A lookout shouted. All engines went astern. The explosion tore a 30-foot hole in the hull. In the subsequent hours, the U.S. Navy showcased its proficiency in damage control—yet revealed dramatic inadequacies in mine warfare.
Stories like this—of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s Tanker War—hold powerful lessons the Navy should apply today.
The Tanker War presents four lessons: Convoy operations rarely address mine warfare effectively; offensive search-and-seizure operations disrupt mines; expeditionary forces are essential mine warfare assets; and mine warfare capabilities must be forward and distributed. Recognizing these lessons, the U.S. Marine Corps can better deter aggression and, if necessary, succeed in combat during potential China-Taiwan contingencies.
Mines have posed the most significant threat, in terms of number of ships damaged, to the U.S. Navy since the Korean War.1 Despite this, the Navy consistently has depended on allied nations—particularly the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden—for its mine warfare capabilities. Mine warfare is acknowledged as “a relatively inexpensive and effective method” for controlling and denying sea space, but the U.S. Navy repeatedly has failed to apply past lessons or properly prepare for future mine warfare contingencies.2 As a recent historical case of U.S. mine warfare operations, the Tanker War highlights the importance and dangers of mines.
Khomeini’s Iran vs. Saddam’s Iraq
In September 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi Army to invade Iran. In 1979, Iran’s Islamic Revolution, spearheaded by the Ayatollah Khomeini, threatened Saddam’s political stability. Long-disputed claims over waterways further raised tensions, as did sectarian clashes and the struggle for regional dominance. These factors resulted in the Iran-Iraq War, a horrific conflict lasting eight years and costing an estimated one million lives. Early on, Iraqi victories seized swaths of Iranian land, but the fighting devolved into attritional stalemate.
To break that stalemate, both states turned seaward. By 1984, Iran had begun to retaliate against Iraq in the maritime domain. Attacks targeting oil platforms and cargo ships launched “a campaign of economic attrition and political intimidation.” While the Iran-Iraq War was primarily a land-centric struggle, action in the Persian Gulf “attracted considerable international interest” as the conflict’s expansion threatened shipping and global oil supplies.3 The threat was magnified in 1984, when naval mines were first used in the conflict (although most mine strikes occurred later in 1987).
Prior to U.S. intervention, mines already had damaged several ships, including the Liberian-registered Primrose and the Soviet-flagged Marshal Chuikov. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter made a declaration justifying U.S. force to prevent any power from fully dominating the Gulf. As shipping premiums rose, and the world watched as regional repercussion reverberated through global markets, the United States decided to intervene, committing itself to preventing a dictatorship in either Iran or Iraq from controlling global supply lines in the Gulf.
As the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the sea, other Gulf states sought protection by reflagging their merchant vessels under other nations’ flags. Kuwait was particularly active in seeking to reflag its oil tankers. After learning of a potential Soviet-Kuwaiti reflagging deal, the United States redoubled its diplomatic efforts and offered to protect each tanker that Kuwait desired to reflag. War raged on, both on land and at sea, as the United States and Kuwait reached a deal for the U.S. Navy to ensure safe passage of oil and shipping.
Operation Earnest Will
In July 1987, the first U.S. escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers began.4 Named Operation Earnest Will, the escorting mission would be one of the largest surface warfare operations since World War II, but its first convoy—escorting the tanker Bridgeton—began with three warships, the USS Kidd (DDG-993), Fox (CG-33), and Crommelin (FFG-37).5 On an early morning, well into the convoy’s voyage to Kuwait, percussive shock rippled across the water as an explosion ripped through the Bridgeton’s hull—she had hit a mine.
Frank Seitz, the Bridgeton’s captain, reported that, even in a supertanker more than 1,000 feet long, “it felt like a 500-ton hammer hit us.” While Seitz saw the likelihood that the Iranians would mine the convoy route as a “simple military problem,” few capabilities—besides limited diving operations and the presence of escorts—were employed to negate the threat. Reflecting on the explosion—which created an 11-by-5.5-foot hole—Seitz believed it would have “done a number” on any of the U.S. warships.6 As the Bridgeton limped along, the Navy ships allowed the tanker to lead the way for the remainder of the journey.
