There are but three weapons of offense in naval warfare,—the gun, the ram, and the torpedo. The hand-to-hand fighting of former days, when ships were lashed together and the 1st lieutenant lead the boarders upon the enemy's deck, has gone never to return, and this method of fighting- no longer needs consideration. But the question whether the gun, the ram, or the torpedo is to be the chief factor in future naval battles is one of the deepest interest, since upon its answer depends in large measure the system of training which we should establish in time of peace, and the tactics which we should adopt in time of war.
Had the question been asked but a few years ago which of these three weapons was the most important, an overwhelming weight of opinion would have been found upon the side of the ram. Captain Coulomb, in his paper on "Lessons from Lissa," said, "The serious part of a future naval attack does not appear to be the guns but the rams." Admiral Touchard said: ''The beak is now the principal weapon in naval combats. '' Capt. Pellew, in his lecture on "Fleet maneuvering," said: "Rams are the arms of naval warfare to which I attach the chief importance." Capt. Noel, in his prize essay, said: "In a general action I do not hold the guns to be the principal weapon," etc But of late years, this view has been greatly modified, and to-day, I believe, the best opinion is once more in favor of the gun. The torpedo has never been considered more than an auxiliary, and by many is looked upon, as far as its use for ships is concerned, as merely a defense against the ram. To indicate the general change of opinion which I have mentioned, the following quotations from comparatively recent articles will suffice. Vice-Admiral Nicholson says: "I do not think anyone would be so mad. as to attempt to use his ram early in action, and I doubt very much whether in a single action the ram would ever be efficiently used, except to deliver the coup de grace.'' Mr. W. Laird Clowes says: "To endeavor to effectively ram a ship that has sea-room and is under control is hopeless, even if she be of greatly inferior speed." Admiral Long says: "I shall assume that an artillery duel will form the first phase of a naval engagement, the object being to engage beyond effective torpedo range until the enemy's battery is much reduced in power and his exposed torpedo discharges are rendered useless," and "Success in naval battles will more than ever depend on the effective working of the guns.'' Comdr. Sturdee, in his prize essay for 1893, says: "Of these three weapons, in my opinion, the gun takes the first place, the torpedo comes next, while the ram comes last," and "Broadly speaking, ramming should not be resorted to unless some distinct advantage is evident, such as meeting a ship disabled or at anchor."
For myself, I am convinced that the last quoted opinions are essentially correct. All history and tradition point to the gun as peculiarly the naval weapon; by it, with a few exceptional instances to the contrary, all naval battles in the past have been decided; by it will they be decided in the future. I hold that the effectiveness of the modern gun is so great that the increased power of the ram, and the invention and rapid development of the automobile torpedo have been unable to oust it from its place as the paramount weapon of naval warfare, and that our training and tactics should be established almost solely with a view to its most efficient use. I shall lay before you the grounds for these convictions, and shall then endeavor to draw some conclusions as to how the gun should be used.
First, let us consider the ram. This weapon, extensively used when war vessels were propelled by oars, and the use of cannon was unknown, fell into complete disuse during the sail period owing to the lack of speed and maneuvering qualities in sailing vessels. It was not till our civil war that the use of the ram was revived, but the tragic circumstances of its occasional successful use during and since that war, and of its, perhaps, more frequent accidental use, gave rise to exaggerated notions of its importance. A table prepared by Mr. W. Laird Clowes, and published in the Royal United Service Institution for March, 1894, gives a detailed list of 74 cases of attempted ramming in modern warfare, including all the cases which Mr. Clowes was able to obtain knowledge of as having occurred since 1860. A summary of this table shows that, of the 74 vessels attempted to be rammed, 36 entirely escaped, 18 were slightly damaged, 5 were seriously damaged, 2 were disabled, and 13 were sunk; while of the 74 vessels which attempted to ram, 56 were uninjured, 13 were slightly damaged, 3 were seriously damaged, 1 was disabled, and 1 was sunk. But, of the ships rammed not one was either disabled or sunk, unless attacked either in narrow waters, when unmanageable, or when at anchor, and of the ships seriously damaged, but one was under steam with sea-room. Mr. Clowes' conclusion, and as far as we can reason from the past to the future, it seems to me well founded, is that if two ships are fully under control and have sea-room, it is more dangerous to try to employ than to try to escape the ram, and that, under these conditions, it is practically hopeless to dream of ramming effectively, since there is no recorded case of the operation being performed, though it has been attempted at least 32 times.
It must be remembered, too, that all these cases occurred before the automobile torpedo had been developed to anything like its present state and before the introduction of heavy breech-loading and light, quick-firing guns. A ship failing to ram must generally pass under the stern of her adversary, and in so doing runs great risk of being torpedoed, stern and quarter torpedo discharges being now almost universal. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the difference between ramming and being rammed is but half a ship's length, or in these days of high speeds, always less than 10 seconds. If two ships approach each other bows on, they risk mutual destruction, and no advantage is apparent which should induce either to attempt such an attack. If they approach on parallel courses, and either wishes to try ramming, he must, in order to tell when to put his helm over, not only have an exact knowledge of the speed and turning power of his own ship, but an almost equally exact knowledge of his adversary's speed, and, having estimated this correctly, a change of the latter's course or speed renders his calculations futile. Even great superiority in speed has not availed to make ramming feasible. In the fight of May 21, 1879, the Huascar, 11 knots, only succeeded in ramming the Esmeralda, 3 knots, when the latter's engines were disabled, and the Independencia, 12 knots, made three unsuccessful attempts to ram the Covadonga, 5 knots, running ashore the third time.
The Merrimac successfully rammed the Cumberland, the latter being at anchor, but five attempts to ram the Monitor were unsuccessful. At Lissa, the only modern fleet action, over 40 vessels were engaged in a general melee, in the smoke and confusion of which nearly every ship made one or more attempts to ram, but only one was sunk, and this when her steering gear was disabled. Admiral Coulomb has recently well said: "What made the ram powerful at Lissa was not the ram itself, but the unskillfulness of the people who met it." In the action of July 11, 1879, the Huascar made four unsuccessful attempts to ram the Magellanes, and in the action of October 8, 1879, the Cochrane failed in several attempts to ram the Huascar, although the latter's steering gear was disabled, and she was being steered by relieving tackles.
