INTRODUCTION.
By Captain H. C. Taylor, U. S. Navy, President of the U. S. Naval War College.
The war between China and Japan began at a moment when the War College was engaged upon problems of naval campaigns. Some officers had already taken up, as an example of strategic principles, a situation based upon hostilities between those nations, with Corea as a theater of operations. It was natural therefore that actual war coming at such a time should engross much of the attention of the officers in attendance during the session of 1894. At the close of the war I requested Captain Wallach, of the permanent staff of the College, to embody in a series of lectures the military operations of the Chinese and Japanese forces and his commentaries thereon. These lectures were read during the session of 1895, and his method of treating the subject proved so interesting that the Naval Institute invited him to publish them under its auspices.
The special value of Captain Wallach's work lies in the comparisons which his historical studies enabled him to draw between the Japanese campaigns and those of former wars, by means of which each military operation is classified with those in history among which it properly belongs. In the pursuit of knowledge we find little satisfaction in the contemplation of an isolated fact. It is only after many facts of like qualities are gathered into a homogeneous group that we begin to discover those threads of truth with which alone we may weave the fabric of a sound philosophy. Captain Wallach's study of the war in the East classifies the data at hand, and moves forward another step in the military art by assigning the operations at Ping Yang and elsewhere their due relation to certain campaigns of Frederick and other leaders. His work is therefore something more than a correct narrative of military events, and will claim the attention of officers on account of its interesting analogies, by means of which we discern more clearly the principles of success and failure, however different may be the military situations which they dominate.
H. C. Taylor.
The narrative of events contained in these lectures was prepared from various reports from the seat of war, chiefly those published in the Army and Navy Gazette, London, and the New York Herald.
The following works were also consulted and drawn upon, viz.:
The Comte de Paris' History of the civil war in America, Jomini's Art of war, Mercur's Art of war, Soady's Lessons of war, Hamley's Operations of war, Derrecagaix's Modern war, Hozier's Seven weeks' war, German official account of the Franco-German war 1870-71, Dufour's Strategy and tactics, Brackenbury's Field fortifications, Greene's Russian army and its campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78, Johnston's Narrative, James' Modern strategy, in United Service Magazine, Fix's Manual of strategy, Gust's Annals of the wars of the 18th century, Jomini's Life of Napoleon, Von der Goltz's Nation in arms, D'Armit's Intrenched camps, in Journal Military Service Institution, Dodge's Caesar, Colomb's Naval warfare, Colomb's Essays on naval defense.
Operations of the First Japanese Army.
In June, 1894, China landed a force of 2000 men at Asan to quell disorders which had assumed such proportions as to be beyond the control of the Corean government. This force was unable to move for a considerable time through lack of preparation for a campaign.
As soon as the Japanese government learned of this step it promptly despatched a force of from 4000 to 5000 men to Chemulpo under convoy of several warships. These troops occupied Seoul without opposition, and cut off the lesser Chinese force from its own frontier and the possibility of succor from that direction. On the other hand, should China continue to throw troops into Corea by way of Asan, there confronted Japan the danger of having its troops hemmed in between two superior forces, since in an invasion of Corea the great mass of Chinese troops would enter it from the north. This danger, however, was averted by the Japanese continuing to pour in troops by way of Chemulpo until their force was self-sustaining. The Kowshing disaster also rendered it highly improbable that Chinese reinforcements would be sent over sea until the command of that element had been secured. During July 27 and 28 several actions occurred in the vicinity of Asan, where the Chinese were attacked in superior numbers. In one of these actions, during a night attack two Japanese divisions fired into each other, doing much damage. The Chinese admit that of the 1500 men lost by their enemy, by far the greater portion fell from their own fire. While the Chinese camp was cut to pieces, the major portion of the troops succeeded in cutting their way through the attackers' lines, retreating to Yoju and escaping to the northward and eastward of Seoul. Keeping to the mountains they eventually, after 26 days of more or less fighting, joined the main body of Chinese encamped at Ping Yang.
This was unquestionably a clever piece of work, as the only avenue of escape was by passing to the eastward of the Japanese force near Seoul, the moral effect of the sinking of the Kowshing leaving little hope of being reinforced by troops from over the sea. The Japanese being in much greater force, their failure to intercept the Chinese can only be accounted for on the ground that they regarded an attempt to march from Asan to Ping Yang, a distance of 200 miles, through such difficult country, as hopeless. For several weeks subsequent to the actions about Asan, a series of combats and affairs between outposts and advance guards took place, the result of the Japanese advance northward.
In the early part of September the Chinese main force occupied a naturally strong position at Ping Yang on the Tatong River, which they had further strengthened with entrenchments, throwing forward advanced posts in the direction of Seoul.
The Japanese, owing to the criminal inertness[*] of the enemy's fleet, had been landing troops unmolested under cover of their cruisers at Gensan on the east coast of Corea, at Chemulpo, and at Hwangju, at the mouth of the Tatong River. This last force the Chinese General Yeh, the same who escaped from Asan, claimed to have destroyed, but as these troops, reinforced by marines and seamen from the fleet, performed such efficient service at the battle of Ping Yang, his statement was apocryphal.
The Japanese converged upon Ping Yang in three columns: the first from Gensan, the second from Seoul, and the third from Hwangju. The paths over the mountains from Gensan were believed to be impracticable for a force of any considerable size, and no great apprehension was felt in this direction by the Chinese, yet the arrival of these troops upon the field with such admirable punctuality demonstrates the skill with which they surmounted all difficulties, and reminds us of General Gourko's march over the Balkans in 1877.
By the night of Friday, September 14, the three Japanese columns were in position for a combined attack, and each in touch with the others. The first, or Gensan column, advancing from the northward, lay in rear of the stronghold; the second, or Seoul column, composed of several divisions, threatened it from the eastward; while the third, or Hwangju column, approaching from the westward, lay in front of the works south of the town.
Ping Yang, itself a natural stronghold, had been added to by the construction of a series of earthworks with modern armaments and manned by China's finest troops. In the main fort, or castle, close to the city gates, there were three Krupp field pieces and several Gatling guns, while all the troops carried Spencer or Mauser rifles, and there was no lack of ammunition. There were one or more field pieces and several Gatling guns in each earthwork and masked fort. Altogether the Chinese troops were entrenched at twenty-five different points, and besides the main castle there were five other large and well armed forts,—two to the south and one to the north of the city and main castle, and two on the banks of the river opposite the city. The masked fort to the northward of the castle is reported to have been the best piece of military engineering ever accomplished by the Chinese. These forts were supplemented by numerous fieldworks. On the banks of the river opposite the city, on a hillside among the pine-trees, were two forts, flanked by two fieldworks, with two more in advance.
It was against these works that the Chinese expected the attack would be made, and had gathered there in greatest force. The Seoul column advancing in this direction had been reinforced by another detachment from the south, and was under the command of Major General Oshima, who began the fight by opening fire with his artillery at daybreak on Saturday, September 15, continuing the bombardment until after noon; the Chinese, whose position in this quarter was recognized as exceptionally strong, replying with a brisk cannonade. At 2 p.m. the Japanese infantry advanced, making a feint attack, and under a combined artillery and rifle fire succeeded in capturing the advanced positions, and discovered that the works in rear had suffered considerably from the bombardment. Desultory firing continued during the night with a view to fixing the attention of the defenders in this direction. This proved so successful that the first and third columns were enabled to close in on the rear and right flank to within 100 yards of the works, the Chinese remaining in ignorance of these movements until the real attack commenced at 3 o'clock on the following morning.
The combined attack of these three forces was executed with perfect precision and regularity. The Seoul column advanced against the hillside forts, but were received with such an effective fire from the Krupp and Gatling guns as to cause the commander of the attacking troops quickly to divide his detachment into two wings. As the Japanese troops neared the works the Chinese fire ceased, but when they reached the walls of the fort the defenders made a desperate charge, and a terrible hand-to-hand conflict ensued, in which the Japanese killed fifty of their adversaries with the bayonet at one spot alone, while the rest of the garrison fled, leaving the Japanese in possession of the works. This occurred at 7 o'clock in the morning. In the meantime a cold drizzling rain set in, increasing to a steady downpour later in the day, adding greatly to the discomfort of the attacking forces. By this time the second wing of the Gensan column had captured a hill commanding the works north of the castle. Placing their fieldpieces upon the crest of this hill, they made the works below untenable, throwing their garrison into a panic and causing them to retreat toward the castle and city in confusion. The western column, in two wings, began the advance against the earthworks and forts to the east at 5 a.m., capturing them by 9 o'clock. The Japanese were thus in possession of all the works outside of Ping Yang with the exception of the castle. Several assaults were made against the gates of the castle, but the resistance at these points was most desperate, and it was after 2 p.m. when the victorious troops, almost worn out from the long-continued fighting and their ammunition well-nigh exhausted, finally occupied the castle and city.
The victory was decisive, the Chinese being dispersed and routed in all directions. The victors claim to have killed 2500 and captured 14,500, among the latter the commander-in-chief and three other generals. They also captured large quantities of equipments, provisions, arms and ammunition, with hundreds of colors. The Japanese reports state that the Chinese defended the position with 20,000 troops, and admit that they outnumbered the Chinese nearly three to one. The Japanese loss was estimated at 30 killed and 270 wounded, including 11 officers.
The concentration and attack on Ping Yang illustrate the successful execution of two of the most difficult and hazardous operations known to military science, requiring ability of the highest order. These are the combined march and the night attack.
Combined marches are generally understood to be those in which two or more armies operating upon separate lines from distant bases, or the corps of a single army marching over separate roads, arrive from two or more directions upon a position occupied by an enemy. There is nothing more influenced by chance than these simultaneous movements; the smallest accident may cause their failure and disarrange the most perfectly laid plans; a body of troops may be led astray by the guide, bad roads may retard the march, streams swollen from a storm may arrest a column, an enterprising enemy may attack one of the detachments, indeed any number of accidents may happen, rendering the operation abortive. The greater the extent of these concentric movements the more they are exposed to chance. There is an inherent element of danger, increasing with the distance separating the forces. Such movements are always attractive from the possibility of enveloping an enemy outweighing the chances of having one of the enveloping detachments beaten before the junction is completed.
