In presenting some views concerning the principles of naval tactics, it may be well to say beforehand that these views are in some respects contrary to the general sentiment of naval officers. Some accepted axioms—such as the great importance and value of large ships, large guns, armor, high speeds—are in some measure dissented from; and the ideas generally are not in line with what is known as modern naval thought, as exampled in the development of the present European navies. I am glad to place these views before the Naval Institute, a body so intelligent and so capable of deciding how far these opinions depart from approved custom, and to what extent they should be considered revolutionary or injurious.
The methods I suggest, however, are meant to lead to a most conservative end, concentration; and in making that principle my text and urging its importance, I am only stepping humbly in the footprints of the centuries. Caesar and Napoleon, Themistocles and Nelson, have recognized it as the essence of victory; have known how so to manage the details of their organizations, the qualities of their individual ships or regiments, the energies of their lieutenants, as to obtain that concentration, so difficult to reach, yet, once attained, so fruitful in victories. Nor does any one of the present age deny in words the value of concentration—assuredly not any naval officers of the present education and experience—but many of us, impressed by the wonderful advance of ingenious mechanisms in these later years, and separated by so long a period from the example of great naval wars, have allowed many minor questions to come between our thoughts and the greater principles of warfare. Concentration has been at times advocated. Solid squares, groups, triangles, have been suggested—for the most part casually, however, and as a minor detail—and at one time, in an able paper by Lieutenant Mason, read before this Institute in 1876, concentration was effectively urged, and the use recommended of hollow squares with reserves inside, a formation approaching closely the compact orders described in this paper. Such efforts, such suggestions, have been rare, however, and have provoked but a faint attention among modern navies, as of something important and true, but as not specially affecting them; and thus we continue to prepare war ships to be powerful singly, but with little reference to their availability as units of a great and effective mass.
Nelson knew he must concentrate to win; but how was he able to concentrate with such brilliant success? Principally because the English builders had built good ships for their navy, similar ships, ships whose build contemplated, first of all, working together, close together—because the Howes and St. Vincents, who came before him, had, through much hard work, trained those ships to work in fleets close together. Thus, when the master mind appeared, grasping the soul of a warlike crisis and commanding effective concentration, the response was instant. Nor were the master's energies wearied and his genius wasted in the long and tedious preparation of ill-assorted fleets and untrained men and officers. We may not all be Howes and St. Vincents, but we may all do our part toward preparing our fleet for that day of our country's need when a Farragut or a Nelson shall demand that trained activity and readiness in ships and crews which is needed for concentration and resulting victory.
What, then, is the object of my paper? Not to prove that concentration is important. That fact is fully recognized, though little acted upon. My object is to urge that it be not only casually acknowledged, but that in every detail of our naval preparation it be kept in view as of prime and critical importance. And I will be doing my small part if I emphasize in this paper the value of concentration in tactics, in the actual engagement; leaving aside for the present the strategic combinations of long-continued operations afloat or ashore. It is concentration in the battle, therefore, rather than in the campaign, which I shall now consider.
What method of tactics will best lend itself to effective concentration—to the massing of our fleet upon a portion of the enemy's fleet? In approaching this question, we must consider what formation will be brought against us. The battle-ships of European navies to-day are of such a character as to make it probable that their formation for attack or defence will be the reverse of a close or solid formation, that it will be an elongated line, single or double, or a number of detached groups in line or echelon. To approach such a line with our own vessels compactly massed and retaining that compactness during preliminary maneuvering, would ensure the ability of striking the enemy—after preliminary feints—at such portion of his formation as might seem expedient. If we add to this the ability to disengage our ships from this close group and to deploy them, when closing with the enemy, it would seem that we have attained the principal conditions essential to success. Such formation should be of the most simple character. The confusion of battle and the many difficulties of wind and sea make simplicity imperative. For the same reasons, this formation should, through constant use, be familiarly known to the fleet, an order in which they would quickly and naturally gather in a time of confusion or when signals are obscured.
The plan I have to suggest for consideration is the massing of the fleet or squadron in a solid square, or as nearly that as the number of vessels may permit four ships forming a solid square with a side of two ships (Fig.1); the solid square of nine ships having a side of three ships (Fig. 2); of sixteen, a side of four (Fig. 3), and going on to larger squares, if desirable. The solid square of four ships would have all its ships outside; that of nine would have eight outside; of sixteen, twelve outside, while it may be observed that the number of inside ships in any square equals the whole number of ships in a square whose side numbers two less ships than the side of the square considered. Before discussing some of the features of this formation, it will be well to say that it is the value of concentration in general that I wish to urge, and not this particular form of concentration. The solid and the hollow squares, as two forms of the "naval square," have been occasionally discussed, and the latest authority on the subject, Commander Bainbridge- Hoff, assigns the name of "naval square" to the solid square alone. Many forms of attaining concentration have been at different times suggested. At present, I believe the solid square (or naval square closed in mass) to be the order which, with our improved modes of propulsion and steering, offers the greatest maneuvering effectiveness, and I shall use it as a text from which to preach the value of close formations and the importance of incessant sea drilling to make such tactics possible. The natural divisions of a fleet in such an order would be the columns which when closed in mass form the square, or the lines which divide the square at right angles to the columns. The flagships of the Admiral and his Commodores should be on a diagonal of the square, in order that whichever way the Admiral shall divide his fleet, each division may always have a divisional commander.
The fleet being in column of divisions in close order, the Admiral would simply signal the divisions to close in mass (Fig. 4), and the closing would continue until distances ahead and astern were equal to distances abreast.
The fleet being in columns of vessels abreast by divisions in close order, the Admiral would signal the divisions to close in mass by obliquing upon a designated division (Fig. 5) and the closing would continue until distances abreast should be equal to distances ahead and astern.
The fleet in column of vessels, van division leading, the Admiral may signal the fleet to form in mass upon the van division (Fig. 6), that division slowing to steerage-way, and the remaining divisions obliquing into position at full speed; or he may designate the second division for the fleet to close upon, that division slowing;, the vessels of van division turning together and obliquing to the rear, and the remaining divisions obliquing at full speed into position (Fig. 7); or if an enemy is discovered ahead and close aboard, the rear division may be designated, and the remainder of fleet, turning together (Fig. 8), will oblique at full speed to the rear into position. Similar principles would govern the fleet when in line, the division designated slowing or keeping full speed, according to its position in the square, and the remainder of the fleet moving into position in front or rear of it. It must be thoroughly understood by the fleet that the relative positions of the divisions and of the vessels will always be the same in the solid square, in order that they may drop readily into accustomed positions made familiar to them from long habit; and they must in time of war cruise almost constantly in this order, by day and by night, in good and bad weather, so that when expecting to meet an enemy they may keep in that order and avoid the possible delay of gathering into the square formation from a long and perhaps scattered column line or echelon.
In forming the square, therefore, after thorough drilling of the fleet, the Admiral, in addition to the simple signal to "Form Square on Division designated" would only need to give the compass signals to indicate the bearings of the lines of the square. The compass directions of the diagonal line of flagships and of the divisional lines will be sufficient, the diagonal's direction being made the principal indication in the signal. The signal, "On Van Division Form Square, NE. Division Lines East" (Fig. 9), will inform the fleet that the Admiral's flag is to bear northeast from the divisional commander's, and that the lines of the divisions will be east and west. The signal, "On Van Division Form Square, NE., Division Lines North" (Fig. 10), would inform the fleet that the Admiral's flag is to bear NE. from the divisional flags, and the lines of divisions will be north and south. It will be needless further to describe methods of forming the square: the simple principles of tactics will apply in all cases, with but slight modifications, both in forming square and in returning from it to other orders of steaming; but I will repeat that when expecting to meet an enemy, the fleet should keep in this compact order day and night.
No maneuvering is contemplated while in the "square" formation, except changes of course, and those are to be only the simultaneous change of direction of each vessel of the fleet. There will be no turning of head of column after the signal to "form square" is executed: the only signals will be "Fleet SW., 10 knots'' "Fleet ENE., 5 knots" and similar signals to indicate direction and speed. Even these simple changes of course, you will say, will be difficult for vessels massed in such close order and moving at high speed—nor do I question the difficulty. Ships of great handiness and exactly alike must be built to ensure a homogeneous fleet, and officers and men must be drilled to the last point to make it possible—and even then it will be difficult; but I do not doubt that victory will be with that navy which meets and overcomes such difficulties, and which, by providing this or some similar battle formation for its fleet, shall ensure the great principle of concentration of force being thoroughly worked out.
