From Angamos to Tsushima to Jutland

Following a speech to open a new session of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2022, President Xi Jinping’s forceful and defiant words concerning the pursuit of an alternative model of power in the Pacific were met with rapturous applause and continued domestic support.¹ Chinese efforts to reshape the world order and ascend as a hegemonic power are not new—and those efforts have been keenly tracked by U.S. military leaders because of the martial nature of many Chinese actions taken to make this vision a reality.

In his address to the House Armed Services Committee in April 2023, Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, not surprisingly had the People’s Republic of China (PRC) listed as the primary “Key Adversarial Challenge” to the region’s stability. He noted with alarm the PRC’s concerted military buildup, including the addition of 17 warships to its operational inventory in 2022.² Beijing’s ongoing commitment to expand its fleet and prepare for potential naval action is a significant concern for U.S. national security, and even though Admiral Aquilino stated optimistically that conflict in the Indo-Pacific is “neither imminent, nor inevitable,” the United States must take appropriate measures to ensure it is prepared should conflict arise in this critical region.³

While military planners should formulate courses of action based on modern tactics and available technologies, attention also should be devoted to understanding the historical context of similar conflicts, pertinent “lessons learned,” and how to apply those lessons to future confrontations to achieve maximum success. The naval threat China currently poses is not unique, nor bereft of appropriate comparisons—as numerous historical parallels exist that should be analyzed to obtain more comprehensive knowledge with which to prepare for a possible war.

Despite China’s long history, it has never fought a large-scale, modern naval battle, so those historical comparisons consequently must come from other combatants. Realizing that the potential goals for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would be to (a) secure resources, (b) project power, and (c) defend the homeland through rapid reaction, apt comparisons can be drawn to (a) Chile during the War of the Pacific, (b) Japan in the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War, and (c) Great Britain in the Battle of Jutland during World War I, respectively.

Ironclads in the Pacific

Often confused with the war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States during World War II, the War of the Pacific was a significant conflict whose impact would be felt by its participants for years thereafter. Fought from 1879 to 1884, the War of the Pacific pitted Chile against an alliance of Bolivia and Peru. While tensions had been strained among these three South American rivals for years, a deteriorating Chilean economy prompted its leaders to look enviously at its northern neighbors, who were reaping enormous profits from nitrate exports.

The nitrate mines, located in the hinterlands of the Atacama Desert—a remote region even today, and one that was almost impossible to access in the late 1800s—were so profitable that Chile declared war on Bolivia and Peru with the goal of claiming this far-flung but resource-rich region.⁴ By the end of the war, Chile would have complete ownership of the huge nitrate deposits and the associated tracts of land, which also removed Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean. In total, the losses suffered by Bolivia and Peru from this conflict were categorized as “catastrophic” and led to economic depression, financial chaos, and, in Peru’s case, civil war.⁵

To defeat Bolivia and Peru and acquire these valuable resources, Chile conducted effective, if not always brilliant, naval and land campaigns. Of critical importance was control of the sea, which Chile had to obtain prior to initiating large-scale, land-based operations. Both Peru and Chile possessed comparable navies with a variety of platforms; most significantly, each had two modern ironclad warships. The Peruvian ironclads Huascar and Independencia initially achieved some measure of success against their Chilean counterparts. However, Chilean leaders realized that it was, according to historian I. C. Little, a “matter of vital importance” to destroy the Peruvian ironclads and secure Chile’s extremely extended, and thus quite vulnerable, lines of supply and communications.⁶

This task was made easier after the Independencia grounded and was lost, which allowed the Chilean Navy to focus its resources on eliminating the Huascar. With the Peruvian Navy now greatly weakened, Chilean ships hunted and eventually trapped the Huascar, ultimately capturing her at the Battle of Angamos in late 1879.⁷ This victory was the turning point that allowed Chile to begin its land campaigns in earnest. The destruction of the Peruvian Navy gave Chile control of the sea and prevented Peru from effectively countering the deployment of the massive infantry units that achieved total victory for Chile against the Peruvian-Bolivian alliance.

Chile’s desire to obtain important resources not only to support its economic growth, but also enhance its international political power in the late 1800s is similar to China’s current expansionist efforts in the South China Sea. The buildup of militarized, man-made islands in disputed areas such as the Spratlys signals China’s desire to extend its influence in this economically valuable waterway, through which an estimated $5 trillion in goods is shipped annually.⁸

The most critical lesson to be gleaned from the War of the Pacific and applied to contemporary PRC goals comes from Bolivia’s lack of preparedness. Bolivia was a poor country with a weak central government unable to control and protect its littorals, where the nitrate mines that Chile desired were located. Consequently, Bolivia never attempted to fortify its main seaport of Antofagasta or build ships to protect it, which allowed Chile to capture it easily in the early stages of the war.⁹ Failing to recognize such a potential danger crippled Bolivia’s ability to defend against Chilean offensives and led to generational setbacks to the country’s growth and prosperity.

