Motto: "In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the full responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."—President’s Message, Dec. 17th, 1895.
Tactical deductions from the few modem fleet engagements under steam are in the main inconclusive and unconvincing. Relying, therefore, on purely theoretical considerations, no well-established general principles and rules can as yet be said to have been satisfactorily formulated or generally accepted. A consistent scheme of tactics is, after all, more or less a series of guesses at the truth, and it would seem that the active discussion of tactical problems by the many interested is the only hope of approximating the theory to the probable conditions of battle.
Many systems of naval tactics which have been proposed have failed of acceptance through the illogical assumption that any advantageous or clever offensive or defensive group formation is the certain key to victory under all circumstances. Analogies have been tried by which a system based on army tactics has seemed to offer a definite solution. It is safe to say that no general scheme can ignore the importance of the study of every possible movement and formation which it is in the power of a hostile fleet to take either offensively or defensively. Such study will show that a false move may give the deciding advantage to an opponent, and that the chances of victory are with the side which makes the fewest mistakes. It may seem that this view makes fleet tactics very much like a game of checkers, in which each move on the board has a corresponding move which carries with it an advantage, and that a fleet engagement must be a series of moves and counter-moves. Up to a certain point this is undoubtedly true. The problem is really to deduce rules of movement and counter-movement, under varying conditions, and thus give definiteness to the formulation of the fundamental principles of fleet tactics. After all, the stern test of war may find any theory wanting, but, for all that, a fleet has an immense initial advantage if its officers recognize certain rules as imperative under given conditions. If this is not really feasible, it at least reduces the necessity of signaling to a minimum, and that is much to be desired.
As applied to troops or large masses made up of different arms, the term grand tactics is generally accepted as meaning the handling of an army in the presence or in the immediate neighborhood of an enemy. When applied to small bodies or single arms, such as cavalry, artillery, or infantry, it is called minor tactics. A fleet being made up of vessels of various types and classes, it may be said that in considering the handling of ships in the line of battle as here advocated, and to which this paper is restricted, we are really dealing with minor naval tactics. One must be very bold indeed to propose a scheme of grand naval tactics embracing the details for maneuvering a great fleet made up of battleships, rams, cruisers, gunboats, colliers, supply ships, tenders, scouts, torpedo cruisers, torpedo boats, torpedo-depot ships, repair ships, and sometimes troop ships—in fact, a fleet of ships comprising the line of battle with auxiliaries and impedimenta—yet some one must undertake it some day and execute it somehow.
Tactical Considerations.
The study of naval tactics has not kept pace with the advance in materiel, and if we can satisfactorily outline the principles which should govern the vessels in the line of battle we shall have made a great step towards the solution of the other questions involved in grand tactics.
Tactics must embrace a consideration of fleet maneuvers in the presence of the enemy, both in battle and in retreat. It will simplify this discussion very much if we consider simply battleships and cruisers in their relation to the fighting line, and regard our own and not foreign ships as the types under discussion.
The elements which we are called upon to consider are the three weapons of the fighting line, the gun, ram, and torpedo. We must also give consideration to the relative values of speed, quick turning powers, subdivision of the ship, and armored protection, as affecting tactics.
As all men-of-war are built primarily to carry guns, the question of armor protection against gun fire is conversely of prime importance. A modern ship with a protective deck, when broadside to the fire of an enemy at long range, is in less danger from the plunging fire of shot and shell striking inboard than if she were bows on, because of the better deflection of the deck, and the fact that when bows on the danger zone is the length of the ship, whereas in broadside it is the breadth. As ships must approach bows on, or else never get within range of one another, the chances are equal in hostile squadrons in the matter of this danger from plunging fire at long distance, but the advantage is with the fleet which brings the greater number of heavy guns to bear. The target being smaller in the bow presentation, and the chances of hitting at long distances not so great, this phase of the armor question takes on another view when we consider that at close range the above conditions are reversed in ships of the line; for a battle-ship of to-day at close range is defensively stronger in bow presentation than in any other, for her deflective deck is not threatened by plunging fire, and her armor offers then its least area, best deflective angle, and its greatest concentration. Importance is here given to plunging fire because the vital parts of a ship are below the protective deck, and as long as these vitals are uninjured it would seem impossible under normal conditions to annihilate or place a ship out of action by gun fire alone. Destruction is the function of the torpedo and the ram. Speed, turning power, and great subdivision are the defensive means by which these dangers are minimized. In fleet engagements, gun fire is the necessary preliminary to the use of the other two weapons, the ram and the torpedo.
Once in the range of the enemy's guns in a fleet engagement, questions of speed and of turning power are important in the ability given, by superiority in these respects, to take and maintain a position of advantage, or to get out of a position of disadvantage. Individually, they imply ability to ram or avoid ramming, but in fleet engagements it must always be borne in mind that the tactics of the fleet is primarily the tactics of the gun.
The installment of heavy guns in pairs near the ends of a ship has grown up as an incidental result of a consideration of the distribution of weights, but also through the facts that: 1st, a gun on the middle line of a ship which can be fired across the deck is under most circumstances equivalent to two guns, one on each side; and, 2d, a pair of guns in a single turret can be given the same armor protection on two-thirds the weight required to install them singly. This contributes largely to the increase of armor protection in the bows-on position. It is claimed by some advocates of the ram that this strengthening of the bow presentation of a modern armored ship is in deference to the power of this weapon. At any rate, with steam, ram or no ram, the approach to an enemy must necessarily be bows on whatever the ships have been designed for, and clearly we will get very much adrift in the discussion if we fail to realize how the modern changes in ship construction have necessarily entailed changes in the sailing frigate tactics of the days of Paul Hoste and Clerk. The danger from an old-time raking fire at close quarters is now changed into a position defensively of advantage. The supreme object in early days was the close-hauled line ahead (column) with the weather gauge—close hauled (or a course near the wind) because this was the only way to keep the advantage, and the weather gauge, because the position to windward gave the power to choose the time and distance for the attack, and gave the disadvantage of smoke to the enemy. Column being safe and easy to maintain, it was natural that broadside fire should be all-important, particularly as the form of the ship and the details of construction practically made bow and stern fire inconsiderable at best. It thus came about, in the sailing-ship days, that guns were in line only when ships were in column, but this is only one phase of the question now. With steam has returned the old weapon of the galley period, the ram, and with modern ship construction heavy bow and stern fire are possible. Modern conditions demand modern tactics.
Bow fire is now a considerable factor; the ram has its subsidiary tactics; armor has nullified the danger from raking fire at close quarters; the torpedo has made it dangerous to fight at close quarters; smokeless powder and high speed, using any powders, have minimized the embarrassments of smoke in the leeward position; and elaborate subdivision in ships tends to prolong and increase the difficulties of the destruction of ships by either the gun, the ram, or the torpedo.
In outlining a modern scheme of minor naval tactics of ships in the line of battle, it will be well to first inquire what class of ships should compose the fighting line. As the battle-ships or coast-defense vessels must be accompanied by scouts, cruisers, and possibly by rams (if this type of ship is persisted in), the fighting line must embrace all of these types. Ignoring the question of the impedimenta, and endeavoring to keep in mind clearly that only the ships built fundamentally for fighting are under consideration, the formations and dispositions chosen for battle should assign the brunt of the fighting to the armored ships, and leave the rams and protected and partially protected cruisers either in the second line or in the reserve, close at hand, ready to be called into action and relying on their speed and handiness to avoid dangerous contact, except when supported by the heavy ships. All this may sound vague, but will be treated in detail later.
Before taking up the question of what formations are best for attack or defense under varying conditions, to prevent the writer from being convicted of error on a misunderstanding of terms, to give definite and technical value to statements, and to limit the discussion to the real issues of the problem, it will be absolutely necessary to give a few definitions taken from the standard works on naval tactics as accepted in this country.
Definitions.
1. In army tactics the strategic front is the line joining the actual positions occupied by the masses of an army. In naval tactics it may be taken to represent the breadth, or sea room, occupied from one extreme flank to the other, measured at right angles to the line of bearing of the enemy. The depth of a formation is the distance from front to rear.
2. Captain Hoff, in "Elementary Naval Tactics," says, "Fighting formations all come within one of the four following categories:
(a) Narrow front—great depth.
(b) Extended front—slight depth.
(c) Front and depth equal.
(d) Groups."
Tacticians have given us the terms direct and rectangular as applying to fleet movements.
3. By direct movements vessels keep within a certain number of points of the original course and reach their new position in a change of formation practically at will, though really, in our navy, by prescribed rules as to variations in helm and speed, and with an oblique limited to three points from the original course. As most direct movements are made by obliquing, it would be quite as accurate to call them oblique movements, although, under any name, it should be noted that from the time the ships break the old formation until the new one is completed they are in no formation at all, and collisions are liable to occur unless great precautions are taken. The real theory of direct movements is that the ships always present their rams to the enemy.
4. By rectangular movements a fleet theoretically goes from one formation to another by a series of simultaneous and successive movements, in which each ship performs the same evolution at undiminished speed, and in which the course and distance passed over are ultimately the same for each vessel. As some rectangular movements are 45° instead of 90°, it would be just as accurate to call them either angular or successive movements, but, under any name, in maneuvering in the presence of the enemy, this method has the apparent drawback that, by it, broadsides are exposed to the enemy's line of rams.
The direct (oblique) method suffers by comparison with the rectangular (angular or successive) method, as will be seen by the following comparison taken from Hoff's "Elementary Naval Tactics": "If there was a force of ships in column, and line was directed to be formed, the direct evolution with eight ships and at a standard speed of eleven knots would only be completed two miles from where the evolution began, and would take twenty minutes. If the rectangular method was used, the evolution would be accomplished in eleven minutes, and only eight hundred feet ahead of the point where the evolution started." If reserve speed were used in the direct method the evolution would be performed more quickly, but as this is equally true of the rectangular, it does not vitiate the illustration.
5. Some tacticians assert that once in the presence of the enemy, in any formation, simultaneous movements, that is, change of heading of all ships simultaneously, are the only ones that can be used in action. In this view, naval tactics consist in selecting some strong offensive or defensive formation, group or otherwise, and sticking to it. It is the standard argument of most advocates of either symmetrical or unsymmetrical group formations. But it is in the main simpler to regard group formations as a separate question, discussing it as such, and to consider simultaneous movements as one phase of the rectangular. This separation of the issues clearly between the direct and rectangular movements, without complicating it with the group question, is important and necessary, and will here be followed.
The following illustration will show the embarrassment of using direct in combination with rectangular movements:
Distance between vessels being in our present tactics 400 yards in line or column, and 566 yards in echelon, if there are six vessels in echelon and either line or column is formed by a half-turn, all vessels must readjust to 400 yards on the leader or guide, requiring the rear, or off guide vessel, to regain 830 yards. Being in line or column, if vessels half-turn, echelon is formed, but the distance is 400 yards instead of 566 yards. If order is now given forward into line, the distance would only be (in line) 283 yards. These readjustments are confusing, and should not be thought of in the face of the enemy.
To point out some practical embarrassments with direct movements per se with distance of 400 yards, let us take the extreme case, the Columbia, or Minneapolis, and state the case in every way in the extreme.
Let us assume the Minneapolis and Columbia as being in section in line and signal made to form column, left vessel forward, right vessel left oblique. Let us further assume that the putting over of the helm does not slow the right vessel appreciably. If the oblique is made four points, the distance to be traversed by one ship is relatively 566 yards to the other's 400 yards. On the completion of the maneuver, the distance from center of A to center of C is only 566—400=166 yards or 498 feet. As each ship is 412 feet long, and distance is measured from center to center, it will be seen that from the stern of the Minneapolis to the bow of the Columbia there will be just 86 feet to spare.
Our present tactics prescribes that B shall slow to two-thirds speed as she puts her helm over to oblique 3 points, but as, even if you stop the engines, a ship carries her way with her original speed some four ship's lengths, it happens practically that B comes uncomfortably near A, and, where there are four or six other ships, the error is cumulative. It takes a very great amount of drill to make the execution of direct methods other than ragged and unsatisfactory. The fact is, the standard distance should vary to suit the particular division, squadron, or fleet, but should not vary for any particular formation. As massed formations require that ships should be as close to one another as feasible, this distance should be what is required to maneuver with safety and no more.
If it is necessary to form echelon to the front or rear by the direct method, vessels should oblique in to standard distance from center to center, because you are then in position to form line or column, and you have regained distance while changing line of bearing. In other words you have minimized the evil of changing bearing in the face of the enemy by readjusting all derangements. Conversely, if in echelon and line is formed to the front, ships should open out to standard distance as they advance to come in line.
The advantages of rectangular methods are as follows:
(a) Each ship executes simultaneously or successively, identically the same maneuver, at same speed, and with same effective helm.
(b) The wake of the next ahead is always clearly marked on the surface of the water, whether or not the ship is visible, so that following is easy even in thick smoke. By towing a sentinel astern on a distance line, all danger of collision is minimized.
(c) Ships are the least possible time out of a distinct formation, and are always on one or, at most, two definite lines of bearing. The change of bearing is successive and definite, so that there is no uncertainty, and no danger arising from uncertainty.
(d) Rectangular movements require fewer signals than direct movements, and, in the absence of signals, most of them can be executed by following the movements of the leader, or flagship.
(e) This method is the best for maneuvering mixed types of ships of different tactical values.
(f) It permits of massed formations with the least maneuvering area for safety. The direct movements are dangerous in smoke, bring a great strain on the mind of the commanding officer, and make the next astern often of more danger than the enemy.
Some direct movements, such as echelon from line (and conversely) are, however, performed more quickly than by the rectangular, and besides do not lose sea room on the flank; but from actual trial in twelve tactical games at the War College the past summer, war conditions being simulated as nearly as practicable, 84 per cent, of all maneuvers were simultaneous or successive changes of direction principally in column, while only 16 per cent, were devoted to all other formations (such as changing front, forming double column, echelon, etc.).
After all, the limitation of tactical maneuvers to certain definite methods limits also the number of signals for battle purposes, and this is much to be desired.
6. Foreign books on tactics, on which all of our own are based, use terms to express formations which we must either use, or else state the equivalent for, in order to give definiteness to statements.
Column is here taken to mean "line ahead." Abroad, a column is any distinct group in any formation.
"Line abreast" is simply line.
"Bow" or "quarter line" is single echelon.
"Double bow" or "double quarter line" is double echelon.
7. The word standard, as applied to helm, speed, or turning circles, in our navy, implies that to make all ships of a fleet homogeneous, or of equal value tactically, all must conform to the capabilities of, and perform the same as the least effective ship in the fleet. Hence such terms as "standard full speed," "standard helm," etc.
Tactical Propositions.
Definitions having been given in order to insure accuracy of statement, the point of view and the guiding principles on which the rules of action are based should be clearly stated.
The object of all maneuvers in a fleet action is to get and keep the enemy within effective range; to blank some of his gun fire by getting a superior position; to hold an advantage gained, or, losing it, to maneuver for a fresh one; to avoid waste of ammunition; to concentrate fire on an exposed flank of the enemy in order to reduce the tactical efficiency of all ships by crippling one or more; but, of all things, at all times, to keep up an effective and destructive fire.