This happened four times to the Austrian army between July, 1796, and February, 1797. Four times within this period the Austrians advanced simultaneously into Italy for the relief of Mantua, besieged by Napoleon, who, concentrating his forces in a central position, twice beat in succession the separated corps of Marshal Wurmser, and twice those of Lieutenant General Alvinzi, gaining from the former the victories of Lonato and Castiglione, and from the latter the still more important and celebrated victories of Areola and Rivoli. The last-mentioned victory resulted in the dispersion of the veteran army of the Empire, the abandonment of further efforts for the relief of Mantua, and the transfer of the young Archduke Charles from the field of his successes in Germany to the theater of operations in northern Italy. Again, when France became the theater of war, Napoleon gave striking evidence of the effectiveness of such strategy. For four months he opposed triple his forces, fighting a battle in one place one day, the next marching 25 or 30 miles to attack another enemy. In February, 1814, Napoleon, after beating in detail, with 25,000 men, the four separate detachments comprising the army of Silesia under Blucher, aggregating 60,000, which extended along the Marne River, threatening Paris from the east, and only about 25 miles from it, drove Blucher back upon Chalons. Leaving Marmont with 10,000 men to guard the approaches to Paris from that direction, he lands like a thunderbolt upon the theater of operations of the Grand Allied Army advancing upon Paris from the south, along the Seine. The Grand Army numbered over 100,000, whilst Napoleon's had increased to 30,000 during his march by picking up detachments m route. By surprises and attacks upon detached corps, advance guards, etc., he forces the enemy back, who thus forms a junction with Blucher. Napoleon says: "I expected that the allies would profit by the union of such large forces to offer me a decisive battle…but to my great astonishment they did nothing, and continued their retreat." Referring to these operations, he says he was convinced that it was only by extreme activity that he could compensate for his great inferiority of numbers. He also says of this march to the Seine: "The cavalry marched night and day; the infantry travelled en poste. In this way we m.ade 36 leagues in 36 hours."
Caesar, when surrounded in Gaul by nations in insurrection, extricated himself from his critical position by similar movements. He gave the Gauls neither time nor means to unite: he fought them successively and beat them in detail.
Napoleon said: "When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, each of which has its separate line of operation until they arrive at a point fixed for their concentration, it should be laid down as a principle that their junction should never take place near the enemy, because the enemy by uniting his forces not only may prevent it, but beat them in detail."
Notwithstanding this maxim, the campaign of Waterloo, 1815, which closed the career of this wonderful soldier, opened with the concentration of the widely separated corps of his army upon the field in the presence of the enemy,—an operation attended with such brilliant success as to call forth the highest praise from Jomini. Of it he says (writing as if in the words of Napoleon):
"The plan and commencement of this campaign form one of the most remarkable operations of my life (Napoleon's). Nine corps of infantry and cavalry cantoned from Lille to Metz, by marches most skillfully concealed, concentrated before Charleroi at the very instant that the guard arrived there from Paris. These movements were combined with so much precision that 120,000 men found themselves assembled, the 14th of July, on the Sambre, as if by enchantment. Wellington, occupied in giving fetes at Brussels, thought me at Paris at the moment that my columns presented themselves on the morning of the 15th to cross the Sambre. So little idea had my enemies of these movements that their armies were not even assembled."
He says that if the allies' generals allowed themselves to be surprised, it must be admitted that they had made their preparations with skill, and admits that to prevent Napoleon from maneuvering to separate their armies, wise dispositions had been made and all rallying points well indicated. "But," he says, "wise as these dispositions were, the celerity and impetuosity of my movements might defeat them." Of the concentration of Blucher's corps upon these rallying points he says: "These movements were evidently based on information received from deserters." Denying this statement, Lieutenant General Cust, British army, says Wellington had "consequently well studied his adversary's last campaign of 1814, when he so successfully separated the Prussian and Austrian armies, and had carefully considered the means of thwarting that favorite maneuver of the French conqueror." In the execution of that maneuver Napoleon was excelled by Caesar alone.
Now as the advance of the Japanese columns was over widely separated lines of operation from distant points, and as their junction took place upon the battlefield, in the immediate presence of the enemy, we must regard it as a violation of a principle of strategy as set forth by Napoleon.
In the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 several divisions from widely distant bases advanced simultaneously into Hanover and Hesse Cassel. These combined marches were executed with such consummate skill and punctuality that the Hanoverian army was paralyzed, and large quantities of stores, munitions and guns captured.
The army of the Elbe under General Herwarth was to invade Saxony from the north (Torgau) in conjunction with the advance of the first army under Prince Frederick Charles from the east (Gorlitz). This simultaneous movement was also made with such precision and celerity that the King with his court had barely time to quit Dresden before the combined columns entered the city. Prince Frederick Charles gathered his army together about Gorlitz for the advance into Bohemia simultaneously with that of the army of the Elbe, with which he formed a junction near the Iser River, and the second army under the Crown Prince from Glatz. The concentration of the first and second armies took place upon the field of Koniggratz, the army of the Elbe striking the left of the Austrian position, the first army the center, and the second army the right and rear, throwing the Austrians back upon Koniggratz in confusion. In the Prussian advance upon Koniggratz the first and second armies, advancing over different lines from Gorlitz and Glatz respectively, were separated by an impassable mountain barrier for several days, and on issuing into Bohemia either might have been confronted by a superior army before the concentration of the two armies was effected.
We may set this down as another violation of a principle of Napoleon's strategy. But we may also see in it the birth of Von Moltke's strategy—or rather the principles of strategy as applied by him—brought about by the immense size of modern armies, the facility of communication by means of the railroad, by which alone it is possible to keep these immense armies supplied, and the constant supply of information through the telegraph. Those lightning-like movements of Napoleon's armies from one part of the theater of war to another would have been impossible with the huge masses of to-day. In the days of Napoleon it required a constant interchange of couriers, orderly officers, or aids, between the general headquarters and the several corps, in order that, on the one hand, the chief of staff who prepares the orders of march may be constantly informed how they are carried out, and may communicate to the commanding general the real condition of affairs at any moment; and on the other hand, that the commanders of corps may be kept acquainted with passing events, and instructed as to the necessary modifications of details in carrying out the main plan. All this is now accomplished by means of the telegraph. Forces hundreds of miles apart can now be kept in constant communication with a single directing head, and their movements regulated with the precision and punctuality of the parade ground.
Von Moltke in replying to certain- criticism on his strategy in uniting the two Prussian armies on the field of Koniggratz said: "Armies are now so large that unless you are willing to reduce war to a mere hammer-and-tongs affair, you must have combinations of this kind; it is not possible to have such striking results unless you do bring about these combinations on the actual battlefield; for, if you bring them to pass before the battle, the enemy is likely to know just as much about it as you do; whereas forces which are moving on exterior lines can now be united by the telegraph, and moved with just as much certainty, so far as direction is concerned, as if they were really under the same commander." In Koniggratz and Ping Yang we have striking examples of how great and far-reaching may be the effects of such a combination; and it is claimed that in future it will be one of the resources of the great general to bring about, unknown to his enemy, combination of forces from different points which will unite on the battlefield for a common object.
While the telegraph has greatly facilitated these simultaneous movements, it has increased the possibility of failure through interruption of the lines connecting the several forces with each other and with the central authority. In the combined march upon Koniggratz, telegraphic communication between the two armies was not maintained up to their junction; had it been, their joint attack might have been so timed as to obviate the risk of separate defeat which the premature onset of the first army entailed. Had the Austrians developed their whole power against the seventh division under General Fransecki, which was exposed across the Bistritz, separated by a wide interval from the nearest division, the result would have had a marked effect upon the battle. This division, engaged since 8 in the morning against the enemy's constantly increasing masses, about 11 o'clock found itself in presence of 51 battalions and more than 100 guns without being able to count upon outside support. Its center first gave way, and the danger of having its wings separated appeared. In this critical position Fransecki vainly called for support. Recognizing the importance of the point occupied, he inspired his officers and troops to defend the position to the last extremity, and by their stubbornness held out until the welcome cry of "The Crown Prince is coming" rang out through the thinned ranks and reanimated the exhausted defenders. This simultaneous advance, although directed by the greatest strategist of our day, who pronounced such movements necessary under present conditions, would probably have had disastrous results had it been made against a more competent general than Marshal Benedek, and convinces us of the danger inseparable from such operations.
In this connection, however, we must bear in mind that circumstances, which are always different, must decide in each particular case that arises; for what is the right thing in one case may be injudicious in another. The course to be followed is greatly influenced by the character and capacity of the opposing generals, the quality of the troops, their armament, state of discipline, etc. In 1654 Turenne passed before the Spanish lines within range, thereby losing several men, which occasioned remark among the officers of his staff who accompanied him. His answer was: "It is true, this movement would be imprudent if made in the presence of Conde, but I desire to examine this position closely, and I know the customs of the Spanish service are such that before the Archduke is informed of our proceedings, has given notice of them to Prince Conde and received his advice, I shall be back in my camp." To make these delicate distinctions and do the right thing at the right time, in the right place, is a manifestation of a true genius for war.
It is fair to assume that the Japanese commander was fully alive to the risk attendant upon his movements if attempted against an active and enterprising enemy, but in this particular case the risk was minimized by the failure of the Chinese to recognize the necessity of the employment of those covering detachments which provide security for their own force as well as information regarding the enemy. The Japanese columns are said to have been in constant communication with each other through the field telegraph, and the intelligent manner in which they performed their patrol and reconnoitering duties kept them well informed of the strength and dispositions of the enemy.
In the Koniggratz campaign we find also a wide difference in the practice of the two armies in providing security and information. The Austrian system was much inferior to the Prussian, said to be due chiefly to the want of military education on the part of the officers to whom patrols were entrusted. The Prussian system never failed, never allowed a surprise, while the Austrians were repeatedly surprised and taken unprepared. A Prussian officer on a scout approached the gates of Koniggratz on the evening of the battle without meeting a single Austrian and boldly entered the place, where he was captured. With a ready resource he informed his captors that he had come to demand the surrender of the town, which demand was courteously refused by the Austrian commander, who had him escorted beyond the lines without even asking if he was an accredited representative. At the battle of Koniggratz the Prussian Guards entered Chlum, established themselves on the Austrian flank under cover of a mist and caused defeat. As a matter of fact the troops of the Crown Prince did not fall in with a single patrol till they actually came into collision with the Austrian line of battle. This same activity in scouting duties is noticeable on the part of the Germans in the war of 1870: the French were unable to shake off the touch of the ubiquitous Uhlan watching their movements.