U.S. leaders must heed the lessons from Bolivia’s mistakes, recognize potential threats to valuable resources and regional power, and plan accordingly or risk being caught unprepared and forced to fight from an undesirable position.

An Asian Fleet Teaches Russia a Lesson

The Russo-Japanese War likewise contains a valuable lesson for modern U.S. military planners. Fought from 1904 to 1905, this war provides a perfect example of a beguiling mindset that must be avoided prior to conflict: overconfidence.

Russia, under the autocratic leadership of Tsar Nicholas II, viewed itself as a peer to other world powers and well ahead of Japan, which only had begun its journey out of isolation and push toward modernity in the 1850s. But Japan had worked tirelessly to build a lethal navy by purchasing numerous foreign-built vessels and sending officers to train overseas with more established navies, such as those of Great Britain and France.

The superiority of Japanese ships that had just finished extensive dry-dock periods, combined with high-quality ammunition and well-trained crews, was vastly underestimated by Russian leaders. They took for granted that their larger fleet would be victorious in any conflict with Japan, even though its fleet numbers were inflated with old, ill-maintained vessels and poorly trained crews.¹⁰

When Japan declared war on Russia in 1904, it was with the goal of claiming territory in mainland Asia, primarily Korea, to project Japanese power and to assert itself as a burgeoning regional leader. Japanese leaders understood that a prolonged war with Russia was not desirable and took to heart one of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s tenets, as noted by historian Kevin McCranie: “defeating the opposing fleet . . . was Mahan’s first critical step in naval war.”¹¹

Though the decisive battle eluded Japan in 1904, Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō would achieve it during the Battle of Tsushima on 27 May 1905. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron, consisting of nearly 40 ships led by Admiral Zinovy Rozhestevnsky, had sailed more than 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea just to get into theater and prepare for combat operations.¹² Manned by exhausted, poorly trained sailors in vessels that had been inadequately maintained during the journey, the Russian fleet was attacked by Admiral Tōgō ’s forces and, in one of the most complete victories in naval history, was almost totally destroyed.

The Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō  maneuvered into optimal striking position and relentlessly pounded the Russian vessels, sinking ships and scattering those that survived, only to capture or sink them in follow-on actions. So total was the Japanese victory that just three Russian ships survived the battle and made it back to the Russian port of Vladivostok.

After this decisive naval battle, Russia continued to fight on land for a period before accepting peace negotiations, but Japan’s control of the sea remained undisputed, and its victory in the Tsushima Strait would become legendary.¹³

As they assess the current situation with China and its evolving military capabilities, U.S. military planners would be wise to avoid the trap of overconfidence that plagued Russian leaders prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. China repeatedly has attempted to project its power beyond the First Island Chain and into the Pacific Ocean, where it can exploit its growing blue-water naval assets in conjunction with its burgeoning rocket force. This has been demonstrated repeatedly over the past few years, as China has engaged in multiple carrier strike group operations beyond the First Island Chain as well as air and missile exercises centered around Taiwan.¹⁴

While U.S. superiority in submarine and aircraft carrier capabilities is still evident, allowing those advantages to foster the dismissal of Chinese gains would be akin to Russian attitudes toward Japanese naval advances prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Russian leaders viewed the Imperial Japanese Navy contemptuously and assumed a conflict between the two would culminate in a quick Russian victory despite its fleet’s own systemic problems: a poorly maintained, inadequately funded fleet that rarely received modern armor and weapon-systems upgrades and that was deficient in practicing maneuvers and firing drills to increase crew proficiency.¹⁵ The Imperial Japanese Navy used Russian overconfidence to destroy the enemy and springboard into a regional leadership position—an example that can serve as a poignant reminder to American leaders: The PRC’s desires to project authority and broaden its claims as a regional power should be taken seriously.

High Noon for the Dreadnoughts

The final comparison between historical events and current PRC aims is the Battle of Jutland in World War I. While this conflict is remembered primarily for its incredibly brutal and prolonged land campaigns across both Western and Eastern Europe, it was at the Battle of Jutland where the German and British navies collided in the largest naval engagement of the war.

