Ever since the Tomahawk missile's effectiveness was dramatically revealed on television screens around the world during 1991's Operation Desert Storm, cruise missiles have come to be accepted as valuable weapons on the modern battlefield. Ship-launched Tomahawks have been used with lethal effectiveness in the Balkans, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For U.S. presidents, they have become a risk-free, cost-effective means of punitive action, striking virtually anywhere in the world without risk to American servicemen.
Ironically, only 41 years ago, Americans lagged behind when the Soviet-manufactured Styx first demonstrated the capabilities of ship-launched cruise missiles by sinking the Israeli destroyer Eilat. Though the event is little remembered, and the weapon responsible has been rendered obsolete by subsequent advances in technology, the sinking nonetheless represented a turning point in naval warfare.
The Styx can be traced back the Soviet Union's World War II nemesis, Nazi Germany, which designed the technology on which the missile was based. The German Henschel Hs. 293 was a radio-controlled antiship glide bomb that was launched from a bomber and directed to its target by the aircraft's bombardier. When an Hs. 293 launched from a Luftwaffe Dornier Do. 217E-5 bomber sank the British sloop Egret on 27 August 1943, it augured a new era in naval warfare and pointed the way toward the Styx's eventual success. Though primitive in comparison to the Styx, the Hs. 293 was still ruthlessly lethal and an important step in the development of stand-off weaponry.
By 1945 the U.S. Navy had introduced a more advanced weapon, the ASM-N-2—more commonly known as Bat—which relied on a small radar in its nose for guidance. Bat was a quantum leap forward because its self-homing capability increased the stand-off range, making it the first true "fire-and-forget" antiship missile. First used against Japanese shipping in April 1945, the weapon compiled a mediocre combat record and the Bat program was abandoned in 1948.
The Soviet Navy recognized potential in the nascent cruise-missile technology, and antiship and land-attack missiles dominated its postwar doctrine. When the dust had finally settled after World War II, the Soviet Union's sea services were revealed to be pitifully equipped to match the country's new global ambition—or to face off against the United States' overwhelming naval mastery. Its fleet consisted almost entirely of submarines and small surface warships suitable only for coastal defense. The most glaring absences were antiship and land-attack capabilities provided by carrier-borne aircraft. To compensate, development of weapons using advanced rocketry and electronic guidance began in earnest in the early 1950s. In 1958, a missile that NATO designated SS-N-2 (surface-to-surface missile, naval, number 2), but which was more commonly referred to as Styx, became operational. The Soviets called it the P-15 Termit (Termite).
The Styx was launched on a 45-degree angle and followed a course preset into its autopilot until a target-seeking radar in its nose was activated, usually about six miles from the target. Once locked on a ship, the radar unerringly directed the missile, plunging it in a steep dive into the enemy vessel's vulnerable deck or upper hull.
The Soviets initally deployed the missiles on modified 80-foot P-6 torpedo boats (copies of American Elco PT boats sent to the USSR under Lend-Lease), which were designated Komar (Mosquito) fast-attack craft. With torpedo launchers removed, each boat could accommodate two missiles, which were enclosed in large protective launch canisters. In 1959 Osa (Wasp) "cutters," ships specifically designed to serve as weapons platforms for the Styx, began entering service in the Soviet Navy. These vessels were a marked improvement over their predecessors; in addition to their greater seaworthiness, they were armed with four Styx missiles.
As the cutters rolled off the production line, the smaller Komars were sold to East European and Third World allies. Egypt, one of the Soviet Union's prized client states, received numerous Komars as well as Osas. By the eve of 1967's Six-Day War with Israel, its flotilla of Styx-equipped vessels included eight of the cutters and ten of the smaller fast-attack craft.
Egypt's enemy, Israel, maintained only a small navy whose intent was to protect its coastline. Vital military supplies from the United States and Western Europe were off-loaded at the country's Mediterranean port of Haifa, but equally important was the southern port of Eilat (Elath in Hebrew) on the Gulf of Aqaba, frequented by Iranian oil tankers. This port was so important the flagship of Israel's fleet, a World War II-era Z-class destroyer purchased from Britain in 1955, was named in its honor.
After years of brewing animosity, war between Israel and its Arab neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—finally erupted again on 5 June 1967. The conflict began when Israeli jets destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground; armored spearheads, meanwhile, rapidly advanced across the Sinai Peninsula. Israel had no answer to the Styx threat, so to prevent an attack its navy went on the immediate offensive. A raid by frogmen on Egypt's Port Said failed to sink any ships, but it did cause the Egyptians to withdraw their naval vessels westward. This was an Israeli strategic victory because it meant any attack launched from the Komars or Osas would be made at distances approaching the limit of the Styx range.
On land, Israeli forces stunned the world by besting the combined might of its adversaries and by occupying the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In the face of such humiliating reversals, the Arab combatants had no option but to accept an armistice with Israel, which went into effect on 11 June.
The armistice, however, was uneasy and did not entirely stop the fighting. During the so-called War of Attrition land, sea, and air skirmishes continued along the borders separating the belligerents. Late on the night of 11 July, the destroyer Eilat and two Israeli torpedo boats skirmished with and sank a pair of Egyptian PT boats some 16 miles off the Sinai coast. In the coming months, the Israeli Navy routinely sent the Eilat to patrol off Port Said, well within Egyptian territorial waters. It was an antagonizing action that would have dire consequences when at last Egypt's wounded pride induced her to strike back.
