Rear-Admiral E. Simpson.—Admiral Luce has given us a useful resume of Naval Administration, and in that division of his paper where he writes under the head of "Board of Navy Commissioners," he fixes the point from which we must take our departure. The formation of that Board was, as he shows, in harmony with the results of many years of English experience. It is the proper starting point from which to consider the subject, for it was found to be very successful in fulfilling the requirements of administration that were needed for the developments of the day of its usefulness; the members of the Board discharged ministerial duties in the office of the Secretary of the Navy, under his superintendence; the Secretary had the benefit of the best professional advice. As the Secretary was supreme in both the civil and military branches, so his assistants were required to act in both capacities; and as naval ideas had not, at the time of the formation of the Board, been influenced by the coming wave of progress, a certain amount of simplicity obtained in all the details of practical work which did not demand the aid of specialists. Steam was not dreamed of as a motor for fighting ships; artillery was of a very simple character; the construction and sailing of wooden ships were the main objects to occupy the attention of the Board, and the practical knowledge possessed by the distinguished men who were from time to time ordered to perform the duties of Commissioners sufficed to fill the bill.
But the vicious combination of civil and military duties necessarily became apparent as time went on and the influence of progressive ideas was felt. The Board was required to attend to the procurement of Stores and materials, a labor in itself sufficient for one office; but in addition to this, it was responsible for the construction, armament, and equipment of vessels of war. In view of its responsibility in the matter of construction, plans for ships recommended to be built had to be submitted to the Commissioners, and their interference and arbitrary action in cases of this kind had much to do with the change of system that was made in 1842. I well remember an instance of this kind which was agitating the Department at the time of my entrance into the Navy in 1840. The first ship that I served on was the Decatur, a third-class sloop of war, as she was called. She was one of four new ships; the Marion, the Preble, and the Yorktown being the other three. These ships had been designed by the Naval Constructors, but when the plans were submitted to the Board of Navy Commissioners, they arbitrarily cut off ten feet of the length, and the constructors were forced to build the ships on these changed proportions. The Constructors of the Navy, as the constructors out of the Navy, were leading the modern ideas in the way of progress in this most important branch, and this error of the Commissioners went to show that the time of the usefulness of the Board was past—that it was an obstacle to development. It was this mistaken interference with the civil branch of the Department which hurried up the abolition of the Board of Commissioners, and the substitution of the bureau system. The action of Congress resulted in removing from the office of the Secretary all ministerial assistance, depriving him of all professional advice in the military and disciplinary branches of his duties, and in establishing certain bureaux, among whom he could distribute such of the duties of the Department as he judged to be expedient and proper.
The great blunder in this action was that it was too extreme. The object was to provide the Secretary with aid in the civil administration, secure against the interference of military control; but the necessity of professional aid in the other branches was ignored. The position of affairs is this: the Secretary is the sole representative of authority, and the chiefs of the bureaux, his aids in civil administration, are his appointments and can be virtually removed at his will. In military matters he stands alone, without advisers. He is absolute in the control of all branches. No official position in the country embodies such absolute authority and so much personal responsibility. This is the position of our Naval Administration. It cannot produce the best results.
There is much to be said in favor of one-man power; on board ship it will hardly be questioned that absolute authority must be vested in the commanding officer, but the commander is fitted by his training and experience to direct intelligently all branches in his command. This knowledge can hardly be expected of a civilian placed in charge of the Navy Department. There have been two instances where the Secretary of the Navy had previously occupied important positions in the Department, and their familiarity with its workings had much to do with the successful manner in which the executive duties of the office were performed during their incumbency; they were able to go into any bureau and direct the chiefs in details of business matters; but even these still lacked professional counsel in military matters. Since the establishment of the bureau system the Secretaries have generally referred for professional points to such line officers as happened to occupy positions as chiefs of bureaux, though such occupation was foreign to the duties of the office they filled. The officer holding the position of Chief of the Bureau of Navigation has generally been most consulted in this way, and to his bureau has been delegated for many years the important work of assigning officers to duty, and preparing instructions for cruisers, besides other executive work totally foreign to the primary work of the bureau. The Bureau of Equipment has charge of the enlisting of men and of the training of boys, work which is entirely military in its character, and this, as the assigning of officers to duty, is something outside of bureau jurisdiction.
The fact of the Secretary being forced to go to chiefs of bureaux designed for civil administration, for aid in military matters, shows the necessity of military advisers, apart from the civil, and that the present establishment is deficient in not providing them. Taking the law as it stands, I see no reason why the Secretary cannot appoint officers to take charge of the military branch, as advisers to him, even though such a board is not established by statute. This board would relieve the Bureau of Navigation of all matters not consistent with its title, and would put the Bureau of Equipment out of commission, as all the work now done by it, apart from enlisting men and training boys, can be more appropriately performed by the bureaux of Construction and Finance.
