The late controversy between distinguished officers of the service has given the naval question great prominence in France. This interest is, besides, increased by the disquieting rumors incessantly arising in Europe. Should war be declared to-morrow, our fleet, say many officers, would be ready to cope with that of any nation; while others, less sanguine, pretend that our materiel is not in keeping with the kind of naval warfare likely to be waged now-a-days, and even say that many ships in our ports could only be gotten ready after long delays. We have here to deal with such a complicated subject that we can easily conceive of a diversity of opinion among the officers, and even in the mind of the Board of Admiralty. The problem, we say, is complex. Naval operations differ entirely from army operations. We are reduced to conjectures in regard to future events, for no fixed theory has so far been established by experience. There is no naval war that could enlighten us by its examples. The battle of Lissa is far too obsolete. China, whom we had to chastise lately, can in no manner be compared either to England, Germany, or Italy; nor does the Turco-Russian conflict disclose any instructive past in sea matters; and to seek in the struggle between Chili and Peru for any useful hints, in view of a European war, is out of the question.
What is then more natural than to find adherents to several adverse theories, and all equally convinced?
We regret to state that we do not think our materiel is up to the requirements of the wars of the future. Besides, the number of powerful ships ready, in a single day, to fall into line is too small, and, owing to the complicated nature of our armored vessels, at the moment of putting out to sea some sudden hitch is bound to occur to cause delay. It is not making too bold an assertion to say that no vessel is ready that has not been in commission for some time. The most regrettable part of it is that no effort is made to find a remedy and enter upon a new course. For the very reason that doubt assails the minds of many concerning the type of ship to be adopted, experiments should be multiplied in seeking a solution of the problem.
What do we possess to-day in the shape of fighting elements? Armored battle-ships? Italy has built colossal ones, and so has England for that matter. Guided by better counsel, we refrained from following the latter nations in their progressive tendencies; nevertheless, we have enormous masses, weighted down with all the modern machinery, all the modern improvements. Do these excessively large and costly vessels really possess advantages so very numerous as to justify their existence?
More or less invulnerable at their water-lines, are they not liable to be hit below by a ram or torpedo, the same as any ordinary cruiser? And will not the same agent equally send to the bottom two vessels, of which one may be ten times more important and expensive than the other? These ponderous ships, intended to crush the enemy's fleet, will find themselves confronted with terrible foes. Since a single blow from ram or torpedo will suffice to cause their total destruction, may not that blow be struck in battle without any possibility of averting it? I will venture further and ask. Will it not be a mere stroke of luck, good or bad, according to circumstances, that will permit the adversary to strike a mortal blow? Will not the unexpected have a large share in the struggle between two otherwise equal naval forces, and will not that terrible hazard, acting as an ominous menace to the destruction of these powerful units we rely upon now-a-days, be the cause of an irremediable disaster?
What, then, will be the nature of the struggle between two opposing squadrons? When two hostile fleets bent on fighting confront each other, in most cases the engagement will be a hand-to-hand combat. Ships of the latest designs are generally armed with powerful bow-chasers; all will find an advantage in bearing down upon the enemy end-on, in order not only to present the least surface target to his fire, but also to protect their water-lines against the dangerous effects of his projectiles.
In fact, a shot directed against the bow can only hit the armor in a point of the receding line of the ram at an angle such that very often it will glance off, or at any rate its penetration will be greatly lessened. Hence two squadrons standing within firing distance will rush upon one another with a speed that, as is now generally admitted, would be equal to twelve miles an hour, or twelve meters per second. This will be indeed a momentous hour when two powerful hosts, within a mile apart, are about to close in a death struggle.
Suppose one vessel wishes to elude another's attack, what will her captain do? Will he put about while he has just yet time to perform his turning maneuver? Certainly not; for he would thus expose his broadside, at a fair firing distance, to the enemy, and by running away, uncover his rudder and screw, for a more or less brief space, to be finally forced once more to present his broadside in order to escape from this the worst of all situations. On the other hand, he will not steer a course perpendicular to the first; his enemy would equally possess the best advantage in bearing down upon him. He will then simply sheer off to elude the enemy, and will, for instance, alter his course 20° to the right. But by this maneuver he will still place himself at a great disadvantage, the enemy always presenting his bow and having a larger target for his fire. Besides, he would be exposing himself to a ramming attack. Neither commander will, therefore, deviate much from his course; and at the moment of the shock, each watching keenly the vessel before him, will aim principally at ramming, sheering neither to port nor starboard for fear of placing himself at a disadvantage, and will rush upon one another like two mad bulls. In most cases the ram will not be able to cut into the receding forms of the bow; there will be only a dislocation, causing a more or less serious leak, and the two masses will rush past each other in opposite directions with a grating, crashing noise, leveling everything outstanding in their mad progress. Guns run out, projecting sponsons, everything may be torn away, stove in, smashed. I do not mention the Bullivant nettings; the ship that should happen to have them set would have her screw fouled or bent, with, however, an equal chance of disabling the enemy in the same way; but it is not a safe game to indulge in. After steaming along and past each other in a few short but awful minutes, the adversaries will endeavor to turn rapidly and attempt to strike the foe before the latter has had time to complete his evolution, and the combat will present a series of passes in which the ram, the artillery, the torpedo, and the torpedo-boat will play combined parts. After a few moments the battle will become a general melee; several vessels will meet with mishaps, they will lose their speed, and combined action will be out of question. Vessels still uninjured will keep their speed, and will meet here a friend, there a foe, perhaps in less than a minute's interval. The greatest coolness and determination and a quick eye will be necessary on the part of commanders; the least hesitation would prove fatal in the midst of the menacing rams. Many a cannon shot, many a launched torpedo will miss its mark and strike a friend.
The struggle will be indeed terrible, but it will be short. The ram alone, if brought into play, would make quick work of the whole affair. At the end of an hour, in less time perhaps, how many wrecks, what an immense havoc! What will there be left of so many millions of accumulated treasure, of hundreds of brave men?