To expand this general proposition, the following special ones are here enunciated as the principles on which any scheme of steam fleet battle tactics must be developed. They may not all be incontrovertible. On the contrary, they may be unconsciously inaccurate and only true in part. If so, they at least serve the purpose of forming a basis for discussion.
1st. As many methods of interior communication should be available in each ship as will enable her commanding officer to handle her effectively.
The four things which he should have under his complete control are (1) the speed, (2) the course, (3) the gun fire, and (4) the torpedo fire. The things which he ought to know at all times, or be able to obtain by proper interior communication, are (1) the helm angle, (2) the revolutions of the engines, (3) the range of the enemy, (4) the distance and bearing of the guide in squadron, (5) the readiness of each division of the battery to fire, (6) the readiness of each torpedo-tube to fire, (7) the intactness of the hull, and (8) the heeling of the ship.
2d. Signaling between ships is merely a means to an end, and, while this end can be attained with the minimum of signaling by perfecting the rules of tactics, yet every known method of signaling between ships should be available for battle, so that if one fails another may be used. The virtue is not so much in any one method as it is in having many.
This includes revving of numerous halliards, developing shape signaling, adopting some form of semaphore, perfecting day fireworks, using some form of siren, or whistle, with cone reflector, and some form of steam jet in the armored tops to make visible steam puffs, etc.
3d. Protecting shields and armored fighting stations at several points should be provided for the admiral, the captain, the signalmen, and the immediate officers liable to succeed to the command in case of accident to the commanding officer.
These latter, the executive and navigator, should be separated somewhat to avoid danger of being killed or injured simultaneously, and should keep the captain posted as to the progress of events and as to signals made.
4th. Every known device for obtaining the range of the enemy and for aiding in keeping position in formation should be available. Range-finders, sextants, trial shots, telemeters, stadimeters, and estimating distances should be resorted to as occasion demands.
5th. Everything should be done that is possible to take certain details off of the mind of the commanding officer in action. Battle signals should be few and simple, corresponding to few and well-understood movements. Tactical rules should be established whereby, in the absence of signals, a certain logical and definite course of action may be pursued. Gun fire and torpedo fire should be regulated by hard and fast rules, so that those in charge may act intelligently, but both should be under the control of the commanding officer, to avoid waste and to prevent injuring friends. The ram is absolutely under his control, because ramming is a question of helm and speed, and on him alone rests the awful responsibility for risking the use of this, the most dreadful weapon known to modern warfare.
6th. As far as practicable, all movements during battle should be rectangular, at standard speed, standard distance, and with standard helm.
7th. Tactical distance, here defined as standard distance, should be the radius of the standard turning circle of the particular fleet or squadron, and not an arbitrary number of yards for all squadrons.
8th. The speed in battle should be standard fast speed. Standard full speed and individual full speed should be reserved for emergencies.
Speed is not a weapon. Superior speed is the means by which one of the three weapons of the line of battle may attain and keep a superior position or secure an advantage. A reserve speed enables a fleet to seize a given advantage when it offers, or get out of a position of disadvantage.
9th. In a fleet action the tactics of the torpedo and the ram are incidental to the tactics of the gun, which is the weapon of prime importance.
This assertion is too fundamental to admit of discussion in the limits of this paper.
10th. Tactical rules apply only to a given relation, temporary or otherwise, between two opposing fleets. An advantage gained by a skilled maneuver may be lost by a counter-maneuver of the enemy, and can only be held, or regained, by either superior speed or superior skill.
11th. Direct movements in changing formations serve an occasional purpose only, and their use should be limited to bare necessity.
12th. If the direct method of forming echelon is used for any purpose, ships should be required to close up to standard distance from center to center, in order to be ready, if necessary, for a change of formation by the rectangular method.
13th. Any long extended order, whether line or column, is fundamentally weak (Captain H.C. Taylor, U.S. Navy).
14th. There is nothing in modern gun fire to deter an admiral from adopting any formation however compact for his advance upon an enemy (same authority, Captain Taylor).
15th. Massed formations are fatal to passive defense, but of the utmost value for vigorous offense (same authority).
16th. Group formations for battle, as distinguished from massed formations, should be limited in use to giving mutual support at critical times, otherwise some form of line, column, or echelon should be the formation.
To justify the arrangement of ships in groups, there must be some advantage attained by it in gun fire, ramming, or in mutual support. All group formations which are not flexible enough to admit of readily passing into simpler formation, such as groups in column, line, or echelon, should be condemned at once. Most of those which have been proposed have been of three or four vessels disposed at the angles of triangles or parallelograms, it being claimed that signals are thus seen more plainly, the vessels give mutual support, and changes of direction simultaneously do not alter the figure. The groups are formed in line of groups, column of groups, and echelon of groups, so it is important to inquire whether groups thus arranged are more advantageous than single ships. In the first place, it is utterly outside of the discussion to claim that groups are a good cruising formation. We are considering battle tactics. We can dispose of the group of four at once by considering it made up of two groups of two each, so we will consider two against three. The peloton is the favorite three group. Ships in line, column, or echelon of pelotons, take up much more sea room and are less compact by one ship for every group than a formation in indented line, column, or echelon, of the same strategic front. If nothing else were needed, this defect of want of compactness would condemn it. Captain Hoff points out most conclusively in all he has written on the subject, that the section of two vessels is the group of greatest mutual support, "where, in line, the gun and ram of one support the gun and ram of the other; and, when formed in column of sections, the guns of the leader support the rear vessel, and where the rear vessel supports the leader with its ram." This section of two is flexible. It is always either tentatively formed, or in position to be formed by a slight movement of the helm, or a change of speed. For instance, in double line, if the second line closes up to standard distance on the first, the formation is really "column of sections disposed in line abreast." In indented line, each ship which is to the rear, by moving its helm, can sheer into the wake of its leader, and we have the same formation as that just stated. Indeed, any other group formation than the section of two ships is a step backwards.
17th. The maneuvering power of a squadron being that of its least efficient ship, tactics should, by judicious formations, aim (a) defensively to preserve the integrity of its units, and (b) offensively to reduce the tactical efficiency of the enemy by concentrating the attack on one or more of the units of his fleet, particularly on the flank, of on a manifestly weak part of his formation.
18th. In maneuvering to concentrate on a part of the enemy's formation, the secondary object of all movements should be to gain an advantage, temporary or otherwise, of your gun fire over that of the enemy by blanking as much of his gun fire as possible.
19th. Concentration may be accomplished by enveloping a portion of the enemy's fleet, but concentration should always be accompanied by constriction and with a full knowledge of its dangers (Captain H.C. Taylor, U.S.N.).
Concentration is either by gun fire or by rams. Neither has much application in the early stages of an action where the maneuvering power is such that gun fire alone will hardly cripple a vessel to a standstill. According to Captain Hoff, concentration by rams means the "causing of a ship attacked to steer a course as divergent as possible from the general course steered by the rest of the ships of the force to which she belongs, and thus cut her off from her consorts."
20th. Echelon is a strong defensive formation, but may be dangerous to the fleet using it, unless superior in speed to the opponent. As a formation for attack, it is too oblique to the line of bearing of the enemy. As a means of concentration of gun fire on the head or rear of a column it is excellent.
If attacked on the flank in the direction of its line of bearing, the fire of all the ships on that bearing is blanked. When thus attacked it is a difficult formation to get out of except by a direct movement, and then the ships interfere with one another's broadside fire just when it is most needed. Echelon is really the compromise between line and column, with the disadvantages of both, for it is as difficult to maintain as line, and not so flexible as column. Vice-Admiral Randolph, R. N., proposes, in Problems in Naval Tactics, a sort of line-echelon formation for attack in which the line of bearing is 17°. In torpedo-boat tactics abroad, the groups steam in overlapping column, each bearing about 17° on the quarter of the other. This is a variation of column towards line. Echelon is really a tentative formation for a special purpose, as illustrated in No. 30. As a continuous battle formation, it has ceased to have many advocates. Therefore, some form of line and some form of column are the remaining ones to be considered.
21st. The reserve, made up of special ships, has its special tactics, not here considered, as they must act independently and maneuver to avoid action until such time as they may relieve a weak position, or consummate the advantage obtained by a strong one.
22d. The flagship in a small fleet should be a battle-ship of the heaviest order, to be able to lead when necessary and bear the brunt of the approach in a maneuver.
23d. The flagship in a large fleet should be an armored cruiser of considerable speed. Her position need not be in the line of battle except when it is to her advantage.
She should be accompanied by a second armored, or a protected, cruiser as a mate, and these two vessels should maneuver as an independent section, or group of two. They may, or may not, be accompanied by two or more torpedo cruisers to serve as dispatch vessels, and also for defensive purposes, in event of a concentrated attack by the enemy on the flagship. The admiral should be in an armored cruiser, in a large fleet action, because of her speed and protection, and should be independent of the formation, that others may easily see his signals, and to enable him to see as much of the action as possible.
24th. Under average conditions, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line in some form or other. If the enemy is not in line also, and a charge through is not practicable, column will probably be used until a charge through, line to line, can be forced on the enemy.
This proposition will be argued at length later on.
25th. Line should be limited to a front of eight vessels, as that is the maximum that can be brought into action and preserve flexibility enough to pass readily into column.
With twelve ships, in double line, six in each line would be better. If the enemy is in line and presents a broader line, the flanks should be strengthened by a heavy ship in column of section with, and in rear of, each flank ship. Distance between lines in double line should be not more than six cables, that being proper supporting distance and inside the limit of time of loading and firing big guns in a charge through.
26th. Column is historically and logically the strongest formation, but should never be used for the approach to the attack unless the fleet using it has the advantage in speed. Once in the zone of fire, and the charge through not expedient or practicable, column is the safest, best, and most effective formation to go into from line.
27th. Column should always be taken to mean indented column, in which ships do not follow exactly in the wake of the next ahead, but a little on the port and starboard quarter, alternately, of each ship.
This minimizes the danger of collision, enables a more compact formation to be maintained, permits signals to be seen to better advantage, places the ram of the mate to better advantage in case of need, and best gives to column all the advantages claimed for it, viz.:
(a) Column is easiest to keep or to reassemble in.
(b) It is perfectly flexible, and can, in a few minutes, change to any direction and into other formations.
(c) Each ship is flanked by the two next astern, which can come up on either side in case of need.
(d) Ships in column can maintain the same speed.
(e) By a slight sheer out of line, any or all the weapons—the gun, ram, or torpedo—can be called into play,
(f) In this formation guns practically are in line.
(g) The indented column is more adhesive and concentrated than direct line ahead (column).
28th. The changes of direction of head of all ships simultaneously, or of head of column in action, should be four points, or multiples of that number.
This enables us to reduce the number of battle signals; it simplifies movements; it adds to the effectiveness of gun fire by not changing direction so often; and it prevents a wavering policy as to converging on the enemy. In rounding the flank or rear of an enemy's formation, an exception to the above will be made in that each will circle and draw in without regard to four points and without the necessity for signals, as hereafter described.
29th. Chase should always be given where opportunity offers, viz., when the enemy offers a stern presentation. Unless he is superior in speed he cannot get room to turn and front you when you are once close in his wake, and you can pick up all stragglers.
30th. A greatly inferior fleet in point of numbers, but possessing a decided advantage in speed, may attack a column with some show of success by the retreat formation in double echelon.
31st. A greatly inferior fleet in point of numbers, or in types of ships, should seek to bring on an engagement, if at all, in narrow waters well known to its officers.
The preceding propositions may all be summed up in the following phrases: 1. Massed formations. 2. Concentration in attack, 3. Reserve speed. 4. Knowledge of plans. 5. Ability to execute them. Further arguments in support of several of the more important propositions will appear in the discussion of the fleet in action.
Until we know a little more about tactics, the most practical method of arriving at sound conclusions is to analyze the gun fire and tactical qualities of the ships we have, and deduce tactics to fit them. We do not know the tactical qualities of many of the newer ships, and it is not good policy to publish the tactical data of those now in commission. Fortunately, gun fire alone gives very conclusive results from its study.
Prof. Alger, U.S. Navy, in a recent lecture at the War College, gave an illustration of the broadside fire of battle-ship No. 5 (Kearsarge), in which it was assumed that a 13-inch gun can be fired once every 5 minutes, an 8-inch once every 2 minutes, a 5-inch R.F. three times in 1 minute, and 4-inch and smaller calibers four times in 1 minute: ''We find that of the whole number of projectiles fired in any period of time on one broadside, only six-tenths of 1 per cent, will be 13-inch, 1.6 per cent, of 8-inch, 16.5 per cent, of 5-inch, and 81.3 per cent, of the smaller calibers. In other words, 3-inch armor will keep out at least 81.3 per cent, of all projectiles fired by one battle-ship against another, 6-inch armor will keep out at least 98 per cent., and 12-inch armor at least 99.4 per cent. When we consider the fact that most impacts will not be normal, and that the range will usually be considerable, we may safely say that under any probable future conditions armor of 7-inch thickness will keep out 98 per cent, of the whole number of projectiles fired against it."
This view of gun fire does not of course deal directly with the chances of hitting or with the variation in striking energy at different distances. It is an important phase, but there are others.
At the War College, in the tactical games, the unit of gun fire is the broadside fire of a ship, for a certain period of time, at 2000 yards range. The right ahead or right astern fire of a ship under the same conditions is one-half unit; and the bow and quarter fire, three-quarters of a unit. At 4000 yards the values are one- fourth the above; at 3000 yards, one-half; and at 1000 yards and less, double. Some re-adjustments of the values assigned to right ahead and bow and quarter fire would seem desirable in the light of the accompanying diagrams, which illustrate the values assigned to the different arcs of fire of various well-known ships in our navy, computed on the basis of the percentage of projectiles thrown in any given time, multiplied by the striking energy, 1st, at 2500 yards, and 2d, at 1000 yards. These distances are chosen because the former is just beyond the effective range of all of the secondary battery, and for the further reason that at this range (2500 yards) the "remaining velocity" of a 6-pdr. is just that of a 1-pdr. at 1000 yards. The dotted line represents the value of a single volley from all the guns bearing in the different arcs. It will be noted that the lengths of the radii, and not the areas of the sectors, are the measures of the striking energy on any line of bearing. This comparison of the volleys is a good method in considering all the ships, for it ignores any question of rate of fire, which may vary. The full lines are computed on the basis of the number of smaller projectiles thrown in the interval between the fires of the largest caliber gun carried by each ship. The right-ahead and right-astern fire is represented as a sector, it being assumed that a variation in the course of one or two degrees will be permissible in formations to bring the guns to bear.
It is assumed in the diagrams that a 13-inch gun can fire once every 6 minutes, a 12-inch once every 5, a 10-inch every 3, an 8-inch every 2, a 6-inch every 1, a 5-inch R.F. 5 times a minute, and a 4-inch R.F. and smaller calibers 7 times a minute. The rates of fire of the 5-inch R.F. and smaller calibers may be considered excessive, but are based on actual trial. The 13-inch and 12-inch guns in the British Navy are said to fire once every 2 minutes, and even less is claimed. Why our guns should be so much slower remains to be explained.
