After the Attack: Expanding the Story of the USS Franklin (CV-13)

Editor's note: This is the second installment of a two-part series. 

Eighty years have passed since the devastating attack on the Essex-class aircraft carrier USS Franklin (CV-13) near the coast of Japan during World War II.¹ But time has not diminished the controversy surrounding the decisions and demeanor of the ship’s commanding officer (CO), Captain Leslie E. Gehres. 

As detailed in Part 1 of this essay, some crewmen held Gehres partially responsible for the attack’s human toll of roughly 800 dead and hundreds more wounded.² The Franklin suffered the greatest number of casualties of any U.S. ship that remained afloat. It was Gehres’ actions after the attack, however, that were considered indefensible by many surviving Franklin veterans.^3,4

Backstory

The Franklin was the flagship of Task Group 58.2 (TG 58.2), one of four task groups in Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force 58 (TF 58).⁵ In the middle of March 1945, TF 58 approached Japan’s shores to attack military bases, installations, and ships in preparation for the invasion of Okinawa. ⁴

At dawn on 19 March, TG 58.2 was operating roughly 70 miles off the coast of Shikoku. The Franklin had launched her first wave of bomber sorties. While a second set of planes was lined up on the flight deck, an enemy aircraft slipped out of a low cloud ahead of the ship. At 0708, its pilot made a well-executed dive toward the Franklin and hurtled into a low run directly over the flight deck, releasing two bombs before escaping.² 

The bombs pierced the flight deck and exploded on the hangar deck, instantly killing almost everyone there and igniting fuel, planes, and ordnance. The conflagration spread up to the fully loaded aircraft on the flight deck. Planes and fuel burned, and ordnance cooked off through a series of explosions that lasted roughly five hours.⁴ 

The inferno spread in multiple directions—into gun mounts and ammunition lockers, aft to the stern and fantail, into the island, and down through parts of four decks.⁶ Many men were killed, and many more went into the sea. Some were blown off the ship by explosions, and some were forced overboard by fires and acrid smoke. Once in the water, some drowned or succumbed to their injuries before they could be rescued.⁴ 

Table 1. Organization and Commanding Officers of Task Group 58.2⁶

TASK GROUP 58.2 – Fast Carrier Group 2 – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
TASK UNIT 58.2.1 – Carrier Unit – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
Carrier Division (CarDiv) 2 – Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison
Franklin (CV-13) flagship – Captain Leslie E. Gehres
Hancock (CV-19) – Captain Robert F. Hickey
Bataan (CVL-29) – Captain John P. Heath
San Jacinto (CVL-30) – Captain Michael H. Kernodle
TASK UNIT 58.2.2 – Support Unit – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
TASK UNIT 58.2.21 – Battleships – Rear Admiral Thomas R. Cooley
Battleship Division (BatDiv) 6 – Rear Admiral Thomas R. Cooley
Washington (BB-56) flagship – Captain Roscoe F. Good
North Carolina (BB-55) – Captain Oswald S. Colclough
TASK UNIT 58.2.22 Cruisers – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
Cruiser Division (CruDiv) 10 – Rear Admiral Lloyd J. Wiltse
Baltimore (CA-68) flagship  – Commander Carl K. Fink
Pittsburgh (CA-72) – Captain John Gingrich
Santa Fe (CL-60) – Captain Harold C. Fitz
TASK UNIT 58.2.3 – Screening Unit – Captain John P. Womble, Jr.
Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 52 – Captain John P. Womble, Jr.
Destroyer Division (DesDiv) 103                 Captain John P. Womble, Jr.	DesDiv 104 – Commander Paul L. High
Owen (DD-536) flagship                 Commander Carlton B. Jones	Hickox (DD-673) flagship         Commander Joseph H. Wesson
Miller (DD-535) – Lieutenant                 Commander Dwight L. Johnson	Hunt (DD-674)         Commander Halford A. Knoertzer
The Sullivans (DD-537)                 Commander Ralph J. Baum	Lewis Hancock (DD-675)         Commander William M. Searles
Stephen Potter (DD-538) – Lieutenant                 Commander George R. Muse	Marshall (DD-676)         Commander Joseph D. McKinney
Tingey (DD-539)                  Commander Kenneth S. Shook
DesRon 53 – Captain Harry B. Jarrett
DesDiv 105 – Captain Harry B. Jarrett	DesDiv 106 – Commander James R. Hogg
Cushing (DD-797) flagship                Commander Louis F. Volk	Wedderburn (DD-684) flagship         Commander Charles H. Kendall
Colahan (DD-658)                 Commander Martin A. Shellabarger	Twining (DD-540)         Captain Frank V. List
Halsey Powell (DD-686)                 Commander Sidney D.B. Merrill	Stockham (DD-683)         Commander Milton G. Johnson
Uhlmann (DD-687)                  Commander Selden C. Small
Benham (DD-796)                  Commander Frederic S. Keeler