So, on the operation’s very first U.S. convoy, Navy warships cautiously fell in behind the Bridgeton, shadowing the crippled vessel that the Navy was tasked to protect.7 As a result, Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, halted all convoy operations “until sufficient mine countermeasure [MCM] platforms” were deployed. These “sufficient measures” included several reserve 1950s-era Aggressive-class minesweepers and the hasty modification of two foreign vessels. Aside from these assets, the United States once again had to depend on its allies to provide the bulk of the hulls able to conduct mine countermeasures.8 As convoy operations paused, reconsolidated, and eventually resumed, Iranian mines continued to flow into the Persian Gulf.
The significant press coverage of mine strikes demonstrated the extent of mine warfare’s “psychological effect,” yet the Navy continued to haphazardly assemble its limited mine warfare capabilities.15 More resources eventually reached the Gulf, but the correlation of forces—mines versus minesweepers—continued to outpace U.S. capabilities. A handful of MCM helicopters, not initially deployed, were mobilized the week after the Bridgeton incident. Four U.S. minesweepers deployed with the amphibious assault ship USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7)—providing essential surge capabilities for mine warfare missions. Kuwait provided the Hercules as a “stationary sea base” for U.S. operations.16 With these resources, the convoys eventually resumed, and the U.S. Navy conducted follow-on mine warfare missions.
Prior to Earnest Will, Iranian mines had already crippled a number of vessels.9 U.S. planners, however, seemingly ignored this threat. Instead, Chinese-made Silkworm missiles were seen as the greatest danger. U.S. decision-makers assumed mines were not a major concern—leading to dire consequences, with multiple mine incidents throughout the operation. Most significantly, no minesweepers were deployed in advance of Earnest Will.10 Wishful thinking, distracted planning, and poor preparation caused mine warfare to be overlooked as U.S. warships gathered in the Gulf.
As the Bridgeton sailed, operational biases clearly facilitated the tactical failures of the first convoy. At the joint planning level, no contingency plans were prepared for mine strikes. The Bridgeton’s route was confined by numerous reefs and islands, yet U.S. planners still had not expected Iranian nighttime mine-laying operations.11 Along the route, Iranian forces had laid approximately three minefields, with 60 mines. Lurking unseen, the minefield awaited its unsuspecting prey. Senior U.S. naval officers later admitted that the convoy route was not checked for mines, despite intelligence warnings.
It was reportedly not until after the Bridgeton was hit that Navy escorts turned on their acoustic systems.12 Even then, sonar measures had “no luck” detecting additional mines, and Navy ships still followed behind the Bridgeton for the remaining slow-crawl to Kuwait.13 Recounting the incident, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger simply stated: “We weren’t looking for mines there because we had never seen a mine in that area.” In just the first half of 1987, six vessels already had struck mines prior to the Bridgeton incident.14
After additional mines were struck and uncovered, on 21 September 1987, U.S. Army helicopters operating off the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) caught the Iranian vessel Iran Ajr actively placing mines. The helicopters engaged the Ajr, resulting in the boarding and seizing of the vessel. In addition to the mines already thrown overboard, ten mines were still on board, and other minefields were uncovered in the vicinity.17
Following the Ajr’s capture, the United States believed Iran’s mining campaign had been tamped down or ended—an optimistic assessment stemming from the surge of MCM resources and the safe discovery of numerous mines. As the convoys continued, however, so too did Iranian minelaying.
The Fate of FFG-58
In February 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) reported to the Persian Gulf to support convoy operations. That same month, President Ronald Reagan announced that U.S. naval presence in the Gulf would be “marginally reduced,” including the removal of amphibious assault platforms, which were swapped out for smaller minesweepers.18 The Roberts conducted normal patrols in her early months of deployment.
