The Vietnam War generation of Tailhookers offers much for present naval aviators and naval flight officers. Although the decade in Southeast Asia has been eclipsed by twice that duration in the war against global terrorism, there are lessons to draw from the similarities—and the differences.
First, both conflicts represent open-ended commitments without a definition of victory, let alone an end date. That in turn leaves current warfighters with what some call “job security” for the duration of a career. It’s the 21st-century version of Vietnam vets’ wry comment, “Sure it’s a lousy war but it’s the only one we have.”
For perspective, in combating global terrorism we should note that often we engage in “long-range planning” over a five-year period. Our enemies think in terms of centuries—or eternity. The Crusades lasted about 200 years in the 11th to 13th centuries and the Moors occupied Spain for 800.
It is conceivable that the current conflict might outlive aircraft carriers as we know them.
Meanwhile, let’s look backward to establish context.
Vietnam in Review
Largely, Vietnam War carriers launched aircraft that predated the nonexistent second “Tonkin Gulf Incident” that President Lyndon Johnson exploited 90 days before the 1964 election. The E-2 Hawkeye entered the fleet in 1964, joining the A-3, A-4, A-6, F-4, F-8, and RA-5. In nearly a decade of the Southeast Asian morass, Navy Air added the A-7 (1967) and EA-6B (1971). The Marines acquired AV-8A Harriers in 1971, although none flew in Vietnam.
The SH-2 Sea Sprite and SH-3 Sea King helicopters both dated circa 1960.
Seventeen attack carriers made 71 Vietnam deployments to January 1973: seven each by Hancock (CVA-19), Oriskany (CVA-34) and Ranger (CVA-61). The 16 air wings accumulated 432 squadron deployments, one-fourth by Skyhawk units.
The Navy lost 538 fixed-wing aircraft in combat, with the Marines adding another 173, excepting helicopters. To those 711 combat losses were 391 attributed to operational causes. The figures included land-based Navy and Marine fixed-wing aircraft throughout Southeast Asia.
Attack carriers lost 681 air wing personnel and ship’s company to all causes while four antisubmarine carriers sustained 22 fatalities.1
Conversely, since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, air wings have spotted only three new types on the flight deck, including the perennially troubled F-35C alongside the CMV-22B Osprey. The Marines have made their last Hornet deployment, but the FA-18E/F saw introduction in 1999 and IOC in 2001 with late-block upgrades since then. The EA-18G Growler joined the fleet in 2009, and the E-2D entered full rate production in 2013.
Regardless of the equipment, warfighters in Southeast Asia labored under onerous rules of engagement, and half a century later the ROE still rankle. In 1965 Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara visited the USS Oriskany (CVA-34) on Yankee Station and told aircrews that they should expect “unlimited losses in pursuit of limited goals.”
Meanwhile, President Johnson’s Tuesday luncheons doubled as target-selection meetings. He boasted, “They can’t bomb an outhouse unless I say so.”2
Nonetheless, gutsy operators sometimes found a way. Captain Martin “Red” Carmody, who sank his first ship at Guadalcanal, was on his third war when he served as CO of the USS Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) in 1965. Learning of a lucrative, time-sensitive target at a North Vietnamese port, he followed protocol by sending Washington a required “Unodir” message, then the cats fired. The expected denial arrived as the A-6s and F-4s rolled in, owing to “an unfortunate delay” in the Hawk’s comm department.
Words of Wisdom
Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith’s VA-82 division off the USS America (CVA-66) won the whimsical Southeast Asia Bombing Trophy by dropping the notorious Thanh Hoa Bridge in 1972. A three-tour attack aviator, he flew A-4s and A-7s against “The Dragon’s Jaw” six years apart.
“Thinking about those years, I see the single biggest issue facing those who go into harm's way is the way they are instantly judged by so many who have no clue what the hell they are talking about. Social media and instant communications can be seriously demoralizing.
“In our day, we knew a lot about what Johnson and his ilk were doing; we also knew a lot about the demonstrations, draft card burning, and so forth. Today, all of that stuff is ‘in your face’ and is demoralizing, to say the least.