The Franklin’s remaining crew and men on assisting ships worked under dangerous conditions to save lives and the ship. The story of the Franklin is replete with temerity, superb seamanship, and heroism. It is one of the greatest tales of survival to come out of the war in the Pacific.

Sadly, this gallant story is marred by criticism directed toward the Franklin’s CO, Captain Gehres—criticism leveled by some crewmen, but also by historians, authors, podcasters, and analysts.^7-10 

Some of the crew asserted that Gehres unfairly abused them by:

• not allowing all surviving crewmembers to return to the U.S. with the ship;

• giving survivors only 15–20 minutes to come back on board and retrieve their personal belongings at Pearl Harbor;

• abandoning them at Pearl Harbor while the ship sailed to the Brooklyn shipyard; and

• threatening to court-martial crewmen and officers who left the ship when no abandon-ship order had been given, including those who were blown off the ship by explosions or who jumped into the water to save their own lives.⁴

The reasons why Gehres made certain criticized decisions have not been investigated until now. 

New Information

Actions after the bombing by those on board the Franklin, and by some of the ships that came to her aid, have been described, but the full scope of the involvement of ships, crews, commanders, and Navy leaders in saving the Franklin has never been fully reported.^1,3,4,11-15 These details, outlined in Table 2 and elsewhere, give context to Gehres’ decisions.¹⁶ 

On 19 March, ships aiding the Franklin rescued almost 1,700 survivors.¹⁶ On arriving at Ulithi Atoll on 22 March, the more seriously wounded were transferred to the hospital ships USS Relief (AH-1) and Bountiful (AH-9). Some survivors—mostly officers—were sent back to the Franklin, while some remained on the rescue ships to be recalled later. The rest were transferred to receiving ships. The Franklin ship’s company went to the USS General Hugh L. Scott (AP-136), while Air Group 5 personnel were sent to the USS Orvetta (IX-157). (See Table 2.).

Crewmen not recalled to the Franklin at Ulithi were transported to Pearl Harbor—except the men of Air Group 5, who would be dropped off in Guam to regroup, then transferred to Alameda, California, for further disposition (see Table 2). With a few exceptions, those who did not leave Ulithi on board the Franklin would not be on the carrier for its voyage from Pearl Harbor to the United States. This was a significant disappointment to the crewmen left in Hawaii.^3,4 

 

Table 2. Movement of Ships and Personnel Connected with the USS Franklin at Ulithi, Guam, and Pearl Harbor, March and April 1945.

