By W. Laird Clowes, United States Naval Institute,* Fellow of King's College, London
[By Permission from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution]
I have heard naval officers, of all ranks from the lowest to the highest, and in this theatre as well as elsewhere, express themselves in very sanguine tones concerning the future of the ram in naval warfare. I do not by any means intend to imply that all naval officers appear to believe to the same extent in the efficacy of this weapon. But I have known many, and among them officers of great experience at sea, who by their utterances suggest that, given slight superiority of speed and good handling, one ship can, without much difficulty, be made to ram another, even when the other is under full control and has plenty of sea-room in which to maneuver. This view of the capabilities of the ram has always, though in a loose and vague kind of way, been widely held; and I venture to think that the number of those who hold it has increased of late, and especially since last June, when the country had to lament the terrible and dramatic fate of the Victoria, and of so many of her gallant officers and men.
It would be undue presumption on my part to evolve, as it were, from my inner consciousness, any opinions and theories as to the employment of the ram, and to put them forward here, before a meeting composed almost entirely of naval officers and practical men, as views worthy of serious consideration. But, recollecting as I do that naval officers and practical men have but little leisure for the study of the past, and that, nevertheless, they all agree that the teachings of the past are of the utmost value to them, I am encouraged to lay before them a number of facts which I have assembled, and, with all deference, to indicate certain conclusions which those facts seem to force upon the mind of a very devoted, and I trust wholly unprejudiced, student of recent, as well as of ancient, naval history. I do not, in a word, ask you to listen to me, but to pay attention to the voice of events, which, though by-gone, have not ceased to be instructive.
The following is a detailed list of 74 cases of attempted ramming in what may be called modern naval warfare. I have included here all the cases, since the outbreak of the American War of Secession, on which I have been able to lay my hand. The list must not, therefore, be regarded as a list of selected examples. No doubt I have omitted some cases, but I have intentionally omitted none.
In the first column I have numbered the cases to facilitate future reference. In the second I have given the date. In the third I have specified whether the scene of the occurrence was in narrow waters (N.) where maneuvering was difficult if not impossible, or in some locality (S.) which afforded a reasonable amount of sea-room. In the fourth column is the name of the would-be rammer. In the fifth is the name of the craft which it was endeavored to ram. In the sixth column I have shown the condition of the would-be rammer after the maneuver had been executed or had failed. By U., I mean that the ship was, so far as the operation was concerned, uninjured; by Da., that she received slight or moderate damage; by S. Da., that she received serious damage sufficient to greatly impair her immediate fighting powers; by R.A., that she missed her mark and ran ashore; and by S., that she sank in consequence of the collision. In the seventh column I have indicated whether the ship intended to be rammed was at that moment under steam (S.), at anchor (A.), or unmanageable, on account of accident either to her machinery or to her steering gear (Un.). In the eighth and last column I have noted the condition, in consequence of the attempt, of the vessel intended to be rammed; U. signifying uninjured; Da., slight or moderate damage; S.Da., serious damage; Di., disabled; and S., sunk.
Before summarizing the results, I will add a few notes on some of these cases.
3.—The Virginia in this case wrenched off her ram, and so decreased her efficiency for the action of the following day.
4, 5—The Virginia had a speed of about 5 knots only on this day. The Monitor was little faster.
15.—The Queen of the West was run ashore to avoid sinking.
20.—The Essex was very slow. The Arkansas, though fast by the stern, had cast off by the bows, and was able to swing her head round to meet the attack.
24.—The Bayou City was able to board and capture the Harriet Lane.
25.—There is some doubt as to whether the Keystone State's opponent was the Palmetto State or the Chicora. The Keystone State, on approaching, was damaged and practically turned off by shell-fire.
26.—The Indianola had a barge lashed on her port side. This was torn away and sunk.
27.—The Webb and Indianola rammed one another bows on. The former damaged the ram.
28.—The Indianola had a barge lashed on her starboard side. This was crushed and sunk.
31, 32.—These were practically simultaneous, the Queen of the West ramming on the starboard side, and the Webb astern.
33.—This occurred off Bahia in neutral waters. The Florida, struck on the starboard quarter, had her bulwarks cut down and her main and mizzen yards carried away, but was not actually disabled, although she surrendered.
34.—The Niphon, and the Ella and Anne, a blockade-runner, rammed one another bows on. The latter lost her bowsprit and stem, and was boarded and taken.
35, 36, 37.—The Miami and Southfield were lashed together, the former on the starboard side of the latter. In No. 35 the Miami was struck on the port bow. In No. 36 the Southfield was struck fair on the starboard bow, and tearing away, sank. In No. 37 the Miami, being free, escaped.
38.—The Sassacus, which was not adapted for ramming, struck squarely and at some speed just abaft the beam, but did more harm to herself than to her enemy.
43.—The Monongahela lost her ram.
50.—The Palestro lost her mizzen topmast and gaff with ensign.