Which of the two squadrons will come out victorious in the contest? Will it be the one that possesses the better commanders, the better gunners, the better ships? Its chances would be great indeed, but, on the other hand, what a vast field is left to hazard! Here we see an armored battle-ship, with her machinery disabled from the effects of a torpedo fired by her consort; there, on the contrary, a luckier one, in the thickness of the blinding smoke, finds herself unexpectedly in the most favorable position for ramming a foe, maneuvering with perfect ease, yet obliged to sheer off to elude the attack of a first adversary; another has her steam gear disabled at the moment when her helm is hard down, and before her commander, irresolute in the conning tower, has time to realize the extent of the mischief, before the order to rig another tiller-rope is given and executed, two minutes elapse, and he is about to collide with a friend, or is in a critical situation before an enemy's ram. On board another vessel, the captain and executive officer have both been killed by the same shot, how many irreparable incidents may take place before the third officer or else the nearest one at hand has had time to assume command. Woe to the ship that remains for a moment without answering her helm!
Would it not be advisable to leave less to hazard and adopt smaller tactical units, which, being of course exposed to the same dangers would be equally fated to perish, but would in their destruction involve only the loss of a few men and a little treasure, instead of carrying down to the bottom five millions of dollars, a crew of eight hundred men, and a staff of twenty officers? Is it not an undeniable fact that, if it is necessary to leave a share to chance, that share should be made as small as possible? Since we cannot ward off entirely these disastrous blows of fate, is it not natural that we should try our best to lessen their consequences, and how can this be better done than by that division into small fighting units that we advocate? When we reflect that the finest ships in our fleet might be lost on the single throw of the dice, so to speak, it may be pertinent to inquire if it would not be wise to adopt some other means of action, as part compensation, at least, for such an immense loss. And all this is no idle supposition; whoever has witnessed a squadron maneuvering knows what constant vigilance is necessary. An accident to the engine or to the helm, the misunderstanding of a signal, may occasion the loss of two vessels, even in a smooth sea and whilst going under easy steam; think, then, of the enormous increase of the difficulties on that momentous day that is to decide the supremacy of the sea, when the thick smoke arising at each discharge of a heavy gun, the deafening din of the artillery, will be a constant obstacle to seeing and hearing. How many signal-quartermasters will be disabled? How many others, in the midst of the fusillade, and the bursting of shells from revolver-guns over deck and bridge, will lose their usual coolness and commit blunders which the officer entrusted with that special duty will not be always able to remedy. And to show what a delicate and dangerous maneuver, crossing the lines while advancing to an end-on attack is, even with friendly squadrons, in the finest weather, and with increased intervals, this evolution, one of the best as affording commanders practice of the eye (coup d’oiel), is rarely attempted in our Navy.
What will then happen on the day when not six, but twenty-five and even thirty armored battle-ships confront each other in deadly strife? What a contrast between the timid evolutions in time of peace, and the bold, decisive movements executed in action! I do not mention night attacks; for hazard then would not only be an important agent, but a preponderant factor, and an action at close quarters is not to be thought of under such conditions.
It must be confessed that what I have just described refers more particularly to a hand-to-hand combat, a melee between two squadrons. If the latter fought at a distance, with artillery alone, the share of the unexpected would be greatly diminished. But once more, will the battles of the future begin by the combatants presenting their broadsides to each other, when those sides are the most vulnerable points, when a lucky shot may wreck the engine, and a target four times as large is offered? I do not think so, and I am not the only one, else armored ships would not have been provided with rams, neither would such ingenious precautions have been taken in arming them so formidably with bow-chasers, or supplying them with torpedo-tubes, it being admitted that the Whitehead should be fired off only within a distance of four hundred meters. Besides, in order to join battle in the above fashion, customary in former times with sailing vessels, but contrary to the tactics of the present time, it would be necessary for the combatants to be of the same opinion. If one squadron bears down upon another, the latter will unhesitatingly do the same, unless he be sure of possessing superior speed; and particular considerations, such, for instance, as unquestionable weight of metal, deter him from engaging at close quarters. But we must reckon upon a hand-to-hand fight as being probable. One is never certain of commanding a squadron possessing greater speed than the enemy, especially when it is borne in mind that a mishap to a single vessel is of frequent occurrence in an engagement, and will delay the progress of the whole fleet. We are therefore of the opinion that engagements at close quarters will be the rule, and hence hazard must be considered a far more important factor than it used to be during the continental wars. Now, according to our idea, small tactical units would be an excellent means of diminishing the disastrous effects resulting from the intervention of hazard alone.
All have still fresh in mind the experiments of Admiral Aube during his short presence in office as Minister of Marine. Torpedo boats and the bateau-canon became famous under his administration. It cannot be denied that these experiments were a failure: but his adversaries took an unfair advantage of this fact in opposing his ideas to the extreme. Because the torpedo-boat of 35 meters was unable to keep at sea in all sorts of weather, is no reason why deep sea torpedo-boats should be useless, for, just in the same way, there is a wide difference between a bateau-canon and a 10,000 tons battleship like the Courbet, and without making the former so small, they might have built the latter smaller. Those experiments have besides proved nothing in favor of the armor, and we frankly confess that since making these naval questions a study, we have become the adversary of the water-line belt. There are three kinds of naval weapons : the gun, the torpedo, and the ram. The last two always strike below the water-line, the first sometimes only. What would be thought of a wall exposed to divers attacks whose summit alone would be protected? Of course a comparison is hardly ever exact, but it helps to get at the truth. Let the guns and the redoubts be protected by armor plates, let even the guns be placed in turrets for still better protection; in fact, protect from shot and shell everything that is liable to be injured by those missiles alone, and we will say nothing better; indeed, we are of opinion that the heavy guns are not sufficiently protected, and that the system which consists in sheltering the carriage and covering the piece with a mere mask may prove disappointing when the enemy's rapid-firing guns of small and medium caliber come into play. But to protect the waterline alone when, one meter below the reach of the gun, the torpedo may open a gap four or five times as large, and with this object, to burden the ship with an enormous weight, is an insufficient palliative, and besides a costly one.
