Barrett Tillman
Dick Camp’s August articles about Guadalcanal’s “Cactus Air Force” (“Flying in the Eye of the Guadalcanal Storm” and “The Cactus Air Force’s Humble Home,” pp. 14–21) stirred many memories of friendships with CAF members—all of whom have departed the pattern. But the recollections began with the photo on page 2, showing exhausted Marine aviators on “The Canal.”
A Navy fighter pilot, the late Vice Admiral Dave Richardson, said, “I learned on Guadalcanal that how much courage a man has can depend on how much food and sleep he’s had in the last 72 hours.” Dave also commented on a 1990s movement for mentors for new naval officers. He said, “My naval mentor was the Jap who shot me down!”
Captain A. Jay Cristol,U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
James Scott’s article (“The Spy Ship Left Out in the Cold,” June, pp. 28–35) is saturated with misleading claims that have their genesis from various conspiracy purveyors. The same claims appear almost daily on the Arab Daily News website. Original reports and documents debunking these claims may be viewed on thelibertyincident.com.
The claims are refuted in my book The Liberty Incident Revealed, referred to in the Naval Institute Press 2017 catalog as “the complete and final story about the Israeli Air Force and Navy attack on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) during the Six-Day War in June 1967. Cutting through all of the controversy and conspiracy theories about Israel’s deadly attack, Cristol revises his well-regarded book about the event with an expanded and in-depth analysis of all the sources, including the released tapes of the National Security Agency intercepts.”
Scott makes numerous false statements. “Pleas for a congressional investigation have fallen on deaf ears.” There have been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation (1967) and the House Armed Services Committee investigations (1971, 1991–92).
The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry investigation record contains more than 700 pages with the testimony of 19 witnesses, including Liberty crew members, and made 52 findings of fact. The two most significant were: “Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty on June 8 was in fact a case of mistaken identity,” and “There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U.S. ship.”
Senator John McCain agreed: “After years of research for this book, Judge A. Jay Cristol has reached a similar conclusion to one my father reached in his June 18, 1967 endorsement of the findings of the court of inquiry. I commend Judge Cristol for his thoroughness and fairness, and I commend this work.”
The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report (1967); the CIA reports (1967); and the National Security Agency reports (1967 and 1981) came to the same conclusions.
Scott falsely claims, “The Navy was ordered to hush this up, say nothing, allow the sailors to say nothing,” a statement he attributes to Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks. Navy messages authorized interviews of Liberty crewmen, restricting them only until after the Court of Inquiry concluded. Scott fails to mention Admiral Brooks’ conclusion in the Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly (October 2002): “[I]t was an unfortunate accident, and not some deliberate Israeli plan to attack a U.S. Navy intelligence collection ship. The conspiracy theories simply are not credible.”
The definitive answer as to whether the attack was intentional is out there; adherence to discounted conspiracy theories adds nothing to naval history.
Captain Robert O. Strange, U.S. Navy (Retired)
I take exception to Commander Martin’s comments on the major caliber lightweight gun (MCLWG) program in his article about the Mark 16 8-inch/55-caliber gun (“Armaments & Innovations,” August, pp. 7–8). As a member of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ staff in 1976–78, I was the MCLWG sponsor. Despite the Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s allegation on its accuracy, the gun was found to be operationally effective and suitable to enter service. The Commandant of the Marine Corps told the Secretary of Defense test results showed the gun was accurate enough for Marines. Accordingly, the Secretary authorized procurement of nine guns to be back-fitted into Spruance-class hulls.
The question about accuracy was based on the results achieved by a version of the gun mounted in a test destroyer—the Forrest Sherman–class USS Hull (DD-945)—that was paired with an antiquated Mark 68 gun fire control system (GFCS) and converted World War II-era ammunition. The intention was to prove the concept in a destroyer-sized ship, which it did. The Mark 86 GFCS and newly developed munitions would have given the Spruance ships a formidable major-caliber armament that would have satisfied the Marines’ fire-support requirements. Budgetary constraints, not accuracy, ultimately were responsible for the demise of the MCLWG.
Dale A. Jenkins
The six pages devoted to Ensign George Gay and Torpedo Squadron 8 in your Battle of Midway June issue (“Torpedo Eight’s Celebrated Survivor,” pp. 22–27) stands as recognition of the sacrifices of all naval personnel in that battle.
But every one of Torpedo 8’s planes had been shot down, with no hits scored, at least 45 minutes before the U.S. dive bombers attacked. They won the battle. Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky, leader of the USS Enterprise (CV-6) dive bombers, persevered even while running low on fuel. In his 13 June 1942 after-action report, the commanding officer of the Enterprise, Captain G. D. Murray, commented on his carrier’s dive-bomber strike on the morning of 4 June: “[T]he success of our forces hinged upon this attack. Any other action on the part of Lt. Cmdr. McClusky would inevitably have led to irreparable loss to our forces.”
William A. Greenberg
John Basilone, featured in the August 2017 issue’s “Acts of Valor” section (pp. 54–57), was raised in Raritan, New Jersey. He was not from Maryland. Residents of Raritan hold an annual John Basilone parade in his honor and there is a statue of him holding a machine gun in the town center.