Motto:—"Me, me adsum qui feci. "
Associate and Honorary Fellow of King’ s College, London. When the automobile torpedo first appeared as a possible factor in naval warfare, its value, like that of the majority of new and startling inventions, was generally misapprehended. The weapon, it was at first widely believed, would not only create novel conditions, but would also render vain and useless all the ancient principles by which warlike operations at sea had been previously conducted. Large craft of all kinds—the swift light cruiser and the slow heavy battleship alike—were to go down at once before the diminutive torpedo-boat, which, besides undertaking the scouting and commerce-destroying work that was of old performed by frigates, corvettes and sloops, was to bear a conspicuous part in the defense of coasts, harbors and estuaries, to do all the duties of the dispatch vessel, to take a leading share in fleet-actions, and, in fine, to carry everything before it and to be irresistible.
It is not necessary here to enquire how these exaggerated ideas of the mission of the torpedo and the torpedo-boat arose; but it may fairly be suggested that the veil of mystery which by all the earliest users of it was thrown around the Whitehead torpedo did much towards fostering the misapprehensions.. Even of the officers, only a select few were permitted to form any judgment of what the torpedo actually was. The rest, familiar merely with the outside of the weapon, were taught to regard it as a kind of fetish, the powers of which, if unknown, were also probably unlimited. In the British service, at that period, the amount of secrecy observed in connection with the Whitehead was, looking to the circumstances, positively amusing. Mr. Whitehead has always been quite willing to sell his torpedo—and so to convey its secret—to any state, corporation, or individual that may choose to pay the price demanded; yet whenever a torpedo had to be examined, cleaned or repaired on board a British man-of-war, a canvas screen was rigged up for the purpose, sentries were posted, and fully as much care was taken to prevent intrusion by the officers and men in general as could have been taken had a goddess been enjoying a bath upon the tabooed stretch of deck. In the meantime, the torpedo-boat was almost equally unfamiliar, save to a small class of specially trained people.
It is only natural that, amid such surroundings, the torpedo was misunderstood, and the torpedo-boat was systematically used for purposes for which it was in no way fitted. For several years during the British and French summer maneuvers, for example, the torpedo flotillas accompanied the fleets to sea and were for long consecutive periods entirely dependent upon their larger consorts for shelter as well as for fuel and stores. Then came the reaction. Torpedo-boats were seen to be unsuitable for keeping the sea, and torpedoes, as they were run for practice, were observed to travel very inaccurately. It was, therefore, concluded—but too hastily—that torpedo-boats, not being able to keep the sea, must be almost useless; that no torpedoes were to be depended upon for accuracy; and that even if they were to be depended upon for accuracy, they could only be discharged with effect either from the shore or from ironclads and large craft. But fresh experiments were made; torpedoes and torpedo-vessels were greatly improved; and the pendulum of opinion, having thus swayed from one extreme to the other, now tends, in the absence of new disturbing influences, to gradually settle to rest at some point between the two. It is the object of the following paper to discover, with the aid of such indications as have been afforded by torpedo-boat maneuvers, and by warlike operations in which torpedoes and torpedo-vessels have played a part, what that point is likely to be, and to show what are the true uses and limitations of the new naval arm.
The subject is not one that at present very nearly touches the United States, a country which scarcely possesses a torpedo-flotilla; but it is every day becoming more important; and in the unhappy event of the outbreak of a war, there would, I suspect, be more discussions about the handling of torpedo-boats, and more excitement about the exploits of them, than about the handling and exploits of craft of any other class. The torpedo-boat is essentially a vessel for a country with a long and deeply indented coast-line, with foreign ports not very far removed from her shores, and with historical traditions which render her more desirous of self-defense than of aggression. I think, therefore, that this paper is neither impertinent nor inopportune.
The modern automobile torpedo is a very different weapon from the Whitehead of six or seven years ago. How different it is can scarcely be realized save by one who has had the handling of both. The new one may fairly claim to be a weapon of precision; the old one—no matter what may have been its claims—was in reality nothing of the sort. Sometimes, when discharged, it traveled in a right line; oftener it did not. It was, moreover, slow, and it carried a comparatively small explosive charge. The latest Woolwich torpedo, on the other hand, is a triumph of light construction, speed, accuracy and power. Its engines, which are capable of developing fifty-two horse-power and making 2000 revolutions a minute, will drive it, up to 700 yards, at a speed of close upon thirty knots; and I have seen it travel in smooth water with fair speed and considerable accuracy as far as 1400 yards. As for its charge, it is so great that, if it be exploded in contact with the bottom of a ship, the vessel can scarcely fail to be put out of action. It may therefore be assumed that the modern automobile torpedo will do all the work that is expected of it, provided that it be properly prepared and properly discharged, that it be used at a reasonable range, and that there be no obstructions between the weapon and the target. Having assumed so much, it is not necessary to devote special attention to the torpedo itself. The more interesting question is: How best shall we bring the torpedo into a position whence we may dispatch it, under all possible advantages, to do its work in war-time? And that is practically the question which I purpose to endeavor to answer.
But before making the attempt, I should premise that for several years I have enjoyed perhaps exceptional opportunities of seeing torpedoes and torpedo-boats at work under the conduct of those who are most familiar with the best types of both. I have witnessed the discharge of hundreds of unloaded torpedoes of all "marks" and designs, and of several loaded ones. I have watched experiments with all kinds of tubes, submerged and above water. I have been afloat in torpedo-vessels and torpedo-boats of all types and in all weathers. I have been present at numerous experimental torpedo attacks, both by day and by night. I have observed the behavior of torpedo-boats under all conditions, and of their crews under all states of discomfort, excitement, danger and hurry. I have conversed or corresponded with the most distinguished torpedo specialists in Europe. And, finally, my experience has not been limited to the torpedoes and torpedo-flotillas of any one nation, and, though it has not of course extended to those of all countries, it has brought me into contact with several which admittedly rank among the best in the world to-day.
I have already said that in the early days of torpedo-boats they were regarded as proper accompaniments for a fleet at sea. In 1885, for example, when the British Particular Service Squadron, under Sir Geoffrey Hornby, maneuvered around the coasts of the British Islands, a squadron of eight torpedo-boats went with it, each boat being attached to an ironclad, and drawing from her the needful supplies of coal, water, stores and food. The boats were of the two following types:
Displ. in tons | Length | Beam | Mean draught | Extreme speed |
6 of 32 | 87’00’ | 10’0’’ | 4’0’’ | 18 knots |
2 of 63 | 113’0’’ | 12’6’’ | 5’7’’ | 20 knots |
At sea the boats were a failure; and, seeing that they met with some rather dirty weather, it has always been to me a matter of astonishment that they got back to their ports without serious disaster. They could sometimes make so little progress that they delayed even ships that had an extreme speed of no more than 10 knots; they were a continual source of trouble and anxiety to all engaged, and they were abodes of misery to those who were in them. On the 9th and 10th of June, while steaming at a very easy speed on a calm sea, three of them broke down. On July 11, off the northwest coast of Ireland, in a brisk breeze from the westward, the senior officer in charge of four of the boats had to request permission to take them all inshore. And on July 17th and 18th, during half a gale in the Irish Sea, some of the boats behaved so badly that their crews, able neither to eat nor to sleep, and overtaken by most alarming sickness, were completely worn out and prostrated. What was attempted by England in 1885 was attempted by France in 1886 and in the following years by both nations. The British, having found that their 113 ft. boats were not sea-keepers, tried 125 ft., 127 ½ ft., and 130 ft. boats. The French tried an even greater number of types, ending with the 151 ft. boats of the Ouragan class. But long before the series of experiments had been carried far, it was pretty generally recognized that the torpedo-boat, as distinct from the torpedo-boat-catcher or torpedo-gunboat, was unsuited for keeping the sea; and that if sea-keeping torpedo-vessels were required, they must be of 250 tons' displacement at least, and might, with advantage to the comfort and condition of their crews, be considerably larger. This conclusion had the effect of creating a new species of small craft, midway between the torpedo-cruiser and the torpedo-boat. To the new craft, the torpedo-gun-vessel, has been assigned most of the work which, it was originally supposed, the torpedo-boat was capable of; and the torpedo-boat, being no longer needed to serve as a scout and dispatch-vessel, fell into some neglect until her merits and her potentialities were developed in a new direction, first to a slight extent by the Germans, and then, especially during the naval maneuvers of 1890, by the British.
What may be called the new view of the proper functions of the torpedo-boat regards that little craft as merely a quick and decisive raider from a base, and not as a vessel from which any kind of sustained effort must be demanded. The torpedo-boat's business is to strike, like a bolt from the blue, in the most unexpected quarters; to be always in perfect readiness for a few hours of rough hard work under extreme pressure; to appear unannounced in distant places; to vanish unpursued and unseen; and never to expose herself unnecessarily either to the violence of the sea or to the attention of the enemy. Yet this new view—which is, I am persuaded, the right one—is not yet exclusively adhered to anywhere. In Germany, during the combined maneuvers of 1890, I saw torpedo-boats in the Nubel-Noor engaged in an entirely inappropriate artillery duel with the field batteries of the Ninth Army Corps. At Kiel, in 1891, other boats made an attempt to rush past forts which were already alarmed and expecting the attack. And, during the British maneuvers of 1891, boats were on several occasions kept too long at sea, so that their people were unduly fatigued; and they were, moreover, so handled that they were never properly withdrawn from the enemy's observation, and were, in consequence, never in a position to deliver a real surprise attack. It was in the British maneuvers of 1890 that the rudimentary principles of the new view were most consistently acted upon; and although the story of the raid from Guernsey upon the fleet at Plymouth has been told more than once, I must here tell it again, if only because that raid seems to me to mark the beginning of a new departure which may some day lead to startling results.
