TORPEDO-BOAT POLICY. (Continued from page 67.)
Assistant Naval Constructor H. G. Gillmor, U. S. Navy.—The author recognizes two uses of torpedo-boats. Is the same kind of boat, that is, one with the same features of speed, armament and coal capacity, best adapted to these two purposes? Is it the custom to embody in the design of coast defense vessels the same features in the same proportions that they are embodied in the cruising battle-ship? Are not the relative values of the different features in torpedo-boats which are to form a part of the coast defenses essentially different for those in torpedo-boats which are for service with the offensive arm—the cruising navy? May not the relative values of the features of a torpedo-boat of the coast defense depend upon the peculiarities of the locality in which it is intended to act?
It is to be feared that the purpose of torpedo-boats, "to destroy the enemy's ships," has, in some cases at any rate, been lost sight of, efforts being directed to the production of "the fastest boat of her size in the World" or "the fastest vessel afloat." The necessity for surprise has certainly been lost sight of in a great many cases.
It is not the intention to commence here the contention regarding the introduction of the ram, but it would seem that the proposition to make a ram of a vessel whose ratio of length to beam is ten to one and whose difficulties of local weakness are so great is ill-advised. Upon the weight allotted by the author—and it is very doubtful if it would be sufficient for the purpose—an additional 3-pounder and about a hundred rounds of ammunition could be installed, and the chances of a disabling shot from it would be considerably greater than the chances of ramming, even could that be attempted with reasonable safety to the ramming vessel.
The case cited of the Audacieux and the Chevalier should prove instructive. The angle belt of steel with a wood backing which the author Speaks of was a wood chafing batten about 3 inches square, secured to the Sides of the boat with two light angles, the whole being intended as a Protection when lying alongside a landing or a ship. That so light a Protection should have produced such disastrous results to the rammer may be taken as an index of the amount of local strengthening necessary to make ramming possible with reasonable safety.
The author has laid great stress upon the question of endurance. The method which he adopts in making comparisons of maximum power is extremely misleading and affords a very poor measure of the relative endurance of boats of different types, because of the very great variation m the maximum horse-power among them. There is usually no relation at all between full speed endurance and economical endurance in two boats unless they have exactly the same speed features. That the maximum power will only be used for short spurts and that the long distance work will be done at the economical speed is pretty well conceded. What, then, is the justice of a comparison of a 51/2 hours endurance at full speed of a thirty-knot boat with the 17 hours endurance at full speed of a twenty-six-knot boat of about the same size, when the endurance of the first at cruising speed is about one-half that of the second, instead of about one-third, as a comparison on the full-power basis would show? The column in the tables devoted to pounds per I. H. P. at the maximum power is equally misleading. The coal consumption trials of the Ardent and the Starfish, the results of which were published in Engineering some time ago, showed that at thirteen knots, the assumed economical speed at which the trial took place, the Ardent would steam 281/2 nautical miles per ton of coal, her full capacity giving her, therefore, an endurance of 2000 nautical miles; and the Starfish would steam 39.6 nautical miles per ton of coal, so that her full capacity would give her an endurance of 2360 nautical miles. M. Normand, in his article before the Association Technique Maritime last year, gives the results of the coal consumption trials of the Forban at ten knots, her economical speed, and from these results the endurance of the Forban at ten knots would be about 2360 nautical miles. This would tend to show that in the matter of endurance size does not possess so great an advantage as might at first sight appear.
The speciousness of the author's argument in the comparison of a 22 1/2-knot boat with a 30-knot boat will be evident by applying it successively to boats differing in speeds by successive equal amounts down to the speed of 12 knots which he assumes as the speed to be used prior to discovery. It is to be noted that this speed of 12 knots assumed by the author as the advisable speed prior to discovery is entirely arbitrary. It is obvious that the speed at which flaming at the funnels and surface disturbance begin to appear to an extent endangering the secrecy must depend upon the approach to maximum power and speed, and while it might be 12 knots in one boat, it might be 20 in another. This in itself would vitiate the comparison between the 22 1/2-knot boat and the 30-knot boat, were it otherwise logical and consistent.
