Motto: Simplicity.
The warship of to-day is the most wonderful product of the fertile brain of man ; the skill of every art, the theory of every science, and the practice of every trade have contributed to its development, while for its efficient use a special talent of the highest order is necessary. It is an arsenal, a fort, a magazine, a drill ground, a training school, a storehouse, a bank, a workshop, a hotel, a barrack, a hospital, a machine, a church, a prison, a home ; but above all it is a unit of sea power, a floating weapon controlled by one man for offense and defense. Like other weapons it should be ready for use at any moment, success depending on skill and bravery alone. Practically, however, this weapon is called upon to perform such numerous and varied functions that it has become a honeycomb structure filled with complicated mechanisms, traversed in all directions by a labyrinth of pipes and shafts, and crowded with scientific appliances and intricate fittings, all of which are liable to such derangement and wear that continual repairs are necessary: and it is subject to sudden and unforeseen mishaps which may happen every time the anchor is weighed. The captain cannot now supervise and direct every part or fitting, he must trust more than ever to the skill of his personnel and the reliability of his materiel: but the latter is so complicated and delicate that a personnel of many specialists is required merely for its efficient care and manipulation in peace. The naval officer is not a scientist and specialist, it is his high privilege to understand and use the developments of science and mechanics which are suitable for his purpose. If the appliances furnished him are so intricate as to require a long and special study of each one, he is apt to be lost in a mass of details and overlook his larger duty of using these appliances merely as instruments which are to be combined in the best manner to produce the most efficient weapon. The crew is far from being specialists, they do not even understand the use of many of the devices about them, and are ignorant of how to take care of them; yet ignorance or negligence is more quickly fatal now than ever before. Every portion of the warship and her equipment should be adapted to secure efficiency with the men available: the human factor cannot be neglected. Any part which saves weight at the expense of durability, which saves space at the expense of accessibility, or which is automatic at the expense of simplicity, is out of place on this floating weapon; no matter how successful it may be elsewhere. The many ingenious appliances and elaborate fittings which crowd our new ships, though worked out with the greatest care, are a source of weakness if they are unnecessary, or if they are not adapted to the trying conditions of service usage. The more simple and durable the ship and her equipment, the greater will be the efficiency, for the crew can become familiar with the use and care of every appliance, and there will be less liability to derangement in excitement or danger.
Mahan has shown us that good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships; it is our duty not only to secure and keep the best men, but to secure the best ships and to train the men in preserving and using them, to follow the service tradition of having the personnel and materiel of each ship superior to any foreign ship of the same rate. This is thoroughly realized by every one in the service; and in the building, equipping and manning of the new ships there has been universal interest; and naturally there was pressure from all sides to make them superior to their foreign competitors in every quality, for each one is apt to think that the quality to which he had given special attention and study was of particular importance. It is therefore not surprising that simplicity has been lost sight of, and that the trying conditions of service afloat were overlooked in the quiet of shore study.
The best warship is the one which most harmoniously combines armor, armament, speed, handiness, habitability and sea efficiency, and which permits the best use of this combination as a whole by the personnel available. The more limited the purpose of this ship the better will be the combination for the end in view; no one quality, however, can be magnified except at the sacrifice of one or all of the others, the lack of which will surely be felt at some supreme moment. In the commendable desire to secure perfection in every quality, have we not lost sight of the prime importance of securing efficiency in the ship as a weapon; and, in the unrealizable desire to fulfill all conditions, so sacrificed simplicity that this weapon is now so complicated as a whole, and so crowded with delicate equipments, that there is too great a liability of derangement or break down from ignorance or negligence?
The ship's efficiency depends upon the certainty that the essential qualities are available when wanted ; if they are obtained by intricate and delicate appliances which function properly only on the proving ground or in the workshop when manipulated by skilled mechanics, there is no certainty that they will be reliable at sea when really needed. In the old ships, officers and crew had that special knowledge which came from long sea experience with familiar equipments, but to-day they spend much of their time in port, and the equipments vary with every ship.
This state of affairs being brought about by the demands of the service, its improvement and remedy lies equally with us; but it can only be brought about by l’entente cordiale which sees the necessity of sacrificing some pet scheme in order to secure greater efficiency of the whole ship. It is difficult to overcome the tendency to exaggerate the necessities of the present moment, and thus forget the possible contingencies and catastrophes of the future. It can only be done by bearing in mind that simplicity requires that everything should be discarded which is not necessary to the efficiency of the weapon or to one of its essential parts, and that nothing should be added unless the advantages of its presence more than counterbalance the disadvantages of its absence.
We are all too apt to believe that while great reforms are necessary in another's arrangements, our own need only some slight additions to make them perfect. Yet, if all the suggestions were summed up, it would appear that complication and crowding were absolutely necessary; that the ships of to-morrow must be even more complicated than those of to-day; that perfection will only be obtained when a vessel shall be produced which shall contain all known means of offense and defense and all known appliances for economy, comfort and convenience. The followers of this school doubtless believe that in time the warship should be like the popular slot machines, when the captain automatically presses a button the vessel will do the rest; do they ever consider what will happen if the button fails to work?
The sciences of peace should not overshadow the science of war, on the warship.
This is not said in a reactionary or conservative spirit, nor to proclaim the failure of what has been done, nor to criticize in any way the faithful work of those thoughtful officers whose combined ingenuity and study have produced the ships of which we are so proud; but it is no reflection on any one to say that there is still room for improvement.
The writer is convinced of the immense importance of simplicity, and he believes that, without any reduction of the fighting power, or any lessening of those comforts which are necessary for the health and cheerfulness of officers and men, more efficient ships will result from the adoption of simplicity as the ruling principle of design and organization. There is nothing novel in this idea, and numerous authorities could be quoted; the following, however, expresses the thought very clearly.
Jurien de la Graviere says: "Les idees simples ont toujours quelque peine a prevaloir. Quand l'heure critique arrive, c'est infailliblement a elles qu'on a recours. Le pedantisme technique ne resiste pas a quelque jours de campagne."
Hichborn says: "The warship of our day has become far too complicated for the people who may be called upon to work her; a balance of advantage, unsuspected by many, rests with that vessel which has comparative simplicity."
Simplicity does not mean an entire return to manual power, although the time will never come for its abandonment; it does not mean that every mechanism or appliance should be so simple as to be used or cared for by the merest landsman; nor does it imply that the fittings which increase safety and health should be discarded. But when for any safeguard supplied, another is crowded out or rendered useless; when one appliance must be accompanied by others to provide for the possibility of a break-down; when the hull requires such constant attention for its care and preservation that there is but little time for drill; when the motive machinery has the delicacy of a watch; when the decks are crowded with encumbrances of all kinds which obstruct the use of the battery and its supply of ammunition, or which render the crew uncomfortable and discontented; when the crew is composed mainly of specialists who know little else than their own particular duties;—when all this is the case, is it not time to remember that the warships exist only to carry guns, and that the officers and crew exist merely to fight them?
Our service is particularly fortunate in combining within itself those qualities which produce improvement; it is renowned for its knowledge of mechanical contrivances, and it has avoided the error of embodying all knowledge in one class of officers and all experience in another. Mere knowledge is insufficient; experience is absolutely necessary to produce the best results, as it gives insight into the causes of failures. Many fittings look well on paper, and even function well in the hands of their builders, which fail when used by those who have not the specialized skill required for their manipulation; and it often occurs that appliances which are satisfactory on shore are found to be entirely unsuited to service conditions afloat. In the difference between the grumbling statement of one officer that a certain part of the ship's equipment is "no good," and the intelligent report of another which states the circumstances of the failure, the probable reasons, and suggests a remedy, lies the key-note of successful improvement; one is mere experience, but the other combines knowledge with experience.
The happy union of these two qualities is especially desirable when considering the value of a ship as a weapon. Invention should receive constant encouragement, but the inventive faculty, unless guided by experience, may run riot and produce a chaotic jumble which shall be defective as a whole, even though there may be no marked defect in any particular fitting. The electric light, the bicycle and the sewing machine are familiar examples of improvement brought about by simplification; those parts which are unreliable, or superfluous, are altered or discarded, and the result obtained by other means in a more satisfactory manner, after close study of the actual conditions of service. The warship of to-day is a new invention, for each one is a new combination of many inventions, and it can be improved in utility and reliability only by the combined efforts of those who build it and those who use it.
