Before the Firestorm: Expanding the Story of the USS Franklin

Editor's note: This is the first installment of a two-part series.

The narrative of the USS Franklin (CV-13) is one of heroism, survival, and controversy. “Big Ben” was the flagship of Task Group 58.2, one cog in the giant machine of Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force 58.¹ On 19 March 1945, the Franklin was roughly 70 miles off the coast of Japan, participating in strikes against airfields and supply ports on Kyushu and Honshu as a prelude to the Okinawa campaign. While preparing to launch the second wave of that morning’s sorties, the ship was hit at 0708 by two bombs dropped from a Japanese plane that had used cloud cover to slip past the fleet’s air protection and largely escape radar detection.^2,3 

The bombs pierced the flight deck and exploded on the hangar deck, killing hundreds of men instantly, cutting firefighting water and station-to-station communication lines, and igniting a firestorm of burning fuel and exploding ordnance. The fires spread to the planes on the flight deck that were fueled and loaded, with engines turning. As the ordnance cooked off and the fires raged for roughly four hours, many crewmen were shattered in the spinning propellers of waiting planes, cut down by shrapnel, caught in explosions and fires, blown overboard, drowned, or suffocated by thick smoke while trapped in the lower decks. In the end, hundreds were wounded and roughly 800 were killed, making it the greatest loss of life on any U.S. ship that was not sunk.³

Against great odds, the Franklin’s commanding officer (CO), Captain Leslie Gehres, his remaining skeleton crew, and other ships in the task group were able to save the ship and rescue many of the men who went into the water. For exceptional acts of achievement, bravery, and heroism, the men of the Franklin became the most decorated crew in the history of the U.S. Navy, including two Medal of Honor recipients. Captain Gehres was awarded the Navy Cross³ and later retired as a rear admiral.  

Sadly, this extraordinary narrative of survival and valor is sometimes overshadowed by the enduring controversies involving Captain Gehres. Writers, bloggers, and podcasters have blamed Gehres for the results of the attack on the Franklin because of his “toxic leadership” and the relaxed battle readiness conditions on the ship that day—opinions based, in part, on narratives from some Franklin survivors.^3-8 Crewmen and historians alike have criticized Gehres’ decisions and actions on 19 March 1945. But what happens to the story when we look at it through a wider lens? 

Events of the Day

On the morning of the attack, the first wave of Franklin aircraft sorties was launched by 0554. The Franklin had been at General Quarters (GQ) since 0336. With the radar and skies showing clear at 0611, Gehres ordered Condition III, a readiness level at which “the probabilities of an attack are rather remote and the crew is standing four hours on and twelve hours off, except for the dog watches,” allowing them a chance to get a hot meal and some sleep after repeated calls to GQ.⁹ (Gehres did not apply Condition III to all gun batteries and fire direction control stations, which remained manned.) Critics, including some Franklin crew members, have questioned why Gehres would place the carrier, a prime target for the enemy, in such a vulnerable condition so close to the shores of Japan.³ 

The seemingly relaxed battle-readiness posture and the lack of call to GQ following alerts of unidentified planes have been cited for the deaths of hundreds of men who were waiting for breakfast in a line that snaked up from a lower deck, through an open hatch, and onto the hangar deck, where the first bomb ultimately exploded—not to mention men who were killed in the lower decks because of the smoke and fire. Had these men been dispersed at GQ stations when the ship was bombed, they would not have been in those areas, and that hatch would not have been open, because the ship would have been at maximum compartment tightness.¹⁰  

Although these criticisms may seem warranted, they focus on the Franklin in isolation. However, the Franklin was in a task group comprised of 26 ships (Table 1). While Gehres was setting Condition III at sunrise that morning, what was happening on the other ships? When unidentified aircraft were picked up on radar, how did COs across the group react?Table 1. Organization and Commanding Officers of Task Group 58.2¹¹ 