I propose, as before said, that the fleet shall habitually remain in this order when expecting to sight the enemy; that once sighted, whether the enemy advances, or remains quiet awaiting the attack, our fleet shall advance upon it. If the enemy were in line, the solid square would direct itself, perhaps, toward its centre, steering south, we will say. Approaching closer, the Admiral may signal, ''Fleet SE." (Fig. 11), when each ship of the square, consisting probably of nine or sixteen ships, changes course simultaneously to SE., without change in order or bearing—somewhat (if thoroughly drilled) as a school of fish, moved by some common impulse, swerves to right or left without derangement or disorder. Approaching still closer, the enemy's fire becoming hot, and his reserves perhaps hastening to reinforce the threatened eastern division, the Admiral may signal, "Fleet SW" and strike, finally, the enemy's western division. As he closes with the enemy, some deployment becomes necessary, and is simple in execution. The Admiral may signal his eastern division, "Division South" the centre division or divisions "Division SSW." said the western division "Division SW." This divergence, or a greater, if desired, will cause the divisions to reach the enemy's line with space enough for their effective fighting.
It is, however, probable that the details of such deployment would be governed by a permanent arrangement, preconcerted between the chief and his subordinates, the proper moment for deployment or separation of divisions being indicated by the flagship's signal to "close with the enemy." The Admiral would also, at this time or before, inform his Commodores, by a simple signal agreed upon beforehand, whether he intended them to bring their divisions alongside of the enemy and fight it out, or whether, preserving their divisional close order, they should pierce and pass through the enemy's line and reform to some extent on the other side. In this latter case, the simplicity of this formation and the fleet's entire familiarity with it become most valuable. Upon emerging from the smoke on the other side, the vessels—such as got through—would gather quickly into their accustomed battle order, ready at the Admiral's signal to return to their original point of attack, or, if his judgment should so decide, to throw themselves upon some other point of the line.
I think this second formation is not likely to occur, though possible. The old style of delivering broadsides and passing on would permit it, but the ramming inevitable in present fleet fighting must cause delays and confusion. Thus, though many advantages would come to the fleet capable of piercing an enemy's line and reforming instantly on the other side, it should not occupy our minds too largely; nor should any plan occupy us seriously which treats of signals, alignment, formations, after close battle is joined; once in hot action, it is not likely that tactics will much avail: bravery and skill and the nautical habit, with a fixed resolve not to surrender, will principally decide the day, when hostile ships once get alongside of each other.
If the enemy is in column heading toward you, which is unlikely, except, perhaps, if surprised by sudden fog-lifting, the square falls at once upon the head of the column, two divisions (say six ships) doubling upon three or four of the enemy's leading vessels, while the third division, passing farther down the column, takes up the work of delaying the approach of the enemy's centre and rear ships, advancing to assist their van division (Fig. 12). Similar tactics would rule if the rear of the enemy's column were the nearer; while, if discovered in any detached or scattering order, our compact formation would show its greatest effectiveness.
An advantage of this "square" order, and of providing for its remaining unchanged, is that preconcerted plans can be made with some assurance that they will not be interrupted by the many accidents possible in actual practice. An Admiral, assured by incessant drills that his fleet can maintain this order, may clearly indicate to his officers his probable method of giving battle. He may thus say beforehand: "When, after possible changes of course to deceive the enemy, we finally strike his line of battle, which will in all cases be indicated by my signaling 'close action' to the fleet, the two divisions nearest to that wing of the enemy which we have struck will fight that wing, without further orders. The remaining division, without further orders, will engage nearer the centre of the enemy's line, and will delay—at the cost of all its ships if necessary—the approach of the other wing. Should we happen upon the van or rear of the enemy in column, the same movements will be executed at the final signal for 'close action.' The two divisions happening to be nearer the enemy as we approach will fight the enemy's extreme vessels, and the remaining division, passing rapidly along their line or column, will throw itself in the way of their centre and other wing."
I recur again to the fact that the solid square of four ships has no inner ship whose fire is lost; that the square of nine ships has only one; that of sixteen has four; of twenty-five, nine; of thirty-six, sixteen; of forty-nine, twenty-five. In other words, over one-half the total number are inside ships in a square of forty-nine, while the sixteen-ship square has but one-quarter inside, and nine ships have but one-ninth of their total number inside. These figures are significant, and indicate that our squares must not be too large; for with the loss of fire come other disadvantages, such as the confusion possible in a large mass from the disabling of one or more inside ships. As well as one may judge without that actual practice so lamentably wanting in our service to-day, twenty-five ships will be the greatest number we can place in this close formation, and much skill in handling will be needed even for this. It might be found expedient to divide such a fleet into two squares of sixteen and nine, separated by a convenient distance for support of each other.
The solid square is for offensive purpose only. I am far from claiming for it any defensive value. It is by no means a formation in which to await an enemy's approach or attack. The evils of closely massing vessels for defence are clearly shown in the case of that fleet, in the galley period, whose Admiral, perhaps lost in admiration of the Grecian phalanx on shore, closed his vessels in a compact mass to receive an attack of a hostile fleet. The enemy encircling the group and approaching closer as they steered around it, pressed back the outer galleys and so crowded the already compact mass as to cause collisions and loss of oars among them, and finally produced such confusion inside the group that the fight was lost before the attacking fleet had made its first charge. But here let me draw your attention to the significant fact of how rarely any defensive formation has been successful—how almost invariably victory lies with the attacking fleet. Whether at Trafalgar, where the enemy under way received the English in a half-moon line of battle, concentrating a withering fire upon the heads of Nelson's advancing columns; whether, as at Aboukir, the fleet at anchor, sheltered by shoals, its wings protected by land batteries, received the English, approaching in single column, and obliged to thread their way with tedious caution through a dangerous channel, while exposed to the fire of land batteries and of the broadsides of the fleet—whether there or elsewhere, no matter how certain the precautions of defence appeared to be, the resolute attack has, with few exceptions, overwhelmed the fleet acting on the defensive. I would say, therefore, that I can imagine no plan so effectual for defence as an active offence, and for that offence or attack I know of nothing better than the solid square.
A fair objection to this order is that the inner ships cannot deliver an efficient fire upon the enemy, as they are hemmed in by those outside. This defect is less than it appears, for the order is to be maintained only until close action is joined, when deployment follows, and the columns of the square diverge, and each ship takes room for fighting.
Another and more forcible objection can be made—namely, that the fleet massed thus closely offers a large target to the enemy's guns when within even a long range. I do not see that this defect can be remedied. No formation is perfect. Boldness of attack indicates risks to be run: where no danger is, no boldness can be. It is well, however, to note it as a valid objection, while at the same time we may expect its effects to be much lessened by the wild firing of the best trained gunners in a seaway. The guns also which we may expect to encounter are of great size and few in number. It required at Alexandria from fifteen to twenty minutes for each fire of the larger guns of the English fleet, and circumstances were there eminently favorable—smooth water, choice of position, a trained and gallant personnel, and a feeble enemy. Substitute for these conditions a fresh breeze and rough sea, an ordinary line of battle, a compact fleet threatening under swift headway first one and then another point of their line. Under such circumstances as these, we may, perhaps, justly reduce our estimate of probable damage done by the guns of a European fleet in the maneuvering preliminary to closing. And here permit me to record my settled conviction that closing must take place—that great naval battles will never be decided at long range. Single ships may fight at long range; light skirmish vessels may exchange shots at a distance; but a great battle of fleets, such a one as decides great wars, must, in the nature of things, end in close action. Whichever fleet shall find itself worsted at long range must close, or its Admiral forgets why he was sent afloat; and if he closes, his opponent must accept close battle or—run away. Officers of great intelligence have stated to me, as a practicable scheme, that a fleet possessing greater speed and greater gun range than an enemy might steam away from it, and, by making a running fight of it, in time destroy or cripple the pursuer. Truly, this is a pleasing picture. Gentlemen who know the sea can figure for themselves the amount of damage which the stern guns of a fleet in a seaway would probably inflict upon an enemy's fleet, miles away, and in hot pursuit. One of the runaways gets a hot journal, perhaps, and before signals can be made and read is overtaken by the concentrated fire of the enemy rapidly advancing. And if no such accident happens, what is it that the pursued Admiral is doing? He is being chased from some station presumably of importance, and which he has been sent to hold, or of which he is to dispossess the enemy.
