Second Chances in War

It is common enough in today’s military to see a commanding officer or flag officer get relieved. A conflict with Russia or China is a real possibility in the coming years, and the services could learn some lessons from the treatment of officers who lost their commands during World War II. Unlike today, many of those officers were given second chances and contributed to the victory over the Axis powers—but the Army and Army Air Corps were more likely to give an officer another major combat command than was the Navy. There were numerous high-visibility cases of relief, such as Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short after Pearl Harbor. To demonstrate the broader trend, it is useful to look at four cases in which naval officers were shelved for the remainder of the war. 

Guilt by Association: The Pearl Harbor Judgement

Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor remains one of the salient failures in U.S. military history. Leading the U.S. battleship force on that day was Admiral William Pye. He was a Navy veteran of nearly 40 years who had attended the U.S. Naval Academy with Admiral Ernest King. During World War I, Pye had commanded the USS Jacob Jones (DD-61), earning the Navy Cross for his actions escorting convoys against German U-boats. He completed staff duty in the United Kingdom toward the end of the war and steadily rose in the surface Navy, commanding at various levels. He was, by the standards of the day, an eminently qualified leader.

After the attack on 7 December, the Japanese landed a string of successes throughout the Pacific. The Marine garrison on Wake Island stubbornly held out, repelling a Japanese invasion on 11 December with a great deal of press coverage. Knowing the Japanese would be back, Kimmel devised a plan to deliver Marine ground and air reinforcements by means of a task force centered on the carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3). Following Kimmel’s relief as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CICPAC) on 17 December 1941, Pye was named the interim commander until Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived in late December. Kimmel’s optimistic plan fell to the new acting CICPAC. 

Unfortunately, the task force was delayed by having to slow for refueling. Meanwhile, Japan launched a renewed attack on Wake supported by two fleet carriers. With an incomplete picture and the Wake Island garrison commander reporting “enemy on island-issue was in doubt,” Pye was forced to decide whether to commit to the Saratoga or call off the resupply mission. Pye knew the Saratoga and the USS Enterprise (CV-6) were the only operational capital ships under his command. Uncertain of the size of the force facing him, and knowing it was possible Wake had already fallen, Pye decided to recall the relief force to Pearl Harbor. 

On Christmas Day 1941, Pye was relieved and reassigned to train the reformed battleship fleet for the ships’ new role of carrier support. On 2 November 1942, he was reassigned to the Naval War College and was not given an operational command again. At a time during which the United States was ramping up forces in Europe and battling against Germany’s wolfpacks, Pye’s experience in convoy operations and working with the British could have helped the war effort in Europe.

Isolated and Forgotten: The Neglected Fleet

Shortly after the bombs stopped falling on Pearl Harbor, they started to fall on U.S. positions in the Philippines. At the start of World War II, the commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was Admiral Thomas Hart. When the Philippines came under attack, Hart was one of the most senior admirals in the Navy, and one of the few officers on active duty who had participated in the Spanish American War. Hart had served in that conflict on board the converted yacht USS Vixen (PY-4) with Ensign Arthur MacArthur III, Douglas MacArthur’s older brother. Later, Hart qualified as a submariner and was instrumental in submarine development during the interwar period. He took command of the Asiatic Fleet in 1939. 

Hart’s relatively small force included a handful of cruisers, destroyers, patrol craft, and auxiliaries. Understanding his ships would be insufficient to impede the increasingly bellicose Japanese, he advocated for, and received, 23 modern submarines to perform sea denial operations.  

Shortly after the opening of hostilities, Hart moved nearly all his ships from the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies, where he was named as American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) naval commander. As leader of this outnumbered slapdash coalition force, Hart directed his submarines to carry out attacks against Japanese shipping. The submarines were plagued by the defective Mark 14 torpedo, however, and scored few successes. Hart’s surface forces attempted to slow the Japanese juggernaut, with even fewer successes. One of his few tactical accomplishments was a successful surprise attack conducted by U.S. destroyers against a Japanese landing element at the Battle of Balikpapan. However, ABDA command was unable to capitalize on the victory, and the Japanese quickly captured Borneo.¹ In mid-February, Hart was relieved as ABDA naval commander by Dutch Admiral Conrad Helfrich, while the Allies’ standing in the southwest Pacific fell apart. Hart was relegated to the Navy’s General Board for the remainder of the war. Hart’s expertise with submarines, his experience with a coalition command, and his victory in a nighttime surface engagement would have made him a valued asset during the Guadalcanal campaign nearly six months later. 

Hidden in Plain Sight: Surface Officer Leads Carrier Actions

While the disastrous campaigns in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies were ending, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was making a name for himself leading the United States’ first offensive strikes against the Japanese and learning critical on-the-job lessons in carrier warfare. 