In comparing the battery power of different ships, as shown by the heavy lines, it will be noted that, for instance, the period shown for the Indiana is 6 minutes, for the Iowa 5 minutes, for the Maine 3 minutes, for the Minneapolis 2 minutes. A comparison of the Minneapolis with the Brooklyn, in which the interval is 2 minutes in both cases, shows clearly where it is advisable to invest money in the future. The assigning of such a slow rate to the big guns and such a high rate to the rapid-fires emphasizes, probably unduly, in the Kearsarge, the great importance of rapid-fire guns, but it is doubtful after all if we can emphasize this too much. The Puritan is the most powerful of our monitor type. All other monitors would plot the same way as to arcs of gun fire, but with smaller radii. The Monterey would present one slight variation, in that her after turret guns are 10-inch and her forward 12-inch. The Maine shows the effect of the echelon arrangement of her turrets in the strong port bow and starboard quarter fire. The Iowa's stern fire fits her admirably for the rear vessel in a column. The Kearsarge illustrates that, as usual, in departing boldly from European models, we have achieved a notable success. It is to be hoped that some ship of this type will be named the Alabama, to demonstrate that, while the war is over, we should not fail to remember one of its most important lessons.
This analysis of the gun fire of different types emphasizes clearly the fact that each unit vessel of a class should possess the same tactical qualities and the same distribution of gun fire, and that a continuous program of ship-building should be at once entered upon in conjunction with a thoroughly renovated system of battle tactics, in which the ships should conform to said tactics. The building now of homogeneous ships of a few definite types, and plenty of them, combined with a clear recognition of our future in this hemisphere, is, as even a purely commercial investment, a sound and wise policy, aside from the manifest duty we owe to the corning generations of Americans in perpetuating our free institutions on this side of the Atlantic.
The Fleet in Action on the Open Sea.
Having a fleet composed of a certain number of armored ships and a greater number of scouts, protected, and partially protected cruisers, the process by which an action would be brought about with practically an equal force of a worthy enemy would seem to be about as follows:
1st. Scouting.—The highest development of the scout would be the improved St. Louis merchant type of high speed, great coal capacity, and armored and coal protection to boilers and engines. Her fighting value would be small, possibly, but her capacity for useful work would be in the nature of a revelation. This type of ship, with an enormous radius of action, would be able to cable
or bring in news of the whereabouts of the enemy.
Proceeding in force to look for him, the scouts accompanying the fleet, deployed in extended order, would bring in and transmit by signal the sighting of the enemy in force on a certain bearing, giving such details of his strength and formation as it had been practicable to ascertain. What formation should our fleet at once assume?
2d. The approach to the attack.—There is a period of time between the sighting of the enemy and the arrival of the two fleets in the zone of each other's fire which we must carefully study, for on it depends the securing of the first advantage, which often implies that a second will follow if properly managed. During this period the formation to be assumed should be one in which tentatively each ship is in such a position towards the enemy, relatively to her consorts, that her weapons may do effective work at the earliest instant, thereby securing the first advantage. The weapon of great range is the gun. We have seen that "armor of 7-inch thickness will keep out 98 per cent, of the whole number of projectiles fired against it," at long range, owing to the fact that impact will not be normal; but we have also seen that a plunging fire of heavy projectiles, striking inboard on the protective deck in the bows-on position at long range, possesses the maximum destructive effect which gun fire can produce in reducing a ship's tactical efficiency. Therefore, when we ask ourselves in what formation we should approach to the attack, the answer is that in which the maximum number of heavy guns can be brought to bear at long range, viz., some compound form of line, preferably double line, each line being indented, the heavy ships in the first indented line and the lighter ships in the second indented line, six cables in rear. This formation is the armed reconnaissance in force preliminary to battle strategy or battle tactics, and in no way commits the fleet to remaining in that formation, because line can at once be changed into column, if desired, as soon as the measure is taken accurately of the enemy's formation and disposition.
In support of indented line formation for the approach to the attack, we may summarize:
(a) It brings all the heavy ships of the first line into the zone of the enemy's fire, and consequently also brings the maximum number of long-range heavy guns into action at practically the same moment.
(b) The second line is protected by the heavy line, and is ready to support it when needed.
(c) It gives a chance to make an armed reconnaissance in force without definitely committing the fleet to any formation.
(d) Indented line can be made compact by using the standard tactical radius for distance from center to center of ships; the group of two is tentatively ready for formation in column of sections; the right-ahead fire of all ships in the first line is unobstructed; the ships in advance in the first line have their broad-on-the-bow fire clear for firing towards the enemy's flanks; and on a simultaneous turn of eight points the line becomes indented column, which is as it should be.
It will be recalled that the flagship, not being in the formation in a large fleet, signals can be seen plainly. In a small fleet the flagship should be on one flank, and should be advanced a ship's length out of line to enable signals to be seen and to act as a general guide.
3d. The attack.—It will be a surprise to many to meet with the statement that a charge through, line to line, with the enemy, should be eagerly sought for and tactically striven for. If, in the approach, the enemy is not in line there is no use in remaining long in line, for, if he is in any other formation, column is the best form of attack under most conditions. To remain in line, the enemy being in any other formation, is to invite a concentrated attack on either flank.
Before considering the best method of attacking each separate formation in which we may find the enemy, let us discuss thoroughly the charge through, which is here claimed as the great desideratum.
Approaching, line to line, we being in indented line with second indented line six cables in rear, and possibly a third line six cables in rear of that, at 1500 yards from the enemy, or on signal being made, the rear ships of each indented line oblique in one-half point on the quarter of their leaders. This opens a way for the enemy to pass through and removes the danger of a "brush past," or collision bows-on, which is to be equally dreaded by both fleets. If the enemy forms column of sections, in the same way, then the fleets are on equal terms as far as formation is concerned; but if the enemy approaches or remains in some form of simple or double line, his ships must seek a passage through between our columns of sections. If any one will take the trouble to compute the advantage in gun fire between column of sections and two ships in line abreast, they will readily see what is here implied. In a remote way, column of sections offers, better than any other formation, a possibility for the rear ships of the second or third line to ram any ship of the enemy which may become disabled as it comes through. It will be observed that no mention is here made of torpedo fire. At such close quarters, torpedoes are alike dangerous to friend and foe, which consideration gives to the charge through the additional advantage that it is about the only method of coming to close quarters in which the torpedo is eliminated as a weapon.
The fleet which can reform quickest after a charge through by a turn through 16 points, presenting a renewed compact formation in chase, has an overwhelming advantage.
To those who think that a "charge through" is chimerical, and that no admiral in his right mind would attempt it, it may be answered that if two fleets approach in line, there comes a time, at about 1500 yards, when it will take more nerve to go into column and present broadsides to line of rams than to continue on. Also, if a line attacks a column, both lines of bearing being parallel, it will require more nerve to remain in column than to turn and meet the charge. Any system of tactics based on the impossibility of the charge through must consider tactics simply a duel of guns; for when fleets begin to maneuver to use the ram or torpedo, close approach, combined with stubbornness, will bring about either collisions or charges through in some form or other.
Tactical Problems.
It is not intended to here formulate definitely the tactical rules which should cover all cases, or which should govern all fleets in action, nor is it intended to illustrate the movements by diagrams. In a fleet which is maneuvered in some compound formation, the method of attack must vary according to circumstances, because the heavier ships must bear the brunt of the fight, and the lighter ships simply act as supports. This paper would, however, come to a lame and impotent conclusion were some inferences not deduced practically from what has been already said, but, if the tactical propositions are sound, the inferences as to moves and counter-moves can be made by any one. A few simple moves will, nevertheless, illustrate the importance of working out all combinations in detail and outlining the plan of battle beforehand.
To take the simplest formation as an illustration, suppose two hostile squadrons are each in single column steaming on parallel courses in opposite directions. If the distance which they would pass each other is too great, the aggressive, or A squadron, would, by a simultaneous change of heading, oblique four points towards the other, and, when satisfied with the prospect, would return simultaneously to the original course and stand on. Gun fire being exchanged in approaching and passing, the head of A's column would turn under the stern of B's rear vessel in column at such distance as would avoid his torpedoes, or enable an exchange of torpedo fire to be made. Assuming that the enemy stands on in column, two or three methods of attack by concentration are open to A:
1st. To concentrate fire on the rear ships of B's column as A's column rounds the rear ships, and afterwards to stand on parallel to B's column in chase and concentrate fire on B's rear ships. B can, however, also concentrate on leading ships of A's column,
2d. If A's squadron is superior in speed, it can divide and then double on the rear ships of B's column.
3d. When half-way round the stern of B's column, A's squadron can go into either single or double echelon on the course steered by B, and concentrate fire on B's rear ships.
Before going into an action, the tactical rules laid down by the commander-in-chief should specify which method of attack is to be pursued; also what to do if B's column doubles on the rear ship of A's column at the same time, as a counter-move.
A good illustration of concentration, blanking fire, and giving chase is exemplified in the attack of a line, or column, on a single echelon formation. If two squadrons, A and B, are approaching, A being in line and B in single echelon, A at once goes into column by a simultaneous turn of eight points towards that flank of A which is nearest to (abreast of) B's leading ship. The head of A's column then changes direction four points so as to cross the line of bearing of B's echelon formation at right angles. After crossing it, A's head of column changes course another four points towards B's squadron, and is then standing on parallel to B's course; the fire of all of B's ships, excepting the leading one (nearest flank), is blanked, while A brings all broadsides to bear in concentration on B's leading (flank) ship. As A's head of column gets well past B's flank, it changes direction eight points, coming in astern of B's ships, and bringing broadside fire to bear against B's stern and quarter fire, then forming line and giving chase by turning eight points towards B, now in retreat.
To illustrate how an adroit tactician may, with an inferior squadron possessing superior speed, attack an enemy's column, suppose A with a few ships in any formation to stand down toward B's column, maneuvering so that he will finally be in line, or double echelon, in retreat, with B's column in chase. A, if in line, can gradually form double echelon, and, by slowing sufficiently, can concentrate on B's leading vessel. Having superior speed, A can avoid action on any terms other than that which is advantageous to him.
To illustrate how to reform after a charge through and immediately give chase, suppose A to have gotten through B's fleet, A being in two or three lines with ships in column of sections disposed in line abreast, eight ships in each line formation: After the rear line gets through (supposing there are three in all), the second and third line go, right wing, head of columns of sections eight points to right, and left wing, head of columns of sections eight points to left. Each wing stands on until clear of the flanks of the first line. (Each wing is in column of four ships.) As soon as clear of the flanks of the first line, each wing of the second and third lines turns simultaneously through eight points, heading away from the first line and towards the enemy, and slows to half-speed. Meanwhile the first line has countermarched by column of sections using port helm, and, standing on at full speed, passes between the wing divisions of the former second and third lines and gives chase to the enemy. As the heavy ships pass, the wing divisions of the other lines successively close in, in the original order, form line, then indented line, and possibly column of sections, according to formation assumed by the heavy ships. It is assumed, in support of this method, that the turn through i6 points is made by the heavy ships better in column of sections than in any other formation, as there is more sea room, and that the other lines in forming divisions on either flank cover the maneuver of this line. As the heavy ships stand on, they in turn cover the maneuvers of the supporting lines as they form. Another, and possibly equally good, method is for all columns of sections to countermarch successively, beginning with the first line.
To illustrate the tactics of column to column, standing on in the same direction, we will consider two squadrons, A and B, in single column, with A as the aggressor. There are two conditions to be considered: (a) A faster than B; and (b) A equal in speed to, or slower than B.
(a) A faster than B. A gradually slows and forms double echelon on rear of B's column. If head of B's column turns through 12 or 16 points (countermarches). A, by a simultaneous turn through 8 points, transfers this same formation to concentrate on the head of B's column, turning through eight points more in the new (opposite) direction. This is safe enough for A, for, though B is in chase, A can at any time stand on and gain sea room and turn.
(b) A equal in speed to, or slower than B. A slows, and, as each ship brings B's rear ship forward of the beam, it sheers out of column, steering four points towards B so as to come in astern in double echelon formation. If B is faster and draws ahead, A has at least concentrated gun fire as long as possible. As soon as B draws ahead, A forms indented line and continues in chase. A counter-move by B may, on the other hand, make the double echelon formation untenable, as follows: If B's head of column countermarches, or changes direction 12 points, A should at once go into column by a simultaneous change with opposite helm of four points for further wing and twelve points for nearer wing, and then, by head of column the necessary number of points, A comes in astern of B again in line, and can form double echelon once more. It will be observed that in this movement A goes around three sides of a square, or a triangle, according to circumstances, but as column is flexible, it is better than using a direct method.
Tactical Rules.
Without intending to outline a consistent system of battle tactics made up of movements and counter-movements in attack and defense, the following tactical rules are offered as suggestive of expansion by inference and by experience into a general scheme. It should be borne in mind that single line and single column, in fact all simple formations, are much more flexible than compound, but that as eight ships are the limit in even compact formations, we are forced to have compound formations if the fleet is large. In selecting the ships to go in the heavy line, the supporting lines, and the reserve, it will be noted that from the nature of things the supporting line or lines should have greater speed than the heavy line, because the latter maneuvers to come between it (or them) and the enemy, and in going from double line into double column and then changing head of double column eight points, the supporting line must use reserve speed. The reserve should be made up of slow ships and ships of special classes, and, protected by torpedo-boats and torpedo-catchers, should shift for itself and maneuver to give such support as it can. It is better to go into action with fewer homogeneous ships of good speed and tactical qualities than with more ships when one or two are lame ducks. These last would be better off in the reserve. The fighting line should be agile, and should rely on its heels to be able to protect the reserve in a concentrated attack on it by the enemy. By maneuvering ordinarily at fast speed, the full and reserve speed is kept for emergencies.
1st. When the enemy is sighted, form indented line at right angles to his bearing, with heavy ships in the first line, and advance at fast speed.
2d. If he is in line, seek a charge through in column of sections disposed in line abreast. Torpedoes shall not be used. Gun fire of rear ships shall be reserved for volley firing under control of the captain, so as not to injure friends, until an enemy's ship becomes a target close-to, when general action may be had.
3d. In the charge, to reform after passing through, the first line shall turn with port helm by countermarching in column of sections. The supporting lines shall divide by wings to right and left, eight points, till clear of flank of heavy line, then head towards enemy and slow to half-speed. The heavy line, after countermarching, shall proceed at full speed, the supporting lines coming in rear and adjusting speed and formation to new requirements. (Another good method is for all columns of sections to countermarch successively, beginning with the first line.)
4th. If enemy is in single echelon, stand across the line of bearing of enemy's formation at right angles in column, then change course to come by successive changes of direction of head of column in rear of his formation, and give chase. If in double echelon, proceed in same manner around either flank.
5th. Always give chase when opportunity offers, because your bow presentation is stronger than his stern presentation; you thus have the advantage in your fire, and while you are in his wake he dares not turn.
6th. In the attack on the head of a column by double echelon, the rear ships of the formation should open out clear of the wake of the enemy's rear ship in column to avoid torpedoes which may be dropped by him in his wake.