“The advent of instant communications also brings with it the natural desire to micro-manage everything. That is, in my view, one of the most dangerous things our warfighters will face.
I was in a room from which an ongoing operation was being watched . . . and controlled from thousands of miles away. I had retired some time before, but I recall feeling uncomfortable that the on-scene commander was, for all practical purposes, not in the loop. He was, in fact, just another switch to be clicked on and/or off.
“We need to take a close look at how we operate. That, to me, is one of the most critical areas to explore.”
Recalling his time as NATO’s coalition commander in the 1996 Bosnia campaign, “Snuffy” Smith explains, “My second point is to underscore the need for some serious calculations before engaging.
“The very first thing is to declare who is in charge. Give him all the help he asks for . . . but do not tell him how to do his job. Once this is sorted out, the guy in charge must address the following:
1. What's the mission?
2. Is it reasonable; can it be easily translated to grunts on the ground so that they understand it?
3. What's the cost . . . in weapons, potential losses, time?
4. What are the ROE?
5. What is the end state?
6. What is the exit strategy?
7. When we achieve our desired end state and execute our exit, will the ‘end state’ have any chance of surviving?
“I'll close with one more thing. I gave many speeches after I departed the Navy. The one I gave about Bosnia was ‘Three R's for success.’ They were:
“A Robust force (well trained and equipped).
“The Right ROE.
“The Resolve to use the force and ROE to achieve the mission.”3
Reflecting Admiral Smith’s concept of warfighters determining their own methods, among the oft-cited examples is Defense Secretary McNamara’s requirement to bomb numerous bridges on perpendicular dive headings, turning a long target into an extremely thin target. Pilots had known at least since 1917 that the way to bomb a bridge is slightly diagonally along the span, minimizing errors both in range and deflection. But in North Vietnam, ROE often were drafted to avoid harming people at the ends of the bridge—including any Chinese, Russians, and North Vietnamese Army gunners.
Captain Michael McGrath, an attack pilot and nearly six-year prisoner of war, said, “My ‘lessons learned’ advice is . . . Don't let politicians halfway around the world assign missions and tactics for our aviators to make suicide attacks against dangerous targets of little or no tactical or strategic value.”4
Another example was featured in the Kitty Hawk’s air plans with a Snoopy character in the series “Joe Cool and the Summer of ’72.” Joe Cool was shown attending a strike briefing that limited nearly everything, including targets, ingress-egress routes, defensive measures, and others. Finally Joe Cool raised a paw: “Excuse me, CAG. Are we throwing the match or just shaving points?”
Flight Time = Retention
A frequent topic at Tailhook flag panels is insufficient flight time. In the past several years Marine Hornet pilots reported nine to 16 hours per month (Navy figures remain elusive, but 11 has been cited.) In vivid contrast, throughout the Vietnam War, carrier aircrews typically logged 30 monthly hours between deployments (trending toward 40) and sometimes more than 60 on cruise. On board the Coral Sea (CVA-43) in April 1972, Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Jerry “Devil” Houston of VF-51 flew nearly 80.
Says Rear Admiral Dennis Wisely, then of the Kitty Hawk’s VF-114, “In my first deployment in 1965–66 we were undermanned and run ragged with flying and alerts. We added crews later. As another example of McNamara and LBJ picking targets, when we first hit Kep Airfield it was on such short notice that we had a recall and then launched a major strike. It was so rushed I only had one ’winder on my plane and then took on eight MiGs!”
Rear Admiral James H. Flatley, III is best known for his C-130 landings aboard the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) in 1963, but he was a repeat member of the “Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club.” He properly notes that force preservation is a critical part of naval strike warfare—retaining personnel and valuable assets to accomplish whatever missions are assigned. Toward that end, he recalls, “The first piece of advice to any new generation of tactical aviators is to fly safe and fight smart, especially if we are going to continue to get involved in prolonged conflicts. That’s not trite advice! In the course of my three Vietnam deployments, the aircraft loss scoreboard between sister F-4 squadrons, two deployments on the Kitty Hawk and one on the Saratoga (CVA-60) was 21 losses for ‘Brand X,’ none for the squadrons in which I was assigned. By coincidence, the count was seven to ten for each of those deployment cycles, which included pre-deployment workups.