Another form of error may be noted in the suggestion of Signor Brin; the eminent naval constructor of Italy, and the designer of her great ironclads. This gentleman makes concentration of fighting force a reason—or excuse—for building enormous vessels, claiming that in this way great war power is compacted and handled by one chief. He claims thus to carry .out the Napoleonic maxim of concentration, and advocates, I am told, still larger ships for the future. The logical result would be a navy consisting of one ship half a mile long by an eighth of a mile beam. Seventy years passed without naval warfare will account for these ideas being listened to by intelligent minds. Signer Brin's logic will, I am sure, fail to convince those persons much of whose lives have been passed afloat. What may come should the square formation prove successful, and other nations adopt it, it is needless now to inquire. Should ideas change, there would still be ships to be changed, and, after that, years of incessant drill afloat before tactics could be changed, and a whole Navy thus become expert and sea-hardened in its work. Should foreign ideas begin to change, it would then be time enough to think of an enemy's fleet approaching ours in a formation as solid, compact, and easily handled as our own. The time would be so much the longer, since entire conviction and desire to change would only come to them through crushing defeats of their formations by our more compact order—and hence, a resulting increase of time needed to build and man and drill new fleets.
I should be glad if our country might be the first to grasp the new methods demanded by new circumstances, and to see that the great, the masterful, power which steam gives us in place of sails is the ability to concentrate, to move swiftly here and there, still concentrated, and, finally, to strike the enemy almost as a solid mass.
I have desired to place before the members of the Institute this idea of a battle order as a fundamental one, and I leave it, therefore, for their reflection just as it stands, bare and unembellished; and I do this with intention. Many valuable additions may doubtless be made. A Polyphemus may be stationed at each angle of the square; a torpedo flotilla may hover in the rear ready to close when the smoke of hot action shall hide its approach; light and swift vessels for scouts and skirmishers may be added most effectively. These are the adjuncts of a fleet, however, not the fleet itself; and yet, it has seemed to me that for some years past the best intelligence of our Navy, its brightest minds, have concentrated their attention upon these adjuncts, rather than upon the fleet itself. Some officers have gone so far as to doubt the occurrence of fleet fighting in any future wars of the United States, and deny the necessity of preparation for it. I will not attempt to combat this error—this idea born of half a century's disuse of great maritime warfare, and opposed to the unchangeable doctrines of all warfare, which demand concentration of force as of first necessity. But that such ideas exist makes me the more satisfied to have had the privilege of setting before the Institute, in the present haze of doubt and speculation, a plain formation for battle as a central fact, a thing to be reached out after, and which once established, will make many of the lesser problems easy of solution.
I do not claim that the solid square is the best system—I hope some one will soon suggest a better—but something of that kind must soon be obtained. The logic of the situation is plain. Warfare demands concentration. Concentration demands many ships in a small area, moving with swiftness, docility, and as one body. To meet this demand, the ships must be all extremely handy and all exactly alike, and squadron drill in this battle formation must be incessant. To those who agree with me, the practical results of this logic will be plain: we must build and drill a homogeneous fleet to the highest point of evolutionary efficiency. What should be the units composing this homogeneous fleet, it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss. The necessities of such a fleet, however, the resources of our nation, the known fleets of possible adversaries, are elements which would make it simple to define and describe the general type desirable and necessary.
I have laid before you a simple though difficult formation; it is crude, as all warfare is crude, but I believe it to be effective—unpolished, not unfinished. Let us seek, then, for the rough essentials of success first, afterward for those finenesses which are secondary; do not let these secondaries occupy us too seriously. Think of warfare not as of the watchmaker's trade, nor of the sewing-machine factory, but as of iron forging, where heavy and crushing but inexact blows are struck. War is a rough trade. Let us not ask for a razor edge upon our heavy cutlass. Let us not dream that fleets will ever lie three miles apart and let the finer-pointed gun-sights decide a battle. Great results are not thus attained. Battles of nations are not thus fought.
DISCUSSION.
Commander Horace Elmer.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—It has given me great pleasure to hear an essay upon Naval Tactics read before this Institute. It is a subject that seems to have been much neglected in the service of late, very naturally, perhaps, in view of the paramount importance of first obtaining ships and guns; but as now we seem to be in a fair way for getting a new navy, it is time we were thinking about how to fight it. It is especially pleasant to find an essayist of such decided views so frankly inviting criticism. I shall accept the invitation in the same spirit it is given.
I find that I disagree with the essayist so radically that it has been difficult, in the short space allowed for discussion, to arrange my remarks. Concentration is his text, and certainly the squares which he proposes as tactical units are the perfection of concentration; but it seems to me that in the importance he attaches to concentration, particularly in the lessons drawn from warfare on shore, he confounds strategy with tactics. It is, indeed, a Napoleonic maxim, verified too often in late wars to be gainsaid at this time, that victory goes to the heaviest battalions, and the general who, by happy combinations or rapid marches, can oppose twenty thousand of his own men to ten thousand of the enemy, has the victory already won; but when once opposed to the enemy in the open field, the domain of strategy is over and that of tactics begins; and in tactics, the experience of all recent wars has been in favor of thinner lines and greater dispersion, until now lines of battle have become nothing more than clouds of skirmishers. The Macedonian phalanx, as a tactical unit, much resembles the solid square proposed by the essayist, yet I scarcely think any army tactician would be bold enough to advocate a return to it at the present time.
In the days of Nelson and Vincent and Howe, there was virtually but one type of battle ship in all navies, and but one weapon to fight with—the gun. The ships were as nearly alike in all their qualities as the builder could make them; there were no hot journals nor sudden variations of steam at critical moments: they were all driven by the same wind and handling alike; nothing but good seamanship was required to keep them together; in other words, it was all in the hands of the captains. They had but one weapon to meet—the gun—and that effective only at comparatively short range. The battle tactics for such a fleet were easily comprised in the words of Nelson: "No captain can go far wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." But at present battle ships are not built alike, nor is it probable they will be in our time. Old weapons have increased in power, new ones are developing. The high-powered gun, the torpedo, the ram, call not for a return to old principles, but an entirely new departure.
I will not dwell upon the practical difficulties to be encountered in keeping a fleet in such close order; that they will be great, the essayist acknowledges, and says that nothing but constant, unremitting drill will make it possible. Is it probable that all our heavy war ships, when built, will be kept constantly in commission and in fleet drill? Is it not more likely, judging the future by the past, that many of them will have to be put in fresh commission at the outbreak of hostilities, and, with others hastily gathered from different parts of the world, form our fleet? Would these tactics be practically possible under such circumstances?
The essayist acknowledges that the square would form an excellent target for the concentrated fire of the enemy's guns, but seems to rely upon wildness of fire to make the risk as little as possible. This is one great weakness of this formation: it makes no allowance for the accuracy and power of the new ordnance. A square of sixteen vessels in close order would extend at least a third of a mile in each direction. It would be exceeding poor practice that could not hit somewhere inside of that, even at long range, and the Whitehead torpedo, however unreliable it may be, fired at ordinary targets, could scarcely fail to hit something, if directed at such a compact mass. Let us imagine for a moment the effect of such a hit disabling any of the leading vessels as the square comes down in compact order, at full speed, to the attack: the vessels in rear would pile up on those in front, or, in their endeavors to avoid collision, the square would be broken up in confusion. It would not need a Whitehead or even a well-placed shell to accomplish this: a hot journal would be almost as effective. The essayist admits that such a formation will not do for defensive purposes. I am perfectly willing to admit the importance and desirability of taking the offensive wherever practicable; but it is not always so, nor does victory lie always with the attacking fleet. I might instance, as bearing some resemblance, on a small scale, to Aboukir, the battle of Lake Champlain, where the attacking fleet, of the same nationality as at Aboukir, came down to the attack in the same gallant manner, bows on, but were defeated, probably because the gunnery practice was better.