The author has made much of the maintenance of speed in a seaway. Just what are the differences between the performances of a torpedo-boat of one hundred tons and a destroyer of two hundred tons in a seaway and in still water has never been determined. It is conceivable that the conditions of sea most unfavorable to the destroyer might be very much less so to a boat of one-half its displacement and two-thirds its length; just as with ships in squadron it is sometimes found that seas most unfavorable to the larger ships have comparatively little effect upon the smaller. In any event, the difference in the performance of the two must be affected through difference in freeboard and the effect of dead weight in maintaining speed in a seaway. Then, too, there is always the question whether, in circumstances of weather seriously affecting the speed, the larger vessel would be in a postion to attack and destroy the smaller.
A careful perusal of all that precedes the author's conclusion as to "the best type of torpedo-boat" fails to bring the conviction beyond question that a boat of one hundred and fifty feet length and one hundred and twenty tons " would fill all the requirements." Even if it would fill all the requirements, is it the boat which would best fill all the requirements? Should we have the same boat for both offensive and defensive purposes—the same for the defense of New York, service in the Chesapeake Bay and with the fleet?
That size need not be governed by conditions of seaworthiness, within the limits of size under our consideration, has been demonstrated practically and effectively by the experiences during the past ten years of torpedo-boats, varying in size from one hundred feet and forty. Tons upward, which have not only successfully weathered gales of great severity, but have made voyages of several thousands of miles in varieties of weather at fairly constant cruising speeds. The Batoum, the Brazilian and her two sister boats, Torpedo-boats No. 62 and No. 63 of the British Navy, boats for Japan, for China, for the Victorian Government, for India and for several of the South American States have long since exposed the baselessness of the charge of unseaworthiness on the ground of size. The possibility of seaworthiness independent of size being established, it is evident that life is no less possible to men habituated to a small torpedo-boat than to the thousands of men who yearly leave this coast and the coasts of other countries for service covering months at sea in fishing vessels whose sizes and the violence of whose motions are not greatly different from torpedo-boats, however greatly they may differ from these boats in proportions and characteristics; and that therefore this need not be taken as placing a limitation upon the size of torpedo-boats. In this connection let the remarks of Captain Eardley- Wilmot, quoted by the author on page 15, be reread. Why then "pass at once to twice the displacement at least"? Does the increase in endurance and armament necessitate this sudden doubling of displacement? Is the increase in first cost, maintenance, the number of men involved in each engagement and the loss in invisibility worth the cost?
The history of English torpedo-boat construction, from its commencement to the present (and a definite policy is not yet established) is a history of keen competition for the highest speed among a limited number of builders. There has never been a time when any type produced has been carefully and systematically tested, after training crews to the peculiar life required by the service, to determine the fitness of the type for the designed purpose, and what, if any, changes might with advantage be made. The development and its course have been determined primarily and preeminently by the rivalry of a few builders of high-speed boats, each seeking to excel the speed performance of the other, regardless of economy of power; and secondarily and partially by yearly haphazard expressions of opinion by officers high in rank, based upon a week's or at most a fortnight's observation from a distance of torpedo-boats hastily commissioned, usually with raw crews and officers new to the special service, working in one kind of weather, on one portion of the coast, under Wholly arbitrary rules governing their performance. They have produced boats increasing constantly in size, displacement and speed. The end has not been reached, and speeds of 32 and 33 knots are talked of.
The "torpedo-boat destroyer" is, for the present only, the last term in the ascending series of torpedo-boats. It is the logical result of the causes which have determined the course of English torpedo-boat construction. Any points of superiority—and it must be admitted that there are some—which it possesses over the earlier members in the series, aside from speed, are incidental to and made possible by the increase in size which, to the English professional mind, is inseparable from increased speed; and not the prime objects sought in the design. It is speed that has ever been the will-o'-the-wisp luring on English torpedo-boat builders. What has been this "several years' experience with the type" which makes it appear "that they are just what is required for general use with the fleet "? Each in turn has come from the builder with column notices in the daily papers, to enjoy for a few days or a few weeks the distinction of being the " fastest boat in the world" or " of her class," and then be commissioned and go to serve with the fleet under peace conditions as one of the cruising fleet, with no more effort to determine her fitness for her definite purpose than was the case with her many predecessors. One year it is a boat of one hundred and ninety feet and 27 to 28 knots that is "just the thing," the next a boat of 200 or 210 feet and 30 knots, and the next a boat of 220 feet and 31 or 32 knots. Is there any reason to believe that the end has been reached, or that five years hence the same treatment of the subject will not demonstrate equally conclusively that "just the thing" is a boat of 330 tons and 39 or 40 knots?