“Of 131 F-4 Vietnam deployments during our years in Vietnam, only three Phantom squadrons came home without any combat or operational losses. I was assigned to two of those three squadrons, one as CO of VF-31 during the Saratoga’s only combat deployment. Then I was the safety officer in the other squadron, VF-213.”5
More recently, some Tailhookers report exceptional monthly totals on cruise. In 2021, Rear Admiral Richard T. Brophy of the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center—a combat veteran and 1,000-trap aviator--reported, “Scanning my logbook during the last several cruises I was averaging around 30 hours per month, and during my Afghanistan line periods I flew between 70 to 80 hours per month.”
Reflecting upon Southeast Asia, Rear Admiral Brophy said, “The ability to fly over North Vietnam, day after day, even with sustained losses, exemplifies a level of commitment that my generation—fortunately—has not seen. When we talk about courage we draw from the past. Prior to every Topgun graduation, we hold a MIG killer debrief, and aces like Commander Willie Driscoll provide an inkling of the fear and fortitude required to succeed when the chips are down. Often times the callsigns we fly under are linked to Vietnam, such as ‘Showtime.’ Each callsign comes with a history that allows us to teach important lessons from engagements and also to remember our proud lineage. The Vietnam legacy—written in blood, skill, and commitment—still lives on.”6
Contact with Home
Frequently morale turns upon the axle of mail, and a major difference between Vietnam and now is the 24-hour news cycle linked to immediate communication with home. Through the 1970s, phone contact was only occasional, and not always reliable even with government facilities. U.S. mail could take three weeks or more to reach a ship in the Tonkin Gulf. Alternately, some deployed service members exchanged tape recordings with family and friends, in the olden days of reel-to-reel machines when cassettes were relatively new.
Retired U.S. Navy Reserve Commander R. R. “Boom” Powell, an A-4 and RA-5C aviator, reports, “I don’t remember mail exchange times in either ’67 or ’70, but they were significant. Some of us took to numbering letters as they would sometimes show up out of sequence. Your bride would comment on something and you’d be going, huh?
“Voice comm was another subject. I had a mini reel-to-reel tape recorder and we’d send tapes back and forth. I think I transferred them to cassettes. Certainly no way I could ever find the C battery–powered original again!
“For emergencies, the ship would allow you to set up a HF link to the states. Usual procedure was to wait until in port and make a costly international phone call. I think the Navy Exchange had a facility. Time zones didn’t help. It was sometimes necessary to do it at zero-dark 30.
“I still have a bundle of letters between Marie and self and some from family. Just haven’t been inclined to collate and reread. Maybe someday in the old folks home.”7
Retired U.S. Navy Reserve Commander Jack Woodul reflects, “I flew airliners for 30 years and I never think about it. I flew combat from an aircraft carrier for six months and I think about it every damn day.”8
The effects of Lyndon Johnson’s politically motivated war linger five decades later. Several years ago, the brother of a Green Beret who disappeared over a line on a map said, “He was an expendable asset, and the U.S. government expended him.”
Of 541 U.S. aircrewmen held in North Vietnam, 467 returned alive, including 140 Navy–Marine Corps POWs. Approximately 50 Americans known to be alive in Southeast Asia as of 1973 still remained missing in 2012. In 2020, nearly 1,600 MIA files remained open, 443 of them in North Vietnam. The case of one Tailhooker was particularly significant, as Commander Harley Hall, XO of VF-143, was shot down on the last day of official hostilities, 27 January 1973. A former Blue Angels skipper, he went missing though his RIO survived brief captivity.
In 1999, Hall’s widow Mary Lou provided The Hook with an in-depth interview, revealing that when Hall’s few remains were returned in 1995, the teeth showed he had lived as much as three years after capture.