With the establishment of the Military Board, the Bureau of Yards and Docks can also be dispensed with. All ships, when not under construction or repair, are under the control of the military branch of the Department, and must be guarded and cared for by those who exercise military authority. They come under the supervision of those charged with executive control and the administration of naval discipline, the source of which, under the Secretary, is found in the Military Board. In reference to care of the yard, this is necessarily under the control of the commandant, a military officer exercising control over all branches of his command, with authority to utilize the means and to direct the services of all the bureau representatives. The commandant of a navy-yard is in his sphere the representative of the Secretary in both his civil and military capacities, and there can be no necessity for an additional authority to direct matters in the yard itself This duty will naturally be delegated to the captain of the yard, who will have his orders from his immediate military commander.
As to the question of docks and wharves, they naturally belong to the Bureau of Construction. As far as relates to docks, it may be asserted that virtually they are under control of the Construction Bureau now, and by turning over to it the building, repairing, and caring for wharves, its duties will not be seriously increased, and such a transfer will save the expense of plant, etc., for an extra workshop. There may be from time to time some engineering work required in a navy-yard, when a civil engineer may be engaged on contract, or a civil engineer of the Navy may be stationed at the yard under the orders of the commandant.
I assert, then, that with the establishment of the Military Board in the Navy Department, the labor can be more appropriately apportioned among the bureaux than it is now, and that two bureaux can be put out of commission, with the advantage of increased facilities for work and reduced expense.
My proposition, then, is, 1st, to remove from the Bureau of Navigation all work not legitimately classed under its title; especially must it be relieved of the roster of officers, and exercise of executive authority over ships in commission. All work of a military character should be transferred to the Military Board.
2d. I submit that the Bureau of Equipment be abolished, transferring to the Military Board the enlistment of men, and all matters relating to enlistment and training of boys; to the Bureau of Finance and Supplies, the purchase of coal for the Navy; and to the Bureau of Construction, all other matters under its control.
3d. I submit that the Bureau of Yards and Docks be abolished, the military and executive control of the yards being transferred to the Military Board, and all matters relating to docks, wharves, etc., being transferred to the Bureau of Construction. If considered necessary, a Navy civil engineer may be permanently or temporarily attached to the staff of the commandant of the yard, or contracts may be made for special work with a civil engineer not in the Navy.
As the assignment of ships for service will come under the direction of the Military Board, it will be necessary for it to be informed from time to time of the progress of work on ships under construction or repair, condition of batteries, engines, boilers, electrical apparatus, etc., all which information should be given by the bureaux when requested by the Board; but the Board can exercise no authority over any bureau, the Secretary of the Navy retaining the sole authority to issue an order to a chief of bureau.
Three line officers of high rank should constitute the Military Board, to be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy for a term of three years, and to be removed, relieved, or reappointed at his pleasure, thus removing all danger of injury to the service by serious difference of opinion between the Secretary and his counselors. The responsibility for all rests with the Secretary, and accord with his counselors is necessary to justify him in assuming the responsibility of following their advice.
What I have said may, I think, serve as a basis to act on—as a first draft of a plan to be discussed, elaborated, or remodeled. It establishes a Military Board, and redistributes the assignment of Department work. I now propose a method by which the work of the bureaux controlling the civil work of the Department may be coordinated.
My views on this matter are formed on the experience I had as President of the Advisory Board charged with the construction of the first four vessels of the new Navy. This Board consisted of the president, a line officer; two engineers, one a civilian; two naval constructors, one a civilian; two line officers, and a secretary (a graduate of the Naval Academy, with rank of Assistant Naval Constructor, well informed on engineering matters). The new ships were designed by this Board, and it had charge of all the details of construction. This Board sat daily, in daily correspondence with its inspectors at the yard of the contractor and at the foundries where the material was being manufactured. Matters relating to all branches, whether of construction, of steam engineering, of platforms for batteries, of position of dynamos or boats, of ventilation, of strength, of metal, or of domestic arrangements, were all discussed by the whole Board, and wherever the work of one branch was found to be interfering, or likely to interfere, with the work of another branch, the difficulty had to be settled there and then, so that the mail of that day might instruct the inspectors. The representative of each branch on the Board was loath to modify its plans, but the matter could not be avoided or postponed, it had to be settled at once. Thus compromises were forced, and these were mainly arranged by the members whose specialties were not concerned, but who were familiar with the needs of all. The representatives of the different branches were thus forced to "coordinate," as a majority of the Board, when a vote was taken, decided the question.