TASK GROUP 58.2 – Fast Carrier Group 2 – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
TASK UNIT 58.2.1 – Carrier Unit – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
Carrier Division (CarDiv) 2 – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
Franklin (CV-13) flagship – Captain Leslie E. Gehres
Hancock (CV-19) – Captain Robert F. Hickey
San Jacinto (CVL-30) – Captain Michael H. Kernodle
Bataan (CVL-29) – Captain John P. Heath
TASK UNIT 58.2.2 – Support Unit – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
TASK UNIT 58.2.21 – Battleships – Rear Admiral Thomas R. Cooley
Battleship Division (BatDiv) 6 – Rear Admiral Thomas R. Cooley
Washington (BB-56) flagship – Captain Roscoe F. Good
North Carolina (BB-55) – Captain Oswald S. Colclough
TASK UNIT 58.2.22 Cruisers – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
Cruiser Division (CruDiv) 10 – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
Baltimore (CA-68) flagship  -- Commander Carl K. Fink
Pittsburgh (CA-72) – Captain John Gingrich
Santa Fe (CL-60) – Captain Harold C. Fitz
TASK UNIT 58.2.3 – Screening Unit – Captain John P. Womble, Jr.
Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 52 – Captain John P. Womble, Jr.
Destroyer Division (DesDiv) 103                 Captain John P. Womble, Jr.	DesDiv 104 – Commander Paul L. High
Owen (DD-536) flagship                 Commander Carlton B. Jones	Hickox (DD-673) flagship         Commander Joseph H. Wesson
Miller (DD-535) – Lieutenant                 Commander Dwight L. Johnson	Hunt (DD-674)         Commander Halford A. Knoertzer
The Sullivans (DD-537)                 Commander Ralph J. Baum	Lewis Hancock (DD-675)         Commander William M. Searles
Stephen Potter (DD-538) – Lieutenant                 Commander George R. Muse	Marshall (DD-676)         Commander Joseph D. McKinney
Tingey (DD-539)                  Commander Kenneth S. Shook
DesRon 53 – Captain Harry B. Jarrett
DesDiv 105 – Capt. Harry B. Jarrett	DesDiv 106 – Commander James R. Hogg
Cushing (DD-797) flagship                Commander Louis F. Volk	Wedderburn (DD-684) flagship         Commander Charles H. Kendall
Colahan (DD-658)                 Commander Martin A. Shellabarger	Twining (DD-540)         Captain Frank V. List
Halsey Powell (DD-686)                 Commander Sidney D.B. Merrill	Stockham (DD-683)         Commander Milton G. Johnson
Uhlmann (DD-687)                  Commander Selden C. Small
Benham (DD-796)                  Commander Frederic S. Keeler

 

To answer these questions, the 17 ships of TG 58.2 that were within 5,000 yards of the Franklin when she was bombed were considered (Figure 1).^12,13 Table 2 compares the timing of events as recorded in the March 19 deck logs, war diaries, and action reports of these 17 ships versus those of the Franklin. In cases where the time stamps logged for the same events in multiple documents from a given ship do not agree, the report with the most detailed information was used.^14-17

Not included in the analysis were eight destroyers of TG 58.2: two that were 12 miles away in picket stations (the USS Hunt [DD-674] and The Sullivans [DD-537]); one that was in a linking position between TG 58.2 and TG 58.3 (Lewis Hancock [DD-675]); and five of Destroyer Division 105 (USS Benham [DD-796], Colahan [DD-658], Cushing [DD-797], Halsey Powell [DD-686], and Uhlmann [DD-687]) that were in a radar picket line of TG 58.8 in advance of Task Force 58.¹⁷

 

 

 

Table 2: Timing of events on the morning of 19 March 1945 in 5-VD day/high-visibility air defense formation of Task Group 58.2^11,14-16