51 .—The Austrian official report says: "In the meantime it looked as if the Re d'ltalia's helm had been shot away, for from this moment she lay isolated in the midst of several of the Imperial ironclads Rear-Admiral von Tegethoff did not fail to note the critical situation of the Re d'ltalia, whose movements, owing to the injury to her steering gear, were confined to backward and forward ones…The Re d'ltalia went ahead at full speed in order, if possible, to avoid the blow, or to weaken the force of it; but an Austrian ironclad barred her way. Then she went full speed astern." This shows I think, beyond question, that at the time of receiving the blow which immediately followed, she was not under control. The blow upset everyone who was below in the Erzherzog Ferdinand Max. The ram penetrated 6 ft. 6 in., the flag-ship having on her a speed of 11.5 knots. The Re d'ltalia, which was struck on the port side, rolled 25° to starboard, then more heavily to port, and sank almost immediately in 200 fathoms.
53.—The Kaiser was a wooden line-of-battleship; the Re di Portogallo, an ironclad. The former, going at full speed, struck a slightly glancing blow on the beam. She lost her bowsprit, stem, foremast, and funnel, and was seriously hurt. The ironclad was also badly injured.
56.—The Maria Pia's opponent, which she failed to strike, was an Austrian wooden ship.
57.—Both vessels were iron paddle-steamers, the Izzedin having a speed of 15.5 and the Arcadion at 15 knots. The latter was not rammed until she had by gun-fire lost the use of one paddle. The blow so badly damaged her that she was run ashore and burnt to save her from capture.
58.—The Bouvet, capable of steaming at 11 knots, struck the Meteor, which could do only 6 knots, a glancing blow on the port bow at an angle of 5°, and rubbing along the port side, damaged the Meteor's upper works, and upset two guns which had been run out ready for firing.
60, 61, 62.—The Huascar on this occasion steamed at about 8 knots. According to the official American account ("Information from Abroad. War Series, No. 11") she fired at the Esmeralda at least 40 shots from her two 300-pdrs. Of these only one struck the enemy, but that one passed through the side, burst in the engine room, and killed every one of the engineers, besides disabling the engine. The fight was the most gallant one that has ever been waged in modern naval warfare. At the first collision. Captain Prat, followed by one man, boarded from the Esmeralda, which was nearly motionless by that time. Both were shot down on the Huascar's deck. At the second collision, Lieutenant Serrano, next in command, boarded and was also shot down. At the third collision, the little Chilian wooden sloop, old, rotten, unable to move, but still firing, went to the bottom with her colors flying.
65.—The Covadonga, an old gunboat, was incapable of doing 5 knots; the Independencia, an ironclad, could do nearly 12 knots. The Covadonga, nevertheless, avoided all three blows, and by good management so placed herself that, on the third occasion, the Independencia, missing her, and at the same moment losing her helmsman, went ashore, where she was burnt to save her from capture.
71, 72, 74.—These attempts all failed, although the Cochrane, at the beginning of the action, could steam 1 2 knots to the Huascar's 10. After 73, the Huascar became partially uncontrollable.
The following summaries of the results to would-be rammer and intended rammed in the above 74 examples are, I think, very suggestive.
The results, so far as the ships intended to be rammed, are concerned, were:
Previous situation of the ship attempted to be rammed | Total number of cases | Effect upon the ship attempted to be rammed | ||||
Nil | Slightly damaged | Seriously damaged | Disabled | Sunk | ||
Under steam with sea-room | 32 | 26 | 5 | 1 | … | … |
Under steam in narrow waters | 32 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
Unmanageable | 4 | 1 | … | 1 | … | 2 |
At anchor | 6 | … | 4 | … | … | 2 |
74 | 36 | 18 | 5 | 2 | 13 |
The results, so far as the ships ramming are concerned, were:
Total number of cases | Effect upon the ship attempting to ram | ||||
Nil | Slightly damaged | Seriously damaged | Disabled | Sunk | |
74 | 56 | 13 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
It will be observed that, in 42 out of the whole number of 74 cited attempts at ramming, damage of some kind or other was done to one or both ships. In 24 of these 42 cases of effectual collision, the ramming ship received no damage worth mentioning but in seven cases the ramming ship did herself about as much harm as she did to her opponent; and in seven other cases she injured herself even more severely than she injured her enemy. In no case did both rammer and rammed sink.
All these cases occurred, of course, before the automobile torpedo had developed into anything like a perfect weapon, and most of them before the introduction of heavy breech-loading and light quick-firing guns. But, reasoning upon the conditions which ruled up to the end of 1879—since when, I believe, there have been no cases of ramming in action—and upon the experience of the 74 attempts which I have noticed, we may fairly say that the probable results, under the old state of affairs, of 100 efforts to ram, would have been thus distributed:
A. If both ships had sea-room and were under control:
(Based on the 32 cases numbered 4, 5, 25, 34, 40 to 45, 49, 50, 52 to 56, 58 to 61, and 63 to 73.)
(1). Effect on the attacked:
Sunk, 0.000
Seriously damaged, 3.125
More slightly damaged, 15.625
Uninjured, 81.250
Total, 100.000
(2). Effect on the attacker:
Fatally injured (run ashore), 3. 125
Seriously damaged, 3.125
More slightly damaged, 15.625
Uninjured, 78.125
Total, 100.00
B. If both ships were in narrow waters, but under control:
(Based on the 32 cases numbered 6 to 19, 22 to 24, 26 to 32, 35 to 39, and 46 to 48.)
