"The Naval Policy of the United States."
Commo. Simpson: I wish to bear my testimony to the excellence of the paper of Lieut. Belknap on what should be our naval policy. I have read the essay with interest, and I recognize very deliberate thought and conservative conclusions. Though I don't approve of all his suggestions, yet I find nothing proposed that is revolutionary or unreasonable. I congratulate the writer on the arrangement of his matter, concluding as he does with a summary of the points on which he has dwelt, thus enabling us to grasp certainly at his meaning.
The treatment of the question as to the necessity for the maintenance of a strong Navy by the United States is admirable, and his reasons are unanswerable, supported as they are by numerous instances, in which it is a matter of history that the influence of the show of naval force vindicated our national dignity, and has proved most efficient in general police. The argument drawn from the present state of affairs about the isthmus of Panama is most apt, for we are likely to see the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of the continent violated unless our government has a suitable force with which to support its protest. In case of a war also, we all can recognize that within ten days after the declaration New York city can be put under a contribution for millions to defray the expenses of an enemy, who happens to be possessed of a few powerful iron-clad vessels.
In the third division of the paper we get at the gist of the matter, in the presentation of the means that the writer would propose in order to revive the Navy, and he very sensibly advances the idea of a Naval Board at the Navy Department to perform the duties of the old Board of Navy Commissioners, although the duties at this time would not be so arduous as formerly, as the Bureaus might be retained to aid the Board. There would thus be a professional and responsible body of advisers for the Secretary of the Navy who, in repeating their advice and recommendations, could speak with no uncertain sound, and could thus remove what Lieut. Belknap alludes to as an insurmountable obstacle at the present time, the difficulty of making an impression on the minds of our legislators that the Navy Department has a system on which it will work consistently; for without being satisfied on this point it is right for them to withhold appropriations which they think are only to be frittered away on vague experiments.
The details of the duty for the Advisory Board seem well indicated, but in practice these would naturally suggest themselves, but I note one point made by the writer which I heartily approve; it is the one that refers to special legislation by Congress in regard to individuals, requiring that no such bills shall be considered by Congress except upon the favorable recommendation of the Advisory Board. Of course this would require in the first place an act of Congress, but I believe it is one that would be readily passed if recommended by the Secretary, as it would relieve Congressmen from a serious source of annoyance.
There is one advantage connected with the Advisory Board that has escaped the notice of Lieut. Belknap, which I will allude to. There is nothing that can be done which will approach nearer to taking the Navy out of politics, and as long as it remains at the mercy of politics, so called, but rather at the mercy of party men, all the recommendations in the world will be of no avail. With the Secretary alone at the Department, making recommendations on his personal responsibility, I don't care how much interested he may be in the Navy, he is still the slave of his party, and he dare not, for his party's sake, recommend appropriations for such expenditures as will expose his party to the charge of squandering the public money. But with a Board behind him, having no interest whatever in politics, not removable by party, he will be freed from the trammels of party, and can fearlessly recommend what he honestly believes will be for the good of the Navy, and for the credit of the country; this, I think, is the most important feature that would arise out of the formation of an Advisory Board.
I do not agree with the writer of the essay in the change that he would make in the system of promotions. I think that we have the best system in the world. When extraordinary instances of skill or gallantry occur Congress will always reserve to itself the right to treat them on their merits, meanwhile there is no system so uniformly just as promotion by seniority. During the late administration of the Navy Department the Navy received a shock which alarmed it and which should have the effect of closing more than ever the door to personal favoritism and political pressure.
I disagree with the proposition to dispense with Boatswains, Carpenters, and Sail makers. The last two can be dispensed with in small vessels, but there are times when their services are all invaluable, and, besides, these positions offer high incentives to the boys that we are trying to train up for seamen in the Navy, and the goal of their aspirations should not be taken away from them.
I agree with Lieut. Belknap in his opinion as to reducing the number of our Navy Yards, as by concentrating the same effort as now we can get better results. I agree with him as to retaining Norfolk, Pensacola, and Mare Island, and I would also retain a small station at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, but I would gradually abandon Boston, New York, and League Island, and I would recommend the establishment on the Thames River, at New London, of what should be the large naval arsenal of the country, removing to it the machinery and tools now at New York, Boston, and League Island, and adding thereto such additional improvements as would be required for a first class yard fit for a nation of fifty millions of people. It would be out of place for me to dwell on this matter, but I agree with Lt, Belknap that at present our expenditures for navy yards are spread out over too much surface.