The Japanese have proved themselves worthy pupils of their masters in this direction, and their great success at Ping Yang, as well as at other points, was contributed to in no small measure by the efficiency of their intelligence department and patrol system. Their intelligence department was provided with accurate maps of the country, with all the roads excellently described, with the passages of the rivers, and their width and varying depths recorded with such exactitude as to enable them to adjust their pontoon trains to precisely the width of each of the rivers it would be necessary for them to cross.
Napoleon says: "Every general who operates not in a desert but in an inhabited country, and yet obtains no information, does not know his trade. The greatest military talent is useless if one is not perfectly instructed as to all the movements of the enemy. The faculty of organizing a system of intelligence is a remarkable quality, and requires a profound knowledge of human nature."
The Japanese had also a well organized and equipped field telegraph detachment, and history does not afford us a better example of the capabilities of this useful appliance when intelligently employed. Within ten hours of the capture of Ping Yang the line was established some distance to the rear, a message flashed over it to the Emperor informing him of the victory, and a reply received congratulating the army upon its success.
Ping Yang stood an obstacle to the further advance of the Japanese as Plevna did to that of the Russians in 1877, but what a marked difference in the result! The Russians stumbled without warning upon a force four times as strong as their own, in a position like Ping Yang, naturally strong, increased by entrenchments, and received the first check to a series of brilliant victories, the moral effect of which was very great upon both belligerents. This crushing defeat occurred on July 20, and brought the Russian advance to a halt. Although two bloody assaults were subsequently made, it was necessary to resort to siege operations, after having called out over 300,000 more Russian troops and appealed to the Prince of Romania to place his army of 50,000 men in the field. The entire Russian empire was paralyzed from the date of the first collision till the date of capitulation, December 10. The battles up to that date cost the Russians 40,000 men. One of the great objects of the art of war is to be stronger than your enemy at the right time and at the right place. In this particular Ping Yang was a brilliant success, Plevna a disastrous failure. While the Russians could not have scored such a victory as Ping Yang, had they possessed an intelligence department equal to the Japanese and been as proficient in their patrol and reconnoitering duty, they would at least have been spared a crushing and humiliating defeat.
How different might have been the result of the concentration upon Ping Yang had the Chinese been informed of the strength and movements of the Japanese columns. We have seen that the Chinese had 20,000 men, and that the Japanese admitted they greatly outnumbered their enemy. We have also seen that the second, or Seoul, column was the strongest; the other two columns most probably were each less than 20,000, and as the advance of the Gensan column was through such difficult country, by mere bridle paths over the mountains, it is quite probable it was weaker than the Hwangju column, and therefore much weaker than the Chinese force.[*] With that intelligence of their enemy which they should have possessed, it was possible for them to have received the Japanese as they debouched from the mountain passes, crushing the head of the column as it appeared. Of course this would have precluded any defense of Ping Yang, for we have seen the sound strategy of the Japanese provided for the arrival of the strongest column first, in front of the position, which would have been found empty; nevertheless this would have been far better than the crushing defeat suffered without injury to the victors. The defeat of one of the Japanese detachments would have been a severe blow to their prestige and a needed addition to their own, which was at a very low ebb.
Long experience has shown that the concentrated action of large masses of troops upon a battlefield is impossible at night, and that attempts to continue a general engagement after dark result in confusion, loss of direction, and general disorganization and demoralization of the different units of an army.[†] The great range and destructive effect of modern firearms have caused the advance of a hostile line from extreme to moderate ranges to be accompanied by such great losses that attention has been strongly directed to the practicability of advancing lines of battle to within short distances of the defensive position under cover of darkness. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, which gave us many examples of night fighting, the Russians applied much thought and study to this subject, and the question was debated generally in European military circles. The events in Corea have revived discussion, which is carried on in tactical manuals, setting forth the pros and cons, and submitting regulations which should govern both the attack and the defense.
One of the most remarkable illustrations of a night attack is that upon the formidable fortress of Kars, armed with 300 guns and defended by 25,000 Turks, which was carried, with inconsiderable loss, by a midnight assault. Tel-el-Kebir follows next as an example, in which the necessary conditions, as set forth by modern writers,—highly trained troops, well-understood plan, and a knowledge of the enemy's position—existed; and although the assaulting columns were composed of such splendid troops as the brigade of guards, royal marines, and in fact England's crack regiments, and the advance was made without noise or firing a shot, two columns almost came in collision, though the leading was as good as it could possibly be.
The Japanese commander appreciated the requisites of a successful night assault. He had a sufficient knowledge of the position, had established perfect communication between his columns, his troops were under admirable discipline and ably led, and the real attack was made unexpectedly and decisively,—the result of such an uncommonly favorable combination being a victory more decisive than either of the two just cited. Ping Yang stands out a masterpiece of modern warfare. Indeed, the night operations of the Japanese have caused military experts to assert more boldly that in the next war protection will be sought in darkness to bring troops up closer to fortified positions, and that night operations and night fighting will be resorted to on a much larger scale than ever before; and it is therefore urgently recommended that a complete system of regulations for attack and defense be formulated and practiced assiduously.
During the month following the battle of Ping Yang the Japanese drove the Chinese across the Yalu River, occupying Wiju, where they waited the arrival of their siege guns, while their adversaries worked day and night strengthening their works on the north bank of the Yalu. Detailed information brought in by the Japanese patrols showed that these defenses were not so strong as first reports indicated, and led the commanding general to believe that the main opposition would be encountered at Kiu Lien Cheng, 30 miles west of the Yalu and 120 from Moukden, which prediction proved to be correct.
A detachment of 1600 infantry from the main body crossed the river above the Sukochin ferry north of Wiju, turning the defenses at that point, and attacking them in rear expelled the defenders, who abandoned everything and fled down the river, only firing a few rounds. The detachment occupied the works commanding the ferry, and with the assistance of the light draft vessels of the fleet, which now entered the river, covered the passage of the main body, which was completed and the army in position before Kiu Lien Cheng by early morning of October 26. The tactics so effective at Ping Yang were again resorted to, the advance at daylight being in four columns for a combined attack, but notwithstanding that the city was strongly fortified and garrisoned by 16,000 troops, the Japanese scouts found it empty. 30 guns, a large quantity of ammunition, rice and fodder, and 300 tents thus fell into the hands of the victors.
Detachments made to effect a diversion or a combined march, or for any other motive, are condemned by those writers on the art of war whose rules have been deduced from a study of the campaigns of the great commanders of earlier times. Conclusions are drawn from such experiences as the following:
The Great Frederick in 1759, near Dresden, detached General Fink with 18,000 men to cut the communications of the Austrian army with Bohemia. Fink succeeded in getting in rear of the Austrians, closing the way, but being too weak to hold it, was surrounded and fell into the enemy's hands, although he fought bravely triple his numbers, constantly hoping the army would come to his rescue, but the army was in ignorance of his peril and failed to do so.
Napoleon, upon nearly the same ground in 1813, detached Vandamme's corps after the battle of Dresden for an advance into Bohemia, the main body of the French army being still in the vicinity of Dresden. This detachment experienced at Culm the same fate as that of Fink, except that Vandamme attempted to break through the enemy's line and a part of his corps escaped. This operation cost Napoleon 10,000 or 12,000 excellent troops, and also affected very sensibly the morale of his army through the check it received.
Again, during our war of secession in 1861 General Lyon, confronting a greatly superior enemy, detached Sigel's brigade with two batteries—1420 men, forming a fourth of his command—for an attack upon his adversary's rear, at the battle of Wilson's Creek, in southwestern Missouri. Although Sigel arrived upon the field without mishap and joined in the battle, he was not in communication or within supporting distance of the main force, and his column was completely crushed and dispersed.
According to the maxim of these writers that detachments are dangerous, especially on the eve of battle, which holds good to a certain extent to-day, the Japanese commander was guilty of another violation of the principles of war when he detached 1600 infantry across the river to turn the defenses at the ferry. All the same, the movement breathed the spirit of modem strategy as set forth by the best writers of to-day. Hamley, for instance, in his admirable "Operations of war," says: "In the case of attempting to dislodge an enemy by sending a detachment round his rear, the telegraph will both diminish the risk of the movement and increase the chances of gaining its complete results." It is true the river separated this detachment from its main body, but with the first step in pursuit of it by the Chinese, the Japanese would have thrown their bridges, already adjusted, across the river and fallen upon their rear before they could have struck a blow, for there is no doubt the Japanese detachment was in constant communication with headquarters.
After the capture of Kiu Lien Cheng the Japanese army was divided into two columns. The right marched by Feng Huang Cheng, where it captured 55 guns, 1500 muskets, and large quantities of ammunition and general stores, through the Motien Pass to the vicinity of Liao Yang, driving the Chinese before it in the direction of Moukden. The left column marched upon Siu Yen by way of Taku Shan and drove the Chinese through Haicheng toward Liao Yang. On December 17 these Chinese troops were reported by the outposts of the right column, whose commander decided to intercept them in their march toward Moukden. He overtook them on the morning of the 19th at a small village, when they forced some fierce fighting upon the Japanese, and being some 10,000 strong, the position of the Japanese was becoming desperate when a brigade of the left column came up from Haicheng, securing a victory after five hours of the hottest fighting the first army had yet experienced. After this action Moukden was given up as an objective, and a junction was formed with the second army after it had captured Kaiping, on January 10, 1895. Niuchwang, where was massed a large number of troops, now became the objective of the combined armies.
Operations of the Second Japanese Army.
The second Japanese army, estimated at 30,000 men, including coolies, sailed with sealed orders from Hiroshima under Field Marshal Count Oyama about October 17. This force, in 38 transports provided with 400 small boats and lighters, 100 steam launches and 8 light draft tugs, rendezvoused at the mouth of the Tatong River, which point it reached on October 23, and was there joined by the fleet of 25 warships and 16 torpedo-boats. On the morning of the 24th the fleet sailed, followed by 12 transports, the remainder of the transports following that evening. Upon the arrival of the commander-in-chief on the Chinese coast with the main body the following morning, he found that the commander of the advance guard had already landed a part of his infantry, not a Chinaman being in sight. The point selected as the landing-place was a village on the Chinese coast, just north of the Elliott group of islands and about 85 miles to the northward of Port Arthur, the objective of the army.
With the exception of Talien Bay, close to Port Arthur, there was not a decent landing-place on the coast. It was impossible to land at Talien Bay, the Chinese having fortified the coast and laid down submarine mines. This selection was made not because the place afforded any great facilities for landing, but because the road from Wiju to Port Arthur passed nearer the coast there than elsewhere.