(1). Effect on the attacked:
Sunk, 28.125
Disabled, 6.250
Seriously damaged, 9.375
More slightly damaged, 28.125
Uninjured, 28.125
Total, 100.000
(2). Effect on the attacker:
Sunk, 3.125
Seriously damaged, 3.125
More slightly damaged, 15.625
Uninjured, 78.125
Total, 100.000
The obvious conclusions are somewhat remarkable. One is that, if two ships have sea-room and be fully under control, it is actually more dangerous to try to employ than to try to escape the ram, and that, under these conditions, it is practically hopeless to dream of ramming effectively, since there is no recorded case of the operation having been performed, although it has been attempted at least 32 times. Another is that, in such circumstances, the rammer stands about the same chance as the rammed does of sustaining non-fatal injuries. Another is that the risks attendant upon ramming are the same whether the attempt be made at sea or in narrow waters. The exact similarity of A (2) and B (2) is, indeed, extraordinary. I do not know that any of these conclusions have ever before been called attention to.
To what extent, it may be pertinent to ask, has the value of the ram as an offensive weapon been modified by the progress of the last 15 years? Will captains be more willing, or will they be less willing, to use it, now, when the nearer they approach to the foe the more fatal will be the foe's quick-firing artillery, and when, at any range up to 800 yards, the effects of a torpedo are to be feared. And why should captains attempt to employ the ram at all, when a torpedo, which is far less easy to avoid, and the use of which involves little or no risk to the user, will do all that is necessary? It may be granted that, having first disabled his enemy by gun-fire, a captain may ram with a reasonable probability of success; but, in doing so he not only risks damaging his own ship, encountering torpedoes, and bringing about needless loss of life, but adopts a course that leaves comparatively little chance that the enemy, which by other action might be reduced and taken, will ever be added to the effective sea-forces of his own country. And, after all, a triumph is only half a triumph unless there be something to show for it. One of the few things that would go towards reconciling Great Britain to the agonies of a naval war would be the occasional spectacle of a foreign battleship brought into Spithead, or Plymouth Sound, with the white ensign blowing out above the other flag. That is a sight which would animate the whole Empire, even in its hours of misery. If only on these grounds, it seems unwise to destroy your foe when peradventure you can take him alive. And it is scarcely conceivable that a disabled vessel cannot be reduced and made to strike by the combined influence of gun-fire and the threat of the torpedo.
I have cited 74 examples of the intentional employment of the ram. In those cases it has, in one way or another, brought about the loss of 15 ships only, including those which perished by their own act. But the ram unintentionally employed, both in action and in peace-time, has, I am afraid, been much more fatal. I am not going to trouble you with another long list and with more statistics. I will only recall the damage it has wrought in the case of the Iron Duke and the Vanguard, the Konig Wilhelm and the Grosser Kurfust, the Camperdown and the Victoria, the Osprey and the Amazon, the Ajax and the Devastation, and many more, in peace-time; and mention two or three examples of its dangerous effect upon friends in action. At the battle of Memphis, on June 6, 1862, the Confederate vessels Beauregard and Price unintentionally rammed one another, and the latter had to run ashore to avoid sinking. At the Battle of Mobile, on August 5, 1864, the Lackawanna unintentionally rammed, and very nearly sank, her consort, the Hartford, Admiral Farragut's flag-ship, and soon afterwards the Ossipee was unable to avoid ramming the Tennessee after the latter had surrendered. Again, on the great day of Lissa, the Ancona accidentally rammed her consort, the Varese, and the San Martino her consort, the Maria Pia. The Ancona and Maria Pia received only slight damage, but the San Martino had her ram twisted and sprang a leak.
To my mind, if I may intrude an opinion by way of making an end, the main lessons of the past on the subject indicate, firstly, that to endeavor to effectively ram a ship that has sea-room and that is under control is hopeless, even if she be of greatly inferior speed; secondly, that a vessel that cannot be sacrificed ought never to be deliberately employed as a ram; and, thirdly, that for ramming purposes a little ship is quite as good as a big one. Whether or not this last deduction points to the fact that, with a view to certain eventualities, this country would do well to build a few fast small craft intended for ramming only, and of no particular value, I will not presume to say. But upon that point I am specially desirous to learn the views of those who are competent to speak about it.