But Admiral Aube laid himself open to a too easy attack; he felt too sanguine of success, and put too many trump-cards in the hands of his adversaries. The two forces opposing each other during the great maneuvers of 1887 were out of proportion. Admiral Peyron's squadron, estimated in men and money, was worth ten times that of Admiral Brown. Yet, when it is sought to find the advantage of one system over another by actual experiment, it would be only fair to grant both sides equal facilities. Besides, the cruisers attached to the torpedo-boats were too slow; finally, the torpedo-boats of 35 meters were too lightly built, and equally slow. Now it was admitted in the new theories that the strength of the torpedo-boats lay in their superiority of speed. The contest was too unequal, and sufficient account was not taken of the conditions of the problem. The experiment was bound to fail. Much talk was created on account of the minister's discomfiture, and justice was not done him. In spite of this first check of the small vessels, however, the primary idea exists in its entirety, i.e., the idea of creating small fighting units. To plan a vessel of just the dimensions that would allow of her keeping at sea in all sorts of weather, and of her launching her torpedoes in spite of a heavy sea, remains still the problem to be solved.
By unanimous consent, the present torpedo-boat of 35 meters is too lightly timbered. But why stand still after a first failure? Let the same experiments be made on a series of superior types, and, according to the law of progression, success is certain before attaining a displacement of 1500 tons. The Ouragan, whose construction has been given out by contract to private industry, is a step in this direction; but, in our opinion, this type is yet too light. Now, what have we in the service superior to the Ouragan? In the first place, the torpedo chasers (contre-torpilletirs) type, Couleuvrine, Bombe, Lance, etc., whose displacement is about 350 tons. So far, these vessels have been provided only with torpedo-tubes placed forward in a position unfavorable for launching in all directions. On the other hand, they have proved, if not remarkably, at least sufficiently, seaworthy. The Couleuvrine, long attached to the training squadron, has followed the latter constantly, and if she put into port, it was only in order to give the overworked crew a needed rest, and not from stress of weather, for her safety was never in doubt. This class of vessels is still subject to constant rolling, which would be a sure inconvenience in launching torpedoes off the sides; nevertheless, good results may be expected from them. Finally, in the way of fast ships provided with torpedo and having a displacement superior to that of the Couleuvrine, we have the torpedo-cruisers Condor, Faucon, etc. The first of these vessels was attached for a year to the training squadron, and gave proofs of her great stability under all circumstances. In regard to this class, doubt is no longer admissible. With tubes sufficiently raised above water, which can be easily done, they can launch their torpedoes under the most favorable conditions. But we have already reached a displacement of 1300 tons, and a sum of more than two millions of francs, the cost of the Couleuvrine being about 1,200,000 francs. But the distance is great from the 350 tons of the Bombe to these 1300 tons, and we are of opinion that between these two extremes will be found the tonnage of the vessel sought, a vessel capable of keeping at sea and launching her torpedoes in spite of wind and wave, and at the same time sufficiently comfortable for the crew. Again, what is there to prevent forming, in time of war, two sets of commanders, officers, and crews, relieving each other at short intervals, one set resting on shore and recuperating strength for the next turn, while the other set is at sea? A serious effort should be made to realize this mean type of vessel, and three or four fast ships built displacing from 600 to 1100 tons. For, once more, where the torpedo-boat of 35 and even 45 meters will fail, that of 55, 60, or 65 is bound to succeed. The cost is not so great that it cannot be risked. The experiment would be decisive, and the millions wasted in building worthless vessels would be saved ten times over. Four ships at 1,500,000 francs each, a very ample sum, would make 6,000,000, which is an insignificant amount of money compared with that voted every day by the Houses. The adoption of the new class of torpedo-boats would, besides, have another and indisputable advantage. Everybody knows that the weapon intended to destroy what has been designated as "the microbes of the sea," is the Hotchkiss gun, firing very rapidly, certainly twenty shots a minute. The little room taken by these guns, and their comparative lightness, have permitted their being multiplied on board and mounted everywhere. In each top of a large armored ship there are two, and even four, of these weapons. But their power is limited; the force of penetration of their shells is relatively small, and a comparatively light armor is proof against them. To be sure, Hotchkiss guns of a heavier caliber have been built lately, and their power is sensibly greater; but with these rapid-firing guns the limit of power is soon reached. The revolver-cannon, with multiple barrels, has been superseded by the single barrel rapid-firing gun; Special arrangements allow of its sufficiently rapid loading and firing, though in this particular it is inferior to the Hotchkiss. But let the size be increased ever so little and we reach a caliber that cannot be exceeded whilst maintaining the suppression of the recoil, that is one of the essential conditions of rapid firing. For this reason repeaters, or at least rapid-firing guns, will always be of small caliber. We are quite aware that England is experimenting with Armstrong guns of 12 cm. and 134 mm. firing from 10 to 12 shots a minute. With these new pieces, the placing in position after each recoil is automatic. But it is evident that the recoil, exclusive of the unavoidable loss of time, increases considerably the space taken by the guns, thereby limiting their number. Besides, the placing of relatively heavy caliber guns in the tops is a very difficult operation, not to say an impossible one. The exclusive protection of a large armored ship, consisting, therefore, of rapid-firing guns of small caliber, if we should build torpedo-boats of a heavier type than those now in the service, the Hotchkiss shells and the shots from rapid firing guns would no longer be able to destroy them as they would our present ones, and the principal bulwark of armored ships would be rendered useless. This fact is worthy of consideration.
A torpedo-boat of the type we advocate above would certainly be capable of carrying light armor sufficient to resist the shells of rapid firing guns. A protective deck placed somewhat below the water line, and, above the latter, a coffer-dam belt along with coal bunkers, etc.—the cellular system, in short—would insure complete protection to the vessel. As a matter of fact, the Faucon and Condor are provided with a protective steel deck running the whole length of the ship, of four centimeters thickness, quite sufficient to resist projectiles of 14 cm. striking at a necessarily sharp angle. Below this deck is, moreover, placed a jacket of light sheet-iron as a further protection against splinters and pieces of shell which otherwise might find their way into the engine-room. It is not necessary at present to go to that extremity, a lesser thickness being, we believe, sufficient for our lighter type of vessels. Finally, the torpedo-launching tubes, four in number, of which two at least should be fired broadside, ought to be also protected with carapaces of sufficient thickness.