My proposition is that the chiefs of bureaux—not all, but such as have to do with materiel—should constitute a permanent Advisory Board, meeting daily and discussing all matters relating to construction of new ships, repair of old ones, arrangement of batteries, etc., with view to making all their plans co-ordinate, by controlling weights, and watching carefully that no departure be made from the original plans or designs without the accord of a majority of the Board. All new ships should be designed by this Board, and every detail of construction followed by it; and all reports from constructors at navy yards, as well as from the inspectors at the yards of contractors, should be received by this Board, discussed, and action decided on before they go to the bureaux. Each bureau will thus be under control of the Board which is composed of their respective chiefs, and there ought to be no danger of complication in the progress of the work.
The antagonism which existed in the Navy Department to the Advisory Board arose from the feeling that it was exercising the functions of the bureaux. The fact that it existed by act of Congress was not sufficient to reconcile the bureaux to its existence. There was no harmonious action, and such aid as was required of them was not readily or willingly rendered. The Advisory Board will go out of existence with the completion of the Chicago, and that injury to the amour propre of the bureaux will be removed, as its duties were limited to the first four ships.
But the bureaux have the same cause of complaint now as regards the designing, at least, of the new ships that are under construction. In the case of those vessels, boards have been formed, under the Secretary's order, to devise and submit plans to him; the bureau chiefs are thus subjected to the same slight at which they so chafed in the case of the Advisory Board established by act of Congress.
If the chiefs themselves are required to act as members of a permanent board, there ought to be no antagonism with anybody. No chief will be entirely independent in control of his work in his bureau, as in work where other bureaux are concerned he m.ust work in accord with them. But the same consideration must be exercised by the other bureaux in reference to him, and thus the quid pro quo will be rendered.
I should look for the best possible results to follow from this daily intercourse of the chiefs of bureaux. Each bureau is seeking and acquiring the latest information in respect to developments in its branch. The Office of Intelligence is engaged in collecting information on all professional subjects, and the fruits of its labors are at the service of the Board. The collections of each being communicated to all the members will keep them au courant with general progress, and no body of men can be found better equipped to advise on matters of new construction. The full benefit of all their research can only be gained by mutual counsel, imparting information one with another, and thus "coordinating" their labors.
Experience has shown that if this matter of meeting for consultation be left to the discretion of the chiefs of bureaux, nothing will come out of it. They are very sensitive to any interference with their prerogatives, and are unwilling to accept suggestions except from their own corps. If it were possible to secure sufficient time for Congress to act on Naval Administration, it would be well to have these consultations of the Board established by statute, and at the same time an assistant chief should be provided for each of the bureaux whose chief is a member of the Board. From my experience on the Advisory Board, I have seen that the work of the Board will occupy a large portion of the labor of its members, who will be prevented from attending in the bureau office for the dispatch of current work. This must be turned over to the assistant chief, in accordance with the decision of the Board, communicated by the chief himself.
This Board should consist of the chiefs of Construction, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and Navigation. The president of the Board should be a line officer of high rank, selected for his known familiarity with matters of construction and materiel; and a secretary should be appointed from the lists of assistant naval constructors or assistant 'Engineers, young men who have shown decided ability in their profession, and familiarity with the higher studies of designing ships and engines. The president of the Board, not being a chief of a bureau, will be more apt to insist on the thorough discharge of the work of the Board than if he were a chief of bureau, and his influence as a moderator will tend much to modify serious differences of opinion by suggesting compromises.
I would leave the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, more properly to be called the Bureau of Finance and Supplies, under the personal control of the Secretary of the Navy. In matters pertaining to this branch of Department work, the chief of the bureau is the all-sufficient adviser to the Secretary. As this bureau has now all disbursements under its control, purchasing all supplies as well as distributing the "pay of the Navy," I would limit the responsibility. The Secretary may naturally be supposed to be a man of business ability and of some legal knowledge, and in affairs of finance should personally assume the control that is imposed by the responsibilities of his office.
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery I would also leave under the personal control of the Secretary, except in the assignment of officers to duty, and employment of personnel, which would be a part of the business of the Military Board.
These, in brief, are the ideas I would suggest for the distribution of the work of the Department. It remains to cite the portion of the labor that would come under the supervision of the Military Board, to which I would add the Commandant of the Marine Corps, when matters relating to that military branch of the service are under consideration.