Vice-Admiral Nicholson:—Mr. Chairman, I venture to make a few remarks on the most interesting paper that has just been read to us. We must all have been surprised at the result of the figures which have been brought out by Mr. Laird Clowes. No doubt the lesson will be most instructive; but I think there are some very important matters to be discussed in connection with the question of ramming, and I hope to hear the opinions of those who are better fitted to express them than myself. It appears to me that whether the ram is a very efficient weapon or not is outside the question. Our lecturer says "naval officers" are very hopeful about it in action. It is not, however, only the naval officers who are very hopeful, but also the rulers of the Navy and naval constructors, because we see every ship of any structural strength fitted with one of these rams, and evidently they would not have been so fitted if they had not been intended to be used. Therefore, we, as naval officers, have to consider this question: Having these rams given us as a means of offense, and consequently being bound to develop their legitimate use, as well as that of torpedoes and guns, what relative value should we attach to them? The question is, having a very powerful ship provided with different means of offense, are we, in the first place, to avail ourselves of the ram, the torpedo, or gun? Of course there can be no question whatever that the ram must be looked upon as the last resource. I do not think any one would be so mad as to attempt to use his ram early in action, and I doubt very much whether in a single action, in spite of all that has been said in this theatre on the subject, the ram would ever be efficiently used, except to deliver the coup de grace. But there are other conditions in which a ram might be used with great effect. Take the case of a general action; to use sporting parlance, one or two rounds having been fought out, everybody knows the confusion which would ensue. At Lissa there were seven intentional attempts to ram and a very large number of unintentional collisions. Suddenly an enemy's ship shoots out from amidst the thick smoke, and is crossing your bow with her whole broadside bearing on you. There is now only one thing that can be done; you cannot stop, you cannot go astern, and you had better harden your heart and use the ram. I think it is under such conditions of confused action that, probably, the ram will develop its greatest use—I mean during the sudden and unforeseen emergencies of a general action. The perfection of the torpedo is so great, and the gun-fire so terrific, that, beyond these accidental occasions, I do not think ram power would be a very efficient or powerful quality to possess, and certainly it would be a hazardous one to use. The point that I wish, then, with all modesty, to press upon my brother officers is this: Whether in the light of what has happened of late years they are content with the construction of the rams of our ships. We all know the lamentable instance of the loss of the Victoria. What happened . The ships were not going at a great speed, but the Camperdown only escaped by the skin of her teeth. Then, shortly afterwards, a second-class cruiser, the Forth, a ship of 4000 tons, coming up channel on a foggy day, presumably not at an excessive speed, accidentally collides with an empty collier. What would naval officers imagine should be the result of such a collision. Surely that the second-class cruiser of 4000 tons would have gone through the empty collier like a knife through a pat of butter! But what happened? The Forth had to go into Plymouth with her bows very seriously damaged. Surely there must be something wrong! And the three points I wish to suggest to the meeting are these: First, whether it is not possible that the rams of ships should be constructed of such material and with such skill that they should be capable of sustaining one of these heavy blows given in actual warfare without material damage; secondly, if this is not possible, would it not be wiser that the rams should be fitted not as a part of the main construction of the ship, so that if you come into collision, and your ram unfortunately is broken, still the main structure shall remain intact ? And the third point I would raise is this: If it is considered desirable that these precautions should be taken in ships that are to be constructed, is it not as desirable that the whole question should be most seriously considered, and, if possible, the rams of ships already built should be strengthened, so that officers, when they feel bound to use this weapon, shall not at the same time fear that they are incurring the risk of sacrificing the ships which the country has placed in their charge?
Lieutenant W. Baden Powell:—I should like to make one remark with regard to what Admiral Nicholson has put before the meeting, "that the ram, when it has done its work, if damaged, might drop off free of the ship." I think there would be a very grave danger to the ship with regard to that ram if it did not drop off, because if there was any angle on the blow in striking the other ship, the ram might get knocked to port or starboard, and though it might do its own work it would leave that ship with practically a bow rudder hard over, and she would do nothing but circle after that until she had been got into dry dock. So that, I think, the only way to look at the ram after the experience of the loss of the Victoria, and the damage to the Camperdown, is to see that it is sufficiently well constructed not to part from the ship, not to twist, and not to damage the ship on impact with the vessel she is intended to ram. I have had, since I have been on shore, very considerable experience in the Admiralty Court with what we may hope is unintentional ramming. The whole of the work in which I have been engaged has been collisions, and we have hundreds of collisions every year, in which merchant ships and some men-of-war unfortunately touch other ships, and with their stems. In nearly every case those mercantile ships are not constructed in any way with the intention of ramming, but they are all constructed with the anticipation of some day perhaps hitting a dock wall or a ship, and thereby damaging themselves to such an extent that they may be in danger of sinking. They are one and all now constructed with most efficient watertight bulkheads, forming a collision compartment, and I may say, without exaggeration, that every year produces hundreds of ships—Lloyd's would be able to give the exact statistics—which, alter serious ramming, are able to get to port, even hundreds of miles, though their bows are completely crushed out of all shape, simply by virtue of that strong collision bulkhead, which prevents the water from getting any further into the ship. I can only say, with due deference to the gentlemen who at the Admiralty and in ship-yards design vessels, that I think it is not "quite up to date" that Her Majesty's ships, like the Camperdown, should suffer so enormously from what I call a very mild impact with the Victoria. If the Camperdown had been going at full speed and had struck the broadside of the Victoria crossing at full speed, would not the damage have extended a great deal further aft, on one bow or perhaps both; and is it not also especially likely that the Camperdown would have been lost at the same time as the Victoria? I think when there is any settled intention of using the ram it should be the naval architect's first principle to see that the structure of the bow of the ship, either by bulkheads and stringers, or by a kind of side longitudinal strengthening outside of the ship in the nature of ridges, should be so strong that nothing on earth or on the water should turn or twist that ram, or do damage to the bow affecting the safety of the ship. I think until this principle has been thoroughly well introduced into the construction of the ships of the service, captains will, as has been said by the lecturer and by Admiral Nicholson, use the ram as simply the last chance; so that I think it is purely a question of ship construction for the future as to whether the ram is to be relied upon—indeed if it is to be used at all.