We may perhaps incur the reproach of running down our heavy armored battle-ships in order to make room for small ironclad ones. "How you condemn armored ships and protect your torpedo-boats with plates; but we, the champions of the big fighting units, will oppose to your plates heavier rapid-firing guns, and thus by degrees bring you back to those very armored ships whose necessity and even usefulness you now deny." You are mistaken! Against torpedo boats you do not require heavy guns, whose fire is too slow, and the smoke blinding, when there is no fresh breeze; but, on the contrary, light, handy, quick-firing guns, so as to fire almost without aiming, correcting only the fire by the continuous fall of a shower of projectiles. To pierce a chrome-steel plate of only four centimeters, forming a protective deck, it will be found necessary to increase the weight of the present light artillery. You may apply to these guns all the improvements of modern invention, work them by steam by means of a lever requiring only the strength of a child to move, there will still be lacking the most indispensable thing for placing these necessarily numerous guns, and that is room. Where you might have set fifteen Hotchkiss guns in the tops and on the taffrails, in order to. protect a momentary retreat, you will have only three or four of these pieces, and if you want more, you will have to encroach upon the space of your heavy ordnance—your only excuse for existing at all.
Up to the present, we see brought up on one side, large armored battle-ships, not only armed with guns of all calibers, but having as many as twenty and even twenty-five revolving cannons, a single projectile from which was enough to disable a torpedo-boat, or at least to render it powerless. On these armored ships the firing maybe regulated as accurately as on shore, owing to the steady platform of many of these floating masses upon a furious sea. On the other side, torpedo-boats of small size, with decks washed by the waves, with tubes flush with the water and almost constantly under it. Of course, the experiments were unsuccessful, they could hardly have been otherwise. But it might be right to suppose that things would be entirely different, if against these same armored ships were brought up staunch sea-going torpedo-boats, capable of launching their torpedoes in all sorts of weather, and scorning rapid-firing cannons, once their most terrible enemies. These small boats armed with four or six torpedo-tubes, could prove formidable against the heaviest ships. Guns of medium caliber being alone capable of arresting their progress, they would rush boldly upon the enemy, for being armed forward and on each side, they could attack under all circumstances. I insist upon broadside tubes, because they will often allow the boat to steer a straight course at the moment of the attack and under a heavy fire, and to launch its Whitehead whilst running at full speed along the enemy's side, being then at liberty to withdraw from action. At the same time, as frequently squadrons will sail in columns, or in orders derived from this, it may happen that a torpedo-boat sailing an exactly inverse course, and passing midway between two ships, will make a simultaneous attack upon the latter by firing off her torpedoes on each side. At any rate, her chances of success would be increased twofold. Will your 10, 14 or 16-cm. guns be able to sink these boats? Hardly. And I think the general opinion among naval officers to be, that the fire from ordinary guns would not be sufficiently heavy to stop the onset of a flotilla of torpedo-boats. At any rate, would not this new type of boat present sufficiently advantageous features to deserve to be given a trial? Supposing that the results would be only a little superior to those of the present torpedo-boats—a supposition that we cannot admit, by the way—where would be the harm? We would possess three or four more torpedo-boats of a heavier build, serving, according to need, as torpedo-chasers or as scouts for our fleet; they would have cost a little more money to build, to be sure, but then they could render useful service. Experiments must not be delayed; the progress of science, the requirements of modern warfare forbid delay. There exists an uncertainty in the minds of naval people; many friends of the torpedo-boats, among the younger class especially, are still convinced of the excellency of their doctrines; a conclusion must be reached, and convincing facts be adduced by one or the other side. If this last experiment is bound to fail, as experiments will have been made with a series of vessels of increased dimensions, the role of the torpedo-boat will be clearly limited to coast defense, and an occasional sail on the deep, weather permitting. But just think of the grand results obtainable if we only found this desired type that is to fill all the conditions of the problem! And what facilities of construction, as a result of the limited number of adopted models!
While almost every armored battle-ship is unique in her model, and demands long years of preparation, these small boats, all similar in construction, could be built in a few months, and furnished to the Government by private industry, in time of war. For we must bear in mind that our ponderous fighting units would soon be destroyed by the enemy, whose vessels would in turn be liable to the same treatment from ours, unless they were stowed away in our dockyards. And then think of the time required to be ready; I do not mention the replacing of the vessels destroyed, that would be an impossibility, unless war were to last forever. In a brief time, then, we would be without a single squadron to send to sea. Let us then try a last experiment which cannot fail to throw light on the subject. We do not pretend in this article to propose any particular type to the exclusion of all others. We advocate a type of a sea-going torpedo-boat superior to those tried up to the present time, and nowise contest the efficiency of boats of heavier build carrying a battery sufficiently powerful to fight at a distance. What we have said in regard to the torpedo we shall say by-and-by in regard to the gun and the ram. But the same as for launching submarine weapons we desire boats of just sufficient capacity, we should also plead in favor of placing the guns, be they 24, 27, or even 34 caliber, on board vessels of smaller size than those recommended nowadays. Our efforts have been principally directed in demonstrating that it was far better to increase the number of small fighting units than to accumulate upon a single costly ship all kinds of war implements. Without going into the detail of all the advantages to be gained by the creation of these new types, we have nevertheless tried to demonstrate their importance. He who will finally plan the model ship that will justify beginning its construction at once, will have rendered his country an eminent service. With very little effort, perhaps inside of a year, we would be the only nation in Europe ready for war, and would hold the first rank until the day when that most admirable of. all the problems of the human mind, the submarine boat, the true weapon of the future, shall have been realized. But a naval power, in order to maintain its supremacy, must make use of all sorts of weapons; the ram, for instance, which when handled by an able commander may prove formidable, and guns which can be directed against an enemy's fleet as well as against a hostile coast and forts to be bombarded. In a general way these weapons go together. All vessels, capable of carrying a powerful battery, possess a large enough tonnage to be able to strike a deadly blow with their rams. But this mode of attack by shock has a great inconvenience. Just think of the enormous strain to which the ram of a vessel striking under the most favorable conditions will be subjected. In most cases the vessel struck will possess a momentum, the lateral component of the shock will therefore be enormous, and the ram being, relatively speaking, feebly supported in that direction, on account of the tapering forms of the bow, will run a great risk of being injured. The example of the Ferdinand Max at the battle of Lissa withdrawing, with but slight injury to herself, after her encounter with the Re d'ltalia cannot be adduced as a proof to the contrary. The Italian ship had only a moderate speed, and vessels of that epoch were far from possessing the weight of the enormous masses that would clash together nowadays.