Familiarity with the behavior and performance of the ship under all conditions is the best way to ascertain the defects and their causes; and experience in remedying many defects of the same nature, developed under different conditions, is the best way to determine upon the improvement which will be most efficient in all cases.
At the close of the Civil War naval personnel and materiel were extraordinarily efficient because activity and invention were stimulated by necessity, and restrained by knowledge of the actual conditions of war service. The lack of any extended knowledge of naval warfare with modern warships emphasizes the importance of continual practice under conditions resembling those of war, to discover the good and bad qualities of each ship, so as to maneuver and fight her to the best advantage in action, as well as to determine the best solution of the many problems still unfathomed for lack of experience. War efficiency is of the highest importance, but it is also essential to check unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, and to promote economical administration. The first cost of mere peace fittings is very great, and the expense of their repair often exceeds that of the essential fittings. They are also hurtful in their effect on the ship's discipline, as the crew become accustomed to refinements and conveniences which must be lacking in active service, and a spirit of fastidiousness in unimportant details is developed which exaggerates their importance, and fosters the habit of thinking that the ship is not ready for sea merely because some minor fitting is incomplete or unsatisfactory. While it is necessary that every part of the ship's equipment should be so perfect that there will be small chance of derangement when it receives reasonable care, and so simple that the repairs due to ordinary wear and tear can be made by the ship's force; it is equally necessary to cultivate a spirit of responsibility and self-reliance, and a desire to remedy the innumerable small defects which are sure to occur, without the aid of a navy yard. If the crew do not feel the responsibility of making- good all ordinary defects, due to service use or to casualties, a spirit of recklessness quickly appears, the ship becomes less efficient and the money paid for such repairs is an inexcusable waste. It is of still greater moment to prevent this, because preparation for battle in the most speedy and precise manner is a requisite for success; if the crew is so helpless as to depend on outside help in the most trifling matters, what can be expected in the hurry and excitement of such a time? Even when the crew is skilful and well trained, the time required for repairs must be taken from that belonging to drill or recreation, so that there is every reason for omitting all unnecessary fittings.
Mahan says: "Theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive." But he also says, in speaking of England's policy in the Napoleonic wars: "She obtained the double advantage of keeping the enemy under her eyes, and of sapping his efficiency by the easy life of port, while her own officers and seamen were hardened by the vigorous cruising into a perfect readiness for every call upon their energies." We do know, however, that the war of the future will come unexpectedly, and that unless the ships are efficient and the crews are familiar with the means of offense and defense they contain, the ablest strategy and the most brilliant tactics will be of no avail. In view of the lack of both money and men, it will doubtless be necessary when all of the new ships are completed, to establish a class of ships in reserve which shall contain the mere nucleus of a crew, and as many small ships will be required for detached service and duty on foreign stations, this reserve will naturally be composed mainly of battleships, coast defense vessels and the larger cruisers. When mobilization for war service becomes necessary, these ships will be needed at once and the few men who know the ship will be lost amidst new recruits. In such emergencies, the ships will be manned mainly by those accustomed to merchant ships and those who have had no experience afloat, and it will be fortunate if the great guns and main engines are used without casualties. We have only to read the accounts of foreign naval maneuvers to be impressed with the many casualties happening to machinery, boilers and steering gear and the numberless break-downs of minor appliances. When such things can happen in times of peace with other navies having a large number of trained men in reserve, and with sufficient warning to navy yard authorities to ensure the materiel being in fair condition, what can we expect with our limited navy yard facilities and the entire absence of any trained seamen? We have the volunteer Naval Reserve whose bravery and ability are unquestioned, but their experience cannot be sufficient to enable them immediately to manage the complicated mechanism of our new battleships. Hollis says: "At present it takes from six month to a year after a new ship goes into commission to get the best results out of her machinery; and through no fault of the firemen. It is only that they do not know when first taken on board." When this is the case is not some simplification necessary?
The necessity for rapid mobilization is but one of the many arguments in favor of simplicity, especially on large vessels. The captain maneuvering such a ship in action can no longer inspire the crew by his presence, he will not even know a tithe of what is occurring in the complicated structure he is directing, and even if he did he could not be certain that his orders were correctly understood and promptly obeyed. More than ever before will the issue depend on the nerve, judgment, and skill of the captain, and on the training, discipline and staunchness of the crew. Cannot a greater efficiency be obtained by making the ships less complicated, so that when the unfortunate necessity arises of fitting them out in haste, the essentials can be quickly mastered, and the crew can feel that, although they may be exposed to more danger from the enemy, there is less probability of danger from some act of ignorance or negligence of their own? The question of manning must be recognized.
In times of ease and leisure, elaborate and complicated methods of the completest character are a fascinating study, but in times of action and pressure the simplest methods will be used. If the battleship cannot be made invulnerable and unsinkable except by intricate and delicate means which may fail in the hour of trial, it is surely better to secure simpler and more reliable means of offense and defense, and accept the risks ensuing from the absence of complicated refinements; or, to use Farragut's words, "The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own guns."
One other reason for simplification: many methods for evaluating the fighting powers of warships in comparison with others of the same tonnage have been proposed, but as their different authors assign different relative values to each element of offense and defense, it is not to be expected that there will be agreement. The actual values of each element, however, tend to equalize themselves more and more; in guns, armor, machinery, torpedoes, subdivision and the like, the knowledge of what each navy is doing is so accurate, and the competition is so keen, that it is probable that real superiority of materiel will lie in simplification of detail. Between two ships equal in all other respects, the one which has the more simple materiel will be the more efficient, because it is not so easily or quickly deranged, and therefore the crew of that ship will have more confidence in her performance their courage will be increased by knowledge of every resource, and many daring and unthought-of expedients can be used with success.
Soley says: "The primary object for a navy at all times is to maintain itself in all its branches, materiel, personnel and organization in the most perfect state that is possible of readiness and efficiency for war.'' When any one feels that a greater degree of readiness and efficiency is possible, it is his duty to point out apparent defects and to suggest some remedy, leaving to higher authority the determination of the merit and practicability of his ideas. Every innovation is followed by unexpected consequences, and many objections can be raised against every suggestion offered; but when the service shall see that the defects due to complication have arisen from its own demands for perfection in every direction, further departures from simplicity and economy will cease. It matters little who furnishes suggestions for each improvement in the future, so long as there is a consensus of opinion as to their desirability.
In such a paper as this the treatment of the many branches of the subject must necessarily be sketchy and incomplete.
Standardizing is the most obvious means of securing- simplicity. When the use and care of standard appliances and fittings are once learned, there will be less loss of efficiency when officers and men are transferred from ship to ship, and on foreign stations extensive repairs can be made by making good the defective parts of one ship from the surplus stores of another.
Standardizing reached its highest perfection at the opening of the century, when ships of the same rate were practically alike from keel to truck. During the long cruises of that period the crews became so familiar with every part of the equipment, that its use and care became almost an instinct. Extraordinary results were accomplished: the marvelous repairs to the Vanguard, and the skill displayed by the new crew of the Constitution, are familiar examples.
Conditions are now different, for the rapid progress of naval science quickly renders obsolete the fittings which were thought to be satisfactory. Too much uniformity will result in mere routine and discourage invention, but standardizing could safely be carried further than has been done. The lack of uniformity is largely due to the many rival ideas among ourselves, but this can be obviated by deciding on the fitting that is best suited for a particular purpose, and then continuing its use, even if it prove deficient in some respects until it becomes clearly obsolete. We have now had sufficient experience with the new vessels to extend the standardizing so admirably begun with ordnance and electrical fittings to many other parts of the ship's equipment.
The question of design is too large for consideration; but it is worthy of note that all navies have strayed too far from simplicity in one respect. In the effort to satisfy all demands and combine on small ships high speed, powerful armament and great protection, there has been such a great sacrifice of strength, stability, habitability and coal endurance, that efficiency as a whole has been lessened. To combine all these qualities in the best manner, there is no longer any doubt that large and costly ships are required: with small ships, some qualities are now deliberately sacrificed to secure reliability in others, as the necessity for simplicity is better understood.