The Board will consist of three line officers of the Navy, carefully selected for fitness, of as high rank as possible, none to be below the rank of commander, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, when that branch of the service is under consideration. One member of the Board shall be selected for his especial acquirements in the branch of naval gunnery. The president of this Board will be the Secretary of the Navy, when his other occupations will admit of his attending the meetings—at other times the senior officer will preside. All orders issued by this Board are supposed to emanate from the Secretary of the Navy, and will be signed by him, or, under instructions from him, by the senior officer, "by order of the Secretary."
Under its control will be placed all that relates to the personnel of the Navy, officers, enlisted men and boys, and the Marine Corps; all that relates to ships not in the hands of the bureaux under construction or under repair, their efficiency if in commission, their care and preservation if in ordinary or waiting assignment to sea duty; the instructions issued to commanders-in-chief, to commanders of ships and commandants of yards; all matters relating to discipline, court-martials, reports of punishment, etc.; all matters relating to military exercises of all kinds, whether with sails, guns, boats, landing-parties, or what not; all matters relating to naval gunnery, as distinguished from ordnance; the office of Naval Intelligence, and the office of the Judge Advocate General.
These duties are of the most important executive character, involving much labor. It is evident that the services of several junior officers will be required to attend to the details of work assigned to the Board. This work will be highly instructive to those who may be charged with this duty.
Believing that the Secretary has the authority to make such assignment of duties as I have indicated, I would point to the advantage thus granted of trying the experiment before fixing the rule by statute. Such inconsistencies as might become apparent by practice could be corrected and the whole adjusted on a working basis, and when perfected, an act of Congress might be asked for making it law. Meantime the two bureaux to whom no duties would be assigned would await eventualities, and their abolition by legal enactment might be declared at the same time as the new law is confirmed. They exist now by law, but only for the convenience of the Secretary if he wishes to assign duties to them. There is nothing mandatory in the law, making it necessary for him to employ them; if he prefers to divide his duties without their use, they are simply in abeyance and superfluous.
What I have said agrees in the main with what has been advanced by Admiral Luce, but we have different ways of reaching the same end. As an officer of the Navy, I am much obliged to him for having started this "ball in motion," and if he finds he has roused the "jeers and taunts of his opponents," he will see that I am not one of them. I hope his paper will attract the attention it deserves, and that it may lead not only out of the Department, but in it as well, to serious thought, and ultimate deliberation in council, by which means alone a final decision may be reached which can be approved by the sound judgment of the Navy.
Lieutenant Richard Wainwright.—The most valuable portion of the paper under discussion is "the principles which should obtain in the organization of a naval government," as deduced by Admiral Luce from his historical account and graphic description of the English, French, and our own naval administration. Certainly there can be no subject of greater importance to the Navy. If our naval administration is faulty, it must affect the Navy to its very core, especially at a time when, under the best of government, its entire organization must be on the stretch because of the great changes being made in its material, and the necessity of keeping going at the same time a very old Navy and a very new Navy. How can we tell if the present system be faulty or no? At first sight it would seem as if the test of war were the only true test. In a naval establishment this is not altogether true, but as it has been claimed that our present system stood the test of war, it may be well to look into the matter. Admiral Luce shows in his paper how, "under the pressure of a great national crisis, the Department changed its organization in the direction suggested by theory, only to relapse when the pressure was removed." But how was it before the organization was changed—that is, before Captain G. V. Fox was appointed Assistant Secretary? Certainly the Navy was not in any way prepared for war. It might well have been that under any system the Navy, at the outbreak of war, would have been unprepared so far as ships and guns, as the material goes; but look at the workings of the Department itself. The Secretary had no one to turn to for advice; none whose duty it was to tell him what operations might be undertaken, what was needed for the successful accomplishment of the objects of the expedition. To be sure there were people in the Department whose duty it was to advise him as to various minutiae, mainly in regard to the material; but no one to tell him what the Navy could do, and what was impracticable, and in fact to give him advice as to naval policy, naval strategy, naval tactics or logistics. Captain Fox did much to supply this need. He was a highly intelligent man, a very able officer, with fine executive ability, but he could not supply the want in the system at once. Much of the information needed he was obliged to gather amidst the pressing necessities of a great naval effort. No one but himself can tell how hard this was in the commencement, or how much energy he was obliged to expend in overcoming the inertia of an old and faulty system. We know that the Secretary, Mr. Welles, found advisers, and chose his men well; but, in the nature of things, they could not sui)ply altogether and immediately the much-felt want. We have seen in the history of Abraham Lincoln, by Hay and Nicolay, who some