once thrown, in a measure, on the defensive. Whatever else she might undertake, this, at least, was imperative, that a sufficient number of powerful vessels should always lie off Narragansett Bay, or at some convenient anchorage near by, ready to engage on terms of superiority should de Ternay venture out. Gardiner's Bay was the point selected. Situated at the eastern end of Long Island, within easy reach of Newport, offering ample and secure shelter and possessing two channels of exit, one of which would be practicable in any wind, it held out exceptional advantages to the British, of which they were not Slow to avail themselves. Accepting the logic of the military situation, Arbuthnot took post in Gardiner's Bay, where the bulk of the British ships of the line were chained until freed by the movements of the French.
Twice during the winter and spring of 1780 and 1781 the latter issued from Narragansett Bay: once but a small detachment towards the south; once in force, quickly followed by Arbuthnot.
The threat embodied in the existence of a French fleet at Newport served later to introduce confusion into the plans of the British Admiral Graves when de Grasse appeared off the coast. Much of the weakness of his measures may be justly attributed to his fear of being worsted in an encounter with de Grasse, who could, unlike Graves, count upon a substantial reinforcement after the action.
It had been the intention of the French government to dispatch a second squadron to America and thus to make de Ternay stronger than Arbuthnot, but the close blockade of Brest interfered on the one hand as did Byron's arrival on the other. On the former's death the command devolved temporarily upon Captain des Touches, who succeeded in getting to sea at night in March, 1781, bound to the Chesapeake. His departure was quickly discovered and his destination guessed by the English, Who hastened to bar his entrance into that bay, where Arnold was ravaging the country about Richmond and along the James, and Whither Lafayette was marching with 1200 Continentals. The two squadrons had each eight vessels, but the English counted in their line one ninety-gun ship while the French had one heavy frigate. They met off Cape Charles in a running fight, in which des Touches had rather the better of it, although he gave up his purpose and returned to Newport, while Arbuthnot anchored in the Chesapeake. Mahan says, "The way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two thousand more English troops, sailing from New York, reached Virginia on the 26th of March, and the subsequent arrival of Cornwallis in May raised the number to seven thousand" (Mahan, Sea Power, p. 387). By order of Clinton, Cornwallis occupied Yorktown, in which point the chief interest now centered. The combined French and American forces at Yorktown numbered about sixteen thousand. It is evident that Cornwallis' fate depended upon his communication by the sea. That such an elementary proposition should have been misapprehended by Graves, now in principal command of the British fleet on our coast, seems incredible, however true.
In justice to an officer upon whom rests the responsibility of disastrous failure, it is proper to state that at first Graves was misled by information from England into going with six sail of the line and two fifty-gun ships to cruise off George's Bank for the interception of an expected squadron of transports bringing reinforcements of French troops to Rochambeau. During his absence the pregnant news of de Grasse's probable sailing from the West Indies to America arrived in New York. The vessel sent thence to him fell among American privateers and was wrecked on Long Island, while a second despatch-boat carrying the more positive intelligence of de Grasse's actual start and destination was captured en route. Graves returned to New York, August 16. There was yet time for an active commander-in-chief to arrange measures by which to profit by the coming of Hood's squadron from the West Indies and to consider what ought to be done in reply to de Grasse's possible attack. Not only did he neglect to take any precautions under this head, but he seriously contemplated a joint expedition to Rhode Island.
Through Graves' return to New York a gap was left open into which de Grasse threw himself with a powerful force from the West Indies. A desultory action took place off the Chesapeake between de Grasse and Graves, of which the only result was to permit de Barras, des Touches' successor, to join de Grasse from Newport and thus to secure for the latter an unquestioned preponderance. He entered the Chesapeake and completed the investment of Cornwallis, who surrendered on the 19th of October, 1781. On this day the war practically came to an end. Had Graves appreciated the paramount necessity of holding the Chesapeake in rear of Cornwallis, or had he met Hood at Cape Henry with his fourteen ships from Rodney's fleet instead of waiting for him at Sandy Hook, Cornwallis might have been saved.
It is impossible to overestimate the value of de Grasse's share In the great result. Says Mahan: "On the French side de Grasse must be credited with a degree of energy, foresight and determination surprising in view of his failures at other times. The decision to take every ship with him, which made him independent of any failure on the part of de Barras; the passage through the Bahama channel to conceal his movements; the address with which he obtained the money and troops required from the Spanish and French military authorities; the prevision Which led him, as early as March 29, shortly after leaving Brest, to write to Rochambeau that American coast pilots should be sent to Cape Francois; the coolness with which he kept Graves amused until de Barras' squadron had slipped in, are all points worthy of admiration" (Mahan, Sea Power, p. 392). It was in no exaggeration of style that Washington wrote to de Grasse the day after the capitulation: "The surrender of York, from which SO great glory and advantage are derived to the allies, and the honor of which belongs to your Excellency, etc." Washington states but the simple truth, the honor of the event does belong to de Grasse.
Mahan says, p. 397: "It must again be affirmed that its (the war's) successful ending, at least at so early a date, was due to the control of the sea—to sea power in the hands of the French and its improper distribution by the English authorities."