The landing was most difficult, the water being so shallow that the steamers had to anchor 4 or 5 miles from the shore. At low tide it was absolutely impossible to land at all, as the sea uncovered a mile and a half of mud. The difficulty of landing 30,000 men, horses, guns, ammunition, wagons, provisions, tents, ambulances—in short, that vast bulk constituting the equipment of a perfectly appointed expedition—under such conditions, I think all officers can appreciate. Using the tide, however, the landing was accomplished in an expeditious manner without the loss of a man. The only accident attending this operation—recognized as one of the most difficult in war—was the destruction by fire of a transport having on board the ammunition and horses of the siege mortars, just as it was about to unload. The ammunition and horses were all lost. The advance on Port Arthur was begun at once, the army marching in two columns, the right consisting of the first division, the left of the second division.
On the morning of November 6 the first division attacked Kinchow, which was defended by some 1200 infantry and artillery. The guns were poorly served, their firing being weak and badly directed. The outlying works were quickly cleared and panic seized the troops in the inner forts, who fled in disorder, abandoning their guns, standards, and stores, and throwing away their rifles. The first division then joined the second in investing Talien Wan on the opposite coast. This strong position was defended by six forts mounting 80 guns of various patterns. On the evening of November 6 the bombardment of the Chinese position commenced, and on the 7th the works were carried by assault, the garrison of 3000 offering but a slight resistance, retiring in the direction of Port Arthur after firing a few shots.
The advance was resumed on the i8th. The country is very mountainous and the roads execrable, presenting great difficulties to the artillery and supply columns. Five miles from Kinchow, at the neck of the peninsula, the space between the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechili is not a mile and a half wide, one road only runs across it, and a few resolute men could have turned it into a veritable Pass of Thermopylae. This narrow neck once passed, two roads lead to Port Arthur. One, following the shores of the Yellow Sea, reaches the city on the east; the other, running southward along the Gulf of Pechili, enters the city on the north; the bulk of the army marched over the latter. A mixed detachment of one regiment of infantry, a detachment of cavalry and engineers, etc., took the southern road. During November 19 the Japanese covered 25 miles of this exceedingly difficult country, up and down mountains, with a faith in Marshal Saxe's maxim that "victory resides in the legs of the soldiers," the advance guard arriving within 4 miles of the enemy at 8 p.m.
Port Arthur itself lies around a large inlet. From seaward the port is entered by a narrow channel diminishing to less than 300 yards' across within the three-fathom line. This channel runs northward from the open sea for a little less than three-quarters of a mile, for two-thirds of which it is enfiladed by a fort placed on a curving spit on the western shore, known as the Tiger's Tail; while another fort on the opposite bank commands nearly the whole passage. The distance of the first-mentioned fort from the entrance is about 900 yards, the second about 600 yards. The bay outside is also dominated by numerous batteries, which cover a front of nearly 4 miles. These works, twelve in number, were nearly evenly divided between the eastern and western sides of the entrance to the harbor. They were armed with about 50 Krupp guns, varying in calibre from 6 to 9 ½ inches, together with several rifled mortars and rapid-fire guns. The entrance to the port, which was commanded by a hill on either side, from 400 to 450 feet high, was also provided with an elaborate submarine mine defense, supplemented by booms and a flotilla of torpedo-boats. Once the strait was passed, the basin opened out on the eastern side, while on the west the land-locked bay widened suddenly behind the Tiger's Tail into a broad shallow lake. Nature herself had protected this stronghold from a land attack by surrounding it with a semicircular chain of hills from 300 to 600 feet high, both extremities resting upon the Yellow Sea. These hills were crowned with forts connected by miniature Chinese walls, redoubts, and shelter trenches. Across a valley a mile wide, and facing these hills, was another chain of hills which the Japanese seized, the Chinese having failed to occupy them, and established their advanced posts upon the most commanding of them, whence they obtained a good view of the entire Chinese defenses.
On the morning of November 20, the advance guard being the only Japanese troops in position, and most of the artillery some distance away, the Chinese appeared in a new role and began what the Japanese supposed was a very opportune attack, which, had it been executed with any vigor, would most likely have proved disastrous to the latter. As usual, however, it degenerated into a weak demonstration, demoralizing to the troops making it, and encouraging those against whom it was directed. Several shots were fired from the works opposite the hills occupied by the Japanese advanced posts, the shots being directed at the staff officers engaged in studying the ground, after which a column of about 2500 men was seen emerging from the center of the chain of hills constituting the first line of defense. Suddenly a second column appeared advancing towards the Japanese right, and then a third column upon their left. These two columns were each about 2000 strong, and after occupying some hills within range on the flanks of the Japanese positions, waited for the central column, which advanced in fine order about 2 p.m. Two mountain batteries and some infantry from the Japanese main body were brought up in great haste, the guns being posted in good positions on the hills previously selected by the staff. The infantry were partly massed in rear of the front hills and partly extended as skirmishers in front of the guns and between the hills. When the central column was about 1500 yards distant the right mountain guns opened fire, the shells falling in the midst of the leading troops. The column halted for a moment, but a few more shells bursting in the thick of them caused them to turn tail and make for Port Arthur in the wildest disorder. The fire of the guns still pursued them, dropping shrapnel with unerring aim over their heads, completely demoralizing them. While this was going on the right and left columns were simple spectators, fearing to approach any nearer. As soon as the central column had fled beyond range, the Japanese guns paid their respects to the column on their right with the same result, a few shells bursting in their ranks producing a stampede. The right column looked on for a while, but without waiting to be served, turned about and made for their works. All this while the forts were concentrating their fire upon the two batteries, but without effect, their range being too great. By 5 p.m. the last Chinaman had retired without firing a shot.
The remaining artillery as well as the rear guard having arrived, the siege guns were mounted during the night within a mile of the Chinese works. The infantry began the advance at 2 a.m., and under cover of darkness were disposed for the attack. The artillery was posted in the center of the line, commanding the right, left, and center of the Chinese position. The cavalry covered the right flank to prevent the enemy's escape to the westward. The army was divided into a right and a left wing, composed respectively of the first and second divisions, each division being composed of two brigades, with only one battery posted in rear of the center as a reserve. The right wing was to take the three forts opposite them, after which the second division was to attack the enemy's left and the forts in their front.
About 6 a.m. one of the siege mortars opened the fight, and in an instant all the mortars, field and mountain guns, over 40 in all, were pouring shell into the Chinese forts. The Chinese replied promptly with the 12 heavy guns in the three forts on their left, but their practice was bad. The largest of the Chinese sea forts also turned its guns upon the mortars, but without effect, their elevation being too great. The Japanese siege mortars produced little result, their projectiles nearly all falling short, but the field and mountain batteries were served with deadly effect after they had changed their projectiles from shell to shrapnel, having observed that the former had little or no effect upon the walls of the forts, while the latter burst with the utmost precision behind the parapets, spreading death and destruction within the works. The artillery duel lasted about an hour, toward the end of which the fire from the forts became weak and irregular.
As the Japanese guns ceased their fire, the first brigade on the right of the line was led by its chief against the most westerly (or left) of the three forts. Soon after beginning the advance they encountered 1000 Chinese who had sallied from the forts, but a few volleys soon dispersed them. The fort now brought 4 big guns to bear upon these troops, but they advanced steadily under a hail of shell from these guns, supplemented by the fire of a body of infantry behind the parapet. Reaching the foot of the hill, 400 feet below the fort, the brigade halted for a moment to pull itself together, the broken ground now protecting it from the hostile fire. Only a moment, out it came, steadily it advanced up the mountain over this shot-swept zone, without wavering, as if on parade. By 8 o'clock the leading troops were under the parapet, and with a cheer the assault was made and the defenders turned out. The guns of this fort were at once turned upon the two others, but their garrisons seeing the fate of the first fort abandoned them and ran toward the town.
The Japanese left wing was really little more than a mixed brigade, and while it had for its task the capture of the strongest part of the Chinese defenses, consisting of eight forts, upon hills from 400 to 500 feet high, it was not to attack until the works on the Chinese left had been captured, thus taking into account the depressing effect upon their defenders, whilst increasing the ardor of the attackers and inspiring them to greater efforts. This attack upon the enemy's right was to be supported by the heaviest artillery, including 4 long-range guns of 12 centimeters, and was commanded by one of Japan's most promising generals, Kasegawa. The artillery was to reduce the works, when the infantry would make the assault. The execution of this plan however was not equal to its conception. As we have already seen, the transport carrying the ammunition and horses of the siege mortars was destroyed just as it was about to unload. The mortars had therefore hardly any ammunition, and the troops being somewhat new to them did not serve them with such good effect. During the attack of the first division 3 of the long-range guns arrived, but the difficulty of bringing them up to the elevated position selected for them and mounting them was so great that by the time the first gun was fired the infantry had advanced so far to the front as to mask them, and they were of no further use; the consequence was that this single brigade of infantry was confronted with the task of taking these seemingly impregnable forts. It was a little before 9 o'clock that the infantry, which until then had remained hidden, approached in its advance across the valley separating the two chains of hills. During the advance the field artillery, which had been preparing the attack of the right wing, quickly changed from its first position on the left to about a mile from the first of the line of eight forts, and began shelling it. The fort replied briskly, but in a few moments huge clouds of smoke were seen, followed by a terrific explosion. The magazine had gone up and the fort was on fire. As the small shells the Japanese were using were unlikely to cause a conflagration, it is probable that the explosion was caused by the Chinese. The defenders served their guns well, concentrating the fire from the eight works upon the attackers with good effect. Several shells landed in their ranks, raising clouds of dust, earth and stones, but upon clearing, the steady columns could be seen, well closed, marching bravely forward.
At this time the detachment on the southern road along, the Yellow Sea appeared on the left, advancing to the attack over a flat unprotected road under the fire of four of the forts, which was now turned upon them. This fire became hotter as the troops approached nearer; the quick-firing guns, revolving cannon and thousands of small arms joined the big guns in their effort to repel the attack. Had the practice with these weapons been at all skillful the brigade would have been completely wiped out; as it was, their advance was so precise and steady as to call forth exclamations of surprise from the foreign attaches who witnessed it. Reaching the foot of the hills across the valley, the trumpets sounded the charge, and up the hill they swept to the assault; suddenly an enormous cloud of smoke was observed and a great explosion was heard, followed by three others; the Chinese had sprung their mines charged with dynamite which had been laid half-way up the hill. Their excitement and anxiety had caused these deadly auxiliaries to be perfectly ineffective, as they were sprung too soon, and not a man was injured. When the smoke disappeared the attackers were seen under the parapets of three of the forts, not in the least affected by what might have proved demoralizing to the best disciplined troops of any western nation. The infantry entered the works a moment later. The column on the extreme left had also captured the fourth fort, and the advance was promptly resumed against the remaining works, which were quickly abandoned.