Ship	Readiness at dawn	Set Condition III	Alerted to/ detected bogey	Visual contact on plane	Fired upon plane	Went to General Quarters (GQ)	Logged time Franklin bombed
Franklin   CV-13	GQ  since 0336	0611	0705a	0708	0708	0709	0708
Baltimore CA-68	Condition I-E since 0532		0647, 0650, 0657b, 0700b, 0706a	0707		0707	0707
Bataan  CVL-29	Condition I-E since 0403	0620		0706	0706	0707	0706
Hancock  CV-19	Condition I-E since 0445	0620	0645, 0650b, 0657b, 0659b	0705	0705	0659	0706
Hickox DD-673	GQ since 0330	0615c	0700a	0704		0705	0704
Marshall DD-676	Condition II-M since 0353		0704a			0704	0706
Miller DD-535	Condition I-A since 0327	0618	0647, 0653, 0657, 0705a	0706		0705	0706
North Carolina BB-55	Condition I-E since 0445	0626	0659b	0704	0705	0659	0704
Owen DD-536	Condition II-M since 0445		0703a	0705		0705	0705
Pittsburgh CA-72	Condition I-E since 0607	0632				0708	0707
San Jacinto CVL-30	—d	0621c		0705	0705	0705	0705
Santa Fe CL-60	Condition I-AA since 0453		0649, 0706a	0708	0708		0708
Stephen Potter DD-538	GQ  since 0515	0625c	0705a	0706		—d	0706
Stockham DD-683	Condition II since 0532		0706a			0706	0706
Tingey DD-539	GQ since 0510	0613c	0647, 0649, 0705a	0708		0708	0708
Twining DD-540	GQ since 0329	0619c	0707a	0707		0707	0707
Washington BB-56	Condition II-A at 0604		0700b, 0705a	0707	0708	0707	0708
Wedderburn DD-684	GQ  since 0334	Set II-B at 0625	0700b, 0705b			0707	0707

^a Received radioed report of sighting by Hancock of twin-engine plane. 

^b Detected bogey by own radar; all others logged radioed alerts. 

^c Did not report setting Condition III, but did secure from GQ at this time.

^d No entry for going to GQ but secured from GQ at a later time point.

 

Expanded Information

The ships of TG 58.2 had been in cruising disposition 5-VN (night/low-visibility air defense) during the darkness of the early hours of 19 March. At roughly 0600, this formation was dissolved, and the ships reformed into the 5-VD cruising disposition.^12-14 Sunrise was noted in several of the logs as being at 0610 to 0615.

Because the Japanese had learned to time their aerial attacks at dawn, with the rising sun at their backs, warships in the Pacific (such as the destroyers USS Tingey [DD-539] and Stephen Potter [DD-538]) would go to dawn GQ. All other ships in the task group were either already at GQ since before dawn, including the Franklin, or at a heightened level of readiness (Table 2).¹⁹ Most of the large ships were at Condition I-E, which is GQ with allowances for some personnel to sleep at their station, access and distribute food, or “answer calls of nature.”¹² The destroyers were either at GQ or at Condition II, which is used when “a surprise attack may take place at any time by aircraft, surface ships or submarines.”⁹ Under Condition II, one-quarter to one-third of the batteries are manned.¹²

At sunrise, Commander Task Group 58.2 (CTG 58.2) Rear Admiral Ralph Davison set Condition III for the task group. This order was set at 0611 on the Franklin.¹⁴ It was logged in the Talk Between Ships “TBS/TBY and Visual Dispatches” at 0617.¹¹ However, the COs, including Gehres, were not obliged to comply. Decisions about how to defend, how to fight, and how to respond to battle damage rest with each ship’s CO. As such, COs needed to interpret the guidance in paragraph 402 of War Instructions, United States Navy:

Responsible commanders in prescribing conditions of readiness strive to bring their commands into action at the peak of fighting effectiveness by striking a common sense balance between security and rest.²⁰

The collective “common sense” of all ship commanders would allow a range of decisions. Indeed, Captain Charles Baker famously kept the crew of the USS Texas (BB-35) at GQ for more than 50 days during the Okinawa campaign.²¹ Nevertheless, not long after sunrise on the morning of 19 March, 11 of the 18 ships relaxed readiness to Condition III (Table 2)—including all four carriers. 

This change of readiness on the Franklin from GQ down to Condition III is considered irresponsible by critics of Gehres, yet most of his counterparts in TG 58.2 did the same, because “it was customary, when no enemy planes were known to be in striking distance, to secure from battle stations in this manner at mealtimes.”² To prevent battle fatigue, crews needed periodic relief from battle readiness and GQ compartmentation.