But it is useless to multiply instances. Past experience having, to say the least, illustrated the uncertainty of the ram as a weapon, let us see if there is not good ground for the belief that the future will show it to be still less important than it has been in the past. The peculiar feature of the ram is that every advance in its power and efficiency is necessarily accompanied by an equal addition to the means of escaping it. Protection against gun-fire is obtained by armor, but armor, although developed along with, and in consequence of the development of guns, does not keep pace with them, and, as will be shown later on, the offensive power of the gun becomes more and more superior to the defensive power of ships. Protection against torpedoes is by minute subdivision, double bottom, nets, and perhaps will be attained in the future by means as yet unknown, but the destructive effect of the torpedo has increased far more rapidly than has the efficiency of the defense against it. The ram, on the other hand, becomes more dangerous as speed and turning power increase, but these very qualities are the defense against the ram, and consequently the advances of offense and defense are exactly equal. When 40 knots is a common speed and ships turn in their own length, it will be no easier for one to safely ram another than it is to-day. I do not say that the collision of ships, with equal chances of destruction to each, will not be brought about more easily, but the chance of one vessel ramming another, and escaping herself will not be greater; rather, it will be less, the smallest error in judgment becoming more and more fatal as speed increases,—and, since it is the very essence of skilful tactics to only engage in such a way as to have the advantage, I believe the ram is destined to be less and less used, and I place it last in importance of the three weapons of naval warfare.
Taking up next the torpedo,—and by this I mean the automobile torpedo similar to the Whitehead and Howell, for the so-called aerial torpedo should be rather considered under the head of guns, and other forms, such as the spar and towing torpedoes, are obsolete,—we are at once struck by the limitation of this weapon, as compared with the gun: its short range, its inaccuracy, and its low speed. It is true, that both the velocity and accuracy of the torpedo have within the last few years been greatly increased, the mean speed of the 18" Whitehead being now 30 knots for 400 yards and its maximum deflection at that range, when fired from a fixed position, less than 8 yards. But, even supposing this speed doubled, it would still be only one twentieth that of the gun's projectile over its much greater effective range, and its accuracy compares no more favorably with the latter. We have had but little experience with the automobile torpedo in actual warfare from which to judge of its efficiency. A number of vessels have been sunk or disabled by its use, but I believe in every case the attack has been upon vessels at anchor by torpedo-boats. There is no instance of a vessel under way having been struck by a torpedo, and there are but few recorded instances of its attempted use in actions between ships. In practice last summer, the Gushing, steaming upwards of 14 knots and discharging Whitehead torpedoes from a broadside tube, showed that their average deflection at 400 yards range was only about 25 yards, so that every shot fired under such circumstances would have struck a vessel broadside on, but under the strain and excitement of action it is certain that such accuracy cannot be counted upon. In the attack of the torpedo-vessels Condell and Lynch upon the Blanco Encalada, the latter being at anchor, five torpedoes were fired at close range, but one striking. Lieutenant Moraga, commanding the Condell, is quoted as saying: "At about 100 yards distance I ordered the bow torpedo to be discharged. It missed its mark, passing astern." The difficulty of estimating distances correctly at night and under such circumstances may well cause us to doubt that the distance was as little as 100 yards, bat there is little doubt that all five torpedoes were fired at ranges at which, in practice, we could count upon hitting, and the fact that but one did hit shows what an effect the circumstances have.
It is generally considered that 600 yards is the maximum range at which the probability of hitting is sufficient to justify the use of the torpedo, and I think we may fairly say that at the present time a vessel which presents her broadside to her opponent's torpedo tube at ranges less than this runs a very fair chance of being disabled or destroyed. It is even possible that in the future the torpedo may be developed to such a point that within 800 or even 1000 yards it will certainly disable or destroy a vessel broadside on, but even granting this, can we then consider the torpedo as more than an auxiliary weapon for ships of war? I think not. The torpedo will play an important part in determining the tactics of sea fighting in two ways: on the defensive side as a counterpoise to the ram, and on the offensive side as rendering it necessary, at least in the preliminary stages of an action, to keep beyond its sphere of action, but at the best it must play a part subordinate to that of the gun. With greater range of action, with almost as destructive an effect if successfully delivered, and not handicapped by being almost as dangerous to the attacker as to the attacked, I place the torpedo ahead of the ram, and second only to the gun as a naval weapon.
One of the most striking characteristics of all warfare is the continual increase of the distance between the combatants as the effectiveness of weapons increases. Of old, fighting was almost entirely hand-to-hand, with sword or dagger; to-day armies engage almost out of sight of each other, and the bayonet, the soldiers' weapon for close combat, would be abandoned entirely but for its value as an entrenching and pioneer tool. On the sea in the same way, the development of the offense, far outstripping that of the defense, has rendered it impossible to fight as formerly, yard arm to yard arm; such an engagement could not last five minutes. The reason of this is obvious; men are much the same today as they were centuries ago; they can stand so much punishment before being demoralized and no more; consequently as weapons become more destructive, fighting range increases, and it is only when the enemy is disabled that we dare to come to close quarters. If mutual destruction were the object of fighting, then men and ships might engage as wild beasts do; but, if we desire to destroy the enemy and escape ourselves, wisdom and proper prudence will cause us to engage at a distance, and this distance will become greater as our weapons become more destructive.. But if this be so, then, evidently, the weapon of longest effective range will play the most important part, and if this weapon is constantly being further developed so that its destructive effects become greater and greater, then more and more will it become paramount and other weapons subordinate. It is upon these grounds that I place the gun first among the weapons of naval warfare, and I now propose to illustrate briefly the growing efficiency of the gun, which makes it more and more the determining factor in naval victories.
Before the introduction of the shell gun, it was of very rare occurrence that ships were sunk, even in the most desperate encounters, and the amount of battering which was endured, and the small loss of life is surprising and almost incredible. In the battle of Soulshaie, June 7, 1672, the Lion d'Or engaged the Prince for 3 ½ hours, side by side, without any maneuvering, and keeping up a continual fire, yet out of 470 men on the Lion d'Or, not one was wounded. This sounds like a fable, but is stated by Gerard Brandt, a contemporary author, who says he had it on good authority. The custom of pointing high to disable and dismast, and a probable lack of appreciation of the elevation due to "line of metal" sighting, partially account for the small damage done. At Trafalgar, the Victory, in bearing down, received a few single shot at about ¾ of a mile from the French line, and, leading the weather column, presented a prominent mark to the enemy; as she slowly approached at a rate not exceeding a knot and a half, the firing increased, and when about 500 or 600 yards from the combined fleet, it is stated that 200 pieces of heavy artillery were playing upon her unanswered. In this manner 40 minutes elapsed between the firing of the first shot and the passage of the Victory under the Bucentaur's stern, at which instant Nelson's battery opened fire, the first broadside being delivered when the ships were nearly touching and causing the Bucentaur to heel 2 or 3 strokes. The other English ships, ranging in wake of their leaders, received and returned entire discharges of the batteries in like manner. In this way for three hours was the contest maintained, and many cases occurred where single ships were exposed for a considerable while to the fire of several. Thus the Belleisle is said to have been assailed for at least an hour by three French ships,—the Achille, Aigle and Neptune. The conflict was almost a general melee, and in it were mingled 60 of the largest ships in the world, from one to four o'clock, delivering their broadsides at distances so short and marks so large that few shot ought to have missed,-—and yet, not a single ship was sunk in the action, and but one went down in the gale that ensued about 36 hours afterwards. In the battle of June 1, 1794, Capt. Collingwood states in a letter to a friend that "the ship we were to engage was two ahead of the French admiral, so that we had to go through his fire and that of two ships next him and received all their broadsides two or three times before we fired a gun. We got very near and then began to fire. We left off in admirable good plight, having sustained less loss than could be expected, considering the fire we had so long on us. We had 9 men killed, and 22 with severe wounds; a few others slightly hurt; our masts, etc., all in their places, though much wounded,—and this, altogether, has been the hardest action that has been fought in our time, or perhaps ever. It did not last very severely much more than two hours."