Subdivision is a necessary departure from simplicity, its function being to prevent or delay capsizing- or foundering; practically its value is vitiated by the necessity for piercing water-tight bulkheads and decks with doors and other openings, and pipes of all kinds. The Admiralty minute concerning the loss of the Victoria states that had the water-tight doors and hatches been closed, the ship would have been saved, but unfortunately it took from three to four minutes at the best to close them and the signal to do so was not given until one minute before the collision. The foundering of so many Chinese ships was probably largely due to the failure to close the doors by crews not properly trained. The difficulty of communication between the various parts of the ship and the great inconvenience ensuing when the doors are closed causes both officers and men to prefer the risk of foundering to the remedy. A certain number of doors must be kept open in action or fleet maneuvers, for the supply of ammunition and the control of the ship; but this is a necessary risk, which is minimized with a crew well trained to close them in an emergency. The danger lies with doors supplied for convenience and accessibility; even though they be reported closed, there is no surety for their remaining so during a panic. Simplicity demands that their number should be the smallest possible consistent with efficiency, at the sacrifice of convenience. Although it may be practicable to keep a greater number in good condition, more men and greater time are required to close them.
The advantages of subdivision, and the effect of flooding different compartments are not thoroughly understood throughout the service, and it would be of great benefit to establish a "stability school", which would afford a short, but instructive course showing by means of suitable models the alterations in stability and in trim occurring in different vessels from flooding compartments singly and in communication through open doors or injured bulkheads. Information presented in this manner would be of greater practicable value than in the shape of technical formulae and curves.
The weight of opinion now seems in favor of an even greater subdivision in the vicinity of the water-line, with fewer bulkheads elsewhere, to reduce the liability of capsizing at the expense of some floating power; the usefulness of a ship, when floating keel up, being questionable. It may be said that bulkheads above the water-line will quickly be rendered useless by the enemy's rapid-fire guns, and therefore, by my own reasoning, there is no use in further complicating the ship; but this is a case when the gain from complication is greater than the loss, as a delay of even five minutes in sinking, may save the lives of the greater part of the crew. Subdivision is the best expedient for reducing the chances of serious accident.
In protective decks there has been a lamentable departure from simplicity; in securing efficiency of minor details, the efficiency of the ship as a whole has been lessened as the decks are pierced in every direction by pipes of all sizes. Some of these, it is true, are provided with automatic valves of uncertain action, but the greater number are only closed by valves located below this deck. When it is struck by a projectile in their vicinity the consequence is obvious, and there is a great probability of stray shots from rapid-fire guns finding some of the many unprotected openings penetrating below the deck and causing fatal damage. The reports of the Yalu fight state that the pumps of all the ships engaged were working furiously, and it seems probable that even on the ships which did not sink, there was much alarm from these causes.
There is no use in weighting down the ship with such an encumbrance unless it be made efficient; no openings should be permitted except those which can be closed in action at short notice, or which must necessarily be open at all times for the working of the ship, and whose risk is known and accepted. Coaling scuttles and ammunition hatches can be closed by watertight shutters, but all other openings should be concentrated near the machinery space and protected as far as practicable. This can be done by a simplification of piping, by placing dynamo and pump rooms amidships as described later, and by separating the ventilation of living quarters entirely from that of ammunition and store rooms, the inlets and outlets of air for the latter being at the extremities of the machinery space.
Rapidity in coaling ship and in supplying coal to the fire rooms is of vital importance, and continually occupies the thoughts of many able officers. It may not be out of place to mention that the difficulties will be lessened by the various simplifications advocated by the writer on other pages, for they would enable the lower bunkers to be made of greater capacity, even on the smaller cruisers. Such bunkers can be more easily and quickly stowed; the scuttles in the protective deck can be kept closed in action because there will be sufficient coal below for continuous rapid supply; and with equal weights of coal less space will be required on the berth deck. This is but one example among many, which shows that when any portion of the ship is simplified there are many resultant benefits.
The man is the most important part of the ship's mechanism; but how has he been treated? Compare the San Francisco with the Constellation, the Detroit with the Portsmouth: the proportion of officers to crew has certainly not been diminished, yet the comforts of the officers have been increased while those of the men have been lessened. At night, even in port, they are packed in small compartments, heated by fire rooms and dynamo rooms or steam pipes wet from condensation or leaking pipes, and at sea their condition is even worse. To offset these discomforts, there have been supplied lockers of all kinds, bake ovens, steam cookers, refrigerating machines, and many other conveniences, but in the small space assigned him, Jacky cannot find rest day or night. The service of guns, the care of ship and machinery and their many complicated appliances require a constant vigilance which cannot be had unless the men can rest when off duty; tickling their palates with hot rolls and ice water is not sufficient. Every one having experience on the new ships feels the necessity for larger crews in war, the present complements being inadequate to perform the many responsible and onerous duties required to secure anything like continuous efficiency; they can stand the pressure during a few hours of excitement, but the continued strain of watching and waiting for the enemy must be distributed among more men, in order that everything shall be ready when he appears. Simplification is thus needed in two directions: a reduction in the number of appliances requiring constant attention, so that fewer additional men will be required; and an increase of crew space by curtailing as far as practicable the space now occupied for other purposes.
The space assigned to officers' quarters in the earlier cruisers was large in order to carry more officers than were required for purely military purposes so that the greatest number possible might obtain sea experience under the altered conditions of modern ships; but as ships become more numerous, fewer officers will be assigned to them, and some of the space now occupied by their quarters can be given to the crew. The innumerable returns, accounts, invoices and other papers now deemed necessary, not only absorb much time from officers and men in mere clerical duties at the expense of true efficiency, but require a large proportion of space in their preparation. With the present rage for scientific investigation and reports, one is tempted to believe that, in a few years, the captain of the hold will have a berth deck office and submit a daily report of the chemical analysis of the contents of his water tanks, a weekly report of the amounts consumed for the various purposes of ship economy, and a quarterly report giving the effect on ship and crew of the varying qualities and quantities of water used; all of which would give very valuable scientific information no doubt, but its collection would be entirely out of place on a warship.
Not satisfied with the crowded state of the ship when newly built, no sooner is she in commission than the demands for more fittings, comforts and conveniences become unceasing another locker, a book case, a desk, a broiler, a deck gear room and the like, are called for and the crew space is lessened continuously: even when additional crew space is obtained by one officer, others promptly ask for additional encumbrances to occupy it. There is no doubt that in time of war both officers and men would demand a general clearing out from stem to stern of everything that was superfluous or merely convenient; but why not simplify now? During visits to navy yards, if all would join in putting obstructions on shore instead of taking more on board, the gain in efficiency would be very great. It is not necessary in peace that the ship should have the Spartan simplicity of war; on the contrary, let us have every comfort that will add to health and cheerfulness, which does not militate against the efficiency of the ship as a weapon; but if common sense does not rule in their selection, we merely crowd the ship with useless gear liable to get out of order.
The Yalu fight has awakened the service to necessity for abolishing wooden bulkheads and elaborate joiner work, to minimize the danger from fire and flying splinters; but it is worthy of note that Nelson, after his experience at Aboukir, considered fire as the greatest danger of naval warfare.
Although the boiler is the most important piece of mechanism on the warship, there has not been so much progress in adapting it to the conditions of modern warfare as has been the case with other parts of the equipment, until during the last few years. The space occupied by cylindrical boilers is nearly two-thirds of that occupied by the whole propelling mechanism, and their weight is more than one-half the total machinery weight, for their form is least adapted to close stowage and reduction of weight. Tubulous boilers are less liable to derangement from accident or neglect they occupying less space, for they can be stowed to better advantage; they are lighter, and steam of higher pressure can be raised in much less time; faults can be sooner detected and easier repaired; but it is only fair to state that their opponents claim that many of these advantages are illusory or are gained at the sacrifice of more important qualities. Many objections of the same nature were offered when surface condensers first appeared, but are heard no more. Efficient boilers should be able to steam quickly and safely at full power at any time during a cruise; other considerations are secondary; but all requirements are met by the tubulous boiler, and its general adoption seems certain.
In the advance from simple self-contained engines to the triple or quadruple-expansion engines of to-day there has been a development of increased power with lessened space and weight beyond the most sanguine expectations of even ten years ago. The Boston and Cincinnati are of practically the same size, yet when the former has one engine the latter has two which develop more than twice the power on the same weight. The complexity necessary to accomplish this is no departure from efficiency when the engines are strong, reliable and durable, for they are directly under the observation of officers who possess skill and judgment to operate and preserve them; and any unusual wear or uncertainty, any fault or weakness can be quickly detected because they are continually in sight. Standardizing has been carried out to a large extent, and there has been much simplification; the Wabash valves of early days have disappeared, and the radial valve gears of geometrical perfection are being displaced by the old familiar and reliable link motion.