Daring the British naval maneuvers of 1890 hostilities began at 5 p.m. on the 8th of August. At that hour the positions of the squadrons, so far as they need here be considered, were as follows:
A. Within Plymouth Breakwater. The battleships Northumberland (flag), Anson (flag), Rodney, Inflexible, Invincible, Triumph, Hotspur, Black Prince, and Hero. The armored cruisers Narcissus, Galatea, and Shannon. The cruisers Iris, Thames, Mersey, Medusa, Inconstant, Mohawk, and Raccoon. The special-service vessel Hearty. The sloop Basilisk. The torpedo-gun-vessels Speedwell and Spider. C. At the Channel Islands.
Sir George Tyron, commander-in-chief of Squadron A, was not permitted, under the rules of the maneuvers, to proceed with his fleet to sea, until 5p.m. on the 9th of August. Being apparently uncertain whether this restriction tied the hands of the senior officer of the opposing Squadron C, as well as his own hands, he, at a quarter past eleven p. m. on the 8th, made the general signal, " Although I consider my hands tied as yet, still we are at no great distance from torpedo-boats; therefore keep a good lookout and have a few guns ready."
This signal was a very injudicious one. Hostilities had commenced and the enemy was at liberty to act when he would. But if there had been the smallest doubt in his mind upon the subject, Sir George should have signaled either: "According to my reading of the rules, no attack is legitimate to-night, and therefore torpedo-boats are not to be treated as enemies." Or: "Although, according to my reading of the rules, no attack is legitimate to-night, there is likely to be one, and all suitable measures must be adopted to ward it off and to repel it." The injunction "have a few guns ready," while it prevented the Admiral from afterwards claiming that he was not prepared, was a half-hearted order. It may perhaps seem frivolous to discuss the matter here, yet, since it is yearly growing more and more obvious that even when there is only the remotest risk of war, no possible precautions should be neglected, it is, I venture to think, worth while calling attention to it. All else that Sir George did was to send three cruisers to scout in the chops of the Channel, without special reference to the force at the Channel Islands.
The torpedo-boats "at no great distance" were at Guernsey, which, as the crow flies, is about 100 nautical miles from Plymouth Breakwater. Having regard to the state of the sea at the time, the distance may be considered as equal to between six and seven hours' steaming at the boats' best attainable speed. The senior officer at Alderney was Commander H. D. Barry, who, I believe, called to his counsel Lieutenants F. C. D. Sturdee and Lionel de L. Wells. I mention the names because to these officers entirely belongs the credit for what was done.
Commander Barry, whose headquarters were at Alderney, had already determined to attack Squadron A at its anchorage as soon as possible after the beginning of hostilities, and he planned two successive onslaughts: one, under Lieutenant Wells, to be made by Nos. 82, 86 and 87; and the other, to be delivered two hours later, under Lieutenant Sturdee, by Nos. 51, 55, 57, 58, 59 and 81.
I was on board one of the ships of Squadron A, and, being fully convinced that an attack would take place, did not leave the deck after about eleven o'clock p. m. The battleships and cruisers lay in four lines, at a distance of two cables, parallel with the breakwater, the line nearest to the breakwater being composed of the Northumberland, Rodney, Anson, and Black Prince. The other big ships, except the Narcissus, Galatea, and Iris (which had been dispatched to the westward at half-past nine), formed the remaining three lines, and the small craft lay by themselves in Cawsand Bay. No vessels had their nets down; there were no search-lights in use on the breakwater or elsewhere; there were no booms, obstructions, or mine-fields at either entrance to the Sound, and there were neither cruisers nor picket-boats specially watching for the torpedo-boats which were "at no great distance." On the other hand, there was a good lookout, "a few guns" were ready, and the night was clear and light.
Lieutenant Wells, who had been lying with his division at St. Peter Port on the east side of Guernsey, started at a little before 6 p.m.—as soon, that is, as the declaration of war had reached him. Proceeding at between 16 and 17 knots and in open order, he sighted the Start Light before midnight, and soon afterwards increased speed to 19 knots. Shortly after 2 a.m., in column of line ahead, he entered the Sound by the eastern entrance, next to which lay the Black Prince. The torpedoes for use were provided with collapsible heads of soft copper. On both sides the official arrangements for timing were very bad, and this fact naturally led to considerable conflicts of evidence as to what occurred: but my own observation convinces me that the boats were not sighted from the ships until they were all within the breakwater, and that, from the moment of the firing of the first gun to the moment when the last of the boats had discharged her torpedo, barely two minutes elapsed. As I had only an ordinary watch, I do not pretend to have been able to measure by seconds. It should here be noted that the rules placed the boats at no small artificial disadvantage. Firstly, although each boat had three tubes, and could have fired three torpedoes almost simultaneously, she was permitted only to fire one. Secondly, after firing, she was required to remain on the spot to pick up her weapon, thus getting in the way of the boat astern of her.
Owing to the conflict of evidence, no claims on either side were allowed by the umpires; but No. 86 claimed the Black Prince, and No. 87 claimed and admittedly hit the Invincible, The Black Prince denied that she had been struck; but the Anson, which was not claimed, was admittedly struck—possibly by the torpedo that was meant for the Black Prince, her next ship. No. 82's torpedo, aimed, like that of No. 86, at the Black Prince, had a leaky air-chamber and failed to run. No. 82 then collided with the Black Prince and was so damaged as to be unfit for further sea-work, though she might still, of course, have discharged her second and third torpedoes at the ships around her.
So much for the bare facts of Lieutenant Wells' attack. Limited though the torpedo-boats were in their operations, there is in my mind very little doubt that they are now entitled to claim that they put out of action the first-class battleship Anson and the second-class battleship Invincible; which two vessels represented at the time an expenditure of very nearly 5,900,000 dollars, and had on board over 1000 officers and men. Supposing the whole of the attacking force to have perished, less than 300,000 dollars and only 57 lives would have been thrown away. And it is worthy of consideration that while new torpedo-boats may be built in three months, new battleships require three years. On board the ships there was, if not confusion, at least lack of system. Guns were fired long after the smoke of previous discharges had effectively shrouded the moving boats; and although it was a light night, the search-lights, which might have been very well dispensed with, were turned on and flashed hither and thither without much method, until one's eyes were unable to distinguish anything. As an eye-witness wrote next day: "It was fairly easy to follow the motions of the daring little craft until the ships, by signal from the Admiral, turned their electric lights on. Thenceforward all was doubt and confusion, for there is nothing more perplexing than the flashing of search-lights at night." I feel sure that the influence of the lights must, upon the whole, have been as favorable to the attack as it certainly was unfavorable to the defense; and had the boats been permitted to discharge three torpedoes apiece, instead of but one, I see no reason why they should not have effected three times as much damage as they did effect.
Lieutenant Sturdee left his anchorage at, I believe, about 7 o'clock, and, steaming more slowly than Lieutenant Wells, entered the Sound by the western entrance at a little before 4 o'clock. He kept well under the land above Cawsand Bay, and was to some extent further sheltered by one or more large steamers that were going out; but, on the other hand, the defense, knowing that three boats only had attacked with the first division, and that many more were at Commander Barry's disposal, was now—or at least should have been—perfectly prepared. Nevertheless, No. 81 torpedoed the Northumberland within a minute of the firing- of the first gun. No. 58 did the same with the cruiser Inconstant. No. 57 discharged her weapon at the Invincible, but it failed to run. No. 59 aimed at the Northumberland, but missed her and struck No. 51, which seems to have meanwhile torpedoed the already damaged Inconstant. The sixth boat, No. 55, was troubled with hot bearings ere she could enter the Sound, and, attacking independently through the eastern entrance, was discovered by a guard-boat. Her commander declared that guns were fired and search-lights turned in every direction save that of his craft, and that his torpedo struck the Invincible. I saw this attack and am inclined to agree with him.
The umpires, confused by the contradictory nature of the numerous accounts, and unable to solve the difficulty in any other manner, declined to give any decision upon the claims of either side; but they did say, in their report, that “the tactics of the torpedo-flotilla operating from Alderney, as a distant base, were well planned and efficiently carried out during the early part of the maneuvers, notably in the attack upon A fleet in Plymouth Sound on the night of the 8th-9th of August.”
Another instructive series of torpedo-boat maneuvers was carried out in British waters in the summer of 1891. They were, it appears to me, far less ably planned than the operations which I have just described, but, in some points at least, they were even more suggestive. I give them, as before, from notes made at the time.
War between the Red and Blue Squadrons was declared at noon on Wednesday, July 22. At that hour the disposition of the hostile forces was, I believe, as follows.
