New York Branch, New York, N. Y.
February 9, 1888.
By Lieut.-Commander Leonard Chenery, U. S. N., in the Chair.
The meeting was called to order at 9 P. M. by Captain A. P. Cooke, Vice-President of the New York Branch of the Institute.
Captain Cooke stated, as he had been requested to read a paper on the subject of the Naval Reserve, for the purpose of provoking discussion, it was to be hoped that a full and free expression of opinion might be had, in order to enlighten those interested in the subject. He then called upon Lieut.-Commander Leonard Chenery, the Corresponding Secretary of the Branch, to preside during the reading of the paper.
Lieut.-Commander Chenery, on taking the chair, made the following address:
Gentlemen:—It may not be out of place at the first meeting of any size and importance of the New York Branch of the U. S. Naval Institute to state, very briefly, something concerning the Institute itself.
It was founded in 1873, nearly fifteen years ago, "for the advancement of professional knowledge in the Navy, by affording a medium for the free interchange of serious thought and the debate of important subjects concerning naval science and practice."
The headquarters of the Institute are at Annapolis, at the Naval Academy, but it has branches at the prominent Navy Yards and Naval Stations. Its regular meetings are held at Annapolis, for the transaction of business and for the reading and discussing of papers on professional subjects, but occasional meetings are held at the Branches for papers and discussions. Its membership, composed of Honorary, Life, Regular, and Associate members, is made up of officers of the Navy, Army, Revenue Marine, and persons in civil life "who may be interested in the purposes of the Institute." I am happy to say that it has a large number of the latter class in and around New York and a constantly growing one. The membership, as a whole, numbers now in the neighborhood of 850.
This is a meeting to-night of the New York Branch of the Naval Institute; it is held on this side of the river, rather than at the Navy Yard, for the convenience of its members and guests. The paper to be read and discussed is of such popular interest and national importance that we have invited a much larger number of guests than is usual, and we extend to those guests a hearty welcome and invite them to take part in the discussion, criticism, and debate with the same freedom that belongs to the members themselves.
In a subject of such vast magnitude as the one before us this evening there are many interests involved, many points of view, many conflicting ideas as to a practicable plan of operation and the details and specifications for the proper carrying out of the same, and it is thought that the Institute offers a neutral ground, peculiar to itself, where all of these interests may be represented and their claims and plans set forth, and that out of it all there may come good seed that shall be pregnant with golden fruit for the future.
On behalf of the officers of the Institute, I again bid both members and guests a most hearty welcome.
Captain Cooke will now read his paper.
Our Naval Reserve and the Necessity for Its Organization
By Captain A. P. Cooke, U. S. N.
The importance of having a Naval Reserve has of late occupied much attention. A bill to create such a force was last winter introduced in Congress by Senator Whitthorne, and bills of a similar purport will be introduced in both houses during the present session of Congress. The matter has been this year, for the first time, mentioned in the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, and organizations interested in maritime affairs have brought the subject forward for discussion. It is a very large and important subject, involving various and diverse interests; it will bear considerable discussion, and should have all the light possible thrown upon it from different quarters. What other governments have done in this direction has been tabulated by our own, and will doubtless be published in due season. Any law establishing a Naval Reserve should deal only with general terms, giving the President authority to formulate the necessary regulations. Yet a thoroughly feasible and useful scheme must be presented for consideration, with all the details for organizing and managing such a force carefully worked out. In order to accomplish this, all classes interested should have a voice in determining the plan, and what has already been done by others should be carefully considered in connection with our own requirements and limitations. The Naval Institute, through its Board of Control, has therefore determined to throw the weight of its influence in favor of the establishment of a Naval Reserve, and to open its arena for discussing the usefulness and necessity of such a force, as well as the manner in which it should be organized, drilled, and instructed in order to bring about the best possible results.
Any effective scheme for a Naval Reserve must, besides opening a field for the training of our officers and men, also secure an efficient commercial marine fitted for remunerative competition with other nations on the great ocean highways; at the same time preparing material in men and ships for offensive naval service whenever national exigencies may require it. In pursuing such a plan we simply follow the sagacious example of all other great maritime nations. And it is well to remember that our enormous contributions to their carrying trade are nourishing and cherishing a naval reserve power for those nations which possibly may, at no distant day, be turned against us. To adopt the successful features of the commercial administration of other powers is a wise rule for the conduct of our own. Considering the results obtained by the other great maritime states in a liberal support of their merchant shipping, this country should surely profit by their example. The same consideration extended to our ocean commerce that has been bestowed on our lines of land transportation would give this country the control of the carrying trade of the world, and our lines of steamers would be only the continuation of our great trunk railway lines to foreign markets. Many considerations are involved in restoring this great national industry, which in time past contributed so much to the pride, power and prosperity of our country.
An efficient fighting navy cannot be maintained without a strong, vigorous and trained commercial navy; and it is important to familiarize the outer world with the sight of the American flag, and have other nations think of our country, not as merely the theme of distant rumors, but as a maritime power able to defend its rights in any quarter of the globe. It therefore becomes the bounden duty of the Government to develop and foster the growth of our merchant marine, which was the birth-place of our navy, and must ever be a nursery for the gallant men who are to make our flag respected and feared upon the ocean. The Navy has always a deep and abiding interest in nourishing our commercial marine, for from that source must chiefly be drawn its recruits in time of war. Our past naval successes were largely won by the endurance, skill, courage, and fidelity of these sailors, and history records their conspicuous services in all the wars in which we have been engaged. The true national importance of a great commercial navy cannot be over-estimated. Such a fleet, created and maintained by private enterprise, although built for peace, will be found our most sure support in time of war. Not only will the ships of this squadron of commerce be invaluable, in many ways, for war purposes, but especially necessary for swelling the ranks of our volunteer navy will be the hardy mariners trained in their service; and the building of these ships will offer an essential training preparatory for war. It is as necessary for our people to be experienced in the building of ships as to be skilled in the manufacture of guns and other warlike implements. Naval power rests primarily on shipbuilding skill, and the necessary opportunity must be afforded for acquiring experience in this art. An efficient naval power cannot be secured without encouraging and protecting the ships and sailors of our country.
By patronizing foreign vessels we aid in the development of the cruising fleets of our possible enemies, instead of giving every advantage to American enterprise, which in return would reward us by maintaining our maritime power. Since it costs our people so many millions of dollars annually in freight money to carry our wares to the markets of the world, why should we not make an effort to expend some of it at least in giving employment to our own people, and by so doing, also render ourselves independent of others? It certainly is sound doctrine that, if money is to be spent, it should be done in giving occupation to our own workmen. And is it not worth the nation's while to encourage by favoring laws its shipping interests, in order to accomplish all this and so much more along with it? There could be no better expenditure of public money than the granting of aid to specially built steamers, both small and great, to be held available for the naval service in case of need such additions to our merchant marine to be constructed so as to be readily converted into armed cruisers or torpedo boats. If we wish to have swift steamers in order that efficient transports and other vessels may be secured for service in time of war, we must make it an object for owners to build and maintain such craft; otherwise we will have to construct a greater number of steamers for the Navy than is necessary in time of peace. Moreover, the first expense of such vessels would only be a fraction of what they would ultimately cost the Government; whereas the subsidized craft would only require a small annual amount, and besides being useful in peace, would always be available for war.
Something must be done to restore the American ship to the ocean, or it will soon disappear altogether. It can be saved, however, by adequate payment in return for the great national benefit rendered by those who are willing to put forward their individual earnings and assume the necessary risk. Before ships can be built and sailed, the conditions for their profitable use must exist, and there must be a certainty of their constant employment. When employment fails the industry will languish. To reinstate our shipping interest and renew its activity, the inequalities and disadvantages in competing with foreign ships must be removed or compensated. The Government must surely defend and provide for the commercial and navigating interests of the country, and the property rights of its citizens, both on the sea and on the land. Government protection may take many different forms to favor, restore, and maintain our merchant marine; but without some helpful interference, it stands demonstrated that we cannot resume our carrying trade on the ocean. And it is a fact that without some kind of government protection in the way of favoring laws, this industry has never prospered.
A Naval Reserve involves both ships and men. As in peace we shall maintain only a small regular force of men, so will it be the same, to a great extent, with the ships; we shall never have enough of these in the Navy for all our needs in war. For this reason the able measures now before Congress advocating the establishment of a Naval Reserve, contemplate the building up of our shipping interest. As an auxiliary to the Navy, the merchant marine affords not only a school for the training of seamen, but also a reserve of ships and dockyards which may supplement the resources of the Navy. Although these craft will be exceedingly useful in many ways, the nation should never deceive itself with the idea that it would be safe to put this class of vessels in the line of battle or depend upon them as fighters. The other chief maritime powers have already, by bounties and otherwise, secured the right to use a great number of their merchant steamers to assist their navies. Recognizing, therefore, the certainty that steamers of high speed will be used as naval auxiliaries, we have every reason to be thankful that measures are being taken to secure our having such vessels. When sea-going steamers are built in this country for commercial purposes, and also when yachts, tugs, and small craft are constructed, the owners should be encouraged by the Government to make them according to such requirements as will render them suitable for naval uses. And this can be done without interfering in any way with their usefulness to their owners. Sufficient inducement must be offered to accomplish this, and all such vessels held available for Government service.
Naval Reserve ships, compensated for accommodating themselves to naval requirements, and enjoying liberal mileage for mail service, or receiving- the bounty proposed for distances sailed according to tonnage, should contract to carry a certain number of Naval Reserve men, and to give the Government the power of engaging them on fair terms and at peace prices in case of need. Thus, at moderate cost, the country would secure the nucleus of a fleet of auxiliaries which would be invaluable in war.
In a sea-going squadron of modern fighting ships, each of the units will have to be attended by numerous satellites. The parent ship will require to be furnished with torpedo boats capable of keeping the sea, lookout boats, and a torpedo boat catcher, while the squadron will require a dispatch boat, a store ship, a hospital ship, a magazine ship, colliers, and powerful tugs.
In our coast defense, too, an important feature will probably be armored guard ships heavily armed, each supporting a swarm of lightly armed small craft. It will thus readily be seen that we shall have abundant necessity for auxiliaries, besides using them as commerce destroyers.
It has always been customary for the national Government to keep up a small contingent of regular forces where the art of war is studied and practiced, and where a little nucleus of those familiar with arms may be found for the training and guidance of our citizens when called upon to defend their country. The same causes which lead to a division of labor in the peaceful arts must always make war a distinct science and a distinct trade, and the use of arms must always occupy the entire attention of a separate class. With us this class, in proportion to our wealth and population, has always been an exceedingly small one; and, if it is taken to represent our insurance against national danger, doubts may well exist as to its having increased in proportion to the war risks.
The armed mariner is a product and a necessity of civilization; and as the latter advances, and the art of war becomes more complicated, the former must devote more time to his specialty, or he can never use effectively the complicated weapons of precision he is now called upon to wield. In the early days of smoothbores and sails, before steam and telegraph were known, it might have been safe enough to defer the moment of preparation to the season of actual hostilities; but our national armaments should now be kept ready and manned. The existence of the trained defender of his country, wholly aside from the question of war, is of benefit to the community; and the maintenance of naval and military establishments, in due proportion to the wealth and population of the state, adds to its prosperity.
The preparation for war, besides developing the mechanical and industrial resources of the country, cultivates also the hardy and essential virtues of courage, discipline, and self-sacrifice; and the ordinary training of men for arms is directed towards producing and nourishing these virtues. Those who are trained to defend their country are fitted to endure hardship, to sacrifice their wills and natural inclinations to a sense of duty. They are required to practice constant restraint and self-denial, and to face pain, sickness, hunger and thirst at the call of duty. Their very lives are not their own, they may neither refuse to give them nor yet waste them, and they must always count them at the disposal of others. What better school could be devised for making good citizens and for cultivating all the nobler qualities of manhood? Surely such a training of both body and mind is not to be despised, and affords a valuable opportunity for cultivating among our people the most elevating virtues.
The vague suspicion that men trained to arms are responsible for war is as groundless as to consider physicians responsible for disease, or clergymen for violations of moral law. The most terrible and destructive invasions have been those not conducted by regular forces. It is not those regularly commissioned who stir up strife, but the spirit of money-making and greed is what chiefly brings it about. The triumphs of commerce, far from being peaceful, have almost invariably been either preceded or followed by the use of arms. The highways of commerce, both by sea and land, have been opened up by fighting. Armed forces are not the cause of war, but they regulate it and reduce it to its mildest terms. Neither are armed men drones in the hive nor a burden of non-producers on the community. Much useful work must be done besides the production of wealth; its protection is no trifling responsibility. Many useful citizens are not by their profession wealth producers, and some of them not even wealth protectors; yet the trained defender of his country can at least claim to exercise the latter function.
Force is necessary as well as law in the organization of society and government, and a proper force, ready to be called out in case of need, might enable our country to go on for hundreds of years without ever having to strike a blow. A well planned scheme for developing our resources, comprehensive and elastic, giving full scope to the enormous local reserves of the country and utilizing them to the utmost, would be the most effectual guarantee ever devised for perpetual peace.
The old methods upon which we have always relied for defense are now impracticable. We have, however, done very little in the way of providing new ones, although the means lie ready at our hands. The larger and wealthier centres offer defensive material on the spot which we have only to organize. They should possess the necessary facilities for training men in the use of the delicate and complicated machines of modern war. Let us hope the time is not far distant when every one will admit the absurdity of leaving enormous commercial interests, not only without the necessary men trained for their protection, but without the weapons and appliances for their defense. All great areas of commercial activity should have defensive centres of their own, from which the means of defense could be procured without delay. The rapidity of modern war will leave no time adequately to meet attacks concerted by telegraph and delivered simultaneously at points thousands of miles apart.
Our regular navy may be said to form a normal school where teachers are prepared to organize and instruct the great body of our seafaring population upon whom this busy country must rely for the protection of its maritime frontiers, when the hardy toilers of the sea are suddenly called from gathering its fruits to protect their homes and firesides.
Besides the regular forces maintained by the general Government, the States have militia organizations where the duties of a soldier are learned, and where reserves may be secured for our armies in case of war; but none of the States have organizations for instructing sailors as a sea militia, nor has any provision ever been made, either by the States or the nation, for securing trained reserves to recruit the Navy in case of war.
The very excellent scheme for organizing our Naval Reserves which Senator Whitthorne has brought forward, provides for the enrollment of a Naval Militia as well as the organization of Naval Reserve forces. Heretofore no naval enrollment has been made, and no provision now exists for assigning naval quotas to States in case of war. Under the existing militia laws all persons between the ages of 1 8 and 45 are to be enrolled, and it is very important that provision should be made for assigning naval quotas to the States when desired. After providing for the general enrollment of a naval militia, Senator Whitthorne proposes to give the States authority to organize such naval commands as may volunteer to join certain branches of the Naval Reserve forces. This puts the Navy on the same footing as the Army, as far as possible, in relation to the militia. Only a few of our States have really efficient National Guards, and probably many of them would not feel disposed to organize Naval Reserve forces. The far-reaching and comprehensive nature of the Whitthorne Naval Reserve bill is shown by its provision to meet this possible contingency. While giving abundant authority to the States for organizing Naval Reserves, it does not depend altogether upon their uncertain action, but, considering the nation responsible for the common defense, makes ample provision for a regular national volunteer Naval Reserve organization under the control of the general Government. Moreover, the general organization, training, and control of the Naval Reserve forces is to be placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy, who may detail such regulars as may be deemed necessary for purposes of inspection and training.
The establishment of a Naval Reserve, if entrusted to the States alone, would surely be beset with difficulties. Although there is no lack of good material, yet the absence of a central control would be even more seriously felt in naval than it is in military matters. The liberties and fortunes of the States are entrusted to the National Government, and although great reliance seems to be placed upon the old provincial militia system, the theory of national defense can not proceed altogether on lines of separation or State independence.
In the light of our past history, the importance of a permanent national volunteer organization is apparent. The records give overwhelming evidence in this direction. In all our wars the main reliance of the nation has been on national volunteers. As yet, we have never maintained a national volunteer force in time of peace. There are many reasons, however, why it would be very desirable. Since in our next war the general Government will at once call out a force of United States volunteers equal to the emergency, why wait until then before having such an organization?
Since our standing force is wisely kept within the lowest possible limits, we must always rely upon volunteers when enlargement becomes necessary. Therefore we ought to develop some comprehensive system, so that such an organization may be in practicable shape for augmenting our sea forces when needed. Volunteer naval organizations at the different ports should be encouraged, and all those interested in maritime affairs induced to join. Thus interest would be excited in these organizations and in the craft which would be available for their use, and generally in the work of protecting our coasts and harbors, which they would have to perform in case of war. In some such manner, at no great expense, a system could be established which would not fail to be of the greatest benefit whenever we are involved in war. Once every year, during the most favorable season, operations should be carried on to test the efficiency of the plan and to make the reserves familiar with the weapons and methods to be employed.