It is to be feared that the key to the author's conclusions is to be found in this question which the author propounds in his introduction—"Which of these different types shall we copy after for the present?"—rather than in the incomplete reasoning which precedes them. Expressed in a few words, the author's conclusion is that we should start in this mad race for torpedo-boat speed about where England now is and accept their latest type in one case, and in the other almost a duplicate of the last thing which the English newspapers chose to call a torpedo-boat.
With regard to coal protection, all that may be said is that if the coal is in the bunkers at the time, and the striking energy is less than sufficient for the penetration of 1/4 inch of steel and 2 feet 6 inches to 3 feet of loose coal, the boat may be saved an occasional shot. It is, however, to be remembered that coal is carried for use and not for protection and may, probably will not, be there when needed and that the top coal of the bunkers is the first used.
It would seem that the decrease in probability of complete disablement by separation of the two engines in compartments longitudinally is considerably overestimated. It is to be remembered that in such a separation the vital target is considerably increased, for in boats like No. 6 and No. 7, injury of the high pressure cylinder, valve chest or the steam supply pipe of either engine would result in the disablement of both on account of the loss of pressure through the opening so made. In the boats designed by the Navy Department, means are provided for closing the stop-valves of either engine from the deck, but even with this arrangement there would be an interval during which both engines would be disabled. When we consider that the chances of such a hit being made are practically doubled by the arrangement suggested, whatever arguments there may be for the arrangement on the ground of increased convenience or better distribution of weight, there can be none on the ground of increased immunity from disablement.
Lieutenant A. P. Niblack, U. S. Navy.—In no country in the world do the technically informed officers control the questions of types of ships and the shipbuilding policy. These are largely determined by political, financial, and commercial considerations. Nevertheless, it is of great interest to know what we ought to hope for, and no one is better qualified, in a way, than the essayist to set us straight in the matter of torpedo-boats. As an observer and in no sense technically informed, I must express my regret that in the limits of the essay so much was left unsaid which it appears to me ought to be considered under the title "Torpedo-boat Policy."
Both the navy and the shipbuilding firms in the United States have figuratively "cut their teeth" on a heterogeneous lot of steel cruisers, and at present the result is: 1st. Our new battle-ships of the Alabama class are about as nearly ideal for our purposes as human ingenuity can devise; 2nd. In the monitor type we have the highest development of inner coast line and harbor defense ships, and 3rd. When we resume building cruisers, we can, and doubtless will, so profit by the past and by results abroad as to assure the adoption of a type suited to our particular needs. It appears that in the torpedo-boat question we must also go through the teething period. Certainly the present programme is indefensible from a technical standpoint, however necessary and wise from a commercial or financial point of view.
It is a pity we cannot inaugurate at once what we, as a sensible, Practical, thinking people, must ultimately come to in torpedo-boats, as we have in battle-ships and monitors (and ultimately will in cruisers), viz. torpedo-boats must suit tactics and policy, and designs must not vary at the whim of boards, designers, or contractors. The important thing is not that each ship or each torpedo-boat must be the latest thing in every detail, but that the fleet shall be homogeneous.
Effective torpedo-boat service can only be organized, carried on in time of peace and operated in time of war by boats manceuvring in company with a fixed system of tactics and with a perfect similarity in type. We have set an example to the world in common sense by limiting the speed of battle-ships to 16 knots: why not stop the equally indefensible high speed for torpedo-boats? The essayist shows conclusively its folly, but fails to drive home the real conclusion. Let us set the limit of Speed for the 230 to 300-ton boats at 26 knots—good, honest, reliable sea Speed without any question. Let us limit the first-class boats at 24 knots. This illusive and always increasing variable once fixed we may grasp the substance and not the shadow.
The true policy is to build torpedo-boats in groups either at the same time or from year to year, each group having identical tactical and rnanceuvring qualities, interchangeable parts, and being as nearly alike as Possible.