It was not quite noon when a great cheer rent the air, announcing the capture of the eleven land forts. The commander-in-chief received the reports of his generals, and at once gave the order for the first division to take the town. The road into the town passed between two hills, the one on the right having a battery of 3 guns on it, served by the best gunners the second army had yet been opposed to. On either side of the road were shelter trenches, the troops being armed with repeating rifles. Although the Japanese made the most intelligent use of the ground it was found impracticable to advance under such a galling fire as they received, and it was not until a small detachment crept around on the flank of the trenches, enfilading them and causing their defenders to retire, that the leading troops crossed the bridge and entered the town, about 2 p.m. Attention was then turned to the only fort not in possession of the Japanese. This was the largest sea fort, which, however, was found deserted, its garrison having escaped. It was just 4 o'clock when the Japanese colors floated over this work, and the chief of staff, saluting the commander-in-chief, modestly said: "Field Marshal, I believe Port Arthur is now in the hands of our soldiers."
Thus fell to the Japanese the finest and most perfectly equipped naval arsenal the Chinese possessed. It contained a dry dock 400 feet long—the only one in China capable of receiving their largest vessels,—its numerous workshops were fitted with the most approved plants for the construction and repairing of vessels, the shops and storehouses being connected with the tidal basin by a railway. There were several fine steam cranes for facilitating loading or unloading war material, for the manufacture of which the foundries and other departments were perfectly equipped, even to the torpedo shops, where these weapons were tested and repaired. In the harbor were two small steamers, a fine sailing ship, an expensive dredger, a partially completed gunboat, several hundred tons of steel rails and 450 fish torpedoes. To these must be added about 100 Krupp guns, thousands of small arms and tons of ammunition, and we have some idea of the value of this victory.
A notable feature of the battle of Port Arthur was the employment for the first time of a new weapon designed for use against fortified positions. After the investment of Paris in 1870-71, Germany and other European nations, as the result of observations upon the extent of injury caused to fortified positions by gunfire, went into the matter of providing batteries of light and short howitzers for moving swiftly upon entrenched positions and works, and crushing them by weight of metal and high angle fire. Krupp of Essen succeeded in producing the piece used by the Japanese, which has already been referred to as a siege mortar. This short howitzer, or mortar, although only of 4 ¾ inches caliber, throws a shell of 80 pounds. The projectile is said to be so long that it protrudes from the muzzle when the piece is loaded. This piece was employed as a general thing in lieu of the regular siege train by the Japanese. We have seen that the best possible results were not obtained from the weapon, owing to a scarcity of ammunition and its novelty in the hands of the troops, who failed to serve it with the efficiency so characteristic of them. It goes to show, however, that the Japanese were possessed of the latest and most improved implements known to their trade.
Port Arthur shows that the second Japanese army was not inferior to the first in its knowledge of the military art. Witness the promptitude with which the staff recognized the fatal error of the Chinese in violating one of the first principles of field fortification, which is, that no work should be commanded by any ground within the range of any weapon likely to be brought against it. The chain of hills facing those upon which were situated the works constituting the Chinese first or outer line of defense dominated the Chinese position, and it was from the tops of them that the Japanese staff carefully studied the defenses, devoting so much time to this operation, and being so near—the valley separating the two lines of hills being but a mile wide—as to become a target for the guns of several of the forts. The staff were quick to recognize the value of these hills, seizing them at once with their advanced troops, and establishing their batteries by night in such positions as to command the entire line of the defensive works. It may be noticed that their tactics in bringing up their infantry to the positions for attack under cover of darkness proved as successful as in previous actions.
We observe that the left wing of the Japanese army, only a little more than half the strength of the right wing, was detailed for the attack of by far the stronger portion of the defenses in the plan of battle; but we must also note that the attack by this column was not to begin until after the works on the Chinese left had fallen. By this disposition the commander-in-chief developed the maximum power of his army. Confident of the ability of the first division to capture the three forts they were to attack, he no doubt believed in Napoleon's dictum that "in war the moral effect is to the material effect as 3 is to 1," and relied upon the demoralizing effect upon the Chinese of seeing their defenses in the hands of the enemy, as well as the incentive this would prove to more heroic exertion on the part of his own troops. Besides, it is a mistake to attack a fortified position with equal strength at all points.
Here we have again the influence of the telegraph upon strategy. By means of the telegraph the position of the detachment advancing over the southern road, which we have seen arrive upon the field with clock-like punctuality joining in the attack, was known at all times.
Port Arthur proves how fully the Japanese recognize the importance of the terrain in military operations. When they halted at the foot of the hills, covering themselves from fire whilst they reformed for the assault, or when the ground was unfavorable for such tactics, as was the case with the detachment from the second division, their adroitness in passing over the shot-swept zone, the troops of the various units throwing themselves flat upon the ground and covering each other by their fire during the forward rushes, they showed themselves to be adepts in the application of modern tactics.
This brilliant feat of arms had but one defect to mar its perfection,—that was the lack of ammunition for the siege howitzers, which in the plans had been relied upon for breaching purposes. This was caused by the burning of the transport already mentioned, but its effect was largely counteracted by the deadly precision with which the shrapnel from the field and mountain guns burst behind the ramparts, the gunners being quick to notice that it was useless to attempt to breach the walls of the forts with these guns, and promptly changing their projectiles from common shell to shrapnel. We must not forget the clever turning movement of the small column which crept around upon the flank of the shelter trenches and battery commanding the flat road into Port Arthur, enfilading them and causing their defenders to retire, carrying out the German creed: "The front is difficult—let us try the flanks."
The errors of the Chinese are only too apparent. First, the narrow neck near Kinchow should have been fortified and tenaciously held. Indeed the ground for several miles in advance of the neck was most admirably adapted to the defense. Second, the outer fine of the land defenses should have been established upon the hills the Japanese occupied, and they should have constituted the principal defense, since they commanded all the ground within cannon range, both in front and rear. This position might have been turned into a sort of Chinese lines of Torres Vedras. Had the Chinese been as well versed in outpost duties as their adversaries, they would have realized that the Japanese advance guard, tired and worn out after its march of 25 miles during the 19th of November, might have fallen a prey to an earnest attack during the night, unsupported as it was; or, if the attack on the Japanese on the 20th had been carried through to an assault, it is possible that it might have succeeded. At least they had troops ample to have attacked successfully, as only a portion of the Japanese main body had arrived and a large part of the artillery was not up, while the rear guard was a long distance off. The land forts on the right of the line could have assisted in repelling the attack of the Japanese right wing, whereas they did not fire a shot until they themselves were attacked. There were six general officers exercising equality of command, with results to be expected. In short, we see here, as elsewhere, ignorance, discord, lack of cooperation, and frequently arrant cowardice. Nothing else could account for the capture of this Gibraltar of the East, with losses which were nothing to what they ought to have been. The forces engaged in this battle were reported as about 20,000 for the Chinese, and from 15,000 to 18,000 for the Japanese.
It is impossible to find a parallel to Port Arthur in the perfection of the combined tactics of the land and sea forces. While the water defenses appear to have been sufficient to deny entrance to the Japanese fleet, the vessels were handled in the most skillful and efficient manner outside of the harbor, drawing the harmless fire of the forts, causing them to expend their ammunition whilst husbanding their own. They nevertheless supported the troops in the most superb manner, cooperating with them in a way probably never seen before. Marshal Oyama, from his headquarters on shore, out of sight of the fleet, kept the vice admiral informed of his progress during the action, directing his movements from time to time as the cooperation of the fleet appeared desirable, indicating the successive targets for the guns of the fleet, into which they dropped their shells in conjunction with the field batteries.[*] While the whole world wondered at the efficiency and versatility of our navy during the civil war as shown by its cooperation with the land forces in the rivers and upon the coast, from which the most valuable lessons known to naval warfare of this description were drawn, we had nothing quite like this almost automatic precision of Port Arthur. Now how were these great forces of the two elements directed by one controlling mind? By that novel and valuable appliance in war which had contributed so largely to their previous successes—the field telegraph. The line from the marshal's headquarters was connected with a signal station within sight of the vessels of the fleet, by which means perfect communication was maintained between the two during the fight. In this respect Port Arthur is without a parallel, and alone should be sufficient to convince us of the intelligence and efficiency of these sturdy little fighters in their first war under modern conditions. In addition to this perfection of mechanical conditions, there existed an accord, a singleness of purpose, between the two commanders which it is impossible to surpass, and which perhaps, as much as any other factor, produced this extraordinary action.
Oyama after providing a garrison for Port Arthur detached a division which advanced up the peninsula, with Niuchwang as its objective. This division drove the Chinese northward towards Niuchwang, capturing Foochow and Kaiping. At the latter place some 4000 Chinese were found strongly entrenched, requiring something of an effort on the part of the invaders to dislodge them. An attack was first made upon the two wings, then upon the center, and finally, by a flank movement enveloping the position, the Chinese were routed.
As we have already seen, a junction was now formed with the first army, which occupied Haicheng and the vicinity.
From January 17 to March 4 the Japanese divisions were entrenched in positions from Kaiping to beyond Haicheng, their forward movements suspended on account of the severity of the weather and the difficulty of operations. During this period the Chinese took the offensive, advancing from the direction of Liao Yang in strong force upon Haicheng in two separate attacks, which really were little more than weak demonstrations, and it was only by a ruse de guerre that the Japanese commander-in-chief, who was present, succeeded in bringing his enemy under fire. In the second attack, which was a night affair, and which from information furnished by his covering detachments he expected and was prepared for, his dispositions were made in such a manner as to draw the Chinese within 700 yards of his line, when falling upon both flanks, he threw them into confusion, amounting to panic, during which many prisoners were captured. During the same period four or five similar attacks were directed against the Japanese at Kaiping from the direction of Niuchwang and Yinkow, the port of Niuchwang.