The defense of our ports by guns and submarine mines is not sufficient of itself There must be an active force afloat. The material is partly at hand in the various coasting and harbor craft which are to be found so abundantly along our coasts. These, manned by naval volunteers and armed with quick-firing guns and torpedoes, would make an excellent improvised force. We need, too, an ocean volunteer force, to which the ships, officers, and men of all sea-going traders should be eligible, with depot organizations, consisting of boatmen, fishermen, and all our sea-going population of every class and denomination ; thus transferring a glaring weakness into a pillar of strength fit to support the honor of our country. There are few men belonging to any of these classes that could not once a year at least answer to their muster before a government official at the ports they frequent. And most of them would be glad to give a small portion of their time to their country for instruction in its defense—if not all at once, then by instalments during the year, as they had opportunity and could secure off-days from their regular occupations. This is the germ of the idea sought to be accomplished so far as the men are concerned. A registry must be had at every port on sea, river, or lake, where every man familiar with boating and the water, coming up to certain requirements as to age and qualifications, may be induced to register his name and address, and to report himself every year for such brief instruction and service as the Government shall require. The patriotic citizens of our country will need little pecuniary compensation as an incentive. The honor of being classed as a Naval Reserve man, and the advantages and instructions derived, will be a great inducement. In case of war, of course they would want credit for their service in the Reserve and expect to enjoy all other benefits accruing therefrom.
The last great warlike uprising of our countrymen convinces us that whenever the patriotism of our people is touched it will be difficult to restrain enlistments. Every portion of our country and every community will be anxious for representation in any cause that appeals to the noblest impulses of our people. To whatever extent we may need fighting men they will be forthcoming, and their alacrity and enthusiasm will be unbounded. Yet it will not do to depend altogether on the unorganized patriotism of our citizens. Without preparation they would not be serviceable, and although they would make reserves in time, the important element of time might be lacking—time for discipline and general training, without which they would be worse than useless. The conditions of war are not now what they were, and the result may be decided in a few brief weeks, victory resting with those who have made the most careful preparations. To trust to hastily organized crews when the emergency arises is to court defeat, for fleets are only consolidated by patient care and skillful forethought. The ships of our future Navy will be very different in type from those of the past, and the crews required toman them different in character. A promiscuous collection of landsmen and untrained seafaring men, hastily placed on board such vessels, would be rather more dangerous than useful.
It is not easy to realize how completely all the conditions of war have been changed within the last generation of men. The enormous increase of the interests to be protected, and of the valuable points to be defended, would alone alter the whole problem. But science has played an even more important part than growth. We cannot now equip a fleet one-half as powerful in relation to the work it would have to do and the foes it would have to meet, as we possessed in our last war. Whatever the future may bring forth, we are confronted by the present and ever growing necessity for adequate and concerted preparation to repel the assaults, direct or indirect, open or covert, which our situation, our wealth, and our prosperity invite.
Some day we must meet an enemy prepared to fight who will not wait for us to get ready,—and what are we going to do about it? We are, of course, rich and strong and prosperous, and full of confidence in our ability to hold our own against all aggressors, yet we utterly lack preparation. No State, whatever its position or its traditional policy, is always secure against an invasion of its rights. With heavy responsibilities and imperfect guaranties, by neglecting preparation we invite aggression; for we can only assert our rights effectively by showing a capacity to enforce them. In spite of our reserve resources, any of the great nations—and we claim to be the peers of such—might strike us a sharp, sudden blow, inflicting injuries which no belated exertions would avail to repair. It is comforting to dismiss this idea as impracticable; but, although no occupation would be permanent, yet temporary local possession in a critical moment is far from being impossible, and the immense forces of foreign nations and their complete organization, together with the modern facilities of transportation, make such an enterprise more probable, as a sudden movement, than ever before. Why should we be so short-sighted as to put off making any preparation to meet the inevitable, when this is the convenient season? Now, in this time of profound peace, it is our duty, as a nation, to ourselves and our posterity, to prepare for the sure coming of our next war, by establishing an efficient Naval Reserve organized by the general Government. The development of such a force can only be brought about by the reiteration of public opinion on the subject. It is of vital importance that the movement in that direction should be successful, and a comparatively small effort made in this cause now may avoid the necessity for large sacrifices hereafter. It is certainly the duty of the country to look after such a scheme and have it carried into effect. Much may be done by local effort and by the exertions of patriotic individuals. In fact, it is only by such exertion that we can hope to accomplish anything. The Government will never take action in such movements until earnestly and persistently urged by those in a position to command attention. For this reason it is most important to interest all our influential citizens occupied in any way with those who do business on the great waters or who go down to the sea in ships.
If there is any subject on which our people should be agreed, it is the necessity of providing for the common defense. As a matter of fact, however, unless some scare gives rise to alarm, they trouble themselves very little about the matter. Yet, in the early part of the present century, the appearance of a hostile cruiser off some of the towns of our coast was no unusual occurrence; and now, steam and long range guns have made a repetition of such visits a matter of disagreeable certainty. Under such circumstances it would seem wise to have some scheme for holding possession of our own waters, prepared and understood before the coming of the evil day. Our coasts and shores will be best defended by keeping an enemy away from them. And our ports, besides their submarine mines and attendant artillery, must have floating batteries and movable torpedoes, together with electric lights—the whole arrangement being under one management. Besides, the forces employed should, by exercises and combined operations, have some idea of what they are expected to do and how it is to be accomplished. If we are ever put to the test of war, while in our present chaotic condition of preparation and loose state of co-operation, the trial will be very great, to say the least.
On the declaration of hostilities, all the navy we can raise will be required out on the open sea, and naval volunteers will have to be relied on to man all the movable defenses of our harbors. Our present small navy could spare neither officers nor men for such purposes, even if the craft required were forthcoming. As a nucleus for our floating harbor defense we could use our smaller coastingsteamers, tugs, and steam yachts, but we are sadly in need of suitable modern, specially built, harbor defense vessels, as well as gun and torpedo boats.
Why should we not have now an organized body of naval volunteers charged with the defense of our harbors and drilled in the work? Doubtless they would be ready and willing to qualify themselves for the performance of this duty if they had fair opportunities of rendering themselves efficient; but at present, those who must be relied on for such service are totally without the necessary instruction, and the needed tools are unavailable. Even the obsolete material in our possession is not ready, and those who must command these flotillas lack the needful experience. The solution of the problem appears to be in the creation of a permanent naval reserve and volunteer coast defense corps. There should be sufficient regulars in time of peace to look after the stores and boats, the remainder being volunteers, who would have an annual training. There would be no difficulty in getting those who have been trained in the regular service, as well as yachtsmen and merchantmen interested in the matter. Every harbor should have properly qualified officers responsible for every detail. At present, nobody being responsible, nobody cares. We must have a well digested plan, worked out and familiar to us, and upon which we have already experimented. The Navy will need its trained reserves even more than the Army. Besides its being easier to secure an effective soldier in our country than an efficient man-of-war's-man, the latter will be drawn chiefly from a smaller portion of the population. The Naval Reserve will come to a great extent from those who dwell on the sea and its tributaries: our fishermen, yachtsmen, the crews of coasters and deep sea craft, as well as the boatmen on our rivers and lakes. All these must be enrolled, their residences and employment known, and they should be connected in some way, however slight, with our regular reserve establishment. Such registration would place a most valuable knowledge of the maritime resources of the country at the disposition of the Government. These people are to a great extent a non-resident and floating class of the population, yet it would require very little to make them offer themselves at convenient localities and seasons for certain brief periods of training.
A Naval Reserve cannot be established without incurring some expense. It costs much to take advantage of all the modern improvements in arms and armament and to be able to use them effectively, but the nation that provides for these things will be likely to succeed. Unfortunately, as yet, we have not furnished our regular forces, or even the Naval Cadets at Annapolis, with modern equipments. It also costs much to make the service popular and efficient—but this is essential. The wages and advantages offered must keep pace with those which the laborer and artisan enjoy.
Our defensive estabhshments are an insurance against national danger. We pay without a murmur high premiums for insurance on our lives and property, but it seems to be with great reluctance we contribute to this most essential insurance. Its expense will be much greater now than formerly, not only because the capital invested is greater, but because other requirements are greater. Formerly our ships were of wood, our guns inexpensive and small; there were no torpedoes, machine guns, electric lights, or other costly devices the pay was less and it cost but little for training. Now all this is changed, but we are rich and prosperous enough to endure the change. It is only a question of whether the necessary funds shall be exoended carefully and deliberately in these quiet times of peace, or recklessly and extravagantly in the hurried and anxious season of danger. When the country, confronted by immediate peril, is startled by the revelation of its utter want of preparation, it will then be too late.
Every maritime power except our own has ready for service a reserve, which includes not only sailors, but coast artillery and volunteer torpedo corps; and so thorough is the organization of some of these forces that in the event of war their mobilization would be a question not of weeks but of days. Although the enrollment of our seafaring population should be complete, it is not expedient or necessary to include so large a number in our proposed Reserve. We need, however, a Reserve of officers and men sufficiently large to man all the additional vessels we should require in case of war, both for cruising and for the protection of our harbors; also to fill the waste by sickness and casualties during war.
Suppose, with our present small Navy and limited merchant marine, we should begin with ten thousand men and officers as the necessary number for our Reserve. This would about double our regular force, and they might be formed into ship's-companies at the various localities where our Navy is now represented. Let a ship's company, or several ship's-companies, forming a division, be organized at the port of New York, for instance. I am sure a fine ship's company, completely officered, could be recruited there at once from officers and men in civil pursuits who had served their time in the regular Navy. These would take great pride in such an organization, and would sacrifice a great deal to accomplish it. Let them be granted the privilege of using the old frigate Minnesota, now located in the North River, off the city, and employed as a training ship. Unfortunately her equipments are rather ancient, but not more so than in most of our ships, which are fully twenty-five years behind the times. Here they might meet and organize and drill and train, and I feel confident they would take great pride in their work. At some convenient season they might be drafted for a brief cruise afloat. Something of this nature could be readily carried out also at other places. Why not organize into ship's-companies and let the officers look after the details of the work? They will do it willingly, and are only too anxious for the opportunity. In some such way, it strikes me, a Naval Reserve might be instituted without any very great expense, and to the great satisfaction of all concerned. All it needs is the slightest encouragement and countenance from the general Government. There would have to be a headquarters for managing the Reserve, located in the Navy Department at Washington, with a sufficient staff, drawn partly from the Reserve itself, and with representatives located in each district.
The officers and men of the Reserve, while undergoing drill and instruction at any naval rendezvous or station, or on board of any vessel, should be uniformed and cared for by the Government and receive credit for their service. When called out for service in the Navy the Reserve men should be treated in all respects as our regular continuous-service men, and given equal pay and allowances. The Reserve man might receive a small annual retaining fee, and while on drill should be paid according to his grade in the regular service. Continuous service in the Reserve should be attended with the same privileges and advantages as in the regular service. The advantages to be derived from belonging to the Reserve should be made as attractive as possible and promulgated to all interested. Applicants for enlistment in the Naval Reserve should be in sound health, of good character, and not above, say, thirty-five years of age, unless they had seen previous service in the regular Navy. The enrollment should be for five years, and the Reserves should be required to drill for about two weeks afloat each year and encouraged to do much more ashore. Schools of instruction should be available for the officers, and they might be permitted to enjoy the courses at the War College and Torpedo Station. Reserve officers should be allowed every facility for perfecting themselves in their duty by being attached to ships in commission on certain occasions of general exercises and manoeuvres, and at stations where instruction could be received. Vessels ready for active service, and manned with reduced crews, should be detailed for drilling the Reserve, and, at times, the men might be drafted directly for brief periods to the regular cruisers along our coasts. Service in the Reserve should interfere as little as possible with the ordinary occupations of its members, and they should be permitted to do their drilling at the most convenient time for themselves. Many excellent men who would like to join might not be able to have their berths kept open or to get leave from their employers for the full annual term of service required. Such might make up the necessary period at different times. The number of days' annual training should be sufficient to admit of some target firing with small arms, as well as great-gun drill and other exercises. To train a very great number of Reserve men during the same time, at any one station, would be impracticable, because accommodations could not be afforded, to say nothing of rifle ranges and other needed equipments.
The days of receiving ships, I think, are numbered, and our regulars will ultimately be quartered in barracks while ashore. Modern ships will hardly be appropriate for this service, and the old hulks cannot last always. This change will be a great benefit in many ways. We should not, ourselves, like to live on shipboard always, neither do the men. A change of quarters is beneficial to them, and when at sea they will look forward with pleasure to a little tour of barrack life, and from barracks they will likewise enjoy a change to the ship. Properly equipped barracks at the different naval stations would afford excellent quarters and a meeting ground for the Reserves, There they could be organized and drilled conveniently, and doubtless it would be an advantage to both Reserves and Regulars to meet each other. In localities where drill ships could not be furnished, drill batteries and barracks with rifle ranges might be established for the benefit of the Reserves. In training our Naval Reserves, practical efficiency should be the aim and object. They should be instructed only in those things which bear on the practical work they will have to perform. The Reserve is to meet the demands of war, and its people should be trained only to fight, and to take their places at short notice on vessels equipped and ready for such an emergency. The regular naval contingent would generally supply ships with their leading officers and men, while the Reserve would be called upon to furnish the main fighting portion of her complement.
The whole subject of establishing an efficient Reserve for the purpose of furnishing crews to our fleet in war is intimately connected with that of manning the Navy in peace. The force of regular men-of- war's-men now enlisted in the Navy should assist in maintaining a trained and disciplined Reserve. Unfortunately, at present, a very large proportion of our men are foreigners; but this is very wrong, and might be greatly changed if the prospective advantages offered to young American youth who volunteered to select the Navy as a calling were greater. Liberal rates of pay must be offered and higher classes of leading men established; besides, the position of petty officers should be greatly improved. Then they should not have to look forward to an interminable life-long service of active cruising, but be eligible, after a certain period, for shore and harbor service. A man-of-war's-man has nothing to look forward to when serving but his bare pay, and in order to secure a good class of petty officers and re-enlisted men, sufficient prospective advantages should be offered them. Nothing will so bind a sailor to the service as the sure prospect of being cared for when old and worn out. And nothing will more surely attract a valuable class of men to the Navy than the knowledge that their pensions will, in part at least, be continued to their families. A service pension will have great attractions. After, say, twenty-five years of faithful service, all enlisted men should be permitted to retire on three-quarters pay, and should be liable, if under fifty-five years of age, to be called out for active service in case of emergency. Such men would need no training. No reserves we can ever secure will be equal to men who have passed a term of active service on board ships of war. The whereabouts of all men who have served in the Navy could be known at slight expense, and these alone would afford a most valuable reserve. There is a strong desire on the part of men who have served to be identified in some way with the service, and all those who do not wish to re-enlist should, on discharge, be encouraged to join the Reserve.
We have at present no power of expanding an establishment barely sufficient for peace purposes, into a navy prepared for war. We should, at least, always have the means of sending forth a fleet with alacrity, and in sufficient strength to hold possession of our own waters.
Our Revenue Marine might be recruited from the Navy, forming a trained reserve at all times ready for service. Every enlisted man of good character, after having served a sufficient number of continuous enlistments in the Navy,—say three,—might be eligible, upon recommendation, for the Revenue Marine, as a reward for faithful conduct. And this service, after being regularly attached to the Navy, might be increased and utilized for guarding our coast and instructing the Reserves. By keeping the Revenue Marine thus manned by regulars, they would at all times be available for transfer to fighting ships, when their places could be filled by less trained recruits. In this way we should hold in reserve a strong body of trained seamen, all accustomed to the discipline of a man-of-war and familiar with its requirements.
Let us hope our people may soon be awakened to the necessity of putting forth some of their vast strength in the direction of national defense. From our commanding position we have looked abroad across the seas and seen no danger of aggression, and having no hunger of conquest, we have simply devoted all our energies to internal improvement. But now that we have accomplished so much within our own borders and have accumulated so much to protect, since the means of communication are multiplying and distance is being annihilated, and we find the world getting smaller and the nations nearer together, let us, like a giant refreshed by long peaceful slumber, set about building up our broken-down hedges and repairing our ruined walls, and with our abundant millions of accumulated wealth let us go forth and make ourselves impregnable.
DISCUSSION.
Mr. J. W. Miller.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—When a mere lad—some twenty years ago—it was my good fortune to be under the instruction of the eminent gentleman whose able essay we have heard to-night. I thought then, what I know now, that in dealing with the various professional subjects, whether seamanship, navigation, or gunnery, he invariably approached them from the broadest possible standpoint. It is, therefore, more of a pleasure than a surprise to me to-night to note the zealous and patriotic way in which he has handled the subject of the Naval Reserve, and to find, also, that he has gone into so many details regarding the matter ; but I am rather afraid he has knocked the wind out of my sails. However, the subject is such a great one, especially in the light of its relation to the country, to the state, to commerce, the various maritime interests, to yachtsmen, the Life Saving Service, and the Revenue Marine, that it is perhaps well that at least some discussion should be given to the essay. With that end in view, I shall take the liberty of reading a few remarks that I have written, representing the view of an ex-naval officer.