7th. The leading ship in a column should never attempt to ram unless it is unavoidable or to prevent being rammed, as it will throw the column into confusion.
8th. If the enemy's column attempts to cut through your column at nearly right angles, either stand on and trust to the rear ships being able to ram or torpedo the enemy; or else (a) turn simultaneously through the necessary number of points to head on same course as enemy, and gradually form double echelon to concentrate; or (b) turn simultaneously as stated and double on head of enemy's column by flank ships forming column by slowing successively.
9th. Gun fire being of prime importance, frequent changes of direction should be avoided as being disconcerting to gun fire. If a fleet is skilled in volley firing, these changes may be made simultaneously to bring certain heavy guns to bear at intervals. The increasing value of rapid-fire guns has, however, weakened the former value of concentrated volley or broadside firing.
10th. Always use rectangular in preference to direct method, unless to serve a special purpose.
As before stated, these rules are founded on the tactical propositions previously enunciated, and do not represent a complete scheme of tactics. One could, and should, be worked out, however, by one or more drill squadrons, or a fleet of steam launches, such as at the Naval Academy, where the practice will undoubtedly develop some flaws in the theories. A set of tactical rules should include both what to do and what not to do. Battle signals will probably be found to be limited to somewhere between 50 and 75. It may be possible, however, to reduce the number to 35 by formulating rules.
The Naval War College, at Newport, R.I., is accomplishing a great work in formulating the theories of naval warfare. The tactical work should be supplemented by practical exercises afloat. Squadron drill in tactics consists more in studying formations in relation to gun fire with actual target practice, than in making dress parade formations according to inaccurate drawings, based on an inconsistent text which nowhere gives an intelligible idea of the why or wherefore of any formation. Our books on tactics are primers; our signal books are a monument to those who do not go to sea; and the Naval War College, like the proverbial prophet without honor in his own country, is really about our only hope of inspiration in case of that form of national trouble for which alone the Navy has any excuse for existing.
DISCUSSION.
Commander C.F. Goodrich, U.S.N.—The prize essay of this year is a valuable contribution to the literature of naval tactics, quite as much for what it does not attempt as for its positive suggestions.
The form which an action will assume, after once begun, is entirely problematical, although, to my mind at least, it appears highly probable that a general melee is an inevitable sequence of the "dash through." If an admiral will, following Nelson's example, take his captains into his confidence, explain his views, invite free discussion, and lay down the result of these conferences in a number of clearly-defined general schemes to cover such actual conditions as are likely to arise, he may be sure that, when the battle has passed beyond the preliminary stage of the attack, when its smoke and confusion have put an end to signaling, and when the casualties, which must be expected, have occurred to prevent further concerted action, he will be only less well served than if he were on board each ship directing its individual maneuvers. For the disorganizing reasons hinted at, it appears wise to consider more particularly the approach, and only to take up the succeeding events as contingent upon emerging from the initial brush with tactical powers reasonably unimpaired.
I am quite at one with the lecturer in believing that, within certain limits, the fewer and the simpler the evolutions for battle the better. Formations offering theoretical advantages, no matter how great, should be ruthlessly discarded if their maintenance makes too heavy a draft on the captain's attention, distracting him from careful study of the enemy in the brief time available after sighting him. We are too apt to become doctrinaire in these long intervals of peace and to welcome the introduction of a number of refinements both in material and tactics that will disappear in the first breath of war. Simplicity should be our aim in all things. I am glad to see that the essayist stands so unreservedly for this cardinal principle.
I am not quite sure that I understand his views as to broadside versus end-on presentation. He is right as to turning your bow towards the enemy if you wish to approach him. That I regard rather as a necessity than as a thing to be sought after for itself. At close range, again, he seems to prefer engaging bows on, from defensive considerations. This conception of his views is further strengthened by his advocacy of the dash through in line. If such be his judgment, I regret that he did not give more space and time to the proof of his contention, for it is the crux of the whole matter. Grant that and the rest follows. Personally, I am not ready to concede the premiss until it has been established. I lean strongly the other way, believing in the superiority of broadside fighting. I may be in error, but I am open to conviction. A formation for opening battle that employs less than half one's guns must, in order to be adopted, hold out great and tangible advantages over a formation that brings in more than half.
There is nothing new under the sun. I shall be greatly surprised if, in the next war, the old-fashioned dodge of raking does not reassert its value. This will undoubtedly be true of unarmored craft, although it may be less true of those armored.
The essayist has, in my opinion, demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, the preferability of rectangular over direct movements. I could wish for more descriptive definitions even at the risk of coining new terms.
Incidental to his just remark that "as many methods of interior communication should be available in each ship as will enable her commanding officer to handle her effectively" comes the reflexion that the elaborate apparatus now in use is liable to derangement or wreck in battle, and that other means are not only required, but that they should be frequently employed in practice to secure satisfactory working.
The tactical propositions are worthy of acceptance in the main. I am disposed to challenge the 23d, and ask sufficient reasons for taking the admiral out of the line of battle. This is a moot question. It has been solved practically both pro and con, yet the balance of historical precedent is against it. I can recall no great sea fight where the admiral was not in the line.
It is worthy of note that the essayist's expressions are not lacking in strength when he speaks of the imperative need of homogeneity in our fleet. They illustrate and enforce his view that the types of vessels are a military concern, yet we all know that technical interests have largely determined the features of our building program. In the value of any fleet, uniformity of type is among the chief factors, yet we go on multiplying types until our new navy presents the aspect of a job-lot of samples. Individually, our ships are admirable. When we group them together their incongruities become manifest. Why not adopt a standard pattern for each class, reproducing the vessels until the logic of progress forces us to recast our scheme in its entirety? There will still remain ample scope for improvement in details without altering principal dimensions, tactical qualities and battery distribution. The essayist is but one among the many who recognize, in the continuance of a mistaken policy, a distinct menace to our fighting power afloat. What we want is a few ships of one kind, not many ships of many kinds. The Institute should speak in no uncertain terms upon this all-important point.
The essayist's mode of attack—line to line—is a surprise to me. It appears to follow as a sequence from an original formation that rules out a notable fraction of one's guns. An admiral so circumstanced must seek to bring his battery into fuller play. The obvious way is to change from line into column. It is conceivable that considerations of the moment may prohibit this maneuver and impel the dash through with its free use of gun-fire at close range except when exactly abreast of the enemy. A general breaking up into a number of duels between ships seems then unavoidable; still the two lines may pass clean and clear through, barring accidents. This movement appears to involve a surrender of any advantage to be derived from skillful tactical handling, and to trust to luck or superior shooting to get out of the scrimmage with less damage than the adversary. The fleet would, in fact, be used, not as an integer, but as a collection of ships, each having its own separate task. I think that, in practice, neither admiral will venture to hold to the line to the last, so that this particular phase is hardly likely to be assumed by a naval action. If either should keep his fleet so formed he would, I take it, afford the other a delightful opportunity of distinction. In making these observations on the one instance in the essay which, in my opinion, requires further elucidation, I only mean to imply a Scotch verdict and to indicate some of the objections that might be urged against the essayist's position.
In his tactical rules I find nothing to question. The paper is an excellent one. It lays down principles that should govern the handling of ships in the line of battle, and spares the reader a multitude of illustrations which would only confuse and distract. As in our study of trigonometry at the Academy, if we only carry away with us the fundamental equations, their application to any especial problem is never very difficult; so, if our prize essayists give us the broad outlines of any subject as well as Mr. Niblack has done, it will be our own fault if we fail to fill in the necessary details.
Lieutenant John M. Ellicott. U.S.N.—I am glad of the opportunity to discuss this essay, having given a good deal of thought to its vitally important yet practically neglected subject.
I think the author attaches undue importance to plunging fire as a tactical consideration at long range. The angle of fall of projectiles at extreme ranges does not exceed 30°, which is much less than their biting angle, whereas their remaining velocity, already small, will be reduced by obstructed progress to the protective deck. Moreover, the range will change more rapidly with bow presentation than with broadside. In the latter it may be assumed that (if the enemy is allowing for his own speed while sighting) the danger zone is the breadth of your ship, but in the former, with the enemy merely guessing at your speed and attempting to allow for it, the danger zone may be only a fraction of your length, or even nil. If you were steaming toward the enemy at ten knots and he had your range at the moment of firing but failed to make allowance for your speed, you would in twenty seconds (a reasonable time of flight for long range) advance 340 feet, or about a battleship's length, and the danger zone would be zero.
The deflection of the protective deck in broadside presentation can scarcely enter in as a measurable factor because of the rolling of the ship; yet if she is rolling much she will, during half the time, present her protective deck to plunging fire at a good angle of impact, whereas she cannot pitch to the same degree and her bow presentation would be safer.
I heartily agree with the author in his remarks about scout vessels, although I think that the scout vessel should be of smaller displacement and greater speed than the St. Louis, and should be a carefully planned and developed type built by the Government, and that there should be plenty of these vessels built.
Tactical rules 1, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 proposed by the author seem to me to be sound and excellent ones. Rule 6 should be more a matter of discretion than a rule.
The first part of rule 8 would cause, I believe, a wretched blunder. The head of the column would be for a time out of action, while the rear would probably be cut off and enveloped by the enemy. Alternative (A) in this rule should be the rule, with (B) as a good alternative.
I should not follow rule 2 until I had first tried, by a simultaneous change of course of four points, to reach the enemy's flank. If he were alert he would no doubt make a corresponding change to prevent this, and the "charge through" would become inevitable, but if he held his course even for a very short time I should gain some of the advantage sought. The "charge through" must, however, be promptly accepted against the alternatives of showing a stern presentation or a broadside to a bow, except in a case which I will mention later.
The first method suggested in rule 3 for returning to the attack after charging through strikes me as a bad one. If the enemy adopts similar tactics the two wings of the supports will become for a time engaged in a running broadside fight on opposite courses leading them away from the fighting line, resulting in three separate encounters and ending possibly in a melee. Granting that the supports will promptly recharge through each other to regain their positions in rear, they will reach them in an unnecessarily crippled condition, and too late to reinforce the fighting lines during the second charge or the next maneuver. The suggested alternative method is decidedly better, for the supports would then be kept well in hand and could promptly fill gaps in the fighting line made during the first charge.
The condition of the sea may sometimes be a large factor in deciding the tactics of approach, making the weather gauge as desirable now as in the days of sailing ships. With a heavy sea running, a fleet may, by steaming to windward and drawing the adversary in pursuit, cause the sea to seriously handicap him in the handling of his guns, while firing at him to leeward would be easy. No consideration of inferior speed need deter one from attempting this maneuver in a heavy sea, for while the enemy is overtaking you he will be long enough at a disadvantage to be considerably injured.
Although concentration with the ram may often be advantageously threatened, its actual use should be limited to special opportunity, and even then a commanding officer must weigh his individual opportunity against the danger of confusing a squadron or fleet maneuver. Torpedoes should be largely husbanded to give the coup de grace to a crippled adversary. They are almost certain weapons of destruction against a vessel whose steering gear or motive power has been even temporarily disabled, while their use in the fighting line is little better than mere gambling. I speak of the weapon in its present development. Tactics should especially contemplate the detachment of vessels from the support to give the coup de grace to disabled adversaries, or to interfere for the protection of one's own vessels in temporary distress.
Another important point to consider in tactics is that a battleship, while still intact in hull, motive power and the major portion of her battery, may be fought to a standstill by the destruction of her battery personnel. Would it not be well to have swift vessels in the reserve with fresh crews for replenishment in such an emergency, and to have some tactical emergency plan for the rehabilitation of such a battleship?
The closing paragraph in the essay might well have been printed in italics and emphasized in every other known way.
Lieutenant Wm. F. Fullam, U.S.N.—The prize essay this year is very timely. The Fleet Drill Book needs immediate revision, and the principles laid down by Mr. Niblack form a good basis for the work. Officers have had enough experience now to enable them to improve upon the present book. Improvement should not be delayed on the ground that perfection is not yet possible. We should at least make some little progress from year to year. Otherwise officers will become very much discouraged and will see little reward in devoting their time and energy to the subject. It is a trifling expense to print a few copies of a drill book, and there should be frequent revisions in order that officers may see the result of their work. In this way there would be steady improvement and a better chance of ultimate perfection than by delaying revision and postponing action.
In the limited space permissible, it will not be possible to note all the points in Mr. Niblack's admirable paper. His arguments against "direct" movements and in favor of "rectangular" and "simultaneous" movements are sound. On paper the "direct" movement looks well. The word "direct" has a winning sound. As in infantry tactics, officers were inclined to choose the system of moving by the shortest line.
But when a squadron engages in maneuvers the objections to oblique movements are soon discovered. Even with a large staff of assistants with stadimeters, etc., and a clear view from the bridge, with no noise and all conditions of the dress-parade order, the officer-of-the-deck finds it difficult to execute direct movements with precision and success. And even after constant repetition the improvement in performing such movements has been so slight as to be hardly noticeable. Evidently, then, a captain alone in the conning-tower, with a hundred things to think about, will find the execution of such evolutions very difficult.
Variations of speed introduce the principal element of trouble in fleet evolutions. If, in action, a certain speed is decided upon and maintained throughout by using rectangular and simultaneous movements, a captain might keep his ship in position, approximately at least, even if all telegraphs and every means of communication between the conning-tower and the engine-room were shot away at the beginning of the fight. The helm alone might enable him to keep his station. But with such communication shot away, necessitating the use of a messenger, one oblique movement might throw a squadron into disorder and compel a captain to leave the formation, temporarily at least. A system of fleet tactics must not ignore such a practical point as this. The conditions likely to obtain in action must be kept ever in mind.
The essayist is undoubtedly right in saying that battle signals must be few and simple. It would be interesting to see how a squadron could be handled by the use of two signals, the first meaning "follow me" (in column or in circle, each ship in the wake of its leader), and the second "follow my motions" (that is, execute a simultaneous movement with the flagship). Each of these signals could be made by a single flag waved or displayed by a junior or petty officer sent aloft on board each ship to look out solely for these two important signals. Other methods could be used for the same purpose. Starting with eight ships maneuvering together, a squadron might break into two divisions of four ships, and each using these two simple signals, they could support each other as the two Japanese squadrons did at the Yalu.
I am surprised that the essayist regards the "charge through" as desirable or inevitable. It should be anticipated and provided for, to be sure, but it would seem that an admiral who has his squadron well in hand and who has confidence in its maneuvering qualities, will avoid a melee or "charge through." He might be forced to it, however, by an opponent who lacked confidence in the discipline and drill of his squadron and who would seek a condition in which chance would enter largely.
The formation in line of section columns advocated by Mr. Niblack for the "charge through" appears to be an excellent one. An extension of this principle suggests itself to me. How would it do to pass through the enemy's line in columns of divisions of four ships, as shown in the figure?