The Japanese now resumed their advance upon Niuchwang. On February 28 the force at Haicheng routed 15,000 Chinese encamped between the roads to Liao Yang and Niuchwang, thus clearing their flank and rear of the enemy; and four days later two actions came off. The force from Kaiping captured all the defenses of Yinkow, on the south and west, on the left bank of the river; and two divisions from Haicheng attacked Niuchwang itself, where the Chinese did some excellent street fighting, only yielding street by street, keeping up the contest from 10 a.m. till 11 p.m., and leaving 1880 of their own and 200 of their enemy's killed and wounded as evidence of the stubbornness of their defense. The advance was continued, after this victory, against a large body of Chinese strongly posted at Yenchaitai on the west bank of the Liao Ho—which was still frozen over—15 miles west of Niuchwang.
On March 6 the dispositions were made for a combined attack in three columns, from the east, northeast and northwest. At 7 a.m. the bombardment commenced, and was continued until 10.30 o'clock, at which time, under cover of the artillery, three columns stormed the position. The defenders at first fought stubbornly, but being outnumbered eventually broke and fled with a loss of 2000 men. The town was set on fire by the Japanese shells, and by night was burned to the ground. With this action the operations in Manchuria were brought to a close, the armistice preceding the declaration of peace following closely upon it.
In reviewing the actions of the first and second armies, which bore the brunt of the fighting during this war, one is struck with the consistency with which the Japanese applied one of the most important elements of modern tactics, that is, a proper preparation by artillery fire of the point of attack before the assault is made. We find no disregard of this necessary precaution such as we remark in the Franco-German war of 1870, as evidenced by the admonitory order of the King of Prussia upon that subject, nor such as was so frequently exhibited by the Russians in 1871, particularly in the earlier battles of Plevna, which their unnecessarily great losses attested. On the contrary, we note the most intelligent cooperation of the two arms, each in its proper sphere.
Of the stuff of which the Japanese infantry and gunners were made we may form some opinion from the foregoing narrative. As to the cavalry it is hardly necessary to say that the theaters of operations were not adapted to the employment of that arm to any great extent. They were most efficient and valuable however in outpost and patrol duty, acquiring a reputation in this direction hardly second to that of the sister arms. That there was no Japanese Bredow was solely from lack of opportunity. One incident which occurred on the march down the peninsula to Port Arthur may help to convince us of this. On November i8 a body of Japanese cavalry of inconsiderable size, forming the leading detachment of an advance guard, came in contact with a mixed detachment of Chinese infantry and cavalry 3000 strong. The Japanese charged, became surrounded, were rescued by a company of infantry from the advance guard, who in turn were hemmed in. The cavalry charged repeatedly and furiously through the Chinese cavalry, releasing the infantry and covering their retreat,—not quite up to Bredow's work at Mars-la-Tour, but very good for the hardy little ponies many of us are familiar with. As may be imagined, this cavalry was lightly mounted, but equipped in the most approved style, even to French jackboots, their arms being the saber and short carbine.
Operations of the Third Japanese Army.
The third Japanese army, having for its objective Weihaiwei, the second Chinese arsenal, at the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, was composed of the Sendai division, which sailed from Hiroshima early in January for Talien Bay, the point of rendezvous, and the Kumomoto division, which formed part of the second army at the capture of Port Arthur. This force of about 25,000, with 12 field guns, 36 light mountain guns and 12 mortars, sailed from Talien Wan in two detachments, the first on January 19, reaching Yung Ching at daybreak the following day. Immediately upon arrival, a force of marines in boats from the fleet landed in the face of a feeble fire from an earthen battery of 4 guns, whose defenders were dispersed by the fire from the guns in the boats, and the marines advancing in a deep and heavy snow completed the rout. The beach having been cleared, the landing of the troops began, and by night the advance guard had captured the works at Yung Ching by assault and the main body was on the march thither. On the following morning the second detachment arrived and completed its landing during the day. About this time a small force was landed from the vessels of the fleet under cover of their guns at Teng Chow, west of Weihaiwei, as a diversion, but this force was withdrawn a little later.
From Yung Ching the country breaks from a gently rising plain into a succession of hills and valleys, the declivities unusually sharp and steep. Deep snow covers the ground from December to the end of February. Five ranges of rocky hills running from 1200 to 2000 feet high intersected the line of march. The difficulty of transporting an army over 30 miles of such country, carrying every pound of fire-wood and food, besides ammunition and stores, will be readily recognized. The two divisions advanced over two separate roads, the Sendai division by the inner road, and having with it all the field guns, it being impossible to transport any vehicles whatever by the track nearer the coast, over which the Kumomoto division advanced. When we remember that the thermometer during this march stood at 12 degrees Fahrenheit, we may compare it with operations in the Crimea, not forgetting that here a high, seemingly impracticable mountain is thrown in every now and then, that no railroads exist, that mere footpaths are substitutes for roads, and that food is terribly scarce at all times.
Weihaiwei is by nature perfectly fitted to protect a fleet. It is landlocked on three sides, and three large islands heavily fortified guard its mouth. The hills on the three landward sides range from 1200 to 2000 feet in height, and the eastern arm was protected by five first-class forts constructed by German experts at great cost and armed with Krupp guns. In the harbor at the time of the attack were 6 ironclads, 8 gunboats and 12 torpedo-boats. Mine fields were laid between the island of Liu Kung and the eastern and western arms of the mainland. A line of booms was also placed just inside the mine fields. The town lying on the west side of the harbor, enclosed by hills on three sides, was surrounded by a wall 25 feet high and 40 feet thick at the base. This wall was rectangular in shape and pierced by four gates at the four chief points of the compass. The naval workshops were situated on Liu Kung Tao, upon the summit of which was a signal station 510 feet above the sea, commanding an extensive view of the land and sea approaches. Across a valley on the highroad to Chefoo a line of entrenchments had been thrown up. On the top of the hill to the right, a difficult height to climb, 3 field guns had been, mounted. The strength of the garrison of the eastern forts was 3000 men, while the same number defended the western and northwestern forts, and 1500 men were in the forts on the islands. The whole of these defenses were under the command of Admiral Ting.
As already stated, the Japanese army advanced in two columns, the Sendai or second division taking the inner route, of a somewhat circuitous nature, in order to attack the western forts, and the Kumomoto or sixth division following a path near the coast against the eastern forts. The sixth division arrived in front of the eastern forts on January 30, and by night had occupied all of them, the Chinese making no defense worthy the name. Fifty gunners were landed from the fleet and the guns turned upon the Chinese fleet.
The task of the second division was a little more difficult. Owing to its longer and more difficult march it did not arrive before the western forts until three days after the eastern ones had fallen and their garrisons had fled to the western,—at least those who did not continue on to Chefoo. The division was divided into two wings, the right advancing from the southwest, the left more to the northward advancing over the Chefoo road. The right wing encountered little opposition and found the southern forts of the western series deserted. The left wing, on the contrary, encountered 2500 Chinese with 4 guns well posted in the mountains about 12 miles west of the town, and an action came off lasting from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m. in the midst of a blinding snow storm, accompanied by a fierce wind blowing the frozen particles in the face, rendering it almost impossible to see any distance. After an effective use of shrapnel the charge was ordered, resulting as usual in the retreat of the Chinese, part by a path towards Chefoo, the remainder scattering in the mountains. The road to Chefoo was now clear of Chinese and the telegraph between that place and Weihaiwei cut. All the forts to the north and west were now occupied without further resistance, as their garrisons abandoned them at the first approach of the Japanese, and Admiral Ting had sent men from his fleet to demolish the works and disable the guns. The Japanese, however, established their field guns and mortars in these works, or rather above them, and plied the decks of the Chinese vessels in the harbor so effectively as to keep the men under cover continually. Fighting between the mainland forts and the Japanese fleet on one side, and the remaining Chinese vessels and forts on the islands on the other, continued until the morning of February 12, when terms of capitulation were arranged; and on the 17th the Japanese entered the harbor, taking possession of the forts on the islands, the torpedo stations, workshops, and 2 ironclads, 1 cruiser, and 6 gunboats, with an aggregate tonnage of 12,660. Thus disappeared the last vestige of Chinese power upon the sea.
Here, for the first time, we observe a want of that perfect punctuality which existed in all other concentrations upon the field of battle, and a consequent want of the usual simultaneity in their combined attack. We may account for this in two ways: first, communication between the two columns and headquarters was probably not maintained, through the impossibility of using the field telegraph on account of the difficult country through which the advance was made; second, being stronger in numbers, immeasurably so in morale, his troops fresh from the field of a great victory, eager to meet an enemy fighting almost in his last ditch, the Japanese commander did not feel it necessary to hold his right column until his left came up; and we cannot, therefore, accuse him of assuming any undue risk.
While the fleet cooperated in the heartiest way here as at Port Arthur, performing its part in the most skillful and efficient manner, its task was of a secondary nature—mainly to draw the fire while out of range and to watch the entrance to the port. Both Port Arthur and Weihaiwei were essentially land victories, and this fact alone shows the victors to have been cognizant of the modern conviction, arrived at after a study of the operations before Charleston, Vicksburg, Fort Fisher, and Alexandria—that the fire of a ship is altogether unable to breach or seriously damage a properly constructed parapet—while such unarmored vessels as composed for the most part their fleet would have been riddled, if not destroyed, in such an unequal contest. We see them wisely, therefore, refraining from futile attacks from the sea, except in support of the principal attack on land, which would result in a useless expenditure of energy and ammunition.
In the defenses from seaward in both of these Chinese maritime fortresses we find the moral effect of submarine mines confirming the lessons of the Franco-Prussian war, where these most effective auxiliaries paralyzed the offensive power of the French navy, its greatest effort proving abortive through dread of them. Submarine mines supplemented by booms in rear of the mine fields proved wholly sufficient to keep the Japanese vessels out of the harbor.
Port Arthur and Weihaiwei have frequently been referred to as commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, and their tactical value greatly overrated. Such a strong analogy exists between the importance and functions of a strongly fortified naval base and a land fortress or entrenched camp, that an exposition of the place of the latter in military warfare may enable us to place a proper value upon the former.