The ships that fought in these and many other similar engagements were of wood, but their oak sides were a better defense against the guns of that day than is the heaviest armor afloat against the guns of to-day. With sides 32" thick at the water-line, 31" at the lower deck, 23" at the main deck, and 18" at the spar deck, the heaviest guns could only pierce them at close range. When we come to the War of 1812, we have only frigates and sloops engaged, and the improvements in powder and gunnery, together with the more equal offensive and defensive qualities of the ships, are apparent in the shorter time of action, the longer ranges employed, and the greater loss of life.
In the fight between the Constitution and the Guerriere, after 25 minutes' close action, the English frigate, dismasted, sinking, and a complete wreck, was compelled to surrender, with one-third of her men disabled,—15 killed and 63 wounded, against 14 killed and wounded on the Constitution.
In the fight between the United States and the Macedonian, close action did not begin till an hour after the firing commenced, and we have the evidence of the British court martial that "the Macedonian was .very materially damaged before close action commenced." In this engagement the Macedonian had 36 killed and 68 wounded, against 7 killed and 6 wounded on the United States,—104 to 13.
The engagement between the Hornet and Peacock lasted only 15 minutes, when the latter was "literally cut to pieces," Lawrence says, and sank with 13 of her own and 3 of the Hornet's crew on board.
When we examine the naval engagements of our Civil War we find that the use of shell guns and the occasional use of rifles has greatly increased the destructive effect of gun-fire, except in some cases where armored ships fought against guns unequal to their penetration, as in the case of the Monitor and Merrimac. On January 31, 1863, the Mercedita. at anchor, was attacked by the Palmetto State, which suddenly appeared close aboard in a thick haze. A single shell from a rifled gun passing through the starboard side of the Mercedita, then through her steam drum and port boiler, and exploding against her port side, tearing a hole 4 or 5 feet square, caused her to surrender.
On March 8, 1862, the Merrimac destroyed the Congress by gunfire alone.
On January 11, 1863, the Albemarle attacked the Hatteras and made her surrender in thirteen minutes. The Hatteras was riddled like a sieve, on fire in two places, and her engines and pumps disabled in 13 minutes, and she sank 10 minutes later.
On June 17, 1863, the engagement of the Weehawken and Atlanta took place, lasting only 15 minutes. During this 15 minutes the Weehawken fired five shots, of which four struck the Atlanta, the first one, a 15-inch shot fired at 300 yards, penetrating her armor and splintering the backing so as to injure 40 men.
On June 19, 1863, occurred the Kearsarge and Alabama fight, which is specially interesting as showing the effects of gun-fire in an action between vessels built for war and of about equal power. The Alabama opened fire at one mile distance. Both ships had their batteries pivoted to starboard, the Alabama with 7 guns and the Kearsarge with five guns in action. The Kearsarge kept on at full speed, receiving a second and a third broadside, and when at 900 yards' range sheered and returned a broadside. After that they circled about a common center, making 7 complete revolutions, the Kearsarge always endeavoring to close and rake and the Alabama edging around, keeping her broadside bearing. In this way they gradually neared to 500 or 600 yards. During this time the sides of the Alabama were greatly torn by shells, and the crew of her after pivot had to be 4 times renewed. After an hour's engagement the Alabama was making water fast and steered for the shore, soon after surrendering, and 20 minutes later she sunk. The Kearsarge fired 173 (27 hits) and the Alabama 370 projectiles during the hour's fight, and the loss in killed and wounded was only 3 on the Kearsarge and 40 on the Alabama.
At the battle of Lissa, the Palestro, a wooden armored ship, was destroyed by gun-fire, being set on fire and blown up.
In the fight between the Huascar and the Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, the Cochrane opened fire at 3000 yards' range and one of her first shots penetrated the Huascar's side armor, and, exploding, entered the turret chamber, killed and wounded twelve men, set fire to the woodwork, and jammed the turret. During the action 80 men out of about 200 were killed or wounded on the Huascar, and twice her turret was pierced and both the gun's crews destroyed.
In the action of August, 1884, in the Min river, the French squadron, consisting of r second-class ironclad, 2 cruisers, 4 gunboats, and two torpedo-boats, attacked the Chinese squadron, consisting of 1 corvette, 8 gunboats, 2 transports and a dozen war junks. The French opened fire at 1.56 P.M., the torpedo-boats attacking under cover of the smoke. In 15 minutes, the fire having slackened and the smoke clearing, it was seen that the Chinese fleet was practically destroyed. The corvette had been sunk by a torpedo, three gunboats, dismasted and on fire from stem to stern, were drifting with the tide and soon sank some miles down the river, and another gunboat was seriously damaged, and sank while attempting to escape up the river. In less than half an hour all that could be seen of the Chinese fleet was sunken vessels and hulks in flames.
The bombardment of Alexandria by the English fleet is often cited as showing the ineffectiveness of modern guns, but it is the effect of guns against ships that I am now speaking of, and that their effect to-day would be vastly greater than ever before seems to me undeniable. At Alexandria, short muzzle-loading rifles using studded projectiles with low velocities were in use, and guns and ammunition were perhaps inferior to any in use by any other naval power at that time. The shell tumbled in flight and frequently went end over end, the fuzes failed to act, and most of the projectiles were battering shot which did not explode at all. If a fleet armed with really modern guns were to repeat that bombardment, I do not doubt that the results would be far different.
But though the few instances I have cited tend to illustrate to some degree the increase in the destructive effect of guns, they do so far less than would be the case had we the experiences of an actual war between well equipped modern navies. Quick-firing guns, and smokeless powder, high velocities with consequent flat trajectories, armor-piercing shell, high explosive shell, efficient fuzes, electric firing, and all the other improvements which are but now reaching their perfect development, will render modern gunfire so terrible in its effects that only long range and armored protection will enable vessels to stand against each other for even a brief period. A ship which, either improperly armed or manned with men insufficiently trained in gun practice, trusts to her torpedoes or ram and endeavors by them to gain the victory, will fall an easy prey to an antagonist in whose construction and tactics the gun is recognized as the paramount weapon. Many will admit this as far as single ship actions go, but still are of opinion that fleet actions can be nothing but general melees in which the ram and torpedo will have full opportunity to do their deadly work. Against this opinion I will confine myself to quoting Admiral Coulomb, who says of the melee: "It is an abomination, a thing which no English officer ought ever to dream about or think about. The admiral who has his fleet in proper command will not have a melee; he will take care to keep his ships together, coute qui coute, and to withdraw for a time from the battle to reform rather than allow them to get into a melee where it is impossible to say who is to win," and Capt. Mahan, who says: "The surer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical development of his fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant must he necessarily be to enter into a melee with equal forces, in which all these advantages will be thrown away, chance reign supreme, and his fleet be placed on terms of equality with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted together."