In another direction, however, a great departure from simplicity and efficiency has occurred. The auxiliaries necessary for the functioning of the propelling machinery are no longer attached to the main engines. They are now independent and scattered throughout the whole machinery space, where they cannot receive the watchful and responsible supervision necessary for their efficient performance; break-downs occur and it is necessary to fit additional auxiliaries to provide for such emergencies. It has been stated that the speed endurance depends as largely on the propelling auxiliaries, as the fighting power depends upon the secondary battery. A stronger case could easily be made out for them, but it is the number of auxiliaries which is being discussed and not their duties.
There are many auxiliaries outside of those connected with the propelling machinery, and the following table has been prepared from the best information at hand to show their number and uses on various types of ships; the classification explains itself.
Economy in coal expenditure is of vital importance: in peace from financial reasons, to save money; and in war from military reasons, to save time. Coal is as necessary for speed to secure the weather gage as are the great guns when once the fight is on. Every unnecessary mechanism should therefore be discarded.
It is proposed by some to produce great coal economy by paying more attention to the design of the auxiliaries and make each one as perfect as possible; but this involves more complication and more skillful attention, so that there will be even greater probability of break-downs than is the case now. This solution of the problem is directly opposed to the principles advocated in this paper.
Others again propose to let the auxiliaries alone and devote greater attention to increasing the economy of the main engines, arguing that increased delicacy and complication are practicable with the skilled supervision and attendance they receive: but it is impossible to obtain economy with the main engines at all the various ranges of power required by the warship, and a choice must be made as to when economy is most desirable. In any case, it can only be obtained by increasing both complication and weight beyond what is necessary or desirable. Reliability is of more importance than economy, and the best and most simple plan seems to be to secure greater power with a given weight of coal by using steam of higher pressures, and by reducing the number of auxiliaries.
Some of these auxiliaries are merely handy labor-saving devices, and are not absolutely necessary. Six ash hoist engines are surely not required on a 3000-ton ship; in many cases their work can be performed to advantage by the deck force who are often not sufficiently employed when the ship is under way, when they cannot be spared from other duties; two ash hoists would be sufficient if suitably placed, as by the aid of leading blocks the refuse of each fire-room could be hoisted through its own ash chute; on smaller ships this could be done by the boat winch. The loss from condensation in exposed lines of piping and from wasteful engines would be prevented, and there would be fewer repairs needed.
The ice machine and permanent refrigerators are luxuries which may be permissible on large ships where the space occupied and the coal expended is but a small proportion of the total available for other purposes. On small ships, however, the additional comfort they provide for a short time are obtained by a sacrifice of space and a waste of coal which detract from real efficiency.
The number of independent auxiliaries will naturally increase with the size of the ship; their relative cost in coal, weight and space will not be so great, and as the complement does not increase in the same ratio as the displacement, the presence of more and larger guns or boats requires something besides manual power for their rapid manipulation. On the other hand, the larger ship requires more care and attention from the crew simply because it is larger; so that there is no reason why unnecessary auxiliaries should be placed on ships for the mere reason that there is space for them. In general, the ruling principle should be to discard every auxiliary whose functions can be performed by manual power without reducing the fighting efficiency, to reduce the number required for emergency or convenience to the lowest possible limit, and to design such as cannot be dispensed with so that they shall be simple, strong and reliable, with one engine performing several duties when practicable.
The great number of pumps supplied the new ships is especially noticeable. Concerning the speed trial of the Minneapolis, it is stated: "The water in the glass gauges was perfectly steady, and only half the feed pumps (at the moderate speed of thirty-one double strokes per minute) were required to keep up the supply." An emergency provision of 100 per cent, above the maximum requirements appears extravagant, to say the least. The numerous feed pumps, fire pumps and bilge pumps are doubtless due to an exaggerated appreciation of the truth that duplication gives safety, while the equally important truth that concentration gives security is overlooked. The ship's armament is dispersed to reduce the chances of its being disabled by a few well aimed or lucky shots, and the large fighting crew is intentionally scattered for the same reason and to have a reserve available to make good inevitable losses. The motive power, on the contrary, should be concentrated because it must be under perfect control to be useful; it must be protected to the greatest practicable extent; and the smallest number of men, consistent with efficiency, should be concentrated at this duty. Some emergency pumps are essential, but if the main pumps are well designed and reliable, and receive greater care, fewer emergency pumps will be needed. If all the pumps necessary for boiler supply, drainage, fire and flushing service were situated in a pump room located amidships and below the protective deck, they would receive better supervision and care with fewer attendants, a smaller number would be necessary, and their concentration would greatly reduce the present maze of piping. Instead of pumps in the fire rooms which require unceasing vigilance to counteract the evil effects of ashes and coal dust, the pump room would provide a continuous supply of feed water, and more attention could be paid to firing; while the removal of the other pumps from the engine rooms would enable the attendants there to devote all of their time to the motive machinery; fire rooms and engine rooms would be less crowded and the lower bunkers could be made larger.
The numerous steam .auxiliaries all over the ship necessitate many steam pipes passing through berthing spaces and store rooms where heat and leaky joints are very objectionable. Aside from this, the terrible possibilities of even a small pipe bursting from the casualties of action are a sufficient justification for abolishing steam auxiliaries outside the machine space, where possible, even if they be replaced by others more wasteful of coal, provided the ship's efficiency, as a weapon, be increased. The hydraulic pipe and the electric wire can be led to the various necessary auxiliaries with greater ease, they occupy less space, cause less discomfort by their presence, and above all, will cause no serious disaster if ruptured. The steam engine, especially when used intermittently, requires some skill to start it; whereas the hydraulic or electric motor can be used with safety and precision at any time, after the most elementary training, as is shown by the character of the operators of the familiar elevator or trolley car. Although such motors require a high degree of skill and intelligence for their repair, a fewer number of specialists is required, and the great amount of standardizing permits casualties to be quickly repaired at short notice; they also have the advantage of being easier kept in good condition as there is less difficulty from corrosion. Their use for capstans and steering engines, however, is clearly undesirable at present; fortunately, steam pipes for these auxiliaries can be arranged to obviate many of the objections mentioned.
The use of some motive power other than steam necessitates the use of additional appliances for their creation, and any conversion of power involves some waste of coal. It may therefore be thought that the plea for such motors is contradicted by the reasons given in advocating simplicity and economy. This is true; but such motors are advantageous from a larger view of real efficiency, and the departure from simplicity and economy is not so great as might appear at first sight.
It is not wasteful of coal when a new weapon like the torpedo, a new safeguard like the electric light, or a marked increase in health and comfort are the result. Power is transmitted to such motors with but little loss even through flooded compartments; but there is a great loss from condensation in long lines of steam pipes, and steam power cannot be transmitted at all through flooded compartments.
A discussion of the relative merits of electric, pneumatic, and hydraulic motors is out of place; it is sufficient to say that the development of applied electricity on the warship is rapidly increasing, now that its possibilities and limitations are better understood, and its advantages for military purposes are appreciated. Its use for search lights and signals, ammunition hoists, gun mounts, turret turning, range finders, firing circuits and the like is well established, while for lighting and ventilation it is invaluable.
Successful electric counters, telegraphs and indicators are the ideal appliances for these purposes. There should be many places about the ship where the captain can direct the ship, and although the present mechanical appliances are generally reliable, they are cumbersome, and it is impracticable to scatter them owing to the practicable difficulties in getting proper leads. The electrical appliances thus far provided, are unreliable, but with their development will come efficiency.
Voice pipes are cumbersome, are a source of danger, and are unreliable, because confusion may arise from orders imperfectly understood, as the central station is better in theory than in practice. What a gain there will be when a suitable telephone shall be developed which will enable the conning tower to distinctly transmit orders to all parts of a ship.
In electricity, as in everything else, we shall stray from efficiency unless simplicity and economy be borne in mind. Such toys as automatic electrical whistles, automatic steering compasses and similar fittings are unnecessary and should be discarded. The electric light is so convenient that the temptation is very great to lose sight of economy in the installation and use of lamps. Fixed lights are located in storerooms and other places where portables could be used; and officers are very apt to use the electric lights on trivial occasions where hand lanterns would answer, or to consider the lamps in their own quarters as a necessity instead of a luxury;—how many stop to think that it takes 2 pounds of coal per hour for a sixteen-candle-power lamp?