Napoleon says of fortresses: "It is true they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an excellent means of retarding, embarrassing and annoying a victorious enemy." According to Prussian theories, fortified places should fulfill certain strategic conditions. They should protect important cities, supply-depots, or depots for troops; should defend communicating roads or important passes; should serve as points of support or pivots for either defensive or offensive operations, and as a refuge from pursuit. Fortresses near the flanks of lines of operations have frequently been found, if not of the first importance, yet of such value as to prevent their being ignored by a commander who sought for success in his operations, for from them expeditions may be made upon the lines of communications of an army, and its flanks may be so constantly menaced as to endanger its advance. It has been a common mistake, however, to treat such works with more respect than they deserve, and to besiege, invest and blockade them. Jomini says: "Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial obstacles"; also: "An invading army may pass by fortified places without attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them or at least to watch them." Thus Wellington and Blucher in their advance on Paris after Waterloo detached small bodies to mask the frontier forts, while the allies of 1793 delayed their advance across the frontier until they had captured the fortresses upon it, the delay enabling the republican armies to rally and reorganize for the defense and eventually to assume the offensive and to commence that career of victory which continued with few intermissions for eighteen years. Jomini says: "Some have attempted to draw a parallel between the efforts of 1793 and 1815…But the allies of 1815 acted very differently from those of the first invasion; they did not, like Mack and Coburg, pass three months before Valenciennes; the times had in all respects changed."
"An excessive tendency to the employment of fortifications has its origin in a feeling of moral weakness. Fortresses are of service only in a war against a superior enemy. But the weaker may be morally strong, and in this case only will it make a judicious use of fortifications. They are, on the contrary, dangerous for the side which is morally weak. For such a nation they have an irresistible attraction. Persuade a people that the center of gravity of the country's defense is to be found behind the ramparts of its fortresses, and long before the necessity arises you will see the army recruited from this people fleeing to these defenses, and if there is not found behind these walls the anticipated security, the fate of that country will soon be decided" (Blume's Strategy). A French writer as early as 1628 says of them: "The strongest of them do not hold out six weeks; the best cannot take care of themselves without an army close at hand"; and Napoleon says: "It is upon the open field of battle that the fate of fortresses and empires is decided."
According to recent French writers, it may be admitted to-day that a fortress ought never to be considered as a base of operations for an army; that is to say, it is insufficient to furnish the army definitively with a refuge in case of defeat or a pivot for its offensive operations. That it should temporarily serve the army for shelter, that it should be a point d’appui in strategic maneuvers, that it should cover concentration or a movement by controlling the means of communication of which an enemy must make use to harass these different movements,—all this is indisputable. But in no case ought an army to shut itself up in a place, or even to take refuge there sufficiently long for an enemy to be able to complete the investment thereof.
What other deductions is it possible to draw from modern history with such examples as Metz, Vicksburg, and Plevna? In the first place, the security which Bazaine supposed would be his salvation proved his ruin. Instead of fighting his way through to Chalons, where McMahon was covering Paris, as he had reported he would do, he allowed himself, at the head of about 125,000 men and 390 guns, to be driven off the Verdun road and sealed up in Metz by 72,000 men with 246 guns. It would seem from the German official report of this war that they expected exactly what happened, and in discussing the possibility of breaking the lines of investment, would say: "But Marshal Bazaine might hope in all cases to find his line of march open, to sever temporarily the but weakly guarded communications of the Germans, and although not without considerable difficulties as to supply, to escape with a large part of his army to the southward." When he did make his sortie he had given the Germans time to strengthen their lines sufficiently to repulse his attack, although conducted with skill and vigor by General Le Boeuf with his own corps.
Great armies which are shut up in a fortress after lost battles are, as the history of investments from Alesia down to Metz proves, always lost. Among all relations between fortress and field army, the latter must make it a supreme rule never to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress. It is always better to use it as a support, which enables the field army to keep its full freedom of action. An army can easily be got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back again into the open field, except it be that strong help from without lends it a hand. Fortresses protect the troops they contain, but at the same time anchor them to the spot.
Vicksburg was very similar to Metz. In reply to an order from General Johnston to move out and attack the enemy near Clinton, General Pemberton, then behind the Big Black, near Vicksburg, overrating the value of that place, which had been passed by Porter's squadron, said: "My own views were expressed as unfavorable to any movement which would remove me from my base, which was, and is, Vicksburg." Upon receipt of this, Johnston's instructions to Pemberton state: "If you are invested in Vicksburg you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to the northeast." This order was not obeyed. According to General Grant's report, the investment of Vicksburg was completed May 19, and by July 4 it had surrendered.
Plevna, the last of these three famous entrenched camps, will ever stand as one of the most brilliant military operations of history, completely arresting the Russian advance and paralyzing the whole empire for five months, straining the resources of a mighty nation, yielding only to a siege and costing the besiegers 40,000 men. Yet its commander failed to comprehend its limitations, and by overstraining broke them, and thereby lost his whole army of 40,000 men. Like the commander at Metz, Osman Pasha made a brilliant effort to break through the lines of investment, but like the former commander, postponed it until it was too late to be effective. Indeed, General Todleben, the great Russian engineer, chief of staff of the besieging army, asked the Turkish chief why he did not retreat in October before the Russian reinforcements were all in position and the investment complete. His answer was that up to the day of his sortie he felt sure the Russians would continue their attacks, and he felt equally sure that he would be able to defeat them with great loss. He gave it as his opinion that the system of entrenched camps with modern breechloaders is admirable so long as the enemy has not troops enough to surround them. But it is their fate to be invested, and then they are doomed. Up to the time referred to, Plevna had brought the Russian operations to a standstill for three months, and had done all that could be expected from it. His failure to relinquish the security within its walls and save his army was the great defect of one of the most brilliant campaigns on record, which had placed the Turkish commander in the front rank of modern generals and gained for him the title of Conquering Osman.
All three of the commanders referred to failed of a just appreciation of the value of a fortified position in connection with an active army. General Brialmont, the great military engineer, says: "To know how to utilize the passive force of these positions for the profit of the active work of armies will always be the characteristic of great generals." It is quite clear then that fortified positions should be regarded solely as auxiliaries of the active force; that more than one good commander has been lured to destruction through the fatuous belief that in their protection lay his salvation. "Fortifications are good servants, bad masters."
After a few words upon Port Arthur and Weihaiwei from a purely military point of view, I shall endeavor to show how applicable what has been said of fortified positions in connection with land operations is to maritime fortresses or strongly fortified naval bases in war upon the sea.
Port Arthur, as we have seen, lay on the flank of the communications of the Japanese army operating in Manchuria, and an active army basing itself upon that stronghold might have harassed the invading army—if it did not cause it to make a great detour to drive the defenders within their walls. An English writer says: "There is no doubt that this operation, taking up a flanking position, will be much oftener used in the war to come, on account of the sensitiveness of the modem army to its communications, and the fact that if you are invading my country…you dare not leave me with a field army on the flank of your communications without turning aside and thoroughly beating and dispersing me first." Substituting sealing up in the Liao Tung peninsula, by fortifying and holding with a small force the neck of land at Talien Wan, for beating and dispersing, we fulfill these requisites with regard to Port Arthur. As has been pointed out, the neck at the head of the Liao Tung peninsula, between Talien Wan and Kinchow, is the key of the position; and that this was recognized by the Japanese is shown by the tenacity with which they clung to it in connection with Port Arthur during the negotiations which followed the close of the war. Consenting to relinquish the conquered territory in Manchuria, they at first decided to fight before abandoning the peninsula from Talien Wan, realizing that by turning it into a vast entrenched camp capable of harboring an army of any dimensions, which upon short notice could be concentrated there, they commanded the situation in the East upon the land.
Command of the sea would have been necessary on the part of the Chinese for the employment of Port Arthur as a base of operations against the Japanese communications, as the Japanese army in Manchuria could have cut off all supplies from landward and it would be equally indispensable to the Japanese in keeping their entrenched camp referred to above supplied.
After the invaders had advanced well into Manchuria, assuming their objective to be Peking by way of Moukden or Niuchwang, Weihaiwei might have harbored an army which would have proved a constant menace to the base of an army operating against Peking from the southern shores of the Gulf of Pechili, in conjunction with a force in Manchuria.
It was not on account of their offensive qualities that the Japanese deemed the reduction of these fortresses necessary. Admiral Colomb says in his "Naval warfare": "In all attacks made over sea against territory, we shall note one almost universal rule—no attacks of magnitude are ever known direct from a distant base." It is clear that with Peking as the objective, a base upon the Gulf of Pechili would sooner or later become necessary. While we have seen an army operating northward after the capture of Port Arthur, we notice its base was Talien Wan, at which point the third army was also concentrated, and from which it embarked. The natural base of operations against Peking is on the shores of the Gulf of Pechili, at the mouth of the Peiho, or at Shanhaikwan, whence there is a railroad to Tientsin. The possession of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei by the Japanese meant the command of the sea, with the ability to select this base. Supposing the strategy of Japan to have contemplated a simultaneous movement upon Peking by three armies advancing from Wiju, Port Arthur, and Weihaiwei as primary bases, around the Gulf of Liao Tung and Liao Chow Bay,—and their movements up to the moment of the cessation of hostilities make this appear quite possible,—successive bases would have been taken up along the shores of those waters as the troops advanced, in order to shorten their lines of communication.
While the fortresses lay on the flanks of the communications with the home bases, they were of themselves tactically a negligible quantity; their guns were harmless. Their great value was as adjuncts of an active fleet. As harbors of refuge for the Chinese fleet operating against the lines of communication of the enemy, they were of inestimable value. Here was a field pregnant with possibilities. To swoop down upon some belated cruiser or luckless transport with a superior force, to send out among the islands numbers of torpedo-boats to operate in the channels under cover of darkness, harassing and retarding the operations of the enemy,—herein lay the value of the strongholds. It would have been foolhardy for the Japanese to have attempted operations along the shores of the Gulf of Pechili with these fortresses upon their flanks and rear harboring a fleet. Admiral Colomb is authority for the statement that "no fleet can be secure against interruption in any operation, such as the transport or landing of troops, or a territorial attack, so long as possibly interfering naval forces of the enemy are unmasked or free to act against it." [*] But the fortresses were merely auxiliaries of the fleet, to be relinquished upon the first appearance of the danger of being masked or sealed up. The Chinese commander, however, like those of the armies of Vicksburg, Metz, and Plevna, courted destruction by clinging to his base until it was too late to escape. The instant the blockade from seaward was completed the fate of the fleet was sealed. Suppose it did require the entire Japanese fleet to mask it, the sea was left open to the undisturbed movements of their transports, and their supplies assured. While I do not intend to discuss the naval operations of this war, I cannot refrain from calling attention to the possible result of the abandonment of its base by the Chinese fleet, forming a junction with the southern squadron, and becoming that "possibly interfering naval force" referred to by Admiral Colomb.