On 14 April 1988, the Roberts prepared to resupply between convoy operations. While the crew had been performing superbly, cognizant of the mine threat, there were no active mine warnings. No special mine-avoidance routes were suggested, and calls to higher command about the threat level received no response. With the ship cruising steadily, the mid-deployment lull was interrupted by a lookout who spotted a suspicious object nearby. In the late afternoon of 14 April, the Roberts had stumbled into a minefield.
Unable to verify the extent of the minefield, Commander Paul X. Rinn—the Roberts’ captain—saw only one way out: backward. As the Roberts crept astern, an estimated 500-pound explosive denotated directly beneath the engine room.19 The crew valiantly fought fires, shored bulkheads, and plugged holes to kept her afloat. Defying the odds, the Roberts limped to safety, then was ferried back to the United States for repairs. According to the Navy’s Surface Combat Systems Director, “most knowledgeable people would say that [the Navy] probably should have lost her.” After $90 million in repairs, the Roberts eventually returned to the fleet and continued to serve.20
Operation Praying Mantis
In the wake of the Roberts incident, the United States was forced to respond to Iran—escalating the conflict through direct and sustained offensive operations. These plans evolved into Operation Praying Mantis, which involved strikes against major Iranian oil platforms and an infamous Iranian warship, the Sabalan. On 18 April 1988, just four days after the Roberts was mined, three surface action groups (SAGs) were assembled and sortied. Two SAGs were sent to destroy separate oil platforms, with the final SAG dedicated to pursuing hostile warships in the area. The Navy successfully engaged the platforms, conducted its first surface-to-surface missile exchange with an Iranian frigate, and conducted follow-on aerial and boarding operations.21 Praying Mantis was a resounding success.
Following the operation, U.S. policy became more assertive—agreeing to protect all neutral shipping in the Gulf. While Praying Mantis was successful, this deepening commitment quickly ended. With the horrific accidental shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes (CG-49), and with Iraqi victories on land, Iran agreed to a cease-fire—ultimately leading to the end of the Iran-Iraq War.22
Throughout the Tanker War, the United States achieved its goals but failed to properly address long-standing and demonstrated deficiencies in mine warfare. Damage control and strike warfare had been superb, and many important lessons were implemented in these areas. Few lessons about mine warfare, however, carried on.
Mine Warfare Today
The Tanker War is a relevant historical case that can be used to prepare the United States not only for ongoing operations in the Red Sea, but also for potential China-Taiwan contingencies. During the Tanker War, the United States intervened in a regional conflict, one with significant international ramifications, to protect commerce and navigational freedom. Occurring in a confined, littoral area, mine warfare seriously hindered U.S. action, and the Navy greatly suffered from its unpreparedness.
In recent years, trends in mine warfare capabilities have placed the United States at a disadvantage. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has heavily invested in expanding its mine warfare capabilities, amassing a large inventory of mines and conducting increasingly complex mine exercises. PLAN strategy emphasizes asymmetric advantage and sees long-lasting value in mines, as they are “easy to lay and difficult to sweep.”23 Across the Taiwan Strait, meanwhile, many suggest that Taiwan should embrace a “porcupine” strategy, in which naval mines would play a critical role. In 2022, Taiwan, having purchased U.S. naval mines, ordered four minelayers and established two mining operations squadrons, but capabilities remain limited.24 The United States itself has a limited stock of just two types of naval mines, and few investments in mine capabilities have translated into observable gains.
The U.S. Marine Corps can, and must, better support mine warfare. By law, the Marine Corps is charged with “the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases” and conducting operations “as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”25 Following 20 years ashore in the Middle East, the Marine Corps recognizes the extent it has strayed from its core mission, and General David Berger’s Force Design 2030 initiative set out to return the Corps to its naval roots.26 Evolving concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and stand-in forces offer promise of more lethal, mobile, and disaggregated operations in the face of peer competition against China. These ideas are essential for the Marine Corps to succeed in a Pacific conflict—but notably, there is little mention of leveraging the Marine Corps to support mine warfare.