To complete the concentration of the principal auxiliaries within the machinery space, the dynamo room should also be located amidships and below the protective deck in a separate compartment; a better and more economical system of wiring would be possible, an easier and safer generation of electricity due to better ventilation and dryer steam; the dynamos would be better protected, and the crew would be saved much annoyance and discomfort.
The maze of piping on the warship of to-day is fully appreciated only after experience on bilge boards. Pipes are found everywhere, encumbering the double bottom, hiding the inner bottom, and obstructing coal bunkers, berthing spaces and officers' quarters. It is no exaggeration to say that their total length exceeds that of the standing and running rigging of sailing ships of equal size, and that the number of valves is greater than the number of blocks. It is claimed that the presence of all these pipes and valves is as necessary to the warship of to-day as the rigging and blocks on the ships of 1812, and that there will be a loss of efficiency if they are reduced in number and simplified. This parallel is not a happy one, for the rigging was reduced in amount and was simplified whenever necessary by furling sail or by sending down yards and spars; the pipes, on the contrary, must always remain as fitted. The rigging was always en evidence its weakness could be detected before injury was done, and its defective parts could be quickly repaired or replaced by the crew, with the stores and appliances on board; but the piping is generally hidden from view by floor plates, stores and lagging, and its interior is never seen; its weakness develops gradually and can rarely be detected until a break-down occurs, which, usually, can only be temporarily repaired by the crew, as it is impossible for them to replace any except the smallest-sized pipes.
Again, the location and use of every part of the rigging were so familiar to every man on board, that on the darkest nights, or in sudden emergencies a mistake was extremely rare; and when a mistake did occur, it quickly betrayed itself and could usually be quickly remedied. What a contrast with the warship of to-day: how many officers and men are there who know the names and uses of every pipe they see, how many men know the leads and combinations necessary to flood this compartment or to pump out that one, if the routine gear is out of order? When it is not uncommon to find that water has entered the double bottom from negligence or ignorance, how great must be the danger in the excitement of action if this can occur in the daily routine of peace? What can be done to simplify? Some suggestion concerning steam and ventilation pipes are offered elsewhere. With drain pipes, there has been a tendency towards requiring that every compartment should be emptied by every pump, but experience with the labyrinth of pipes and fittings already fitted has shown that many of them are rarely utilized. It is desirable, no doubt, to have the drainage complete; but it is more desirable that this should be done in such a simple and reliable way that every petty officer can learn to manipulate the system and thus eliminate the danger arising from entire dependence on specialists to operate the multitude of valves, when blunders may imperil the safety of the ship.
The many small pumps required for the fresh water service are a fruitful source of annoyance, but the growing system of having one pump fill a cistern located in or above the hammock berthing, from which the water is distributed throughout the ship by gravity alone, is exactly in the line of progress advocated. Those who have had experience in breaking out a lower bunker on the eve of sailing to get at a leaky joint, may think that an effort should be made to standardize the leads of pipes; but if joints are located in accessible places, and if the pipes do not pierce the protective deck outside the machinery space, further simplification will not be necessary.
Brassey says: "Nowhere more than in the forces of the navy and the army do we see indications of that thoughtless impatience to be in the new fashion of the day. Should it not be remembered that an instrument of war depends for its value not only on the weapon itself, but on the training and knowledge of those in whose hands it is placed?" Officers naturally desire to have everything of the latest and best type regardless of the cost, when greater efficiency can be secured. Yet true economy is but another term for efficiency, and when the service realizes the immense improvement which a well developed system of economy will bring about, gratifying results will follow. This does not mean that fighting power should be subordinated to a parsimonious use of stores, or to a niggardly policy of repairs, for that is false economy; it does mean, however, that extravagant and wasteful expenditure is an evidence of incompetence or carelessness.
With our form of government, it is not easy to secure money for any purely military purpose unless its necessity is self-apparent. Although it has been realized that high class ships are needed and that high prices must be paid for them; we cannot expect large annual appropriations for the maintenance and improvement of these ships unless it be self-evident that carelessness and extravagance do not exist, and that the necessity for economy is appreciated. It is imperative that excellence be secured by economy, for if there is carelessness or waste, a disastrous reaction will set in, and the navy will again suffer as it did twenty years ago.
First cost is always important; but when a greater expenditure will secure greater fighting power, or will secure greater economy in peace without lessening the war efficiency, there is no extravagance.
Economy in running expenses is essential. These are of two kinds: military expenses, for ammunition, coal, stores, pay, etc., which are regulated by the exigencies of the service and by the policy of the day; and mechanical expenses, for repairs or improvements, which are more or less regulated by the service itself, for they depend upon the ship's design and workmanship and upon the crew's skill and vigilance. The expense of repairs due to wear and tear and to accidents is one criterion of a ship's efficiency, because their amount can be lessened by vigilance and the proverbial "stitch in time;" and as the money available is limited in amount, the less there is required for these expenses the greater the amount available for improvements. Officers whose intelligence and fertility of resource secure economy in peace by maintaining efficiency with the means at hand, will not only add to their reputations but will be developing those qualities which will prove most valuable in war.
Jurien de la Graviere, in speaking of Nelson's long watch off Toulon for the French fleet, says: "Chose digne de remarque le bouillant amiral managait ses vergues et ses voiles dans les circonstances ordinaires plus soigneusement que son escadre ou son vaisseau dans les occasions decisives." The necessity for constant supervision and attention to detail is more important on the complicated warship of 1895 than on its predecessor of ninety years ago; greater and increasing responsibilities therefore rest on the personnel of to-day as compared with that of the past. Competition is keener and increasing; each new ship is somewhat better than the one before it, and it rests largely with the most intelligent use of the materiel to gain the advantage. No matter how simple and perfect the mechanism, the mere fact that it is a mechanism requires skill and vigilance for its care and management.
Seamanship is the art of providing, preserving and handling ships and their equipment; and the knowledge of this art is more difficult to acquire than ever before because of the many different types of ships, which have their special purposes and peculiarities. With the general principles of this art all officers are familiar, and it is merely a question of time to successfully adapt them to the peculiarities of individual ships; but this time must be taken from other duties, officers are so overwhelmed by a mass of petty details, that a considerable period must elapse before they can grasp the peculiarities of her equipment and summarize her qualities so as to be prepared for the contingencies of service afloat.
This period could be greatly shortened by a study of a "ship's manual" which would contain the results of the investigations of all those connected with her building and equipment, and the results of the experience of those previously serving on her. Such a manual should state, briefly but clearly, the ship's merits and demerits, laying stress on those duties which she is best and least qualified to perform; with descriptions of the armament, ammunition and armor; of the machinery, with statements of the speed, horse-power, and coal endurance under various conditions; of the electric plant, with explanations of peculiar appliances; of the hull and its subdivisions; of the drainage system, and the method of pumping or flooding various compartments and a statement of the ship's trim and behavior when the large compartments are filled. It would also describe the handiness and qualities during all weathers, and mention the parts of her equipment which are most liable to give trouble. In other words, the ship's manual would contain in a concise form that information which every officer gathers and assimilates as best he may, and it would be of the greatest value in rapid mobilization of ships in the reserve.
The drudgery of bilge board duty becomes very wearisome, but in no other way can the ship be known so well and thoroughly. When an officer is able to mentally photograph the interior of every compartment with every important fitting in it, he is far better equipped for handling the ship, and for quickly deciding what should be done in an emergency, than one who has perhaps spent even more time in pouring over plans, curves and tabulated data.
Accuracy and dispatch are the fundamentals of successful seamanship, and they are best obtained by practical observation of every appliance and fitting in the ship. When all things remained stationery, as in the times of sailing ships, the art of seamanship was largely formulated, and for every probable contingency the best line of action had been established by precedent. But to-day there is little or no precedent and nothing is formulated, for everything is changing.
The contingencies themselves are often unlocked for and the best procedure for one ship may be worst for the other. Unremitting vigilance and complete familiarity with every detail on the part of the officers are more necessary than ever before, because the men have not yet learned the requirements of the new seamanship, and much of their work must be done for them. This knowledge of detail is valuable in another way for it gives an insight into the causes of failure, and an appreciation of the uselessness of refinements that are seldom or never used. Without this knowledge proper suggestions for simplification and improvement cannot be made.