Regarding the Naval Reserve from the point of view of an ex-naval officer, my attention is first drawn to the fact that there is distributed throughout the country a large body of men who have formerly been in the service, and who, collectively, might be made to be of great and immediate value to the Navy. Individually they are scattered so far and wide that any benefit would be neutralized unless they should be enrolled in some systematic manner. These men consist: First, of officers who served during the War; second, of recent graduates of the Naval Academy who, on account of the lack of vacancies in the various grades, have been forced to resign; third, of a small body of men who have served before the mast and who should be enrolled in the Naval Reserve. Upon the second class the Government has already spent money and time and should have its equivalent in return. It is scarcely too much to state that the young men who pass four years at the Naval Academy and then leave the service should be forced to join the Naval Reserve. It is due to the Government and due to them that they should continue to render an equivalent for the education received.
The enrollment of all the above classes should be on the basis of rank and rating which they had on leaving the service, provided they are physically, mentally, and morally qualified. Ex-naval officers (from the regular service) should also be entitled to the rank of their date or grade, provided that they can pass an examination corresponding to that of their contemporaries in the regular service, and that they could bring to the Naval Reserve a force in men and discipline equal to the command of their date and grade in the regular service. It will thus be seen that an ex-naval officer could not by virtue of his former rank, per se, obtain high position, but must add thereto work and brains in forming and systematizing gun's-crews, divisions, ship's companies, naval brigades and squadrons, until the result of his labors raises him from the lower rank in which he left the service through intermediate ranks to the highest obtainable.
To enlist the interest of the persons mentioned above, some inducements similar to those given the militia must be offered. In order to combine the personnel, the coast and lakes should be divided into geographical districts. A gunnery vessel should be stationed at the headquarters of each district ; this vessel to be used for port drill only, and to be analogous to the militia " armory." The vessel should be commanded by a regular officer, with the greater part of a small crew composed of "continuous service" men retired; a paymaster to enroll all seafaring men who volunteer, and to keep record of the same; but these seafaring men should not be entitled to join the Naval Reserve until they qualify in the regular gun's-crews, divisions, naval brigades, etc., of the district. Their qualifications to be determined by a Board of Control consisting of a "district captain" and five commissioned officers of Reserve. Each district to be divided into ship's companies of loo each with their officers. Ship's companies to consist of two divisions; each division to comprise two gun's-crews with their proper officers.
Objections may be raised to dividing the Naval Reserve by districts as outlined above. The rights and laws of States may interfere. In forming a National Naval Reserve, the traditions hostile to centralizing armed forces may feel outraged and the scheme may become unpopular. The better policy may be to allow each State to form its own sea militia in the same manner as it does its regiments, the general Government providing, on the request of the Governor, such ships, material and officers for instruction as the State may desire. The advantages of this system would be a praiseworthy rivalry between the commonwealths, a local development of maritime interest on the seaboard and lakes, and above all, at least an enrollment of seafaring men who in case of war would be at once available, and who when called into active service would be credited to the quota of the State from which called. This latter point is important: at the outbreak of the Rebellion no data of this kind existed, and neither the Navy nor the individual States got the credit for sea-going volunteers. The consequence in the past was, as it is in the present, and will be in the future, that the Navy, though regarded with pride, was not close to the hearts of the population.
The Naval Reserve commanded by ex-naval officers and organized by States will bring the Navy scattered over the globe into more intimate union with the country, the States and the people.
Lieutenant J. C. Soley, U. S.N. (Retired).—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—It is a very fortunate thing that we are going to discuss a matter here this evening upon which we all agree, and that is the necessity of a Naval Reserve ; and in view of the fact that we are all agreed on the necessity of it, it is unnecessary to criticise and condemn it.
What we want to do to-day is to try and unite all our opinions in such a manner as to develop a permanent and feasible organization. The nautical taste of our people is so strong that they will readily go, particularly those in the seaboard States, into any organization which has a naval basis.
We have seen that, apart or outside of the service, the efforts made by gentlemen who are fond of the sea, and who are devoted to aquatic pursuits for their own amusement, have touched the keynote of the necessities of our situation to-day. We want a Naval Reserve ; the only question is, how is the best way to obtain it. In the first place this able essay makes it absolutely unnecessary to dilate on the necessity for a Naval Reserve. We all know how much we need it ; we all want it, and we are all going to have it, but up to this time we have been in a state of apathy. The whole nation has been in a state of apathy. We have stood still and been willing to see other nations build vessels, thinking we could build ours after war had been declared by some foreign nation. But that has been proved to be practically an impossibility. We have got to build vessels for ourselves and now. We have got to build more vessels, and the more we build the better ones we will build.
I want to-night to propose a method for a plan for a Naval Reserve which I think will be feasible. Our peculiar federal relations make the subject a very delicate one to handle where it comes to a matter of military organization. The European organizations are suited to the nations to which they belong; none of them will suit our peculiar conditions. The federal relations provide for certain contingencies which are unknown amongst foreign nations ; their commercial relations are also different from ours.
Now we have had a bill presented in Congress, and the thanks of the service are due to the Senator from Tennessee for the valuable services he has rendered to the country and to the service in presenting his bill. Even if it is only a bill, we have passed the threshold. We have been living in a state of apathy heretofore, and now in the Senate of the United States, and amongst gentlemen who are devoted to yachting and aquatic pursuits, and in the Navy, we see the spirit cropping out all over, everywhere, of a desire to establish a Naval Reserve, and it shows the bond of sympathy between sailors. And we sailors, all of us, have got to take hold and man the deck tackles; we have got to lift the anchor from the sea of apathy and take hold and do our best for the service. We are all going to work for the service; nothing can be done in opposition to one another. The only thing that we have got to do is to work together and develop a suitable plan, and the bill for the Naval Reserve which has been introduced, as I have said, I consider a great boon to the service; but I do not suppose that the honorable Senator who introduced it considers that it is conclusive in its present form, and I speak with a great deal of hesitation when I say anything that approaches towards a criticism of it, because I am sure that with his experience in the halls of Congress, and particularly during the war, that the Senator from Tennessee has studied the matter of federal relations much more closely than I have. I can only speak from the standpoint of my associations with other men, who belong to militia organizations, who are in business, and whom I am constantly meeting from day to day. Therefore, I am not going to criticise the bill at all, as far as the Naval Reserve is concerned, but I do hope that when it comes to be more carefully studied, some of its provisions may be changed, and the plan that I am going to propose looks towards such a change.
In the third section of the bill it is provided that the officers shall be selected and commissioned by the State authorities, and I agree with it there entirely; but after that it says, "If found qualified by the Board of Naval Officers, they may be commissioned by the President, but the holders of such commissions have no claims upon the United States for pay or compensation." It seems that this is very anomalous, because the officers are commissioned in the first place by the State authorities, and after the State has given sanction to that commission they are to be examined by the naval officers to see if the State ought to give that sanction, and then they are to be commissioned by the President, but after they are commissioned by the President they shall have no claim on the United States for pay or compensation.
In the Whitthorne bill I have found another subject which I approach with the greatest hesitation, but as it has already been spoken of in the essay of the evening, I think it deserves serious consideration. Mention has been made of the necessity for paying a mileage or a subsidy for vessels to be used in the service. Now, so far as foreign nations are concerned, it is very true that in France the mercantile marine, with its maritime inscription, provides for the payment of large subsidies to vessels and for the enrollment of men. But we do not live under the same military organization as that of France, or one similar even to the English service. In the English mercantile marine I grant that they pay large subsidies for mail packets, but it is paid for handling the mail, and not with regard to the availability of the vessel for the service. It is, however, provided there in connection with the admiralty laws that vessels available in case of war may be called for and classed among ships available, and shipowners are requested to send in plans of their ships. If vessels are approved it is because they could easily be used, and they are given preference by the Government, which is informed as to the details of construction, equipment, arrangement of bulkheads, etc. These vessels aTe only to be called for in case of war and paid for. The shipowners, it is true, have asked extra compensation, but have not been subsidized. The English mercantile marine is the largest in the world. That is as far as they have been able to go.
Now, in reference to building up our mercantile marine: we want to secure a mercantile marine and the establishment of the Naval Reserve, but the building up of our commerce and of our mercantile marine must wait, for our commerce depends upon business considerations, and when it is best to do so we will have the commerce under our flag, but it is not best to have it now, and therefore we do not want it. If you have the Naval Reserve wait for commerce or make it in any way dependent on commerce, you will have no Reserve. The question of our maritime supremacy depends on matters connected with the tariff, and merchants and Congressmen must settle them. Try to connect your Reserve with political measures and you kill it. We cannot go to work to build up the mercantile marine, but we can build up the Naval Reserve. Make it possible for us to build vessels and our merchants will do it, but not by subsidies. In the first place the word is abhorrent to the average American, but allowing a rebate on dutiable articles would give shipbuilding an impetus together with building in private yards. As far as the personnel is concerned, the English system has only been partially successful.
Now there is another point to touch upon, and that is the organization of naval volunteers, which will lead more than anything else to cultivate the sense of sympathy between the people and the service; and naval officers must do a large share and render their best assistance in every way in order that they may strengthen themselves with the people. More attention should be paid to improving our relations with the civil authorities. The civil authorities represent the will of the people; and the establishment of closer relations with these officers will tend to create an interest in this matter which in time will lead to a good result. Now, that I may offer an example I will mention the manoeuvres at Newport, which has an admirable harbor, but we want to make the people feel that we are doing something by the fleet exercises and if the subject of the defense of the principal seaports like New York or Boston should be entered into, the whole question debated in the War College, and then if a fleet could go through their manoeuvres here, or in Boston, or Philadelphia, to show from this what can be done in defense of those ports, people will realize that the service is doing something for them. The moment that they realize that we are working actively for them they will turn around and work actively for us.
I do not agree with the point made in the essay, that the law providing for a Naval Reserve should deal only with general terms. The time is past when we shall treat any important measure in general terms. When I first began to think about the matter of the Naval Reserve, my attention was attracted to it by the duties to which I was assigned in Europe, where I had to study particularly the connection between the civil and the military administration of the French marine, and from my studies there, and my training as a naval officer, I felt that the organization of the Naval Reserve must be directed by the central government, and that the whole organization should be under the control of the Secretary of the Navy; but the more I have talked with men in civil life, and men who are interested in these matters, I find that there is a strong desire to belong to the Naval Reserve, but a feeling that the Naval Reserve should be on the same basis as the militia, and the plan which I offer and for which I ask the severest criticism, being perfectly ready to yield any point that does not seem to be desirable, is this: the Government has been for years training officers and men at Annapolis and in the training squadrons, and of these a large portion have gone into civil life. What better reserve do you want than these very men who have had an education from the Government, with support in their early years whether as cadet or apprentice, and who have now gone into civil life? But these people have been suffered to drift out of sight. Now this is the reserve which is of the first importance and which you can get. The whole Navy should look after this. These men were brought up in our schools, trained in our methods, and are familiar with our discipline; they have been trained and been paid for that training, and those are the men who belong to the Navy. Make these men officers and petty officers; get a certain amount of drill four or five days each year, but get hold of those men. Those are the first reserves; they belong to the Government and it is entitled to use them.
Now, in regard to the second reserve; as I said before, it is a delicate matter to handle because of our peculiar federal relations. We never want to come in opposition to those federal relations, and yet at the same time we want to manage so that there will be a quota of men following the sea, ready for service in time of war. In the last war we didn't have that quota. The States were called upon to furnish their men and they were put in the Army, and after some length of time the Navy got them back, but it was not for some time. In the interval it was difficult to get men in the Navy. Now it only requires volunteers. They will only volunteer in the expectation of some return. Call it the naval militia or naval reserve. This is a matter that requires some serious thought. All I say about it is, that we want to induce the seaport States to form a naval militia, leaving to them the organization, uniform, drill, and other affairs. The Government should assist them by every means in its power, loan them ships, guns and ammunition, and drill officers if they want them. But remember that it is a volunteer organization which will be, if properly handled, a powerful auxiliary to the Navy.
Now, I do not believe in talking about any plan unless it proposes something definite to be done. I have already had some conversation with the Adjutant General of the State of Massachusetts with regard to this plan, and I find that under the law it is perfectly feasible, and although the plan has not been definitely settled upon, it will require some legislation which I do not think there will be any trouble in getting. I wish to quote from the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts:
"Chap. II, Sec. VII.—The Governor of this commonwealth, for the time being, shall be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all the military forces of the State by sea and land; and shall have full power by himself, or by any commander, or other officer or officers, from time to time, to train, instruct, exercise, and govern the militia and navy; and for the special safety of the commonwealth to assemble in martial array and put in warlike posture the inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter, repel, resist, expel and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within or without the limits of this commonwealth, etc., etc."
It is proposed to form a Naval Reserve, or rather a Naval Battalion, and except as regards the Naval Battalion you will not find the plan differs very much from the one in the essay. It is proposed to form ship's companies at the principal seaports, and though I quote the State of Massachusetts as an example, it is perfectly feasible to take hold of it in the same manner in New York and in Connecticut or any of the seaboard States; but take Massachusetts for example. It is proposed to form one ship's company of one hundred men each, one at Gloucester, one at Marblehead, one at Sarem, two at Boston, one at Plymouth, one at Provincetown, and one at New Bedford. They will give about a thousand men for the Naval Battalion. The ship's companies are to be formed into divisions of fifty men each and gun's-crews. The officers are to be obtained in exactly the same manner as the officers of the State militia are obtained. The whole force will report directly to the Adjutant General of the State, because it is of no use to have a double military organization in the State, as it requires too much machinery. But in the Adjutant General's office of the State there is now a complete record of all the able-bodied men liable to military service, all it requires in addition is their occupation. Naturally the seafaring men who volunteer in the Naval Battalion should have an armory at each seaport, and the men instructed fully in the working of rifles and such things as they require on shore. They should ask the general Government to loan them a monitor which may be moved from one port to another at certain seasons during the year, to stay in each station for one or two weeks, in order to allow gun-crews in turn to get proper practice and go on board and get that drill, and then, in the summer time it is proposed that the crews should be sent to sea for two or three weeks, and on board ship they should be given exercises at sea-firing at the target and so on.
Lieutenant R. P. Rodgers, U. S. N.—I have read Captain Cooke's capital paper with the greatest interest, and regard his presentation of this important and popular question as most fortunate; and as the creation of a Naval Reserve is being generally considered throughout the country, it is wise to have it fully discussed before the Naval Institute.
I presume all who have given attention to the question under discussion would agree that, from a naval or military point of view, the best personnel for a Naval Reserve would be obtained from a sufficiently large body of well trained men who have already served a prescribed term of years in the regular Navy and have retired from active naval service, either on a small retaining pension, or to other duties nearer home in one of the Government services which should be regarded as a part of the Naval Establishment, viz., the Revenue Marine, the Life-Saving Service, the Light House Service, the Coast Signal Service, the Coast Survey, the Fish Commission. But while this plan may be the most effective and rational for a country mindful of its coast defense and naval prestige, and is in general that of foreign powers such as England, France, Germany, Italy, etc., yet all must concur that under our American system it is impracticable in its entirety. There is no reason, however, why it should not be carried out in a measure, provided the necessary legislation were secured; but even then the Reserve thus secured from our small naval force would be insufficient to meet the demands of war, which entail a large increase of our fleet, with its vessels of various modern types—armor-clads, cruisers, coast-defense vessels, torpedo boats, etc.
Granted this, the next plan which suggests itself to many as most desirable is a National Naval Reserve, drawn by voluntary enlistment from the mercantile marine and that portion of the population finding employment on the water; controlled, trained and maintained by the national Government. While this plan presents most desirable features, it offers some objections, the chief of which are cost, difficulties of administration, and the insufficiency of the trained force so enrolled to meet alone the demands and needs of the country.
The third plan of enrolling in the coast and lakeboard States, as additional to the force possible under plans 1 and 2, a naval militia from which organized commands may be voluntarily formed after the method of the National Guard, presents features which offer returns in point of numbers, organization, training, and local interest and support, which probably can be obtained in no other way in this country at so small an expenditure.
The subject of creating Naval Reserves in the United States has been discussed by naval officers and others for some years past, and while there have been published many general ideas relating to it, there has not, I believe, been presented any definite plan for the creation of a Reserve of men, officers, and auxiliary naval vessels adapted to the country's needs for the defense of the coasts and the manning of the fleet in time of war, until the present session of Congress, when Mr. Whitthorne introduced his bill for this purpose in the House of Representatives. It is true that Mr. Whitthorne had introduced a similar measure into the Senate during the last session of the last Congress, but that bill, presented near the close of the session, was not nearly so comprehensive and far-reaching as the one which he has now framed, and which is now before the Naval Committees of both houses for discussion.