For years, Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II had been investing heavily in building a navy that would compare to that of the British. Sensing a potential threat in a strong German navy, Great Britain countered with its own naval buildup. The ensuing arms race resulted in both nations amassing large fleets with enormous and destructive battlecruisers at the forefront.¹⁶

Despite the German naval increase, impressive preparedness by British leaders such as First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill ensured the Royal Navy had effectively bottled up the German High Seas Fleet in its few Baltic ports shortly after the outbreak of war.¹⁷ British efforts placed Germany in the unenviable position of possessing no readily apparent access to the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean—a critical avenue Germany needed to be able to disrupt Allied sea lanes and constrict the Allies’ lifeblood of foreign war supplies. It was under this circumstance that the Imperial German Navy sortied out of port and into the North Sea, with the goal of destroying the British Grand Fleet and breaking the blockade.

A decisive conflict was what German Admiral Reinhard Scheer wanted when his ships engaged the fleet of British Admirals John Jellicoe and David Beatty on 31 May 1916. Throughout the day, the two navies pummeled one another, and, eventually, through British codebreaking efforts (which provided information on impending German movements), the Grand Fleet was able to outmaneuver the German High Seas Fleet and ultimately force its ships back toward their home ports.

Both sides would claim victory, as Germany sank 14 Royal Navy ships and inflicted almost 7,000 casualties, whereas Great Britain touted how it, too, had sunk several enemy ships, including the German flagship, the battle-cruiser Lützow. But most important, the British had preserved the critical blockade of the German fleet.¹⁸ The war would continue for two more years, and the German High Seas Fleet, though it would never sail offensively again, remained a “fleet in being” with the capability to strike and cause much angst to British leadership.

Much like the Imperial German Navy before the Battle of Jutland, the PLAN considers itself to be concentrated behind the First Island Chain, which represents a physical impediment to open sea access. This is only exacerbated by U.S. efforts to maintain a presence in the South China Sea, as seen through retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis’ advocacy for a network of at least four bases in this region.¹⁹ The Chinese believe that such bases, in addition to U.S. and allied presence, are an additional barrier to existing geographic constraints.

U.S. naval leaders would do well to consider the context of the Battle of Jutland—and how a feeling of entrapment could entice a rival into an attempt at decisively breaking the barrier, similar to how German naval leaders felt it was of vital national interest to push their fleet outward and into the open ocean and to defend their shores from what they perceived as an encroaching enemy.

Further, as noted, the Battle of Jutland did not destroy the Imperial German Navy but instead forced Germany to pivot to a different strategic implementation of its fleet. Germany did this by abandoning surface actions and instead mounting effective naval undersea operations against Allied shipping. British naval leaders reported that, unless immediate repulsion of German U-boats was achieved, the enemy submarines were, according to renowned maritime historian Daniel Butler, “about to bleed the country dry.”²⁰

U.S. leaders must prepare for a potential shift in the PLAN’s operations should it fail in any initial efforts, as evidenced in the example of the post-Jutland environment. In this case, even though Germany did not achieve its strategic goal in that battle, it was still able to flex and conduct effective, and nearly crippling, operations. Should the United States be able to defeat initial PRC efforts, U.S. leaders and planners must anticipate a variety of additional and even unorthodox tactics that could influence the operating environment.

‘Wisdom Is What One Learns From It’

Historical examples such as these three conflicts and their seminal battles can serve as reference points for modern U.S. naval planners as they approach current concerns relative to the People’s Republic of China. The growth of the PRC’s military and its corresponding naval capabilities is not a surprise and is in fact the direct result of more than two decades of concerted development. China’s fleet now boasts more than 350 ships—with ambitions to reach 440 ships by 2030.²¹

The increased capabilities of the PRC military also nest with China’s diplomatic and economic efforts to implant itself on the world stage as a hegemonic power. U.S. military leaders have remained critically focused on the Indo-Pacific region, however, and have taken measures to increase presence through a diversified array of platforms, signifying to partners and allies that this area of the world is of critical importance.

The lessons of history and its tenets, such as ensuring proper preparedness, avoiding overconfidence, and being operationally flexible, remain important to naval planners and should not be forgotten or overlooked. As historian Gordon Wood has written, “History is like experience and old age; wisdom is what one learns from it.”²²

Indeed, as Professor Wood has said about the study of history in general, U.S. naval and military planners must ensure that lessons gleaned from past conflicts and battles, such as those illustrated here, are studied, assessed, and, when applicable and relevant, implemented in the strategic planning process.

Or, as Alfred Thayer Mahan so eloquently affirmed many years ago in Armaments and Arbitration: The Place of Force in the International Relations of States, “The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”²³