The "Blue" torpedo-boats were Nos. 25, 33, 42, 45, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67, 73, 74, 75, 82, 83, 84 and 85. The vessels with them were stationary.
The Red Squadron was under Captain S. Long, who flew a broad pennant in the Barracouta; the Blue was under Rear-Admiral Erskine, senior officer at Queenstown, Capt. J. Dunford, of the Hecla, directing operations afloat, and Commander Barry, the projector of the raid upon Plymouth Sound, being in the Curlew.
In the leading idea, England and Scotland, within certain limits which it is unnecessary here to define, were supposed to be at war with Ireland. To the former belonged the Red and to the latter the Blue Squadron. Red's armored vessels were taken to represent a fleet of battleships which was awaiting opportunities to annoy Blue's ships and coasts. Blue's flotilla was taken to be a hostile force which might be expected to repeat against Red the tactics which had been essayed in 1890 from the Channel Islands against Sir George Tryon at Plymouth, and which, also, would endeavor in every possible way to thwart whatever designs might from time to time occur to the Red commanding officer. To Red's light craft were entrusted such duties as would naturally fall to the lot of cruisers, scouts and dispatch vessels in war-time. Blue's heavy craft were to do the work merely of guard-ships and depot-ships.
Seeing that, at the time of writing, the official report of the umpires has not been made public, I am obliged to trust exclusively to my own observation for a knowledge of what occurred. This, according to my diary, as kept from day to day and as amplified from information obtained at the time from officers concerned, was briefly as follows:
Wednesday, July 22. The Red small craft left Milford Haven to scout in the Channel.
Thursday, July 23. Early this morning they returned, claiming to have taken or sunk in the offing eight Blue torpedo-boats which had been prowling about outside. At 6 a. m. the ironclads, having taken in their nets, weighed and proceeded to sea from Dale Roads. A few hours afterwards nine Blue torpedo-boats made a raid into Milford Haven, but found the quarry gone.
Friday, July 24. This morning the Red Squadron appeared off Kingstown, and for four hours fired at the Belle-isle, which lay behind the pier with her guns masked by it, and which was then claimed as destroyed. The Red Squadron thereupon headed for Belfast.
Saturday, July 25. At 12.20 a.m., while the Red Squadron was still on its way under easy steam to Belfast, torpedo-boat No. 74 approached the Northampton, which was last in the line, and discharged a Whitehead, which struck the ironclad on the port quarter, but not until the boat had been under fire for at least four minutes. The umpires, who were appealed to by telegraph from both sides, adjudged the boat to have been out of action when she launched her torpedo. Arrived in Belfast Lough, the squadron found that the Hecla had laid down extensive mine-fields to protect herself. It was deemed inadvisable to risk the ships or waste time, and the squadron withdrew to Luce Bay, Wigtonshire, where it anchored at 2 p.m., got out its nets, and sent out its small craft to scout.
Sunday, July 26. At 2.15 a.m. torpedo boats Nos. 42, 25 and 55 attacked, having crept under the land and so got inside the Red Squadron. No. 42 discharged a Whitehead, which missed the Hotspur, the center ship of the line, and, almost spent, ran gently into the Northampton's nets. At 3 a.m. No. 83 attacked, discharging at the Northampton a torpedo which failed to run.
Monday, July 27. At 12.43 a.m. torpedo-boat No. 25 entered the bay, under the land, rounded the Northampton's bow, came down on the starboard or land side, and discharged a Whitehead which failed to run. At daybreak nets were taken in, and at 8 a.m. the squadron steamed south.
Tuesday, July 28. While the squadron was at sea in the early morning two torpedo-boats came up astern. One did not press the attack, but withdrew on being fired at. The other approached and attempted to torpedo the rearmost ship on the port quarter, but the Whiteheads failed to run. At 2.45 a.m. a third boat came up astern, but withdrew on being fired at. At 9 a.m. Wicklow was reached, and by 1 p.m. the Traveller, which was found there, had been put out of action by the guns of the ironclads. The squadron then steamed to Milford Haven.
Wednesday, July 29. At 9.30 a.m. the Red Squadron anchored in Milford Haven, in its former anchorage, and got out its nets, while the small craft scouted in the offing.
Thursday, July 30. At 1.30 a.m. two torpedo-boats attacked the Shannon and Hotspur, but did not strike them and were put out of action. At 3 a.m. a third boat, No. 45, attacked the Northampton from astern and fired a torpedo, which, however, did not touch the nets. At 12 a.m., hostilities ceased.
The usual formation, while the Red Squadron was at sea, was with the three armored ships in column of line ahead, and with the light craft disposed around them, ahead, astern and on the beams, at distances of about 10 cables. The important and suggestive points to be borne in mind in connection with the operations are: (a) that none of the torpedo attacks were completely successful; (b) that, out of eight torpedoes discharged, three failed to run; three ran but failed to hit anything; one ran, missed its aim and hit something else, but did not hit it until the impulsive force had been expended; and only one ran, hit what it intended to hit, and (save that the boat which discharged it was already theoretically out of action) did its appointed work; (c) that every torpedo attack that was made against the ships while they were under steam was made from astern; and (d) that all the attacks made against ships at anchor were altogether fruitless, while the only one which met with even comparative success was made at sea. All the attacks were, by the way, made during the night.
I must cite two other examples of the use or abuse of torpedoes and torpedo-boats. I shall then have referred to all the most important of my "leading cases," and shall be free to point out the lessons which it seems to me are to be derived from them and from others.
I have heard it said over and over again that the sinking of the Blanco Encalada teaches no lessons, and I have as often disagreed. It is, I submit, in some respects the most significant leading case we have. I was not upon the Chilian coast at the time, but I have before me the official dispatches from both sides, and, better still, an account which has been kindly prepared for me by my friend Capt. St. Clair, late of H. British M. Ship Champion, which was upon the coast. This account includes the substance of a report that was rendered by the Champion's gunnery lieutenant, Mr. R.B. Colmore, who, with the aid of divers, thoroughly examined the Blanco Encalada two days after she was sunk.
The Blanco Encalada arrived in Caldera Bay on April 22d with several transports in company, and at once landed a force which left by railway to take possession of Copiapo. Captain Goni, of the Blanco, commanded the force, and, after Copiapo had been occupied, returned to Caldera, boarding his own ship at about 1.30 a.m. on the morning of the 23d. In his absence no fears of any attack were entertained and no precautions had been taken.
The ship was lying at a buoy in the southern part of the bay, with steam ready for moving the engines, and with the ordinary guard of seven men on watch. The armament of rapid-firing and machine guns had been reduced to admit of arming the transports, and at the time the ship had three 6-pr. R.F. Hotchkiss guns, disposed one on each side of the forecastle and one on the poop; four 1-inch Nordenfelts, disposed one on each side of the fore- bridge, one on the after-bridge, and one on the starboard side of the poop; one Hotchkiss R.C. in the top; and two .45-inch machine guns. Her original complement had been 300 well-trained men, but of these only 80 remained on board, the rest having been drafted to other vessels or landed with the Naval Brigade, and their places having been taken by raw recruits who had small knowledge of their duties, or even of a ship.
The Almirante Lynch and Almirante Condell were commanded by Captains Moraga and Fuentes, both of whom had received torpedo training at the Torpedo School in Valparaiso under Captain Santa Cruz; and they had the services of an experienced French torpedo artificer who had recently arrived from Europe to repair and adjust torpedoes for the Chilian government. The armam.ent of each consisted of three 14-pr, R.F. Hotchkiss guns, disposed two on the forecastle en echelon and one on the poop; four 3-pr. R.F. Hotchkiss guns, disposed two on the poop and one on each beam or sponsons; and five torpedo-tubes, disposed one ahead and two on each beam. The torpedo-gun-vessels left Valparaiso on the 18th, and spent part of the 18th and the whole of the 19th and 20th in Quinteros Bay, and started northward again on the 21st, arriving off Huasco at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 22d. There they remained until after 5 p.m., probably, as would appear from Captain Moraga's report, until about 6 p.m., Quinteros is, roughly speaking, 400, and Huasco 100, miles from Caldera; so that, if up to 6 p.m. on the evening of the 22d the Congressionalists at Caldera had been informed of the whereabouts of their enemies, they would have known them to be 100 miles away. There seems to be no reason for supposing that they had any knowledge that the foe had come north from Valparaiso at all.
Caldera Bay opens to the northwest. Instead of entering round the southern promontory on which stands the lighthouse, the attacking force appears to have kept away until well beyond the northern promontory, and to have then turned and entered on that side. Says Captain Moraga:
"Shortly before 4 o'clock in the morning (of the 23d) I entered Caldera Bay. So far as the moonlight permitted, I reconnoitered the position of the revolutionary vessels from the bridge. In the meantime the Lynch followed in my wake at a distance of about 50 meters. When I had discovered the positions of the vessels I retired at half-speed directly for the Blanco or Cochrane, for at that moment I did not know which of the two ships was before me. Behind the after-part of the ironclad I distinguished another vessel, which from her outline I took to be the Huascar. At a distance of about 100 meters I discharged a bow torpedo, which missed and, almost grazing the stern of the ironclad, probably struck the ship which lay close to her. Immediately after this first shot I turned to starboard, and at about 60 meters fired one of the port torpedoes, which must have struck the forward part of the ship attacked. Almost simultaneously I ordered Lieutenant Rivera to let go the second torpedo on the same side. Between the second and third discharges the ironclad opened fire upon my ship with great quickness and spirit from mitrailleuses, rapid-firing guns and small-arms. After my ship had discharged her first torpedo I ordered full speed ahead. The fire of the ironclad remained concentrated on the senior officer's ship, and they did not notice that the Lynch, which had followed the motions of the Condell, placed herself at very short range and fired her bow torpedo, which missed. Turning to starboard, the Lynch discharged her second torpedo, which struck the Blanco somewhere amidships. Two minutes later the revolutionary ship sank. From the discharge of the Condell's first torpedo to the discharge of the Lynch's second, about seven minutes elapsed."