Lieut. R. P. Rodgers: The plan of the system of promotion proposed by Lt. Belknap seems to me one of the most striking points of his Naval Policy which I have read with much interest. Although it has many features which should recommend it yet I doubt whether it would be acceptably received by the service at large. It is practically the French system, by which an officer is sure to get his promotion by seniority, and may secure it earlier by distinguished merit or by some signal act of service. Whether such a system, generally applied, in our country, would not be abused by means of political influence and patronage is a question to be solved only by experience.
I would, however, advise a plan of a similar but less extensive nature. I would recommend the plan of selecting our flag-officers from the list of captains. No captain should be eligible for promotion until he had seen a stated term (say two or three years) of sea service as a captain. By this means the best captains would seek commands as soon as they entered the grade, and with the incentive of a possible promotion before them, they would put forth their best exertions to improve their ships, (and thus the service) in every possible manner, in other words they would naturally take greater pride and interest in their work.
The flag-officers selected might not always be the best men eligible, but they could certainly be men of some distinction. Promotions to brigadier generals in our army are made in this manner and as yet no man without merit has been advanced. It would probably prove equally good if adopted for the Navy.
If this were done, flag officers would all be men of high intelligence, broad views, and strong character. The head of the Navy would then be strong, and the body would soon feel the influence of its strength.
I believe that this would prove a beneficial change in the system of promotion of our Navy, and I think it is probably the only safe one.
It may be claimed that the commanding officers also should be selected, but by increasing the field for selection there would be more scope for political and other outside influence: and although I think such selection would undoubtedly be beneficial (should it be judiciously made) yet the innovation would be so decided that I do not believe it would be accepted by the service.
P. A. Engnr Kafer: The first and as far as I can see the only step in the future Naval Policy of the United States as set forth in the essay is to re-establish a Board of Navy Commissioners which shall be an Advisory Board to the Secretary of the Navy.
If this Board is to direct the Secretary what to do, or order the Bureaus to do whatever it appears to the Board most expedient to be done making their decision final in all matters connected with the Navy Department then the office of Secretary of the Navy might be abolished as he would be a figure head only; but if the Board is to be under the direction and supervision of the Secretary, being advisory in its action, and only that, I can see no necessity for creating such a Board, giving the Secretary three advisers in addition to the eight provided by law; the Secretary can now get the opinion of any officer from the highest to the lowest if he desires it.
The reason for organizing the Bureau system in the Navy Department, was to fix the responsibility of any act performed under the cognizance of a Bureau, which was found to be impossible under the workings of the Board of Navy Commissioners prior to 1842.
Congress and the Secretary of the Navy were in accord on this point and both deemed it necessary to the interests of the Navy to abolish the Board of Commissioners and substitute the present system, not because there was any objection to the members of the board; as they were appointed as chiefs of bureau by Secretary Upshur, immediately on the bill re-organizing the Navy Department becoming a law; the objection was to the system.
Secretary Upshur in a communication to Congress stated that though the reorganization of the Navy Department under the system recommended would involve an increased expenditure of $19,000 per annum to pay the salaries of these bureau officers, it would, by fixing the responsibilities of such bureau and every act performed under its cognizance, be a saving of $700,000 to $800,000; and not only was the Secretary anxious for a change, but Congress also demanded a change in the administration of affairs in the Navy Department.
And now it is proposed after an experience of nearly forty years with the bureau system to go back to a system that was unsuitable to the wants and requirements of the Navy, when they were much simpler than they are to-day.
The author of the essay says that, "there was no call for the abolition of the Board," but from the records of the debates in congress and the communications of the Secretary of the Navy at that time, it will be seen that there was a decided call for the abolition of that Board, and the wisdom of the change was not questioned at that time.
Will we get officers as members of this proposed Board that are in any way superior to those selected as chiefs of bureaus? I think not.
The supposition is that we get the best man for chief of bureau, and we would take this same man as a member of this proposed Board, and the next best man for chief of bureau.
In reference to the question of the establishment of such a board as proposed in the essay, I will quote from a letter of a Chief of Bureau on this subject.
"I can conceive of no possible object in this. The present bureaus constitute an admiralty board with all its advantages and without its defects. The only modification I would suggest would be to require, by law, a daily meeting for conference presided over by the Secretary of the Navy or senior Chief of Bureau present, the minutes of the proceedings to be taken down for future reference.