Roosevelt says: "The captains and lieutenants of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very practical school." It was to this knowledge of their duties that the perfection of our warships of that period was largely due, for they were able to suggest improvements of practical value to builders who had long been accustomed to constructing and equipping ships which could fight as well as they could run. To-day the value of proposed improvements is largely a matter of judgment based upon the behavior of the ship in peaceful cruises or maneuvers. How important, therefore, it is that no ideas or suggestions should be lost, particularly those which arise after some annoying or perplexing experience has shown the best way of overcoming some unforeseen difficulty. There have been numberless suggestions for improvement during wardroom discussions, but they have usually been forgotten.
It is thought that a "suggestion book," in which every officer would be encouraged to record the results of his individual experiences and his suggestions for improvement, would prove of interest and utility. If it were possible to adopt the German regimental system, and have occasional discussions by all officers of the various questions arising, and record the ruling opinions in the suggestion book it would be of still more value.
Such a book would have a twofold usefulness: for those afloat, it would accentuate the familiar fact that a ship is a compromise; that what is added to one quality must be taken from another, and by showing the cost of improvements, it would increase the desire for economy in order that the improvements could be carried out. For those ashore, it would show where improvement was most desirable, and it would recall the onerous conditions of sea service, which are so quickly forgotten after a few months of shore duty.
In suggesting and making improvements, however, let us avoid jumping at the conclusion that every new device makes obsolete everything preceding it; for it is the demand for perpetual change in minor details which fritters away money that could be more efficiently used on more vital alterations. The better way is to spend money only on those alterations that are absolutely necessary, until such time as the ship is laid up for a general overhauling and refitting. At that time, especially if the suggestion book has been utilized with the proper spirit, the money which has been saved on useless or unnecessary alterations can be expended to produce a harmonious whole or at least a complete development of one or more qualities, instead of having a patchwork of incomplete improvements which give satisfaction to no one. The knowledge that there is not sufficient money available for more improvements should increase the desire for frugality, as economy is a revenue in itself.
If simplicity and economy be carried out, as suggested in this paper, a more efficient ship can be built for the same money in the first place; there will be less expense in making good wear and tear; and the ship can be kept in line with the onward march of naval science.
The ideal seaman for the modern warship is admirably described by Luce: "The highest expression of the trained man is to be found in the able seaman and expert gunner combined." The necessary complication of hull and equipment requires from the men a reasonable amount of mechanical skill and capacity for their effective use and care. Much has been said and written concerning methods of training seamen and making them comfortable, and the writer merely wishes to call attention to some particular qualities which are touched on in this paper.
It is not possible for one man to have a thorough knowledge of the entire ship, and some specialists are therefore necessary, although there is little room for the man who knows one thing only. The most valuable men are those who know their own duties well, and who have a general knowledge of the duties of others, for they do their own work more efficiently, and do some portion of the work of others in an emergency. This is well recognized in the training of both officers and men; but greater efficiency can be obtained when we have a larger number of men who are mechanic-sailors; above everything else they must have the bold, self-reliant spirit of the old seamen. We want men who know what to do and how to do it, who are quick to see the necessity for action, and who are prompt to act without waiting for orders; such men cannot be mere sailors, for they lack the necessary mechanical skill; nor mere mechanics, for they lack the necessary knowledge of the sea, and their point of view is apt to be too narrow.
We have such men but we need more, and all should be taught a wider range of duties. The boys who can take apart and replace the breech mechanism of a rapid-fire gun can quickly learn to overhaul the gear for operating a water-tight door; and the men who know how to use and care for the torpedo plant can easily learn to care for the steering gear. The knowledge of drill and monkey-wrench is as important as that of marling-spike and mallet; and the skill to pack a stuffing-box or hand-pump, or to fit a rubber gasket is as necessary as the skill to reeve off a fish tackle, or a boat's falls, or to heave the lead. To get and keep the right man is not easy; he must get good pay and good treatment, but with them he must accept the altered conditions of the service, must feel his increased responsibility and must expect prompt punishment for every act of carelessness or negligence.
The lack of an American seafaring element to draw upon in war is a deplorable fact, but there is consolation in the thought that many valuable men can be had in war from another class. The new navy is popular throughout the country; and when the emergency arises it will require but small encouragement to obtain thousands of volunteers from the young, alert and self-reliant American artisans, who now find an abundance of well paid work on shore. Such men under capable petty officers, would quickly adapt themselves to sea life and the special mechanical appliances found on board the modern warship. After a few months' training they would be more valuable in the gun and powder divisions than the best north countrymen, who are sailors from instinct, but who do not have that adaptive and ingenious faculty which is peculiarly American. Seamen are more needed than ever before, for their special knowledge is absolutely essential. The experience of the Romans in the Punic wars, of the Spaniards with Armada, and of the French in the time of Napoleon, is sufficient to show that knowledge of wind and weather cannot be obtained by a royal decree or a general order; and that without this knowledge the proudest fleets are useless. But it is also true that only a small number of men who are seamen and nothing else is needed on our ships to-day where sails are conspicuous by their absence. There are certain duties which none but the seamen can perform; and even if this were not so, his presence is necessary for the fostering of those peculiar qualities which are needed by those who "go down to the sea in ships," even though it be on a floating battery which never sees blue water. The necessity for men who are more than mere seamen is recognized in the training given to the seamen gunners, and in the appointment of boatswains and gunners who have had this admirable training. With more such men, and with carpenters who have been navy yard apprentices, our ships will be more efficient and better cared for, and executive officers can devote less time to petty details, and occupy themselves in more important and congenial administrative duties, and economy will be more practicable.
To attain this desirable end with the crews of to-day, they must be made to realize that no duty is unimportant, that every man on the ship is there to perform as many duties as possible, and that carelessness is the worst of faults. They should feel that it is as discreditable to be ignorant of the leads and uses of pipes and electric wires now as it was to be ignorant of the leads and uses of the rigging. Petty officers in particular should know the use and care of every appliance and fitting in their part of the ship, and should be taught to foresee and meet the many emergencies which may arise. In the minute subdivision of the present warship, the petty officers must often be relied upon to remedy defects at once, instead of waiting for orders. In the action between the Constellation and l’Insurgente, Porter in the foretop, finding that his hails to the deck were disregarded when the foretopmast was badly wounded near the lower cap, cut the stoppers and lowered the yard, and thus insured the victory. Such appreciation of danger, and such prompt action to meet it, is a lesson to officers and men alike, for if Porter and his men had not been taught the use and necessity of this maneuver it could not have been accomplished.
The superb condition of the ships coming from the Pacific for the Naval Rendezvous shows what may be done by proper training on long cruises. On the home station, however, one often sees a spirit of carelessness and recklessness that is opposed to efficiency and economy. To some extent, this may be due to the present unfortunate necessity for transferring men from ship to ship; the men have not time to learn their ship, and they feel little interest or responsibility in her.
But it is mainly due to the feeling that a navy yard is near by, and that the defects due to their own carelessness will there be made good by some one else, instead of by themselves. This can best be remedied by impressing every one that the appliances at hand must be utilized, and that the numerous small defects which are sure to occur must be made good on the ship whenever possible.
Many times victories have been won by sailing ships, merely from rapidity in repairing damages. After close cannonading without decisive results, although each ship had suffered severely from her opponent's fire, it was common for them to separate and attempt to repair damages; the one which was first able to haul into position to rake the other was certain of victory. It may be said that this is no longer true with the modern warship, as damages can only be made good at navy yards. This is only partially true, for there will be many minor injuries which can be repaired at sea, and with two ships similarly damaged, the one with a crew which is able to make even temporary repairs will be most efficient because she will be more formidable en route to a navy yard, and will be ready for active service sooner than the other. This is well illustrated by the behavior of the Japanese ships after the Yalu fight; and in our own Civil War, great delay and embarrassment were experienced from inefficiency and incompetence.
To keep the mechanic-sailor after he has been trained to his new duties, more pay must be offered him, or he will seek the higher wages to be found on shore. Yet true economy and efficiency will follow when this is done, for ships can be kept in a more perfect state of readiness, and the additional expense for pay will be much less than the expense of increased repairs due to ignorance or incompetence. It should be thoroughly understood, however, that any increase of pay must be accompanied by a strict accountability, and that any negligence will be followed by severe punishment.