No naval event of importance took place during the remainder of hostilities. Raids were effected and single ships were taken, but the war ended at Yorktown. Fitful flames, as from the ruins of a freshly burned dwelling, alone indicated the existence of still smouldering embers. Parliament, in 1782, put a final stop to all offensive operations pending the negotiations of the terms of peace.
We have traced the course of events in a hasty and imperfect manner, we have witnessed the gradual disappearance of our little navy, we have seen the happy advent at the critical moment of an allied fleet sufficient in numbers and power to compel success. In justice to those upon whom devolved the responsibility of conducting the nation's affairs, we must admit that the necessity of a certain measure of sea power did not continue to be unrecognized. As the war dragged on with its alternation of victory and defeat, the weak point of the British combinations became apparent, so that when the French alliance was effected, Washington, from whose decision there can be no appeal, laid this down as the first clause of his memorandum of concerted action submitted to the Comte de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay on July 15, 1780:
"1. In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend."
That the campaign ending in the concentration upon Yorktown was a direct result of an assumed superiority of the French fleet is seen in his letter to Col. Laurens at Paris, dated 9 April, 1781: "On the first notice of the storm, which happened on the 22d of January, and of its effects, I intimated to the French general the possibility and importance of improving the opportunity in an attempt upon Arnold. When I received a more certain account of the total loss of the Culloden and the dismasting of the Bedford, two 74-gun ships belonging to the British fleet in Gardiner's Bay, I immediately put in motion, under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, as large a part of my small force here as I could with prudence detach to proceed to the Head of Elk, and, with all expedition, made a proposal to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Destouches for a co-operation in Virginia with the whole of the fleet of our allies and a part of their land force. . . . It may be declared in a word, that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come. While, indeed, how easy it would be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made to comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these seas. ..”
It is needless to multiply quotations. Washington's correspondence of this period abounds in reiterations of the same plea for ships. Even after the capture of Yorktown, when other offensive movements were contemplated, he wrote to de Grasse suggesting a plan of further operations and said: "You will have observed that whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest." Had such a view prevailed six years before, how different would have been the course of events! Our forefathers learnt wisdom from an experience by which we should profit. It is easy for us, after the lapse of more than a century, and guided by the teaching of the new school in naval thought, of which Captain Mahan is the most brilliant exponent, to survey the war and point out the mistakes made on both sides.
It may be alleged that the poverty of the colonies was an allsufficient bar to the acquisition of a suitable navy. To this it is difficult to make an answer other than to urge the imperative necessity, as proved by subsequent events, for proper ships under Proper organization. At all costs and at all sacrifice they should have been obtained, for upon them ultimately depended our existence as a nation.
The fact is that Congress, at the outset, failed to appreciate the strategic form which the war was inevitably bound to assume. Herein lies a reason, cogent in itself, for the course which was actually adopted. When our public men finally came to a realization of our needs it was too late to repair the fault. Fortunate We were in securing from our friend and ally the means we had neglected to provide for ourselves.
Let us, in conclusion, recapitulate the deductions to be drawn from this study. They are six in number.
1st. A mistaken idea at the inception of hostilities of the ultimate importance of naval power.
2d. As a corollary to the above, a shipbuilding programme Wrong in its details and wrong in its extent.
3d. A misuse of our great maritime resources, through which We failed to derive substantial benefit from a superiority in numbers afloat, which were nearly, if not quite, three to one in our favor.
4th. A neglect of tactical precautions in the case of a serious Combined expedition.
5th. That the part taken by the sailor was not less important than that taken by the soldier.
6th. The termination of the war by the presence of an adequate naval force.
If these inferences be accepted as correct, it follows, as a broad generalization, that a sufficient navy is to-day of paramount importance to us in coast defense. Possessing it, we need have little fear. Without it, we shall be debarred from acting on the offensive-defensive and must remain content to retire from the sea, abandon our coastwise commerce and seek refuge behind the immobile works erected at the principal ports for their protection against the foreign fleets which a continuance of the old continental policy will assuredly invite to our shores. It is not meant to imply that our navy should rival in numbers that of a possible foe, but it is held and urged that, as our forefathers built sloops and frigates where line-of-battle ships alone would answer, we should profit by their unhappy experience and concentrate our efforts in naval construction on armored vessels until our fleet is strong enough to serve its true purpose, the avoidance of hostilities through its power to act with vigor and effect in the event of war. More than this we do not require, and more than this would be contrary to our traditions as a people who seek only peace with honor.
[*] Read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, March 17, 1896, the Army and Navy Club of Washington, January 11, 1897, and the Sewanhaka Corinthian Yacht Club, January 19, 1897.
[*] E. E. Hale, in Crit. and Narr. Hist. America.
[*] Samuel Graves is not to be confounded with Thomas Graves who, seven years afterwards, unfortnate enough to fail in his attempt to keep De Grasse out of the Chesapeake. The former was as energetic as the latter was incapable.
[*] Hist. de la Mar. Fran., p. 148.