Fletcher graduated from the Naval Academy in 1908, and his class included eventual World War II flag officers Thomas Kinkaid, Richmond Kelly Turner, and Francis Rockwell. Following graduation, Fletcher served in several battleship postings leading up to the occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914, where he earned the Medal of Honor for his heroism rescuing refugees while under the command of his uncle, Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher. During World War I, Fletcher commanded destroyers. He was awarded the Navy Cross for escorting convoys against German U-boats. In the early 1920s, Fletcher was placed in command of a submarine tender, then of the submarine base in Cavite, in the Philippines. During the interwar period, Fletcher graduated from both the Army and Navy war colleges. Between these posting he served as executive and commanding officer of battleships before he was promoted to rear admiral in command of a cruiser scouting force.

Fletcher was sent as part of the failed Wake Island relief effort and quickly learned the logistical constraints of his destroyers when he was forced to slow to refuel his escorts. The Navy received criticism from the Marine Corps for the failed relief effort. The USS Yorktown (CV-5) reached the Pacific Fleet in late December 1941, becoming the center of Task Force 17 and Fletcher’s flagship carrier raids on Japanese possessions in early 1942. After these raids, Task Force 17 was sent to oppose Japan’s invasion of New Guinea’s Port Moresby. While outnumbered by the Japanese, Fletcher was tactically defeated at Battle of the Coral Sea. 

Fletcher was criticized by aviators throughout the fleet. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King resented Fletcher’s loss of the USS Lexington (CV-2). But despite the tragic loss of a fleet carrier, Fletcher foiled a Japanese seizure of Port Moresby.² During the Coral Sea engagement, the Yorktown sustained damage and returned to Pearl Harbor to be hastily repaired for the next action off Midway Island. With Admiral William Halsey hospitalized with shingles, Fletcher was placed in overall command of the U.S. carriers at Midway. Using lessons from the Battle of the Coral Sea, Fletcher launched his carrier strikes, eventually sinking three Japanese carriers before the Yorktown was damaged. This forced Fletcher to transfer tactical command of the engagement to Admiral Raymond Spruance, on board the Enterprise, whose aircraft would sink the last Japanese carrier and end the threat to Midway. 

The Japanese defeat at Midway gave the Americans the tactical advantage, and on 7 August 1942 the First Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal; Fletcher provided air cover for the landing from the Saratoga. Expecting a Japanese counterattack, Fletcher pulled the final U.S. carriers out to refuel. However, on the night after the landing, a Japanese cruiser force sank four allied cruisers, compelling the remaining naval forces to withdraw without unloading most of the Marines’ supplies. Again Fletcher was criticized, this time by the Marines and his fellow admirals. Rear Admiral John Towers wrote in his diary, "He ran away!" 

The expected counterattack came on 24 August, when a Japanese force attempted to push the Marines off Guadalcanal. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was Fletcher’s third carrier engagement of the war. In all three actions he was severely outnumbered, but on this occasion, he again claimed victory, sinking another Japanese carrier and downing 70 aircraft. Fletcher was wounded in action when the Saratoga was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. When he was sent back to the United States to recover and take his first leave since the war started, Fletcher thought he would be given another major command.³ Instead, he was relegated to leading lesser naval forces in the North Pacific until 1945. 

Fletcher’s priceless experience leading carrier task forces was not put to good use after his recovery because of personal grudges and negative perceptions. The battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf might have played out differently if Fletcher had been allowed to lead the expanded U.S. carrier task forces. His extensive experience in carrier combat and forward operations could have made all the difference. Later, Samuel Elliot Morrison, who wrote the Navy’s official history of the war, would overlook Fletcher’s critical role in the first nine months of the conflict. Morrison questioned Fletcher’s decisions, but did not interview him. For instance, Morrison second guesses Fletcher’s decision to refuel his destroyer during the Wake relief expedition and states “he [Fletcher] should have pressed on to execute his mission, regardless of the destroyers,” which ignores the risk of Japanese submarines.⁴

Leading from the Front but Forgotten

While Marines fought to survive on Guadalcanal, a parallel struggle played out at sea. During the first six months of fighting, the U.S. surface fleet fought four major engagements. Captain Gilbert Hoover, as commanding officer of the light cruiser USS Helena (CL-50), was vital to U.S. success in two of the fights. 

After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1916, Hoover was assigned to the battleship USS Wyoming (BB-32) where he served with the British Grand Fleet during World War I. After the war, Hoover was detailed to various surface ships. During the interwar period Hoover received a degree in metallurgy from Carnegie Institute, and in 1939 he was assigned to the Bureau of Ordnance, in the Experimental Section. 

At the start of World War II, Hoover was assigned to destroyers patrolling the North Atlantic. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, he was assigned to command a destroyer division tasked to escort the Yorktown and Lexington. He was awarded his first Navy Cross for leading his ships to rescue survivors from the sinking Lexington at Coral Sea. Again, at Midway, Hoover screened and rescued sailors from the Yorktown. After the two carrier battles, Hoover was given command of the Helena in October 1942. At the Battle of Savo Island, the Allies had received a serious defeat that left the Japanese controlling the waters around Guadalcanal at night and forced the Americans to reevaluate their tactics. Shortly after taking command of the Helena, Hoover was placed under Rear Admiral Norman Scott for what ended up being known as the Battle of Cape Esperance. During the engagement, Hoover used the Helena’s radar to track the Japanese. After hesitation from Scott, Hoover recognized that the potential for surprise was slipping away—he took initiative and opened fire on the Japanese. Hoover’s actions led to a slim tactical victory and a significant morale boost, and he won his second Navy Cross. 