The tests applied to the torpedo-boats of the world, which the essayist passes in review, is illusive because he fails to appreciate the wonderful system of Germany, which country has grasped the fundamental principles thoroughly. Their system is to build boats in groups, roughly, one division boat corresponding to an English "destroyer," and seven or eight first-class boats. Six torpedo-boats and one division boat form the group unit, with one or two first-class boats in reserve to keep the number up to six. The division or " mother " boat carries spare parts for the group and is practically flag-ship. All boats have single screws, and manoeuvring qualities are easily obtained by a bow rudder in addition to the one astern. A flock of swallows could not manoeuvre more adroitly at close distance than do the German boats.
In our country, manceuvring in groups from fixed bases, laying up in groups, scouting in groups, accompanying squadrons in groups are as clearly the real policy as for Germany. This building of individual ships and of torpedo-boats to break records and advertise particular shipbuilding firms is a great thing commercially, but not from a military standpoint. Speed costs tremendously. Four torpedo-boats that we really want, for the same money that three cost of a type we don't want, is a proposition to be commended to those who have the spending of the money. Why not use good, hard common sense and stop this folly now, instead of waiting two or three years? We don't buy race-horses for the cavalry. Of all sciences, cavalry tactics imposes definite conclusions, and so does torpedo-boat tactics, if we will only think about it.
I am not so sure that twin screws are essential, although they are a great comfort. As for strengthening the bows for ramming, I rather think that for group manoeuvring the continual danger to consorts is not worth its offensive advantage in the remote chance of ramming an enemy's torpedo-boat. It would seem to me better policy to make the bow light and to give armor protection amidships at the water line, especially in view of the increased penetration and rapidity of fire of modern small arms and machine guns. Coal endurance, reliable sea speed, and seaworthiness are the benefits we may look for in reducing the speed.
I think the essayist has either somewhat lost sight of the tactical side or else does not believe in its efficiency. He is quite right in saying that the Austrian Viper does not handle well because she has only one screw; but the Natter, built by Schichau in competition with the Viper, has only one screw also, but by means of a forward rudder she handles splendidly. After all, six torpedo-boats of inferior speed and older type, but all identical, are worth more than six faster ones of heterogeneous types, unless tactics is a dream of theorists.
THE COMPOSITION OF THE FLEET.
[See No. 791
Lieut. J. M. Ewcorr, U. S. Navy.—I presented my essay on the composition
of the fleet under a conviction that the time had come when not
one, but many, even all, officers of the Navy ought to give their views
upon the number and types of vessels which should make up our naval
establishment; hoping that from the presentation of such views there
might be deduced a sufficient consensus of opinion to command the attention
of our legislators in framing and maintaining a building program.
My views, as those of an individual, I presented briefly, trusting that
others would round out the subject by discussion. As it has been impossible
to reach more than a small percentage of officers with advanced
copies, and as these were distributed in the summer season when the
mind seeks relaxation and rest, I hoped that my essay may yet "draw
more fire." I am gratified to find that my views are so little at variance
With a majority of those expressed in the discussion, and I beg room in
the pages of the Proceedings of the Institute for some words to those who
seriously differ from me.
Lieut.-Commander Wainwright seems willing to allow the building up of our navy to be determined by "the opinions of our legislators for the time being." Those opinions are happily trending in the right direction at present, but such haphazard building will not give us a homogeneous fleet, nor keep it up to any constant standard of efficiency. He also advocates basing our program upon the present needs of the country," in Which case we will always be at least five years behind our needs, for a battle-ship takes five years from appropriation to completion. When it IS remembered that we are a child among nations, growing at an enormous rate, and in a time when international relations around us are strained, almost to breaking, and enterprises are projected over which we should, for our welfare, exercise paramount control, it must be conceded that we have got to speculate to a certain extent upon future requirements in order to keep abreast of the needs of the country.
Lieut.-Commander Wainwright states that "the most expensive way of mounting guns, when due weight is given to their proportional effectiveness, is on monitors." I regret that I cannot now get figures upon the subject, but I say without hesitation that I believe this statement can be proven to be wholly and vastly wrong. We now have guns of the same calibres and latest construction mounted both ashore and upon monitors. Mr. Wainwright is in a position to get full information of the expense in each case, and I beg that he will look it up and state it.