A careful examination of this bill, to which Captain Cooke has this evening referred, and to which he has, I think I may say, given his assent and support, will show that it affords authority and machinery for the executive branch of the Government to ascertain the nautical or naval population of the country, to prescribe and superintend in general the organization, instruction and training of the personnel of the various branches of the Reserves enrolled, and to secure the war services of the best United States merchant steamers which may be adapted for the purpose of increasing our comparatively small number of cruisers—to prey upon the enemy's commerce, to engage similar cruisers, to accompany the fleet as scouts, despatch and torpedo vessels, etc.
I invite your attention to the several sections of the bill and venture to present to you my views upon them.
Section 1 provides for the enrollment of a Naval Militia (unorganized) in the States and Territories bordering on the sea and lake coasts and navigable rivers; to include all men, between the ages of 18 and 45, engaged in navigation, the construction of ships and crafts, ship-owners and employes, yachtowners and members of yacht clubs, and all ex-officers and ex-enlisted men of the Navy.
This section should be regarded as of great importance, as establishing the right of the Government to the services of a certain portion of its citizens for duty in the naval establishment, as well as in the army, in the event of war.
Under the existing militia laws all persons between the ages of 18 and 45 shall be enrolled in the militia. But as no naval enrollment has heretofore been made, no provision has ever existed for assigning naval quotas to States in case of war, and during the civil war great difficulty was found in supplying sufficient men to man the fleet. In fact, it was only by arrangement and adjustment between the Navy and War Departments, by which some of those drafted or forming part of the States' quotas could be and were transferred from the Army to the Navy, that men were to be had in sufficient numbers for our ships. This section provides for this deficiency in the future, and under it the Government will be in position to know, with sufficient exactness, the number of men available for naval duty, and to assign the naval quotas for the States.
Letters received at the Navy Department in answer to a circular addressed to the authorities of different States indicate that but little difficulty will be encountered in executing the requirements of this section.
Sections 2 and 3 provide for the organization of certain commands under the State militia laws by voluntary methods, indicate the units of organization, and prescribe that the further organization, equipment, and officering of these shall be subject to regulations established by the President ; thus ensuring uniformity throughout the country.
The Naval Reserves of this branch are under this plan to be divided into two bodies or branches:
1. The Naval Reserve Artillery.
2. The Naval Torpedo Corps.
The first to be trained to the use of guns, rifles and other small arms, the handling of boats, target practice afloat and ashore, and be made, as far as practicable, acquainted with man-of-war life and discipline. In time of war this force furnishes the fleet with gunners and men trained to the use of arms, of all kinds.
The second, to be trained to the use of torpedoes, torpedo boats, mines, mine-laying, countermining, electric search lights, etc., furnishes the crews of torpedo vessels and boats, and the torpedo complements of other vessels.
The battery of Naval Reserve Artillery is to consist of not less than 80 men. This force would furnish five full gun's-crews of 16 men each, or ten half crews of 8 men each, which is nearly the exact number required to man the battery of six 5-inch B. L. R. and six R. F. G. or machine guns, prescribed for the battery of an auxiliary cruiser.
The crew of the Naval Reserve Torpedo Corps is also placed at 16. This is the number generally assigned torpedo boats abroad, and admits of easy development or assemblage into a mining crew.
While these sections indicate the general features of organization, the details of such are left to the Navy Department, under the President, and would doubtless be arranged by a board appointed by him.
Section 4 resembles the corresponding section in the United States Statutes for calling out the militia. But as the training of the Naval Reserves must differ from that of the National Guardsman in that the latter receives his instruction and drill at home, in the hours of rest or leisure, while with the Naval Reserve men these must be carried on at points removed from the homes of some, and in batteries, vessels, or boats especially adapted for the purpose. These conditions entail certain expenses for transportation, compensation for labor lost, etc.; and in order that this naval training may be effective, and commensurate with the expenditure made, it is essential that it should be continuous through a period of several days or weeks, and for this reason the second and third conditions under which the President may call out the Naval Reserves (for annual drill and training) are added.
So much of the bill relates to the Reserves organized under State laws.
It may be objected that there are constitutional difficulties in prescribing regulations concerning the organization, instruction, and equipment of the commands of the several States, but in reply I would refer to the present militia laws which have existed in the United States Statutes from the foundation of the Government, and which contain prescriptions much more detailed than any to be found in the Whitthorne bill. I believe Mr. Whitthorne has studied the constitutional aspect of the bill from the strict-construction point of view and feels secure in his position.
Sections 9, 10, 11 provide for the enrollment of another class or branch of Reserves, known under the bill as the Navigating Naval Reserve, which may be regarded as the national contingent of the Naval Reserve forces.
This class will be drawn from the officers, quartermasters, seamen, engineers, firemen and others employed in merchant steamers, and yachtsmen. The officers and men must qualify before a naval board, and are to be voluntarily enrolled in the Navigating Naval Reserve for periods of five years. When so enrolled, they will be obliged to report once each year at a naval rendezvous, and, upon their continued fitness being established, they will receive certain graded compensations or retaining fees.
This body of officers and men would be separately enrolled, and it would have no organization or military coherence beyond the chance association in steamships which might be taken into the public service and in which officers and men might continue to serve. It would be desirable, and the endeavor should be made, to give this class a certain amount of annual training and instruction when the difficulties of doing so can be overcome. But in creating this branch of Reserves the Government would as a rule expect to reap greater advantages from the qualities already acquired in the every-day occupation of its personnel than from the result of the small amount of naval training which it might be possible to give.
The duties of the men of this branch, while of the greatest importance, do not necessitate training to the use of naval weapons. Men and officers in time of war would be detailed to vessels to which a complement of trained gunners or torpedoists were also assigned, and thus complete the ship's company.
It is, however, much to be desired that the officers of the Navigating Reserve should associate themselves with the local organizations at their home ports and embrace every opportunity for securing the benefits of its instruction and drill, and thereby add to their seamanlike qualities the habit of commanding trained men.
These sections also authorize the temporary voluntary enrollment of a steam yacht, or yachts, which may be adapted for certain services as auxiliary naval vessels to take part in the naval manoeuvres of the fleet, or in other naval drills for the purpose of instructing their personnel in the use of naval weapons and the art of naval warfare. The advantages of this clause I believe will be apparent to many of the yachtsmen of the country who have shown so much interest and who have taken so prominent a part in the Reserve movement.
There yet remains a most important clause in this section which authorizes (although it does not command) the enrollment of the personnel of the Life Saving Service, Light House Tender Service, Coast Signal Service, and the Revenue Marine in the Naval Reserves.
The men of these services (the Coast Survey and Fish Commission are already manned by men from the Navy) form the natural First Naval Reserve. They are already under Government pay; they are trained to the water and to the habits of discipline, and should the Executive desire to adjust the question between the Navy and Treasury Department, they could under this act not only be enrolled in the Naval Reserves, but be efficiently trained to naval warfare at but small additional expense to the Government. The advantages of this most reasonable proposition cannot be overestimated in considering this question.
Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 provide the means of securing the services of those United States merchant steamers found to fulfill certain conditions for war purposes, and encourage the building of faster and safer steamers especially adapted for service as cruisers in time of war. It is proposed under these sections to give a mileage compensation based on tonnage, speed, and distance steamed annually, to any steamer found by a Naval Board to fulfill the Navy Department's requirements for auxiliary cruisers and capable of maintaining a speed of 14 knots or more per hour for 24 hours. The maximum compensation, 30 cents per net ton per 1000 miles steamed, is to be awarded only to those steamers capable of maintaining a speed of 18 knots, while for those whose speeds range from 18 knots down to 14 the compensation is to be graded by a suitable board. The speed condition is not so essential for Lake steamers, because the fastest United States steamer will surely be the fastest of any on the Lakes. Probably the highest speed there does not at present exceed 13 knots. With our present mercantile fleet it is believed that there are not more than 30 steamers which can fill the conditions of these sections. There are also a few steam yachts which fill the requirements, but these would receive no mileage compensation under the act. The steamers receiving compensation will be held subject to the Government's order in time of war or emergency, and must carry a crew which include a certain number of American citizens.
Having pointed out the prominent features of this plan, let us see what results may be fairly expected of it. The object of creating a Naval Reserve is to provide in time of peace for the demands of war for a great increase of the enlisted men of the Navy, a much smaller increase of officers, and for additional vessels which may be especially adapted for naval service as auxiliary cruisers, torpedo and despatch vessels, etc., etc. For the latter we must depend upon our mercantile fleet; as it improves, so will our additional cruisers improve in character and number.
For the supply of officers we must also look to the mercantile marine, other governmental marine services (other than the Navy), ex-officers of the Navy of whom there are probably some 300 to 400 in different parts of the country), yachtsmen, and others interested in naval matters. There would probably be little difficulty in officering the increased fleet, so far as numbers are concerned, but there would be much greater difficulty in getting a sufficient supply of trained men.
The Whitthorne plan furnishes two methods of supply : first, from the organized commands of Naval Militia, and second from the Navigating Reserve.
Considering the first source of supply, it is estimated that the strength of the unorganized naval militia would be in the rough about 300,000. Applying to this the highest percentage of organized militia (National Guards) to unorganized militia in any State, 5 per cent, we may fairly assume that in time some 15,000 men might be organized into the commands of the Naval Reserves of the States on coast and lake-board.
Considering the second source of supply, the Navigating Reserve, it is stated in official reports that there were, in 1886, engaged in United States vessels of the foreign, coasting and lake trade some 25,000 American citizens. At the same time the number of British subjects employed in British vessels was 162,000. Now, the authorized strength of the British Naval Reserve, which resembles in principal features those of our Navigating Naval Reserve, is 30,000 enlisted men and 920 officers, but in numbers actually enrolled it has never exceeded 17,500 men and 325 officers. This is about 11 per cent of the available force from which to draw. Granting that similar results should attend the organization of a similar force in this country, which is perhaps doubtful, we should have enrolled about 2800 officers and men, of which but a proportion would be efficient, as the total number drawn from includes all classes employed on board ship.
From the Life Saving, Light House Tender, and Coast Signal Services, and from the Revenue Marine, the Navigating, or National, Reserve might draw some 3300 excellent officers and men capable of most efficient service after some instruction and training.
This force of some 20,000 Reserves would wonderfully increase our naval strength, and, supposing ourselves to be possessed of a suitable fleet, would permit us to mobilize it and to take the sea upon short notice to defend our coasts and great cities (for the defense of these to be secure must be a naval defense), and to attack the enemy's commerce upon the outbreak of war.
And how is this force composed? As the summary I have given shows, of about 3300 men and officers from Government marine services, which should be regarded as connected with and forming part of the naval establishment—men already disciplined, already maintained by the Government, and who with little difficulty could be trained to use of arms ; of about 2800 men and officers drawn from the yachtsmen and the deep-water mercantile marine, whose services are secured to the Government by a yearly retainer, and from whose number the Navy would chiefly expect to recruit its seamen, quartermasters, engineers, and firemen, and a number of officers of the highest type. This Navigating Reserve, or National Reserve, thus gives us a possible 6000 valuable men (supposing the services under the Treasury to be enrolled), only a portion, perhaps but a small portion, of which would be trained to the use of arms.
The remaining 15,000, of the Naval Reserve Artillery and Naval Reserve Torpedo Corps, are to be organized under the States, and instructed and trained in vessels, boats, or batteries, and under instructors supplied by the general Government. These bodies of men will have the advantages of organization, regular instruction and training under their own officers, who in active service would continue to command them. They will receive the support and encouragement of their local or home interest, and would be especially available from their local knowledge for service in coast and harbor defense vessels, torpedo boats, etc., at their home ports, as well as for the manning of auxiliary cruisers and for filling out the nucleus of trained men-of-wars-men in vessels of the regular fleet.
I do not believe that in any other manner can so large a number of trained men be at present secured to our proposed Naval Reserves at so small an expenditure, and I think that the definite plan which Mr. Whitthorne has introduced deserves the support of all interested in the creation of a Naval Reserve, and that it furnishes the authority and foundation upon which a most useful and efficient institution may be built by those whose duty it will be to shape its organization and regulations.
Lieutenant S. A. Staunton.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—In discussing Captain Cooke's excellent paper, I am naturally led to speak of the legislative measure introduced to the present Congress by Mr. Whitthorne, of Tennessee. In this bill the general features of a comprehensive scheme to organize a Naval Reserve are outlined, while a wide scope of judgment and all details are left to the Executive. The wisdom of this large executive discretion will not, I am sure, be questioned ; the idea of a Naval Reserve, although old enough in theory, is quite new in its application in the United States, and it is to be expected that any organization of the kind must be moulded and changed by actual experience before it fully meets the needs that demand its creation.
I am glad that Captain Cooke advocates this bill ; and I think his objections to state organizations for Naval Reserve purposes may be somewhat modified by fuller explanation and argument. These objections are held by a number of naval officers who dislike anything like state control and who maintain that efficiency can be obtained only by national control. We cannot as yet be dogmatic on this point, but we have a right to reason from analogy. The regiments of national guards are recognized as a valuable army reserve, and there is no good reason why batteries of reserve artillery and crews of reserve torpedo men, organized by the states, should not be equally valuable as a naval reserve. No questions of tactics or mobilization make the latter scheme more impracticable than the former. A regiment of national guards, when called out by the President and mobilized for war service, will be transported to any point where its strength is needed—the same with a battery of artillery or a torpedo crew. The latter will not probably be removed to a greater distance from the homes of its members than the former. In fact, nearly all of the torpedo crews and many of the batteries would fight upon and defend the ground familiar to them from boyhood. It is expected that the full measure of advantage, possible to be realized under any circumstances from neighborly association, home defense, and everything that is included in local esprit de corps, would be obtained in these state naval reserve commands.
The bill has received much thought and study from Mr. Whitthorne and from the naval officers to whom he has applied for facts and professional opinion. Its provisions keep carefully within constitutional limitations and follow closely those precedents which are most applicable.
It is in line with the militia laws, giving only slight additional powers to the President, which the character of training and drills renders advisable. Among many endorsements and favorable notices from the press the bill meets some opposition; it has been violently assailed by the Boston Herald, which calls it "a gigantic subsidy scheme," and "roughly estimates" the cost to the country of mileage compensation at $50,000,000 per annum.
A naval board of inspection has during the past five years been making reports upon merchant vessels visiting the port of New York, and a similar board has existed at San Francisco. The reports of these boards indicate only 26 steamships (and they include all except perhaps two or three Atlantic coasters which do not touch at New York)—20 in the Atlantic and 6 in the Pacific—that meet the speed requirement of this bill ; of these 15 have a sea speed for 24 hours of 14 knots, 1 of 14 ¼, 3 of 14 ½, 5 of 15, 1 of 16 ½, and 1 of 17. The majority have the lowest rate of speed to which Mr. Whitthorne's bill grants any compensation whatever, 'and only two have over 15 knots. Not one could receive the maximum compensation, and all would require much fitting and alteration to prepare them for service. It is not speed alone, but other requirements as well, that determine the amount given; and these requirements, in the language of the bill, "may be modified from time to time," i. e. as the demands of naval construction vary with the progress of naval warfare.
It is fair then, and probably results in more than they would actually receive, to allot to these 26 vessels the average compensation provided by the bill, and to call this average one half the maximum for each class, L e. 15 cents per net ton per 1000 miles for vessels in the foreign trade, and 10 cents per net ton per 1000 miles for those in the coasting trade, since the compensation may vary between nothing and this maximum. The actual distances made in one year by 17 of these vessels are known. Estimating the remainder on the basis of those known, and computing the average compensation as above, we have a round sum of $300,000 per annum as the compensation paid to 26 vessels. This differs materially from the fifty millions of the Boston Herald.
The mileage compensation is not a subsidy, either in terms or intention. It is a retaining fee for future service, obtained by building ships to meet the demands of war. It creates no monopoly—the essential feature of a subsidy— but is open to competition. It is so much money expended for naval efficiency and the common defense. Whatever effect it may have in stimulating shipbuilding and American commerce is a move in the same direction and to the same end.
The same paper asserts that the bill authorizes the states to "create navies, with all their pomp and ceremony." This is as much in error as the financial statement. What the bill does authorize is that the states may raise men to whom the United States supplies arms, equipments and vessels for training, instruction and drill. The vessels will always be under the command of regular naval officers, and the government property always under their responsible care.
Until recently the sole idea of a Naval Reserve has been that formed by the enrollment of seafaring men—the best part of the American merchant service—who were to be trained in the use of arms and were to constitute our needed strength ; the same class of men, a certain number of whom are proposed by Mr. Whitthorne as the Navigating Naval Reserve. There is a good deal of valuable material here, and it would perhaps be easy enough to enroll a considerable number; but the practical difficulties of training these men have not been taken seriously into account.
Fifty years ago, when a gun was a piece of cast iron with a hole in it, fired by a match and throwing a solid shot, little special training was necessary to make of a merchant sailor a man-of-warsman. Seamanship was all essential, and disciplined courage was worth more than skill in gunnery when actions were decided by boarding. It is no disparagement to former achievements to assert that what succeeded then would probably fail now. Complicated weapons need special training, thorough and long continued.