Time	Action
24 March
1315	Task Group 58.2 (TG 58.2; Franklin, Enterprise, Wasp, Santa Fe, Hickox, Hunt, Lewis Hancock, Marshall, Miller, Owen, Stephen Potter, and Tingey) entered the Mugai Channel of the Ulithi Atoll.21
1406	Franklin, assisted by Molala (ATF-106),22 anchored at berth #6.21
1407	Santa Fe anchored at berth #116.23
1425	Tingey anchored at berth #145 and then departed at 1438.24
1439	Marshall anchored in northwest corner of berth #8.25
1445	A five-man bomb disposal team came aboard Franklin to remove an unexploded rocket head.21
1454	Miller anchored in the southwestern section of berth #115.26
1500	Hickox anchored between berths #6 and #7.27
1505	Marshall transferred 6 wounded Franklin survivors who had been rescued at sea to Relief (AH-1) hospital ship for treatment.25,28 Relief was anchored between berths #7 and #8.28
1510	Santa Fe transferred 25 wounded Franklin survivors to Relief hospital ship.23,28
1525	Tingey anchored at berth #7.24
1530	Hickox transferred 12 wounded survivors to hospital ship Relief.27
1539	Hunt anchored in northwest corner of berth #7.29
1545	Tingey transferred 17 wounded Franklin survivors to Relief.24,28
1603	Hickox transferred five survivors of Franklin’s Air Group 5 to Orvetta (IX-157) receiving ship that was anchored at berth #412.27,30
1607	Marshall transferred Franklin air group survivors to Orvetta.25
1610	LCT-1178 came alongside Santa Fe for transfer of personnel.23
1615	Hunt transferred to Relief (AH-1) for treatment 54 wounded Franklin survivors who had been rescued from the sea. (Relief only logged 19 of these men.)28,29
1620	Hunt transferred seven officers and three enlisted survivors back to Franklin.21,29
1625	One officer returned back aboard Franklin from Marshall.21
1630	Tingey transferred 11 survivors (1 officer) of Franklin air group to Orvetta.24,31
1649	Hunt shifted berths.29 Miller transferred ten enlisted ship’s company survivors of the Franklin to the General Hugh L. Scott (AP-136) receiving ship that was moored in berth #113.26
1654	Hickox shifted berths.27
1721	Santa Fe transferred ten injured Franklin survivors to Relief (1 officer and 9 enlisted) via LCT-1178.23
1726	Santa Fe transferred Franklin survivors back to Franklin (15 officers and 1 war correspondent) via LCT-1178.23 Miller shifted berths to southern anchorage area berth #281 by 1903.26
1728	Hickox anchored at berth #113.27
1740	Tingey transferred 2 Marines (1 officer, 1 enlisted) and 35 ship’s company Franklin survivors to General Hugh L. Scott.24
1805	Hunt anchored in berth #11.29
1810	Tingey anchored at berth #117 for 25 minutes, then shifted to berth #317 by 1952.24
1810	Hunt transferred 341 Franklin survivors, which included 17 officers, to General Hugh L. Scott receiving ship.32
1825	Bomb disposal team left Franklin after jettisoning unexploded rocket over the side.21
1831	Hickox transferred 71 Franklin survivors to General Hugh L. Scott.27
1845	Marshall transferred remaining Franklin survivors to General Hugh L. Scott.25
1849	Hickox shifted berths to southern anchorage area.27
1851	15 officers and 1 war correspondent came on board Franklin, transferred from Santa Fe.21
1905	Santa Fe transferred one injured Franklin survivor to Relief.23
1922	Franklin transferred one officer and three enlisted men to Bountiful (AH-9) hospital ship,21 which was anchored at the eastern edge of the seaplane area.33
1955	Santa Fe transferred 392 enlisted Franklin survivors to General Hugh L. Scott and 66 officers and 50 enlisted personnel of Franklin’s air group to Orvetta via LCT-1178.23
1955	LCT-1178 cast off from Santa Fe ferrying Franklin personnel.23
2330	84 survivors who had been rescued by other ships were recalled back aboard Franklin from General Hugh L. Scott—1 who had been rescued by Hickox, 2 by Marshall, 2 by Tingey, 6 by Santa Fe, 70 by Hunt, and 3 by an unknown ship(s).21,23-25,29
25 March
0745	Santa Fe transferred three survivors of the Combat Photo Unit who arrived back aboard Franklin at 0830.21,23