And now, having given reasons for my belief that in the construction of ships of war and in their handling everything else should be made subordinate to the guns, let us consider by what means the maximum gun effect is to be attained with any given vessel, for, since the maximum force of a fleet is but the best combination of the forces of individual ships, the solution of the problem of getting the most effective navy will be found when we have determined what is the most powerful armament that can be put on each class of ship.
Now this problem may be resolved into two parts, (1) How many and what sort of guns should each class of ships carry; (2) How can those guns be fought most efficiently, and I shall take up these questions separately.
First, as to the number and kind of guns which any given vessel should be armed with. Speaking generally, the total displacement of every ship of war is taken up by three things: the weight of hull, hull protection and equipment; the weight for motive power and the weight for the armament and its protection. The first of these may be considered constant for each class of ship; the problem is how best to divide the remainder. If we were to accept the solution of this problem which is given us in some of our own recent naval constructions, we might at once conclude that the rule is to fill each ship as full of machinery and coal as possible, and then, if there is any available displacement left, to put that into armament. But I do not accept this solution as correct. On the contrary, I think that in each class of ships a certain fixed percentage of the displacement should be allotted to the armament, and that everything else should be subordinate to this. It is of the first importance that a ship of war shall be able to exercise a full power of offense and defense within the circle of which she is the center. Secondary in importance to this comes the capacity of transferring that power from one point to another with certainty and rapidity. It is very right that a vessel of war should have speed to overhaul an inferior or escape from a superior force, but the necessary diminution of her offensive power must not be so great as to disable her from matching any vessel of her own class having inferior locomotive power but provided with the proper armament, for this would render her unable to cope in battle with any but inferior rates of war-vessels; her usual business will therefore be running, and fighting will be the exception, a state of affairs rather incompatible with the notions commonly entertained of large and expensive vessels. It must often happen that in order to protect important interests the battle must be fought at all hazards and that avoiding action will not serve the purpose. What then will be the chances of costly fabrics like the Columbia, in which everything has been sacrificed to speed?
Moreover, if we are to sacrifice so much for speed, let us at least be sure of the possession of the whistle we pay so high for. Is not the speed we purchase so dearly in the smaller classes of vessels fictitious—not to be obtained under the conditions of real service .''
That the armament of a ship should be in proportion to her tonnage seems to me so apparent that it should command universal assent, for it concerns the honor of the nation that its ships should always cope with an equal on not less than equal terms, and also it is a matter of financial interest that the force should be proportional to the cost of the vessel.
Now let us see what percentage of the displacement has been assigned in our modern ships to the armament and its protection, in which I include all guns with their mounts, ammunition, spare articles, and equipments, and all armor used to protect the guns, their crews, and their machinery, such as shields, armored sponsons, turrets, barbettes, and ammunition tubes. This percentage is as follows:
Petrel, 8.3
Machias, 8.6
Yorktown Class, 7.7
Detroit Class, 9-3 (old battery.)
Boston and Atlanta, 6.6
Charleston, 6.6
Chicago, 6.7
San Francisco, 6.7
Baltimore, 6.7
Olympia, 7.7
Columbia and Minneapolis, 4.2
New York, 8.3
Indiana, Massachusetts and Oregon, 25.3
and, considering the weight of the guns and their mountings alone, their percentages are reduced to the following:
Petrel, 4.1
Machias, 4.0
Yorktown Class, 4.1
Detroit Class, 3.5
Boston and Atlanta, 3.5
Charleston, 3.0
Chicago, 3.6
San Francisco, 3.6
Baltimore, 3.8
Olympia, 1.9
Columbia and Minneapolis, 1.4
New York, 2.3
Indiana Class, 6.8
Incredible as it may appear, the weight of battery of the Columbia and Minneapolis, of 7350 tons normal displacement, is no greater than that of the batteries formerly carried by the Constellation class, of 1200 tons displacement; and, moreover, the weight of metal discharged by a broadside of the latter vessel is considerably the greater. I will not attempt to lay down rules for determining the proper percentage of displacement to apply to armament, but it seems apparent that the above stated percentages are, in most cases, miserably insufficient.
The weight assigned to the battery being known, let us next consider how this weight should be distributed, and in this connection, the history of the old navies of sailing ships has the highest value for our instruction; for, the basis of their organization was founded on the experience gained in actual warfare. Two fundamental principles guided the armament of these ships. The first, and most commonly adhered to, was the grouping of the greatest possible number of guns on all ships, of whatever class; the second, and later, principle was that of dividing the same weight of battery among a smaller number of the largest guns which could be readily handled at sea.
The argument in favor of the latter idea was well stated by Commodore Jeffers, as follows: "Many persons believe that a smaller caliber may, by celerity of fire and being more numerous for the same weight of battery, more than compensate for diminished accuracy and power. This is entirely fallacious. This argument is not new; it was offered by the English in 1812 for preferring the 18 to the 24-pdr., and has no better foundation now than then. I have found that with a well drilled crew the average time between fires is 43 seconds for the 9" smooth bore, and that this time is not reduced with the same crew and the 8" smooth bore. At the same time I may remark that every officer knows that the time required to load, fire and run out is never the standard for accurate practice; that is controlled on shipboard by the difficulty of pointing amidst the smoke and disturbed by the rolling and progressive motion of both ships. So that, as a general rule, under fair conditions, the rate of good firing may be two to three minutes. Rate of fire, therefore, will not effect the weight of metal thrown, but it will be influenced by another condition—the inferior accuracy of the inferior caliber. The 9", at 1200 yards, was found to strike 75 per cent, of the fires against 50 per cent with the 8". No effort, therefore, should be spared to use the heavier caliber, and wherever possible to go above the 9", I would advise it, but never below it. Therefore, in every case, the Bureau assigns the smallest number of the heaviest guns to form the assigned weight of battery, and prefers pivots to broadsides when the deck arrangements will permit."
Admiral Dahlgren, in advocating the use of the largest caliber practicable, says: "The misfortune of the larger caliber is that its substantial benefits are never visible before those who continually experience the disadvantage of its greater weight. The bulk of the gun, the toil in handling it, and its projectile, are ever enforced to the eye of the officer and to the exertions of the men. But the great power which it does confer is not exhibited by the ordinary practice, and remains a myth until the hour of battle discloses the important fact, and permits the heavy caliber to tell its own tale more eloquently than the most labored advocacy. Fifty years ago the merits of the 24-pdr. were equally depreciated by the convenience of the i8-pdr. How rudely the delusion was dispelled may be inferred by the humiliating order of the Admiralty, issued after the loss of the Guerriere, Macedonian and Java, forbidding their 18-pdr. frigates to seek an engagement with the American 24-pdr. frigates."