Colomb says: "When man power is capable of doing the work, I cannot help thinking it is very much better, on board warships, that the man power should do it." This is exactly in accordance with the simplicity and economy advocated in this paper. Such fittings as the automatic whistle and the automatic steering compass are complicated and delicate, and their cost for installation and repairs is out of all proportion to their practical usefulness. The warship carries a sufficient complement to afford men to do the work of such devices, who thereby learn those habits of alertness and self-reliance which are so valuable. In manning boat falls, ash whip and fish tackle, coal is saved, and the crew exercised. A voice tube and annunciator to a military top may function reliably, but it is simpler and surer to hail the top from deck. It is better to abolish all small fittings which are not necessary and which are so unreliable that they may fail just when the men are accustomed to their use and depend upon them in emergencies. Larger appliances must be supplied for use when there are few men available, but their use should be restricted to such times, except when dispatch is required.
Soley's comparison of the actions between the Shannon and the Chesapeake, and between the Weehawken and the Atlanta might have been used as the text for this paper. He says: "In both cases the victorious captain…is bold and prudent, attentive to details, minutely careful in preparation"; the victorious ships were "always ready for any kind of service"; with the losers "there was the same absence of preparation." Ships and crews were as nearly perfect as the naval science of the day could make them, and that is what is wanted with the warship of to-day.
Perfection in the ship is not to be had by crowding her with complicated and fragile mechanisms or superfluous fittings upon which no reliance would be placed in war, and which are seldom, if ever, used in peace, even though the ship be fresh from a navy yard. True progress lies in supplying those appliances which are useful and reliable, and in subordinating their individual efficiency to that of the whole ship.
Perfection in the crew is to be had by encouraging versatility and by restoring the old spirit of self-reliance, so that the complicated fittings which are necessary on modern warships can be maintained in constant readiness for use.
Improvements are continually necessary; but they cannot be had unless economy provides the money, and they will rarely be of permanent value if they are the expression of hastily conceived notions, or cause a departure from simplicity.
Simplicity and economy cannot be secured by the efforts of the few; the concentrated desire of the many as manifested in their daily duties, can alone cause a lasting improvement. Complication has arisen from the demands of the entire service, and the remedy is in its hands, for it is only by the cordial cooperation of every one that the warship can be made an efficient weapon.
DISCUSSION.
Commander C.F. Goodrich, U.S.N.:—A more timely article could not have been penned, nor one more urgently needed, to call attention, in tones not to be misunderstood, to a tendency of our service which is full of evil. Every officer who has served on board of a modern ship must have felt the inconvenience arising from break downs of delicate machinery and apparatus, upon which reliance had been placed until the habit of trusting to them had become fixed. Convenient and useful these machines and appliances are, but the question seems never to have been asked, Do they sufficiently increase the ships' fighting efficiency to justify their adoption, or what provision has been made for doing their work in the event of failure during an action?
There are three systems which especially offend against the doctrine of simplicity—the electric call and alarm circuits, the drainage, and the auxiliaries.
It would seem as if officers had so clamored for easy communications that they had been granted electrical calls from each to every point on board, so numerous and so intricate are the leads in some instances. I should be afraid to say how large a percentage of these circuits I believe to be usually out of order. As to automatic alarms—their annunciators are as ornamental as they are doubtless costly—but, too often, the vital organs in the bilge and bunkers are out of order. Why should they replace that human vigilance which is the essential condition of safety? Would a captain be cleared of the charge of negligence if he lost his ship through failure of an electric alarm?
The writer has dwelt upon the drainage maze of pipes even less censuringly than he might. After what he has said it will be impossible in the future to repeat the errors of the past.
The auxiliaries should either be operated without steam, or they should be abolished rather than lead steam pipes through living spaces—I had almost written outside the engine and boiler compartments. Personally, I see no reason why all really vital to the ship's proper functions, should not be electrically driven. The electric motor is now in daily use on tram cars and under conditions which make shipboard employment a laboratory experiment in comparison.
The ventilation of our ships as at present designed is fraught with danger in the event of the sticking of the automatic valve and the consequent free passage of water from one water-tight compartment to another. I was told by Mr. Cramp that the air ducts for the New York covered one of his docks and stopped much yard work until gotten out of the way, and in their place on board where they took up the room of 300 tons of coal. I am not original in suggesting independent electrical ventilating fans at such points, and such only, where they are indispensable, discharging directly upwards through tubes that pierce no bulkhead. While this suggestion appears to involve a departure from simplicity, I think, upon study, it will be found to be within the author's limitations.
The proposed "manual" needs no endorsement, its value is axiomatic. The "suggestion book" is equally admirable. Personally, I have adopted its leading features by requiring my subordinates on board ship to submit to me written memoranda of their recommendations and criticism upon the hull and fittings for embodiment, at my discretion, in my periodical reports to the Bureau of Construction. I am loath to urge upon a service already deeply laden with papers and returns any additional burden of a clerical nature, but the manual and suggestion book seem sufficiently useful to meet even this objection.
It is not often that an article can command such hearty agreement as I am sure will meet this sermon on Simplicity. It is a contribution to the literature of the profession as notable for its subject as for the manner and style of its treatment.
I hope the author will pardon me if I rewrite one of his clauses and conclude by saying, "nothing should be added unless the advantages of its presence more than counterbalance the advantages of its absence."
Lieutenant H.S. Knapp, U.S.N.:—The service is fortunate in having presented to it in such an able way the important subject of Mr. Baxter's essay, and I believe that his general conclusions will meet with hearty approval. To my mind, he strikes the key-note in his remark, "The man is the most important part of the ship's mechanism," and what he has said in that connection appeals especially to me as a sea-going officer. In the desire to surpass like ships in foreign navies, many of our own ships have been so filled up with weapons and machinery as to fatally crowd and discomfort the men. Heavy batteries, torpedoes and powerful machinery are all desirable, no doubt; but every addition in either direction involves additions to the complement, while, at the same time, there is less room for the greater number of men and for the increased supplies of all sorts required. The question is one of compromise, but the compromise should not ignore Jack; in too many of our new ships it does.
I am serving on board one of our smaller ships that admirably points the moral. On a displacement of about 2000 tons only she carries a main battery of nine 5-in. B.L.Rs. (it is proposed to add another), four automobile torpedoes of two distinct types, and the engines and auxiliaries develop 5400 I.H.P., giving a trial speed of a trifle over 19 knots. As a consequence, the cubical air space per man is much less than that required by statute for emigrants on ocean steamers. Considering the necessary heat from the boilers and dynamo-room, which latter is immediately below one compartment of the berth deck, it will be seen how crowded and uncomfortable the men are at night. Nor are they much better off by day, except in fine weather, for the forecastle is their only comfortable place when it is hot, and when it rains they cannot stay there. Bad as this is, considerably less berthing space was allowed in the original design, which provided for a somewhat heavier armament. I leave out of consideration the Gehenna-like side passages which were provided with hammock-hooks by some genius.
Lest I be accused of growling without suggesting a remedy, I will state briefly in what way changes might be made that would, in my opinion, result in a better ship. In the first place, I would leave out altogether the automobile torpedoes, of whose value, on small ships of the cruiser class, I am skeptical. But the great change that seems to me desirable is in the boiler power. Three-quarters of the power now installed, 4000 horses say, could be distributed in two double-ended and two single-ended boilers, and would give the ship a speed of 17 knots. This would result in the saving of space below and on the berth deck equal to the length of a single ended boiler plus the width of one fire-room. Below the berth deck a large additional coal space could be provided, together with increased hold and store-room space in which the ship is lamentably deficient. On the berth deck there would be an additional compartment available for berthing and messing space. The result would be a great increase in habitability, considerable gain in stowage room, increased coal capacity, increased radius at full speed of at least 700 miles, largely increased radius at cruising speed, and a diminished number of auxiliaries, together with a smaller number of men. To offset these advantages there would be a sacrifice of two knots at extreme speed, though a 2000-ton ship is no laggard that can make 17 knots.
The changes proposed are all in the direction of simplicity. To my mind, however, the greatest gain of all would be in habitability, which must have an effect, and that so great as hardly to admit of exaggeration, on the efficiency of the ship as a war machine, especially if the proposed changes cross the line between comfort and discomfort. I am convinced that changes such as I have indicated would increase the efficiency and value of the ship for both peace and war.