We think that many a ship whose ram may come in contact with an enemy's will spring serious leaks, and under such circumstances will hesitate before striking another blow. But, have we not in the Whitehead torpedo placed at the bow, a sort of detachable and renewable ram, which presents the inestimable advantage of being safe for the assailant, while producing upon the enemy effects similar to those of the shock? It is certain that at the moment of an encounter, a commander could stop his ram at about 40 or 50 yards of his adversary, or else avoid a collision by a sudden sheer, at the same time launching one or two Whiteheads, which at that distance would be sure not to miss their mark. And if the torpedo-tubes are in good condition, he can renew this maneuver as often as his supply of torpedoes will allow—that is, four, six, and eight times. We will here remark that torpedo-boats, which at first sight appear incapable of an attack by shock, are not after all placed in a state of real inferiority. It is true that there is nothing to prevent an armored ship from placing torpedo-tubes on her bow besides the ram, whilst a torpedo-boat would never think of ramming a larger vessel, and it is evident that it is better to have two strings to one's bow.
Our second type of vessel will therefore be provided with a ram of as great a resisting power as possible, and with two torpedo-tubes at the bow, the latter to be used in preference, especially against a superior adversary. This arrangement will, I think, be readily admitted by everybody. Now we come to the artillery, and will first admit this principle. The conditions of seaworthiness (buoyancy) being secured, the vessel must be of a dimension just sufficient to carry one or two guns, no more. This is necessary in order to obtain the maximum fractionnement, which must be realized, for the reasons already given. The vessel will be a floating gun-carriage, nothing more. She will be built for the gun, and her size will depend upon the caliber of her battery.
We have endeavored, in the beginning of this study, to illustrate the following point : being admitted that a vessel, whatever her size and power, is liable to be destroyed by one of the three weapons, torpedo, ram, or gun, it becomes imperative for that very reason to give ships the minimum dimension necessary to accomplish their work. But this dividing into small fighting units holds other advantages besides limiting the ravages of the enemy's blows. First must be reckoned the advantages in point of the number of rams to be brought into line of battle, a condition of success of no mean value.
We are convinced that in a close encounter it is far better to have at command a large number of vessels of small size, for the reason that a ram will play, if not a preponderant part, at least an important one. An enemy assailed at close quarters by three or four adversaries will find great difficulties in parrying their blows, and have very little chance to escape them. For the very maneuver, that would save him from one foe, will often expose him to the risk of being rammed by another. We would certainly prefer in an action of this kind five vessels of the Bayard type, that do not attain 6000 tons, to two of those colossal ships like the Italia that reach nearly 14,000.
The advantage of numbers in a hand-to-hand contest will be immense, preponderant, decisive. It is in view of the attack with the ram that we should seek to realize a second condition, also of the highest importance, and which we are pleased to acknowledge has been paramount with us; we refer to turning power, which allows, after an end-on onset, of turning round in a small circle and assailing the adversary before he has had time to perfect his change of bearing. This quality is nearly as important as speed in a large ship which is bent upon an attack, and vessels like the Italia are far from possessing it. The tactical units enable us besides to cover and watch a more considerable extent of sea, which in naval warfare is of prime necessity. It should be remembered that it was in privateering warfare that we did the English the greater amount of injury. A large number of vessels will permit us to enlarge the cruising grounds, and to stretch upon the most frequented seas a net sufficiently tight to make it difficult for an enemy to pass through unperceived.
The number of torpedo-launching tubes can be considerably increased. Each vessel carrying only one or two guns on the upper deck, all the gun-deck can be fitted with six or eight tubes—two forward, and the others on the sides. The light draft of these vessels will enable them to escape from a more powerful adversary, and also to occupy a more favorable position in a coast attack or defense. The training of the personnel would also be benefited thereby; the number of officers in command being greater, more of them would have an opportunity for observation, and in time of war we would have a large number who had experience in the arduous duties of a commander. Another advantage is found in rapidity of construction. Up to the last moment of her fitting out, an armored vessel is useless. If four of these new torpedo-boats are equal in men and money to a single armored ship, and one would take one-fourth the time to construct, the same dockyard and the same stock could be used successively, and thus an armored ship would be launched in quarters, so to speak. Besides, nothing would prevent their being put on the stocks at the same time, in different yards, in case of war, and they would be ready in one fourth the time. From all the reasons adduced, the maximum fractionnement, forced upon us.
Now, what caliber of gun must be adopted? The war in China has demonstrated the inadequacy of the 14 cm. At least 24 cm. is necessary to produce any deadly effect in land attacks, and in certain cases even 27 cm. We are not adverse to heavy guns; had we several fast cruisers armed with the excellent 34 cm. now in use in the navy, we could turn them to good account. We, as well as our neighbors, possess only a few armored battle-ships whose plates could resist the impact of the 27 cm. fired at short range. Often one part of the ship is protected whilst another, nearly as important, is much less so. Few central redoubts would be proof against guns of this caliber. Turrets, better faced in general and harder to pierce, sometimes leave the breech and often the chase of the gun exposed; it is very probable that the heavy pieces would be injured seriously by a projectile of this caliber. There being few armored vessels necessitating 34 cm., it would be inconsistent to build many of those guns. Were they even more numerous, we would still advocate the building of guns of an inferior caliber. The ram is at hand, along with the torpedo, ready to accomplish the submarine work the gun cannot perform. It is better, we think, to resort to a different weapon than to build guns of exaggerated weight, slow in firing, and whose power is far from compensating for the cost of the ships they require. In the majority of cases, then, 27 cm. will be quite sufficient, and we would advocate three types of vessels: one carrying 24 cm., the second 27 cm., the last 34 cm., the number of the latter being relatively small. With the necessity of batteries of 24 cm. arises that of a pretty considerable displacement, certainly superior to that of torpedo-boats, for the type of vessels we are studying. But before discussing figures we should first find out what will be the other principal dispositions, such as protection of the water-line, battery, coal capacity, in order to calculate consistently the displacement of the sums of the weights assigned to each object.