Captain Curtis:—I should like to say a word or two upon what Lieut. Baden Powell has said. In the Crimean War the Recruit went from Malta to Corfu with a double rudder, a rudder at each end, but the rudder was not locked at the bows; apparently it never turned the ship from her course, as it was not discovered until they anchored at Corfu. I think that proves that the bow rudder would have very little effect on the vessel going ahead. I have always understood that the greater the velocity with which you strike a body the better it is for the striking body. You remember the old experiment of firing a candle through a barn door, and we all see in railway collisions that when a train is going at a tremendous speed it suffers less than if it is going at a small speed. I have no doubt there are gentlemen here who have been to school later than myself, and they know all about the theory of forces.
Admiral Boys:—It seems that our young members are somewhat bashful in giving us their views on this important subject. Therefore, although I am an old one, I rise to say a word or two. With respect to the Camperdown,—I happen to know something about the Camperdown, having had a son in her at the time of the collision, and we have corresponded on the subject. It is generally thought that the Camperdown was in great danger of following the Victoria to the bottom from the effect of the collision, and so she was. But it was not from the damage done to her own ram; that was uninjured, the damage was all above the ram, and it was because the water-tight doors were not closed that the ship was in danger. If the water-tight doors had been closed in time, as they would have been "in action," there would have been comparatively but little risk in the Camperdown, beyond the filling of the foremost compartments. With regard to the removable ram that has been referred to, I do not think such an arrangement practicable, it would never stand a collision, and would weaken a ship where she should be strongest.
The Chairman (Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton):—I think with regard to what Admiral Nicholson said, we have an every-day illustration of it in every regatta, that is, the galley and punt race. The difficulty of the galley catching the punt is very great, in fact it is almost an impossibility if the punt is properly handled. Therefore the short ship has a very great advantage. The fact that the ram of a big ship like the Forth should be wrenched off by a little collier shows something very radically wrong in the construction of rams of the present day. I myself have always thought so, and I believe that we cannot have a better ram than a straight up and down stem, which is quite sufficient for all practical purposes. There is very little fear of any damage being done to the ramming ship under such conditions. I entirely agree with what Mr. Baden Powell said, especially as to the water-tight doors and the collision bulkheads, and no better instance is within my own recollection than the case of the Arizona, which, when going 15 knots, ran into an iceberg, and backed off perfectly uninjured abaft the collision bulkhead. Had she been going at 8 knots instead of 15, she would have been racked. In this case, as in gunnery, the element of time is a consideration, even if it be only a fractional part of a second, and the Arizona was saved by her great speed. The moral is, if ever you are ramming another ship go at full speed, the greatest speed you can put on. Although of course I have heard of the candle and the barn door, I have never come across anybody yet who has tried it.
Captain Curtis:—I tried it last summer.
The Chairman:—One has very often heard of it, but you are the first person that I have ever come across who has actually seen it tried. In that case it is precisely the same thing as the Arizona. It is the great speed that carries it through, but if you took up a candle and dashed it on the table, it would simply go to smithereens. The result of the table drawn up by Mr. Clowes we must all agree is very curious, and has opened our eyes a great deal. There is one illustration as to the Albemarle, which was uninjured. Some years ago I read a paper in this Institution on the result of the American Civil War. There was this very curious fact. The Albemarle was an improvised ram, armed with two guns. She was attacked by eight wooden vessels, which were especially ordered to ram her, and to try to run her down. The Albemarle had one gun disabled in the early part of the day, and she fought the whole action with one gun, and although she was repeatedly rammed by eight vessels, and they tried to circle nets round her to foul her screw, she yet gained a glorious victory, and went back without losing a man. What the Northern loss was I do not know, but Boynton, the historian, says, "many killed, wounded, and scalded." The conclusion the lecturer comes to is, that if two ships do ram it is certainly more dangerous to be the rammer than those rammed. In my own opinion he would be a very bold man who would try to ram a ship unless he was perfectly certain that her torpedoes were all fired. It is one great value of the torpedo that it acts as an anti-rammer. None of us would like to go near a ship that has a torpedo, because before you get within ramming distance you might be blown up. This is a great comfort to those who have to fight in ships, and though I shall not have to do it, it will no doubt be a comfort to those who may. Then of course there is the question as to whether we should not try to capture the enemy rather than sink her. I believe there would be nothing that would stir up the martial feeling of this country more than the sight of a captured enemy, for although we may be a nation of shopkeepers, still there is a good deal of fight in us when occasion arises.