The American deep-sea sailor is not available for this training. He makes long voyages of uncertain duration; his returns to his domicile are irregular and unreliable. A body of such men, enrolled in one of our ports, could never be brought together at any one time for purposes of drill. At the best a majority of them could be obtained in squads of 2, 5, or 10 at a time ; necessitating the permanent maintenance of a drill-ship or barracks and staff—an expensive measure—and failing totally to obtain those advantages that spring from the coherence and association of an organized body. England, with her magnificent body of English seamen, has tried this scheme, has used every effort to make it successful, and with results so much inferior to what was hoped, that they offer no encouragement to similar attempts in America.
The Whitthorne bill proposes a division of labor. It ,will enroll the best seamen, pay them an annual fee, and when they are needed, put them in stations where they can best use their professional knowledge. With each man the Government makes an individual contract. It does not attempt to organize them, but drills them whenever it can do so.
The other people, the state organizations, are men that can be found at any time, and that can be drilled a few weeks in each year, paying them enough to make it an object for them to obey the call. These will be taught as much as possible, and will fight the guns ; the others will sail the ship. It is not an ideal arrangement, but we have not ideal powers, and we must do as well as we can. I think it may be confidently said that Mr. Whitthorne has indicated fair possibilities and pointed out a probable solution of a difficult problem.
It is perhaps appropriate to this discussion to sketch a plan of organization which has been suggested to carry out the provisions of the Whitthorne bill ; a plan which has received no official endorsement, but which has been produced as the result of a pretty thorough examination of the subject by several officers.
The only prescription in the bill as to the details of its execution is that which puts the minimum strength of the units of organization at not less than 4 officers and 80 petty officers and men for the battery of Naval Reserve artillery, and not less than i officer and 16 petty officers and men for the torpedo crew. These numbers are not taken at random, but are based upon the following considerations. The crew of a 5-inch or 6-inch B. L, R. is 8 men, and that of a R. F. G. or H. R. C. is 4 men. The battery assigned to an auxiliary cruiser of the first class will be six 5-inch or 6-inch B. L. R. and six R. F. G. or H. R. C. To man these will require six crews of 8 men each, 48 men, and six crews of 4 men each, 24 men ; a total of 72 men—leaving of the battery 8 men to fill the vacancies which occur in action, to work below in the magazines, or to act as riflemen in protected stations. It is expected that such an auxiliary cruiser, when taken into the service, will keep her force of engineers and firemen and quartermasters, already enrolled in the Navigating Naval Reserve. She will be commanded and officered by officers of the Navigating Naval Reserve and Regular Navy. She will be supposed to have her gun platforms fitted and her battery in store. It will only be necessary to put her armament on board and order to her a battery of reserve artillery to make her ready for service. Clerks, writers, certain artisans and servants will be supplied by voluntary enlistment while fitting out, as is now the case in the regular navy. Of these classes of men, from whom no military training is required, there is always a supply.
This strength, enough men and officers to man the batteries, principal and secondary, of a first-class auxiliary cruiser on a war footing, has therefore been taken as the unit of organization and administration. If less than 8 men are required to work a B. L. R. of the calibre employed—this will depend upon its mounting and the protection afforded by its shield—the force in reserve, which may be employed as riflemen or at light machine guns, will be proportionately increased; but it is safe at present to allow for this number to fight the guns with which the auxiliary cruisers will probably be armed. Eighty men gives us five full gun's-crevvs (crew and relief) or ten half crews, or twenty R. F. G. or H. R. C. crews. It is a convenient number for subdivision ; and for assignment to cruisers of the second class, to gunboats and armed transports and despatch vessels, it would be so subdivided. The unit of subdivision—tactical but not administrative—would be the full crew of 16 men, containing 4 petty officers of different ratings, at least 2 of whom should be instructed in armorer's duties, the care and preservation of weapons. This crew would never be broken up in service ; it would be the smallest detail of Naval Reserve artillery made to any vessel. Such a crew, for example, with an ensign or junior lieutenant in command, would be assigned to a despatch vessel armed with two to four rapid-fire guns, or to a gunboat armed with one gun of large calibre.
The battery will be commanded by a lieutenant, with a junior lieutenant and two ensigns as assistants. When the battery is embarked as a whole, all its officers will accompany it ; when subdivided, the lieutenant will command the larger portion and the junior lieutenant the smaller one ; if broken up into more than two details, an ensign will have a separate command. Many of these batteries will be needed to man ships of the regular navy in the event of war. The permanent establishment will never be sufficient to supply crews for all national ships—battle ships, cruisers, and coast defense vessels. The regularly trained force of seamen and gunners will be detailed in due proportion to all of these classes ; probably it will also be found advisable to send a limited number of them on board the principal auxiliai-y cruisers in order to aid by their knowledge and skill the efficiency of that service. All the vacancies thus made in the complements of regular ships will be filled from the reserve artillery. These duties—to reinforce the regular navy and to man the batteries of the auxiliary navy—it is confidently expected this artillery reserve will faithfully and efficiently perform. Its principal details will be in the auxiliary cruisers and harbor defense ships ; its officers while embarked will be marine artillerists only, and not eligible to command nor to navigation duty, unless they have qualified under the examinations held for candidates for the Navigating Naval Reserve. When so qualified they would be eligible for any naval duty, and all reserve officers would be encouraged and aided to so qualify. Many joining the organizations in the large maritime cities would be ready to do so at once.
Should it be deemed advisable to make the batteries larger, it would be done by adding integral gun's-crews of 16 men each—i. e. making the strength 96, 112, or 128, with a corresponding increase in the number of commissioned officers, first by adding one junior lieutenant, and after that by adding ensigns. The gun's-crews might then be so organized as to provide bodies of young and unmarried men for cruiser service, leaving the older men to supply the coast and harbor defense ships. I do not suggest such an increase as desirable, but merely to show the flexibility of the bill. It is probable that the strength discussed will be large enough and that increase will not be found necessary.
The strength of a torpedo crew is fixed at 16 men; this is the number required, according to European experience, for the crew of an ordinary torpedo boat with two discharging tubes, and includes firemen and seamen, all trained to torpedo warfare, and the seamen trained to the use of small arms and machine guns. The submarine mining crews have been allotted the same number of men. Four such crews—64 men and 5 officers (a lieutenant would be added to command the whole)—make a submarine mining company of sufficient strength to manipulate the fixed defenses of a port with only one channel of entrance. This is the force allowed in England, and is considered as the minimum. The bill permits the crews, if too small, to be increased at executive discretion.
There is no lack of testimony to the value of local knowledge and habit in submarine mining; all foreign experience bears evidence in its favor, and all foreign progress in this branch of warfare possesses the feature of enlisting and training a permanent local personnel. Knowledge of the tides, of the bottom, of shifting sands and floods in rivers, is all-important. Yachtsmen and pilots, fishermen and boatmen, men from local steamers and harbor tugs, with a sprinkling of locomotive engineers, mechanics and electricians, are to be the backbone of our future Volunteer Torpedo and Submarine Service. As much as possible we shall take into it men of acquired skill in kindred pursuits and of quick resource and unfailing nerve. The crack locomotive engineer who can endure the nervous strain of running his engine 50 miles an hour, will not fail to stand by his post when his boat is steered into an enemy's fleet.
The bill provides that the organization, uniform, equipment, etc., shall be the same in all the states and territories. This is essential, and gives to the force, when called into the service of the United States for war or training, a national character. At the request of state authorities, officers and petty officers of the navy may be detailed to act as inspectors, instructors and assistant instructors of the reserve forces. This insures a uniform system of instruction and drill, and further increases their national character and unity.
An estimate has been made in the report of the Fortifications Board, appointed under the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, of the number of mines, electric lights, and torpedo boats with which our coast should be supplied as a second line of defense. The number of mines is about 5000, of electric lights 200, and of torpedo boats 150. Allotting a crew to each torpedo boat, and a sufficient number of crews to work the mine fields and electric light apparatus, gives us about 300 crews or 4800 men that should be organized and trained in this specialty of warfare.
If engaged in war we should commission all our ships, old and new—everything that could carry a gun—and all the auxiliary cruisers ; and would add to our fleet with our best energies. All complements would be increased, and we should need at least three times our present enlisted force (which, including boys under training, is 8250) or 25,000 men, an increase of 16,750. If, as indicated in Lieutenant Rodgers' remarks, 6000 of these could be obtained from the Navigating Naval Reserve and the Government services of a nautical character, we should still have to look to the Naval Reserve artillery for 10,750, which, with 4S00 torpedo men, would make necessary over 15,000 men in the state organizations to supply our demands. With the required batteries and crews to fill vacancies and keep up our naval strength in a war of any duration, these figures would be increased. Lieutenant Rodgers has placed the strength of our naval militia at 300,000 ; an organized strength of 6 per cent would therefore produce about the force that we need.
Should the bill become a law, the interest that has been felt and expressed throughout the country in the creation of a Naval Reserve can at once find a channel of action. Yachtsmen, gentlemen of leisure, members of shipping firms, ex-naval officers and others, can obtain commissions from the governors of their respective states and raise batteries or crews. When organized and properly authenticated by the state authorities to the Secretary of the Navy, rifles, ammunition, and machine guns will be supplied to these commands ; also naval commissioned and petty officers in due proportion to instruct in their use.
Setting up, calisthenics and gymnastics, the manual of the piece, sword and bayonet exercise, target firing, the school of the company, and the drill of machine guns, can be given quite as well to the Naval Reserve as to the National Guard ; and in many places the same facilities—e. g. firing ranges—can be used. The compass will be taught, and the log and lead line—all the bits of nautical education that the men can understand and that the circumstances favor. The commissioned naval officer will instruct the reserve officers in an appropriately higher scale of effort, and will encourage and aid them to apply for United States commissions. Should a drill ship be moored in the vicinity, the battery will be taken on board for exercise as often as practicable. All this will be only preliminary nursing for the period of drill—the real work of the year—when the battery will regularly enter the Government service and receive systematic and thorough naval training.
The Naval Reserve artillery may be further organized into battalions, to contain four batteries and be commanded by a lieutenant commander; and regiments of two, three, or four battalions commanded by a commander. Two or more regiments in the same state may be brigaded and commanded by an officer of higher rank. The battalion organization would be of practical value for instruction in field drills, but the regiments and brigades would serve only for parades and reviews. The superior officers would have to be carefully selected from seamen eligible to naval command, as otherwise there would be no place for them on board ship. No staff organization would be necessary, as, whether at annual drill or taken in for war service, the reserves would form a part of the navy and be administered as such.
The Naval Reserve torpedo corps will include two district organizations, viz. the mobile force, or the crews destined to man torpedo boats, and the submarine force, intended solely for defensive mining. The training of these two forces will be quite distinct and their duties will not be interchangeable. In both classes individuals will be instructed and drilled as much as possible in the special duties which they are to perform. The demands of the service are of so high a character that they are best realized in this manner.
A considerable outlay in material and stations will be required for this training: boats for the mobile force and mining outfits for the submarine crews, but this is precisely the supply of war material demanded for the defense of our coasts.
The officers of the mobile force must all be nautical men, since they are to command cruising boats. No such qualification is of necessity demanded from the officers of the mining force, since they will not serve afloat.
Four crews of the mobile force may form a squadron, commanded by a lieutenant ; two, three, or four squadrons a flotilla, commanded by a lieutenant commander ; and two or more flotillas a division, commanded by a commander.
Four crews of the submarine force may form a company, a lieutenant commanding; two, three, or four companies, a battalion, a lieutenant commander commanding ; and two or more battalions, a division, a commander commanding. A company will usually be assigned to the defense of one point, and no port will require a larger force than a battalion.
The scheme is capable of results and is worth a trial. Its success, on the lines laid down, must depend upon the attitude of the people, their appreciation of our defenseless condition, and their desire to remedy it ; and the same is true of any other scheme which contemplates dependence upon naval volunteers. Mere details, about which we may all differ, should not stand in the way of any one's support of the bill. It must not be forgotten that it embodies a principle higher than all details, that of the "common defense and general welfare," and this should silence opposition and strengthen its friends.
Mr. J. Frederic Tams.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—The interests of the ex-naval officer and of the mercantile marine seem to be so well represented here that my remarks will be confined to a yachtsman's standpoint, and some of them, having been based on an advance copy of Captain Cooke's paper, and alterations having been made in the same since its receipt, do not now apply.
That the necessity of a Naval Reserve in this country has impressed itself on all classes who have given the subject any consideration seems to be an accomplished fact. The aim of all those who are working in a disinterested way for the establishment of a Naval Reserve is to provide the Government with material, in men and ships, fitted to a greater or less extent for the purpose, which it can, in time of need, make use of to fill up the skeleton or framework now furnished by the regular Navy.
Captain Cooke in his paper ably sets this forth, and the suggested plan of the general details of organization, etc., as stated by him are most excellent and practical.
He and many others, however, seem to have lost sight of the fact that a bill, H. R. 1847, is now before Congress, having been introduced in the House of Representatives January 4th inst. by Hon. W. C. Whitthorne. It has received its second reading and has been referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and is now in their hands for action. And in view of this fact it would seem that the time has come when the energies of those interested in the subject should be directed towards securing the form best adapted to the needs and peculiarities of this country, and consequently most likely to secure the best possible results, rather than in continuing the effort towards influencing public opinion.
Captain Cooke in the opening paragraph of his paper says : "A thoroughly feasible and useful scheme must be presented for consideration, with all the details for organizing and managing such a force carefully worked out." This would seem to be the natural corollary to the proposition contained in the preceding sentence in his paper, that " any law establishing a Naval Reserve should deal only with general terms, leaving the formulation of the necessary regulations to carry them into effect, to the proper authorities," the alternative appearing to be that the formulation of the details should appear in the bill. This latter would be almost an impossibility, or, to the extent to which it would be possible, would prove cumbersome and probably defeat its own ends. It is my opinion that it would be wise to leave as much as possible as regards details of organization to a board of well qualified naval officers, who would doubtless consult with representatives of the various classes interested. Captain Cooke goes on to point out that in order to obtain a feasible scheme, "all classes interested should have a voice in determining the plan, and what has already been done by others should be carefully considered in connection with our own requirements and limitations." The following ideas are therefore presented from a member of the yachtsman class.
Owing to the very nature of the element in which the Navy operates, material, whether men or appliances, must be specially adapted and prepared for the requirements, or it becomes an obstacle instead of an aid. The living material must have a liking for the field on which it is to perform, and must have acquired a greater or less familiarity with its characteristics and requirements, and must have received more or less training to enable it to make use of experience acquired, just as the inert material must be specially adapted in shape, construction, etc., to be of use in its way.
The material can be made to go towards the regular trained naval officer or specially constructed appliance but a short distance, and therefore the Navy must go to the material. In other words, it must be taken as it is and as much made of it as possible. Many naval officers do not grasp this fact, and forgetting the long years of drudgery through which they went and the continuous training which they are undergoing to attain and retain their present position, which is their life and occupation, and also losing sight of the fact that the material aforesaid is daily occupied in the battle of life and cannot be taken away from it except voluntarily and then at a definite loss to be expressed in dollars and cents, they either underestimate their own acquirements or overrate the abilities or expect too much of the material. On the other hand, few laymen, or rather few who have not been down to the sea in ships, can realize tire difficulties or understand the requirements of the case. Between the two, the poor volunteer, anxious to be of service, willing to make many sacrifices, instead of having the way for him strewn with roses, finds thorns and briars.
This view of the case would apply also to other classes of a Naval Reserve not formed exclusively from ex-naval officers.
If the services of yachtsmen would be of any value at all to the Government it could only be in one way, and that is as officers of some sort or another; and in this connection an extract from a letter from Admiral Gherardi, embodying his views on this point, will be of interest : "An available body of men, it seems to me, outside of the fishing and coasting fleets, are our amateur sailors, the gentlemen of the yacht clubs, who would form a body of intelligent and efficient officers. Their voluntary enrollment as a naval reserve, with the exemptions and rules similar to those accorded to the militia of the several States, would prove a service of the greatest maritime strength to the Government in case of war. Their proficiency in seamanship and general nautical knowledge would render their instruction by the officers of the Navy, in the many duties on board an armed vessel, an easy and agreeable task. This once accomplished, their value would be particularly felt in organizing a naval force from the blue jackets, unfortunately of nearly every nationality but our own, that find occupation in American bottoms."
To this class pecuniary inducements could not be offered, and not only would have no attraction, but if offered would have the contrary effect. The inducements should be in the nature of position, honorable consideration, promotion, and a right to fly, under proper restrictions, an ensign indicative of the United States Naval Reserve, instead of the burgee proposed in the Whitthorne bill. The ensign would prove a most potent factor, and would have a beneficial effect and lend dignity to the classes authorized to display it, as has been found to be the case in England, whose blue ensign is always found displayed on the ocean steamship or yacht whose captain has conformed to the regulations in the Naval Reserve entitling him to display it.