Again, another fact which renders these tactics, even if theoretically desirable, practically impossible in the near future, is the admission of the essayist that the "fleet must be homogeneous, that vessels of great handiness and exactly alike must be built to make the handling of such squares possible." This, then, postpones the adoption of such tactics until the vexed question of construction is settled, and the best type adopted, if any such single vessel can be found. I feel safe in saying that will not be in our time. The rapid development of weapons of offense and defense makes the selection of any such single type more difficult every year.
I will now consider for a few moments the practical application of these tactics to battle as illustrated in the case proposed by the essayist; but, before going farther, I must protest against this idea of feinting at one wing and attacking another while charging down upon the enemy's line. Would a regiment, in column of divisions closed in mass, charging an enemy across an open field, first oblique to the right and then to the left, thus remaining under fire twice as long as necessary, in the vain delusion they were deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack—or, to make the analogy more complete, suppose the enemy on the other side were advancing to meet them—would not these oblique maneuvers be considered quite extraordinary? It seems to me as unreasonable to suppose that any advantage could be gained by thus maneuvering a fleet in the open sea and in the full presence of the enemy. In a fleet of sixteen vessels in order of battle, say in two lines indented, the vessel on the extreme right is well within the range of the guns of the vessel on the left, and the time distance between them at 12 knots is less than four minutes; so that one portion of a fleet can scarcely be crushed while the other is left out of action. That much, steam and high-powered guns have accomplished; and the more thoroughly we realize that fact, the truer, in my opinion, will be our conception of tactics. When once the formation for attack is decided upon, and the time for making it, the less maneuvering the better. But let us analyze the case proposed by the essayist: A fleet of sixteen vessels in close order (a solid square), steering south, is approaching an enemy at high speed, say 13 knots; the enemy in line at the same speed. This will bring them together at the rate of a mile in less than 2 ½ minutes. The admiral in command of the square (I quote from the essay) signals fleet SE, when the sixteen vessels will change course simultaneously four points. To accomplish this, even with steam steering gear, would take probably one minute. Then approaching still closer, the enemy's fire becoming hot, the admiral signals fleet SW., and these sixteen vessels turn eight points to starboard not instantly—nor in any degree resembling a school of fish, but through an advance of perhaps one thousand feet and a time of at least two minutes. I allow the shortest appreciable time for reading and answering the signal. If the fire was hot at the beginning, the fleets are certainly together before or by the time the turn is accomplished. The vessels of the square would have scant time to steady on their new course when the shock came. There would be little opportunity for deployment, were such a thing contemplated. The vessels of the enemy's left wing would meet them stem to stem, having but 45° to turn, while the square turned 90°, and the vessels of the right wing would bear down with their rams (turning 45° with starboard helm) upon the exposed broadsides of the left vessels of the square. It is not difficult to imagine what would become of this solid square after the first shock, should it ever succeed in reaching the enemy's line without being broken up. It seems to me the vessels would be piled upon one another in inextricable confusion, impossible to reform. Suppose that the leading vessels meet the rams of their opponents fairly: those in rear—for the formation is in close order, four deep—must get out of the way immediately or run into them. The time is fearfully short, and the fact is, there is no chance for any but the outer ones, in so compact a formation, to get out of the way; and they will have the rams of the enemy's right wing to meet. It must not be forgotten that the admiral in command of the square, though under fire confessedly hot, cannot use his own guns. He would not dare to run the risk: the smoke would hide his signals and, covering his square, render such delicate maneuvering impossible. These tactics, then, ignore whatever advantage there may be in long range and flat trajectory, and use the gun only when broadside to broadside, as in the days of the old carronades.
About two years ago I had the honor of reading a paper before this Institute on the subject of Naval Tactics. I then stated that, in my opinion, "concentration is the fallacy we are most likely to fall into by too closely following the military idea, and that it would seem a fundamental rule for all orders of battle that no vessel of a fleet should be in the water of another." Time and considerable thought upon the subject have only strengthened this conclusion. In view of the acknowledged unhandiness of the English groups of three, in the form of a scalene triangle, I then suggested that the groups consist of two vessels and the fleet be divided into pairs, as the best development of the group system. This was not a new idea, I discovered afterwards, having been proposed some years before by a French writer on tactics; but I was none the less pleased to hear, as an evidence that my prophecy as to the true evolution of modern tactics was not far wrong, that the English fleet, in their evolutions last summer, under that distinguished tactician, Sir Geoffrey Hornby, discarded the group formations of three entirely and adopted a formation by pairs.
A theoretically perfect tactics should permit ns to use to the best advantage all the weapons with which we are provided; formations should be flexible, not easily destroyed, quickly reformed, adapted to defense as well as offense, and, to use the language of Admiral Randolph, R. N., "affording the utmost freedom to each ship of increasing or reducing speed, as well as altering course, or hauling out of action if disabled." It seems to me that the formation in solid squares answers none of these requirements.
Lieutenant H. O. Rittenhouse.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—Success in battle is the supreme consideration which should control every detail in the organization and development of naval force. The most vigorous and effective application of this force being no less essential to success than the possession of the force itself, we cannot afford to neglect the consideration of any system of tactics which might conduce to victory.
Of the value of concentration there can be no question, but I apprehend that it is concentration of attack rather than concentration of force which is generally regarded as a necessary condition of success. I make this distinction for the purpose of simplifying the discussion, and by no means as a criticism, for, if I understand the writer correctly, he advocates the massing of his force not because he regards the mass as an element of strength in itself, but because he believes it to be the best formation from which concentration of attack is made possible. Indeed, he plainly recognizes that this massing of material, and consequently of people, is in itself a source of danger; but he takes the risk of all its dangers in the hope of securing at least compensating advantages. It is at this point that I am unable to follow to his conclusion. I think too great a value is placed upon the advantages to which the system may lead, while its disadvantages are underestimated.
Whatever its merits or defects at other times, it must be judged alone by its qualities as a factor of battle. The advantages claimed are, that it enables the Admiral to make feints whereby the enemy may be deceived, and, finally, that a part or all of the vessels may be suddenly deployed in close action upon a selected portion of the enemy's force. I think these advantages are deceptive. To illustrate by the examples cited in the paper, we suppose the feint has been successful, and the reserves are hastening in one direction, while the real attack soon takes place in another. During this contest our vessels receive some damage, at least, and although the enemy's reserves arrive later, they are fresh to fulfill their important duties at a possibly more critical and decisive moment than if they had been engaged at first. Likewise, the advantage of throwing a superior force upon a smaller number of the enemy, whereby the enemy is left to throw his superior force upon the residue of our fleet, is not obvious. I do not go so far as to say that there can be no advantages in such measures, but only note that such advantages are not as great as they are sometimes thought to be.
The building of a fleet designed to fit a plan of tactics can be justified only by showing that the advantages of the tactics are so great that all conflicting considerations should be subordinated to such plan. When force meets equal force on the open sea, attempts at deception will avail but little. In operations on shore, the topographical features invite and require the use of strategy; but at sea nothing is concealed, and when equal fleets meet on such even terms, the laws of compensation are so uniform that we are led to look for success in the more rapid and skillful handling of our rams, guns and torpedoes, rather than by any devices of maneuvering. The disadvantages which attach to the formation in solid square are numerous, and, I think, of greater moment than the paper discloses. We are met at the outset by the admitted fact that a fleet must be constructed to conform to the tactics, and no stronger statement can be made of the practical difficulties of the formation. If ramming is to constitute a material part of the action at close quarters, it is likely that the vessels of the homogeneous fleet would be fitted, to some extent at least, for such work—a fact which increases the difficulty, not to say danger, in time of peace, and might lead to confusion, if not disaster, in time of action.
To produce confusion, it is not necessary that accident should happen to one of the interior vessels of the square. An accident to any vessel, excepting those which happen to be in the rear, when steering a given course, would be equally unfortunate. It will be remembered that in the galley conflict referred to, the disastrous confusion was not due to a cause originating inside.
While the mass offers an attractive target to the enemy even at long range, it will be seen that the fire from the mass will be very much restricted, and when the fleet is steering on lines of the square or parallel with either diagonal (it is not probable that other courses would be in much use), the fire parallel to the keel would be restricted to a portion only of the outer lines.