This course of reasoning was sound, but new conditions have arisen within the past few years which should, I think, lead us to somewhat modify our conclusions. In the first place, the introduction of the rifled gun has greatly reduced the superiority of accuracy of large over small calibers. The 4" gun is now practically as accurate as the 13". In the second place, the power of guns has been so increased that the smallest gun is now a match for the unarmored parts of ships at the longest range. In the third place, the introduction of smokeless powders will greatly increase the importance of rapid firing. Finally, the use of fixed ammunition in comparatively large guns has greatly increased the celerity of fire of these guns. Consequently, I am of opinion that on unarmored ships, which must be armed with a view to opposing their equals, the advantages are no longer on the side of the larger calibers, but are rather on the side of the rapid-fire guns. On armored ships, on the other hand, where the guns must be suited to the attack of armor, the largest caliber practicable is still the best, for the destructive effect of projectiles increases rapidly with the caliber. Guns of such a size as to require machinery to handle them are absolutely necessary for use against heavily armored ships, and we lose nothing in rapidity of fire, while gaining greatly in effectiveness, by the use of the largest calibers instead of those of moderate size.
Another consideration, often disregarded, should have great weight in determining the batteries of ships. It is an axiom that the utmost simplicity is indispensable in all the arrangements of the battery, and the importance formerly attached to this was illustrated by the changes in the batteries of our own as well as the English and French ships about 1840, when the 32-pdr. was substituted, at great expense, for all other calibers. Unity of caliber was then thought so desirable that even the superior power of the 42-pdrs. was sacrificed to it, and they, as well as the 18-pdrs. were displaced by 32-pdrs. To-day the importance of unity of caliber is less than formerly, owing to the less number of guns, and the practice of giving to each group of guns, or even to each gun, its separate line of ammunition supply; but when we learn that there are to-day in the English Navy twenty-six different patterns of guns, each requiring a different charge, and that five different calibers are frequently found on a single ship, we cannot but perceive the advantages of less diversity. For it must be remembered that unity of caliber carries with it the greatest possible simplification of all equipments, reduction in the number of spare parts, greater possibilities in the way of repair, and greater familiarity of the crew with the weapons they are to handle in action. But we cannot, of course, attain unity of caliber to-day, when the uses to which the guns of a ship must be applied are no longer as simple as they were of old. The heavy guns of the battleship would not avail to repel torpedo-boat attacks, nor are they necessary against unarmored structures, consequently other lighter guns must supplement them, and to a less degree this is the case on all ships.
Guided, then, by these considerations, let us fix upon the calibers which seem most suitable to the different classes of vessels which, roughly, we may take to be battleships, armored cruisers and unarmored cruisers. Despatch and torpedo-vessels, having other functions more important than fighting with guns, I shall not consider. All other war ships, whether built for commerce destroying or not, should, I think, have batteries proportioned to their size, and of such a character as to enable them to meet on equal ground any ship of their own displacement.
The main battery of every battleship should consist of at least four guns of the largest caliber which she can carry consistently with a suitable second battery and properly proportioned armored protection. Although the 12" gun will pierce any armor afloat with normal impact at fighting range, there is to-day on the proving ground armor which it cannot pierce at point blank—the side and barbette armor of the Indiana class will be a complete protection against the 13" caliber—consequently this caliber is too small for these ships. We have adopted the 13" as our largest caliber; its muzzle energy is one-third greater than that of the 12" gun, and it will probably be equal to any armor applied to ships, for the certain use of smokeless powder and the inevitable improvements in A.P. shell, will probably meet any further development of the processes of armor manufacture, and a further increase in thickness of armor is unlikely. We will, therefore, take the 13" as the caliber which should constitute the main batteries of our largest battleships. The second and third-class battleships should have the 12" caliber and the 10" caliber respectively, for these guns are equal to piercing the armor of similar ships, and the reduction in the number of guns below four which would be necessary if we retained the 13" caliber on the smaller battleships is undesirable. Next in importance to the four large guns constituting the main battery of each battleship, comes the second battery which is essential for protection against torpedo-boat attack, and which also may play an important part in action against other armored ships by being directed against the unarmored parts and the personnel. For this purpose we have adopted five different guns, the 6-pdr., 3-pdr. and 1-pdr. single barrel guns, and the 37 and 47-mm. rifled cannon, four of the five being placed sometimes on one ship. In recent ships, however, we have used only the 6 and 1-pdr.—a step in the right direction. The revolver cannon are much inferior to the single barrel guns and their use should be entirely given up. Of the other three guns, the rapidity of fire and ease of handling are not greatly different, and although the use of the 3-pdr. alone would have some advantages, still our present plan of abolishing this caliber and using the 6-pdr. and 1-pdr. guns only is perhaps the best, as the 1-pdr. can often be used in places where either the 3 or 6-pdrs. would be too heavy and occupy too much space. On many of the French battleships the 65-mm. or 9-pdr. R.F. gun forms a large part of the second battery, but I think that handiness is too much sacrificed to superior caliber in these guns, and I prefer the 6-pdr. Every battleship should carry as many 6 and 1-pdrs. as space can be found for. The weight of the greatest number for which emplacements can be found is insignificant beside that of the main battery; e.g., the sixteen 6-pdrs. and ten 1-pdrs. of the Indiana class, with their ammunition and outfit weigh but 80 tons out of the 1100 tons of the entire battery, and each gun adds appreciably to the power of the ship. Our ships as a rule carry too few of these guns.
But besides the main and secondary batteries, there is considerable displacement available on the larger battle-ships for other guns, and what these should be is a question which has received many answers. The French battleships of recent design usually carry a number of the larger R.F. guns; e.g., the Lazare Carnot has eight 14-cm., the Marceau seventeen 14-cm., and the Massena eight 14-cm. and eight 10-cm. R.F. guns. The English Barfleur carries ten 4.7-in- and the Royal Sovereign class ten 6" R.F. guns. Our own Indiana class have eight 8" and four 6" guns.
I think the extended use of thin armor in the armored ships now being built justifies our position in this matter. The eight 8" guns of the Indiana are equal to the penetration of the heaviest armor of many armored ships and will be very effective against all but the heaviest armor of the largest battleships. This caliber is the largest which can be conveniently worked entirely by hand, and whenever, as in second and third-class battleships, there is not sufficient displacement to allow its use, I would advocate going at once to the 5" gun for this part of the armament. The 6" gun, being too large to admit of the convenient use of fixed ammunition, should have no place in the batteries of our ships hereafter.