It would be quite compatible with the views we have so far expressed to arm each vessel with one gun only; however, as this single gun must necessarily be placed on the deck, and as it is impossible to suppress the smoke-stack, there would be left a dead angle of about 90°. We will then admit two guns instead of one, arranged, for instance, like those of the Terrible, or else like the turrets of the Italian armored vessels Duilio and Dandolo; two high-power guns, but with the greater number of rapid-firing guns and Hotchkisses. This light artillery will be useful against small torpedo-boats like those now in the service, and in intercepting merchant vessels. The continuous shower of shot and shell that it will pour on the enemy's deck in battle will also produce a great moral effect, and carry dismay among the men necessarily exposed, like the signalmen. Many ships have besides useful organs, such as electric search-lights and divers connecting gears, that are not protected at all, and which it would be advantageous to destroy. To the two heavy pieces, then, we add machine guns or rapid-firing guns, but nothing else.
The high-power guns will be placed in closed turrets. The object being to have at command a certain number of guns, it would be better to make them absolutely independent of one another; in the first place, always according to the same principles, the loss of one gun will leave the other uninjured, and then each gun will have a firing arc of 270°, thus commanding nearly the whole horizon. A great firing arc is indeed of the greatest advantage, and a vessel armed with guns, each of which has a train of great compass, will often silence an adversary who has a greater number of pieces, but an inadequate horizontal train.
This is a twofold advantage of the turret over the redoubt, to which it will not be amiss to call attention here. Thus the plates of our largest armored battle-ships are too weak, and powerless in preventing a projectile of heavy caliber from penetrating the blockhaus. Just think of the horror and dismay resulting from the bursting of a 34 cm. shell in a central redoubt. Two or three guns may be disabled at one blow, and those of the gunners who may escape the numerous fragments of shell and plates will hardly resist the high temperature caused by the explosion.
The turret affords, besides, a better control, and its fire will be all the more dangerous, as it can be made more plunging. Finally, the turret is better protected against the action of the sea, and its circular form presents only one point at which a shot can strike it about normally.
The turret, therefore, will be selected, and protected heavily; we would not consider a 40 cm. steel plate excessive. The turret will move with the gun so as to be entirely closed. In case of an injury preventing its revolving, a special device will make the movements independent. To do this, the gun will be mounted on a platform with slide rollers, secured to the turret cover. A simple lift by means of hydraulic apparatus will clear the chase of the gun in the cylindrical part of the turret, and the same gear that turned the whole will revolve the gun and cover alone, leaving the turret still. The deck will be perfectly flush, with the exception of the line of the two guns, where stand the smoke-stack and the one mast or two masts used for signals. A protective steel deck of 10 cm. maximum, under which will be fitted a splinter netting, will extend the whole length of the ship at nearly five feet below the water-line; its shape shall be somewhat convex in order to afford more room for the engine. Above this protective deck, a wide cellular belt will gird the ship up to at least 20 inches above the water line. At this height there will be an upper deck of very light sheet-iron, and the whole space between the two decks not filled with cellulose, with the exception of the necessary narrow passages, will be divided into numerous compartments by longitudinal and transversal bulkheads. Each of these little compartments will be a coal bunker. Under these conditions, a shot penetrating at the water-line will at most flood only a few of these cells, and one of two things, either they will be filled with coal, and very little water will enter, or else they will be empty in consequence of expenditure, and the vessel off trim from loss of a given weight, in which case she will recover her load-lines with the influx of water. In either case, the invariableness of stability is secured. The only inconvenience will be that the available coal will be reduced, at least momentarily, by the quantity in the flooded cells. The turrets and protective decks will be connected by armored passages for powder and projectiles.
The essential organs, i.e. the helm, the gearing, the speaking tubes, will be protected in an absolute manner; the commander will have his armored conning tower in a favorable position. There the helm and speaking tubes will be perfectly safe; the apparatus for aiming torpedoes may also be placed there, or will have a well protected redoubt of its own. All the gearing, speaking tubes, etc., will go directly from the conning tower down below the protective deck, so as to reduce to a minimum the dangerous part of their course; a heavily armored passage will insure their immunity from injury. Too many precautions cannot be taken for securing constant communication between the commander and the vital parts of the ship, the helm and the engine. Perhaps the best way of obtaining this result would be to adopt for all transmissions of orders, electric apparatus, which can certainly be done, and to multiply the wires; these questions of detail may at certain moments acquire a capital importance.
On the gun-deck will be placed the torpedo-tubes, two meters at least above water, so that the latter will not interfere with their launching. Sufficient account has not been taken of this condition of elevation in building most of our torpedo-boats; it was a great mistake, and we recognize it now. Above the protective deck there will be, as already stated, an orlop deck (faux pont) of light sheet-iron, raised somewhat above the water-line, 20 inches, for instance. This deck will form the floor of the torpedo battery, and by raising the tubes above it some five feet, a sufficient elevation will be obtained. With a height of 2.50 m. under beam and the 2 meters of the turrets, the guns will be placed more than five meters above the water, which is quite sufficient, the more so as the turrets are closed, and the pointing will be done from a conning tower (blockhaus). It would be even possible to reduce this height considerably, if it were found to interfere seriously with the ship's stability.
It would be desirable to have the tubes protected against the fire from machine guns; on the other hand, it is necessary to avoid increasing the weight of the ship, and a splinter-netting on the gun deck to offset the destructive effect of the projectiles will be sufficient. A belt of coal 2.50 m. high, and as wide as possible, encircling the ship, gives a relative protection. Besides, in the rear of the bow tubes, a transversal coal bunker two meters thick at least, that must be left untouched as much as possible, will partially protect the battery against an enfilading fire which might work disastrous results. To use the coal necessary for the engine as a bulwark of protection is assuredly an economical solution of the question of weights and a very satisfactory one.
It is seen that the coal-carrying capacity is great; as a compensation, a great economy will be made in stores and supplies. It seems rather inconsistent to have three months' provisions, and coal only for a week; such, however, is the condition of things on board many vessels. It would be preferable to be provided with a little of everything for an equal length of time. Economy in weight must be carried to its utmost limits. Everything useless must be avoided. The least possible number of boats must be assigned to the vessel, except in time of peace or on a special occasion, when they will hang from movable davits. Only two small anchors will be used, such as Martin anchors, for instance. The masts, two in number at most, and very low, will be of steel. The exclusive use of steel is demanded as much because of diminished weight as to lessen danger of fire. We think that wood should be entirely excluded from the ship, even from the rooms of officers. The risks from fire are already too great, and if one should break out in the midst of battle, we would not know against which enemy to turn.