It is essential that the whole scheme should be, not of an honorary but of an essentially utilitarian character, in order to obtain the dignity and value necessary to insure its success. That the yachtsmen enrolled in a Naval Reserve should form a distinct and separate class, and be fitted to serve in positions of authority. That the inducements and rewards should be worthy and valuable, but not of a pecuniary nature, and that the representations of all sections of the yachting public should be considered.
Perhaps an intelligent and careful consideration of the bill now before Congress by all classes, and a presentation of the ideas resulting therefrom to the committee in charge of the bill, would lead to some practical result. With neither the time nor the desire on this occasion to go into the matter from the yachtsman's standpoint, attention is called only to the following:
First, as indicated at the beginning of this paper, the bill either goes too far or not far enough. In many respects Senate Bill S. 3320, introduced in the last Congress by Senator Whitthorne also, is not open to this criticism in that it is more general.
Second, the divisions mentioned do not seem to be definite enough, nor do they apparently recognize the separate classes into which all men likely to be enrolled would seem to resolve themselves naturally. To us they are as follows:
1. A suitable division for officers and men who have served in the Navy.
2. The mercantile marine :
a. Officers,
b. Men.
3. Fishermen, Life Saving, etc.:
a. Offshore,
b. Alongshore,
c. Life Saving Service.
4. Yachtsmen, or Volunteers, as it might better be called, to include all who would volunteer and qualify under the stated standard :
a. Owners of yachts and members of yacht clubs.
b. The officers and men employed on yachts.
In the case of volunteers their effectiveness would rather seem to increase with age up to a certain point, and the higher limit in the Whitthorne bill might with advantage be extended.
The true yachtsman's interest in the scheme for a Naval Reserve is a disinterested one. His time, his person, and, on the part of those who own yachts, in addition, his vessel, will be found in time of need at the service of the Government. All he asks is that he may be given a part in the scheme where his capabilities can be made use of to advantage, and in return receive proper recognition therefor.
Mr. Park Benjamin.—Mr. Chairman:—That part of the discussion which has been naturally of the greatest interest to me is that which has dealt with the position of the ex-naval officer and his relations to a Naval Reserve.
I would like to go into a little bit of history in regard to a reserve attempted to be created some sixteen years ago. I allude to it because in Mr. Soley's very able paper he lays so much stress upon the necessity of bringing in gentlemen who have been educated at the expense of the Government. I have seen it stated—I do not know how true it is—that the average cost of educating each cadet who graduates from the Naval School runs well up into the thousands. In some cases it has been estimated above $15,000.
If that is the case, there are many ex-naval officers who have cost the Government a large sum for their education ; and while I do not deem the Government has any legal right to demand their services, yet it undoubtedly has a very strong moral right to do so.
In the year 1873 a small collection of ex-naval officers, whose names I do not now mention, gathered here in New York, and with the sanction of the then Secretary of the Navy formulated a Reserve Corps scheme which proposed that all graduates of the Naval School and ex-naval officers who had served in the service in time of war, and who had honorably left the service, should be enrolled by the Secretary of the Navy as a Reserve Corps; that their names should appear in the Naval Register; that they should be given a nominal rank, and the grades of seniority which they would have held had they remained in the service. They were to do nothing in time of peace, but as soon as war was declared, by that act ipso facto they were drawn immediately into the service, subject to orders.
It always seemed to me whatever merit lay in that scheme rested in the uses to which these gentlemen were to be put. We had a small Navy then, and all the chance of a much smaller one. The idea was, in case of war, these gentlemen being educated in the discipline and conduct of the Navy, should be ordered at once to those duties for which their civilian experience best fitted them, that is, to equipment and recruiting work, to arsenals, gun factories and, in brief, to all those stations in which more or less practical business knowledge is needed. If they were wanted on active duty, then of course they performed the avocations of their grade. The main object was thus to free the entire active personnel of the Navy for service in the field.
I was informed at that time that that measure had gone so far that a bill was drafted and had received the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, and all necessary preliminaries were arranged for its introduction in Congress with a strong backing, when for some reason it was suggested that the provisions of the bill be published, and a brief synopsis was published—I think in the Army and Navy Jour7ial. The reception which was accorded to it by the service was so intensely antagonistic that the whole thing was dropped almost instantly. While individually I did not see a single naval ofiScer who did not seem to approve of it, yet collectively there seemed to be a great many objections to it.
I must dissent entirely from the suggestion of my very good friend and classmate. Miller, in which he favors ex-naval officers, or any one else, organizing battalions or companies after the fashion of volunteer officers of the late war. Not that that is not a very excellent and commendable service, but I do not think a man who happens to have the capacity to get together a company or a large following necessarily possesses the qualifications which are required of an officer. I think, also, any clause which would limit the period of office-holding to a definite length of time would be found rather an obstacle than otherwise. I am speaking now from the general tone of expression and opinion I have heard on this subject for upwards of sixteen years ; I do not think ex-officers would agree to it. I think that they would refuse to join under a five years' tenure of office, or under any limited tenure. There are not many of them, nor can it be expected that all would enroll themselves. But it seems to me that their value is such that there would be little sacrifice in giving them permanent office and their original seniority. Just as the last speaker said, the inducements offered must be especially of a sentimental nature. There is no man who has ever been in the service who does not feel the strongest attachment for it—an attachment far stronger than the alumnus of a college feels for his alma mater. Unless something of that kind, something of that feeling can be encouraged, I do not think much success will be obtained in drawing ex-officers together. I doubt greatly whether they will go in under such an organization as that of the militia.
I think we lose sight of the great difference between the training of naval officers and that of a graduate of West Point, When the latter goes back into civil life he may easily keep alive the military feeling. He can go into a militia regiment, but the naval officer cannot have recourse to any similar naval organization. If, however, a naval officer as soon as graduated, or at any time after that, had a right to enter into the Reserve Corps, no matter what his occupation might be afterwards, his connection with the Reserve Corps would keep him in touch with the service, so that if called back into actual naval work he would be in a position of utility. It seems to me whatever Reserve bill becomes a law there should be some provision for holding the former officers of the Navy in some such relation. Of course there are great difficulties in the way, and they become greater in putting ex-naval officers into positions merely on the basis of seniority. That is undoubtedly true. My friend and classmate, Mr. Miller, could probably go back into the service and none could assume the duties of a naval officer better than he could ; but, on the other hand, there are a great many men who have gone out whose course of life has been entirely different, who would probably be rejected as totally unfit for naval life. I think that is the great difficulty in putting back ex-naval officers on the basis of seniority.
I wish to apologize for referring to this limited view of a great subject, but I simply wanted to speak on that point of which I knew the most.
Captain James Parker.—Mr. Chairman:—Having been for about forty-two years connected with naval matters, first as an officer of the Navy, and, since my resignation in 1866, very intimately connected with the mercantile marine ; having a large acquaintance with almost all the persons who own vessels, or who are interested in vessels, in this country, I think I can throw some little light upon this subject.
There is an old statement—something of a "chestnut" I fear—an old receipt "How to cook a hare," and that begins, as I remember, by the statement "First catch your hare." We have been cooking the hare this evening exclusively. I propose to suggest some way to catch it. All these details that have been talked of, it seems to me, would be inappropriate in any bill. Mr. Whitthorne brought that bill to a committee of which I have the honor to be one, and he explained to us that he received it from the Navy Department. I have heard again its provisions most forcibly advocated by that officer of the Navy Department from whom Mr. Whitthorne said he had received it, in a letter (a communication) which has been read here.
Now, I believe in taking our Government as we find it. I believe, therefore, in the effort to enlist the States in this subject ; and I think, to that end, the provisions of the Whitthorne bill which are based upon our present militia laws are very desirable. I can see no reason why there should not be those local organizations for naval purposes, for the uses to which such organizations could very well be put to in time of actual war. I can see many reasons why such organizations should be encouraged, and why the naval militia law should be as much a part of the system of the country as the present military militia law, and quite as useful. But we must all remember that, in so far as the militia of this country has any connection whatever with the General Government, that connection only becomes felt when it is taken into the service of the General Government, and becomes a part of its army. It retains, in the case of the State regiments, their organizations ; its officers are appointed in the first place by the State. When they are mustered into the service of the United States they then become military officers of the United States, as much so as though they had passed their whole lives in the regular service ; their rank, their relation to the rest of the military affairs of the United States is fixed by the general law of the United States, and not by the militia laws at all. Now, that is what we want for a Naval Reserve. All the regulations which determine the character of the militia when it has gone into the army of the United States are those which pertain to the army of the United States. The regulations of war immediately apply; all the other regulations that belong to the army of the United States at once belong to this volunteer force, for it becomes an integral part of the army of the United States for the time being. It does not interfere with the regular army ; the officers of the militia forces do not go into the regular army and interfere with the register of its officers ; and I do not think any scheme should be adopted for this Naval Reserve that would accomplish that result.
Now, what should a Naval Reserve consist of? We want a Naval Reserve to supply the navy of the United States in time of war precisely as the military organizations supplement the army of the United States. We want something from which we can at once inject ships and men into the navy of the United States, and to that extent augment it. Now the question is. How are we to get these ? Our citizens own the ships. Men must volunteer into the Naval Reserve so that they can be taken from this body of volunteers when wanted. You can't organize ship's crews on shore. You have got to put those men on board the ships and organize them there as to crews, etc., and then you have got to get ships to put them on board of. Now the question for us to determine is, How are we to get the men and ships ? We want ships for all sorts of purposes. In the first place auxiliary cruisers, vessels that can fly across the ocean, inflicting the same injuries upon an enemy's commerce that the Alabama and a few others of the Confederate cruisers exerted upon ours; enough to almost destroy it.
Three or four ships, as my naval friends and those who are familiar with the history of that time know, were sufficient almost to drive our flag from the ocean ; to give it a blow from which the merchant service has never recovered. I do not say that was the sole cause of its disintegration and its almost entire destruction, but I do say that those three or four ships—cruisers, vessels that never fought, but always ran from an enemy that could fight—thus attacking the enemy in his most vital part, were the principal cause. That is what we want there must be some inducement held out. At the beginning of the late war the Government of the United States never seized a ship, but paid for them at prices far beyond their value. Talk about the patriotism of people! When the time comes for them to put their hands in Uncle Sam's pocket they all take a pretty big handful out every time. We found that was so in time of war, and we will find it so in time of war again ; and so, when we organize our naval reserve of ships, we should know the terms upon which we can obtain them, based not upon any such uncertain basis as mileage, but upon the actual value of the ship, by payment of a certain sum per annum for that ship whether she lies at the dock or goes to sea. Whether she engages in coastwise or foreign trade should not be considered. Is she suitable for naval purposes, should be the only test. We all want to see a bill that looks like an effort to revive the merchant service ; but, anxious as I am to see our flag once more occupy its position on the oceans of the world, I do not think this country will ever consent to bring the flag back upon any terms that have the suspicion of the subsidy about it, nor do I want to see the Naval Reserve hazarded by any attempt to connect it with any such scheme to revive shipping on any such basis. Let the two measures be divorced.
Now, how are we to get men? I want to see some inducement held out to them to volunteer into the Naval Reserve, so that, in time of need, we may say "Come," and have them bound to obey. Let us go to our yachting friends. Upon what terms will you agree that the Government may have your services ? What scheme should be incorporated in the bill so far as yachtsmen are concerned? We want the organization of gun's-crews and all that, and other measures which are to be found in Mr. Whitthorne's bill. The world at large doesn't understand that talk ; by the organization of gun's-crews it doesn't understand anything ; but when we say to my friend Mr. Stewart, who is a lawyer and a most excellent one, and who has a yacht—I don't think he has a steam one, but I hope he will have one—" We want your steam yacht in time of war to use as a torpedo boat," and then he should say " You can have her upon such and such terms," we have something that the world can understand. I mention him because he sits before me, and I know how anxious and interested he is on the subject. It would be an insult to offer to pay him money ; he doesn't need it and he don't want it ; but take the average Jack Tar, who has got to live, and you have got to pay him, and he must be paid in time of peace, as an inducement to give his services to the Government in time of war. I think a scheme that can be offered that will accomplish these simple purposes will provide for the greatest difficulty, which is "to get the hare." Having gotten it, our experience to-night shows that there will be no difficulty whatever in finding receipts for cooking the hare in the best possible manner.
Mr. W. A. W. Stewart.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I wish to acknowledge my allegiance to the proposition made by Captain Cooke, that the law, if any is passed, authorizing a Naval Reserve, should be embodied in general terms. I mean by that, in general terms kindred to the necessities of the situation. Whatever concessions may properly be made in the bill in order to establish the Naval Reserve, to achieve the best practical results, are considerations which cannot be foreseen definitely, and for that reason I am in favor of framing the bill in very general terms, in order to avoid going from one extreme to the other, and so as to be able to meet any actual exigencies that may arise.
I want to say one word from a yachting point of view. As Captain Parker has stated, I am a zealous yachtsman : I am too zealous a yachtsman to own a steam yacht. I know a few of my friends in the club who do most of their yachting on the water; I will say a word for them. They believe they can be of some service to the Naval Reserve. Some of them own steam yachts, and I am told by the naval authorities some of these yachts could be made useful in time of war; and those yachtsmen I speak for would be very glad to put their yachts at the service of their country, to submit them to annual inspection and to reasonable regulations, to preserve them always in time of peace in such a condition as will make them fit for naval auxiliary purposes, and in time of war to put them absolutely at the service of the Government. What do they ask in return for this? No possible compensation in money; they ask only some suitable indication of the truth of the fact that they have put their vessels to that extent at the service of their country. It is suggested that a suitable indication of that truth would be an ensign which they might fly.
There are a few yachtsmen who own vessels and they believe, presumptuous as they may be, that they may be of service. I am aware of the changes in vessels ; I am aware of the abolishment of sailing men-of-war. I suppose it will be admitted that sailing ships, even for the purpose of aiding our steam men-of-war, form an essential element, and I believe our sailing yachts are useful as encouraging and fostering American sailors, and I believe yachtsmen— and I mean those who are really practical yachtsmen—may be made some use of. They do not want to be understood as regarding themselves as of the slightest use to-day in a Naval Reserve. They are absolutely unfamiliar with the points of war ; they are utterly unacquainted with the discipline of the Navy or in the method of handling guns, but they are men of zeal and intelligence, and they are more or less familiar with the sea and have been more or less accustomed to the command of small vessels and small crews. What do they want ? They want that you, gentlemen of the Navy, will make some use of their zeal and their undoubted familiarity with the sea, whatever it may be. Train, educate, and make use of the utility of these enthusiastic yachtsmen. They do not want any rewards from the Government. They wish for neither money nor any other dignity than the right to fly some suitable ensign indicative of the truth that they are thus putting themselves in a position to be of service to their country when called upon. One thing more—I am sorry to find myself making a speech—we are quite satisfied, so far as any uniform or rank or exchange of courtesies is concerned, to put ourselves in your hands, and we will wait until we have achieved the work. I suppose that, while yachtsmen may be credited with a good deal of zeal, it is not equal to that of those gentlemen who have made it the serious business of their lives to serve their country, and who are alone entitled to all the dignity of the service. We appreciate that the rewards, great as they may be, and ought to be for such sacrifices, are chiefly sentimental, and they ought not to be cheapened by the creation of an artificial taste for the imitation naval officer.
The following remarks, received in writing from some of those who were invited to discuss the paper but were unable to attend the meeting, were not read owing to the lateness of the hour. . By direction of the Board of Control, they are here appended as a part of the discussion.
Captain A. R. Yates, U. S. N.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—The able paper of Captain Cooke upon the Naval Reserve, now under discussion by the Institute, is one worthy of the thoughtful attention of every citizen of our country, and particularly of every officer in both branches of the military service. That steps are taken to create a Naval Reserve is a very satisfactory sign of the increasing interest throughout the country in the welfare of the Navy as well as in that of the mercantile marine.
The fact that the Navy has no adequate source from which to draw its seamen in time of war is so well known and has been so often stated in papers and in discussions, that it is unnecessary to do more than allude to this sad condition.
The requirements for an able seaman in the Navy of the present day are so different from those of one before the Rebellion, that were the commercial marine now in the flourishing condition it was then, its seamen would be lacking in some of the most important qualifications now necessary to the efficient performance of the duties of a man-of-warsman. In fact, outside of the Engineer's Department, the men now to be obtained from this source would not be nearly as valuable to the Navy as those derived from that source before the Civil War. The experience and training obtained by men in the sailing ships then developed qualities that fitted them for service in a man-of-war, and when steam was an auxiliary and ordnance was comparatively simple, as in those days, a short period of training converted the merchant sailor into the active and efficient naval seaman. Since steam has taken the place of sails as the principal motive power on the ocean, and the man-of-war of to-day is a mass of machinery by which not only the ship is impelled but the ordnance handled, the majority of the crews of the steam merchant vessels—deck hands as they are technically called—possess in no higher degree the qualities of an efficient naval seaman than did the afterguard-sweepers in the old sailing frigates those of topmen. From the quartermasters and the few seamen the merchant steamers carry we hope to draw a small force at least, but unless the commercial marine becomes of a respectable size the number will be but a small part of the force required in the event of a war with one of the maritime powers.