If a separate admiralty board was constituted and the bureaus retained it is probable that the same reasons that created me Chief of Bureau would put me on that board, and some inferior man put in as Chief of * * *; and so with all the other chiefs, which would do nothing to conduce to harmony of action.
The reunion of chiefs proposed with their language taken down would prevent its assuming the character of a debating club, and each man become responsible for the advice he gave the Secretary; his views, if erroneous, being combated on the spot by the other chiefs."
The late Commodore F. A. Parker says, when writing on this subject:—"Much has been said of our defective system of naval administration; but when we remember that under that system a force was organized in 1861 that effectually blockaded our sea-coast from Virginia to Texas, a Herculean task which Europe pronounced impossible; and a number of monitors put afloat in 1862, which excited the admiration of the world; and further when we recall the triumph of American over English ideas in the memorable conflict off Cherbourg, of June 19, 1864, I do not think we need cross the ocean for instruction."
And with the opinions—as here expressed—of these eminent officers of the Navy I fully agree.
The Naval Policy of the United States has been much discussed by officers of the Navy, and these discussions have left the impression on my mind, that the naval policy as well as the policy of the naval officer, is to induce Congress to appropriate money enough to build ships that will compare favorably with those of England and France in numbers as well as in kind:—but the naval policy as set forth in the essay is, the re-establishment of a Board which was acknowledged on all sides to be a failure forty years ago; and if this is to be the future policy of the Navy, I think we are much better off without a policy.
It has been said that Congress would furnish the money to build ships if the Navy Department would furnish the designs for them.
On the contrary I believe that there are designs for vessels with all the details of construction now ready and only awaiting an appropriation from Congress to build the ships.
The monitors now on the stocks should be completed, and would make very efficient war vessels of their class;—though by no means such vessels as might be designed to-day.
As the author of the essay, says "after all it is Congress that decides the Naval Policy of the country."
If Congress should agree with the author of the essay, and authorize a Board, organized as proposed, the members being specialists in their own profession; that of ordnance, seamanship and navigation,—these subjects they would be fully competent to judge, and their opinion on them would be of more weight than the opinion of any one who had not made these subjects a study and followed them as a profession; but in fixing on the best type of ship or to get a ship that will fulfill the conditions required of her, as to speed, ability to maintain that speed for a given time, strength and weight of the structure, stability and many other details, a special knowledge of the profession of engineering, and naval architecture, practical and theoretical, is necessary.
The engineer and naval architect are better fitted, than a navigator, seaman or ordnance officer, by their special professions, to form an intelligent opinion on the subjects of engineering and naval architecture.
The bureaus, that must work in accord to make a successful vessel of war, are Ordnance, Engineering and Construction, and as I have already said, must be men competent to judge of all the details of a ship; and these men we now have as the chiefs of bureau.
If specialists are not best fitted to judge of subjects pertaining to their own profession; then if a question of ordnance is to be considered, the Board should be composed of persons having no special knowledge of ordnance, instead of officers that make that subject a professional study, and if the subject to be considered is chemistry, the Board should be composed of persons who are not chemists.
But it is well known that when any person or organization wish an opinion on any subject, they seek that opinion of those who have made that subject a study, and for this reason I consider that such a Board should be composed of all the chiefs of bureaus instead of three men who may be very eminent in their own profession, and fully competent to judge of any question pertaining thereto, but not as competent to give an opinion on matters pertaining to other professions.
It has been asked what ships have we now, that have been built under the bureau system. I point to the Trenton, ships of the Vandalia and Adams class built since 1870; the Vandalia class have equal if not greater speed than the vessels of the Gem class of the English Navy, vessels of about the same size as the Vandalia; the frames of the Gem class, being of iron, they are superior in that respect; the height of the boilers of the Vandalia class being about two feet less than those of the Gem class and with the same draught of water, places the boilers of our own vessels, two feet more below the water line, giving them greater security and protection from shot.
These vessels, I consider good vessels of their class, and a very desirable class. Much has been said of the worthlessness of the vessels built between 1861 and '65; but they were good vessels; they served their purpose, fulfilling all the demands required of them; it is true that they are rotten, but it was known at the time they were built that they would not last, they were built chiefly of white oak, the best timber that we had; but had the frames been made of iron,—as they might have been—instead of wood, we would have a number of good cruising ships to-day.
It was due to the conservative influence in the Navy that they were built entirely of wood; but since then we have made some progress and I hope to see still more in the right direction, instead of going back to the ways of forty years ago.