For the main batteries of the unarmored classes of war ships, I advocate R.F. guns alone. With smokeless powder in use, rapidity of fire will have full play, and the four 5" R.F. guns, which can be substituted for one 8" gun, will deliver at least four times the weight of metal with practically equal accuracy. The 6" gun, with a very expert crew, may perhaps fire one well-aimed round per minute, the 5" R.F. gun should fire certainly two, and perhaps three. If the present San Francisco, with her twelve 6" guns were opposed by a similar ship with twenty 5" R.F. guns, an equal weight, would not the odds be in favor of the latter's victory? Against unarmored ships, and under the conditions which will prevail in the near future, the number of guns and their rate of fire are more important than their individual power. Consequently the main batteries of the larger unarmored ships should consist of as many 5" R.F. guns as they can carry, and the main batteries of the smaller ships of as many 4" R.F. guns as they can carry. The secondary batteries of unarmored ships should be made upon the same plan as those of battleships—each ship should carry as many 6-pdr. or 1-pdr. guns as space can be found for.
Armored cruisers, being of very considerable displacement, in order to combine great speed with reasonable armored protection, must be armed with a view to engaging not only cruisers, but, on occasion, battleships of the smaller classes. Consequently armor-piercing guns must constitute a portion of their batteries, and the 8" caliber is peculiarly adapted to this use, having sufficient power for efficient use against even the most modern armor up to 10 inches in thickness, and at the same time being capable of working entirely by hand. At least four, and if possible six or even eight, of these guns should be carried by every armored cruiser. The rest of the main battery should be similar to that of unarmored cruisers, namely, the largest number of 5" rapid-fire guns which can be properly placed, the 4" R.F. gun being used if the displacement available for battery is not sufficient to allow a considerable number of 5" guns to be carried. The secondary battery should, of course, be of the same character as for all other ships.
Having fixed upon the calibers of guns to be used, the next question is as to the power of these guns. Should they all be long, high power guns, or should we use shorter and lighter guns so as to have more of them for the same weight? The advantages of high power are greater penetration of armor and greater flatness of trajectory, of which the first is only important in the larger guns while the second is of great value in all cases. We gain these advantages in two ways, by using large powder charges, and by adding to the length of our guns; have we gone too far, or not far enough in these two directions? The guns in common use all over the world to-day use powder charges of about half the weight of their projectiles and are from 30 to 40 and even 45 calibers length of bore. To increase the velocity by increasing the size of the chamber and using a larger powder charge, would be very undesirable, and is not likely to be done because the adoption of smokeless powders will give a far greater increase of velocity with the present chambers than can be gained in any other way. To add to the present length of guns is to add but slightly to their velocity, and even less with smokeless than with the brown powders, and, moreover, this would add to at least as great an extent to the weight of the guns besides detracting from their handiness. Altogether I think that 40 calibers is about the extreme length of bore desirable and even the advantages of this length over 30 or 35 caliber guns are doubtful. I regard it as certain, however, that there will be no backward step, the increased danger space of high powered guns will not be sacrificed to the possibility of mounting more guns on a given displacement. The real difficulty is to find emplacements for the guns which a proper disposition of weights will permit ships to carry. (Harveyized armor requires high power. If we abandon heavy guns, complete protection can be gained.)
The next question to consider is the best disposition of the guns which are assigned to each class of ships. All heavy guns should be mounted in pairs, in turrets, and if possible on the middle line, so as to be used on either side with equal facility, a pivot gun is practically two guns, and turret guns are the modern substitute for the pivot guns of older types of ship. The plan, often used by the French, of mounting 4 single guns in turrets, one ahead, one astern, and on each side, has only apparent advantages. It would appear that by this means equal weight of fire was obtained at all angles, 3 guns on each bearing, but actually there is loss of efficiency, for on the bow and quarter bearings but two guns are available, and on no bearing are more than three in action, while with pairs of guns on the middle line we have four guns on each broadside and two on every bearing. Besides, this is a very uneconomical arrangement, the protection of a single gun being almost as heavy as would be required for a pair of guns.
Whenever possible, the guns should be mounted in pairs, in turrets, on the middle line. When there are numerous small guns, this plan is, of course, no longer feasible, and in such cases guns should be mounted in broadside on covered decks, or, at least, under the cover of bridges and superstructures. They should never be enclosed in compartments, each separate from the others, but should be mounted as far as possible on one deck, open fore and aft, like the gun decks of the old wooden ships. To enclose a gun as those of the Columbia are enclosed, in small compartments, is to insure the destruction of the crew and the putting of the gun out of action by the first shell which enters the compartment. The absence of bulkheads, and above all of wooden sheathed bulkheads, is of the utmost importance, and a clear deck is as essential to efficiency to-day as it ever was. In former times all necessary bulkheads were made removable and when the ship was cleared for action they were taken down. Long experience had shown the terrible effects of splinters, and every possible precaution was taken to prevent them as well as the risk of fire.
Moreover, a clear deck is necessary to complete control of the battery and this is even more essential to-day, with rapid-fire guns, than it used to be. The objection to a clear battery deck is the supposed effect of a bursting shell sweeping the deck fore and aft, but this seems to me ill founded. Unarmored ships should, as far as possible, be fought broadside on, not only so as to deliver their most effective fire, but also because in this way they are best protected against gun-fire. In this position, percussion shell, the only ones of any value, passing through the thin side plating, will not burst until they have traveled from six to ten feet, and thus cannot injure men on the engaged side except those almost directly in the path of the shell. No splinters are produced by the perforation of the side, unless it be sheathed, and as all men on deck should be on the engaged side the damage done by the exploding shell will be a minimum.
Of course, if ramming tactics are employed by the enemy, it becomes necessary as he closes to either meet him bows on or to run away, using quarter fire. This disposition on the part of an adversary, when it becomes apparent, will therefore force the assumption of a position with the enemy on bow or quarter so that his shell will enter at an angle of 30° to 40° with the keel, and consequently tend to sweep the gun deck fore and aft with their fragments. This attack, however, may easily be met by the use of splinter bulkheads, or partial transverse bulkheads between the guns and extending inboard sufficient to shield each gun from the fragments of a shell entering just forward or abaft it. In this way, the advantages of a clear deck and complete control of battery are not sacrificed.
I have said that guns should, if possible, be mounted under cover. The reason for this is the ever increasing efficiency of machine gun fire. It seems to me that with well served machine guns of the modern small caliber in an enemy's tops, the crews of exposed guns could not live at 1000 yards or even greater range. Invisibility is one of the greatest of protections, and even the lightest deck or other covering will, I believe, be of great service. There is something, however, to be said in favor of open deck batteries. In the first place, I believe that men will fight better in the open than when closed in, though there may not be much in this idea. In the second place, and this is important, the smoke and fumes of bursting shell will more quickly dissipate on open than on covered decks.