Does Lieut.-Commander Wainwright believe that we will ever have "adequate fixed defenses"? Does any military or naval man fully believe it? I think not. On the contrary, I believe we all know that we never shall. "Adequate fixed defenses" for New York City will include heavy modern batteries at Sandy Hook, Romer Shoal, Forts Hamilton and Wadsworth, Governor's Island, Willees Point, Fisher's Island, Plum Island, and Little Gull Island. A few of these we have, and all are projected, but there is not a shadow of a chance of the scheme being completed within fifty years. Had we not better put such batteries on ten monitors in the meantime, ready to be mobilized in time of war wherever in this district they are needed?
I believe that the views expressed by Lieut.-Commander Wainwright, Commander Goodrich and others against commerce destroying are more sentimental than military. It is looked upon as the resort of a weakling among nations because the most apparent damage is to the commercially strong. Moreover, its effect upon the conduct of a war is indirect and not easily measured, and it has never been systematically projected and maintained by a nation strong enough to do so. The demands of trade control the actions of nations more and more every day. The nation which first compels the voice of trade in the other to cry out against a war will have won half the fight. Supposing a nation at war with Great Britain; would it not be looked upon as folly if the former allowed the latter's thirteen million tons of shipping to sail the seas unmolested?
I do not think that my statement about army scouts will suggest to any one who carefully reads the paragraph that I confuse army scouts and spies, but my suggestion that scout vessels " should be modeled so closely after ocean coastwise passenger steamers as to be readily mistaken for them " does place them more in the category of spies than scouts. I am ready to concede that they might, therefore, be designated " spy vessels," yet I think that we would prefer to call them scouts and leave the enemy to use the other designation. Whatever we call them, I reiterate my belief in their importance.
I cannot admit that I have failed to grasp the true use of the armored cruiser, but I overlooked the important use for her which Lieut.-Commander Wainwright well states, and which might briefly be called reconnoissance in force. When she returns upon the fleet from such reconnoissance, however, she is bound to find her place in the line of battle very much as I have suggested. I advocated the New York in ignorance of her many developed shortcomings. After much discussion at the War College last summer a preponderating opinion developed that the Olympia, with 1500 to 2000 tons more given to protection, making her about 7500 tons displacement, would make a good type. Lieut.-Commander Wainwright says "the necessary qualities have been obtained in other countries by building vessels of less than 7000 tons." If he will name the vessels he has in mind and state their offensive and defensive qualities in further discussion, his information will, I know, be read with the deepest attention and interest.
Lieut.-Commander Wainwright is correct about the necessity of improving some of our canals and interior waterways for torpedo-boat navigation. Let us insist that this be done and not "be satisfied with inferior boats."
I challenge the statement that "a portion of the public view the navy with suspicion and suggest ambitious motives," and that my paper gives cause for such suspicion. What possible ambition can we have except to see our magnificent country sufficiently armed to be unassailable by inferiors, and to have no superiors; to assert a dignity, an independence and a control in the Western World with the confidence of being able to maintain them; and to insure the continued advancement and civilizing influences of republican institutions. Increase in our naval establishment can only mean to individual officers more arduous and continual duty afloat. The view Lieut.-Commander Wainwright takes sounds medieval.
Lieut.-Commander Wainwright condemns my "ambitious program," but let it be noted that he says "we need more battle-ships, more armored cruisers and many more torpedo-boats," and I hope that these statements, coming from him, will have very serious weight with those who have the shaping of our naval shipbuilding policy."
To a great majority of readers the language with which Commander Goodrich opens his discussion must seem so harsh as to discount the value of his criticism. He even impeaches the judgment of the Board of Control of the Institute in awarding the essay honorable mention. It was at my written request that Commander Goodrich's discussion was solicited by the Institute, and I made the request because I knew that his views were radically different from mine. I fully understand, therefore, that his harsh words are due to the very positive opinions he holds upon the subject of the essay.