In this way the three rear ships of each division would secure a raking fire at the beginning of the movement and an effective fire while passing. After passing through, the heads of the divisions could turn outward O and O, and pass around the flanks of the enemy, or they could counter march inward I and I, and come back closer together with the idea of concentrating upon a part of the enemy's line, or they could turn or countermarch in the same direction I and O, thus maintaining the same distance between divisions. It is submitted that this plan of keeping divisions intact, if possible, might enable a squadron to come back in better order after a charge. And the adoption of this formation against the columns of sections might secure the same advantage in the "charge through" that the essayist proves for the columns of sections against the line. The distance between the divisions might permit the use of torpedoes against the enemy.
From the little knowledge I have of the subject of fleet tactics, and from limited experience afforded in our squadrons of evolution, the plan of keeping a fleet under good control by maintaining the integrity of divisions of four ships, in connection with simultaneous and rectangular movements, seems both practicable and wise.
Lieutenant Spencer S. Wood, U.S.N.—I fully agree with the essayist in thinking that, with our present facilities as regards types of ships and our very meagre coal allowance, we could gain much from an active discussion of tactical problems which would be of great benefit to us when we have enough ships of types which at least are somewhat similar, to prove the value of the theories advanced. True, theory in many cases has not been proved in practice, but there can be no question that an active discussion of the various theories will do much toward helping us to develop the practice, and to this end the essayist has chosen a subject from which the service should derive much benefit.
Individual intelligence is absolutely indispensable when the battle nears the duel stage, but the intelligent co-operation of each individual ship of the fleet, based on well known and established principles which have, if possible, been proved when separated from the excitement of actual warfare, will have great weight in deciding the result of an engagement.
We cannot depend much upon our signals, for at the critical time they may fail us; we should give more time to the study of tactics and should have more actual practice.
I am not yet convinced that it would be advisable to entirely wipe out the direct method of performing an evolution from our tactics. From personal observation, when the Columbia and Minneapolis were cruising in the same squadron, I can testify to the very uncomfortable sense of nearness which was felt when these two vessels were maneuvering. Could we not modify or use the distance with a sliding scale to fit the ships which compose the fleet? Unquestionably the best results will be obtained in any practice with the best types of similar ships; but it seems to me that the theory of keeping "bows on" to an enemy is a good one.
It would seem, as the essayist admits, that an admiral would hesitate some time before signaling a vessel to expose her broadside to an enemy when that enemy is approaching, which would be necessary in performing the rectangular method, for by so doing he gives the greatest target possible and exposes it to the heaviest fire from the enemy, which will not interfere in any way with the enemy's advance. By training his turret but a few degrees he covers the ship which is performing the rectangular movement within the range of his heavy guns only. The rectangular movement is undoubtedly safer, and for ordinary maneuvers gives officers an opportunity of learning the capabilities of their ships, but when they have mastered these points, surely they should try the next step and drill with the direct movement, which will involve more care. To my mind the advantage carried with it more than outweighs, at times, the risk which will be incurred with extreme types of ships such as the Columbia and Minneapolis, although we are not likely to repeat the experiment of building any more of this class. It seems hardly fair to condemn the method because two extreme examples seem to interfere with the practice of it. When the tactics were written this type of vessels was overlooked, and in this special case it would seem as if these vessels might well be relegated to their original functions, viz.: commerce destroying, and keep them out of the fighting line. They are not strong either offensively or defensively; then why harass the remainder of the line with a type which does not belong there? Let us change the distances if necessary, but let us retain the direct movement, which, with practice, could, in certain cases, be made an effective one.
It will depend on circumstances which formation will be more advantageous to use, and I frankly admit that the essayist's reasons for using the rectangular as much as possible are excellent. I simply plead that both should be retained in the tactics and practiced. I will also admit that I have tried to imagine formations where the direct method would be so much better than the rectangular that it would justify the additional care which would be necessary to perform it, but I have been unable to think of more than a very few cases.
I fully agree with the essayist in thinking that the more we can reduce the need of signals in action, as well as insure certainty of being able to use some simple method, the more ready will we be to go into an action. It would be interesting to see experiments with some method of day fireworks. The Japanese are clever in showing floating shapes of horses, boats, etc., in the air, and we might make use of paper shapes which would float in the air to indicate numbers or even well-known maneuvers.
The smoke may interfere at times, but these would be more likely to be visible than any system of flags or shapes which we could hoist on board ship, and in closer quarters the whistle would be used.
There is no question in my mind that an admiral or captain would be unable to remain cooped up in the present conning-tower during an action. He would require a position from which he could see more, and if we cannot improve the present tower, might we not materially increase his power of observation by having a second tower aft? There a subordinate would be stationed who should be in direct communication with the other tower. Both towers should be fitted with the same instruments, and perhaps it might be well to have the captain of the ship and the navigator in the after tower and the admiral and his chief-of-staff in the forward one. It is surely better to separate those who will succeed to the command in case of accident to the commanding officer.
Another point which the essayist has touched on lightly, but which would seem to merit a little more attention, is the following: "We do not know the tactical qualities of many of the newer ships, and it is not good policy to publish the tactical data of those now in commission." Knowledge of the tactical data of an enemy's ships would be of great advantage in or before an action. Let us then cherish the little we have found out about our ships and throw at least this obstacle in the way of an enemy knowing as much as we do. We invite foreign officers, naval and military attaches, to our gun tests; armor and steel contractors are so anxious to advertise their products that they give all possible information in regard to them, and the contractors for our ships are equally ready to furnish foreigners with information to show the handiness of the vessels they have built. Are we not a little too willing to give foreigners all the data they request?
The essayist's diagrams of gun-fire and effectiveness of ships give an excellent idea of the powers of the various types of ships.
As regards the maneuver of "charging through" an enemy's line, which is claimed to be the great desideratum to be striven for, I do not entirely agree. That such a movement may be advantageous at times is evident, but it would seem that the second or third line of weaker ships would be in a most embarrassing position should the enemy turn short under their sterns and form column, provided, of course, that the lighter vessels could survive an action at such close quarters as they would be exposed to in passing between two of an enemy's ships. Another point which seems worthy of consideration: would not the fire of our own adjacent ships be likely to prove decidedly uncomfortable, if not actually dangerous, to our friends? We aim to hit our enemy, of course, but even at such close quarters an error of a few degrees would carry a projectile clear of an enemy's top works and land it in a friend's side. If, however, this method is employed and we decide to carry torpedoes on our ships, would not this be our time to use them from the forward broadside tubes? There is a risk of their being struck before they leave their tubes, but the risk is really no greater than at any other time when they are carried in action. There will only be a short time that the tubes will be a target for an enemy's guns, whereas in column they are exposed fully from 45 degrees forward to 45 degrees abaft the beam. In this formation only the 45 degrees forward will be the dangerous zone when an enemy approaches from the bow. It would seem as if the torpedo would prove less dangerous to our friends in the "charge through" than the gun-fire. With fleets of about equal power, the charge through might be advisable; with the superior fleet it would be likely to prove most advantageous; but with a slightly inferior fleet the maneuvering to cut off part of the other fleet would be the wiser course to pursue.
In closing I should like to join my voice with that of the essayist and second most heartily what he says in his closing paragraph in regard to the utility of the Naval War College.
Lieut.-Comdr. Richard Wainwright, U.S.N.—Lieutenant Niblack's essay is a most valuable contribution to the art of naval tactics, and will be read with interest by all students of that branch of the profession of a naval officer. In the following sentence he sounds the keynote of fleet tactics: "The object of all maneuvers in a fleet action is to get and keep the enemy within effective range; to blank some of his gun-fire by getting a superior position; to hold an advantage gained, or, losing it, to maneuver for a fresh one." Holding this in mind as the introduction to 31 tactical propositions, one is naturally surprised by the 24th, which is as follows: "Under average conditions, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line in some form or other. If the enemy is not in line also, and a charge through is not practicable, column will probably be used until a charge through, line to line, can be forced on the enemy." This is more fully explained under the heading "The Fleet in Action on the Open Sea"; on page 21 is the following sentence: "3d. The attack.—It will be a surprise to many to meet with the statement that a charge through, line to line, with the enemy, should be eagerly sought for and tactically striven for. If, in the approach, the enemy is not in line there is no use remaining long in line, for if he is in any other formation, column is the best form of attack under most conditions. To remain in line, the enemy being in any other formation, is to invite a concentrated attack on either flank." In other words, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line, and charge through with both fleets in that formation should be eagerly sought for. Does this agree with "the object of all fleet maneuvers," as stated in the opening sentence? Is there any attempt to get a superior position, to blank some of the enemy's gun-fire or to gain an advantage? Both fleets being equal in all points, the charge through leaves the advantage to be gained to the chances of a lucky shot. Most of the propositions and conclusions of the essayist are sound, so that this conclusion causes the greater surprise, for it is radically opposed to all the other statements in the essay. Lieut. Niblack's scheme for approaching in indented line and going into column of sections for the charge through would be an excellent one should the enemy remain in single line, and I imagine this scheme has led him to advocate the charge through.
His treatment of the questions of gun-fire, speed and turning power is logically sound. In the question of formation he states of echelon, "As a continuous battle formation it has ceased to have many advocates." This is true of all formations. A tactician may well have a favorite formation for approaching an enemy, but his formation must be changed to meet the varying circumstances due to the formations and positions of the enemy.
Lieutenant R.C. Smith, U.S.N.—While I agree entirely with much of Lieutenant Niblack's essay, I do not believe it can be assumed as certain that torpedoes will not be used in the "charge through." The prohibitive consideration, as stated in the essay, is that they will be dangerous alike to friend and foe.
Now, whatever danger there may be to friends must arise from one or more of the three following suppositions:
- There will be friends as well as foes on bearings commanded by torpedo-tubes, as the fleets are passing.
- Torpedoes are erratic, and may hit a friend on a widely different bearing from that of the enemy aimed at.
- Torpedoes that miss may remain afloat after their run and prove a source of danger to friends in the second or third line.
Considering these objections in order:
1. In the formation suggested in the essay the rear ship of each section would have a fine chance to use its broadside tubes as soon as the enemy's leading ships bore. For with tubes trained abeam, or abaft the beam, and a deflection of the torpedo due to the speed of the ship, no friends of the same line could possibly be reached. If the torpedo missed its aim and ran far enough, it might reach a friend in the following line. Our torpedoes are adjusted for one speed and one range; the latter 800 yards, the former the highest attainable, and at least double any speed that would be used in a fleet action. Assume that this 800 yards brought the torpedo in the course of a friendly section in the next succeeding line. While the torpedo was running 800 yards, or four cables, the following line would not have advanced more than two cables. As there are six cables between lines, four cables, or 800 yards (less a ship's length), would represent the clear space this torpedo might bring up in without danger to a friend. The rear line would not be subject even to this limitation, but could launch its torpedoes with impunity as soon as the enemy passed abeam.
But if we consider the enemy's formation as supposed in the essay, namely, some form of simple or double line, it is seen that he is at an advantage as regards torpedo fire, and could hardly fail to make hits with his quarter tubes firing obliquely through our double or treble indented line.
In the above, the formation is considered regular. In case of irregularity there would be times when friends and foes might be bunched as the tubes bore; but this in itself would involve possibilities of open spaces with enemies alone in other parts of the field.
It is also worth noticing that whatever objections obtain against torpedoes that fail to hit in these circumstances apply equally to gun fire. There would be of course a large proportion of hits at such close range; but to offset this, the projectiles that missed would by their greater range be more apt to strike a friend than a torpedo that missed. The essay, however, assumes that the captain will control the gun fire when friends are in danger. As will be seen later, the officers at the sighting stations can likewise control the torpedo fire.
2. It is hard to reply to this objection without writing an article in itself. At the risk of occupying too much space, I will try and mention briefly the main points. In the first place, what torpedoes are considered, and what is the location of the tubes? In our own service we have at present the 14-inch Howell and the short 18-inch Whitehead. The latter is admittedly very hard to get into the water on a predetermined course, though its path is straight enough after it gets started. In Europe almost all nations are adopting the long S-meter type, which is appreciably more accurate; and we ourselves shall also have them shortly, as the specifications are now in course of preparation.
In regard to the Howell, whatever its other faults, no one can claim that it is not accurate laterally. When launched from the broadside of the Stiletto at 15 knots its deflection is only one-third that of the Whitehead from the Gushing at the same speed; and, what is more to the point, its deflection is exceedingly uniform. In the larger 18-inch type, for which the specifications are now ready, even better results are to be anticipated.
Then, too, the location of tubes is to be considered. There has been an entire revolution of opinion since the days of the English Scout, 10 or 11 years ago. All cruisers then and subsequently were torpedo cruisers, whatever their speed, and their tubes were mainly over-water. Opinion now tends decidedly to omitting torpedo-tubes from all vessels except armor-clads and torpedo-boats. The reason for removing them from cruisers is not that there is material danger of an exploding warhead, which has been shown by careful experiment to be remote; nor even that the air-flask may be burst, a much more probable occurrence; but simply that the launching gear would be shot to pieces before it could be used. This reduces the case to submerged tubes in battle-ships and large cruisers, or over-water tubes behind armor. Torpedo-boats are not here considered.
Now as to the accuracy of fire from submerged tubes, it is a question of providing an apparatus strong enough to withstand the great force of the current of water past the ship. This done, the practice should be far more accurate than from over-water tubes, for this reason. There is one sole deflecting force, the current of water past the ship, which is uniform for uniform speed. From an over-water tube the deflection is dependent not only on the speed, but on the angle of entry, which varies with the roll of the ship, the roughness of the water, and accidental variations of the impulse. The development of a strong and reliable apparatus has been extremely slow. The English so far are apparently the only nation who have made a satisfactory solution; and that their solution is satisfactory the following random quotations will indicate:
1892. An English officer, an acknowledged torpedo expert, whose name I am not at liberty to mention, considered that practice from broadside submerged tubes up to a speed of 14 knots was as accurate as was possible with the Whitehead torpedo under any circumstances.
1892. The Royal Sovereign at torpedo practice at 600 yards at 11 to 12 knots: "The practice was not very good from the over-water tubes, but fairly good from the submerged tubes."—Annual of Office of Naval Intelligence, 1894, page 126.
1893. The Sanspareil at a speed of 12 knots was reported to have launched 14 torpedoes at a moving target (speed not given) 40 yards long and 700 yards distant. 5 of the 14 struck the target.
1893. The Vulcan at a speed of 18 knots made 11 hits out of 16 against a fixed target 100 yards long and 600 yards distant.
1894. Commander Sturdee, R. N., in the Prize Essay of the R.U.S. Institution, page 375: "From above-water tubes 450 yards may be considered as the effective torpedo range between ships under way, while an extra hundred yards may be allowed from submerged fire. Within that range about 50 per cent of hits ought to be scored, a larger percentage having been actually made in the different annual maneuvers."
It may be added that if the English have succeeded, other nations will do so in time. Broadside tubes only have been considered, as bow and stern tubes, over and under water, are everywhere disappearing. The forward pairs of broadside tubes are usually fixed abeam, and the after pairs at an angle of 20 to 30 degrees abaft the beam. They do not admit of train.
3. This danger may be absolutely obviated by removing the drain plugs from the buoyancy chamber when the war-head is attached. This is the rule in our service. The accuracy of the run is in no way affected, as has been abundantly proved by experiment, and the torpedo must necessarily sink shortly after it ceases to run. A sinking lever, which automatically opened a valve, was formerly used for this purpose; but as it sometimes did not act, its effectiveness was discredited.