The secondary battery guns should be distributed as far as possible all over the ship, but should not be allowed to interfere in any way with the placing of the main battery, being generally mounted above the latter, on bridges and superstructures. In some large ships, it may be possible to mount these guns below the main battery guns as well as above them, and this would be very advantageous in repelling torpedo-boat attacks. The grouping of these guns, so as to give combined action and control of fire, is not important as it is with the main battery guns.
For the military tops I believe in machine guns only. A pair of small caliber machine guns, with a motor attachment for running at high speed, or even worked by hand, can deliver a stream or bullets almost like the water out of a hose and with fair accuracy even up to 2000 yards' range. Moreover, these bullets will perforate the sides of light vessels at short range, and so will be very effective against torpedo-boats. Their destructive effect on the personnel, if they are used to the extent that they should be, will be very great in future naval engagements.
To sum up the foregoing remarks, I would lay down the following propositions as a guide to the determination of the batteries of ships:
(1) The whole object of a man-of-war is to fight, and whatever detracts from her fighting power should be remedied or removed. The battery constitutes the main fighting power of every ship, and all other things should be made subordinate to its efficiency.
(2) The grouping of the maximum number of guns on each should be the principal idea in the armament of modern ships as it was for those of former times, due regard being paid, however, to the necessity for sufficient power in the main battery guns of armored ships to penetrate the armor of probable adversaries.
(3) Power lies in broadside far more than in end-on fire.
(4) Control of gun-fire is of great importance, both to avoid waste of ammunition and to prevent injuring friends in actions where several ships are engaged.
(5) It is of great importance to so place guns as to avoid the fragments caused by shot striking neighboring structures, and, above all, not to enclose them with wooden or sheathed bulkheads.
(6) Unless rapidity of tire is greatly inferior, the larger caliber should be preferred, whenever displacement permits its use in reasonable numbers.
(7) Diversity of armament should be avoided as far as consistent with the probable uses of the battery.
And now, having fixed upon the batteries of our ships, we come to the important, but little studied, subject of how to use them, and as a preliminary to the few remarks which I have to make on this subject, let me quote to you the words of Comdr. Morris as to the causes of our naval successes in the War of 1812: "The remote cause, as it appeared to me, was to be found in the confidence of our enemy, and in our distrust of ourselves to contend successfully against them; in the neglect of careful exercise which resulted from the enemy's confidence, and, on our part, in the unwearied attention of our officers to devise and bring into daily exercise every improvement which might increase the chances of success against a navy to which we might soon be opposed as an enemy…But the great source of our success was undoubtedly the superior management and direction of our guns; and that the English and other governments were satisfied of this is sufficiently evident by the careful attention they have since continued to give to this branch of the naval service."
Observe that he says "the management and direction of our guns!" The very idea of managing and directing the guns of a ship so as to greatly increase their efficiency is, I fear, a strange one to most officers of our navy to-day. No attention whatever appears to be paid by any one to this subject, and one would judge by the general indifference that there was no longer anything to do with the guns in action but to let the gun crews fire them at will.
The offensive power of a ship's artillery depends on three things only: the speed of the ship, the character of the battery, and the method of using the battery. Other things being equal, speed enables a ship to engage when and as she elects, to place herself near or far off, within or without the field of her adversary's fire. Other things being equal, the battery composed of the greatest number, of the largest, of the most powerful, or of the most accurate guns has the advantage. But it is the method of using the battery which weighs most in the balance, and it is upon this element that we must depend for decisive advantages.
Speed is an affair of the design and construction of the ship; the character of the battery is a matter of design and of regulation; the use of the battery is in the hands of the officers of the ship themselves, and it is to their discredit if any effort is spared to bring this element to the same plane of efficiency as the other two. I shall not now speak of the instruction and training of the men in the use of the guns, though the importance of constant exercise and drill, directed always to produce the most efficient use of the guns under the circumstances of actual battle, cannot be exaggerated. It is the subject of methods or systems of fire to which I wish to direct attention. Have, we any systems of fire in our navy? I fear not. And yet it cannot but be that under the various circumstances of naval engagements there are various systems of fire, of more or less efficiency. At close range, and with the view constantly obscured by smoke, it would be absurd to use the guns in the same way as at long range. With guns which take three minutes to load it would be absurd to open fire under circumstances which justify the use of rapid-fire guns. How, then, shall we use our guns? In the first place, it is essential that the maneuvers of the ship shall be directed to facilitate the effective action of the battery, and to this end the captain should have effective, and not merely nominal, control of the guns of his ship. This requires proper grouping of the guns and a system of transmitting orders clearly and rapidly. Voice tubes, or better, electric dial indicators, should transmit the ranges, kind of fire, and other necessary directions from a central station to the officer of each gun division. The officers and men at the guns cannot properly estimate the distance of the target or the correctness of their aim, and they should not be allowed to alter the setting of the sight bars except by order from the commanding officer or whatever officer may be assigned to the duty of regulating the fire of the battery. An efficient range finder would add to the accuracy of gun-fire, but the greatest help to effective fire will be the constancy of range or its slow variation, which should be sought by skillful maneuvering. With a uniform or slowly varying range, the fire of a battery can be controlled and directed so as to give a large percentage of hits even at extreme range. Without any system of control and direction the best trained guns' crews will fail to deliver an effective fire.
If smokeless powder were in use in guns of all calibers, the problem would be greatly simplified, for then firing at will, under proper control as regards rapidity of fire and corrections of elevation, would be best in almost all cases. But with our present powder, an attempt to fire at will, except at close range, or under special circumstances, would result in such confusion and obscuration of the target as to greatly reduce the efficiency of the fire.
The following is a brief description and discussion of the various systems of fire which may be used under different circumstances:
1. Concentrated Broadside Fire.—The guns are laid so as to converge upon a point at a given distance upon a given bearing, and are fired simultaneously when the enemy reaches that point. This method, much used formerly, has fallen into disuse on account of the character of the batteries of modern ships. It appears to have many advantages for use at close range or in passing an enemy, permitting the captain to deliver his entire weight of shot at a single blow and at the most effective moment. With broadside batteries of rapid-fire guns, such as I advocate for unarmored ships, this method of firing has no place, but with heavy guns in pairs in turrets it may be used in a partial way to advantage. Each pair of turret guns should be fitted for simultaneous firing by the gun captain in the sighting-hood above them. The turret should be trained by another man on the turret floor, whose whole business should be to keep the guns pointing at the target all the time, and there should be marks indicating angles of train. Except at long range, simultaneous firing of each pair of guns should be used for the reason that this will cause less loss of time from smoke, and at times, as when about to pass close to an enemy, it may, and probably will, be desirable to lay all the turrets on a given line of bearing and reserve fire till all the guns bear together. In such cases, of course, the angle of train selected should be such as to deliver the shot as nearly as possible at right angles to the enemy's armor, if armor is being attacked. An attempt to fire all the guns from a central station, will, however, require electrical connections, more or less complicated and very liable to be cut or otherwise injured, and the firing will, I think, be as nearly simultaneous as necessary if each pair is fired by its own captain when it bears. For such firing the guns should be laid horizontal, as it can only be used effectively at such short range and under such circumstances that errors in elevation due to roll are immaterial.