0850	Commander Carrier Division 4 (COMCARDIV 4) Rear Admiral Bogan came aboard Franklin with another officer.21
0915	Fleet and Service Squadron ten maintenance officers boarded Franklin.21
1030	Thanksgiving and memorial services were held on the Franklin flight deck.21
1031	Commander Task Group 58.2 (CTG 58.2), COMCARDIV 2 Rear Admiral Davison came on board Franklin to attend services.21
1110	COMCARDIV 4 Rear Admiral Bogan left Franklin.21
1145	Fleet and maintenance officers departed from Franklin.21
1150	CTG 58.2, COMCARDIV 2 Rear Admiral Davison departed from Franklin.21
1225	LCT-838 came alongside Franklin with officers of Air Group 5 who came aboard to remove their gear and belongings.21
1615	Three wounded Franklin survivors were transferred by Relief to Bountiful for further treatment and disposition.28 Bountiful reported receiving 123 patients transferred from Relief of which 37 were Franklin survivors, including the 3 logged by Relief as being transferred.33
1630	Fifty-seven crewmen, mostly cooks, steward’s mates, bakers, storekeepers, tailors, pharmacist’s mates, ship’s services (laundry), and commissary stewards returned to Franklin after being recalled back aboard.21
1720	COMCARDIV 2 personnel who had come on board Franklin to retrieve belongings departed the ship.21
1730	Air Group 5 personnel who had come on board Franklin to retrieve belongings departed the ship.21
1905	Five wounded Franklin survivors transferred from Relief to Bountiful, medical treatment completed.28
1910	Santa Fe sent five rescued survivors back to Franklin per request.23
1945	Five survivors returned on board Franklin from Santa Fe.21
2000	Two surviving crewmen returned on board Franklin from General Hugh L. Scott.21
26 March
0828	Relief departed Ulithi Atoll, heading for Guam.28
1000	Pursuant to request by COMSERVRON 10 Captain Worrall Reed Carter and approval by Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, 1,427 officers and enlisted survivors of Franklin transferred from General Hugh L. Scott to Oneida (APA-221), which was moored at berth #115.34,35
1140	Eight men of the Franklin Marine detachment returned aboard.21
1245	Franklin transferred three enlisted men to Oneida (APA-221) for transport to the “nearest port United States.”21
1300	Santa Fe transferred 25 Marines, survivors of the March 19 action, back to Franklin,23 1 officer was detached from Franklin.21
1425	Two lieutenants were transferred from Franklin for temporary duty on Oneida and were to return to the ship once at the next U.S. port.21
1446	One enlisted man returned to Franklin from Santa Fe.21
1530	Two lieutenants on temporary duty from Franklin reported aboard Oneida “to take charge of the personnel of their ship the U.S.S. FRANKLIN enroute to Pearl Harbor, T.H.”35
1700	Two officers and two enlisted men from the Combat Photo Unit were detached from Franklin, having completed their temporary duty.21,36
2220	One deceased crewman was delivered to barge M-57 for burial by SERVRON 10.21
27 March
0715	Oneida made preparations to get underway.35
0752	Oneida underway, destination Pearl Harbor via Guam, escorted by Hogan (DMS-6).34,35
1530	Twenty-three crewmen returned to Franklin after discharge from hospital ship Bountiful.21,33
1730	Franklin made preparations to get underway.21
1745	After entering Apra Harbor, Guam, Relief moored to dock 4-X.28
1755	Franklin underway, destination Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.21
1805	Santa Fe underway to accompany Franklin to Pearl Harbor.23
1840	Franklin cleared Mugai Channel of Ulithi Atoll behind Santa Fe.21,23
2000	Relief transferred 184 wounded to U.S. Naval Hospital, Navy Base 196, Guam. Of those, 47 were Franklin survivors (5 being officers) and were likely members of Air Group 5.28
28 March
1412	Oneida and Hogan anchored in Apra Harbor, Guam, Oneida at berth #561.35
1607	253 Franklin survivors of Air Group 5 (103 officers, 150 enlisted) disembarked from Oneida and remained in Guam awaiting further orders.34,35,37