On the morning of 21 October, the Eilat again appeared off Port Said and began monitoring activity in the harbor. Radar and lookouts reported nothing out of the ordinary, although Egyptian radar was active. By late afternoon the destroyer was cruising northeast of the port in the Bay of Romani, her course and speed changing frequently to confound submarines that were possibly shadowing her. There is some debate about how close the destroyer actually came to shore. The Egyptians claim she ventured within 6.5 miles of the coast, thereby violating the internationally accepted 12-mile territorial limit, while Israel insists the Eilat never came closer than 14 miles.
Whatever the truth, Egypt felt sufficiently threatened to risk a renewed outbreak of war by launching a Styx attack on the destroyer. The order came directly from President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo, and at 1730 a pair of missiles roared out of their canisters on board a Komar boat and raced across the darkening bay. Lookouts in the Eilat spotted a green flash, followed by a pair of white streaks approaching in the sky. The destroyer's captain, Commander Yitzhak Shoshan, ordered speed increased and evasive maneuvers, but there was no escaping these predators.
The first Styx dove out of the sky so swiftly that the destroyer's crew barely had an opportunity to fire antiaircraft weapons against it. The missile struck amidships, starting a raging fire and destroying the main radio. Just over a minute later the second missile impacted, incinerating the boiler and engine rooms. All power failed, leaving the Eilat dead in the water, burning and listing badly.
Anchors were dropped to prevent the destroyer from drifting closer to the Egyptian coast as the crew valiantly struggled to save the ship. Thick smoke and the ship's lack of power impeded firefighting efforts, and only slowly did the crew gain the upper hand on the flames. Individuals trapped by fire and the twisted hull were rescued and wounded crewmen treated. Meanwhile, a battery-powered emergency radio sent out desperate cries for assistance. The crew of the Eilat was on its own for more than hour, on board a mortally wounded ship and under threat of renewed attack. Finally, an Israeli army post picked up the distress signal. By then, however, it was too late.
A third Styx hit the ship's stern, detonating the ammunition magazine. The stricken Eilat exploded in a fiery ball and capsized seconds after impact. Many men were trapped below deck, unable to escape in time and consequently committed to a watery grave. As the gallant old ship sank beneath the waves, a fourth and final missile plunged into the sea, exploding among the bobbing crew members, causing even more casualties.
By this time Israel had belatedly realized that a disaster had occurred and began rushing helicopters and ships to the area. The Egyptians respected a request by United Nations truce observers to withhold fire as rescue operations unfolded. Egypt had nothing else to gain by escalating the crisis; its Navy had restored at least a portion of national pride. Of the 199 officers and men on board the Eilat, 47 were killed and 91 wounded.
The attack on the Eilat, the first wartime use of a cruise missile—as well as the first strike against an enemy ship by surface-to-surface missiles—shocked every Western navy, especially that of the United States, which had abandoned development of this type of weapon just a few years earlier. The introspection and re-evaluation that followed led directly to the rebirth of cruise missile programs around the world, including development of the U.S.-manufactured Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles and the French Exocet.
The Styx, meanwhile, continued to demonstrate its deadly capabilities in subsequent conflicts. During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1974, India used the missile to sink a Pakistani destroyer and minesweeper and to damage another destroyer and three tankers. It more than likely was also employed by China during the 1974 maritime skirmishes with South Vietnam off the Paracel Islands. The sinking of the Eilat had clearly not been an anomaly.
Improvements in the Styx design were made over the years to keep her apace of technology. Range was increased to 50 miles, the warhead weight was boosted to nearly 1,000 pounds, and the accuracy of the guidance system was greatly enhanced. Perhaps more important, a sea-skimming attack mode was added to avoid detection by radar and prevent the weapon from being shot down by gunfire or surface-to-air missiles. The People's Republic of China has manufactured its own copy of the Styx, called the HY-2 Hai Ying (Sea Eagle), known in the West as the Silkworm. China widely exported the missile the Middle East, and it was used by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War. Although outdated, the Styx continues to be employed by several Third World navies because of its simplicity, reliability, affordability, and large warhead.
History is full of turning points, and the history of naval warfare is no exception. Technology has always been applied to that end, but every once in a while a revolution occurs that turns the very nature of maritime warfare on its head. In the time it took for the Eilat to be crippled and sunk, all the traditional measures of naval power changed. A technological innovation—the cruise missile—now allowed a small and inexpensive platform—a patrol boat—to sink virtually any ship afloat from a distance of up to 25 miles. The character of naval warfare had been altered forever as the Styx augured the dawn of the naval cruise missile era.
Sources:
Geoffrey Kemp, Arms and Security: The Egypt-Isreali Case (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).
Nels A. Parson, Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).
Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg: The Secret Israeli Operation that Revolutionized Naval Warfare (New York: Seaver Books, 1988; rev. ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
Stephen Sim, "The Anti-Ship Missile: A Revolution in Naval Warfare," Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, vol. 24, no. 4 (October-November 1991).
"SS-N-2 Styx," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ss-n-2.htm.