To the Japanese fleet, Port Arthur was a pearl without price, with its perfect facilities for docking, repairing and refitting, saving a journey of 1400 miles to the home dockyards, with the attendant danger of destruction or capture to the detached vessel. The importance of its possession, or of its counterpart across the water, needs no argument—a glance at the map is sufficient Indeed it is difficult to find a war in which the command of the sea was fraught with graver consequences. Japan's insular position, her great distance from the theater of operations, with the resulting long lines of communication, all made it peculiarly desirable to her. Without it, the phenomenal campaigns, which astonished the thinking men of the military world not less than those of 1866 and 1870, would not have been possible. That this was recognized is shown by the promptitude with which she gathered herself for a superb effort for its attainment, the result of which is attested by the disappearance of her enemy from the water, so far as active operations went, after the fleet action at the mouth of the Yalu. From that date the invasion was a triumphant march, made possible by the decisive victory upon the sea.
If we bring ourselves to a realizing sense of the brilliancy of the Japanese operations which I have attempted to outline, we are at once struck with a desire to know what were the causes which produced such results. We cannot attribute them entirely to the feeble resistance they encountered, which in no way detracts from the soundness of their strategy and tactics. Indeed, some less skillful commanders might have committed the not uncommon fault of underrating the enemy, which would almost have been pardonable. On the contrary, they observed the greatest precaution whether on the march or in bivouac. Like the Germans in their last wars, their patrol system never failed, and as I have said, contributed in no small degree to their success. It is to be regretted that more minute details of the tactics and formations used in attack and defense have not been received, but from the general knowledge we possess of their operations we have every reason to believe them to have been the highest type of modern ideas in that direction.
It is claimed that superior strategic ability, superior organization, and greater activity contributed more to the successful concentration of the Prussian armies and the victory at Koniggratz than superior armament. It is also claimed that the victorious campaigns of the Germans in 1870-71 were the result of organization; that they were due to the organization created by Von Moltke, rather than Von Moltke himself,—to the system, not the man. So also were the admirable operations of the Japanese the result of organization—organization and preparation.
The strategic function of an army may be divided into two periods: first, a period of preparation for war, incident to times of peace, embracing a study of the theater of operations and of the resources of the enemy, and the preparation of the plans of campaigns; then a period of execution, which follows the declaration of war and during which operations are effected according to the plan established, or at least in conformity with a general idea, serving as a basis for the plans of the commander-in-chief, which the more or less unforeseen events of war often modify. The plan formulated by Von Moltke in 1868 unfolded itself in 1870 with almost mathematical regularity and in conformity with settled anticipations.
General Trochu says: "Of all things which contribute most directly and effectually to the success of a military undertaking, preparation holds the first place. Without doubt, the genius of the man who conducts the war may sometimes rule its events, but this only in a certain measure and for a limited time. And history tells us that the greatest military geniuses of the world, Caesar and the Emperor Napoleon, to wit, who had so many grounds for trusting alike in their inspirations and their fortunes, did not disdain preparation, on the contrary, that they applied themselves entirely to it and made a thorough study of it as a science from which they hoped great things." In a recent speech, Prince Bismarck, in referring to the wars which led to the unification of Germany, said: "After Sadowa (Koniggratz), the principal point with me was that war with the French was not to come too soon, and that we should not be forced to begin it without proper preparation."
Preparation includes, first, a study of the theater of operations and of the resources of the enemy, then the drawing up of a plan of operations and a system of transportation. The strategic importance of a theater of operations often depends upon its topographical characteristics. We have, therefore, two points of view from which it should be examined: first, topographic, having for its aim the study of the features of the ground; second, the strategic, designed to determine their military importance. The task of making a reconnaissance of the theater of operations from this double point of view is one of the most important duties of staff officers.
How thorough had been the work of the Japanese staff is best shown by the remarks of a prominent cabinet minister. When speaking of this war he said: "It has been inevitable for ten years. Steady preparation has been made for it. Every road in Corea and eastern China was surveyed by our War Department years ago. We had timbers measured and cut for bridges over their streams. Every fort and its armament was familiar to our officers. Our sheet-iron stoves for the soldiers in the winter campaign were made before war was declared. Our transport service was as well organized as our navy, and there were no cartridges made of sand, you will observe, in the belts of our troops."
Under the heading of plans, of campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel Fix, in his "Manual of strategy," quotes Colonel Vial, a French writer, as follows: "The study of the part which the ground plays is indispensable before entering upon the campaign. In 1805, when the Emperor foresees the war with Austria, he sends his generals, Murat, Savary, and Bertrand, through Germany under assumed names, charged with studying the ground and reconnoitering the roads, positions, water-courses, mountain chains, bridges, defiles, and means of subsistence. In 1866 the Prussian government, foreseeing the war with Austria, sends a large number of officers to execute similar reconnaissances in Bohemia. Finally, in 1870, everybody remarked the perfect knowledge of our country possessed by the Germans; in many respects they knew our ways of communications, the accidents of the surface and our resources better than we did. All of which shows how advantageous it is to study in advance and with care the ground upon which we are to operate."
A British officer who witnessed the mobilization of the first Japanese army and its transfer to Corea, when comparing it with the Crimea and Wolseley's expedition to Egypt, asserted that such a transport and commissary service had never been seen in the world. The truth is, the Japanese have proved themselves to be masters of the science of logistics.
Even to the minutest detail of the personal comfort of the soldier was their preparation absolutely perfect. In addition to the stoves referred to, their winter uniform was designed to afford the greatest protection against the rigors of a Chinese climate. Every soldier, besides his uniform of heavy dark blue waterproof cloth, was provided with a blanket overcoat, nearly a quarter of an inch thick and approaching felt in density, yet permitting perfect freedom of action. A heavy blanket and several pairs of thickly plaited straw sandals were also provided every man by the clothing department. These sandals, worn outside the ordinary Japanese foot-gear, in this case made of heavy cloth and padded with cotton, proved more effective against the snows and ice than fur socks and riding boots. The military glove, especially designed for this campaign, was the most unique portion of the altogether admirable equipment. This gauntlet was made of flexible felt, yet thick enough to keep out the severest cold of the almost Siberian climate. In form it was an improvement on the old mitten, having a thumb and a place for the index finger, which, midway down it, had a slit with a flap to allow the bare finger to be used to pull the trigger of the rifle. The men were also provided with heavy cloth gaiters. Where do we find a more thorough preparation? It was not surpassed by Prussia in either of her late wars. What a contrast it was to the Crimea with its indescribable sufferings!
The work of the Japanese staff was complete. It left nothing to be desired, and it may be said of it, as has been said of the Prussian general staff, after which it is formed: "This body has become a real element of strength for their army, and has in a large measure contributed to their success, while gaining for itself a justly merited reputation." The Japanese leaders by their work have shown themselves to be models of the highest type of scientific warfare, and I believe that when the official account of this war shall have been written it will be found to have been fruitful in lessons upon the art of war. Already we find the English army at Aldershot practicing night operations with the field telegraph as a medium of communication between the advancing columns. Three brigades engaged in this maneuver on April 19 in presence of the Duke of Connaught, repeating the practice a little later with volunteer troops.
In no portion of that tremendous leap to civilization which Sir Edwin Arnold has called a quiet revolution, has Japan made greater advances than in her military department. Her ambition in the beginning of this remarkable transformation was to possess a complete army corps, armed, equipped, organized and drilled after modern ideas, with transport and supplies ready at all times for instant use, making her a valuable ally to be sought in any contemplated operations in the far East, thus giving her a voice in questions which might involve her interests. How far her aim has been attained may be judged if we realize that when the war began her military resources consisted of three lines of troops,—viz.: with the colors 62,425, first reserve 97,707, second reserve 109,987, total number of troops on war footing 270,119,—and that a combination of three great military nations was deemed none too strong to overawe this plucky little people, who only succumbed to their demands for want of an ally to stand by her side in the fight she was burning to make.
It seems hardly to be realized that a great military nation has been born, ushered into existence amidst the rattle of musketry, the booming of cannon—baptized with fire. This nation, displaying all the best qualities of a warlike people trained to arms, commanded by men who upon the land and upon the sea have proved themselves to be strategists and tacticians of the first order, must no longer be regarded only in the light of tea-houses, quaint art and gentle manners. When the smoke has cleared away, the effect of Ping Yang will be found hardly less violent and far-reaching than Koniggratz and Sedan. Japan is at once the England and the Germany of the far East; she is invincible in her island home to any single nation that may come against her.
[*] Later information shows that the non-interference of the Chinese fleet was due to orders from the Tsung Li Yamen restricting its cruising limits, and not to its commander.
[*] A Japanese writer claims that they were a very little stronger than the Chinese at Ping Yang, and that the Gensan column numbered only about 1500 infantry with guns.
[†] An English officer, as a result of observation during the Franco-German war, said: "The nation that first so trains its army during peace as to move and attack with relative facility by night will gain an advantage, which in future warfare will be decisive.
[*] A British officer who witnessed this fight from the deck of the Porpoise says: "On a signal from the general on shore, Admiral Ito's cruisers all steamed past the forts just out of range, without replying, only drawing hte fire off the torpedo-boats, which did all the work. The torpedo-boats were dashing about in all directions, but were obeying the signals of the convoying cruisers, which again followed the orders conveyed by Field Marshal Oyama's field telegraph."
[*] In this connection Captain Mahan is quoted as saying, referring to the Chinese convoying feet and the action at the mouth of the Yalu: "The prominent lesson of the engagement was that it is necessary that the fleet convoying transports should be decidedly superior to the enemy. . . . The whole affair illustrates the extreme difficulty of the attacking movement across the water, unless the attacking force had the control of the water absolutely, . . . The question was in this case whether it was worth while to take such risk for the sake of landing troops." Referring to the Chinese attempt to carry a force across the water, Captain Mahan pointed out that the incident showed that the mere existence of a hostile fleet did not constitute a deterrent force upon the movements of a resolute man. The fleet "in being" was doubtless a most important factor to be considered in making such an attempt, but it was plain that the fleet would not deter a man who saw that the object of his attempt was sufficiently important to justify the risk taken. What remains to be seen is whether the object accomplished was such as to justify the risk.--(Remarks of Captain Mahan published in the Army and Navy Gazette, London, after the battle fo the Yalu.)