Post-Vietnam Examples
In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted that an unknown number of U.S. servicemen had been held in the Soviet Union since 1945. However, Moscow added that subsequently no U.S. citizens were held “against their will.” Some published accounts said they had been killed, died naturally, or accepted Russian “hospitality.” Some Air Force personnel reportedly were taken to Russia from North Vietnam, presumably those with knowledge of aircraft systems and electronic warfare. Apparently no returning POWs reported any confirmation, though reportedly some U.S. Air Force electronic warfare crewmen were interrogated by Russians in Vietnam or China.9
Operational and political problems did not end with Vietnam, and subsequent operations hold lessons for today. In December 1983, the Reagan administration authorized a strike against Syrian AAA sites in Lebanon that fired on U.S. recon flights. It was six weeks after the Iranian-sponsored Beirut bombing that killed 241 Americans. The debrief during Tailhook ’84 included some comments from CNO James D. Watkins. He noted that the USS Independence (CV-62) and John F. Kennedy (CV-67) strike, scheduled for 36 planes, launched 28 on short notice following a download-upload sequence. Furthermore, the mission’s composition, ordnance, and ingress-egress reportedly were imposed by Washington. Despite objections at the carrier group and NavEur levels, the timing required by D.C. (exactly who was undetermined) forced ingressing aircrews to attack with the rising sun in their eyes. Visibility was complicated by the usual morning haze.
Two jets were shot down by Syrian missiles as Lieutenant Mark Lange of the JFK’s VA-85 died of injuries while B/N Lieutenant Robert Goodman was captured. The Indy’s CAG-6, Commander Edward “Honiak” Andrews, safely ejected from his VA-15 A-7E offshore.
Timing of the mission was heavily criticized by aircrews and operations analysts who theorized that the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wanted to make the day’s U.S. news cycle. Whatever the reasons, the operators’ opinions were overruled.
The losses were widely considered a poor exchange for any Syrian gun sites claimed destroyed. Subsequently learning basic lessons, the Navy established the Strike Warfare Center at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada.
Meanwhile, the French flew a successful strike against the Iranian barracks at Baalbeck, Lebanon.
Additional Washington leadership faults arose seven years later under the George H. W. Bush administration. On the morning after Desert Storm kicked off, 17 January 1991, SecDef Dick Cheney and JCS Chairman Colin Powell immediately wrote off Lieutenant Commander Scott Speicher of the Saratoga’s VFA-81, the only Coalition loss that first night. In fact, later Speicher was carried as “missing-captured,” a rare and perhaps unique category. His Hornet had been downed by an Iraqi MiG-25 owing to AWACS concern over a possible blue vs. blue incident.
Speicher’s case was sustained in part by the Tailhook Association until his death was confirmed in 2009. Previously, the Clinton administration and its JCS chairman, Army General John Shalikashvili, had refused to intrude on Iraqi soil to investigate the crash site.10
A point for today’s aircrews to consider is that the Syrian and Iraqi episodes both occurred under presumably pro-military presidential administrations. Previously Democrat Harry S. Truman had written off unknown thousands of Allied POWs “liberated” by the Soviets in 1945, and the Eisenhower administration refused to press Moscow for Americans missing in Korea and probably taken to Russia.
In 1991, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a detailed study of military personnel left in enemy or foreign hands since 1919. After World War II, at least 12,500 U.S. Army and Air Forces personnel were never returned from Soviet control, being retained as laborers, technicians, or “credits” to be brokered as geopolitical pawns.
Following the Korean armistice in 1953, 41 Americans returned from China. However, Beijing welcomed 21 turncoats, most of whom eventually were allowed back into the United States because they had received dishonorable discharges and were beyond army control.
Each of the foregoing examples might remind current operators that frequently the chain of command takes them for granted. Few know that A-6 pilot Stephen Coonts’ debut bestseller was titled For Each Other before it was published as Flight of the Intruder. Recognizing that their nation was committed to an endless, no-win policy, Lieutenant Jake Grafton and his fictional squadron mates represented the very real attitude of Tonkin Gulf JOs at the sharp end—looking out for each other when few seniors would.
Ironically, subordinates often exerted atypical influence in the hierarchical Japanese military. The concept gekokujō is variously translated as “loyal insubordination” or “leading from below.” Probably more often practiced for ill than good, nonetheless the Imperial Army and Navy produced relatively junior officers whose competence and forceful personalities could sway superiors.