The account obtained by the Champion's officers from Captain Goni and other survivors is as follows:
"The morning was dull and cloudy, the moon at intervals being completely obscured. At about 4 a.m. the torpedo-vessels were sighted by the lookout men at a distance of about 2000 yards. The alarm was at once given, but some delay took place in getting the people to their quarters, owing to the bugler mistaking the orders and sounding the ordinary reveille instead of the call for action. By this time the torpedo-vessels had approached within 500 yards on the starboard bow, and fire was opened on them from R.F. and machine guns. This was at once returned, the Condell at the same time discharging her bow torpedo, which passed ahead of the ironclad and, running on shore, exploded there. The vessels then appeared to stop their engines. Orders were given on board the ironclad to slip the cable and go ahead with the port engine and astern with the starboard, but these orders do not seem to have been carried out. The Lynch then went full speed ahead, passing along the starboard beam and discharging both tubes at a distance of about 100 yards. One torpedo struck the Blanco and exploded. That vessel slowly heeled over and sank in less than five minutes. She first fired one of her heavy guns, but the shell passed over the Lynch without damaging her, and the latter passing under the Blanco's stern, discharged her bow torpedo at the transport Biobio, which lay inside, but without effect. The torpedo is said to have passed underneath the transport. The torpedo-vessels then steamed out of the bay, apparently uninjured."
The discrepancies between the two accounts are remarkable, but perhaps not greater than should, in the circumstances, be looked for. Nor do they affect the conclusions, which are, that the Blanco Encalada was surprised and destroyed, and that her assailants got away from her practically scot-free. Torpedo practice and gun-fire seem to have been alike execrable.
My last leading case is that of the attack on the armed transport Aconcagua. This is what Captain Moraga, of the Condell, has to say about it:
"As we drew off from Caldera we fell in with the transport Aconcagua, which was coming from the southward as if to enter the bay. As soon as she recognized us she endeavored to getaway, turning to seaward and at the same time opening fire on us. When the revolutionary transport perceived that, on account of our superior speed, retreat was hopeless, she again headed for Caldera, possibly in expectation of there sighting her consorts and being assisted by them. She was at once engaged by the two torpedo-vessels in an action which lasted for an hour and a half. During this period the fire of the Lynch and Condell silenced that of the Aconcagua and forced that ship to stop her engines. She did not strike, for she fought without her flag. At the crisis of the action there appeared on the horizon smoke, which I imagined to proceed from the Esmeralda; and, in addition, several tubes in one of my port-boilers exploded and obliged the engineers for a few moments to leave their employment in that compartment. In consequence of these occurrences I headed to the southward and ordered the Lynch to permit our prey to depart. Soon afterwards I discovered that the vessel which had been sighted was the ironclad Warspite of the English Navy She seemed desirous of entering the harbor. The Aconcagua took advantage of the situation to head with all speed for Caldera and to place herself under the protection of the forts."
The official account of Captain Merino Jarpa, of the Aconcagua, puts a different complexion upon the action. It runs:
"At seven o'clock on the morning of the 23d of April it was reported to me from forward that the torpedo-vessels Lynch and Condell had been sighted of Morro Copiapo at a distance of about 7000 meters (about 4 ½ miles). I at once ordered the vessel to be headed in that direction, caused 'clear ship' to be sounded, and increased my speed. When I was about 4000 meters from them I opened fire from my rapid-firing guns. This was immediately returned by both vessels with great rapidity and promptness. So incessant was the discharge that it resembled that of small-arms rather than that of guns. At first they separated, as if to place us between two fires, but they soon altered their intentions, possibly because the maneuver would have enabled me to use the guns on both broadsides. Both put themselves on our port hand. At this time one of them was struck by a shell and emitted such quantities of smoke and steam that for a period of two minutes she was completely invisible to us. Her speed, from this moment, sensibly diminished, and she fell away on the Aconcagua's port quarter, while the other craft kept parallel with us at a distance of from 1500 to 2000 meters. As this position did not permit me to use all my guns, I turned and headed the Aconcagua for the latter ship, and so was able to bring two of my 13-cm. (5.1") guns into action. Upon this the torpedo-vessel increased her speed and withdrew, keeping away to seaward. The action began at seven and ended at twenty minutes past eight in the morning. During that time we fired without intermission 197 rounds, including 7 from the 13-cm. guns. The rest were from the rapid-firing guns, with a few from the Hotchkiss mitrailleuse. The Aconcagua's speed throughout the action was 11 knots. Out of more than 400 projectiles which the enemy fired from his rapid-firing guns eight only struck this ship, and these hit the woodwork above the water line and did but little damage to the vessel and her crew. We had four slightly wounded. . . The action confirms the opinion that torpedo-vessels are useful only for unexpected attack. The view that they are worth nothing as fighting craft will perhaps be shared by the naval officers of the Dictator when they reflect that during a ninety minutes' hot conflict they could gain absolutely no advantage over a simple merchant-steamer whose classification as a man-of-war is based solely upon the fact that she happens now to carry a few guns of small calibre. From this it results that torpedo-vessels are lost from the moment when they encounter a real man-of-war, if only she can bring them to action."
Captain Jarpa's conclusion that torpedo-vessels are useful only for unexpected attack seems to me to be fairly supported by all the examples which I have cited, and by the majority of the other examples which I might cite. The successful attacks on the Housatonic and the Albemarle, during the war of Secession, were surprises; the Russian torpedo-attack off Batoum on the night of May 12th-13th, 1877, was a surprise, and, but for an accident, would have been successful; the successful attack, a fortnight later, on the monitor Seifi, off Matchin, was a surprise. On the other hand, the exceedingly gallant daylight attacks of June 20th and 23d, 1877, off Rustchuk and Nicopolis respectively, were costly failures. In the same year the Huascar, attacked with a Whitehead by the Shah, evaded the projectile by accidentally or intentionally altering course; and in 1885 the Polyphemus, during the Bantry Bay operations, easily escaped several Whiteheads which were aimed at her, she being able to see them, and having sufficient speed and turning-power to out maneuver them. Indeed, I can think of no case in which, either in peace or in war, a torpedo attack, unless made in darkness or as a complete surprise, has attained its object, or would, but for accidental circumstances, have attained those objects.
Secrecy and suddenness, then, are desiderata of prime importance for the success of a torpedo-attack. Equally important are organization and training. The descent upon the fleet at Plymouth was made with sufficient secrecy and suddenness; but neither the organization of the flotilla nor the training of the ship's companies engaged was what it should have been. An officer who took part in the affair lamented to me that Lieutenant Sturdee's division of six boats was too large to admit of being properly kept in hand by a single commander, and another officer informed me that many of the lieutenants in command of boats had gone on board without proper instruments for the navigation of their craft in case of the separation of the flotilla; that the engine-room complements were not familiar with the machinery, and that the discharge of the torpedoes took place in some cases with undue haste and flurry. These were the naturally resultant faults of incomplete organization and training. Similar causes led, no doubt, to the large number of failures to run during the British maneuvers of 1891, and to the numerous misses and failures of the Chilian war. One has heard of torpedoes having been fired before they have been tested for floatability, and even before they have been charged with air; and I myself have seen a torpedo picked up with its water-tripper jammed in such a way that it could not possibly act. Accidents, oversights and follies may always occur in connection with operations like those which are now under consideration, but system will reduce to a minimum the liability to any of these, and I shall devote the rest of this paper to the advocacy of the system of peace organization, training, and war-tactics which appears to be logically suggested by the experience of the past.
In order to be able, in war-time, to properly utilize torpedo-boats for a descent such as was made upon Plymouth in 1890, a naval power should, I am convinced, keep the greater part of its torpedo-flotilla perpetually in commission. I do not mean that each boat, where there are considerable numbers of boats, need be kept in full commission with, as in the British Navy, her lieutenant, one or two sub-lieutenants, and a gunner or boatswain on board. But the engine-room staff, since it can never know too much about the boilers and machinery, should be always attached to the craft, and should be given frequent opportunities of perfecting acquaintance with its delicacies and its peculiarities. The executive and navigating staffs require no such special and intimate knowledge. One torpedo-boat may be navigated and fought very much like another. Her idiosyncrasies—or, at least, her important ones—reside entirely in her boilers and machinery. While, therefore, each boat, if she is to be employed to the greatest advantage, must have an engine-room staff that is thoroughly accustomed to her, any competent navigator or any competent executive-officer would serve almost as well as one who had been born and bred on board. It would be enough, in ordinary peace-time, to place a trustworthy warrant-officer in charge, and to leave him there as second or third officer upon the full commissioning of the boat for maneuvers of war.