Only a few weeks after Cape Esperance, the Japanese made a more powerful effort to push the Americans off Guadalcanal. Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan was placed in command of a patchwork force of cruisers and destroyers. They were outnumbered and outgunned by a pair of Japanese battleships and their powerful force of escorts. The nighttime close-range surface engagement rapidly escalated, and soon, Admiral Scott and Admiral Callaghan were killed, leaving Hoover as the senior U.S. officer. He ordered what remained of his force to withdraw. The next morning, as the U.S. force was limping away, the already damaged cruiser USS Juneau (CL-52) was struck by a submarine-fired torpedo. The Juneau disappeared in a blinding explosion that broke the ship in half. Hoover was in a difficult position. If he sent his only operational destroyer to attack the submarine, he would leave the remainder of his crippled force with no protection from other submarines that might be in the area. According to at least one account, Hoover contacted an Air Corps B-17 and tasked it to search for survivors. Veterans of the Helena and Fletcher reported seeing the B-17 respond to the signal, but the Army records show no such flight. Upon arriving at Noumea, New Caledonia, Admiral Halsey relieved Hoover of his command for leaving the survivors of the Juneau and withdrawing from the battle with an operational ship. He would not be given another operational command. 

Hoover’s decision not to search for the Juneau’s survivors was correct, not cowardly—his courage was already well established. Hoover understood he had to preserve his wounded force to fight another day. Hoover would eventually be awarded his third Navy Cross, six months later, for his conduct leading the Helena during the battle. Hoover was an aggressive commander who understood the tactical picture and the employment of surface action groups. His experience with radar and surface tactics would have saved American lives in the remaining surface battles in the Solomons in 1943, had he not been fired. 

Lost Experience: The Missed Opportunities

The Army and Air Corps did not treat their senior leaders the same way after failures. In the opening stages of the conflict in the Philippines, two major commanders performed dismally. While General Douglas MacArthur had been praised in public, there were serious questions about the decisions that led to the largest surrender in U.S. military history. A more obscure Army Air Corps leader, General Lewis Brereton, shared some of the blame for the outcome in the Philippines because of how many Army Air Corps planes were destroyed on the ground at Clark Field. Despite their shortcomings, the War Department saw these leaders’ experience and leadership potential and gave them in major commands in the Southwest Pacific and European Theaters. 

In Europe, commanders such as Major General Terry Allen and General George Patton were both relieved, not for battlefield failures, but for their actions behind the lines. Both were given command again, leading the Army to final victory in Europe. 

Finally, General Ralph Smith’s poor battlefield leadership on Saipan contributed to his firing. However, the Army did not write him off—it moved him to Europe, where he commanded at the divisional level as well. 

Some trends are readily apparent in the Navy’s institutional culture. During World War II, most senior officers in the Navy had graduated from the Naval Academy right after the Spanish American War, during which there had been a public feud between Admirals William Sampson and Winfield Scott Schley about who was responsible for the victory at the Battle of Santiago.⁵ For the next 40 years, most senior naval officers avoided press coverage and stayed out of the public eye. Admirals King and Spruance were known to detest reporters. A January 1944 article from Collier’s Magazine stated, “[Spruance] eats correspondents-chews them up fine and spits out the pieces!”⁶ An accidental leak of classified submarine information by Congressman Andrew May that led to the deaths of American submariners added to naval leaders’ reluctance to work with the press. Therefore, any real or imagined “bad press” likely had an effect on whether a senior officer was kept in their position, given a second chance, or written off. Even if the officer had come out victorious in battle, perception of the leader by their peers or the other services could lead to his removal. Neither the influence of personal friendship nor the absolution of courage in battles fought at serious disadvantage were likely to erase a real or perceived failure. 

It is rare to find leaders in today’s Navy with experience in more than one arm of the service. But the leaders profiled above could claim a wealth of experience in two or more combat arms of the Navy. Unfortunately, being primarily surface officers worked against these officers at a time when naval aviators and submariners were emerging from the shadows of a battleship-dominated Navy. 

Whatever the reasons a commander was relieved, by not giving these officers a new chance to contribute to the war effort, the Navy repeatedly deprived itself of combat-experienced leaders at critical stages of the conflict. Most armchair historians are familiar with the relief of Admiral Kimmel, but most are not aware of the interim commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Pye. Both men were innovative leaders who were put into difficult positions and publicly failed. But Pye understood the value of calculated risks. He refused to risk his assets when victory seemed out of reach. Admiral Thomas Hart made a heroic stand in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies against insurmountable odds. His experience in submarine and coalition operations went unnoticed, and he was banished to planning and training roles until the end of the war. While at Guadalcanal, Admiral Frank Fletcher and Captain Gilbert Hoover were dismissed, despite surviving that brutal six-month campaign. They had gone toe-to-toe with the Japanese and come out victorious despite long odds. 

These were combat-decorated officers who, under closer examination, had different reasons for being relieved. If given the chance to return to the battlefield, they might have shortened the war.