Lieutenant Charles R. Miles.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—The question brought before us this evening presents a wide field for discussion, and the student of naval warfare must confess himself bewildered at the great number of intricate problems to be considered before anything like a definite conclusion can be reached in regard to the subject. The existing jealousies of the great powers of Europe may, at no distant day, give some of the well-equipped fleets of the period an opportunity to furnish us with valuable practicable lessons in battle tactics; but it will not be wise for us to pursue a "waiting policy," lest we ourselves should first be called upon to furnish those lessons and be found wanting. Naval officers have been urging upon the American people for years the necessity for building modern ships of war, and now that the prospect seems good for having a fleet of these ships entrusted to our care, it becomes us to look fairly at this question of battle tactics, and, by freely discussing it, to endeavor to form some idea of what tactical formation will be the best to fight successfully a modern fleet.
The paper under discussion presents very forcibly the value of compact formations for battle, but I doubt very much whether a candid consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the solid squares will be in favor of the adoption of such formations for battle. It appears to me that the only solid squares that are at all practicable are those composed of four and of nine ships. The former, that of four ships, has the disadvantage I should urge against the group system—that it would break up the fleet into small, detached squadrons, thus destroying its unity, and rendering it liable to be beaten in detail. The latter formation, that of nine ships, has a great disadvantage in having so many ships whose guns cannot be brought to bear upon the enemy while approaching him. This makes a very desirable formation to maneuver from when the enemy's line of battle is reached, as illustrated by Commander Taylor in Figs. 12 and 13; but imagine the disheartening effect produced upon the officers and men of the silent ships in the rear and centre by being exposed to the galling, concentrated fire of the enemy without an opportunity to strike back until the enemy's line is reached.
I am disposed to favor concentration in the abstract, however, and believe that some other form of concentration not having the disadvantages of the solid square will be found in future fleet actions to possess the essential elements of success. I place much force upon the effect of breaking the enemy's line, should the enemy form in lines abreast in open order; for, with this feat accomplished by a fleet in compact order, the battle is hall won. One of the principal axioms of warfare, be it on land or at sea, is that we must endeavor to catch the enemy unawares by out-maneuvering him, and then to overwhelm a portion of his force by the whole of our own. In order to accomplish this result, concentration must be resorted to at the critical moment of the final charge. Open-order formations may be employed as a means of spreading the fire of the enemy's fleet while endeavoring to out-maneuver it, but they must be such open-order formations as will render it possible to form rapidly into the most advantageous compact order for striking the enemy the decisive blow when the opportune moment arrives.
All open-order formations are based, I take it, upon certain well-known principles of modern military tactics, but the advocates of these formations for naval battle tactics forget the difference in the character of the battles on land and those on the open sea. In the former, the conformation of the land, the presence of trees and of fortifications, etc., render the approach of an enemy slow and cautious, while the army acting on the defensive has a decided advantage. In the latter case, there is a smooth, unbroken surface, with no obstacle save the enemy's guns to prevent the two fleets from coming rapidly together. It, therefore, appears to me that we should liken naval battles to the cavalry charge, made by compact bodies moving at full speed, sweeping all before them, rather than to the movements of the slowly and cautiously advancing infantry in skirmish line.
I believe long lines either abreast or ahead to be very weak formations in which to make or receive an attack. First, because naval actions of the future, as Commodore Taylor says, will not degenerate into mere target practice at long range; for, with the great speed of the modern battle ship, and with the possibilities of her offensive weapons, the gun, the ram, and the torpedo, well considered, no commander, hoping for success, will hesitate to bring into effective co-operation all the resources thus entrusted to him. It is needless for me to refer to the impotency of the ram and the torpedo at long range, or to their deadly effectiveness at close quarters, except to draw the conclusion more forcibly that, in order to produce the most effective co-operation of all the offensive weapons in a modern fleet, the commander must seek close action, and the earlier he brings his rams and torpedoes to the assistance of his guns the better, always providing that he obtains the advantage of position before doing so. The advocates of open order lay much stress upon the immunity thus obtained from the evil effects of concentrated fire, forgetting, apparently, that the time during which a fleet will be exposed to such a tire at anything like a comfortable distance for cool target practice will be very short indeed. Secondly, the line abreast, either with vessels in groups or in echelon, it seems to me, does not possess the necessary element of unity. The commander-in-chief does not have his vessels so much under his own control as in the compact order, and, as future actions will be fought, in all probability, in less time than even the most decisive battles were fought in the past, the necessity for compactness, to prevent early demoralization in the fleet, seems imperative.
I wish to propose, in place of the solid square, the double-echelon formation of two indented lines; or, to make my meaning clearer, I would form the fleet in two wedge-shaped lines, one within the other, the apexes towards the enemy, and the sides of each wedge making an angle of 90°. The vessels of the inner line must take position opposite the intervals between the vessels of the outer line, making, as it were, two bow and quarter lines of vessels on each side of the wedge. I claim for this formation, which I shall name the battle angle, the following advantages:
- The formation is compact and can be easily maneuvered.
- All the vessels will be able to use one broadside and their bow guns while bearing down upon the enemy.
- When the enemy's line is reached, each vessel in the rear can continue on her course without fear of colliding with a vessel of her own fleet, and thus use her ram and torpedoes most effectively at the first onslaught.
- The angle within the inner line can be used as a shelter for the more lightly armored torpedo and dispatch boats and rams.
- It affords abundant opportunity for the display of strategy, in breaking through the enemy's line and doubling on one wing of his fleet.
I wish here to take issue with Lieutenant Rittenhouse in regard to the importance of strategy in fleet actions. Of course, strategical maneuvers are much more difficult to accomplish on the open sea than on land, but the commander of a fleet must employ strategy as well as tactics, if he hopes to win victory. I hold there is plenty of room for the display of strategy in maneuvering a fleet to outwit an enemy; and, although it may be difficult to deceive the enemy, yet that does not furnish sufficient excuse for neglecting to make an attempt to do so.
As the formation I have proposed would probably draw the concentrated fire of the enemy, while bearing down upon him the fleet might be deployed into two lines abreast in open order, preserving the relative positions of the ships in the two lines as they were in the wedges. This formation could be maintained until near enough the enemy to discover the weak points in his line, when the fleet should form the battle angle again upon some designated ship, presumably the one opposite some weak point in the enemy's line.
I wish to state here that the formation I have advocated in line appears to be identical with that advocated by Commander Elmer in his paper on Naval Tactics, printed in No. 30 of the Proceedings of the Institute; and, further, that my formation of the wedge is simply that line formed in double echelon. I make this statement in justice to Commander Elmer, although, when I first conceived these formations, I had not seen his article.
I do not wish it understood that I advocate a rigid adherence to concentration under all circumstances; but this much I wish to assert—that, while the position of the enemy's fleet and the strategical intentions of the commander-in-chief may demand the open-order formation for the purpose of maneuvering into position, the concentrated, compact formation will be successfully resorted to for the final attack. After the fleets close and the signals become obscured, the fight must become a melee, and the best advice then, perhaps, for the individual commanders will be that given by Nelson to his captains at Trafalgar.
It may be a little irrelevant, perhaps, in this discussion to speak of the value of our present method of signaling; but as the success of fleet maneuvers in the future must depend upon the rapidity with which signals can be made and received, I shall claim the indulgence of the meeting for a moment longer, while I enter my protest against the continuance in use of the present methods. With two hostile fleets approaching each other at the rate of 12, 13, or perhaps 15 knots an hour, very little time can be given to the making and reading of signals; hence, some new and more rapid method should be devised.
It would be better, however, during battle, not to trust too much to signaling, even under the most favorable conditions. When the circumstances permit, all the possible features of the battle should be discussed beforehand by the admiral and his captains, and then, in case a signal is obscured or is wanting at the critical moment, the captains have their own knowledge of the plan of the battle to act upon. Nelson always adopted this method previous to his great actions, and by so doing he gained the confidence and thorough co-operation of his captains. If such were the case in those days, when plenty of time was given to the reading of signals, owing to the slowness of the approach of two hostile fleets, how much more important—nay, imperative—it is that each captain in the modern fleet should know what to do instantly, without waiting for a signal, when the enemy is approaching at the rate of 15 knots, and is, in all probability, directly upon him in less time than it would take to make out and answer a signal from the flagship!