Comdr. Cooke: I have read with great interest Lieut. Belknap's prize essay on the Naval Policy of the United States. He has certainly drawn a very truthful yet unflattering picture of the condition of our Navy. Indeed were its efficiency at the moment alone to be considered, it might with accuracy be ranked after that of Holland, and perhaps after those of Brazil and Japan.
We have not a single armored sea-going ship, and can hardly be said to have any modern cruising vessels, and no armaments of modern rifled guns; yet a brief glance at the very complete and excellent annual reports from the Navy Department is sufficient to set forth how earnestly the naval authorities have begged and implored Congress, from year to year to provide the necessary funds for keeping abreast with the times.
Besides being the right arm of our national defense, our navy is, of course, an important and necessary ally of our commerce, and their development must be mutual. The point to which its efficiency should be carried must, therefore, depend, in a great measure, upon the amount of commerce we have to protect.
Our Navy may be sufficient now to protect our commerce, in the present stage of its development, for we can hardly be said to have either Navy or Commerce worthy of consideration. But as our surplus productions are annually increasing and must be transported to foreign markets or become a total loss in our own hands, the question whether or not the Navy shall be improved so as to provide for this state of anticipated development must quickly be decided. And it is well to remember, that if the freights paid by our people to vessels sailing under foreign flags had been retained at home and allowed to become part of our national wealth, our ability to meet and overcome the embarrassments of trade would have been greatly increased. It is very clear that we cannot afford to continue our dependence upon foreign nations for the transportation of our surplus products to the markets of the world. The benefits and profits of our own carrying trade belong to our own people and should be enjoyed by them.
We are certainly the great "middle kingdom" and have the most favorably located business stand on the face of the globe. From our geographical position and territorial advantages we may justly aspire to commercial supremacy, which if we fail to achieve we cannot expect to maintain a position in the front rank of nations.
From the whole of our vast country comes one universal wish for a restored American marine. We are great in production, great in internal commerce, and the whole country is now looking with anxious hopes for the building up of our shipping interest and of making it our principal arm of defense in war and our proudest boast in peace. Why should we not hope for a glorious future for our marine if we will only devote our enterprise and intelligence to this important interest, so long prosperous in the past.
Under our present policy and laws we cannot successfully compete with foreign countries in our ocean carrying trade, and the remedy must be to relieve our shipping employed in foreign trade, from all restrictions and burdens which place it at a disadvantage in competing with foreign vessels. This must be accomplished in the near future, and all admit that our marine resources must be restored or we shall be disarmed of our defense, and our productions will be at the mercy of the nation which possesses itself of the means of carrying them. Should we not, then, at once begin to remove abuses, to introduce improvements, and to build up our long neglected marine?
We have stood with folded hands and permitted our rivals in naval power to get far in advance in a line of improvements in which the United States not many years ago knew no superior.
The first step in the future naval policy of this country, as recommended in the essay before us, might be taken at once, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, and would be a great stride in the right direction. It being the establishment of a Board of Naval officers, which should determine certain vital points, therein briefly summarized.
The recommendation to modify the present system of promotion by seniority, by occasional selection, would not accomplish the desired result, as those most influential and not those most deserving would gain by it. To encourage retirement would be far better.
It is useless to attempt to enlarge upon the points suggested in the prize essay under consideration, but I am sure you will agree with me that it is full of excellent ideas which we should earnestly advocate in the hope that our naval policy may be fixed and its development commence at the earliest possible moment.
Lieut. Belknap. If the appointments to the position of warrant officer could be made solely upon the recommendation of naval officers through the Advisory Board, the grades would doubtless be useful as incentives to the naval apprentices, as suggested by Commo. Simpson. But would not the end be as effectually gained by making the chief petty officers permanent positions dependent upon good behavior, and would it not be an incentive equally stimulating to the apprentice to know that by length of service, good conduct and ability, he would inevitably fall heir to one of these ratings independently of the political influence his friends might have? With the exception of gunner, the usefulness of these grades passed away with the sailing frigates, and I trust Commo. Simpson will pardon me for saying that I see no reason why we should continue to swell the total number of officers in the service by some one hundred and seventy-five (active and retired) and to deprive our already too crowded berth decks of the space that might be gained, for the sake of affording an incentive to the naval apprentice.