The qualities necessary for a first-class seaman in the steam merchantman of to-day are the knowledge how to steer, heave the lead, and handle the small sails she carries—qualities necessary in a man-of-war undoubtedly, but the experience thus obtained is not calculated to produce that hardihood, fertility of resource and self-reliance that the daily contact with danger in handling a sailing ship in all weathers generated in the courageous sailor of thirty or forty years ago. It is true that the life in a modern cruiser is hot conducive to the production of these qualities, but this is in a measure compensated for by that training resulting from the drills, routine, and discipline.
From our fisheries, off shore and in shore, we would probably obtain our most efficient crews for the modern man-of-war. In them the hardy qualities of the seaman are developed, which, though obtained in fore and aft vessels, are such important adjuncts to a man-of-warsman that with a few weeks training they would become tolerably efficient as naval seamen.
Although yachts with few exceptions cruise but in summer and in moderate weather, and draw their crews from our merchant service, mostly from the coasters, yet there is a fair discipline maintained in most of them, and this with the training obtained in the sailing yachts, particularly in the racers, are of value to the naval seaman.
The experience of a sea life, no matter in what capacity, is not to be neglected in the Naval Reserve man. The future wars will be short, and but a few days will elapse after the declaration of war before a fleet of ironclads might be off one of our important seaports. Should we possess the necessary vessels to attack the force, they should be manned by those who, in addition to being able to manipulate the batteries, are familiar with the sea and accustomed to be upon it, although the vessels in which they might serve should be only coast or harbor defense ships.
Could anything be more humiliating than that an attack should fail or a vessel be captured owing to the seasickness of the seamen? This may appear an absurdity, still not so very improbable. In my own experience in the sloop of war Cyane in 1863, while beating out of the harbor of San Francisco, nearly two thirds of the crew, who were one year's men and had made the passage from New York to Panama in a steamer, and from Panama to San Francisco in the Lancaster, were so seasick as to be of little use, and consequently the task of working the ship through the Gates was not unattended with risk. This is an exceptional case, as the Cyane was a short ship and the sea was choppy ; still the circumstance impresses one with the necessity for some sea life for those who are to man the coast or harbor defense ships, and I have mentioned this circumstance as showing the need of the Naval Reserve man being a seaman, at least so far as familiarity with the sea is concerned. Were this not a requisite, landsmen to man our armored battle ships might be drilled in barracks or forts, since these vessels have no masts nor sails to handle. No kind of drilling with guns on shore will entirely take the place of that in a seaway. Even with the old 8-inch and 9-inch smoothbore guns, the crew that would work and dismount a gun in a remarkably short time found that it had considerable to learn before it could do the same in a moderate seaway without injury to themselves, gun, and ship.
In anything I have said about the men in the merchant service of to-day I do not wish to be understood as belittling their importance in case of a war, for this I fully recognize. I wish simply to show the great necessity for training the Naval Reserves, and further to bring to the minds of those interested in this subject the fact that the crews of the merchant steamships are not now, as formerly, nine tenths seamen, but that one fourth is a liberal estimate for the number of seamen—or those who know how to " reef, hand, and steer "—to be found in their crews at the present day. With a sea life all are acquainted, and this experience is not to be ignored for reasons I have given. To give the Naval Reserves any training with guns at sea at the present time, with so few vessels in the Navy, appears to be impracticable, but it is hoped the future will remove the obstacles. In the following sketch of a plan for training the Naval Reserves a temporary provision is made for this object, but it is only an expedient.
While comparatively easy to state what qualities are necessary to make an efficient Naval Reserve man, it is not by any means so easy to formulate a plan to obtain them that will accord with the means we have and the temper of the people. In a discussion of the paper of Captain Cooke, the details of a plan for the purpose mentioned cannot, owing to want of space and time, be given ; but a general idea of one can be sketched with the hope of presenting an idea or two to assist those who may be called upon to devise a well digested system of a Naval Reserve force, and with this view I suggest the following :
In our principal seaports let there be moored men-of-war condemned for active service. At the present time we have a number of wooden cruisers that, housed over and sheathed similar to the Vermont and New Hampshire, would last for years, or at any rate until other cruisers are condemned for active cruising and can take their places. On these vessels have three or four officers, as the number of available officers in the service will allow, and a few petty officers and seamen taken from those who have seen a certain amount of faithful service in the Navy. For this purpose those who for slight physical defects are unfit for active service in a cruiser could be given employment. The men for the Naval Reserve force, the number to be decided upon by the Department, should be drawn from the seafaring class, sailors on the lakes and boatmen of all descriptions on the adjacent bays and rivers. These should be enrolled at the nearest naval station, and required to spend at least one month a year for the first two years, afterwards two weeks a year, on one of the Reserve training ships : these periods to be employed in such a course of training as may be decided upon. They should receive while so employed the pay and ration of a seaman in the Navy, and should be given on first entrance to the ship two suits of uniform and their bedding, afterwards furnishing these articles themselves, and in addition to the above inducements they should receive a small sum per month so long as enrolled and conforming to the regulations that may be made by the Department governing the Naval Reserves. The vessels should be provided with a modern gun of each class that it is practicable to mount on them, and with the requisite number of small arms, torpedo gear, etc., that may be necessary for the purpose of instruction.
These Reserve training ships could be adapted for the purpose without much expense. The Constitution at Portsmouth is, with few alterations, available now for this work. The Hartford, Kearsarge, and other vessels of historical note will soon be suitable for this service only. The repairing of the Hartford for an active cruiser, simply out of deference to sentiment, does not appear to me sound judgment. The same sum of money asked for this purpose would fit up all the Reserve training ships needed, and those vessels like the Hartford which have become historical would be retained in a service worthy of their record and age.
From the men under training on these ships could be taken the force to test the torpedo and submarine system of the defense of the port or of the adjacent coast. If to each ship a small gunboat carrying an 8-inch or larger modern gun could be attached, as well as a torpedo boat, the training of the Reserves would be the more thorough. In the absence of such accessories, vessels from the North Atlantic Squadron, and others specially detailed by the Department, could be directed to take out the Reserves that might be on the ships for an experience of a week or two at sea. This would give a portion at least of the Reserves some training with guns at sea, and so far render them of great value in sudden emergencies.
Any officer of the merchant service, or graduate of the Naval Academy, or owner or master of a yacht, who can pass a required examination, to be practical in its character, and can furnish adequate testimonials as to conduct, character, and ability, should be eligible to the position of an officer in the Naval Reserves. The rank should be determined by the examination, service, and age of the applicant, but should not be higher than that of lieutenant-commander. As inducements to applicants, a member of the Reserve should be permitted to fly a distinctive flag on any vessel he may command, to wear the uniform of his grade when he pleases off duty, and in the event of a war, to be called into active service and paid according to his relative rank in the Navy. Other inducements, such as pay while under instruction, or a small sum per month, as may be deemed advisable, should be offered to obtain the enrollment of officers of the mercantile marine who stand highest in their profession. The officers of the Reserve should be given the facilities of the Government yards and stations for obtaining the knowledge necessary to the performance of their duties, and the same should be given also to those desiring to present themselves for examination as officers. For this purpose an officer or officers should be stationed at the several yards and stations to instruct applicants and officers of the Reserve. The officers of the Reserve should be required to present themselves once a year for instruction at the station at which enrolled, that they may keep pace with the improvements in naval warfare. They should also be called upon to perform such duties with the crews of the Reserve training ships in the line of instruction as may add to the efficiency of both.
Our Navy, as stated in the paper under discussion, will not in times of peace be large ; and if not in peace, since to build a man-of-war now requires years where it required months a half century ago, we may say it will never be large. A force of 50 vessels afloat, or 75 or 100 in all, including all classes, is a liberal estimate of the number we are to have in a future as far distant as we can look. To man these vessels with a trained body of seamen equal to any in the world should be our first object, and the number of this regular force should not be less than 12,000. To obtain and retain these men, inducements additional to those already afforded must be offered, such as laws for retirements, interest on deposits (embodied in the report of the Chief of Bureau of Equipment), the pay of the boatswain-mates, quartermasters, and other petty officers of the seamen class made equal to that of those of the other classes in the Navy, the privilege of serving after a certain length of sea service in the training ships with increased pay as instructors and the like.
The present system of training naval apprentices is working well, and with a few modifications will in the future give us a class of seamen for the regular force equal to any in the world ; but as this system is not under discussion I refrain from further mention of it.
The plan I have sketched is different from Captain Cooke's scheme for the formation of ship's companies. I think his plan would be an excellent one if it were possible to collect the men composing the companies, but when one thinks of the wanderings of seamen, this seems almost an impossibility. In the plan I have mentioned officers and men receive the instruction as opportunities are favorable to them ; and at the breaking out of war, those in the vicinity of their station of enrollment can at once be formed into a ship's company or into ships' companies, as the number will permit. Should the number of officers on the active list not be sufficient for the duties in connection with the Naval Reserve, the Secretary of the Navy should be empowered to employ those officers upon the retired list who are capable of performing these duties. These officers while so employed should receive the sea pay of their grade, which rate of pay should be that assigned to all officers serving on the training Reserve ships.
The bills before Congress to create a naval reserve of vessels will, I hope, attain this end, but the expense of shipbuilding in this country, together with that of running the ships after they are built, is so great compared with that of foreign ships, that it appears to me impossible to compete successfully with them without large subsidies or bounties from the Government. Consequently we cannot look for much aid from this source in time of war. Yet the mercantile marine is about our only source for vessels for the Reserve, and to place it on a respectable footing has engaged the attention of some of our ablest statesmen. A solution of the problem will be reached when the interests of trade favor the industry; in the meantime would it not be advisable to remove the duties from shipbuilding materials, and thus by removing part of the load from this branch of our trade, encourage it in its struggles to regain its once proud footing? The plan of a payment of a sum for every ton of those vessels built in accordance with instructions from the Navy Department is certainly a good one as far as it goes, but what is to maintain these vessels after they are built? The protectionist and freetrader will each give such excellent arguments that one not a political economist might be well pleased with the plan of either. Steamers in the coasting trade, steam yachts, and tugs might be put upon the Reserve list, as mentioned in the paper, and would in various ways be useful in time of war.
The plan for a Naval Reserve that will commend itself to Congressmen and to the country must be simple and comparatively inexpensive, easily understood by the landsman and readily explained by a Representative to his constituents. As the idea is a new one in our country. Congress would be more willing to approve it if a failure would not involve much expense. If the plan proved successful, it could be enlarged as its merits became apparent.
Lieutenant-Commander C. H. Stockton, U. S. N.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I wish to preface my remarks upon the paper read by Captain Cooke, by saying that, though I differ from him in regard to the relative importance of this question, and also in regard to some points of its treatment, I desire to express my appreciation of the intelligence and zeal with which he discusses the subject, and my general belief in the value and importance of a Naval Reserve to supplement the regular naval forces of the nation. I say supplement, for my only fear is that it may attain an undue prominence in the naval questions of the day, to the detriment of more vital matters.
The first inquiry that comes to my mind, after the reading of the paper, is concerning the wisdom, to say the least, of the ground taken by the writer, of linking the question of governmental aid to the construction and maintenance of naval vessels in reserve in time of peace, with the fiscal questions of subsidy and protection to shipbuilding and shipowning.
The question of cheapening the cost of shipbuilding and owning by the reduction in the cost of the raw or partly shaped and manufactured material which enters into the ship, instead of the provision of a system of bounties, is at least a debatable one, and to my mind should not be allowed to complicate the subject, which, from our point of view, is a purely professional matter and not a question of fiscal politics. The formation of a Naval Reserve by encouraging the construction of a certain type or types of vessels for war purposes is, to us, a military matter, to be treated as such, and I think especially to be separated from any advocacy of a paralleling in this country of the French bounty system, with its consequent want of success.
With the uncertain and varying policy generally shown by Congress toward the Navy, it seems wise to me that in advocating a Naval Reserve we should ask that this Reserve, composed of vessels constructed by private shipowners, aided by the Government, serving as trade carriers in time of peace, should be the source from which we would draw mainly, if not entirely, our dispatch vessels, our transports, our depot ships, our commerce destroyers, and even our rapid cruisers.
As matters are going, it seems to me the duty of the men of the naval service to devote time and talent now, and first of all, to the advocacy of the construction of battle ships as the regular naval force of the country, so that we shall meet the war vessels of other navies with vessels that are at least their peers in every way. We must meet naval force with naval force, and not naval strength with naval weakness, otherwise the rapid cruisers that are being constructed at present, and about whose utility I fear at times we delude ourselves, will be rapidly engaged in seeking home ports to avoid meeting certain destruction from the armored and able-bodied commerce protectors of the enemy. I say home ports, for we have no coaling stations or harbors of refuge away from home that we can control or defend.
It seems almost hopeless to expect that we will get, by the action of Congress, both the strong and the weaker class of vessels, so let us concentrate our efforts first upon the strongest vessels for the regular navy, and then, as a secondary naval line, favor the formation of the Naval Reserve and volunteer fleet, built for auxiliary war purposes in war-time, and for trade purposes in time of peace ; the conformity to certain naval regulations being duly compensated by the general Government. But in advocating the latter, do not let us lose sight of the essential element and unit for maritime combat so well described by Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, "as a ship covered with armor for protection and defense; carrying gun, ram, and torpedo for defiance; with powerful machinery ; with abundant provision of fuel for independence and duration of speed, and not restricted by its construction to place, weather, or state of the sea." Is it necessary to add that no nation determined to defend its coasts is free to renounce a combat upon the high seas ? and furthermore, that the fighting unit just referred to, or its closest approximation, can only be provided by an expenditure of time, skill, and money ?
In resuming the examination of the paper, let me call attention to another phase of the argument offered in favor of an indiscriminate tonnage subsidy to our mercantile marine. If this were given, a much larger and special subsidy would have to be given for vessels to form the Naval Reserve, as with equal subsidy no shipowner would incur the additional expense and probable limitations. It is much wiser to confine the governmental aid to the reserve vessels, for which an equivalent is thus returned, and not attempt an artificial stimulant to the whole mercantile marine.
The proposition of the writer to limit the personnel and materiel of the Naval Reserve to national control is, I believe, a wise one. It is the duty of the general Government to "provide for the common defense," made a sacred obligation by the Constitution, and that alone should place especially the materiel under the charge of the national administration, charged as it is already with the registry and responsibility of all vessels carrying the American flag.
The remarks of the writer in regard to the necessity and wisdom of due preparation for the defense and protection of our interests by the development of our naval strength cannot be too often repeated. Nowhere in the world is presented to inimical naval powers so strikingly the combination of wealth, inviting cupidity, with weakness, inviting attack, as on the sea-coast of this great country at the present day.
All of our resources for protection and defense, now while we can, should be thoroughly developed. We should sturdily resist all undermining attacks upon our naval educational establishments. We should more closely link the officers and men of the revenue marine to us both in time of peace and war; we should bind the interests and services of the merchant marine with us in peace, and more especially in war; and above all, if Congress should fail to realize and provide for the immense work that will be required from the Navy in time of war, in the protection of our coasting and foreign trade, the efficient guarding of our enormous sea-coast, and the defense of our rich seaports ; let us, nevertheless, not fail to proclaim aloud the country's need for battle ships so that the enemy's ships may be met by vessels in all respects their equal, and our men-of-war be not compelled to meet destruction or defeat, or seek safety by inglorious flight.
Prof. R. H. Thurston.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen :—I have read the paper of Captain Cooke with all the interest and awakened earnestness that, in my opinion, must to-day be felt by every real friend of our country. To me it seems marvellous that our people, and especially so many of our legislators in Congress, can remain, as they actually do remain, absolutely blind and indifferent to the fearful dangers to which their supineness and folly are exposing our whole nation. We boast of our intelligence, and our neighbors are laughing at our stupidity and ostrich-like confidence. We are anxious lest our treasury should overflow into the purses of undeserving citizens, and we leave our coasts absolutely defenseless against the weakest of possible foreign foes. We talk loudly of our patriotism and crack our Fourth-of-July fireworks, and yet go into a wordy and possibly (probably, indeed) threatening dispute with a neighbor already a thousand times better prepared than we to cross the border in case of sudden war, and ready to lay waste a thousand provinces and cripple for a generation our most important industries and lines of trade. Could any idiot, saving his pennies by hoarding at the expense of the sacrifice of all that makes life worth living, and by risking his every possession and hope, be guilty of greater folly ?
A Naval Reserve we do most certainly need, and it is a good time to agitate in favor it, even though we have not yet a decently large and reliable nucleus for the Navy that it should be prepared to reinforce. How that Reserve shall be secured and maintained is a question that will become vital just as soon as it is rendered certain that we are to be permitted to hope for its establishment, and this is a good time to discuss the various methods of establishing and maintaining it.