Mr. Arnold Forster, M. P.:—I should like to be allowed to say one or two words on this matter, as it does not appear that, at this stage of the discussion, I should be standing in the way of any naval officer. I have read the figures of the lecturer, and I confess I am not quite clear as to what are the conclusions arrived at; as to whether it is safe or unsafe to ram. Mr. Clowes concludes the paper with a recommendation in which I should most respectfully concur, that, ramming, to be an efficient operation of war, should be confined, as far as possible, to specially designed ships. But I am not convinced by his figures that the conclusion is unfavorable to the ram, because I observe in the table he gives that, in as many as 70 per cent, of the cases of ramming ships within confined waters, the rammed ship has been more or less seriously damaged. Of course I am familiar with many of the cases cited, though not with all, and a great number are cases of wooden ships; and, certainly from the information I have received, I am convinced that the problem of a wooden ship being rammed is a totally different one from that presented by the case of an iron ship when she is rammed. The question as to which ship is going to be damaged is much more difficult when you come to look into it than appears on the surface. I have lately been trying to get the opinion of scientific mathematicians as to what ought mathematically to be the result of one heavy ship ramming another at full speed. I have propounded the problem, and have never yet had an absolute, definite reply as to what the answer ought to be. Of course the question is complicated, as I was told the other day, by facts which only a practiced shipbuilder can supply, as to the question of the resistance offered by the particular class of materials which are opposed to the impact of the ram. If you are dealing with two solid bodies, you can work out the thing mathematically without reference to any other formula at all, and you can get a positive conclusion. But certainly as far as my researches have gone into cases of modern ramming, under conditions anything like those which may probably occur in war, the record against the ram is not so serious as the lecturer would have us suppose. I remember seeing a photograph of the bow of the Arizona, and certainly nothing could be a more perfect illustration of what might happen to a ram of a ship than that was. I do not suppose you can imagine a more immobile body than an iceberg. The Arizona charged the iceberg at 15 knots. The bow was smashed in, and the mild steel plates drawn and damaged, but still that ship went 700 miles and was docked, I believe, at Halifax. She was certainly not incapable of steaming, or, I suppose, of taking part in an action if she had been a man-of-war. I also saw the Northampton after she had been rammed in the Channel by a sailing barque. The sailing barque went off scot free. I saw the side of the Northampton, and you could drive a cart through it; at any rate, the rent was high enough for that. The blow was arrested by the armor plating; the scroll work on the figure-head of the barque came right on board of the Northampton. In the case of ships which have been sunk like the Grosser Kurfurst and the Vanguard, the same lesson is taught. These are most marked cases of one ship ramming another with no damage, or practically none, to the ramming ship. Then there is the case of the Bellerophon, by the mere touch of the ram, sinking a steamer off the North American coast. Of course the case of the Forth may be quoted as an example on the other side. What I believe was the case was this: the Forth is not constructed in any sense as a ram, and could not be considered to be a ram in the proper sense. As a matter of fact, she struck the steamer at the joining of two compartments—I am not sure if that is the case, but I believe so—and no doubt much damage was inflicted by the strain; but I do not know if it is considered that that solves the problem presented by a properly constructed ship adapted for the purposes of ramming. Ramming is no new thing. The warships of ancient times were properly constructed rams; the Roman ships, and, at a later dale, the Venetian galleys, were properly provided with rams, and we have never had any reason to doubt that in those ancient actions the successful blow of the ram was absolutely fatal to the ship rammed. That was because the ram was properly constructed. The case of the Camperdown has been mentioned. I took some pains to follow out the contours of the ram of the Camperdown, and I certainly can bear out the fact that the damage to the Camperdown was not damage done to the ram. If you followed the contours of the Camperdown and Victoria, you would see structurally it was impossible that what happened could have been avoided, namely, that the Camperdown striking the Victoria should not strike her with her ram only, but, following the line of the ship underneath the stem of the Camperdown, should come in contact with the armor plate and the heavy deck plating of the Victoria. The wrench was chiefly inflicted upon the upper parts of the Camperdown, and was not in any way damage to the ram itself. A very remarkable case of ramming, on a very small scale, occurred the other day at Portsmouth harbor, and almost at the same time I heard Sir Edward Harland speak of the particular form given to our torpedo-boats, I mean the ram-shaped bow. I believe that that form has now been condemned. He said how ludicrous it is to suppose that a torpedo-boat should inflict any damage upon a sea-going ship. I do not believe myself that they were intended for that purpose; but it was curious that only the other day the Trafalgar was accidentally rammed by a torpedo-boat, and that that sharp snout did go right through the thin plate of the Trafalgar, so that the Trafalgar had to go into dock, and would have been actually unable to take part in an action. Certainly the result of my observation is that the ram is not necessarily a dangerous weapon to the ship which carries it. The other day I saw a photograph of the Achilles, which was rammed in the Mediterranean accidentally, and certainly there was a sharp, clean-cut hole in the side of that ship which would effectually have put her out of action, but there was no corresponding danger to the ship ramming. Then we come to the question whether it is advisable for any captain to use his ram in preference to any other weapon. There, of course, I have a very humble opinion, but it does seem to me, and what was said by the lecturer confirms my view, that where we have great ships costing enormous sums of money, with powerful armaments and heavy armor, it would be madness for the commanding officer to attempt at the outset of an action, or at any period of an action, if his opponent were not disabled, to use his ram. And for this reason, that the use of the ram involves the fact that you are within effective torpedo range. You spend a million sterling upon a ship which can be destroyed, and if struck will most certainly be destroyed, by a torpedo the moment she comes within 600 yards. Every advantage that you give to that ship, of speed, armory, discipline, gunnery, is neutralized in a moment if she comes within 500 yards of a Thames tug, just as surely as if it is a ship of her own size and strength, provided that the tug successfully discharges a Whitehead torpedo. Therefore it does seem to me that no powerful ship should ever, except in the last resource, think of using the ram. But that does not remove from our consideration the question as to whether or not it would be wise to fit ships specially for the purpose of carrying rams. Certainly my opinion, guided by what I have read and heard, is very strongly to the effect that there might be a very great advantage in fitting ships on purpose to carry the ram. I am very familiar indeed with the Polyphemus, and how she has served during her three commissions. I would not say that the Polyphemus is the last word in the creation of ships of her class, but I think no naval officer would hesitate for a moment to say that ships presenting a comparatively small target to gun-fire and structurally designed SO as to be able to carry the ram with the greatest possible effect, having a high speed, and only taking part when their services would be likely to be effective, would not be about the most formidable engines of war that could be conceived, because, after all, granting that the ramming ship be not sunk, and even granting she is, it is absolutely the fact that a fairly delivered blow from a ram is destruction to a ship-of-war. Therefore I should support the lecturer's view in so far as he holds us to that, and I believe that the ram ought not to be discarded as a naval weapon, provided it is used by naval officers in the best and most scientific way; but I should have a great objection to any encouragement being given to use our costly vessels for the purpose of ramming, for which purposes in their present form they are not designed.