2. Concentrated Fire at Will.—This system of fire can be used effectively only with rapid-fire guns. Its object is the delivery of a great volume of fire for short intervals of time when at comparatively short range and when the smoke prevents accurate pointing by the gun captains themselves. The guns are laid on a given line of bearing, elevated for the given range by the use of the sights, and at the signal are fired as rapidly as possible without change of train or elevation, the ship being, of course, so maneuvered during the interval of firing as to keep the bearing of the enemy unchanged. Even in case of considerable rolling of the ship this method can be used effectively if, by practice, the gun captains have learned to regulate their rate of firing to agree approximately with the period of the ship, so that each round is fired at about the same phases of the roll. The following instance of an attempt at rapid firing at will is given by Admiral Dahlgren: "On one occasion the Cumberland, Commodore Smith, was at general quarters and had placed a target at about 600 yards to windward, the sea was smooth and the breeze light. After some leisure firing an order was sent from the quarter-deck to fire as rapidly as possible for fifteen minutes. The number fired in that time averaged about seven rounds per gun on the main deck, though a few of the guns went as high as eight rounds. The crew of the frigate was one of the best trained (not merely in the form) that I remember to have seen. So embarrassing was the smoke that there is little doubt that, even with the interval of two minutes, more than half the shot were fired upon the general direction which the target was supposed to have." What, then, is the use of rapid-fire guns, if some system be not devised to enable us to profit by their peculiar excellence, rapidity of fire? Imagine the case of the San Francisco, with a battery of twenty 5" R.F. guns, about to engage with another unarmored ship. At a given moment the captain estimates that within so many seconds his adversary will bear at such an angle and be at such a distance, the proper signal causes each gun on the engaged side to be laid upon the stated line of bearing at the stated elevation, and as the guns bear, the signal is given, "commence firing.'' For say thirty seconds, by the proper helm, the bearing is kept as nearly unchanged as possible, and then the signal is given "cease firing," and anew line of bearing and range are given. By the time the smoke has cleared the guns will be again ready and fire is again opened for thirty seconds, and so on. In this way at least five rounds per gun can be delivered with very fair accuracy of pointing, during each interval of thirty seconds, while if the guns are fired continuously at will, the gun captains may be unable to get a glimpse of the target more than once in a minute or even two minutes. This system of fire, tested on a large scale in the French Navy some thirty years ago, and called "Tir precipite" was then found very effective.
3. Successive Firing.—This system of fire has great advantages at long range, both because by firing successively from forward or aft, as the case may be; the interference of smoke can be prevented, and above all because the accuracy of the fire can be increased by observation of the points of fall. The firing interval, of course, depends largely upon the character of the guns employed, but it may, in the case of rapid-fire guns, be desirable to specify it, lest too rapid a fire annul the advantages sought by the use of the system. In using this method, it is important that the sight bars be adjusted only as directed by the officer on deck who regulates the fire, and a system of signals, by bugle, drum or whistle, should be established, whereby orders may be given to correct the elevation. For example, the distance being estimated at 4000 yards and the ship steaming at high speed, or with the wind strong from ahead, the order would be given "fire in succession, from forward, 4000 yards." As soon as pointed, the forward gun fires and as their sights bear the other guns fire in succession, with the same sight-bar setting. The officer whose duty it is to regulate the fire from a suitable position on deck, observes the points of fall, and from time to time, without causing any slackening of the fire, corrects the elevation by signals which indicate "move the sight-bars up so much" or "down so much," as the case may be.
4. Firing at Will.—This, which would be the most effective system of fire under almost all circumstances, if the target and the point of fall of their shell were visible to the gun captains or divisional officers, will become the most important method of firing only when smokeless powders are in common use in all guns. At present it should only be used under such circumstances that the smoke clears rapidly and the range is known accurately, and is either nearly constant or changes very slowly. Firing at will is, however, almost necessarily used for the secondary battery guns, and consequently it is of the utmost importance to have these guns supplied with smokeless powder, so that they can be used without interfering with the more important role of the main battery.
A very important question, especially with regard to heavy guns, is at what range should they open fire. Some years ago it was generally thought that it would be advisable to reserve the fire of the main battery guns of battleships until close range, from 300 to 500 yards, was reached, but this opinion was based on the idea that such ships would engage in a series of mad rushes at and by each other. To-day I find the use of long range fire advocated by most recent writers. For myself, generally speaking, I consider that it would be folly for the captain of a ship to miss any chance, however small, of disabling his adversary, unless he thereby sacrifices other superior advantages. Of course, if the enemy is approaching, and you are forced to meet and pass by him, you must not lose the chance of close range fire for the sake of the smaller chance of disabling him at long range. All, in such a case, depends on how long it takes to reload the guns. If approaching at twenty knots, and it takes less than three minutes to reload and point, then I would open fire at 4000 yards, knowing I could again fire at 2000 yards, and yet be prepared for the most advantageous position when abreast of my adversary. But if it takes four minutes to reload, it would be throwing away chances to open at 4000 yards. Consequently, the importance of knowing the time of reloading heavy guns and reducing this time to a minimum by frequent exercise, is very great.
In case the engagement is one in which both sides seek an artillery duel, and consequently steer so as to remain at a distance, I believe that fire should be opened with the main battery guns at least 4000 yards. It is a mistake to seek to save ammunition at the risk of losing your ship, and the fire of modern guns may, with proper skill, be made so effective at 4000 yards range as to practically decide a battle at that distance. The secondary battery fire should, as a rule, be reserved until the range has been reduced to about 2000 yards, but may be used at greater ranges when smokeless powder is in use.
And now, in closing, let me repeat to you the words of a distinguished French naval officer who wrote a good many years ago, but whose words are as true to-day as ever:
"The gun is everything. Upon its employ should be concentrated all the attention, all the intelligence, all the activity, and all the energy of the navy. To have efficient guns, good systems of fire, every auxiliary which will assure accuracy and increase rapidity of fire, and to combine the service of the battery, well practiced and prepared for emergencies, with the movements of the ship, offers an immense field, unhappily ill explored, to the activity of a squadron."
"It is not by the invention of special projectiles and of powerful guns of exceptional range and accuracy that superiority is attained. Everything lies in the use which one makes of these. Material imitation is easy; what one invents to-day, his neighbor has to-morrow. That which is really difficult to imitate is patience, persevering efforts applied to the instruction of the crews, the aptitude which comes of habitual practice, and the harmony established between commanding officers, the maneuvers of their ships and the service of their batteries."
'' These are the bases of a real and lasting superiority; these are the only advances whose foundations can be laid by naval officers and whose realization they can directly seek."