In a related manner, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s extremely professional NCO aviators often adopted a practical philosophy. One high-scoring Japanese ace said, “We looked out for the good leaders and sometimes were not present to assist the others.”11
CAG Stockdale’s Advice
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale was an iconic naval aviation leader, only partly because he received the Medal of Honor for resisting Communist torture and extortion during seven years in Hanoi. At his last Tailhook appearance in 1988, he spoke to those warriors “whose war is yet to come.”
Stockdale challenged aircrews to work constantly at perfecting their skills. He stressed the ability to improvise effortlessly to changing situations. In recalling the start of the Vietnam War, he said that military professionals were expected to adapt themselves to a limited-conflict mindset. “But even in a limited war, there’s nothing limited about your effort over the target.”
Acknowledging that not all soldiers are warriors, Stockdale cautioned the JOs that they will meet “some who will always hide in the system, they’re not built for the job.” But he noted that the tigers will find ways around the unmotivated—including senior officers—to accomplish the mission.
The former VF-51 CO described how he selected his warriors for the 1964 first launch into North Vietnam. He said that the names came quickly, without regard to rank or seniority—not just those who were especially good on “the handlebars” but those whom squadron mates trusted most.
In summing up, Stockdale left some advice for the ages: “Think big, think basically, and cheat like hell. And develop a sense of history.”
Comparing then and now, MiG killer and POW Captain Jack “Fingers” Ensch said, “We old-timers always have a tendency to hearken back to the ‘good ole days’ when we were at the point in our careers where the kids are today. Well, they're building their own ‘good ole days’ right now. But what doesn’t change is the spirit and dedication to the mission in each era. Just like a relay race in track, each era must carry the baton and pass it off to the next era. And, in over 110 years the baton hasn't been dropped—maybe juggled a little sometimes—but never dropped. I feel the baton is still in good hands with today's pilots and NFOs.”12
The author thanks Rear Admiral Richard T. Brophy, Commander Curtis R. Dosé, Captain Jack Ensch, Rear Admiral James H. Flatley III, Captain Jerry B. Houston, Captain John Michael McGrath, Captain Lonny K. McClung, Commander Robert R. Powell, Admiral H. Leighton W. Smith, Rear Admiral Dennis Wisely, and Commander Jack D. Woodul.
Vietnam War Carrier Personnel Losses
Attack Carriers:
America (CVA-66): 16
Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31): 34
Constellation (CVA-64): 55
Coral Sea (CVA-43): 69
Enterprise (CVAN-65 ): 36
Forrestal (CVA-59): 134
Hancock (CVA-19): 28
Independence (CVA-62): 7
Intrepid (CVS-11): 10
Kitty Hawk (CVA-63): 68
Midway (CVA-41): 28
Oriskany (CVA-34): 102
Ranger (CVA-61): 47
Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42): 20
Saratoga (CVA-60): 6
Shangri-La (CVA-38): 3
Ticonderoga (CVA-14): 18
Total: 681
Antisubmarine Carriers:
Bennington (CVS-20): 3
Hornet (CVS-12): 8
Valley Forge (CVS-45): 4
Yorktown (CVS-10): 7
Total: 22
Grand total: 703
Thus, carrier aircrews and sailors accounted for more than one-quarter of all Navy deaths in the Vietnam War.
Meanwhile, 21 patrol squadrons also logged Southeast Asia tours.
1. James T. Bryan, Jr. The Unknown Memorial: National Memorial to Carrier Aviation (privately published, 1991).
2. “Forty Years After the Vietnam War, results Are Still in Dispute,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 30 April 2024,
https://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/article21730140.html.
3. Smith emails, August 2021.
4. McGrath email, October 2021.
5. Flatley emails, September 2021.
6. Brophy emails, March 2021.
7. Powell email July 2021.
8. Woodul email July 2021.
9. “Yeltsin Writes Senate Panel. No Sign of POWs Found,” Los Angeles Times, 12 November 1992, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-11-12-mn-234-story.html.
10. “Pilot Downed in 1991 Gulf Dogfight Is Now Declared MIA,” The New York Times, 22 January 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/world/pilot-downed-in-1991-gulf-dogfight-is-now-declared-mia.html.
11. Sakai interviews 1991.
12. Ensch email, March 2021.