A word as to the control of torpedo fire aboard ship: I believe I am right in saying that the policy recommended in our service, and the theory on which our sighting arrangements are installed, is that the captain controls the bow torpedo exclusively, when there is one (the desirability of its presence is questioned), and gives general directions to the officers at the remaining sighting stations, "enemy on such a bearing," it being understood that the officer fires if he gets a chance. This is also the practice in foreign services. The captain cannot give his attention more in detail than this. But with this arrangement, and a "stand-by" from the captain, if the officer at the sighting station sees a good chance to torpedo a passing enemy without danger to friends, as I believe he will in any form of "charge through," the torpedo is launched at once without further reference to the captain, except to notify him that the torpedo has been fired and to inform him when another is ready.
There is one consideration that somewhat impairs the above line of argument, and that is the effect of smoke in shutting out all except near neighbors. But this militates no more against the torpedo than the gun; and with the adoption of smokeless powder the inconvenience will be reduced to a minimum.
The essayist makes no mention of large torpedo-boats, or torpedo-boat destroyers, in the enemy's line. His own boats he places with the reserve. But it is quite commonly held abroad that these craft should accompany the battle-ships in the line, keeping under their lee in action. They would want no better chance than to have us charge through their line. But I doubt if Lieutenant Niblack would advocate the "charge through" in this case, even if we had an equal number of destroyers.
At least one other writer recently has held opinions somewhat similar to those advanced in the essay, in that he regards the "charge through" as desirable under certain circumstances; but he does not urge it as the "great desideratum." Lieutenant Calthorpe, R. N., in the R.U.S. Institution in May, 1894 in an essay that received special mention, writes as follows, page 488: "It is conceivable that it would be good tactics to endeavor to pass through the enemy's fleet 'en masse,' that is, in concentrated formation, invariably maneuvering to meet them 'end on'; and then to turn, reforming on guides immediately, with the object of falling upon them, if possible, in a weak spot, according to circumstances, before they have themselves had time to turn…and the side which succeeds in concentrating a majority upon some defective spot in the opponent's fleet will have gained a great advantage."
Generally speaking, he advocates other tactics, and quotes Captain Mahan as follows, page 496 of the Proceedings: "He believes that a fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but not until some advantage has been obtained for the collision, which will usually be gained by maneuvering, and will fall to the best drilled and managed fleet."
His own conclusion follows on the same page: "This, then, would appear to be a very sound tactical principle. Try to out-maneuver the enemy and fight him with your guns, remaining outside the range of his rams and torpedoes until you have obtained an advantage, and then fall upon him, in his weakest spot if possible."
He also has this to say on the subject of torpedoes, page 489: "A few officers there may be who are still of opinion that torpedoes should not be 'let loose' in a fleet action at all, on the grounds that they will be as dangerous to friends as to foes. Doubtless they might be if discharged indiscriminately, but in many cases (on first going into action, for instance, in a formation of narrow front) each ship might get beam shots on passing the enemy with, practically speaking, absolute safety to her consorts." As has been shown, there might also be chances in a line formation. Continuing the quotation: "Here, then, is the opportunity for submerged tubes. The dangerous objections (referring to over-water fire) already discussed disappear altogether; and this weapon, the submerged tube, I hold to be one, if not the most important engine of destruction in a ship. A vessel may be crippled, her steering gear shot away, her machinery disabled, half her guns dismounted or out of action, and, in fact, be in a semi-sinking condition, and yet retain intact on each broadside a weapon representing the destructive force due to about 200 lbs. of gun-cotton. The torpedo practice in our navy from submerged tubes has, on the whole, been very good at everything but extreme speeds, and fairly straight shooting might be anticipated with confidence at speeds up to at least 15 knots, which speed will probably not be exceeded by large fleets maneuvering in close order." Also on page 509, one of ten conclusions as regards fleets: "8. That torpedoes should be freely made use of from the beams of ships, when passing the enemy at close quarters."
Commander Sturdee's opinion as to the method of going into action, in the essay previously quoted, page 396, is as follows: "I lean very strongly to the opinion that the gun is the most important one (weapon) at first, because, as in the case of a single-ship action, on account of its long range; but even more so of the danger of coming within torpedo and ramming distance without having first obtained an advantage over the enemy, and I would lay it down as an axiom that no fleet should risk a close encounter (at first) without having obtained a tactical advantage over the other one, as otherwise it becomes a matter of chance what will happen on a charge being made, supposing both fleets are equal and in similar formation." He also cites Captain Mahan in the quotation already given.
After a careful reading of the essay, the advantages claimed for the "charge through" seems to be that, if the enemy is in some form of simple or double line, and the attacking force is in two or three indented lines or lines of sections, then the attack will by its formation possess a better command of fire, some of the supporting ships of the second or third lines may find a chance to ram ships of the enemy disabled in passing through, and the squadron which reforms quickest after charging will possess an overwhelming advantage.
Now comparing the two formations as described above, and supposing the fleets of equal strength, it will be seen that one is essentially a broad front formation with slight depth, and in the other the front and depth approach equality.
Then suppose the enemy to be a believer in this principle, page 21 of the essay: "To remain in line, the enemy being in any other formation, is to invite a concentrated attack on either flank." The line would evidently soon be abandoned. It will not do to say that you are not in another formation, for if you have three lines your formation resembles column of divisions; and it is in any case a narrow front formation as compared with the enemy's.
If the enemy remains in line until a charge seems imminent, he still has one or two counter-moves. His flanks overlap at both ends of the line if the demonstration is against the center. He may form indented columns on the center of wings and allow you to pass through, unless you still have time to countermarch. All his inner broadside guns and tubes will bear, and only those of your flank ships.
Or he may leave his center to receive the charge, countermarch with his flanks, form column or echelon in the rear, and envelop you on either hand, trusting to his center to reform and bring up the rear. You would hardly attempt to reform under these circumstances.
But it is not very satisfactory to follow through a series of countermoves, except in the war games, for the simple reason that you cannot assume your adversary's answer.
Therefore suppose the charge to be made as intended. It has already been shown that the enemy having no rear lines to hamper him will be free to use his beam and quarter torpedo-tubes as soon as they bear, without in any way endangering his own line, and with every chance of successful runs on diagonal courses across your compact formation.
Then, too, the enemy with his simple line can reform in about a quarter of the time it will require for the deep formation by either method described in the essay, and will hence secure the "overwhelming advantage."
Finally, the question of the "charge through" reduces itself to the supposition that the attacking fleet is possessed of greater skill, first in the adoption of its tactical formation, and second in reforming after the charge. Now, as in "charging through" I believe it to be clear that the attacking fleet subjects itself to the possibility of both torpedoes and accidental ramming, it would be by all odds the part of policy to use its superior skill in selecting tactical formations that would permit of concentrated gun fire on portions of the enemy until he was whipped in detail, to avoid the enemy's rams and torpedoes if possible, and not to seek to use the ram or torpedo except when forced to do so in defense, or in the final onset after some considerable advantage had been already assured.
In conclusion, I will say that I agree with Lieutenant Niblack in the other features of his essay, and congratulate him on his success. I shall not venture to hope that my arguments as above cannot be controverted, but I offer them as giving another view of a very important matter.
Rear-Admiral S.B. Luce, U.S.N.—I have read this essay with pleasure and profit. The writer approaches the main question in the true spirit, laying down general principles and reasoning from them in a logical manner. This is the only proper method of reaching just conclusions.
One of the causes, I may say the chief cause, of the variety of opinion as to the best battle formation for a fleet lies in the ship which is to take its place in the line of battle, commonly called the line-of-battle ship. The battle formation is determined by the tactics of its units, and the tactics of the units are determined by their chief characteristics. Variety of characteristics requires variety of treatment.
In the galley period, when the ram was the principal weapon of offense, the battle formation had to be in line, or modifications of the line, the prow pointing towards the enemy. It could not possibly be otherwise. The crescent formation of the Persian fleet at Artemisium, the formation at Arginusse, the indented line of the Roman fleet commanded by Caesar off Alexandria, the double echelon of the Romans in the battle of Ecnomus, are familiar examples of this. On the first introduction of guns on board ship, the galley, or, more correctly speaking, the Galleas, had end-on fire, as at Lepanto. The gun and the ram acting in unison necessitated a continuance of the line as the normal formation for battle—the line, that is to say, with its modifications of echelon, single and double, or with its flanks thrown forward, as in the crescent formation. During the sail period the tactics of the ship was equally imperative in requiring the principal battle formation to be in column, in order to present to the enemy the principal weapon of offense, the gun, which was placed in the broadside. The ships themselves were in column, while the guns were in line. No other battle formation was possible.
Some of the earlier writers on steam tactics, finding the gun still in broadside and the ram restored to its ancient functions, were compelled to give the battle formations of both the periods represented. Hence they laid down the rule: "The line (single or indented) for ironclads and rams; the column (single or indented) for ships whose offensive powers lie in their broadside batteries." The effort to adopt one standard battle formation for both classes of vessels, without due regard to the principal weapons of offense, naturally led to some confusion. It was an attempt to formulate a system of fleet tactics without considering the tactics of the units. The resultant confusion was somewhat intensified by practice when fleets composed of various classes, or rather of various types of ships, have undertaken to perform military movements. In the battle of Lissa, both the Austrian and the Italian fleet were composed of the latest type of ironclad of that day, and wooden sailing-ships having auxiliary steam power. With the heterogeneous assemblage of ships, Tegetthoff bore down on the Italian fleet (the latter in column of ships) in column of squadrons, each squadron formed in double echelon. The Kaiser, an old 90-gun ship, with head booms and the old style of cutwater, undertook to ram the Italian ironclad Re di Portogallo and was fortunate in being able to reach an anchorage in San Giorgio. I have referred to this incident in the January number of the North American Review. At the battle of the Yalu the Chinese fleet came out to give battle in an irregular line, while the Japanese moved up to the attack in column. Referring to this battle, Admiral Colomb, of the English Navy, says it was a trial of strength between two tactical formations—the line and the column. "I ventured to declare in former tactical studies," he says, "that the line-abreast was an exceedingly weak formation which ought to succumb to the line-ahead in all cases where things are otherwise equal." (Essay on Naval Defense, 2d Edition, by Vice-Admiral P.H. Colomb, R.N.)
In his very clever and entertaining skit describing, in the "Battle of Dorking" style, a battle between an English and a French fleet, Captain Eardley-Wilmot of the English Navy forms the English fleet in double echelon, "the flagship leading, the other vessels ranged on her quarters, making an isosceles triangle. Thus the squadron had the shape of a wedge, in which each ship's ram and bow fire were clear of the next ahead." This was the formation of the Roman fleet under Marcus Atilius Regulus, minus the triarii. [An account of the principal battle formations of the galley period will be found in Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. III., No. 1, April 20th, 1876.] The French fleet were "in two divisions, line ahead, a formation that meets with the unqualified approval of the metaphorical Paul Brachet," and, by implication, that of the ingenious author.
I have traced these successive steps in the history of naval tactics with a view to calling attention to, and emphasizing the fact that the essayist has touched the root of the matter when, to the question, page 20, "In what formation should we approach to the attack?" he answers: "that in which the maximum number of heavy guns can be brought to bear at long range." This sound principle had already been enunciated on page 17, where it is stated, as the summing up of the 31 tactical propositions, that "the most practical method of arriving at sound conclusions is to analyze the gun fire and the tactical qualities of the ships we have, and deduce tactics to fit them."
As the line of battle, which forms the basis of every system of tactics, must be made up of ships of sufficiently high military value, I cannot help wishing the author had been a little more explicit in the statement first quoted, and had recommended, as no doubt he intended to do, the deducing of a system of tactics best adapted to the gun fire and tactical qualities of our line-of-battle ships. A system of tactics based on the offensive and maneuvering powers of a ship of the line of the Massachusetts type might not be suitable for a light cruiser of the Montgomery class. The role of each class is essentially different. It will be the duty of the tactician to classify our ships and indicate those that are to be. admitted to the line of battle and those that are to perform functions in connection with the line of battle, and from those elements to deduce his system.
In the passages first quoted lies the gist of the whole question. It was that very principle, as laid down by the author, that determined, as we have seen, the battle formation in the oar and in the sail period. Reasoning from that fundamental principle, the true solution of the problem cannot be very far off. The English Naval Prize Essayist of 1879 said of naval tactics, "We are groping in the dark," a fact we may reaffirm with the qualification, thanks to the author and those working on the same lines, that dawn is breaking.
I find myself compelled to dissent somewhat from the author on one point. He recommends, on page 27, that a complete scheme of tactics "should be worked out by one or more drill squadrons, or a fleet of steam launches…"If we can keep up one squadron of evolutions we will do well, but the flotilla of launches is a poor substitute for it. The views on this subject of the distinguished French Admiral Jurien de la Graviere may well be quoted on this point. It was proposed some years ago in France to reduce naval expenditure to such an extent that the Minister of Marine would be no longer able to keep up the Mediterranean squadron of evolutions. "That squadron," the admiral observes, in opposing its abolition, "is the school where the young officers apply the knowledge acquired in all others." "It is the source," he continues, "whence our officers and crews derive their true naval spirit. For this reason alone the squadron of evolutions should be maintained at any cost. But a more important consideration yet urges its continuance. It is our only school of tactics. The fleet most thoroughly drilled in naval tactics will have the greatest advantage in war."
"When opposing fleets join battle the lines will be broken through, and immediately every ship will have to reverse her course to resume the fight. This maneuver must almost inevitably result in collisions among ships of the same fleet. If these ships are all homogeneous, and describe equal arcs of evolution, the risks of collisions will be small; and if to this there be added a constant habit of maneuvering together, those risks will disappear altogether. It is not simply in practicing regular evolutions and following geometrical lines that gives the self-possession so essential in battle. Neither single cruisers nor the semblance of a squadron composed of steam launches or gunboats constitute an adequate school for this difficult art."
"It is absolutely necessary to accustom oneself to handling, within contracted spaces, masses of from eight to ten thousand tons, which cannot collide without mutual destruction. One must become accustomed to the imminence of such dangers; to become habituated to the close order of steaming by night as well as by day, in fair weather and in foul; to know how to form groups; to extend the lines, to mass the ships or to throw them out in echelon. Above all, one must be possessed of the faculty of placing himself in full sympathy with the commander-in-chief, to have an intuitive perception of his designs, and to anticipate his movements without the use of signals. Herein lies the whole secret of naval tactics. There is but one definition for this species of tactics: it is the art of maneuvering in battle, and while rendering support to your consorts, to avoid fouling them. The most skillful are those who can execute fleet evolutions when the transmission of orders has become impossible. The very last measure of economy France should resort to, then, is, in my judgment, the dispensing with the squadron of evolutions."
Did these views need confirmation it would be found in the work accomplished by the French squadron of evolutions. It has produced two of the best works on naval tactics. The Tactique Navale and Tactique Supplhnenfaire a r usage d'une Flotfe Cuirassee, par Vice-Amiral Cte. Bouet-Willaumez, was the direct result of that officer's term of service as its commander-in-chief; and this was followed by Escadre d' Evolutions, 1868-1870, Considerations Generates sur la Tactique Navale, par Vice-Amiral Jurien de la Graviere.