Lieutenant C. D. Galloway.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—It is fair to assume that the tactics adopted by any nation will be known by all the other nations with which a conflict is likely to take place. This knowledge will enable fleet commanders to make their plans to a certain extent before the action begins.
Let us suppose, for example, two hostile fleets, A and B, approaching each other, each consisting of an equal number of vessels, say nine, not counting torpedo boats. The commander of fleet A adopts the tactics of the essayist, and advances to the attack in a solid square; while the commander of fleet B advances to meet him in single line of battle. I here choose the single line to oppose the solid square, rather than the indented or double line, in order that every gun that will train ahead or nearly ahead may be used upon the advancing square, which certainly offers a fine target for even extreme range. While approaching, therefore, the square will be subjected, from every ship in the line, to at least two rounds from each gun that can be brought to bear, while the line will be under the fire of only the leading ships of the square, and will naturally offer a much less favorable target. It is quite possible, also, that projectiles fired into the square may injure more than one vessel by passing through unarmored parts, creating debris and confusion, if not doing more serious damage.
Should the approaching square feint on either wing of the line, it will simply hold itself under fire from the whole line for a longer period and suffer more. A very important point to be noted here is the fact that the speed of the vessels of the square will be materially lessened by any change of direction, as mentioned by Commander Elmer. Another point to be noted is, that in all changes of direction of four points or more (the essayist suggests a change of eight points when feinting on one wing and attacking the other), as the vessels of the square are in close order, the rear ships in each column must slow almost to steerage way, or oblique at least two points before turning, in order to avoid running into the stern of the leading vessel, because, the pivoting point being invariably forward of the middle of a vessel, the stern of the leading vessel would extend at least 150 feet across the line of her former direction. This alone would greatly enhance the danger of maneuvering the square after the firing began, on account of smoke, as it would also in drill during fog or thick weather. My attention was called to this fact in 1880, by an officer of the Royal Navy attached to one of the ironclads of the Mediterranean fleet. In tactics other than that recommended by the essayist, this is avoided by the change of direction being more gradual, the vessels really steaming on an arc of small radius. Even in the square this is practicable, but I think the necessity for it increases the danger of fouling, and renders the fish-like maneuvering less practicable.
Let us now suppose A's square has attacked the left of B's line, and, while it is thus occupied, that the latter's right wing attacks the left flank of the square. Only the outside vessels of the square, in this case, would be able to do much execution, while the torpedo vessels belonging to fleet B would sweep around upon the right flank of the square, either attacking the vessels of the square on this flank or its torpedo boats; or else they would divide their attention between such an attack and in defending the vessels of their own right wing against an attack from the torpedo vessels of the enemy. Any damage thus done to the outside vessels of the square would materially weaken the effective force and utility of the inner ones, while any damage done to one of the vessels of B's line would simply amount to the loss of one vessel. Should, however, the square break through the line, and assuming that it has swept away the vessels in its immediate path, suffering naturally some loss, the remaining vessels of the line need simply change from their original direction 16 points, and attack the rear of the square, continuing the attack while fleet A is reforming its square, or any other form of concentration demanded by the tactics proposed.
It appears to me that the tactics of the essayist subjects the vessels of A’s fleet not only to the entire force of its opponents, but also to the great danger of being destroyed by its own auto-mobile torpedoes, or of being fired into or rammed by its own vessels.
Lieutenant D. H. Mahan.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—Besides the compact mass proposed by Commander Taylor, and the other formations suggested, I would like to propose a plan embracing the good points of both, as I think, and I hope I may either render my position good or receive such suggestions as may cause me to change my opinion. It is said, "In time of peace prepare for war"; so let us fight our battles to come now, that in the future we may be able to talk over our successful battles which have been.
The plan I would propose is, having nine ships, or any other number (but I take nine to place against Commander Taylor's nine), let us arrange them in a combination of two of the plans suggested, the double echelon and a partial line of battle; the centre three in line of battle, the two wings in echelon. This is the cruising formation, two or more cables' lengths apart both abeam and from astern to ahead. This formation of fleet can be more easily managed than either of those proposed. It is easy to form line of battle by the vessels in echelon moving at full speed into line. To change direction even to eight points is accomplished without the ahead and astern dilemma, and the position of echelon can be quickly regained by the wings. In all changes the three centre vessels wheel as one into the new formation, except when the signal, "Vessels right, or left, about" is made. For instance, there is a fleet in this formation heading E; speed 9 knots, greatest possible speed 14 knots. A hostile fleet is reported from aloft bearing SE. Our admiral signals either, "Fleet SE. in echelon" or, "Fleet SE., left support." If the first is made, the centre wheels until heading SE; the right slows until position is gained; the left increases speed to take position. If the second is made, each vessel of the right wing changes course to SE; the centre wheels four points to SE. The left wing changes direction—No. 1 to SE., No. 2 to SSE., No. 3 to S. by E., forming in rear of the line of battle formed by the centre and right wing, on a line of bearing NE. and SW., and four or more cables' lengths in rear of that line of battle. On attack, these three vessels are held in reserve according to instructions well understood beforehand.
If it is found that the enemy is advancing in mass or square of nine vessels, I would attack in the echelon formation, and (the mass tactics being well understood) our captains would only have to consider what possible change would be made by the enemy. If the enemy should feint to the left, as his first change, it may be considered almost certain that his time will be too short to attack the right; it is far different now from "Feint left face, cut right"; the distance travelled over by ships at full speed seems to have been disregarded by the writer. Our fleet has so far been advancing at 9 knots (the best maneuvering speed) in echelon formation; our admiral signals, "Full speed." This means he has determined to attack, and it is well understood that he will, with our centre, attack the enemy's van. Kara, if possible, is the order. The captains of the centre know this. There is no other signal to be watched for: all attention is given to the enemy. Fire is to be reserved until close aboard. Our centre strikes the enemy's van; the centre and rear of the enemy have to sheer boldly to the left and right, to avoid collision with their own vessels. Our right and left are advancing at 14 knots, straight as arrows, only allowing sufficient helm to strike decisive blows on the enemy's bows now open to us, and the result is what? 1st. The probable loss of our three centre vessels. 2d. The probable loss to the enemy of his three van vessels; three of his vessels, trying to escape to the left, run down by our right; three of his vessels, trying to escape to the right, run down by our left. The captains in the enemy's fleet have been trammeled by signals expected from their admiral. As soon as it is seen that they are bound to be hit by one of our approaching vessels, an effort is made to secure the best possible position to receive shock, but too late.
Suppose, however, that the position on heading SE. were the second, "Fleet SE, left support." Our centre would again attack the enemy's van. Our right would converge to attack the enemy's ships diverging towards it, or, better still, away from it. Our left, as support, has such a position that it can be moved to the right or the left, or support the centre by engaging any vessels which may have slipped through. Our left has also the advantage of being free from smoke and with more room to maneuver. If, before the attack, the enemy should have changed so much to the left as to cause change of formation, the signal could be made, "Fleet E." or "Fleet NE.," when the centre and left would be in line of battle and the right wing in support. Readily concerted signals could be determined upon; for instance, "Full speed, left" would mean, "The left will attack enemy's van, fleet full speed to attack."
By these changes every movement is an advance, and only the vessels farthest from the enemy have need to slow down. Never make a movement in retreat when near the enemy. Nos. 7 and 8 of the writer's figures are just the positions I should like to see an enemy's fleet take, if I had a fleet of strong, swift ships close to it. By having a general understanding as to the movements of individual vessels, the necessity of signals can be done away with to a great extent. An admiral must depend upon his commodores and captains, and he can soon determine upon the character of each and assign them positions best suited to them. In such an engagement as I have described, the man who has the most grit will win. If the enemy's admiral falters, no matter how little, so much the worse for him. If our admiral falters, there is still a chance for us from the pluck of the commodores of the right and left wings.
If it is necessary to change course 16 or 12 points on sighting an enemy, signal, "Fleet W., vessels right, or left, about," whichever gains ground towards the enemy. Let us say right about, for example: then all turn one-half circle to right; on completion of turn the centre advances at full speed; each of the other vessels takes up full speed, so as to retain position in echelon, heading W. Now the maneuvers can be resumed so as to head SW. or NW, or as you choose.