It is evident that the greatest solicitude should be directed to the motive-power. The engine, packed as snug as possible on account of the lowering of the protective deck, will benefit by all the weight economized in suppressing the armor plates at the water-line. It is unnecessary to dwell on the advantages of speed, this is too well understood nowadays. To be able at will to offer or refuse battle is half the victory. In order to obtain at the same time great turning power, there will be two screws, each operated by a separate engine. As a matter of course, water-tight bulkheads will be as numerous as possible. Thanks to the preceding arrangements, the greater portion of the personnel will be perfectly sheltered. Below the protective deck, in the engine and fire rooms, the torpedo and the ram alone will be able to make a breach; no human device can avert their blows. The guns and their crews will have adequate protection; the torpedo artificers will possess a relative security, and will be safe from the fire of the Hotchkiss gun.
It will be noticed that owing to the general arrangement of guns and torpedo-tubes, the latter can be fired under all conditions, without hindrance from the blast of the heavy pieces; whereas on board of more than one of our large battle-ships, the reverse is often the case.
The masts will be surrounded with a spiral staircase, armed with the Hotchkiss or rapid-firing guns protected against musketry. The latter will be done away with; it takes three men to work a revolving gun which pours forth a continuous stream of shot and shell, and three men represent only three muskets. There is therefore an overwhelming superiority on the side of the Hotchkiss, and as the gun is light and small, its use can be multiplied; musketry must give way to it entirely.
What will finally be the tonnage of a vessel of this class? Is it possible to reduce to that extent the size of our large battle-ships, whilst preserving to them the sufficiently powerful means of action we have just enumerated?
Before everything, the vessel must be seaworthy. Let us pick up examples among the list of our fleet. After the large battle-ships of the first class, displacing 10,000 and 11,000 tons, come those of the second class, like the Bayard, Duguesclin, and Turenne, of 6000 tons. Next in order come the Triomphante type, with a displacement of 4100 tons, and finally the old armored vessels of 3000 to 3500 tons, quite large enough to keep at sea in all sorts of weather. They have given sufficient proofs of it in distant parts of the world, for they are armored cruisers. Let us stop here. In the first place we will state that we take these vessels only as samples of seaworthiness, for they are entirely too antiquated.
With the saving in weight resulting from the substitution of steel for wood, the doing away with the redoubt and the armored belt—in fact, by carrying- out the plans we have described above—we are convinced that with a vessel of 3000 or 3500 tons displacement we would realize the class of vessel desired. This vessel could carry two guns of 34 cm., and would prove, I think, sufficiently seaworthy.
Is it possible to decrease even that tonnage? Here we have, among the large cruisers, the Iphigenie, which displaces only 3200 tons, the Duguay Trouin, 3300 tons; the Laperouse, Magon, etc., 2200 tons. These are still pretty fast vessels, averaging fifteen knots, and are very good sea-boats. They are armed with fifteen pieces of 14 cm.
A vessel of that size (2500 tons) could carry two guns of 27 cm. Lastly, a third type would carry two 24 cm., with a displacement of about 2000 tons.
Notice that the Fusee, which carries one 24 cm., displaces 1045 tons; the Acheron, which carries one 27 cm., 1639; it is unnecessary to add that the displacement of a vessel is not increased double because the armament has been doubled. If a 1000 tons vessel is able to carry twenty-fours, it proves that she possesses sufficient resisting power against the fire of that caliber, and there is the whole question. The addition of a new gun would only increase the displacement by a few hundred tons at the utmost. Two thousand tons, and especially three thousand, is a great deal indeed, and it is to be much regretted that a smaller displacement is impossible. However, we think that our figures are pretty correct, and that a vessel strong enough to carry heavy guns, and at the same time to challenge all kinds of weather, can be small only relatively.
Well, let us compare a squadron of these new fighters with our Mediterranean training squadron, for instance.
Taking fifteen millions of francs as the average cost of each of these—and it is not exaggerated—we have then spent 105 millions to put afloat 61,400 tons and 40 pieces of heavy ordnance.
The same displacement represents to us 20 vessels of 3000 tons each, also carrying 40 heavy pieces, for nearly the same price.
We would therefore possess all the advantages enumerated above without paying one cent more; and surely far more reliance can be placed in the twenty vessels fitted with rams, than in the seven of our present squadron. No doubt the Courbet is a superb vessel, but let a 34-cm. shell burst in her redoubt, and at one blow a considerable portion of her battery will be put hors de combat. The Devastation is the exact counterpart of the Courbet. This is still more true of the Colbert and Redoutable. As to the Indomptable, the Terrible and the Duperre, their enormous guns are protected very little or not at all; the carriages alone are sheltered; and, as we have already stated, a moderate-sized shot striking any of these pieces would be very likely to disable them. It was owing to the overweight of the armor at the water-line that full protection could not be given to the guns. It is to this same armored belt that are due all the other defects of our vessels, as want of speed, and inadequate coal-carrying capacity.
The vessels we propose, having a light draught and great speed, could seek safety in flight in case of inferiority; but on the day when they were in sufficient number, they would advance boldly to the combat, accompanied by their smaller escorts, the torpedo-boats.
We have selected three types of somewhat different dimensions, carrying respectively 34, 27, and 24 calibers. Does it mean that our light batteries will become useless? Not absolutely so. It is not enough to assail the squadrons of the enemy, we must also destroy his commerce. We have already stated that our experience in China has taught us that in order to attack large vessels or land fortifications with any show of success, we must not make use of a caliber inferior to 24 cm. The intermediary pieces of 19 and 16 cm., too powerful against a defenseless enemy and too weak against large battle-ships, should be laid aside.
It remains, then, to determine the type of the vessel carrying 14 cm. intended for cruising against merchantmen. We will still pursue the same way of reasoning, but we do not here reach the same conclusions. A vessel able to carry only two guns of 14 cm. would be of too slight scantling, and it must be remembered that seaworthiness is the first condition. Now, when discussing torpedo-boats, we settled upon a figure somewhere between 400 and 1000 tons, let us say 700, for the sake of argument; we will thus commit only a trifling error.