In the course of a few introductory remarks in the later work occurs the following: "Charges par le Ministre d'entreprendre la revision du livre des signaux et de la tactique officielle, nous n'avons pas perdu de vue les conditions dans lesquelles cette revision allait s'accomplir," etc.
It will be seen from this passage that the French Government took sufficient interest in such matters to direct the commander-in-chief to utilize his squadron as a School of Application and to do exactly the work proposed by the essayist. That is one picture, and here is another. It is within the memory of men still living that attempts to utilize an American squadron for similar purposes were repeatedly and determinedly frustrated by the American Government; and when, with the remains of a depleted squadron, a final effort was made in that direction it was seriously proposed to make the officers concerned pay for the coal expended! Is it to be wondered at, then, that the author should tell us "our books on tactics are primers, our signal books a monument to those who do not go to sea"?
The essayist has very properly devoted one chapter to definitions. Naval tactics is entitled to a terminology of its own. But I think the author is slightly in error when he says, page 9, §6, that our books on tactics are based on foreign works. He then tells us that column is here taken to mean "line ahead," etc., etc.
Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, U.S.N., prepared his Fleet Tactics under Steam in 1869. It was published by authority of the Navy Department. Six years previously he had been drilling seamen with a field battery of naval howitzers, and conceived the idea of adapting the movements of an assemblage of fieldpieces to the flotilla he subsequently commanded. In the preparation of his work he was no doubt indebted to the treatise of Vice-Admiral Bouet-Willaumez. However that may be, Commodore Parker discarded the terms that had been used in the old naval tactics under sail and stated that there "are but three formations for a fleet… any one of which may constitute an order of battle, viz., line, column, echelon."
Captain Hoff, in his last work on tactics, adopted the same terms. It seems hardly necessary, therefore, to use "foreign terms to express formations," or even "to state their equivalents." Captain Hoff also uses the term line-of-battle ship, a name by which our first-rates should be designated. Under the head of Tactical Propositions, page 10, the expression "steam fleet battle tactics" is unnecessarily cumulative. The word "blank," in "to blank some of the enemy's gun fire," sounds (or reads) like the euphemistic form of the not wholly unfamiliar damn. Thus in one account of the battle of Mobile we read that Farragut cried out: "Blank the torpedoes! Go ahead!" The verb "to blank" is used here, presumably, in the sense of to mask. The latter word has the sanction of good military usage. But these are very small matters. The essay is an able one, and a welcome indication of the progressive spirit of the Navy.
Lieutenant A. A. Ackerman, U. S. N.—Lieutenant Niblack is to be congratulated upon having so clearly and briefly brought the fundamental principles of a modern naval tactics into one's mental grasp. The essay is all the more admirable that in spite of its brevity it is so full of suggestion. No one can read it without beholding in every direction vistas of possibilities and being impelled to investigate for himself this old subject revived through changed conditions to a new and fascinating youth.
While thus recognizing the great value of the essay, there are certain considerations to which I ascribe a different weight than the author, and accordingly carry my conclusions not so far or farther than he does. Possibly my lack of experience in fleet maneuvers, or their systematic study as pursued at the Naval War College, has permitted me to err, in which case a speedy correction is most desirable.
Modern naval tactics seems to be a tactics of gun fire alone. When it is considered what great sacrifices are made in order to clothe battleships in armor, or to give them a knot more speed, it is natural to desire to get some return; yet battle-ships, when in fleet formation, are to be handled almost as gingerly as cruisers, and their extra speed, if they have any, is thrown away.
Now it would seem that that admiral whose tactics required the armor to do its share in the fight as well as the guns, and which made the knot more speed compensate in some way for the consequent lighter battery, would be more worthy of success than the one who treated his ships like so many units.
The fact is, the effect of gun fire under battle conditions is as much overrated as the defensive power of armor is underrated. The battleships are built to stand punishment, and if any of them are disabled by gun fire alone, it will be because of a lack of armor rather than in spite of it.
Thus far the characteristics of individual ships seem to have been assigned neither credit nor debit values in naval tactics. In fact, two of the most important of all, namely, ammunition supply and marksmanship, have not been mentioned at all; yet both of these are deeply involved, and merit early consideration in the design of the ship.
One agrees with Lieutenant Niblack that we must deduce tactics to fit the ships we have. But then our ships should be designed to fit the grand tactics best adapted to the exigencies of the national defense; so that actually the best minor tactics are derived ultimately from the best grand tactics. Thus grand tactics will fix the size of the fleet, its disposition, and the duties and responsibilities of its various subdivisions. And the duties of the individuals should determine their draught, coal supply, speed, offensive and defensive powers, and finally, the minor tactics.
For example, it is possible for a nimble opponent with numerous ships to establish a flexible blockade, which would recede without breaking before a sortie of coast-defense vessels, only to flow back when the pressure was relieved. And this might continue indefinitely before one or more ports, until there was concentrated an overwhelming fleet capable of crushing the defenders of each port in succession. This seems to indicate the advisability of adding to our purely defensive fleet of battle-ships a number of powerful armored cruisers carrying lo or 12-inch guns. In these vessels the offensive should predominate. It is asked, however, that the supply of ammunition to their guns should at least be no more precarious than the service of the guns themselves. They should have speed and a great radius of action; in fact, they should be the stormy petrels of the Navy; and living and fighting at sea, the question of draught should not be permitted to impair their efficiency.
With regard, however, to the defending fleet. Our coast and harbor defense vessels cannot choose their opponents. They must take issue with any and all who come. Reliability and endurance are, therefore, qualities which in these vessels should overshadow all others. At the same time their offensive powers must be great, or they will fail in their purpose of intimidating or destroying the enemy, while perhaps not suffering destruction themselves. It must be admitted that when the individual organizations lack the quality of endurance, to say nothing of permanence, the most brilliantly conceived evolution may result in confusion, if not demoralization. Failure to consider this fact must condemn any tactics. Yet theorists regard a ship as more or less formidable, if we take the diagrams, according to the energies of its gun fires and the arcs over which these energies may be delivered. Nothing is said of the vulnerability of the ship, and yet upon that more than the dependent gun fire, speed, or any other quality, rests its ability to carry out its part of the evolution and maintain the fight. It seems no more than common-sense and good military practice to take full account of the effect of more than probable disasters. It is the weak points in a ship's design, and its interior organization as affected and dependent upon that design, which will determine its value and reliability in war, quite as much, if not more than, the arcs and energies of its gun fire.
The less vulnerable the battle-ships are, the more independent they will be; the greater the power to extend a line of battle without rendering it fatally weak, or to undertake isolated movements without fear of being destroyed in detail. With an extended formation every gun may be brought to bear, while concentration is certain to mask some of them.
The time interval mentioned by Lieut. Niblack is most important as affecting concentration of fire when the fleets are moving past each other. If, for example, it is intended to concentrate the fire upon a certain squadron or division of the enemy, and the opportunity or necessity for a "charge through" presents itself, the formation of columns of sections in three lines as proposed by Lieut. Niblack is undoubtedly most powerful. I prefer, however, on account of the time interval, to go farther and close up the lines for the charge, forming from each column of sections an indented column. For the enemy has a time interval as well as ourselves, so that if we can place a new Hartford at the head of the column to take the first shock without faltering, the advantage of the continuous concentrated fire delivered by each succeeding ship as it approaches and passes through the enemy's line is evident. In fact the two ships between which each column passes would have received six successive broadsides at close range while delivering only one, or perhaps two, at widely separated ships. If the charge had been made in lines, each line would have received its broadside.
In all evolutions of this character the time interval and the relation which it bears to the range of effective gun fire—and that varies with marksmen, weather, guns, and defensive powers—is most important. Full credit should also be given to the natural defensive advantages possessed by every armored ship in a naval engagement. The gun rarely, if ever, can obtain favorable simultaneous conditions of normal impact, short range, and precision of fire. For that reason armored ships should be required to maneuver boldly, making as full use of their defensive as of their offensive powers. The advisability of such action, however, does not seem to be brought out clearly in any tactics. When the effort is not made to obtain all the advantage possible from the enemy's time interval by bringing a column of as many vessels successively past the point of attack in that time as possible, the "charge through" partakes more of the desperate effort of a losing side.
It is true that in the "charge through" in lines six cables apart, certain of the enemy's ships will be exposed successively to the fire of several of our ships, and therefore, supposing all the ships equal in other respects, they will have borne all the casualties, which in our own case is distributed over a larger number of vessels. Nevertheless, this plan seems to me advantageous only as an offensive-defensive method of fighting. For the fire of the weaker second and third lines is masked by the first line, which takes the brunt of the attack. In other words, offensive power is sacrificed to an extent in order to obtain a lesser advantage with less risk. It is therefore the method of fighting which would suggest itself to that admiral whose guns are less powerful but more quickly served than his opponent's, whose vessels are light and speedy rather than weighted down with armor; it is in fact the maneuver of cruisers rather than of battle-ships. With battle-ships having a slow fire the defensive arrangements become all the more important; still the masking of their guns through formation in masses causes a most serious loss of offensive power. If, for example, a 13-inch gun cannot be counted upon to deliver more than ten shots an hour, it is evident that they should be in action continuously in order to obtain effects at all commensurate with their energies, otherwise fragile cruisers and lesser guns will have played their part and perhaps have passed away before the real power of the fleet is felt. Delayed action is always sought by those seeking to avoid or fearing a general engagement. If the defensive power of our battle-ships is sufficient and as great as it should be, the best effect as to concentration of our own fire and the scattering or weakening of the enemy's would be obtained by deploying our own vessels around those of the enemy when massed.
Apart from the loss of offensive power, there seem many dangers connected with the "charge through" in lines. Take, for example, our fleet in three lines of six or more vessels, each about to make a "charge through" the enemy's left division of six ships. It is evident that with so many vessels to arrange with due regard to their speed and powers of offense and defense, this opportunity must have presented itself, rather than have been intentionally brought about; unless of course our vessels are far more speedy than those of the enemy, or the latter has adopted a purely passive defense. However little time the preparation for this movement has taken, it is hardly possible that it could have escaped comprehension by the enemy. It seems also that the order for the charge past must have been given at some point outside of battle range; also that once the charge is commenced, inextricable confusion is apt to result from an unexpected change of plan when under fire. If there is time, however, for the enemy to make a single signal, what was a decided advantage to us may become a disaster. All that would be necessary for him to do would be to retract his left flank by forming the division to the rear into column, right vessel leading. This movement should be direct and at reserve speed, for time is precious and each ship must for the moment look out for itself. During the maneuver the broadsides of six vessels are brought to bear on the three heads of the charging columns of sections. When the division has formed column, the charging lines, after having received the port bow fire of the enemy's entire fleet, must pass in succession the six ships of the column, receiving a broadside from each, while each line, on account of the masking of guns and the time interval, is capable of delivering in return a broadside from but two ships. If we suppose the enemy's fleet to be also composed of three divisions of six ships each, it is probable he would find a way of continuing and improving his advantage. It is evident that a minute or two lost in such a maneuver may turn possible victory into defeat; so that Lieutenant Niblack's recommendations as to the simplicity and small number of battle signals, as well as the necessity of a great variety of methods of publishing them, is of vital importance.
Possibly our admiral would endeavor to avert disaster by forming his lines into echelons, the right leading, so as to bring all of his guns to bear, and he might charge with that signal flying, otherwise confusion seems inevitable.
The advantage seems to rest with that fleet which last adopts a more favorable formation before entering within battle range, and in that respect the advantage of a sudden and unexpected resort to reserve speed is clearly indicated. Direct movements will perhaps permit the quickest and best results to be obtained on such occasions; moreover, the object and resulting formation obtained by a direct movement, in which reserve speed is used, is hardly clear to the enemy until it is practically completed. This cannot be said of rectangular and successive movements. It is proposed in fact that however slowly a formation may advance, the changes of formation in the enemy's presence should be rapid. Nevertheless, with a raw or insufficiently drilled fleet, it seems advisable to adhere to rectangular movements and standard speed.
This makes all the more clear the importance of the previous knowledge of plans upon which Lieutenant Niblack has insisted. The ability to execute them may vary momentarily; it is dependent upon the rigor of the training and the effective organization of the fleet, however, rather than upon that of the individual ships. In fact, a thorough fleet training is absolutely necessary if it is hoped to profit by the advantages claimed for the defense of our coast by vessels especially designed for that purpose.
With regard to reserve speed. If all movements are to be successive, then it will be practically impossible to obtain the greatest efficiency under favorable conditions from all of our ships. In other words, various important battle characteristics in certain of our ships have been sacrificed to an extent in order to obtain a higher speed. If, then, we fail to make use of this greater speed, we are not fighting these ships to the best advantage; they have in fact lost not only prestige, but actual power on joining the fleet. The loss of what otherwise might have been increased gun fire or armor protection, which would thus be experienced by a large number of our ships should they be formed into a fleet, would be enormous. I would suggest as a preliminary formation that would make both armor and speed do their part in the fight, columns of divisions in line abreast. Let the heads of the columns be the best protected, and hence, perhaps, the slowest ships, the rear to be the fleetest, and thus most able to quickly change the formation. It seems almost axiomatic that all movements, in the immediate presence of the enemy, should as far as possible be based upon the slowest ships. The admiral must favor them in every way possible. If the battle is not joined in their vicinity, they may never get in it at all, or get in it too late. However he may use his faster ships to cloak his actual intentions, the final maneuver should be such that the least loss results from the peculiar weaknesses of the different ships, and the maximum offensive power is brought to bear on the enemy.
It would seem that during the period of approach to the enemy more attention should be paid to tactics than to an effective delivery of gun fire from individual ships. The formation should be such as presents the greatest number of alternatives for engagement. The enemy is thereby rendered uncertain and puzzled; his movements can be most easily countered, and your own initiated. Of course get as much out of the guns as possible, but no really important advantage will be secured by long-range firing against an opponent who is at all formidable. The probability of hitting a ship bows on at 2000 yards range is of course great, the angle subtended by her beam being about 35°; but unless she is very weakly armored, the obliquity of the impact is so great that penetration will hardly be obtained except over unprotected surfaces. The angle of descent of the projectiles at that range is not sufficient to produce any material advantage from a "bows on" fire, and if the range is increased until any actual advantage is obtained from this angle of fall, the chances of hitting would become exceedingly small. On the other hand a very direct, and hence powerful, fire, with a plunging effect, may be obtained when through unbalanced turrets the enemy's ships are heavily listed merely by training the guns abeam. There are a number of such ships in foreign navies; of course broadside engagements will be avoided by them and sought by their opponents. When listed, the belt on the near side is rolled under water, and that on the far side lifted out. In either case the machinery space is much exposed.
The unprotected portion of the target offered to the enemy when "bows on" is quite small; still if it is struck, it is possible that much more damage will be done than when the broadside is exposed.