These few remarks are made to show that this formation has the following advantages: 1st. No ahead or astern line, unless one wing acts as support, and in that case the support is sufficiently far from the main fleet to avoid fouling. 2d. Easy to change to another formation. 3d. More space given for calculation than in mass or line of battle formation. 4th. Being in open order, there is less liability of being struck by a shot intended for another vessel.
Commander H. C. Taylor.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—In the opening remarks of my paper I stated that my ideas were not at all in line with modern naval thought. In other words, I quite expected the severe criticism which this discussion has developed. This criticism has come from most able and intelligent officers. It is in all probability correct and just, for it expresses the sentiment of a majority of the thinking men of our Navy. While unable to change my own convictions, based upon some experience, thought and study, I shall not imitate the solitary juror who complained of the obstinacy of the eleven other jurymen. I shall, therefore, make some explanations and clear away some misapprehension of my meaning, not hoping, however, that even then we shall be much closer together.
In the first place, when it was determined to build a navy, and suggestions were invited as to future ships, it seemed to me a logical course to consider what future fleets could inflict most damage upon an enemy; and to consider then what form and class of vessel would make that future fleet a possibility. To determine what form or method of fleet was best for our needs, it seemed logical also to observe the European armaments, to note without prejudice the points where they have failed to obey the great laws which thousands of years of warfare have made for us, and, avoiding their defects, to prepare by more skillful methods to take advantage of those defects in case of a future war.
Thus, my desire being to deduce the ship from the necessities of the fleet and its tactics, I am quite at odds with the excellent and valuable remarks of Commander Elmer, which open with the statement that naval tactics have been "much neglected in the service of late, very naturally, perhaps, in view of the paramount importance of first obtaining ships and guns." He intimates that a fleet of Nelson's or Howe's time was more easily kept together than a modern steam fleet, being driven by the same wind, and having no hot journals to contend with. I cannot agree that this is a fact. I think flaws and baffling winds were greater enemies to compact formations in the days of sails than are the steam accidents of the present day. That battle ships are not built alike is in my opinion much to be regretted, but it is, I confess, a good reason for objecting to compact formations. But I urge that they can be and ought to be built alike, in order that we may have and use such formations.
Though I have referred to both the sailing period and the galley period, I should here say that the history and laws of warfare afloat during the galley period, which counted thousands of years against the sailing period's centuries, have been my principal reliance in deducing effective rules for our present guidance under steam. Commander Elmer believes that "the high-powered gun, the torpedo, and the ram, call not for a return to old principles, but for an entirely new departure." I do not agree with him. Fundamental principles of warfare do not change. No new departure is needed. The gun, ram, and torpedo will work with these principles, or may, perhaps, retard them somewhat, but they can neither change nor destroy them.
The system I advocate does not contemplate for its unit "heavy war ships," as I understand Commander Elmer to use the term. The use of such ships has forced upon European navies formations and tactics hopelessly faulty. Formations and tactics to defeat theirs are possible only with a different unit of fleet, a smaller, cheaper, slower, but quicker-handling unit. It will give me pleasure at some future day to lay before my able critics and good friends a general idea of the unit which I finally suggested as the result of what seems to me a course of logical naval deduction.
I am willing to consider as of great weight the objection to the square as a target for the enemy's fire. I can imagine circumstances in which it would result in the loss of a battle. I consider, however, the advantage I have pointed out to outweigh this defect.
I noted in my paper that there were some rare exceptions to an attacking fleet being successful. The battle of Lake Champlain is one. A few others are recorded in naval histories.
I contemplate the changes of direction referred to by Commander Elmer as being made while out of close or destructive range; and I expected the turnings to be made simultaneously, not, as he seems to think, instantly. To go further into possible details would prove too great a trespass upon your time. It is evident to me, however, that the power of feinting with a compact formation may be employed when at a long distance from the enemy, and to such a degree as to throw into serious confusion any elongated formation which attempts changes of front in order to meet the attack. I had no wish to ignore long ranges and flat trajectories, but one of my chief purposes was to protest against the undue weight given to this and other improvements of details, in considering methods of fighting. It is asked: Would regiments, in charging, oblique in order to make feints? Had these regiments means of being transported smoothly and swiftly across the space intervening between them and their enemy's line, it is my opinion that they would employ this obliquing though exposed to heavy fire while so doing.
The explanations I have made in answer to Commander Elmer's criticisms will cover much of the ground of the remarks of the other officers—remarks giving evidence of careful thought and a thorough understanding of the subject. I wish to accede at once to the statement of Lieutenant Rittenhouse that it is concentration of attack rather than concentration of force that is to be desired and sought for. I recognize, also, the wisdom of his remark that "the building of a fleet designed to fit a plan of tactics can only be justified by showing that the advantages of the tactics are so great that all conflicting considerations should be subordinated to such plan." But my claim is that any ordinary system o£ tactics will have those great advantages if it is made effective by building ships and fleets to fit it.
As regards Lieutenant Miles's valuable suggestion of a double wedge, I have only to say that if the angle of the wedge is 90°, he produces something very similar to the half of a solid square. I desire compactness, but have no special fondness for the square, and am quite ready to believe that the wedge may prove highly effective. The instant, however, it is attempted to fill in the space between the wings by weaker vessels, his formation has the same defect as the hollow square proposed some years ago by Lieutenant Mason, who filled the inner space with vessels not belonging to the formation proper, and thus effectively separated the sides of the square from each other and prevented mutual support. Omitting this feature, the hollow square is not an undesirable form of concentration, and with the same omission I consider Lieutenant Miles's wedge practicable and effective.
In Lieutenant Galloway's discussion of this formation, he expresses a belief that vessels would run into the sterns of their leaders. If I understand him correctly, he has misapprehended my meaning. I have not deemed it possible to have any wheeling or following of leaders in a compact formation like this. At the signal, "Fleet NW.," each vessel turns NW. at the same moment, preserving unchanged the bearings of the lines and columns. It is not intended that any ship should continue her course until she arrives at the point where her leader turned, and so run the danger of fouling him. Lieutenant Galloway also suggests that after the square has attacked the enemy's left, the enemy's right wing may attack the left face of the square. In answer to this, I may say that before delivering the attack the square would disengage and reach the enemy's front in detached lines or columns, as shown in the figures.
Lieutenant Mahan has suggested a formation which appears to me to have much strength, but I am disposed to believe any formation defective that calls for wheelings and new alignments while maneuvering in the presence of an enemy. This it is that has made me desire a formation which need not be changed during preliminary evolutions. I have not disregarded the short times and great distances of our modern ships at full speed, but have, on the contrary, felt that fact to constitute a great danger to wheelings and fresh alignments.
Throughout this discussion, from which I have derived great benefit, though not a change of opinion, I seem to observe that the examples of European navies have considerable influence upon the views of our officers. This is natural; but I submit that it is not wise to defer too much to systems of warfare which have never endured the tests of war. English admirals have used their skill as tacticians to procure the best formations possible with such units as they possess. Nor am I surprised that their conclusions should nearly coincide with those of the talented officers of our own Navy, whose study of the subject makes their criticism so valuable. But if their units are oversized, clumsy, and expensive; if the fleets formed of them are strangely ineffective in proportion to their cost; if their tactics are vague and feeble; and, finally, if we, having no units, no fleets, no tactics, are about to get them, why shall we not first say what tactics and fleets will prevail against European systems, and then provide the unit ships of a kind to make those fleets possible? Whatever we may decide, therefore, as to the best fleet and formation, do not let us so decide because the "modern ship" will or will not fit it. However great may be my error, this would be a greater one.
The Chairman.—Gentlemen:—The discussion has anticipated many of the thoughts which had occurred to me with regard to the subject under consideration. Another form of expression may, however, give some interest to a brief statement of ideas which have been presented already so well and forcibly.
A fleet of sixteen vessels in single column, at one cable distance, occupies a length of one mile and a half. If formed in square, at two cables' distance, which may be estimated as the least distance, in that order, for maneuvering under steam and at full speed, the side of the square would be six and the diagonal eight and a half cables. In the first formation, supposing the van ship at rest, the rear vessel, at a speed of twelve knots, would reach the van in seven and a half minutes. If the leading ship proceeds at half speed, the rear ship would require fifteen minutes to overtake the van. Similarly, if in square, steering in the direction of a side and its parallels, the rear squadron could reach the van in from three to six minutes. In the old battle formation, a single column upon a line of bearing, the ships to leeward were liable to be thrown out of action, a disability which, it is evident, could not be imposed upon a steam fleet of the present day. These two formations, the line of single ships and the square, present the extreme cases of dispersion and of concentration of the fleet.
The square insures the advantages of simplicity in maneuvering and deployment of divisions, of close supervision by the commander-in-chief, and of bringing with the greatest rapidity one part of the fleet to the support or relief of another. It imposes some disabilities. The ramming power of a fleet of sixteen vessels in square is reduced, primarily, to that of four ships, if steering upon a side of the square and its parallels, or to that of seven vessels, if heading in the direction of a diagonal. Similarly, the amount of gun fire is reduced as follows: In a square of four vessels, one-half or one-fourth, according as the ships head in the direction of a side or a diagonal; in a square of nine vessels, two-thirds or four-ninths; and in a square composed of sixteen vessels, three-fourths or nine-sixteenths, respectively. The inner ships lose all their circle of fire. Indeed, it does not appear that the enclosed vessels have any defensive power while that formation is maintained, nor any offensive power, except that of proceeding to points where their latent force may become effective.
The square offers a broad mark to the distant fire of an enemy, and, although fleets will probably approach with such rapidity that not more than two rounds may be fired from bow guns, the guns being again loaded and ready for the moment of collision, this must be noted as a serious disadvantage.
In the square, the attention of commanders must be given largely to the relative bearings and distances of their consorts, while in the presence of the enemy, when his mind should be relieved, as far as possible, from considerations of tactics, distances, angles, and compass courses. The general plans of action will have been formed and communicated by the commander-in-chief to his captains; and, in these last moments, his attention should not be absorbed in maneuvers to attain a battle formation. His efforts should be directed rather to the transfer of his battle line, already formed, to a position from which the attack may be delivered as he would prefer, in the prevailing condition of the wind and sea.
In the event of surprise, as from sudden fog-lifting or at night, with the enemy close aboard, these disadvantages would be, apparently, somewhat increased. It would be difficult to change the formation promptly. The leading ships of the square would probably charge, with an intention of ramming; but it is thought that, in a fleet about to charge, no ship should be directly in the wake of a leader, unless in very open order. The sudden disability of the commander of a leading ship, or any of the accidents of war occurring in the van, might precipitate disaster. The square is considered a bad formation in which to receive a sudden charge of some of the enemy's ships, if equal in number to the front of the square.
The composition of the battle fleet is an essential part of this problem. Some think that each ship of the line of battle will be attended by one or two sea-going torpedo vessels. Others maintain that it will be better to compose the line of heavy ships of great and equal speed, strengthened for ramming, and carrying powerful batteries. The existing opinion and practice appear opposed to the employment of vessels solely as rams, and it is not likely that they will have a place in the line of battle. The naval mind, throughout the world, is bent on ramming with any ship which may enter the line, irrespective of her artillery power; and, for this object, a strong and sharp bow, speed, and weight of vessel, are necessary. These qualities can be obtained without sacrifice of battery.
Let us consider an example of the necessary size and speed of a vessel for effective ramming. At Mobile Bay, the Monongahela, of about two thousand tons displacement, when ramming the ironclad Tennessee the second time, struck her upon the beam nearly at a right angle. The speed of the former, at the moment of striking, exceeded ten knots; but both ships had their helms a-port, the Monongahela endeavoring to deliver a perpendicular blow, and the Tennessee striving to sheer clear of her antagonist or to make the blow a glancing one. At ten knots speed, the perpendicular or direct blow would have amounted to about nine thousand foot-tons, but the blow was not a direct one, and the peculiar form of the Tennessee's side secured great structural strength and resistance. The Tennessee heeled far over and sheered rapidly away from the bow of her adversary. A part of the blow was absorbed in the destruction of the Monongahela's bow. Of course, the Tennessee's side did not take up instantaneously the remaining energy of the blow, but it is thought that had her side been straight it must have been penetrated. The force exerted by a ram, striking perpendicularly, varies directly as the weight and as the square of the speed of the ram. The Trenton could deliver, therefore, at a speed of twelve knots, a blow of about twenty-four thousand foot-tons. A large portion of the energy of a ram will be spent otherwise than in producing rupture at the point of impact. But it is believed that only an exterior structure, similar to the wedge shape of the Tennessee's side, powerfully braced upon the beams of a ship, could be hopefully opposed to the direct blow of sixty thousand foot-tons, given by the sharp bow of a ship of six thousand tons displacement, at a speed of fifteen knots.
Assuming that the battle line will be composed of heavy armored ships, with great speed and powerful batteries, does the square provide the greatest development of the ram and the gun, as the two most effective and reliable forces of the fleet? The effort should be to strike as heavy a blow as possible at the beginning of the fight, and we should look for a formation which will enable the ships to deliver that blow in unison. The square does not permit all the ships to participate in an attack, either with ram or guns. But the essayist says, "The square is to be maintained only until close action is joined, when deployment follows, the columns of the square diverge, and each ship takes room for fighting." It is submitted that the deployment is too late, and may result in partial or successive assaults by divisions of the fleet, or in one division sustaining the first onset of the entire fleet of the enemy.
The design and argument of the essayist appear to rest in this change of formation in the immediate presence of the enemy, precisely executed by a highly drilled fleet, thus keeping the enemy in ignorance of the point at which the blow will fall, and taking advantage of any peculiarity of his formation. It is a daring conception. The essayist concedes, practically, that the square can neither attack nor defend, but he uses it as the element from which he will develop his battle in the face of the enemy. The aim is high, and he will deserve success.
The fleet should cruise habitually in the battle formation, and the line of battle should be that in which the offensive and defensive powers of all the ships may be instantly employed. The double line of battle, in which the unit is a group of two ships, exemplifies this principle. Some advantages of this order were ably stated by the present Head of the Department of Seamanship and Naval Tactics, in a paper read before the Institute in January, 1884. It affords some other facilities besides those noted by Commander Elmer. In this formation, the rear ship of a group may keep its station four or five points abaft the beam, or it may be shifted quickly from one quarter to the other. Maneuvering is quite as simple as in the single line. When in double column, the broadsides of every ship are preserved; in line, the way is clear for each as a ram; and, at nearly all other angles, the double echelon formed gives scope for all the powers of the fleet. The leading ship has the task of maintaining its correct alignment and distance reduced to the least difficulty. The rear ships have only to watch their leaders and to follow up the attack of the leading line. Angles and relative bearings of ships find their utmost simplicity. The lookout ships should be stationed upon the flanks in front and rear, and, having signaled the number and formation of the enemy, they should assemble in rear of the double line and form, with the torpedo vessels, the reserve of the fleet. The front should equal or exceed that presented by the enemy, and the reserve of the double line affords a means of prolongation, either deliberately or suddenly, when considered necessary or desirable.
It is thought that the double line gives a powerful concentration, that concentration which subjects a number or all of the enemy's ships to a second blow from the supporting line swiftly following the first, or that other form of concentration which is effected simultaneously by enveloping and turning upon the flanks of the enemy.
Since we must concede to the enemy's ships a speed equal to that of our own fleet, the problem of doubling upon a part of his line has now an additional difficulty. And if one steam fleet doubles on a part of the other, why cannot the disengaged ships double also? If the formation is a good one, maneuvers will not avail much against an enemy of equal force: the victory will rest with the fleet which possesses the superior preparation, cohesiveness, skill, and endurance.
Commander H. C. Taylor.—Mr. Chairman:—Permit me to say, in answer to your fears that the deployment of the square may be too late and may thus result in disaster, that the deployment would be ordered when closing with the enemy, and the time for it would be determined by the admiral, sooner or later, as the firing became hotter and collisions impended. You consider, very justly, that a powerful concentration is obtained by the double line in attack. I submit to your judgment that the solid square of nine ships only adds another line to your proposed line of attack, while it ensures a formation equal at all points and in all directions.
Commander Horace Elmer.—Mr. Chairman:—I move that a vote of thanks be tendered to Commander Taylor for his very interesting and valuable paper.
The motion was carried, and the meeting then adjourned.