The plan for the promotion of flag officers as suggested by Lieut. Rodgers is rather more of a sweeping change from the system now followed than mine, for it would certainly be a greater innovation to choose all of the flag officers by selection instead of every third one, and with how much more force would the objection on the score of political influence apply in the former case than in the latter. But with an Advisory Board to choose the officers to be promoted why stop the selection at flag officers? As Commo. Simpson so ably says, nothing could be clone which would approach nearer to taking the Navy out of politics than the establishment of an Advisory Board, and that being the case we might feel confident that the recommendations of the fitness of an officer for promotion over the heads of his seniors in length of service would be free from political influence or party bias. Congress has the power to advance an officer a grade, but only for war services, or for extraordinary heroism; my plan provides for peace, to prevent minds rusting during the long years that must elapse before promotion. Take for instance the graduates from this School. We all know that each year some manage to get through by hook or crook who should not. Should not the bright men of the succeeding class be given an incentive to perfect themselves in their profession and what more fitting one than that they should step over the heads of the laggards in the class above?
To Congress it is that we look for our very existence; it is to Congress then that we should naturally look for a naval policy. But without a policy we can so prepare ourselves that when one is adopted we shall be ready to take advantage of it. This can best be done, in my opinion, by the establishment of an Advisory Board. The needs of the service will then be defined, and the unification of its management being completed, steps can be taken to place the Navy in a condition worthy of a nation of fifty millions of inhabitants.
Undoubtedly the Secretary of the Navy can get opinions from the different chiefs of bureaus, but do they agree? Is it not necessary for the Secretary after they are received to endeavor to form the diverging, and, but too likely, directly opposite opinions into a settled plan? That this can be done and that a master mind can wrest success from such unpromising sources is evident from the management of the Navy Department during the late war. But similar circumstances would have to recur to permit any one man taking the responsibility and sole direction of affairs as Mr. Welles did. In time of peace few men not trained in the service would venture to action the plan of one specialist as opposed to that of another, both being chiefs of bureaus.
But with a wise and competent Advisory Board to advise and encourage, as Commo. Simpson shows, the Secretary would be able to guide with no uncertain hand the branch of public service committed to his charge. The growing wants of the Navy in 1842 demanded the establishment of the Bureaus, for it was too much to expect that three men could give the care to the details for which seven are now necessary. But in the itching for change the Advisory Board fell. I think, and I am not alone in this opinion, that it would have been far wiser to have increased its efficiency by establishing the bureaus, subordinate to an extent, but charged with special duties, leaving general affairs to the Board. In proof I say look at the state of affairs to-day:—seven heads, often working against one another, often with entirely different plans for ships—interior arrangements, discipline, et cet. The responsibility of some things may be fixed, but who is responsible that we have no Navy worthy our nation? Is it not on account of the lack of unity shown? Does it not to a great extent arise from the desire of each Bureau to be left alone and to claim non-interference on the score of non-interference?
The fault was not in the old system; that worked admirably. The three commissioners needed executors to carry out the details after a general plan had been decided upon. We cannot say that better men can be found for the Advisory Board than we have for chiefs of bureaus. Were not the same men who were commissioners made chiefs of bureaus? The Advisory Board would not build the ships, nor put the engines in, nor yet the guns: but after deciding upon the class or type of ship required to carry the gun selected, it would say to the constructor, build the ship; to the engineer, design and construct the engines. The men who go to sea in ships, who command them and who have to fight them, might then have some regard paid to their ideas. As it is the constructors build and say to the engineers and ordnance officers, put in your engine and guns as best you may.
I have listened with great interest to the criticisms passed this evening upon my essay and while it is but natural that differences of opinion should exist as to the remedy, I think that all who have spoken can hardly but recognize the fact that we have no naval policy, that we go on year after year in a hap-hazard way trusting to luck, and that it is only when a strong and prevailing sentiment exists that any decided step is taken. I believe further that most of us must feel that the future is unsettled, not to say dark; that the Navy may at any moment after a futile resistance be swept from existence on the seas. And I ask you, is it not time that we, representing different branches of that Navy, should, sinking minor differences, join together to bring about a change that in case of our Country's need would give us an opportunity of supporting its cause with some show of success? Can we afford to go on, with no settled plan, with conflicting aims, until war opens our eyes to the necessity of our unification? I believe that men can be found among us, who, appointed to the Advisory Board, could be just to all, partial to none. They need not be specialists who are generally men of bias, but they should be men of sound judgment, clear views, and impartial minds. I have sufficient trust in human nature to believe that such men can be chosen, and their voice, speaking for the Navy, would lift us from the slough into which we have fallen and restore us to the position we should occupy among the navies of the world.