At Condition III, readiness was set for “normal wartime cruising watch.”²² One-half to two-thirds of the anti-aircraft and automatic-weapon batteries remain manned.¹² Gehres went beyond that and left all gun batteries manned, which kept the ship defended while allowing the crew to get much-needed food and sleep.¹¹ For Gehres, this was his “balance between security and rest.” 

The respite was to be shortlived. Less than an hour later, “bogies” (unidentified aircraft) were detected by task group command and radioed via TBS/TBY to the ships of the group at 0654, 0657, and 0659.¹¹ The bogey detected at 0657 was identified within minutes as “friendly.”²³ Bogies were also logged as detected by radar at roughly the same times on four ships in the formation (Table 2): the Baltimore, Hancock, North Carolina (BB-55), and Washington (BB-56). 

After the radioed alerts and radar indications, only two ships in the formation, the Hancock and the North Carolina, went to GQ. That was based on their own radar detection of bogies (Table 2), perhaps indicating radar was given priority over radioed alerts as a basis for decisions. Indeed, none of the nine ships that logged reception of radioed bogey alerts went to GQ. There was nothing in the Franklin logs about the bogies that had been detected by radar on other ships. 

For time 0705, Gehres wrote in his action report that the Hancock radioed to CTG the sighting of an unidentified twin-engine plane at 350°T (10 degrees west of due north), 10 miles away, which was relayed to the task group. Two minutes later, the North Carolina also reported a twin-engine plane at 035° and two miles distant, but this report was not logged by other ships. Of the 11 other ships in the task group that logged the radioed report of the Hancock’s sighting prior to the bombing of the Franklin (Table 2), only two, the destroyers USS Miller (DD-535) and Marshall (DD-676), went to GQ. Of the six ships that did not go to GQ, four of them had not reduced readiness to Condition III after sunrise (the Baltimore, Owen [DD-536], Santa Fe [CL-60], and Washington).

After receiving the report at 0705 of the twin-engine plane sighted by the Hancock, Gehres asked the Franklin’s Combat Intelligence Center (CIC) about this bogey. The CIC did not show it on their radar, so Gehres did not call GQ. The question is, why not? Maybe it was a combination of factors. Gun batteries were fully manned even in Condition III, and Gehres might have had confidence in them to see and fire upon any bogey. Perhaps he was thinking of Davison’s Condition III order and was hesitant to call GQ without more proof of an imminent attack. He also might have wanted detection from his own ship’s radar before sending the men to their stations.  

Discerning enemy planes from the many friendly planes on radar was a challenge the task group had already faced for two days.^11,14-16 The Hancock and Franklin had just sent up their first wave of planes that morning, and combat air patrol (CAP) planes were always circling nearby to act as the first interceptors against attacking Japanese aircraft. Bogies would sometimes show up on radar but then disappear, or merge in all the clutter of airborne aircraft—sometimes, they would not register on radar at all. This point was reiterated in the Washington’s action report:  At about 0700, there had been reports of enemy planes in the vicinity of the task group, when [CIC] picked up an unidentified plane on the SK [long-range] radar. . . . Five-inch [gun] directors were unable to pick up this contact on FD radars.¹⁶

FD radar was used to direct anti-aircraft weaponry, and Gehres may have wanted a bearing to direct the batteries when he checked with CIC. 

Interestingly, there is no entry in the deck logs, action report, or war diary of the Hancock about the sighting of an unidentified twin-engine plane at 0705 on March 19. However, the narrative in the action report of the Hancock paints a more complete picture of the tracking of the plane that eventually bombed the Franklin—including that some personnel in the group identified the plane as friendly:

The morning of 19 March a questionable bogey was picked up at 240° about forty-five miles, time 0650, closing, and in checking some bases believed it showed friendly. There were many friendlies to the West and another Task Group was at 300° fifteen miles. Planes were turning up on all decks for a 0700 strike launch, and the usual interference caused by planes turning up gave some doubt as to this bogey’s identity. However, within a minute the Task Group Fighter Director told the SAN JACINTO to start out a [CAP] division which was amplified as being a division of friendly fighters. About three minutes later this vessel was told to send out a division to back up the other division. When the bogey was at 250° fifteen miles this vessel’s SM [long-range radar] picked out the bogey from at least fifty friendly groups of planes in the close vicinity. The Task Group to the Northwest was apparently intercepting also. A minute later, or about 0700, a Tally-Ho [enemy target sighted report] was made by the SAN JACINTO division which was amplified as being a division of friendly fighters. The HANCOCK division was then two miles from the bogey but by the time they could see him he was at 345° eight miles and starting to dive.¹⁶

The Attack

At 0706, the Hancock radioed directly to the Franklin “BOGEY CLOSING YOU,” but this message did not make it to the Franklin’s bridge, possibly due to radio-communications issues.¹⁶ Of the 13 ships that logged visual sighting of the attacking plane (Table 2), most saw it emerge from the clouds ahead of the Franklin and execute a steep dive (Figure 2). The Hancock and the Santa Fe began firing on the enemy plane, but the North Carolina, Tingey, and Washington could not, because they judged the risk of hitting other ships was too great.^14-16 

 

Lookouts on other ships, including the Franklin, may not have spotted the attacker because they were looking for a different plane, as summed up in the Commander Cruiser Division 10 action report:

The reports of sighting of a twin-engine plane made by HANCOCK and NORTH CAROLINA, which checked quite closely with the radar track, alerted the task group to the possibility of a bogey overhead, but actually may have impeded immediate identification when the single-engine attacking plane came out of the clouds.¹⁸

In addition, the gunnery officer on the Franklin, Lieutenant Commander William McKinney, wrote that CIC had reported a bogey on their port beam. The men on the Franklin’s gun batteries may have been looking to port when the attacking plane came from in front of the ship. It flew straight down the flight deck of the Franklin, dropped its bomb payload as the Franklin gunners commenced firing, then passed down the port side of the nearby North Carolina, which opened fire along with five other ships (Table 2, Figure 2). Gehres wrote in his report that the plane “must have been making at least 320 knots,” rendering it almost impossible to hit.¹¹ 

Multiple ships in the group logged that the offending enemy plane was later shot down, which was also documented by Joseph Springer.³  

Points for Consideration

This expanded view of the Franklin’s fate shows that reconsideration of the events and decisions of 19 March is warranted. 

Gehres has been criticized for taking the Franklin to Condition III after dawn, even as it was located relatively close to enemy shores, but analysis finds that this was standard practice. It was ordered by CTG Davison for the entire task group, with most of the ships complying. 

Gehres did not call the crew to GQ after radio alerts of bogies in the battle area, or of the sighting of a twin-engine plane, were relayed. However, COs of some other ships, including the two light carriers, also did not go to GQ after receiving the alerts.

Perhaps Davison should have ordered GQ for the entire task group, much as he had set Condition III after dawn. Indeed, he had ordered Condition I in the anti-aircraft batteries at 0330 that same morning after a bogey was reported in the vicinity.¹⁴  But it is also worth considering whether this attack should be viewed purely as a tragic consequence of war and the limitations of the time. 

What is lacking in the deck logs, action reports, and war diaries of TG 58.2 is any criticism of Captain Gehres’s decisions on the morning of 19 March 1945. Gehres is called out neither by his peers nor his superiors. Only one upper-level officer, Rear Admiral Gerald Bogan, serving alongside Davison, mentioned in his War Diary, “The ship was not at General Quarters when the bomb exploded.”²⁴

The focus of Part 1 of the expanded story has been on the events leading up to the bombing attack on the Franklin. Part 2 will focus on the post-attack events, and the criticisms and controversies regarding Captain Gehres and the crew of the Franklin.

 

The author thanks Captain Gary Schnurrpusch, U.S. Navy (Ret.) for his expert input, review and assistance with this article. He thanks Allan Edmands of The Wordsman Editorial Services for his editorial review of the draft.