He first asserts that there is no evidence that "we are in daily jeopardy of national humiliation," etc., because of our small navy. Is there a legislator or a military man, is there a thinking man in our whole country Who has not felt more or less misgiving within the past year about our being able to maintain our loudly proclaimed attitude in the Venezuela boundary dispute? Was there a naval man who did not realize the Jeopardy of humiliation in the matter about a year ago when England called into being, without drawing from her cruising fleet, a flying squadron superior to our whole navy, and dispatched it—Heaven only knew where, during the white heat of the controversy? Does any American believe that any other power would have been so tolerant and calmly argumentative as England has been in the matter? Does not all Europe stand aghast to-day at the position England has accorded to us in the control of the affairs of our American neighbors?—the Continental press declaring that European states cannot abide by it.
As evidence of our daily jeopardy of national humiliation because of an insufficient navy I beg leave to cite the following occasions:
1. In 1795, when we felt compelled to pay one million dollars in tribute and sign a treaty guaranteeing $22,00o annually to Algiers to spare our commerce because we had not a navy sufficient for its protection.
2. The impressment of American seamen by the British, culminating in the wanton capture of the Chesapeake by the Leopard in a time of profound peace (1807), when we could do nothing for redress but issue a Proclamation prohibiting British warships from entering our ports.
3. The drawn fight of 1812, when we felt compelled to accept terms of Peace without adjustment of the cause for which we fought, because, despite the brilliant victories of our seamen, we had not ships enough to cope with the enemy, and ships could not be built in a day.
4- The wholesale shooting in Santiago de Cuba of American citizens taken on board the Virginius in 1873, after a summary and farcical court martial in direct violation of our treaty with Spain. This massacre was only checked by the arrival of a British war vessel, and, in spite of our strenuous efforts to galvanize our decaying naval hulks into a semblance of life and strength in a demonstration at Key West, it is doubtful if we would have gotten the partial reparation we did had not Great Britain's claim been the same as ours.
5. The hunting down and killing, in the streets of Valparaiso, of sailors from a United States man-of-war in I89I, and Chile's insolent attitude in the matter, which was unquestionably born of her, belief in our naval inferiority.
Commander Goodrich says "Mr. Ellicott's plan rests upon a policy which he thinks the nation should adopt." On the contrary it rests upon a policy which the nation has adopted, and which is no departure from the teachings of Washington, but the amplification of those teachings commensurate with our national growth. No man realized the value of a naval force more than did Washington, and, when President, he was continually urging upon Congress the importance of building up a navy. These are some of his " teachings " in his own words, and one statement I take the liberty of italicizing:—" To an active, external commerce the protection of a naval force is indispensable." "Will it not be advisable to begin without delay to provide and lay up the materials for the building and equipping of ships of war, and to provide in the work by degrees in proportion as our resources shall render it practicable?" " To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression."
I confess that I am utterly unable to comprehend Commander Goodrich's fine distinction between coast and harbor defense. When our mobile fleet goes to sea to meet the enemy it is defending our harbors and thereby our coast. It is the multitude of our harbors and their wide distribution along a continuous coast line which renders us so vulnerable. We cannot tell where the blow will fall. Our fleet of battle-ships, be it eight or twenty strong, may, and probably will, be eluded, and a blow struck at a harbor for a base or ransom. We must have some harbor defense in addition to the fleet at sea to ward off such a blow until our fleet regains touch. Fortifications will not accomplish this; their immobility would require them to be too numerous. A monitor fleet would accomplish the purpose. It is mobile; its units able to support each other; its guns never out of range and never masked. This is not localizing our defense and scattering our forces, abandoning strategy and surrendering the command of our water approaches, as Commander Goodrich tells the Institute readers I have proposed.
"Our great contingent power" cannot be mobilized, cannot be materialized when a catastrophe is imminent. At best it brings us scanty apology and inadequate reparation for insult offered and injury done. Few statesmen will have the temerity to rely upon it. We need an actual, material, mobilized naval force which will enable us not only to assert but to maintain our national policy, and which, instead of assisting us to collect damages for injuries done, will make it impossible for such injuries to be committed. If we fear that such a naval force would be a menace to our democratic principles we have not sufficient confidence in ourselves to develop a strong national character. We must not be content to provide a future naval force "based upon the present needs of the country," nor to rely upon "our great contingent power." Washington said, "To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression."