West Point, N. Y., September 6, 1889.
To The Secretary U.S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Md.
Sir:—Captain W. T. Sampson, in his excellent article on the Naval Defense of the Coast, published in the July issue of the Proceedings of the Naval Institute, takes occasion to depart somewhat from the strict limits of his subject, to explain why the Board on Fortifications and Other Defenses did not provide for the defense of the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound at the Race by forts. In making this excursion from the main line of his argument, the Captain has unintentionally misstated a paper read by myself before the Military Service Institution, and, in consequence of this error on his part, I am prompted to ask permission to make the proper correction.
The portion of Captain Sampson's paper to which I refer is the following: "A paper read before the United States Military Institution criticizes the 'Board on Fortifications and Other Defenses' for not defending this passage [the Race] and thus protecting all points within the Sound, including New York itself. The Board was of the opinion that an enemy could not be stopped at the Race by fortifications, and, as the Board was organized to make practical recommendations, I think it wisely placed the defenses where they were confident the enemy could be stopped [at Throgg's Neck].
"The recommendations of the Board did not present the beautiful simplicity of the plan in the paper above referred to, in which 20-inch guns are advocated for each side of the Race."
I pass by in good humor the doubtful compliment ensconced within the passage quoted, and beg simply to say, purely by way of correction, that the paper referred to did not advocate 20-inch guns for the defense of the Race. It did state that, in the judgment of the writer, the Race could be defended from the shore, and, since the publication of the paper, this has been confirmed by the statement of one of the best practical military engineers of our country, after a personal inspection of the point. A reference to page 181 of the paper as published will show that the writer considered guns of no larger caliber than 17.5 inches to have sufficient power to close the Race against anything carrying 20 inches of steel armor, or its equivalent, or less.
If the quotation means to imply that it is impracticable to mount guns as large as 20 inches caliber at important points on our coast, I am in position to answer that I have accurate information that at least one firm of gun makers (Krupp) can produce guns of this size, and so good an authority as Gen. Abbot advocates "the largest possible gun" for coast defense.
Captain Sampson makes another error in treating of this matter, to which attention should be called. He assumes that the Race can only be defended by forts from Fisher's and Gull Islands. In this he has clearly overlooked the fact that Valiant and Race Rocks stand in the interval between these islands and offer typical sites for turret forts. If these rocks be occupied, the range would be reduced to one half that given by Captain Sampson, or to such as would require a hostile vessel to run within one mile of the guns of the forts. It must be admitted that better conditions than this for land defense cannot reasonably be asked for.
It is a difficult matter to fix in a definite way what amount of defense, whether land or water, will "stop" and what will not "stop" an enemy, but it may be accepted as a fact that if this point were fortified as proposed, no ship could pass in through the Race without being exposed to fort fire at point-blank range, and to a thoroughly effective fire for some time before and after passing through the Race.
In reference to the point made that the enemy's man-of-war might make a sudden dash through the Race under cover of fog or darkness, since, on account of the swiftness of the current, torpedoes cannot be planted, it may be said in reply that the waterway leading up to the mouth of the Race might be rendered so tortuous by sunken obstructions as to effectually estop any such procedure. But, this aside, would a ship venture into such a cul-de-sac as Long Island Sound with the "choke" at Throgg's Neck and the Race held by the enemy?
It would seem, therefore, that the interior position at the Race might very well be left to the artillery, while the navy would have the more important exterior lines to look after from Montauk Point to Block Island, from Block Island to Nantucket Island, and from Nantucket Island to Cape Malabar.
Very respectfully,
E. M. Weaver, 1st Lieut. 2d Arty.
Lieutenant Weaver refers to page 181 of his paper as published to show that he did not advocate 20-inch guns for the defense of the Race. On page 180 of his paper, Vol. IX, No. 134, Journal of the Military Service Institution, he says: "Therefore for the purpose of this discussion a 20-inch gun is assumed as the standard gun for the defense of our outside line."
There are seventeen feet of water over Valiant Rock; it may be a possible but is hardly a typical site for a turret fort.
The following quotation from Abbot's "Defense of the Sea Coast of the United States" shows why floating defenses are considered necessary for the Race: "One question formerly stoutly contested has been practically answered so many times in late years that there is no longer any difference of opinion upon the subject; every one now admits that a fleet can force a passage past a line of batteries of equal or even of superior armament, provided the channel be unobstructed." R. W.
OPEN LETTER
ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONGRESS BY THE PROVIDENCE AND STONINGTON STEAMSHIP COMPANY.
Prepared by Lieut.-Commander E. H. C. Leutze, U. S. N.
Based on the Experience of the President, Captains, and Pilots of the Company.
To The American Delegates of the International Maritime Conference.
Gentlemen:—It is expected that the International Maritime Conference will adopt new rules for the prevention of collisions at sea, new regulations for lights of vessels, fog signals, etc. In the event that these international rules are suitable for our purposes, we intend to petition Congress to make the rules and regulations that govern United States vessels in United States waters the same as the international ones, as simplicity and uniformity in such rules seem to be of the utmost importance. For this reason we beg to submit to you our views on these subjects. They are based largely on personal experience and on the experience of the captains of our steamers, and we hope that they may receive due weight in your deliberations.
General Division 1.
1. Visibility, number, and position of lights to be carried by vessels.
(a) Steamers under way.—We consider the lights carried by the Sound steamers as required by Rule 7 of United States excellent in every respect. The " central range " of white lights we consider of the utmost importance, for when end on, or nearly end on, the course of an approaching vessel can be seen to within one point of the compass, and the slightest change of course is immediately detected, and all this without reference to the side lights. When vessels are crossing at right angles, or nearly so, the course cannot be told so closely, but it is then not of the same importance. For that reason the actual position of the lights need not be accurately known, as long as we are sure that the lights are not less than a certain horizontal distance apart, and that the after light is not less than a certain number of feet above the forward one. Should it become a question between the central range and side lights or double side lights, we would strongly favor the former.
If it should be decided that neither of the central range lights be visible all around, as is likely to be the case, on account of masts, smoke-stacks, etc., we would then recommend a white taffrail light in addition, the same to show over an arc of 180° from right abeam around the stern to right abeam.
We do not favor the adoption of distinctive lights for steamers of different speeds, as there seems to be no necessity for them.
We would here call attention to the fact that the captains of our vessels have had actual and constant experience with the "central range" for a number of years, and are therefore excellent judges of their value. They are unanimous and strong in their opinion that they are the best guide for judging a vessel's course or change of course.
We would also invite the Conference to investigate the matter of search lights for steamers. We are of the opinion that, when shaded with a red screen and thrown vertically, they may often be useful in determining a vessel's position in a fog. We base our opinion on this fact, viz.: This company furnishes the lighthouse keeper at Beavertail with red fire, which he burns during foggy nights about the times when our steamers are expected. The loom of this red fire is seen before the lighthouse, or when the lighthouse cannot be seen at all; it is also seen before the fog signal is heard.
(b) Steamers towing.—We think that they should be distinguished from other steamers by having the after range consist of two lights carried one above the other.
We also think that all vessels being towed should carry two white lights, one above the other near the stern, a certain number of feet above the deck, and visible all around the horizon.
It is very difficult at present to distinguish the rear vessel of a long tow (such as formed by coal barges, which tow with very long lines), and there are cases on record where vessels have run foul of the long tow lines, as the vessel astern could not be distinguished as belonging to the tow.
(c) Vessels under way but not under command.—For this purpose we consider the steam whistle sufficient. A sailing vessel could use her instrument for making fog signals for the same purpose, or the rapid ringing of the bell might be adopted. We have no views in regard to cable steamers, as we do not meet them.
(d) Sailing vessels under way.—There seems to be no reason why a sailing vessel should not carry a central range of white lights like a steamer. One of the range lights of either steamer or sailing vessel could have a distinctive feature by which one could be told from the other. Should, however, the "right of way" of sailing vessels be taken away, then there seems to be no absolute necessity for this distinctive feature.
Should the "central range" be considered objectionable, we would then strongly urge that a sailing vessel carry either a bright white light visible all around, or else a white mast-head light visible over 20 points, from right ahead to two points abaft beam on both sides, and a white taffrail light visible over 16 points from right abeam, round by the stern, to right abeam on the other side. The correct principle to start with seems to us, the smaller the vessel, the brighter the light.
It may be urged that the single white light might be mistaken for that of a vessel at anchor, but this does not seem to be any real objection, as objects to be avoided are marked in both cases.
(e) Sailing vessels towing.—Should two white lights be the distinctive mark of a steamer towing, we then think that a sailing vessel doing the same work should carry the same distinctive mark, in addition to her regular lights, if she carry no white light; or in place of the one white light, if that is adopted; or in place of the upper range light, in case that is adopted.
(f) Vessels at anchor.—They should carry a bright white light visible all around the horizon.
(g) Pilot vessels.—They should carry their regular lights (steamer or sailing vessel), and should in addition burn a flare up or flash lights at regular intervals.
(h) Fishing vessels.—As these vessels are practically at anchor, we think they should carry the lights of vessels at anchor.
We would add that the lights should be of a certain minimum power, all colored shades should be of a certain standard shade, and all lights should be subject to inspection at any moment, and a fine should be imposed if they are found dirty or wanting in any respect.
2. Sound signals; their character, number, range, and position of signals.
(a) For use in fog, mist, falling snow, and thick weather as position signals. For steamers under way.—It seems to be the consensus of the opinions of our captains, that for steamers pursuing a course, one long blast of the whistle, say of 8 seconds' duration, at intervals of 30 seconds, is the simplest and best signal that can be devised. In this connection we would recommend that some automatic machine for blowing the whistle, with blast of equal length and at regular intervals (Crosby machine, for instance), which can be instantly used by hand, would be an excellent appliance to each steamer, as at present the whistles are blown very irregularly.
We would recommend a very deep or chime whistle as one to be heard best, and would have only one for all purposes. (We must state that we have had no experience with the steam siren that is now fitted to many ocean-going steamers.) The range of the whistle should be about 10 miles in acoustically clear weather; we make this qualified statement as it is a well-known fact that, under certain conditions of the atmosphere, any fog signal, no matter what its range is, is unreliable as to distance and as to direction, and this unreliability decreases as the sound instrument increases in force.
The instrument for making the signal should be situated so that the emitted sound waves shall be as little obstructed as possible by surrounding objects, such as smoke-stacks, masts, or boats. It should be situated as high as possible, and, if practicable, it should be revolving, so as to emit sounds in all directions.
We favor one whistle only, as being less liable to confusion. If there are two whistles, they might be mistaken for separate vessels. Besides, no whistle has the same sound at all times, the difference in tone being caused by different pressure of steam or amount of water in pipes after having been unused for some time.
It is also the consensus of the opinions of our captains, that it is not necessary to have separate signals for vessels standing in opposite directions in narrow channels.
They think it might be well for sea-going vessels to have a code by which one of 8 points (cardinal and quadrantal points) can be signaled, and that, if such code is devised, the vessel signaling such a point should be obliged to steer that course. In no case should any signal be introduced into this course, which may be adopted as helm signal or any other purpose.
For steamers towing.—Steamers towing should have a distinctive signal. We would recommend one long and two short blasts of the whistle. This signal should not signify anything else. We would also recommend that the rear vessel of each tow should make the same distinctive signal with her horn as the towing steamer makes with her whistle.
For sailing vessels under way.—We are of the opinion that a sailing vessel should be obliged to carry a powerful horn, which is to be blown by mechanical means. The least amount of power should be fixed by law, and all horns should be inspected and stamped by the inspectors.
We are also of the opinion that the present fog signal indicating the tack a sailing vessel is on, is of no value. During light winds it is almost impossible, on board of a fast steamer, to judge the direction of the wind correctly. The rule also requires too much thought for a matter which has generally to be decided at a moment's notice.
We think that they should make the same signals with the horn that a steamer would make with her whistle.
Sailing vessels towing.—They also should make the same signal with the horn that the steamer makes with her whistle.
We would here state that we are aware that a more complete code of signals could be devised which would often be convenient, but it would be at the cost of simplicity, and that, as before stated, we consider of the greatest importance.
For vessels at anchor.—The present rapid ringing of the bell seems to be a good signal; the minimum size and tone of the bells should, however, be established by law.
If it should be desirable, we see no objection to substituting a powerful gong for the bell.
Vessels under way, but not under command, including steamers laying cables.—As they are on a par with a vessel at anchor, the same signal would seem to suffice. A steamer could indicate this condition by a continuous blast of the whistle.
(b) For use in all weathers as helm signals only.
For steamers meeting and crossing.—We consider the present pilot rules for United States waters good. One short, decisive, blast of the whistle should mean, "I am directing my course to starboard," and two short, decisive blasts, "I am directing my course to port." It is of great importance that these signals should not be used for any other purpose, and should not be included in any code of signals devised to denote a vessel's course during thick weather.
Vessels before turning a sharp curve in a channel where an approaching vessel might be hidden from view should sound a long blast of the whistle at least half a mile before reaching such a curve.
For steamer overtaking.—We do not consider the present arrangement in the United States rules good. In this case, the steamer being overtaken has to answer the same signal which she hears, and would then not be able to steer as she indicates by whistle. For instance, if the overtaking steamer gives one blast of the whistle, she means, "I am directing my course to starboard"; the vessel being overtaken now answers one whistle, which in this case would mean, "I understand; I will let you pass, and, if necessary, direct my course to port." We would suggest that some signal be adopted for these cases, which would mean "I understand," and which should be immediately followed by the whistle, indicating which way the helm is put or which way the ship's head is altered.
For steamers backing.—Three short, decisive, blasts of the whistle should signify, "I am stopped," and should include, "I am backing."
It seems to us that this signal deserves careful consideration; it should be specially stated if "I have stopped" or "I am backing" should refer to the vessel or to the engine.
(c) Whether the helm signals shall be made compulsory or remain optional.
We are strongly of the opinion that they should be compulsory in all conditions of the atmosphere, i.e., whether vessels are in sight of each other or not.
3. Steering Rules:
(a) Sailing vessels meeting, crossing, overtaken or being overtaken by each Other.
(b) Steamers meeting, crossing, overtaken or being overtaken by each other.
We consider that the present rules for steamers are excellent and simple, and would recommend them to remain as they are, but their wording should be freed from all ambiguity. Those for sailing vessels are complicated, and though we have little or nothing to do with the management of sailing vessels, we see no reason why the present steamer rules should not be adopted for their use. It would be a great advantage to have the same rules for both, so that officers or pilots who might go from one class of vessels to the other would have no confusion in their minds.
(c) Sailing vessels meeting, crossing, overtaking or being overtaken by steamers.
(d) Steamers meeting, crossing, overtaking or being overtaken by sailing vessels.
It is a mooted question whether sailing vessels shall continue to have the right of way, or only at certain times, or not at all. It is certainly as easy for them to give way as it is for a long tow, and also as easy for a schooner, for instance, to maneuver as for a large steamer. In a narrow channel a long steamer can often not steer, when a sailing vessel could tack easily. We would invite the serious consideration on this most important matter by the Conference, and, on the whole, would throw our influence in the direction of not giving the sailing vessel the right of way, and specially not in narrow channels.
In this connection we would also invite the attention of the Conference to steamers towing ahead of long tows through narrow channels with smooth water. Hell Gate for instance. Such tows are not manageable, and our steamers have to give way at imminent risk to themselves. We would recommend that in such waters vessels be obliged to tow alongside.
(e) Special rules for channels and tide-ways where no local rules exist.—It would be best to frame the rules so that special rules should not be necessary, unless it is also necessary to take a local pilot.
(f) Conflict of international and local rules,—The international rules and local rules should be the same.
(g) Uniform system of commands to the helm.—Uniform commands to the helm should be adopted, by all means. The first step towards accomplishing this would be to have the steering wheels of all vessels constructed so as to turn in the same way to produce same change in direction of course. The wheels of our steamers turn in the opposite direction from those of sea-going vessels. Helmsmen going from one class of vessel to another, though taught the difference, are apt to become confused at critical moments.
We would venture to suggest that, at the present day, there seems to be no reason why the word of command should not be the same, as both the ship's head and wheel are to go. For instance, the word "Starboard" should mean put the wheel over to starboard, to make the ship's head go to starboard. This seems to be the most logical, and there seems to be only one great objection, and that is, that the present generation of seamen will have to unlearn the habit of a lifetime. And this objection always exists to any change from old to new.
We would also call your attention to the difference in the compass card of different nations. For instance, the French and English compass are different; for instance, NE¼E in English has a very different meaning from NE¼E in French, the latter meaning NE by E in English. This we think should be changed.
(h) Speed of vessels in thick weather.—We think that "fast" speed is the best in thick weather in open water, provided that vessels will stop or slow immediately on hearing another vessel's fog signal, and will remain so until danger of collision is past.
We give the following reasons: The vessel is less liable to be drifted by currents and tides, therefore more sure of her position, and less apt to drift into the course of a vessel coming from an opposite direction, where vessels follow regular lanes. She will get through a fog bank more quickly, and thus lessen time in which she is liable to collision. She will be under better command of helm. The minimum speed at which large steamers are under control is so great that the effect of collisions is nearly as disastrous as at full speed. When going at a slow speed, a good head of steam must be kept to give an effective back-turn of the engine, and this frequently causes the blowing off of steam, which (unless vessels are fitted with mufflers) will prevent other vessels' signals from being heard.
The fast speed is also most in accordance with the wishes of the public. A steamship line that would habitually deliver passengers, mails, and freight later than any competing line, from no matter what cause, would probably lose the greater part of its business.
In narrow channels we would recommend that vessels should go slow or anchor.
General Division 2.
(c) Discipline of crew.—We would here suggest that it be made obligatory for all vessels to carry a bow lookout.
General Division 6.
(a) Uniform system of examination for the different grades.—We are of the opinion that it would be a safeguard against loss of life, etc., if the captains, pilots, and engineers of pleasure boats, yachts, steam, and naphtha launches were required to have certificates of efficiency.
General Division 11.
Under this general division we would call the attention of the Conference to the present indiscriminate use of electric lights on wharves, bridges, in cities and parks. We would strongly urge that some measures be taken that any such lights which may interfere with the navigation of adjacent waters be shaded towards such waters.
At present they blind the pilots, interfere with range lights, and mislead greatly in judging distances.
The electric lights on the Brooklyn Bridge are a constant source of danger to our steamers. Underneath the bridge it looks like a black wall to the pilots, who are blinded from the glare above, and they cannot distinguish anything. In fact, these lights have about the same effect that the high electric lights at Hell Gate had. That these were a failure was conceded by the U. S. Lighthouse Board, which had these lights and tower removed.
In conclusion we would state that in framing the new rules all ambiguity in wording them should be carefully avoided. We would also again call attention that simplicity in all rules is of the utmost necessity. They have to be applied at a moment's notice by men of different grades of intelligence, and they should be able to do so without consulting printed regulations or without having to search in their minds for a proper solution. With this view we have refrained from recommending more elaborate systems of lights, fog signals, or code of course and steering signals. Respectfully,
(Signed) J. W. Miller, President P. & S.S. Co.
THE BOMBARDMENT OF UNFORTIFIED, UNRESISTING CITIES.
[Reprinted from the United Services Gazette.]
The capture of the Scotch and the bombardment of the English ports, described in our issue of the 31st ult., has again opened up the question whether, in time of war, an unfortified, unresisting city may be bombarded. As the views expressed on this point which have already appeared have been rather contradictory, we refer our readers to an essay by Captain \V. T. Sampson, U. S. N., on this topic. He says:
“Those writers on international law who mention the subject lay it down as an acknowledged rule that an unresisting city may not be bombarded. In this matter it is certain that a broad distinction exists, which has not been recognized by writers upon this subject, between the bombardment by an army and a bombardment by a naval force. In the case of an advancing army, it appears most reasonable that it should not bombard a city which offers no resistance, for the army has only to take possession. To bombard under such circumstances would be not only useless, but inhuman: all right-minded people justly condemn it.
“The case is quite different, however, when it is a question of the bombardment of an unresisting city by a naval force; it being understood that resistance would be offered if the naval force should land to take possession. The naval force has the power, as had the army, to inflict injury upon the city, and compel compliance with its demands, but in a different way; and this difference in the form of the force involves a modification of the international rule when applied to bombardment by a naval force.”
Upon this point Calvo, a French authority on the law of nations, says: “In no case, under no pretext, is it permitted to bombard an open unfortified city which is not defended by military. To act against such places as the necessities of war authorize to be done against fortresses is to violate all the laws of nations, and to place one’s self outside the law of those nations which march at the head of civilization.”
“Among the modern cases of this kind which have most awakened public attention may be cited the bombardment of Valparaiso in 1866 by the Spanish squadron, under the command of Admiral Mendez Nunez, which constitutes a deplorable precedent of the application of force as a means of resolving an international question.”
“Further upon this subject the same author cites several cases where the attack upon fortified cities was directed upon the fortifications and other defenses, and not upon the city itself, and commends this mode of proceeding as causing less bloodshed. This is, however, questionable and in strong contrast to the business methods inaugurated by Farragut, who passed the fortifications and brought the cities directly under the guns of his fleet. In these cases it cannot be said that the bloodshed was increased.”
“The manoeuvres of the British fleet during the summer of 1888 led to a very animated discussion, both in the press and in Parliament, upon the question of bombarding undefended cities. All naval and military authorities agreed that it was a kind of warfare likely to ensue in case of hostilities, and that it should be prepared for ; while others declared that the rules of civilized warfare forbade such bombardment, and some even went so far as to declare such cities as Greenock would require no defenses, that they would not be molested by any probable enemy. Unfortunately, it cannot be assumed that such opinions were not, to some extent at least, biased by political views. Those in England who think that the navy should be increased took one view, while those opposed to any material increase in the naval force, whether from economical reasons or from opposition to the Government, were led to adopt the view that would require the least preparations for defense.”
“One English authority on international law quotes the rules laid down by the military delegates of all European states to the Brussels Conference in 1874, and says that, with the necessary changes in wording, these rules apply to the operations of naval forces against places on land.”
The rules that interest us at this time are as follows:
“Art. 15.—Fortified places are alone liable to be besieged. Towns, agglomerations of houses, or villages, which are open or undefended, cannot be attacked or bombarded.”
“Art. 16.—But if a town, etc., be defended, the commander of the attacking forces should, before commencing a bombardment, and except in the case of a surprise, do all in his power to warn the authorities.”
“As before explained, the rule laid down in Art. 15 is for land forces, and requires material modification before it can be made applicable to a naval force. It is more than likely that the commanding officers will receive specific instructions covering all doubtful cases. The Spanish admiral was so instructed in the case of Valparaiso.”
“A city may be defended by armed men only, and consequently be totally unprepared to resist a naval attack; or it may even be fortified to prevent the approach and landing of a naval force, and yet be exposed to destruction by bombardment. No restriction can be placed upon a naval force in either case to prevent bombardment. If such a city refuses to comply with any reasonable—even though exorbitant—demands made upon it, it lays itself liable to bombardment by an enemy having the power to inflict such punishment. On the other hand, it may be safely stated, as a rule, that a naval force intending to bombard a city must give ample warning of its intention, and, if anticipating the approach of succor, must abandon its intention rather than attack without such warning as will permit the escape of women and children. Even should the object of the bombardment be to destroy military or naval depots, it cannot be done without warning, if the lives of non-combatants would be endangered thereby. A notification of intention to bombard should be given only when the naval force is present. It should not be considered proper warning should an enemy telegraph along the coast or to any particular city that it would be bombarded on a specified date.”
“Many rules of international law are deliberately violated when it appears to advance the interests of the violator, and there is the necessary power to brave the consequences. It is for this reason that the protection offered by many of the wise and humane rules of international usage are not to be relied upon.
“But this rule, that a city shall not be bombarded without due notice which will permit women and children to be removed beyond possible injury, is a rule no civilized nation would venture to disregard.”
“During the manoeuvres of the British squadron in 1888, the Irish squadron eluded the blockade of their English enemies, and engaged in a raid upon the English coast, bombarding Greenock, Liverpool, and other unprotected cities. Greenock harbor was entered by a single vessel one Sunday morning and bombarded immediately, without any communication with the shore, and while the people were at divine service. This does not represent actual warfare, because no commander would bombard an open city without first making a demand for a ransom or the fulfilment of any conditions he might see fit to impose. No impossible demand should be made, with the alternative of bombardment in case of refusal. Reasonable time must be granted for a reply, and, in case of refusal, further delay must be granted to permit non-combatants to leave the city. A large sum of money, for example, cannot be produced at a moment’s notice, and such transactions must be conducted upon a strictly cash basis. The citizens would doubtless request a modification of the demands, all of which negotiations would require time. This could not be refused by the commander, except in cases of extreme necessity involving the safety of his ship, and even then he would have to face the execrations of the whole world for his inhumanity. In any case, more time would be consumed than ten hours, which was permitted by the English rules.”
“We shall see that this has a very important bearing upon the naval defense of a city. The time element that the rule involves furnishes a great advantage to the defenders. The modern practice regarding bombardment of unfortified cities, as in the case of Valparaiso, is directly opposed to the international rule against it. At the same time, the popular conviction of what would take place in event of a foreign war is in harmony with the views expressed above.”
“If further argument was necessary to show that an unfortified city may be bombarded by a naval force, it may be found in the statement that if bombardment is not permitted under such circumstances, then complete protection is to be had by non-resistance. An unfortified city that offers no resistance to a naval force would be exempt from molestation, because the naval force, when landed, would be too insignificant to contend with the land force that would then be developed to oppose it. When a fleet has made a demand for a ransom upon a fortified city and the ransom has been refused, the fleet cannot be expected to abandon its position of advantage, its power as a fleet, and land its men and attempt to take by a landing party what was refused to the fleet. If such a construction could be put upon the general rule that unfortified cities may not be bombarded, then it would become absurd, and in coast defense naval supremacy would have no significance.”
In examining the different accounts of the raids carried out by the ships of A and B fleets during the late naval manoeuvres, we cannot fail to see that, judged by the opinions given above, the performance of the raiding vessels, as regards the time taken, was different from what would be expected in actual warfare.
Blit enough was done to show that—
1. Unfortified, unresisting cities must expect to be bombarded unless they cash up pretty sharp.
2. The telegraph system failed to give warning in time for the defending force to send succor.
3. Floating defenses, unless very powerful, are of no account.
4. Our military defenses at such places as Aberdeen and other coast towns require strengthening considerably. It is very evident, if we had to fight active and energetic enemies, that, long before their fleet could be destroyed, these military defenses would be brought into play.
5. The torpedo-boats have to score another failure in their powers of offense.
The advantage in speed and size our powerful new battle-ships will have if acting against slightly fortified towns was illustrated by the feats accomplished by the Anson, who distanced all pursuers and always turned up where least expected.
TORPEDO-BOATS FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
[Reprinted from the United Services Gazette.]
An interesting and very successful trial was on Saturday last made of two of the second-class and one of the first-class torpedo-boats now being built by Messrs. Yarrow & Co., of Poplar. We were much struck by the general handiness, and observed many marked improvements on all previous types.
The firm have on the point of completion ten of the second-class boats for the Admiralty. These are modifications of “No. 50,” which was constructed two years ago, and which was also the result of competitive designs submitted to the Admiralty authorities. They are 60 feet in length by 9 feet 3 inches beam, which secures them very fine seagoing qualities. These boats have a guaranteed speed of 16 knots during a run of two hours, carrying four tons. They may be considered as the standard type of second-class boat to be adopted in future in the British Navy. They are to serve as tenders to our large ironclads, and not only to be used as torpedo-boats, but also for the general service of the ships to which they are attached. The lifting weight averages about twelve tons. They are entirely decked from end to end, which is essential to ensure thorough seagoing qualities; the machinery, of the triple expansion type, is capable of indicating about 200 horse-power. There are small cabins both forward and aft, but in a boat of this size much accommodation cannot be expected. As previously stated, this order was given to Messrs. Yarrow & Co. in consideration of the success of “No. 50,” built by them, which has been considered, from actual service, to be a great improvement on the old-fashioned long and narrow second-class torpedo-boats which were previously adopted in the service. As a matter of fact, the present boats, with their far greater beam, actually have a speed of fully half a knot more than those that were formerly constructed, and which were really not safe at sea in rough weather. These second-class boats are built throughout of steel, which is the only material at all suitable for craft of this description, as a wooden 'structure, if decked in completely, which is essential to make it thoroughly seaworthy, would deteriorate rapidly in consequence of the heat radiated from the boiler.
Last year proposals were invited by the Admiralty authorities for six first- class torpedo-boats, which it was intended to add to the navy during the present year. The designs submitted by Messrs. Yarrow & Co. were those to which preference was given, partly in consequence of their guaranteeing a higher speed than any other firm. These boats are, as regards all leading particulars, similar to “ No. 79,” a sample boat, constructed three years since by the above firm, and which gave specially good results, on account of her excellent speed, combined with exceptional manoeuvring powers. The official trial of “No. 79 ” was fully reported in the press at the time it took place. As is well known, she has become the favorite torpedo-boat in Her Majesty’s Navy, and it will be remembered by our readers that this one was selected to be placed under the command of Prince George of Wales during the naval review and recent manoeuvres.
The new boats, which embody all the latest improvements, are 130 feet in length by 13 feet 6 inches beam. They are constructed of galvanized steel, and propelled by triple expansion engines indicating about 1150 horse-power. All six boats have now been tested officially by the Admiralty authorities, the trial speed consisting of a run of three hours’ duration, without stoppage of any kind, carrying a load of 20 tons; and the speeds attained have varied from 22½ to 23 knots, the actual speeds being 22.53, 22.57, 22.64, 22.62, 22.59, 23.03, from which it will be seen how remarkably alike the results in all the boats have proved to be.
In comparing these boats with those constructed during the last Russian scare, four years since, it will be of interest to note that the former ones were stipulated, by the authorities then in power, to have a speed of nineteen knots during two hours, carrying a load of ten tons, whilst the present boats actually give from three and one-half to four knots more during a run of three hours, with ten tons greater load. These results represent the rapid advance which has been made in torpedo-boat construction in this country during the last three years. The trials of these boats show that an equal advance has been made as regards steering efficiency and rapidity of manoeuvring, which is of almost equal importance to speed.