But a single boat would never, for any purposes, be regarded as an independent unit. What the unit in torpedo-warfare should be is still, in Europe, a matter of discussion. In infantry tactics the battalion is the unit; in artillery tactics it is the battery; in torpedo-boat tactics it must be the division; but battalions and batteries are not in all armies of the same strength, nor even in particular armies are they always invariable; and the same is the case with torpedo-boat divisions. The German division, for example, consists of six first-class boats and a "division boat"—a vessel of three or four hundred tons' displacement, of great speed, and of characteristics generally resembling those of the "avisos-torpilleurs" of the French navy, or of the "torpedo-gun-vessels" of the British. In England the division has contained six, four, or three boats, with or without a torpedo-gun-vessel attached. In France, also, the constitution of the division varies, or has varied. Professional opinion now, however, seems to incline in most countries in the direction of the division of three boats, with, if possible, a larger craft to carry the divisional commander, to lead the navigation, to undertake the repair of small defects, to provide supplies of water, coal and stores, and in short to act, for brief periods, as a small mere cigogne to her consorts. Where three boats to the division are not advocated, two appear, save in Germany, to meet with more favor than four, and four with more favor than five or any greater number. British officers of experience, almost with one accord, advocate three, with a larger craft; and I shall confine myself to the consideration of the division as thus constituted; for I believe it to be far and away the best.
The peace "state" of such a division would include a full complement for the larger craft (which would be commanded by a lieutenant; with a lieutenant for navigating duties; a sub-lieutenant or ensign, a chief engineer, a surgeon, and subordinate officers under him), and reduced complements (consisting only of a warrant-officer and engine-room staff) for each of the three boats. The divisional commander would thus have at his disposal sufficient officers and men to enable him to keep his division in good order and training, and to continually exercise part of it along the coast in the neighborhood of his headquarters. But he should by no means be the sole director of its operations. An officer of a superior rank (a lieutenant commander, commander or junior captain) should be appointed to a small cruiser or gun-vessel as inspecting officer, and should be empowered and required to visit all divisional headquarters unannounced, and, by day or by night, to mobilize the divisions, manning them up to full war complement from the ship's company of his own vessel, and then exercising them at maneuvers at full speed. If, for example, a division had its headquarters at Newport, R.I., an inspecting officer arriving there unannounced by night would teach valuable experience to the command by mobilizing and dispatching it in all haste to Nantucket or to New Haven, Conn., and back. The celerity, ease and absence of mishaps with which the operation should be carried out would to a large extent measure the efficiency of the division for the kind of work to which it would be put in war-time.
And here I may fitly state some of the arguments in favor of adding a "division-boat" or torpedo-gun-vessel to each division. Every one who has had much experience at sea in torpedo-boats knows how very limited is the horizon from the low deck of so small a craft, and how difficult—especially in bad weather—is the navigation of her. A vessel with a mast of some kind, and with a proportionately wider horizon, can keep a far better lookout than any torpedo-boat, and so avoid dangers that the torpedo-boat may easily fail to discover until she is close upon them. Again, the larger vessel being roomier and steadier, can take observations and conduct navigation with much greater facility than the smaller one, and may, in fact, "make" the navigation for her consorts when they cannot readily make it for themselves. But this is by no means all. The inevitable delicacy of torpedo-boats renders them particularly liable to slight but not insignificant damage by collision and other accidents. A "division boat" can carry appliances for the remedy of innumerable small defects either in hull or in machinery. She can also tow a more seriously injured craft; render effective help to the crew of a foundering one; serve as hospital to her division; make a lee for the protection of her little consorts; shield them, until the critical moment, from the observation of a careless enemy; cover them with her guns, and render them a thousand small offices of value, besides inspiring them generally with confidence.
So numerous are the advantages attendant upon the presence of a division-boat with the division that, in my humble opinion, a division should as seldom as possible be employed without such a leader; but circumstances will in war-time of course occasionally arise to render impracticable the combined operation of a whole division as thus constituted. For example, there may be a scarcity of vessels. This cause would, for the present, stand in the way of the formation of regular divisions in the United States and in some other countries. And it might, in certain contingencies, stand in the way of the formation of regular divisions even in those countries which are best provided both with torpedo-boats and with torpedo-gun-vessels; for it is easy to conceive that, in the event of hostilities between a very strong naval power and a comparatively weak one, the naval ports of the latter might be so carefully watched as to make it hopeless for a regular torpedo-flotilla to issue from them with any prospect of being able to deal a sudden blow. Single vessels might escape and take refuge temporarily along the coast until they saw their opportunity to strike, but they might be unable to arrange any combined attack and might be reduced to operating independently. This would deprive them of much of their value; and therefore I confidently anticipate that in the next war, wherever it may occur, means will be devised to facilitate the concentration and combined action of torpedo-boats in spite of any system of observation or actual blockade that may be established by the enemy.
Devices of this kind would not facilitate the co-operation of division-boats, save in countries which are exceptionally well provided with a network of canals of some depth; but they might, in all civilized countries, ensure the complete mobility of torpedo-boats not exceeding about fifty tons displacement.
Thus, supposing the United States to be at war with some country of superior naval power; supposing the United States to possess six torpedo-boats and no more ; supposing all those boats to be lying at New York; and supposing New York harbor, with both the Narrows and Long Island Sound, to be closely sealed up by the largest and most efficient fleet that could be collected off the coast:—supposing all this, I say, it would be by no means difficult, if proper arrangements were made, to deal by means of the torpedo-boats a very staggering blow at the blockading fleet, and, moreover, to deal it from the least expected quarter, namely from seaward.
In 1887 experiments were made in France to test the transportability of torpedo-boats by railway. The first-class torpedo-boat No. 71 was sent overland from Toulon to Cherbourg in August of that year. The special train which carried it consisted of three carriages, two freight-cars for the armament, two more freight-cars for the stores and gear, and a series of specially constructed trucks for the boat itself. The boat measures 108 feet long, 10 feet 8 inches broad and 9 feet deep, and at the time of transit weighed 38 tons. It reached Cherbourg in four days, but it did not travel by night; and so it may be assumed that had promptness been necessary it could have covered the distance of about 700 miles in forty-eight hours or less. The cost of the single experiment was, at the time, stated to be but 7000 dollars. In the total the expense of the specially built trucks was, of course, a very large item.
What could be done in France could be done with even greater facility in the United States or in England. In the case which I have imagined, the boats shut up in New York could, in a very short space of time, be transported say to Atlantic City, Cape May, New London, or Bristol, R. I., whence, having awaited a favorable chance, they might operate with deadly effect, and probably with small risk, upon the rear of the blockading fleet. The only special appliances that would be requisite would be the trucks, and at each end of the distance a short branch line of rails running from the existing track into the sea. The trucks could be built in three days; the branch lines could be laid in as many hours.
Probably no attack would have better prospects of success than one conducted in this way; for it might be made from any one of a hundred different quarters, and it would be obviously impossible for any fleet to watch all the practicable points from which the boats might be launched upon their mission. But the case which I have imagined is an extreme one. Effective blockades are growing every day more and more difficult. In August, 1888, I was with a squadron consisting of the British vessels Warspite, Iris, and Severn, which, without being observed, and with the greatest possible ease, escaped from Bantry Bay, in spite of the attempted blockade of the comparatively narrow-mouthed haven by seven battleships, seven cruisers, and six torpedo-boats. Save in the face of perfectly overwhelming outside force, a well-handled torpedo-flotilla, constituted either as a division or otherwise, should always be able to operate from a port like New York and to strike with the requisite suddenness. It would be from more open ports, or from ports with only one narrow entrance, that effective surprises, without railroad aid, would be really difficult.
And this leads me to the consideration of the three kinds of torpedo-boat attacks which seem to be permissible in the warfare of the future. These are:
A. Attacks from a base against an observing or blockading force that is close at hand.
B. Attacks against fleets or single ships cruising at sea at a distance.
C. Attacks against fleets or single ships at anchor close at hand or at a distance.
Attacks from a base against an observing or blockading force that is close at hand.—This is the form of attack in which the co-operation of the division-boat may, with the least disadvantage, be dispensed with. The approximate position and strength of the enemy are known. The superior horizon of the division-boat is therefore not required, neither is that craft likely to be so urgently needed to serve as a magazine, store-ship and refuge for the division as in the case of operations conducted from a distant base. I do not think that the number of vessels constituting the hostile force should influence the number of torpedo-boats to be employed. French tacticians have suggested that, in the attack, at least three boats should be devoted to each ironclad; but I would not use more than three boats in any attack, whether against a single ironclad or against a whole squadron. A greater number cannot easily be controlled by a single directing intelligence upon the spot; and if I had at my disposal more boats than three, I would utilize them, not in any solitary onslaught, but in a succession of attacks by divisions of two or three boats operating from different quarters at times laid down beforehand by a superior authority on shore. An attack in numbers would inevitably lead to confusion, and probably to collision and damage; for this reason I would not allow even a division of three boats to attack simultaneously en masse. The whole secret of success in torpedo warfare must lie in the wide utilization of those moral effects which are produced upon nearly all men by the unexpected, the terrible and the vague; and in order to utilize these to the greatest advantage, my boats, as well as my divisions, should go into action successively. One would be naturally tempted to select for attack the leading or the rearmost ship of the enemy. To choose the center vessels of a column would be to expose the boats to a concentrated fire from several crafts. On the other hand, the leading and rearmost ships, realizing their relatively exposed position, would be apt to be keeping a better lookout and to be more prepared than the others. On the whole, therefore, I am inclined to think that the best procedure is to adopt such tactics by way of commencement as will disorganize the enemy's preconceived ideas, and to then act as prudence and the situation may have suggested.