The United States has here a more difficult problem to deal with than has Great Britain, that nation which, even more than our own, is most vitally concerned in the maintenance of a reliable naval establishment. The business aspects of the matter are such as favor her and tell strongly, perhaps fatally, against us. Our people can use their capital vastly more profitably in the internal industries of the country than on the ocean, and capital never of itself goes permanently into channels in which it cannot flow smoothly, with prospect of permanence of current toward the profitable lines in trade. Marine transportation can never become profitable to our people until the value of capital, as measured by the rate of interest and by the normal profits of business, settles down to a level with that of capital possessed by competing nations. This latter state of things is gradually being approached, but we may hope will not be reached until our competitors among nations shall have attained the state of general civilization and prosperity that to-day distinguishes the United States. Were it attained, it would mean the reduction of our people to the condition of those of European countries.
A Naval Reserve must, therefore, be created by artificial aids in so far as we are dependent for it upon trans-oceanic lines of ships. Whether we can wisely and prudently assume to tax ourselves to place in the pockets of a few of our citizens the difference between the natural earnings of capital in transoceanic trade and the natural product of capital in internal industries I am not quite sure ; but of this I am sure, that it were far better to expend a thousand millions in such a manner than to throw away that thousand millions in a war that might cripple the industries of the globe by breaking up the great lines of communication and transportation, by distorting the now smooth and natural network of our own manufactures and trades, by gleaning out and destroying the flower of our own citizen body—those who would be first driven by patriotic sentiment into the contest and probably to certain destruction—and, worse than all, turning back the current of civilization for the world by more than the period during which ourselves and our antagonists would be thrown back toward barbarism, just at a time when we had begun to suppose that the introduction of the custom of arbitrament of national disputes had brought to an end national strife. Nations do not arbitrate where the more powerful can see clearly that the other party is too weak to defend himself.
It is worth while to consider to what extent we may first secure a Reserve by proper management of the merchant navy already existing, growing, and probably likely to continue permanently to grow, in our coastwise trade. Its ships are daily becoming larger and more numerous, its officers and men more and more efficient, and a careful adjustment of the regulations controlling it and its internal competing lines of transportation may possibly do something for us in this direction. I am not at all certain that we can hope for very much, far less for adequate assistance ; but the question may nevertheless be worthy of study. I am myself inclined to believe that a carefully devised system of encouragement of direct trans-oceanic lines, especially to other than European countries, by at the same time opening and promoting foreign trade with them while furnishing us with a naval militia, would be the most safe and satisfactory plan, and that it would, next to the provision of the desperately needed coast defense by fortifications and a navy, be the best possible direction of expenditure of that somewhat uncertain growth of the "surplus " about which some of our most intelligent but, to my mind, mistaken statesmen are so seriously alarmed. The one encouraging fact, in the present alarming situation, is that our army and navy ofiicers are so far breaking through the traditional abstinence from discussions affecting matters in the hands of our legislators, to temperately and clearly set forth the results of their own observation and thought, in such manner that they, who are naturally our best advisers as experts in the art of war and of defense, shall exert a wholesome influence in awakening that patriotism and that statecraft which have been for a quarter of a century dormant among those bodies of our representatives to whom we look ordinarily for examples of the most noble sentiments. The United States can never, and will never, desire to do more than defend country, home, and people against aggression ; our policy is of necessity as well as of choice one of peace ; but we can only be safe when we are prepared to meet the strongest and most enduring of possible aggressors, and when it shall be plainly seen that we cannot be safely attacked by any nation on the globe, or by any combination of possible enemies. The cost to the nation of such safety is a matter of comparatively insignificant importance.
When our older, wiser, more steady and trustworthy officers in the Navy and Army are taken into the councils of the nation ; when our wisest and most patriotic citizens exert that influence which they have only to take into their hands to make felt most effectively ; when the educated men of the country contribute their part to the general fund of patriotism ; when the youth growing up around us are as carefully bred to love their country as to become useful citizens and successful men of business : then we may hope to find ourselves safe behind impregnable walls of material and moral defense, and then only may we hope to lead in the great movements of modern national growth and civilization.
The tone of these comments upon the paper which has preceded may seem here somewhat out of place ; yet I am sure that every member of this body will, as these thoughts are suggested, see that after all they are vital thoughts for us and for our countrymen.
W. Thornton Parker, M. D.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen :—I have read with great interest the paper of Captain Cooke, U. S.N., on the U. S. Naval Reserve, which, through your courtesy, I am invited to express my opinions upon in writing. The subject is unquestionably of national importance, and must sooner or later, unless we are hindered by ignorant legislation, become a part of our national defense.
In considering the matter, however, we must go back to proximate principles. Unquestionably this creation of the Naval Reserve, while it is advantageous for the best interests of national defense, and must act as a wholesome influence to encourage proficiency and general excellence in the merchant marine, must have, like everything else, a base of supplies. It must have in the first place a well organized and disciplined merchant marine to draw its recruits from. I do not mean to claim that all its supplies of men must come from the merchant marine or from discharged U. S. sailors, for it is evident that the intention is to follow very closely the recruiting system for volunteers ; but there must exist, so to speak, a marine atmosphere. Just as in the Rocky Mountains no Naval Reserve would be thought of, so in sections of seacoast where commerce had been rendered so dead by unwise protective legislation that sailors had practically disappeared—the interest in a Naval Reserve would be absolutely nil. It is of vital importance that legislation to resuscitate our commerce and protect and improve our merchant marine shall go hand in hand with this laudable and necessary movement to create, what has been needed for more than half a century, a Naval Reserve. If we consider the condition of the German merchant marine and the German Navy at the close of our War of the Rebellion and its present admirable but still improving condition in 1888, we can readily understand and have powerful arguments to offer for national legislation for our unfortunate merchant marine of to-day. Reckless neglect and indifference on the part of the Government, absence of intelligent and patriotic legislation, has done its work to present what was once the best merchant marine of the world in a condition of dilapidated worthlessness, if not in well-nigh hopeless disorganization and demoralization. The Government of Germany showed great wisdom and prudence in its determination to have a navy. By patient, plodding, wise, and generous legislation, free ships, subsidies, and as many naval and marine institutes as could be operated, the dream of the German Government has been more than realized, and a superb and effective navy is the gratifying result.
To go back again to proximate principles. The morale of the merchant marine must first be looked into. Take a German sailor ashore ; he is dressed in his best clothing, he has his pay in his pocket or his bank-book to show that it is in safe keeping, and he endeavors in every way by his conduct and general appearance to show to the community that he is a respectable, decent man, and that he respects his vocation and respects himself. Look at the other picture of a drunken Yankee sailor on shore ; poorly clad, his pockets empty or shortly to become so, with a hang-dog, worried look in his dissipated face, and steering straight for the lowest slums of vice and dishonor in the city. He winds up at length uncared for, miserable, sick, and well-nigh in delirium tremens, at some vile den yclept a sailor''s boarding house. Over this dreadful place presides a brace or more of the most miserable and brutal masters, who soon possess themselves not only of all our poor Jack has on his person, but the body itself, and the wages it may earn for weeks and perhaps months to come. This is not an overdrawn picture. In spite of the noble-hearted efforts of many good people to establish here and there houses and homes of refuge for our sailors, no real practical good can be accomplished until the Government follows line by line the course which has proved so successful in Germany, and offers insurmountable barriers of protection for our sailors. Men of courage wherever real danger is to be met and overcome, with records for gallant actions the envy of the sailors of the world, they succumb in port to these heartless and miserable cowards who should receive absolutely no better reward than that meted out to pirates a hundred years ago—hanging in chains, and burial between high and low water mark. Pirates of the sea deserve honor beside such despicable, loathsome brutes who make our sailors mere junk for ready sale and barter. I must beg pardon for taking your valuable time in what may seem to many the relation of facts well known and well understood, but of the most baffling difficulty when a remedy is looked for.
We see, then, that reform in the merchant marine to secure a respectable name for our sailors is of the first importance. Wise legislation for the vexed question of shipping, and the cultivation of a decent and reasonable esprit de corps in our naval sailors and apprentices, are essential. We must never sink into the mistaken position of some nations whose ships often enter our harbors, but whose sailors are worthless and whose officers are inferior men, by supposing that if our officers are good men it matters little what the personnel of the sailors may be. "Hearts of oak" our sailors must have just as well as their officers. Manly, self-respecting men must they be, whether wearing the broad blue collar or the golden shoulder strap. Then we can look for a successful Naval Reserve when improvement has been begun at the bottom—the merchant marine must be healthy and effective. Undoubtedly the creation of an efficient and well disciplined Naval Reserve would be of the greatest service to the merchant marine, and an incentive to our young men to go to sea with some hope of an honorable calling. The sailors are useful at sea, but in the Naval Reserve we should have a force available for duty on shore in cases of emergency. When we look back at the history of our blue jackets we find pages of history relating many deeds of daring and gallant battles fought on shore, and while the most enviable records of gallantry afloat are common on the naval archives, deeds of bravery on shore have been, and ever will be, recorded whenever opportunity offers. The Naval Reserve is needed now, but the pity is it has been needed for many years. Every patriotic and economic interest should be exerted in the organization of a powerful Naval Reserve as soon as possible, for the best interests of our nation in general.
Lieutenant-Commander W. W. Reisinger, U. S. N.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen—I have read with great interest the very able paper by Captain A. P. Cooke, U. S. N., and agree with him in his presentation of the case. There is no longer any doubt as to the general demand for some immediate action looking to the establishing of additional means of defense for our now unprotected coasts and harbors, and for the increase of our naval power ; nor is this demand confined to military circles. The organization of a Naval Reserve and of Volunteer Artillery and Torpedo Corps is a step in the desired direction.
The bill introduced by Senator Whitthorne covers nearly all of the ground as to the Naval Reserve. I would, however, like to emphasize that portion of his bill which is to be found in the closing words of Section 1, i. e., " And all ex-officers and enlisted men of the Navy."
Captain Cooke says : "No reserves we can ever secure will be equal to men who have passed a term of active service on board ships of war." If this be true as regards the enlisted man, how much more so is it when applied to the officer who has been specially trained to command. In nearly every important seaport there are ex-officers of the Navy, line and staff, men who have had excellent records during their terms of active service, but who preferred civil life to naval life during peace, and who resigned, not under pressure, but of choice. There are many retired officers also of the same class who are unfit from physical causes to undertake extended cruises under various climatic influences, who might be of great service in the home ports. The services of these ex-officers and retired officers, whether of the line or staff, would be of great value, and their places in a naval reserve or volunteer corps should be clearly defined. I do not advocate any change in the existing laws regarding the status of these officers in the Navy proper, but have in view only their probable employment in the proposed corps and reserve.
Another point I beg leave to call attention to is the eminent fitness of the harbor of Newport, R. I., as a training station for all forces. Naval, Army, Naval Reserve, and Volunteer Artillery and Torpedo Corps. The fact that the Naval War College, Torpedo Station, and a large fort are located here, and the further fact that there exists plenty of enclosed water for large operations, will mark it as particularly suitable for our purposes, and in this connection I would urge the great importance of having every available vessel of the North Atlantic Squadron rendezvous here during the months of May, June, July, August, and September, as a general school of evolution and instruction. It might not be going too far to suggest that all of the new men-of-war now being built, and all ships fitting out for foreign service, should spend a month or two with this fleet for a general "setting up" before their inspection and previous to their final assignments to duty. This fleet, in conjunction with the lectures at the War College and the experimental work of the Torpedo Station, will be an excellent school for all officers and men of the Regular Navy, and it is here, and when this fleet is assembled, that the officers of the Naval Reserve, and Volunteer Artillery and Torpedo Corps, should be ordered for their training.
Further, this harbor is an excellent place of rendezvous for such yachts as may be enrolled in the Reserves, and one month's or even two weeks' service with the fleet under an energetic Admiral would teach more of naval duties than a year of theoretical work or hap-hazard exercises. Such practical exercises as were inaugurated by Admiral Luce during this last summer would be of immense service. In all these drills the Admiral had the hearty co-operation of the officers of the Army and the Torpedo Station; and the officers in attendance at the War College had the full benefit of all that was done.
Landing parties from the fleet to attack positions defended by the army, mining and countermining, running batteries, night torpedo attacks, are all possible here, and if carried out with the new and improved weapons would command the attention of all officers. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the advantages of such a squadron of manoeuvre. It is perfectly feasible and involves no extra expense, except the trifle for mileage of officers ordered there. These officers will take away with them the knowledge there acquired, and will impart it to their crews and companies.
Lieutenant Seaton Schroeder, U. S. N.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen : Among the many excellent points brought out in Captain Cooke's paper I would like especially to commend the paragraph in which it is suggested that, after a certain length of service, the enlisted men of the Navy should be eligible for duty in the Revenue Marine. I would suggest that the same plan could be adopted in regard to the Fish Commission, Coast Survey, and Light House vessels. In the past the sailor has usually adopted his calling in consequence of a certain restlessness of temperament, coupled with other less ambiguous attributes, which have led him to seek a life of adventure. This applies to a less extent now ; and while it is perhaps desirable that a seafaring man should be possessed of a more or less roving disposition, that of itself will not always induce a supply of experts up to the demands that may be suddenly made, nor will it alone always provide just the class of men we want. The effort now (and I am happy to say I believe it to be successful) is to elevate the enlisted man morally, physically, and intellectually ; in the furtherance of that idea, it would be an incentive to desirable young men to enter the Navy if they could feel certain that after learning their profession, and giving a certain number of years of military service in return, they would be assigned to duty where, while working equally hard and in kindred circumstances, they would be off our own coast and have an occasional chance to see their homes and families. There is nothing in the proposed duty to unfit them for future naval work. In the Fish Commission and Coast Survey they would be absent from the guns and from the Naval Brigade ; but one term of enlistment would not cause them to forget what they had been studying and practicing during three enlistments ; like swimming, it would all come back on trial ; and in the meantime their work in all other ways would be strictly nautical, and would furnish a diversion far from devoid of benefit to the individual man and to the service in consequence.
An experience of over three years as executive officer of the Albatross showed me what can be expected from those men. The crew, like the officers, were worked very hard, but most of them took great interest in the business, and were as zealous as any of the officers in, for instance, securing the results of a deep haul of the dredge by the electric light in a squally mid-watch. When the ship lay for a week at the Exposition Grounds at New Orleans, it was the enlisted men who showed the visitors about and explained intelligently the working of the steam and hand sounding machines, the dredging engines, trawls and tangles, the automatic sounding cups, thermometers and deep-sea water bottles, the submarine electric light, and seine and gill nets, etc. And when sightseers from the West and from all over the country asked if those fine looking, bright men were " common sailors," I was proud to answer, "Yes, they are representative Navy blue-jackets."
If the absence from what may be called the military part of their calling be undesirable, it would be a simple matter to have them take part for a month or so in the yearly evolutions on sea and land. And while in the Revenue Service a certain amount of drill could ordinarily be carried on, both with small arms and with the modern guns that should be supplied to those vessels, yet I would advise and strongly urge that both their officers and men should also take part in the annual squadron drills which I trust will become a fixed feature in our naval policy.
By this arrangement the number of well trained fighting men available immediately on the outbreak of hostilities would be increased by a number which, although not very large, would assist materially in leavening other less valuable contingents. It is in the power of the Navy Department now to apply this rule in manning the Fish Commission and Coast Survey vessels, and it is certainly desirable that appropriate legislation should enable it to do the same for those other services. There seems to be no good excuse for the maintenance of two national naval schools and nautical establishments ; the members of each of these now separate corps should be able to do the work of all. No one will question the professional benefit to the officers of the Navy that would accrue from an increased opportunity to become familiar with our own coast, which familiarity can only be properly acquired from the ground itself and not from charts. Nor can the present revenue officers question the advantage to them of being able to extend their sphere of usefulness by being incorporated in the Navy. The fusion of these two services seems an almost essential feature in any practical scheme of coast defense ; and I think the Institute would do well to throw the weight of its opinion in favor of that end.
Lieutenant W. H, Beehler. U. S. N.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen :—Captain Cooke's valuable paper on the Naval Reserve should enlist the hearty cooperation of the Navy and merchant marine. The methods advocated do not go into such details as we might desire, but the details of organization and strength cannot be elaborated until there is something definite upon which to base the organization. Discussion of the measure is therefore at the outset restricted to advocating the advantages and necessity of a Naval Reserve, and I think we all feel greatly indebted to Captain Cooke for the clear, concise statement of these advantages and the necessity for a Naval Reserve.
To assist in bringing the subject still more prominently into notice, I enclose herewith a list of mercantile cruisers of all countries having a speed of 14 knots or over, capable of being utilized as auxiliary cruisers in time of war.
Upon motion duly seconded, it was Resolved, That a vote of thanks be tendered the Seawanhaka Corinthian Yacht Club for the kind permission to use their rooms for the purpose of the meeting.