The forward part of the boat, extending from the bow to the conning tower, is devoted to the accommodation of the crew, and immediately aft of this compartment is a small space containing galley, electric-light plant, and stores. Aft of this is placed the boiler, which is of the locomotive type, but of exceptional size and power, so as to avoid any straining, which recent experience, both in the British and foreign navies, has shown to be so detrimental to the durability and reliability of the boiler, to enable steam to be maintained by comparatively untrained men. We believe that a locomotive boiler, if properly designed and constructed of the best materials and workmanship, should be a thoroughly reliable, and probably the most advantageous steam generator, and in all those torpedo-boats constructed by Messrs. Yarrow & Co., there has never, as far as we are aware, occurred any accident, although hundreds of these vessels are now afloat and in constant service. The great secret of construction to make a boiler reliable seems to be to design it so that the various parts can accommodate themselves, without strain, to meet the changes of form due to expansion and contraction, owing to variations in the rate of combustion and of pressure. If this main principle is kept always in view in the design, we are fully confident that there should be none of the troubles frequently experienced in working boilers under forced draft, which is mainly due to the rigidity of their construction; and under those circumstances, when any part requires to change its form, however small, owing to the expansion and contraction due to changes of temperature, an overwhelming force is involved, and something must in consequence give way. Another special feature in these new boats, and one of great importance to fighting ships, is the adoption of Yarrow’s system of enclosing the furnace, or fire-box, of the boiler in a complete water-tight casing. In this system all the air which is required for the purpose of combustion has to pass over the casing and then downward to the furnace. The effect of this is to prevent the extinction of the fire, should a sudden inrush of water find its way into the stokehole or boiler compartment.
The importance of securing immunity from this will be self-evident when the probability of damage to the thin steel plates of the hull through shot or collision is borne in mind. It has been found that when the boiler compartment is filled with water the steaming power of the boat is sufficiently maintained to enable it to run fully fifty miles without a fireman entering the stokehole. Aft of the boiler compartment is-the engine room, in which are placed triple expansion engines capable of indicating about 1150 horse-power. Within the engine room, in addition to the propelling machinery, there are two engines for compressing air for the use of the torpedoes; an engine for driving the ventilator, which forces the air under pressure to the furnaces; also an engine for producing a current of water through the surface condenser, and an engine for steering the boat. Further aft we come to a cabin compartment, in which is supplied sleeping accommodations for two engineers ; also the magazine for the supply of ammunition for the machine guns. Aft of this we come to a neatly fitted up cabin for the officers, and further aft a pantry for the officers’ use. The armament consists of one torpedo-gun for direct ahead fire, placed forward below the turtle deck and secured into the stem of the boat. Near the stern is provided a turntable, on which are placed two torpedo-guns for side fire. These two guns are placed at an angle of five degrees with one another, arranged on Yarrow’s patent system; by which means, if the two torpedoes are fired simultaneously, by taking slightly divergent courses, they cover a much larger area, and consequently ensure much more certainty of hitting the vessel aimed at, on the same principle that in firing at a bird on the wing a number of small shots are adopted, which disperse, in preference to firing one shot only. This system of arranging the torpedo-guns is now becoming largely adopted, especially for side fire, where the difficulty of accurate aim is enhanced. The machine-gun armament consists of three 3-pounder quick-firing guns, one amidships and one on each beam, in echelon. Steering gear is fitted at two points, one within the conning tower (which would mainly be used in time of war) and aft, in front of which a movable brass shield is placed for the protection of the steersman.
As regards the manoeuvring power of these boats, it may be mentioned that they can turn to port or starboard within a circle the radius of which is only a trifle in excess of the length of the boat, and this result is obtained by means of only one rudder of the simplest construction. The times occupied in turning circles when running at full speed averaged seventy-five seconds. The rudder is designed in such a manner that when hard over it counteracts the natural heel of the boat, thus maintaining a steady platform, and avoiding at the same time the risk of capsizing, to which torpedo-boats, both in the French and Danish navies, have lately shown themselves liable. The trials of these boats took place below Gravesend, and the above speeds were obtained during runs over the measured mile at Lower Hope, at intervals determined by the Admiralty authorities during the run of three hours, and therefore represent the mean speed of the three hours’ run. There is one point in the construction of these boats which should be noted, viz., the bulkheads are throughout intact, there being no opening or door of any kind in them, and which experience has shown to be so often open at the very time when the subdivision of the hull is most needed.
In addition to sixteeen boats which Messrs. Yarrow & Co. are now on the point of completing for the British Government, they have also in hand fourteen for foreign governments.
CAST-IRON MORTAR.
[Reprinted from the Army and Navy Register.]
The 12-inch cast-iron mortar, which was submitted to the Ordnance Department by Wm. P. Hunt, Esq., of Boston, for testing under the terms of the act of Congress of last winter, has gone to pieces at Sandy Hook, and it is possible that we may hear no more of cast iron as a material for heavy ordnance in this country. The mortar broke up on the twentieth round with a charge of only 55 pounds of powder. It had been fired round for round, under the same conditions as the steel-hooped mortar, which has been fired over 200 times, and the record of the pressure gauges on the exploding charge were not excessive, being less than 30,000. The mortar burst on the 3d inst., Mr. Hunt being present at the time.