Two recommendations will enable Marines to support mine warfare:
Mine Warfare EABO. Stand-in forces are mobile, low-signature expeditionary forces for sea control/denial. Marine Corps publications only rarely mention mine warfare but acknowledge potential contributions from aviation and combat engineer assets. Going forward, stand-in forces could conduct mine/countermine missions to support sea denial or aid friendly convoys by leveraging artillery and further integrating unmanned aerial and undersea capabilities with mine warfare. Repackaging high-mobility artillery rocket systems to launch mine/countermine munitions, and using EABO to facilitate low-signature, close-in unmanned mine warfare missions, represent just the beginning. In the Tanker War, distributed and forward operations with expeditionary forces led to tactical successes in mine warfare. Today, EABO promise even greater effects, with the ability to have forces already positioned in-theater with mine warfare capabilities.
Leverage ESBs. Expeditionary sea bases (ESBs) are lesser-known Navy vessels but have outsized potential to further support mine warfare—acting as mobile landing platforms with the ability to support unique expeditionary operations. The Navy has four ESBs, with two more under construction.27 Just as the Hercules served as an essential asset for supporting patrols and conducting mine warfare missions during the Tanker War, the Navy’s fleet of ESBs today could increase the capacity of the joint force to both counter and leverage mine warfare.
To fulfill its obligations—and be more lethal to succeed in potential China-Taiwan conflicts—the Marine Corps must support mine warfare. The Tanker War provides an important historical case for the United States concerning mine warfare, and ongoing changes in the Marine Corps present an opportunity to incorporate these lessons.
1. Scott C. Truver, “Writing U.S. Naval Operational History 1980–2010: U.S. Navy Mine Countermeasures in Terror and War,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 15 December 2016.
2. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “An Assessment of the Navy’s Mine Warfare Mission,” 1981.
3. Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 5 (May 1988): 30.
4. Wesley L. McDonald, “The Convoy Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 5 (May 1988): 37.
5. Andrew R. Marvin, “Operation Earnest Will: The U.S. Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Curious Case,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 1.
6. Frank C. Seitz Jr., “SS Bridgeton: The First Convoy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 5 (May 1988): 52.
7. Scott C. Truver, “Weapons That Wait . . . and Wait . . . ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 2 (February 1988): 32.
8. Stephen A. Kelley, Better Lucky Than Good: Operation EARNEST WILL as Gunboat Diplomacy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 58–59.
9. Kelley, Better Lucky Than Good, 55.
10. Kelley, 51–52.
11. Nadia El-Sayed El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq’s Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 293, 301.
12. Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980–1988 (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 1996), 143; El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War, 293–94.
13. “Mine Blast Turns A Calm Gulf Cruise Chaotic,” Chicago Tribune, 25 July 1987.
14. Truver, “Weapons,” 32; Navias, Tanker Wars, 136.
15. O’Rourke, “Tanker,” 32.
16. El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War, 296, 298; Navias, Tanker Wars, 144; and Kelley, Better Lucky Than Good, 60.
17. O’Rourke, “Tanker,” 32; Harold Lee Wise, Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 92–116.
18. Bradley Peniston, No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), xv; O’Rourke, “Tanker,” 34.
19. Peniston, Honor, 114–115, 117, 129–130.
20. Ronald O’Rourke, “Gulf Ops,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 115, no. 5 (May 1989): 44; Bradley Peniston, “The Day Frigate Samuel B. Roberts Was Mined,” USNI News, May 22, 2015; and Peniston, Honor, 223.
21. Kelley, Better Lucky Than Good, 68–70.
22. Kelley, 71; Samuel J. Cox, “The Fog of War: USS Vincennes Tragedy, 3 July 1988,” Naval History and Heritage Command, July 2018; and Wise, Danger Zone, 233.
23. Ryan Hilger, “The Navy Needs Agile Mine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 145, no. 10 (October 2019).
24. “Taiwan Adds Minelaying to Defenses against China,” Associated Press, 14 January 2022.
25. “10 U.S. Code § 8063—United States Marine Corps: composition; functions,” Cornell Law School.
26. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, March 2020, hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf.
27. U.S. Navy, “Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB),” 21 January 2021, navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169994/expeditionary-sea-base-esb/.