My criticisms have been made on the one ship with which I am most familiar; but conversations with many brother officers convince me that, in a general way, they are true of almost all of our new ships of less than 5000 tons. I will trespass no further on the pages of the Proceedings, beyond expressing my belief that the sentiment of the service at large is entirely in accord with the spirit of Mr. Baxter's paper.
Lieutenant Wm. F. Fullam, U.S.N.:—Practical naval officers who go to sea in ships of war, who have opportunities to note the workings and defects of the many mechanical devices now supplied, and who have Stopped to consider how these ingenious and labor-saving machines would probably fail and cause confusion in battle, will heartily welcome Mr. Baxter's article on "Simplicity." A few months' experience afloat should be enough to convince any man whose duty it is to study how to make ships efficient for the one emergency for which they exist, that we have passed beyond the limit fixed by practical considerations, in the introduction of complicated mechanical contrivances on board ship. It is fortunate indeed that Mr. Baxter has brought the subject up, and it will be equally unfortunate if the discussion does not bear good fruit.
It has too often been asserted that those who use weapons are not supposed to know much about the mechanism, and that they should not presume to criticize the design. This is an absurd theory, of course. The inventor should always be glad to utilize the experience, and to benefit by the advice, of the man who uses the arm. It is gratifying to note that Mr. Baxter recognizes this fact. The idea of a "suggestion book" on board every ship is an excellent one. It could be kept confidential, and only referred to by those who properly have occasion to deal with such questions.
Mr. Baxter covers the ground so thoroughly that there appears to be little chance for additional suggestions. I can take exception to no statement or argument in Mr. Baxter's paper, except in the one particular that the ice machine is an unnecessary "luxury." Even this statement may be perfectly sound as regards the majority of ships. But in the case of the Raleigh, the capacity of the fresh water tanks is so limited, and their situation is such, that the ice machine is a practical necessity for cooling the water for the men to drink.
In the limits assigned for a printed discussion, it is hardly possible to dwell upon the many important points of this valuable paper. But there is one idea that demands special attention. Mr. Baxter has recognized that, after all, the matt is the most important machine on board a fighting ship; that he must be kept in good condition; that he must not be crowded out by other machines; that he must be given space in which to live like a human being. "Every one having experience on the new ships feels the necessity for larger crews in war, the present complements being inadequate to perform the many responsible and onerous duties required to secure anything like continuous efficiency; they can stand the pressure during a few hours of excitement, but the continued strain of watching and waiting for the enemy must be distributed among more men in order that everything shall be ready when he appears." This statement is sound. And to the "strain of watching and waiting for the enemy," we must add the strain of coaling and cleaning ship. There are not enough men to bear the burden and drudgery of routine work afloat.
The essayist displays sound judgment regarding the kind of men needed in the modern ship as well as the number. A Pinafore theory that the day of the sailor is passed is being urged by certain individuals who see "as through a glass-eye darkly." Because sails are abolished they think the sailor has no place on board a modern ship! His usefulness, they think, is measured by the first syllable of his name—"sail." But this argument is not deep. It cuts both ways—this play upon syllables. It has been well said that "the sailor is also a seaman, and the sea has not yet been abolished." As long as there is water enough to float the navy, we shall need seamen. The necessity for seamen is daily felt by officers on board mastless ships. Their training should be somewhat different, as Mr. Baxter says, but not so different as many people imagine who have nothing but imagination as a basis for their opinions. There is hardly a quality of the old-time sailor that is not needed in the man-of-war's man of to-day. Something should be added, but little taken away, to convert the man of the past into the man of to-day. The change can be made with great ease. With the seaman, we simply have to add one quality to the ten he already possesses. With any other man, we should have to add ten qualities to the one he already possesses. Let us take the simplest solution and stick to the best man.
When naval architects recognize the vital importance of the human "machine"; when they provide for the stowage of men as well as for the stowage of material, we may hope that line officers will give more attention to the subject. To bring the man to the highest possible state of efficiency; to attend to the "care and preservation" of this piece of mechanism, is peculiarly their function—it is their first and most important duty. And they should not approach the subject with timidity, but with the fearlessness and practical sense that should distinguish those who may command ships and squadrons in battle. Questions regarding the number of men, the kind of men, and the development of men have not received their proper share of attention. Officers are court-martialed for permitting iron to rust, and machinery to deteriorate. They are encouraged or forced to devote too much time and thought to naval material. They hesitate, for various reasons, to deal courageously and thoroughly with the one question that most vitally affects the fighting efficiency of the navy—the question of men.
Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, U.S.N.:—In his "Suggestions for Increasing the Efficiency Of our New Ships," Naval Constructor Baxter has given to the service a most fortunate and opportune paper.
In reconstructing our navy we have built ships of every type, and with many variations in each type, so that, with our first battleships now completed, we have just reached the point where we can compare the results and eliminate, simplify and standardize for future construction. Agreeing then as I do with nearly every suggestion in the paper toward simplicity in the fittings of our men-of-war, I cannot help feeling regret and disappointment that the author avoids the very groundwork of simplicity, the standardizing of designs.
Mr. Baxter states truly that "standardizing is the most obvious means of securing simplicity," and that "standardizing reached its highest perfection at the opening of the century, when ships of the same type were practically alike from keel to truck," but almost immediately afterward, he abandons these important premises by saying, "the question of design is too large for consideration."
On the contrary, it seems to me that unless we begin with the question of design, the question of simplicity in fittings becomes almost too large for consideration. I believe that in the Indiana, New York, Columbia and the Newport News gunboats we have reached best adapted types, and that their designs could be adopted as standards in their respective classes to such an extent that variations from them would not materially affect the standardizing of mechanism and of its distribution and fittings in them as adopted standards of design.
It therefore seems to me that we could succeed in standardizing and simplifying our men-of-war and their fitting, in the following manner: let the Board of Bureau Chiefs advise the Secretary of the Navy which of our new men-of-war most nearly represent standards in each class and type. Let the Secretary then assign a naval constructor to each ship so designated, to cruise on her during some period of maneuver which will fully test her efficiency for the purpose for which she was built, as a member of a "Standardizing Board," composed, beside himself, of the captain of the ship, the executive officer and the chief engineer; this board to decide upon standard types of auxiliaries, standardized localities for same, standardized leads for all conduits, and to advise upon equipments which can be discarded; having always in mind the efficiency of the ship as a fighting machine. Let the plans of these boards, after being passed upon by the Board of Bureau Chiefs, be adopted as standardized plans for interior fittings, and in future construction let these plans be followed as nearly as the ships' designs will permit, until in some parts there is discovered room for obvious improvement. It strikes me that such a method of procedure would be more directly to the point, and have a more exact end in view than the keeping of "suggestion books."
I should like to ask the writer why he regards hydraulic or electric motors, "clearly undesirable at present," for capstan and steering engines.
I shall be sorry to see voice pipes condemned as "cumbersome," "dangerous" and "unreliable," until that "suitable telephone" suggested by the writer shall have been developed. I cannot see that voice pipes are particularly cumbersome or dangerous, and they are chiefly unreliable, because poorly installed. They are fitted too much like water spouting, with sharp angles at every change of direction, these changes, too, being often unnecessarily numerous. Easy curves at such points and a minimum of turns would render the pipes absolutely reliable for the transmission of orders until cut by shell. Duplication of pipes to vital points with different leads would reduce the chances of that misfortune, I do not believe in a central station for voice pipes, but in separate pipes connecting all important stations between which the voice alone would not carry, manual signaling would be impracticable, or messenger service too slow in battle. Such pipes, by following as far as practicable other conduit leads, would not detract from simplicity. Many voice pipes now installed are redundant, while more important connections are lacking.
As for telephones, they will function afloat in peace as well as they do on shore, but what officer at all familiar with the not infrequent vexations of intercourse over the ordinary commercial telephones would place any reliance in the best installment of such instruments on a battleship amid the din of combat? Let us give more thought, then, to voice pipes, for the time may come when one properly installed will win a battle.
It will be noted that it is chiefly for what he has left unsaid that I criticize Mr. Baxter. What he has said, with the exceptions noted, strikes me as so opportune, so important and so correctly suggestive, that I should like to see a paper by him on standardizing designs, even though he now regards the subject as too large for consideration.
Naval Constructor W.J. Baxter, U.S.N.:—This favorable discussion encourages the writer to hope that the service at large will be more willing in the future to do its part to secure the benefits arising from "Simplicity."