Mr. E. Rupert Hicks:—With regard to the question of ramming, I certainly am of opinion, with the last speaker, that vessels should be specially constructed for that purpose, and especially that they should meet the requirements spoken of In the case of the Camperdown, the damage caused by the accident which happened to her bows and deck would not have occurred, in my opinion, had there been a solid steel cutting piece across the vessel's bows, to catch the second blow.
Admiral Boys:—May I add one word with respect to something that has fallen from Mr. Arnold Forster, which I should not like to go forth to the public from this Institution as he has put it? I think he intimated that if a vessel was struck by a torpedo she must necessarily be destroyed. I do not agree with that at all. Having had some experimental experience with torpedoes my opinion is, it does not follow at all that a large vessel struck by a torpedo, or more than one, must necessarily be utterly destroyed.
Mr. Arnold Forster:—What I wished to point out was that a large ship may be destroyed by a smaller ship, and that the torpedo discharged by a small ship is equally effective with the same weapon discharged by a large ship. If I put the matter more strongly than that I admit I somewhat overstated it.
Lieut. W.C. Crutchley, R.N.R.:—Sir, will you permit me to say that from the lecture, admirable though it be, there appears to be an impression that superior speed will not give you the power of ramming a slower ship? The contention has been mainly on the supposition that two vessels of unequal size are opposed to one another, but before any fair conclusion can be drawn vessels of equal size and handiness must be opposed to one another, when superior speed would give the advantage. For two vessels to run at one another end on to ram, would show as much skill in fighting as two goats in a field. The ram as a weapon would be used as a last resource, and then I think superiority of speed would be everything.
Major Blacker:—With regard to the question of the torpedo it has been stated that the fear of being struck by a torpedo will prevent a ship from ramming another. Is there any fear, on the other hand, that the torpedo might explode in the tube through a shot striking it and actually damage the ship using it? Only submerged tubes could thus be used, and they cannot always be trained in the required direction.
Commander Berkeley, R. N.:—As you have called upon junior officers, I should not like the appeal to be altogether unresponded to. There is one thing I think that has not been mentioned. I believe about the safest position in which a ship can go when she is likely to be attacked by a torpedo is full speed at her enemy. I have seen it tried, some years ago, on the Polyphemus. I believe I am right in saying that she was steaming about seven knots. A torpedo was fired within three lines on her bow—I think two of them—and both glanced off within a very few feet, being turned aside by the bow wave. Therefore it seems to me the best thing we can do is to go full speed at the enemy, using our gun-fire, and, if opportunity serves, our torpedo, but let us go at them with the ram by all means. The question, of course, is whether we can depend upon our weapon, and for that we must trust to the contractors and not to ourselves.
Mr. Laird Clowes:—When was the experiment with the Polyphemus that you were speaking of?
Commander Berkeley:—It was in 1886.
The Chairman (Sir Vesey Hamilton):—You mean to say the torpedo did not touch the vessel at all, but the bow wave glanced it off?
Commander Berkeley:—Exactly. The torpedoes glanced off on each side.
Mr. Laird Clowes, in reply, said:—I am very sorry that there has not been so much discussion as I could have desired. I am afraid that it is because I have restrained myself in expressing my opinions, but I intend to express them now very definitely indeed. Admiral Nicholson made some very instructive and suggestive remarks. He spoke of the universal application of rams to battleships. It is an interesting fact in connection with this subject that the latest French battleship to be completed, the Brennus, has no ram. She has a straight-up-and-down bow. The case of the Forth has been cited as tending to certain conclusions. Now, I purposed, when I put a title to this paper, to consider in detail the effect on the rammer and rammee of the ram in accident as well as in action, but I found that it would have taken far too long, and that I should not have been able to deal with the subject for want of time. I saw the other day at Toulon a very curious case in the action on the rammer of involuntary ramming. It was that of the French cruiser Cecille. She has, of course, no ram, except in the sense that the Forth has been said to possess one. She has merely a ram-shaped bow, exaggerated into an "avant a plage" as the French call it. She had rammed a merchant ship and the collision had the most extraordinary effect upon her bow. The whole was twisted nearly at right angles to port, yet nothing had given way except the rivets. It was a most extraordinary piece of good workmanship; the plates were all intact, but nearly every rivet had been torn away. It is useless to cite the case of men-of-war ramming merchant ships, or of merchant ships ramming icebergs, as having any real bearing upon the question of the employment of the ram in warfare, because, as the unfortunate case of the Camperdown vs. Victoria shows, a great deal of the damage which is done in such cases to the rammer is done by the knife-like action of the armored deck of the rammee, and neither icebergs nor merchant steamers have armored decks. As for dropping rams, I do not know whether it has ever been attempted to build a ship with a ram which could be dropped at sea without injury to the parent structure. The Shannon has a detachable but not a dropping ram. But in the case of the Merrimac that vessel did lose her ram, and she did not thereby so much weaken herself as to restrain herself next day from preparing to ram the Monitor with her unarmored bow. Several speakers seem to think it a question of strength and construction whether the ram should be used or not.