And here I would say one serious word which applies to all torpedo-attacks. Every contingency must be arranged and provided for beforehand. When the undertaking has once been begun the time for alteration of schemes has passed away. In presence of an enemy, torpedo-boats cannot signal to one another without danger of betraying themselves, and they must therefore be prepared to do without signaling. But this does not, of course, imply that a single cast-iron plan must be adopted and rigidly adhered to. Alterations may, without difficulty, be prearranged, and their adoption may be made to depend upon the condition of the sea, or of the light, or upon the motions of the foe. If signaling were permissible, the work would be easier; but it should not be forgotten that in the French maneuvers of 1891 Admiral Puech would not, on a certain critical occasion, have discovered the whereabouts of Admiral Dorlodot des Essarts had not the torpedo-boats of the latter's squadron been reduced to making night-signals indicative of their inability to keep the sea. Indeed, the slightest glimmer from a lantern, the striking of a match, or the weakest suspicion of flame above the top of a smokestack may so effectively render abortive all attempts at surprises that nothing of the kind must be permitted upon any pretence whatever.
A fleet engaged in blockading or watching a port may be disposed in any one of a hundred different ways, and is almost certain to be at night in a formation different from that which it maintains by day. But it would nearly always be possible to ascertain something of its habits. There will probably be an inshore squadron of light craft and cruisers, while outside will be the battleships and other heavy vessels. The quarry should of course be the heavy vessels; and the initial problem for the attack is how to avoid the cruisers. The problem solves itself if the idea of transporting the boats by railway to some unsuspected and unwatched base be made use of. If that project be impracticable, the boats must feel their way out as best they can; but those boats which are to immediately co-operate must at all hazards keep together until they have passed the inshore squadron. I mean that if only one division be employed it must not, on any excuse, separate until it is quite certain that the whole of it has got through and is available for the prearranged work. If two or three divisions be employed, each may go out independently; but the second must not start until it knows that the first has escaped, nor must the third go until the second is safe; for just as boats No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 of each division are dependent, No. 2 upon No. 1, and No. 3 upon No. 2, so are squadrons 1, 2 and 3 of the whole force. It will not be of great importance to Division No. 1 to know that Division No. 2 is out; but it will be of the highest importance to Division No. 2 to know that Division No. 1 is in a position to do its share towards preparing the way for No. 2's attack.
If the outgoing vessels be fired upon, they should not return the fire, or even hesitate in their attempt, so long as there remains the remotest possibility that they are not clearly seen and recognized. Experience shows that cruisers often fire at things which exist only in the imagination of some excitable man. I well recollect that in 1888, upon the occasion of the escape from Bantry Bay, there was a great deal of firing from the blockading force, and that we all believed that we had been observed. It appeared afterwards, however, that we had not been seen at all, and that the firing had been directed either at an imaginary target or at some of our consorts which, though not trying to escape, were making a diversion in our favor. Nor need the outgoing boats necessarily lose heart if the search-lights of their opponents be flashed right upon them. In 1888 a search-light from the Hotspur was flashed along the whole length of the escaping Severn at a distance of not more than 2 or 3 cables (for we could distinctly see the people around the projector), yet by some chance the Severn was not discovered. But of course, should there be no doubt that the attempt has been fully detected, there should be a retreat. An axiom of torpedo warfare is that, save perhaps where mere picket-boats and launches are her opponents, the torpedo-boat must avoid being attacked and being provoked to fire until she is endeavoring to use her torpedoes. And another axiom is that she must not employ torpedoes as weapons of defense against casual foes, but must reserve them for employment as weapons of offense against the main enemy. Her proper defense is evasion, and if forced to it, flight.
In addition to the position and formation of the enemy, the wind deserves the attentive consideration of the attacking commander. Approach from leeward, especially when the wind is on the beam of the ships to be attacked, seems, upon the whole, to hold out the greatest promise of success; for the smoke of the ships' guns when they open, while sufficient to obscure the boats from the ships, will not be sufficient to obscure the ships from the boats. If there be no wind, an attack is certainly best made from seaward, firstly because that is the quarter which is regarded with least suspicion; and secondly, because the boat, having attacked and discharged her torpedoes, need not lose time and incur risk while turning under fire, but may run straight past the enemy back to port. But special circumstances must regulate the interpretation of all general rules. Where the coast is bold, and the depth of water has invited the enemy to cruise close in, it may be found wise to make the attack from under cover of the shadows of the land. In such shadows, both when there is no moon and when the moon is low down over the land, a torpedo-boat can only with the utmost difficulty be detected. It was by taking advantage of the land-shadows that the boats of the Blue Squadron were able to approach the Red Squadron at anchor in Luce Bay on the morning of July 26 during the British maneuvers of 1891. I was watching for them with an excellent night-glass, but, while in the shadow, they were absolutely invisible, although they were less than half a mile away, and although the night was by no means a very dark one. I do not desire to advocate the making of the attack from any particular quarter, so much as to dwell upon the necessity for well organizing it beforehand, and upon the advisability of prefacing the real attack with one or two feints from a different direction.
On the eve of an attack the boats to be employed should test all their torpedoes both as to immersion and as to the working of the machinery. The weapons should then be freshly charged, and, finally, everything should be formally and severely inspected by a responsible and specially qualified executive-officer accompanied by an engineer-assistant. The inspection should take cognizance of officers, men, armament, engines, charts, instruments, etc., down to the smallest detail, and, the general plan of attack having been decided upon, all possible contingencies must be provided for. The main object to be attained is that, at the specified hour for the commencement of the action, all boats shall be in their prearranged position, and that each commander shall know what every other is going to do and when he is going to do it, and also what he himself has to do, and at what moment. All is to tend to the due carrying out of successive single concerted feints and attacks which have been prearranged and set down with the conciseness and accuracy of the entries in a railroad time-bill.
The chief cautions to be observed, so far as experience causes them to occur to me, are, that boats should never expose themselves longer than is absolutely necessary, and should, as quickly as possible, withdraw out of sight and rapidly shift position so as to appear next time from a new quarter. Haste and excitement must be studiously repressed by the officers, who should themselves discharge the torpedoes from distances never exceeding one cable: in returning to port after action boats must throw off the rule of secrecy and in some unmistakable manner announce their approach to their friends, signaling also whether or not they are pursued. If this precaution be not taken the returning boats will certainly be fired upon. Sir George Tryon's well-known maxim is: "In war-time, if you see a doubtful torpedo-boat, fire at her without waiting to ask questions"; and, in offering this advice, the gallant admiral is fully justified by all that has been seen of torpedo-boat work in the past. I think, however, that if returning boats made use of some very conspicuous rocket-signal, each boat having her own for that particular night only, no risk would be run by not firing at her. On the other hand, if there be the slightest doubt about the craft, she must be attacked as she comes in. Wherever it may be feasible, I should advise that boats do not return to port until daylight, and, in the meantime, take refuge in some unwatched cove or lie to where they are out of danger. It would indeed be a misfortune if boats, after having done good work outside, should come back to be sunk by their friends. But the risk is a very real one. Every recent series of maneuvers in England, France and Germany have exemplified it.
Attacks against fleets or single ships cruising at sea at a distance. In this kind of attack the division-boats may play an exceedingly important part. They can save their division from much useless wear-and-tear and exhaustion at sea, and can enable them to go fresh into action. The torpedo-boats themselves are, as has been said, not fit to attempt to keep the sea. If they do so they do it at the expense of the nerve and physique of their officers and men. But the division-boats can keep the sea without danger of this kind; and it is therefore an unfair test of the capabilities of a torpedo-flotilla to send it, as was done during the British maneuvers of 1891, to worry and attack a seagoing fleet, and to deprive it of the co-operation of torpedo-gun-vessels. It is equivalent to sending a battleship fleet to sea without cruisers.
When one talks of torpedo-attacks against ships at sea at a distance, one speaks, of course, relatively. No one dreams of attacking in this way a fleet in mid-Atlantic, or even five hundred miles from shore. But a fleet operating, for example, in the Adriatic, in the English Channel, in the Irish Sea, among the West India Islands, or within, say, 150 miles of any coast-line, would be susceptible of attack by an enemy possessed of a shore-base within range. That base need not be one prepared beforehand. Only a safe and unobtrusive haven for torpedo-boats is needed, and any retired little bay with a sufficiency of water and not too difficult an entrance will serve admirably.