The vessel carrying 14 cm. will have to be somewhat larger than the torpedo-boat, but must not exceed a maximum displacement of 1000 tons. She will also have a protective deck, the only difference from her smaller companions consisting in the number of guns of 14 cm. she will carry, three or four at least. The guns will be mounted on deck in light turrets, and so arranged as to fire ahead as much as possible. We are prepared to accept the plan of the Amiral Duperre, with slight modifications in the arrangements of the turrets which would allow three guns out of four to fire directly ahead, which is natural, considering that these vessels are built for the special purpose of chasing others. The steel plating of the turrets will be of sufficient thickness to resist shots from quick-firing machine guns, and even 14 cm. caliber, with which many ocean steamers would be armed in time of war. Besides the above battery, the armament would comprise the same apparatus for discharging torpedoes as the torpedo-boats, so that these vessels would serve two ends.
This is only natural, since their tonnage would differ very little, and they would carry in excess of their companions only an auxiliary light battery. As is the case with torpedo-boats, a maximum speed will be sought in preference to everything else. Intended to fight in single combats, and scattered over distant seas, these vessels may find themselves exposed to dangerous encounters, which they must be able to avoid by rapid flight.
Resuming our project, we will then have:
1st. Vessels of 3000 to 3500 tons with protective decks, carrying each two guns of 34 cm. in armored turrets.
2d. Vessels of 2500 tons with protective decks, carrying each two of 27 cm. in armored turrets.
3d. Vessels of 2000 tons with protective decks, carrying each two of 24 cm. in armored turrets.
4th. Vessels of about .800 tons with protective decks, carrying each three or four guns of 14 cm. caliber, in turrets protected with light steel plating.
5th. Torpedo boats of about 500 or 600 tons, perhaps even 700, with protective decks.
All these vessels are built according to the same ideas. All can contribute towards the same end. Those carrying heavy batteries, intended more specially to destroy hostile fleets and fortifications, can render all kinds of services and give chase to fast mail steamers, since they will have great speed.
The two inferior classes of vessels can both chase merchantmen and act as torpedo-boats in battle. Forty vessels carrying heavy batteries, six armed with 34 cm., seventeen with 27 cm., and seventeen with 24 cm., would replace with advantage and economy the twenty-odd armored battle-ships that could be put into line in the month following a declaration of war. With these forty vessels we would have an effective control of the Atlantic and the Channel as well as the Mediterranean. As to the last two classes, their number would greatly depend upon the resources of the Treasury, but should never be less than 100. Double that figure would be about sufficient to meet any emergency. Of course, we could not obtain this desideratum at once, on account of the vast outlay of money it would take to restore our materiel, but we may cast aside in new constructions all vessels not closely connected with one of the types or classes mentioned. And, then, let us begin with the most urgent point. We have heavy guns carried by armored battle-ships; but we are deficient in light and fleet vessels, cruisers carrying 14 cm., and above all torpedo-boats: this is our weak point, it may give us a sudden ascendancy, or it may precipitate our downfall. And the construction of these light (fast) vessels becomes all the more urgent that they are the very class we will most stand in need of in case of war with England, an eventuality which must always be considered in discussing naval questions. In a war with Germany our fleet would be powerless towards reaching a solution. It will be on the banks of the Rhine that the great game will be played, and the loss of one or more ships would only be so many drops in the ocean. Even with Italy the part played by the navy might not be decisive, whilst with England it would be quite different; to make an attack on her commerce would be to stab her in the heart. But in order to do this we want a great many fast ships, and this is the first want to be supplied.
Before finishing we will make a few reservations in regard to ordnance. New improvements being made every day by science, we do not absolutely favor one caliber above another. It is possible that in a more or less near future the 34 and 27 cm. may be discarded to make way for smaller calibers, but having far greater initial velocities; but our type of vessel will vary very little, for if the caliber of a gun decreases while the initial velocity at the same time increases, the total weight must remain about the same.
The 14 cm. might be replaced by rapid-firing guns similar to the four 13 cm. delivered lately by Armstrong to the English Government.
While some modifications may take place in the minor details, the principal features will remain unchanged.
We will have to beg for a little indulgence on the part of professional men, who know how difficult it is to assign a tonnage to a vessel of an entirely new design and minimum displacement. If experience should demonstrate that it is impossible to come down as low as 3500 tons for a vessel unprotected at the water-line, but carrying 34 cm. calibers, if it were found necessary to increase somewhat the displacement, one fact would still remain clear, and that is that the actual dimensions can be considerably reduced and capital changes made.
Finally, we would like to refute in advance an objection which will not fail to be brought against us. We will be criticized for sending out to distant seas vessels armed with a few 14 cm. only, and incapable of offering resistance to a moderate-sized enemy. Similarly, one of these 3000 tons vessels meeting an armed battle-ship would be placed under a great disadvantage. We will remark in the first place that our small cruisers, with their appliances for discharging torpedoes, their protective decks and cellular divisions, will be more than a match for larger cruisers not fitted with the same appliances; and this is the case with the majority of vessels in foreign navies, as well as in our own. We find consolation in the fact that on distant stations where we keep so many old-time tubs, we meet many vessels flying the English flag that are no better.
Finally, when one is too weak to be able to cope successfully with an adversary, he must seek safety in flight. This will often be the case with our little cruisers, who will be bound to avoid an action whenever they are not sure of coming out victorious. Their object will be the destruction of the enemy's commerce, and putting aside all chivalric notions, they will attack the weak and shun the strong. This may not be generous, but it is practical, and it is in this light that we must view it. Then again, ships armed with heavy batteries will sail in groups as long as the hostile squadron is not destroyed, for their object is to try and crush it the moment they come up with it.
Besides, the best argument of all is the following: vessels of the class we propose can always keep together, for no bad weather can disperse them; then they can also sail singly, whenever they see fit. For our part, we feel convinced that the nation who will first resolve upon this new and promising course of dividing into small fighting units, will in a short time obtain the supremacy of the sea. Our only hope is that France may not some day regret having delayed too long in adopting it.