I will point out later what my conclusions are, but I thought that, if I had dwelt upon any conclusion at all, it was upon the fact that, whether you have a strong or weak ram, you cannot effectually use it as long as the enemy has sea room, and is under full command. Whether the straight up-and-down stem, even if it were made so strong as to justify a ship in ramming with it, would suffer less than the sharp ram I do not know. I should think that it would not suffer any less, because, as a rule, the "tumbling-home" line of the bows of a modern ship is continued far above the waterline, and therefore the tendency of it is to wrench up and lift the armored deck of the rammed ship, and so, while intensifying the injuries of the enemy, to minimize the cutting effect of his deck. If you had a straight up-and-down bow it would not have any effect of that kind on the armored deck, which would cut the stem nearly at right angles, and not be deflected upwards. I think that the question as to whether the ram ought to be delivered at reduced or at lull speed is one which deserves a great deal of consideration. I believe in the case of the Erzherzog Ferdinand Max that the ship did ram at full speed, and that the speed was not actually reduced until the moment of collision. There is now rising up in the British Navy a school which would ram at full speed, although, only two or three years ago, if in this theatre the question of ramming at full speed had been put forward, nobody would have spoken in favor of it.
The importance of ramming at least at fair speed was shown in the case of the action of the Huascar with the Esmeralda. The Esmeralda had practically no speed at all and could not run away, but the captain of the Huascar was anxious to save his own vessel, and he tried to ram with a speed of only 3 knots. On two occasions, although the Esmeralda was barely able to move, she avoided the blow, and at last, when the captain of the Huascar did ram, he had to ram at speed. Mr. Arnold Forster wants my conclusions, and I shall give them. He says that he does not agree with my percentages and cites against them cases of accidental ramming. I do not think that you can lump the two classes of cases together. In the case of accidental ramming the conditions are different on the side of the rammer as well as oh that of the rammee. Mr. Forster tells us that, in the case of accidental ramming, it is an unusual thing for the rammer, being a battleship, to do herself much harm, but we should bear in mind that in these cases of accidental ramming it generally happens that, although there is sufficient to produce damage to the rammed ship, the blow is delivered at such slight speed and in such circumstances that one would hardly expect that a specially-prepared ship should do herself any considerable damage. In action, however, attempted ramming must be at great speed or it will be almost impossible to attain any success at all. The question of superior speed has been dealt with by several speakers as something which will enable you to ram your enemy. No doubt in theory it should do so, and if one ship be running away, and the other ship, having superior speed, be coming rapidly up, you would expect the latter to be able to ram, but practice shows that it is almost impossible unless the first causes the other vessel to lose control of herself, or unless the ships be in confined waters, which comes to much the same thing. An observation made by Captain Berkeley about the Polyphemus reminds me that I was present in 1885, when a similar kind of experiment was tried. My recollection is that the torpedoes were not fired from any point ahead of the Polyphemus, but from each side as she entered Berehaven. The torpedoes were deflected by her bow wave, but, of course, the operation of the bow wave on a torpedo coming at right angles to the ship would be different from that on one coming up head on; and, beyond all manner of doubt, the torpedo of the present day is very different from the torpedo of 1885. One point which I wonder has not been called attention to is this: What is going to be the result of your ramming if you happen to have a live torpedo in you bow tube at the time? It seems to me that there again is a point that is worth consideration.
My general conclusions, so far as I can hastily formulate them, would be these:—1. That attempted ramming is not dangerous to a rammee when there is sea room, and when the ship is under control. 2. That attempted ramming is always dangerous to the rammer—I mean in action—but, as a rule, only dangerous to the rammee where ships are in narrow waters or where the rammee is not under control. But, even where the rammee is not under control, ramming, besides being dangerous to the rammer, is really unnecessary, since there are generally other ways of dealing with a ship that can neither steer nor steam. She ought certainly to be made a prize.
The next conclusion would be that, since in accidental ramming the ram is notoriously dangerous, and since in cases of intentional ramming it has been shown to be not nearly so dangerous, therefore the ram (or, at least, the projecting ram) as a weapon is more dangerous to friend than foe, and might advantageously be got rid of.
My fourth conclusion would be that superiority of speed will not give success to attempted ramming. With regard to the construction of vessels specially with a view to ramming I have not intended to express any opinion. I hoped to have obtained an expression of opinion from the meeting. But it is necessary to bear in mind that vessels are built abroad especially for the purpose and for nothing else. Whether vessels like the Katahdin, which steams at a speed of only 17 knots, will be able to do much ramming I very much doubt; but still, other Powers are building vessels for this purpose, and it is a question which we ought to consider in this country. I thank you very much for the attention which you have paid to me.
The Chairman (Sir Vesey Hamilton):—I am sure you will agree in according a vote of thanks to Mr. Laird Clowes for his admirable lecture, and the great trouble he has taken in drawing up these tabulated statements with regard to the results of ramming. I do not think any one had any idea that there were so many cases as he has tabulated.