From the base, having first seen her smaller consorts snugly anchored in it, the division-boat issues. If there be two division boats so much the better. They go forth alone, and at 18 or 19 knots speed. They scour the seas in search of the enemy. Having found him, they follow him a little so as to discover, if possible, his intentions, and then send or take back information to the base. If they be near a friendly coast, they telegraph the information from the next point and order a rendezvous. If they cannot telegraph, one of them must go back with the news; but as the division-boat should be able to cover about 150 miles in eight hours, and as a fleet, unless pressed, does not do much more than half the distance in the same period, the loss of time, though regrettable, is not particularly serious. Upon receiving the information the torpedo-boats make the best of their way to the rendezvous. This brings them somewhere in the neighborhood of the fleet. They pick up their division-boat and follow the quarry, taking care, however, to keep well away from his cruisers by daylight. At night an attack, arranged very much as in the case of an attack upon a blockading fleet, is made, the division boats covering their divisions as much as possible, and then standing by either to attack meddlesome cruisers or to render help to their divisions in case of need. I do not think that they should approach ironclads unnecessarily, for they are comparatively large targets, and big shells bursting in them may easily be fatal; but I think that they may advantageously interfere to harass and take off the attention of the enemy's scouts; and if one of the latter should be a little rash or unwary, there may bean opportunity of torpedoing her. Before any attack, a rendezvous for each division should of course be arranged. If there be more than one division, the two points of rendezvous should be well out of sight, but not too far distant one from the other. Once more a series of successive single concerted feints and attacks, directed according to plans as prearranged, seems to promise the best chance of success. I desire, however, to call attention to some of the relative advantages and disadvantages of attacks from ahead and attacks from astern upon a fleet under steam; since a consideration of these may influence a divisional commander in his choice of the quarter whence he will attack most seriously.
The economical steaming speed for most large ships is about ten knots. This is about the speed at which a squadron would be likely to cruise in war-time, unless it were engaged upon some pressing duty; and it is a speed which is roughly equal to 17 feet a second. The attacking speed of torpedo-boats ought to be at least 18 knots. This is a speed equal to over 30 feet a second. On a moderately dark night a torpedo-boat approaching is not much exposed to detection by the lookouts in a battleship so long as she is at a greater distance than 2000 yards. She may, of course, be prevented by cruisers and light craft from approaching even so near as that. But for the purpose in hand I will assume that she is not. The range at which, with reasonably favorable prospects, she may discharge her torpedoes at night at a moving target does not probably exceed 150 yards. It becomes, therefore, in the highest degree important to her to traverse in as brief a period as possible what I may call the Helpless Zone—the zone, I mean, in which, although she may be discovered and fired at, she cannot effectively attack in return. She will naturally traverse it most quickly if she approach from ahead on the line of the enemy's course.
In the case of vessels having the speed given above, viz. 17 feet per second for the ship, and 30 feet per second for the torpedo-boat, the times occupied by the latter in traversing the Helpless Zone of 1850 yards (5550 feet) are:
If attacking from right astern, 7 min. 7 sec.
If attacking from right ahead, 1 min. 58 sec.
Balance in favor of attack from ahead, 5 min. 9 sec.
Seeing that, so long as she remains in the Helpless Zone, a torpedo-boat is liable to be struck and damaged or sunk, without being able to do the work upon which she is employed, this possible reduction of the period of exposure deserves serious attention. What it means may be illustrated by a moment's consideration of the enormous number of projectiles which a modern vessel can launch at an opponent in the space of a single minute of time. Many a battleship of recent construction can bring to bear right ahead or right astern two heavy guns, six rapid-firing guns, and six machineguns or revolving cannon. Leaving the heavy guns aside, the rapid-firing guns could, in a minute, fire eight and the machine-guns 200 projectiles apiece. This, from such a battleship as I have in my mind, would give a total of 1240 projectiles of all sorts per minute. Surely it cannot be a matter of indifference to the commander of a torpedo-boat whether he run the gauntlet of about 2470 projectiles or of about 8750. Nor is this all. The slower the approach of the boat the greater will be the accuracy of the ship's fire; and the more prolonged the exposure, the more will that accuracy of fire increase. In addition—and this is very important—a torpedo discharged from the boat coming down ahead will near the ship much more rapidly than one discharged from a boat following astern, and will afford proportionately less opportunity to the enemy to outmaneuver it But although I would attract attention to this, I do not wish to be understood to imply that any torpedo ought to be discharged from right ahead or right astern. A torpedo discharged from right astern is liable to be deflected by the wash from the ship's propellers, and has, moreover, but a small target; and a torpedo discharged from right ahead has not only a still smaller target, but has also to contend with the ship's bow-wave, which is almost certain to deflect the weapon harmlessly astern. The proper position from which to discharge the torpedo from a boat coming from ahead seems to me to be broad on the ship's bow; and from one coming from astern, broad on the ship's beam. In each I would prefer to use broadside rather than bow-tubes; for bow-tubes, when boats are running at high speed, often act most unsatisfactorily. Many authorities advocate that an effort should be made to hit the enemy in the neighborhood of his propellers and rudder; but experience seems to show that, if you can fairly explode your torpedo anywhere against his side, you will do him all the damage that is necessary; and undoubtedly, if you aim at him amidships, you are less likely to miss him than if you aim at his counter. If you succeed in disabling him in any way, his next astern may complete your work by running him down in the confusion.
I have dwelt somewhat upon this question of the direction of the main attack because, although it is quite obvious that, at least in some respects, the attack from ahead is much less risky than the attack from astern, nearly all the attacks which I have seen made during maneuvers upon ships under way have, strange to say, been executed by boats coming up from astern. This attack will always, I suspect, be the favorite one in peace maneuvers, because for various reasons it is in peace-time the easier to attempt. It may also be the fact that vessels habitually keep a worse lookout astern than ahead. But I do not think it will be the favorite mode in actual war; for it bids fair to be too costly in men and material, owing to the relatively long exposure in the Helpless Zone. The attack from ahead against ships under way was not attempted at all during the British maneuvers of 1891. Two torpedoes only were aimed at ships under way, and both of these were discharged from boats approaching from astern; and all the threatened attacks came from the same quarter.
How to get safely out of action will be almost as difficult a problem as how to get safely in; but nothing more generally wise can be counseled than for the boat which has already swerved a point or two, in order to bring herself on to the bow or quarter of her opponent, to complete a turn of eight points, if there be a second ship in the line, and to get away as fast as she can, showing her stern to the enemy's broadside, and so affording as small a mark as possible. If, before doing so, she can discharge a second torpedo, so much the better; but when withdrawing she must not lose sight of the probability that she will encounter a cruiser or be pursued by one, and therefore, as soon as she is out of the zone of immediate danger, she should sharply alter course for the quarter which seems to promise her the greatest security. It may appear inhuman to say so, but I cannot convince myself that a torpedo-boat, having sunk her enemy, should stand by to assist the survivors. Her crew is obviously too small to resist an attempt made by numbers and desperation to seize her, and she has no accommodation for prisoners. When there is no second ship, the best course is for the torpedo-boat to maintain her original direction. Using the helm involves delay, no matter how handy the boat may be, and should, when practicable, be avoided. Not far away, the boat should be able to rejoin her division, and with it she should be comparatively safe.
Attacks against fleets or single ships at anchor close at hand or at a distance.—I regard this as the least promising mode of attacking ironclads by means of torpedo-boats, for all modern ironclads have, or may have, torpedo-nets; and vessels properly commanded and possessed of nets would not fail to get them out immediately after anchoring in war-time. It is true that Captain A.K. Wilson, of the British Navy, has invented a species of shears which, fitted to the head of the torpedo, will enable it, provided all goes favorably, to cut through some existing nets; yet it is equally true that the invention, though ingenious, has little practical value, and that nets strong enough to defeat it could be easily carried, even if it were all that it is intended to be. But certain vessels do not, and are not likely to, carry nets; and these, especially if they can be thoroughly surprised, may be attacked at anchor with good results. It may also be sometimes worth while to descend upon battleships immediately after they have anchored, in reasonable expectation of finding that they have not had time to get their nets out. As a rule, however, battleships will in war-time get their nets out and in very quickly. I know of ships in the Mediterranean which, when first commissioned, could not execute either maneuver in less than three hours, but which can now do either in ten minutes. Commanders should, therefore, turn their attention to inducing hostile men-of-war at anchor with nets out to take their nets in, and to make them also, if possible, get under way. This they may sometimes do, particularly when the vessels are lying elsewhere than under forts, by obtaining the temporary co-operation of battleships of their own. Ships in unfortified havens will remain doggedly anchored when threatened by torpedo-boats, but not when threatened by craft of their own class, and when in deference to a feint by battleships they weigh, the torpedo-boats may dash in and find their opportunity. When an attack is made, the same considerations should guide it as should guide other attacks. Surprise, efficiency of men, machinery and weapons, and concerted action, are all-important factors in the success of the undertaking; and if the attack can be delivered from the most unexpected quarter—which in this case is the direction of the shore—it will have the best chance of doing well.