As for the broadside position. The difficulty of seriously injuring a hostile ship which is on the alert and moving at a moderate speed, by ramming, is very great. It is not believed that special precautions as to formation need be taken to avoid this kind of attack by the enemy's line of battle. Any formation would, however, be thrown into confusion if it was necessary for the individuals to avoid rams; doubtless this will be the chief result accomplished by vessels of that description. While feeling the force of Lieutenant Niblack's objections to the echelon formation for slow ships, it seems evident that most of them can be overcome by the use of direct movements and reserve speed. Undoubtedly if an echelon be "attacked on its flank in the direction of its line of bearing, the fire of all the ships on that bearing is blanked." The same thing, however, can be said of a line. The echelon has the advantages of both line and column, with the disadvantage that a readjustment of distance is required if a change to either one or the other be made. Should the admiral with his fleet in echelon permit it to be attacked in flank, it would be little or no worse for him than if the mishap occurred when he was in line or column.
At the risk of taking up too much space in a digression, I must protest against the employment of the diagrams showing the arcs of train and energies of the guns of different ships as representing the efficiencies of their gun fire. It is granted that custom has sanctioned it, but it is nevertheless far from being correct. The fact is these diagrams, viewed in this light, represent the summation of an indefinite number of constant values or possibilities of energy, delivered under ideal conditions which continue over an indefinite period of time. Such a comparison would be of little value even if the work of our battle-ships was limited to bombarding defenseless cities or sinking peaceful merchantmen. For if the diagrams are true for one broadside, then they are not true for the other at the same time; if they are correct on any line at one moment, they cannot be correct on any other for a period of from one to six minutes. The diagram in fact merely conveys a limited amount of information which is seriously qualified by conditions of which it says nothing. The object of the battle is to produce changes, disastrous changes, in our adversary; and we know that we too will suffer from them—that some of our ships are more vulnerable than others and will suffer earlier and more severely.
There is not a ship designed but has its special features, its advantages and its disadvantages; and both in some ships are so glaring and important that doubt and appreciation, fear and favor, alternately claim our consideration. But so long as the attention can be kept riveted upon such diagrams of gun fire the designer's task is easy; it is merely necessary to multiply guns to compensate for lack of position; it is no matter whether the guns can be fired without mutual interference or not, for on that point, and on all others that affect their service, the diagram is discreetly silent.
It gives the low-lying 12-inch guns of the Puritan the same precision of fire and independence of sea conditions as those on the battle-ship Iowa. So far as the turrets themselves are concerned, those on the Iowa, being somewhat larger, may be hit more frequently; but the Puritan's face-hardened turret armor is but 8 inches thick, while that of the Iowa is from 15 to 17 inches thick. The diagram does not take that into account. Neither does it mention the fact that while the Puritan's ammunition supply is absolutely safe and that of the Iowa as nearly so as armor can make it, little can be said in this respect about the Texas.
It is true that in the Baltimore we have two bow and stern 8-inch guns, while on the Charleston we have but one, and therefore in a fight to the death against odds, should either ship lose her maneuvering power so as to permit an enemy to lie on each beam, the Baltimore would have a distinct advantage over the Charleston. Not that I think much of this advantage, since to produce the necessary conditions, both ships must previously have been either out-maneuvered or out-fought. There have been cases in our naval history where one of our ships has fought against great odds and even captured two of the enemy, but there is nothing to indicate that our captains permitted their opponents to choose their own position or take any advantage from their superiority in numbers.
The diagram does not recognize the very important fact that on the Charleston the one gun has twice the arc of fire of either on the Baltimore. This in itself, so far as precision and marksmanship are concerned, is a great advantage, especially when the target is near at hand and moving rapidly, as would necessarily be the case should the attempt be made to take vessels of the Baltimore or Charleston types at a disadvantage.
The fact is, the limiting lines of the arcs of the diagrams would be far from full length or sharp and clear if the effect of the energy, rather than its mere delivery, was considered. As the end of the arc of train is approached the marksmanship inevitably falls off, there is perhaps undue haste; certainly the full benefit of all the arc cannot be obtained. When the next gun takes up its duty, it is a lucky shot indeed that is well placed the instant the target comes into the field. These difficulties of course multiply with the subdivision of the field, but there would be nothing in these diagrams to show the difference between eighteen guns, each covering a successive arc of 10°, and a single gun capable of continuous train over the entire 180°. They do not show that a pair of 8-inch guns has been given the command of those on the Indiana, with an ammunition supply as assured as that of the 12-inch guns on the Iowa, and that while the turret containing these guns is far smaller than that containing the 12-inch guns of the Puritan, the guns in the former would undoubtedly give a good account of themselves in a duel, although unequal to the task of perforating the latter's turret.
This is a time when on one hand a cry of alarm goes up against the cramming of our battle-ships with delicate and complicated means of interior communication, as if their possible failure would constitute a serious weakness not otherwise existing, and only to be avoided by denying ourselves these facilities. On the other hand, it is often stated that the fire control on the larger ships is almost certainly lost to the commanding officer on account of the distances and subdivision of the vessel. Not that I agree with either of these, for there seems no reason why the officers of the different gun stations and turrets should not be as well informed as to the commanding officer's wishes as those in the engine and steering rooms, except that the number of stations is great, and opportunity will be lost in the time required to transmit instructions rather than conventional signals. Gratitude must, however, be felt to the promoters of the design which, without sacrificing the fire of the guns, diminishes the important stations to one-third of their present number, making it in fact as easy to control the main battery of a great ship as it is the twin engines which propel her.
For want of a better arrangement these diagrams must be employed to represent the different ships in the war game, but only conventionally and with due consideration of the changes which would undoubtedly take place in the various ships as the battle progressed; for example, it may be expected that long after the supply of ammunition to the 8-inch guns of the Indiana is cut off and their turrets perhaps wrecked, the 8-inch guns of the Kearsarge will be as formidable as ever.
Ensign Philip Andrews, U.S.N.—Lieut. Niblack's exhaustive and clever presentation of the various questions connected with the conduct of a fleet in action will undoubtedly result in his primary object—of stimulating interest and discussion, and thus turning more minds toward a subject than which there is none more important for naval officers.
It is certain that modern naval tactics must be largely theoretical, as we have practically no modern engagements from which to deduce lessons.
In spite of warnings against applying the principles of military grand tactics to the tactics of steam vessels, I believe that this must be done. Broadly speaking, it seems logical to assume that fleet tactics (ships being practically independent of wind and weather) may be likened to the movements of masses of troops on shore.
The idea that the changed weapons of modern warfare demand widely different tactics from olden times is, I believe, what has led to so much divergence of opinion: one man favors the gun, or the torpedo, or the ram; the result is confusion.
The weapon of the past, and of to-day, is the gun, and so far more important is it than the ram or torpedo that it seems necessary to consider battle tactics only with reference to the gun, since the use of the ram and torpedo in fleet actions will be only occasional and largely accidental.
The fact that the gun has increased in penetrative power I do not believe will invalidate the plain lessons to be drawn from the study of naval and military history and tactics of the past and the valuable object lessons of battles of bygone times; for with the advancement of the gun has come protection to meet it (in the fighters), or speed for defense (in those that run away). The ratio of the elements of offense and defense continues to be about the same.
Taking up Lieut. Niblack's tactical propositions, it may be noted that he enunciates them "as the principles on which any scheme of fleet battle tactics must be developed."
Taking the first, it seems to me that the captain cannot possibly keep track of all the things counted necessary for him to know, or handle all the weapons which communication has placed at his hand. With the complexity of the present war ships the captain should occupy much the same position as the general of an army—his corps of subordinates, within reach of his voice, should control the ship and her weapons.
I would suggest that instead of boxing the captain, several officers and a helmsman in a conning tower with about fifteen things to handle, that an armored space similar to a turret be provided (of size suited to the ship), which would contain the means for controlling the ship and her weapons, and enough officers to carry out without confusion the captain's general directions.
The captain's mind should be freed from annoying details during the conduct of an action, and it would be better if he could not see the wheel or the other details usual in a conning tower. If he himself is stationed in a small conning tower communicating with, and directly over the armored space containing the means necessary to carry out his orders, he can more coolly direct his ship and give his orders. One officer might control the battery directly, another the torpedoes, another the position of the ship in squadron, etc.
We all know that the officer directing the movements of the ship should not be at the wheel himself, and on the same principle it seems to me that the captain's attention should not be distracted by any possibility of having to attend to any detail himself.
2nd proposition. I think all signaling in tactical evolutions should be by whistle or siren. Either can be heard to the limits of a good-sized squadron, as every officer knows who has heard the flagship at the head of a column in a fog.
The necessity for limiting the number of battle signals then largely disappears, as sound signals can be quickly made, and, if necessary, repeated from ship to ship. It is easy to have a number of whistles, in case one is shot away. I think we are all pretty well impressed in this squadron with the lack of success attained with flag signals, even without halliards being shot away.
6th proposition. I believe in direct movements, and only in rectangular movements when you lack sea-room and time; but neither apply in the system of battle tactics to which I refer later on. When either a rectangular or a direct movement is necessary, I would prefer the direct, and believe (leaving aside the considerations of sea-room and time) that the objections to it are caused by lack of homogeneity of our war vessels, which should be remedied by gradually forming homogeneous squadrons of all classes as the Navy increases in size. No system of tactics can be evolved, nor one properly tested, in a squadron which contains the Montgomery and Columbia.
17th proposition. This seems the most valuable of all the tactical propositions. "Tactics should, by judicious formations, aim (b) offensively to reduce the tactical efficiency of the enemy by concentrating the attack on one or more of the units of his fleet, particularly on the flank, or on a manifestly weak part of his formation."
This is the backbone of all tactics, whether on land or sea, and should be a motto in preparing any system of tactics.
Captain Taylor, in a paper on Battle Tactics, in Whole Number 2,7 of the Naval Institute, points out the value of concentration, and suggests a solid square for the approach to the attack, in order that the principle of concentration may be carried out and the greater number of vessels thrown upon the less. This is the system of tactics which I think will prove the best, whether the solid square is the best form of massing or not; some massed formation will, I believe, be used for the advance to the attack, and deployment will be made for close action according to the formation of the enemy's fleet. I do not think that it will be possible, however, to deceive the enemy by feigning an attack on one point and then attacking another. That is a principle of military tactics made inadvisable by the fact that movements are too clearly seen and gun fire too unimpeded, and a feint simply means longer exposure to gun fire in a formation making a big target.
The 24th proposition, "that the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line in some form or other," and the 3rd proposition, of the fleet in action on the open sea, "that a charge through, line to line, with the enemy, should be eagerly sought for, and tactically striven for," I believe is subordinating grand tactics to minor tactics, and that these are incorrect conclusions based on probably good premises.
The handling of a fleet worthy the name is grand tactics. The fact that steam fleets of to-day have the advantage in certainty of movement over sailing fleets but emphasizes the necessity of a system of grand tactics which does not include a charge through as a desideratum
In this connection I cannot do better than refer to an article "On the Study of Naval History" by Admiral Luce, in Whole Number 41 of the Naval Institute, from which I will now quote:
"For it should be remembered that in Howe's great battle of the 1st of June (1794) he exhibited no such fighting tactics as was afterwards practiced by Nelson. With his accustomed exactness he formed his line with great precision and stood down for the French fleet, each ship steering for her opposite, with the intention that all should pass through and haul to the wind, to leeward of the French line. There is no hint of crushing any one part of the enemy's force by overwhelming numbers; no indication of an intention of doubling on the van or center, or of placing the enemy between two fires. It was simply the old custom of placing ship against ship, and allowing a great fleet fight to resolve itself into a series of single engagements. The result was the customary indecisive battle, and consequent popular dissatisfaction. Howe, then, was not a tactician in the sense that Nelson was…
"Minor tactics change with the change of arms or improvements in naval architecture. Not so with grand tactics. But whether it was Phormio or Agrippa or Russell, a Nelson or a Perry, the victory has generally been with that leader who had the skill to throw two or more of his own ships on one of the enemy. That is one of the most valuable lessons of all naval history, and that, it may be stated here, is one of the fundamental principles of our science. It is the capacity to carry out that principle that gives evidence of the skillful tactician. It is the ignoring of that principle that serves as one of the most impressive warnings of naval history…"
The excellent chart of diagrams of gun fire which Mr. Niblack has prepared, with the cost of the vessels represented on the same sheet, would be excellent material to use on Congress as an argument in favor of battle-ships, and we would have no more Columbias. Such commerce destroyers would be supplied by the merchant marine.
The use of language as an expression of ideas by one, and the understanding of it by another, being often different, I must confess that I am not entirely clear as to all of Mr. Niblack's propositions, and seem to find occasional contradictions in them. It is more than likely that my criticism—where criticism is found—is due to not entirely catching the meaning intended.
Captain H.C. Taylor, U.S.N.—An active mind working upon a professional topic of such importance as naval tactics must always produce results of interest, and the more so if the topic is one that has hitherto been neglected. It is not possible to touch upon all parts of the extensive field which our essayist covers, but a few remarks may not be out of place, coming from the Naval War College, whose interest in tactical questions increases as the subject is better understood. The diagrams by which Lieutenant Niblack illustrates the values of the different arcs of fire from typical ships in our Navy are destined to be of much service in working out questions of tactical formations, and it is found at the College that these diagrams repay long and attentive examination.
As to the indented line, there are some who believe that no object is gained in thus forming the line, and that the natural irregularity of the best formed line or column in the open sea is so great that the effort to indent it would produce greater confusion, and is, in fact, a striving after too fine a result in the case of great ships, rough seas, and the confusion of battle.
The essayist's plan of charging through in columns of sections has, I believe, much to recommend it, and the principle might perhaps be carried further. It has been suggested that a line of nine ships should charge in three columns of three each, sixteen ships in four columns of four each, or in such proportions as may be found desirable with varying speeds and different classes of ships.
I will not attempt to touch upon all parts of this excellent essay, and will only say that it shows throughout that a thorough examination of tactical questions has been made and that the conditions of naval warfare have been kept constantly in mind, resulting in the production of a most valuable professional work.
Lieutenant Niblack will, I am sure, permit me to suggest the advisability of extending and enlarging our idea of naval tactics and of including in it something more than questions of line, column, evolution, and the relative places of ships and their distances and lines of bearing. We recognize that there is something more in the tactics of armies than questions of depth of lines of battle, positions of artillery, and how cavalry shall be placed. These are not tactics themselves, they are only methods of carrying out a controlling tactical idea.
These ideas or governing principles of tactics, though few in number, are of various and diverse application as influenced by conditions of configuration of ground, hills and rivers, and by natural obstacles and strongholds.
It is very desirable that naval officers should give their minds to a full consideration of similar conditions in their effect upon the tactics of fleets. There will be little opportunity for this in open sea fighting, though even there the larger tactical principles must be first considered; but we may reasonably expect a great proportion of fleet battles under steam to be fought under such conditions of adjacent land and shoals, channels and islands, as to make their success largely dependent upon the advantage taken of these circumstances.
I would suggest to the essayist and all officers, therefore, to give much thought for the next few years to the broader field of tactics, in which must originate those primal laws which are to guide us in the choice of line, column or echelon, as well as in all the other numerous details of tactical drill.