of his and the President's advisers were, and to the names of Fox, Meigs, and Porter might be added the names of Professor Bache, the Superintendent of the Coast Survey; and the then Hydrographic Inspector and afterwards Superintendent, Carlisle Patterson, once an officer of the Navy—all able men, all able advisers, but none directly responsible for their advice; none with plans prepared beforehand; none with the necessary information—nor was there the necessary machinery in the Department to carry out the best of plans. The plans were various; they were pushed forward to a great extent by personal exertion. They interfered with each other; and so faulty was the machinery, that an expedition, approved and authorized by Mr. Welles, was prevented from being a success by the diversion of some of the vessels needed, without the Secretary being aware of the change of destination. The Navy during the war met with many successes and achieved wonderful results, but in spite of the bureau system and not because of it. It is difficult to judge of the efficiency of a naval or military system by success or failure in war. In time of war, great men, men of genius, come to the front and trample down all obstacles, and the blood and money of the country run as water. It is only by noticing the obstacles that are overcome, and seeking the cause of failures that do arise; by careful observation of the workings of the system itself, as separated from special change made under pressure—that the faults of a system may be discovered, though the war be successful. The same argument was used, prior to the Crimean war, in favor of the military administration of Great Britain. It was urged that under this administration, Napoleon I was conquered by Wellington. Kinglake shows how the administration altered under pressure, and thus altered, served to enable Wellington to conquer; and he also shows how it again fell into old grooves and became so wedded to them that it failed to yield to pressure in the early part of the Crimean war, and thus produced the horrors, the crimes of that first winter, and nearly brought about the overthrow of the English, and thus of the allied armies. It is to be hoped we may not need such a lesson to force the adoption of needed reform.
Admiral Luce has sounded the keynote of our necessities, the separation of the military from the civil business of the Department. If any one doubt this, let him look for any definite naval policy under the present system. Surely a naval policy is necessary during the formation of a Navy, so that the class and number of vessels to be built may be decided upon, as well as afterwards, for the wielding of the power formed. Under what bureau of the Department does naval policy come? Whose duty is it to advise the Secretary as to the policy to be adopted, and place before him the data necessary for him to reach a conclusion; to inform him of the various kinds of policy, and the material needed according to the policy he may adopt? Surely this alone requires much machinery to gather the necessary information, and long study to digest it, an active naval career to prepare for its understanding. Above all, who is required by authority and custom to place before the country the outlines of a scheme for building up the new Navy, and for its proper use after it is built? What is our policy? Surely not one of offensive war, for we are not beginning to think of building a Navy that can keep the seas. Not a defensive war, for we have not thought of building the necessary torpedo-boats and coast-defense vessels or a flanking fleet. In fact it has not been decided what part the Navy would take in a defensive war; whether it would be a better defense to rely on fortifications aided by torpedo-boats and a few harbor-defense vessels, or combine fortifications, torpedo-boats and coast-defense vessels with a flanking fleet of armored vessels, as advocated by some high naval authorities. Not to prey on the enemy's commerce and thus force a peace, for we have no coaling stations, and few fast cruisers in comparison with some of our possible enemies.
We have some cruisers and are building others. We are building some gunboats, and are to build three armored vessels, with one or two torpedo-boats. If there is any definite end towards which we are striving, if there is any definite number of vessels or class of vessels which is the limit towards which we are aiming, it has not been made public. The Army has a definite plan for defending our coasts, but where is ours? To be sure, if the Army plan be adopted as the correct one, there is but little need for a Navy. It has a few peace duties and may manage some torpedo-boats and three floating batteries. If these will protect our coasts, what more can the Navy expect, for it can be hardly contemplated to build an armored fleet that will enable us to make aggressive demonstrations against the great maritime powers of the world. But imagine—the necessity for a Navy having been recognized—a Navy has been built. War is declared; an admiral is placed in command of our fleet. Will he be allowed to form his own policy, or will one be dictated to him? Where will he get the necessary information as to the constituents of his force, and as to the supplies he may rely upon for carrying on the war? Fortunately we have an Intelligence Office that will give him all information about the enemy. Will he take a staff, as at present, or will he be allowed to choose one more in accordance with modern requirements? Without a purely military branch in the Department, the first operation of war must be made at haphazard, or be dependent upon the will and brain of the commander chosen, who, in place of bending all his energies to the combat, must supply the details neglected in time of peace because of a faulty system of administration. It is to be hoped that Admiral Luce's paper will serve to crystallize naval thought, and that the energies of all who bear the interest of the Navy at heart may be bent towards accomplishing this much-needed reform, of the separation of the military from the civil business of the Naval Department.