It is claimed for some of the most modern "marks" of the Whitehead torpedo that, if they hit a net fairly and squarely when running at full speed, they will penetrate it. This may be so. If they explode in contact with it, they will certainly demolish great part of it, no matter how it may be boomed out, and therefore it may occasionally be worth while to organize a torpedo-attack with a view to first destroying the nets and then the ships; but this seems to me to be a risky and precarious device, and one which should not be attempted where there is a possibility that other methods may, within a reasonable time, become practicable.
So much for those forms of attack which seem to be permissible.
The attacks which, in my humble view, are not permissible are attacks by daylight, and attacks during actions wherein two fleets are engaged. Concerning the almost absolute hopelessness of success by daylight against any respectable enemy, I need, I think, say nothing; but it is necessary to say a word concerning attacks during actions wherein two fleets are engaged: firstly, because French tacticians notoriously believe them to be practicable and even advisable, and secondly, because at least one very capable British naval officer may be suspected of holding the same opinion.
The tactical unit of the French fleet consists to-day of a division commanded by a rear-admiral, and consisting of three ironclads, three cruisers, and three torpedo-boats. This unit was adopted a few years ago, and was deliberately readopted for the maneuvers of 1891. And, in his recently published book on "The Development of Navies," Captain A. Eardley Wilmot, of the British service, criticizing the battle of Lissa, says:
"One thing is wanting to complete the valuable experience gained on that day and make it applicable to the present time. No locomotive torpedoes were used, this arm as a naval weapon not having been then introduced. Whether, after the line was broken and the ships were all mixed up together, it would not have been as dangerous to friend as to foe may well be questioned; but small vessels, specially armed in this way, would have had good opportunities of gliding in under cover of the smoke, and dealing deadly blows to partially disabled ships."
The objections to the use of torpedo-boats in fleet actions are two-fold. If they be used in fleet actions, they must, of course, accompany fleets to sea; and, whenever they have hitherto done so, the inconvenience of the plan has been abundantly apparent. They cannot, in bad weather, keep up with ten-knot battleships; they are perpetually in distress, and their crews get worn out and incapable of energetic action. Lieutenant Charles C. Rogers, U.S. Navy, in his summary of and comments on the naval maneuvers of 1890 (General Information Series No. 10, Office of Naval Intelligence), says of the French operations: "The battleships and cruisers behaved well at sea, but the torpedo and dispatch-vessels were a source of anxiety. Several times the battleships were obliged to take some of them in tow. The maneuvers seemed to prove that they have not sufficient endurance. Their very powerful and complicated engines are in small and light hulls; and in continued bad weather, which occurred during the later maneuvers, the personnel gave out constantly." And in his report on the French maneuvers of 1891 (Marine Rundschau, November, 1891) Kapitan-Lieutenant von Klein, of the German Navy, remarks of the torpedo-boats: "These, which, with their superiority of speed, were intended to attack the enemy during the night, experienced trouble and discomfort in keeping up with the squadron at 10 knots. Those of A. Squadron, the ships of which steamed at 12 knots, were absolutely unable to preserve station, and had to be sent away to await better weather." This distinguished officer, in summarizing the lessons of the operations, suggests that they indicate that the proper functions of torpedo-boats are not understood in France, and that such craft should be entirely restricted to service as part of the mobile coast-defenses.
The other great objection to the employment of torpedo-boats in fleet actions has been hinted at by Captain Eardley Wilmot, and is, I am sure, a very real one. The boats would be as dangerous to friend as to foe. I have shown how, in 1890, No. 86's torpedo, intended for the Black Prince, apparently hit the Anson; and how No. 59's torpedo, intended for the Northumberland, hit No. 51; and how, in 1891, No. 42's torpedo, aimed at the Hotspur, struck the nets of the Northampton. I have shown, too, how, in both these British maneuvers, quite a number of torpedoes that had missed their mark were wandering about after almost every attack; how the same thing happened at the attack on the Blanco Encalada; and how probable it is that something similar will happen in the case of every future attack. What, then, would happen to two fleets of ironclads mixed up in a melee with two flotillas of torpedo-boats? The question seems to me to require no answer.
But there is a mission for small torpedo-boats, accompanying large ships to sea and acting from them as from a mobile base. The British torpedo depot-ship Vulcan—a comparative failure, I admit, yet the representative of a type which may easily be improved—carries six of Yarrow's 60-feet 16-knot boats, and these, dropped into a comparatively smooth sea within a reasonable distance of a hostile squadron, might, in certain circumstances, do very useful work. A land base is, however, always much superior to a floating one. It admits of larger and faster boats being employed; it gives the boats far better shelter; it involves much less wear-and-tear; and, in brief, it is above comparison with the other, which is at best a pis aller. A Vulcan, caught in daylight by a couple of fast ironclads, with her flotilla waiting around her to be hoisted inboard, would not be in an enviable position. A good land-base, containing an equal number of torpedo-boats, would be vastly safer, and could be easily rendered so strong as to be perfectly secure, unless forces were landed to co-operate against it.
The limits prescribed for this paper will not permit me to offer any remarks on the subject of the handling of fleets and large ships in presence of torpedo-boats, but there remain some general considerations to which attention may be advantageously paid.
The French and Italian Governments have adopted the principle of establishing "nests," or small military harbors for torpedo-boats, around their coasts. This seems to be an unwise proceeding. A "nest," the existence of which is perfectly well known, can be guarded against and easily attacked. An impromptu "nest," on the other hand, can be quickly created almost anywhere on a deeply indented coast; may be quite as serviceable as a permanent one; and may, for a considerable period, exist in war-time unknown to the enemy. A permanent "nest," moreover, must be in some way protected by expensive works or by mines, while an impromptu "nest" may be, for a time at least, protected by the secrecy with which it has been formed. Stores and provisions for torpedo-boats can quickly and easily be sent to any point of a civilized country by rail, and it is almost as convenient for the boats to take them on board at one place as at another. Therefore I would strongly advocate impromptu, as opposed to permanent, torpedo-boat stations. The former conduce to mobility; the latter really tend to restrict it; and it is the mobility, within, say, a distance of 200 miles of your coast-line, of your torpedo-flotilla that, more than anything else, measures its utility. With a sufficient, efficient, and completely mobile torpedo-flotilla on its coast-line, a country should be able for a long time to keep any maritime enemy at a very respectful distance. Permanent stations are well enough in peace-time; in war-time, the first step would be to abandon them in favor of impromptu ones.
It has often been debated whether or not the search-light should be employed by torpedo-boats in the attack. My experience indicates that generally it should not. Silence, darkness, secrecy—all these are, as a rule, favorable to the boats, and they cannot be, as a rule, too carefully observed. But when an approaching torpedo-boat, which has been seen and fired at, discovers that the enemy has got her range and is doing her damage, she may, I am convinced, often save herself by boldly flashing her light full in the eyes of the gunners. I saw a case in 1891 in which, after the light had been so used, the range of the boat seemed to be entirely lost. The use of searchlights, and especially of search lights as against search-lights, is a subject which has not yet been sufficiently studied. As at present advised, I would prefer to dispense with them on ordinary occasions of defense as well as attack. The glare exercises a prejudicial and varying effect upon the eyesight, at the time as well as subsequently; and, while it may make valuable revelations, it may also make dangerous betrayals.
For the numerous failures of torpedoes to hit their target, and even to run at all, I think the human element is more to blame than the mechanical. Familiarity with the weapons on the part of those who have to use them will, as training improves, reduce these failures to a minimum; and the weapons themselves have now reached so great a degree of perfection that they leave very little to be desired. I do not mean that it is impossible to conceive a better automobile torpedo than the latest mark of Whitehead, but I do mean that the Whitehead seems to have very nearly exhausted such improvements as can be made in it; and that at present, although it has some inherent and inevitable defects, it is, upon the whole, better than any other torpedo. This is, I believe, so generally recognized that I am entitled, in dealing with the torpedo-warfare of the immediate future, to assume, as I have assumed throughout, that "torpedo" and "Whitehead" are almost interchangeable terms. Inventions, based upon principles which do not resemble the principles of Mr. Whitehead, are numerous, and several of them are very full of promise, and will some day, I doubt not, come to the front. But for the next year or two, should any naval war break out, the torpedo to be used will be the Whitehead chiefly, if not exclusively, or, of course, the Woolwich or Schwarzkopf, which is essentially the same thing.
The kind of warfare which torpedoes and torpedo-boats and vessels promise to introduce to us is not perhaps a warfare of the most heroic and chivalrous nature. Torpedo-vessels will not—and as the Aconcagua affair seems to show, cannot—meet other opponents in the open day and vanquish them with powder and shot in the old-fashioned style. It will be their function to steal up in the dark and deal a blow which some may deem rather the blow of the assassin than of the hero. But these considerations must not blind us to the immense value of these little craft when properly employed. War is to-day less than ever to be made with rose water and waged in kid gloves. Chivalry has less and less place in it. Utilitarianism in war, as in almost everything else, overrides natural predilection. Nor is torpedo warfare an employment in itself unworthy of a patriot; for in it he may exhibit qualities of the very highest character, and only by devotion, steadfastness, carefulness, coolness and bravery, can he hope to gain the slightest success in it. If these few reflections of mine should help any patriot to the efficient defense of his fatherland, or if they should tend to convince any ambitious nation of the growing dangers of aggression, they will not have been set down in vain.