1728	Relief departed Apra Harbor, Guam, making way toward Okinawa.28
29 March
0748	Bougainville (CVE-100) with escorts Reynolds (DE-42) and Conklin (DE-439) arrived at Apra Harbor, Guam, and moored to buoy at berth #702.38
0830	Forty officers and one enlisted survivor of Franklin air group disembarked Bougainville.38
1643	Oneida underway from Guam for Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, via Eniwetok Lagoon, escorted by Hogan.34,35,39
March 31
1010	Survivors of Franklin air group embarked Barnes (CVE-20), moored at berth #702 in Apra Harbor, Guam, for transport to Pearl Harbor.40
1230	Barnes made way for Pearl Harbor with McConnell (DE-163) as screening escort.40
1 April
1609	Franklin and Santa Fe steaming enroute to Pearl Harbor crossed the International Date Line.21,23
2 April
0948	Oneida and Hogan anchored at Enitewok Lagoon, Oneida at berth #C-1 and then #C-3.34,35,39
1415	Oneida and Hogan cleared Enitewok Lagoon, enroute to Pearl Harbor.34,39
3 April
1040	Franklin and Santa Fe entered Pearl Harbor. Pilots came on board each ship and made way through the channel.21,23,a
1111	Franklin passed a first line to moor at berth #F-12, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor.21
1145	Rear Admiral J. Penoyer and staff went on board Franklin and departed at 1225.21
1153	Santa Fe moored at berth #S-24, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.23
1338b	McConnell detached as screening escort for Barnes enroute to Pearl Harbor.40
1410	Vice Admiral Towers and Rear Admiral Ainsworth came aboard Franklin and departed at 1435.21
1440b	Barnes passed Eniwetok Atoll abeam to port.40
1625	Vice Admiral Bagley, Vice Admiral Murray, Rear Admiral Furlong, staffs, and delegation of labor leaders went aboard Franklin and departed the ship at 1701.21
2125	An electrical fire sprang up in the forward crane engine room of Franklin and was brought under control and extinguished.21
4 April
1055	Rear Admiral Ginder, U.S. Navy, and Captain Bassett, Royal Navy, and officers came aboard Franklin for a visit and then departed at 1215.21
6 April
0000	Barnes crossed the International Date Line.40
8 April
0841	A pilot came on board to maneuver Franklin away from berth #F-12 at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, to shift berths.21
1040	Franklin completed mooring at berth #B-22 at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.21
1250	Oneida arrived at Pearl Harbor, and a pilot came on board to take the conn.35
1354	With tugs in assistance, Oneida moored to the dock at berth #A-13. Hogan was detached, and the pilot disembarked from Oneida.34,35,39
1610	Ninty-three Franklin survivor casualties were transferred from Oneida to U.S. Naval Hospital, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.34,35
9 April
0713	Franklin survivors (9 officers, 1,164 enlisted) commenced disembarking from Oneida.35
0915	Two Franklin officers returned on board after completing temporary duty on Oneida to accompany survivors.21
1030	Franklin survivors completed disembarking from Oneida.35
1204	Barnes entered Pearl Harbor channel.40
1343	Barnes moored at Naval Air Station, Ford Island pier #F-13 of Pearl Harbor.40
1615	Pilot came aboard Franklin to steer her out the channels of Pearl Harbor.21
1703	Pilot disembarked Franklin and the captain assumed the conn, setting a course for the Panama Canal.21
10 April
0900	Barnes commenced embarking passengers for transport to the U.S., including the remainder of Franklin Air Group 5.40
1559	Barnes made way for San Francisco, departing Pearl Harbor.40 Air Group 5 personnel would be transferred to the base in Alameda for further disposition.

 

Gehres cited the extensive damage to the ship as the reason he could not take the ship’s whole company back on board, an assertion doubted by many Franklin crewmen who were left at Pearl Harbor. However, they had not remained on board the ship on 19 March and may not have realized the full extent of the damage. As described in Gehres’ 23 March dispatch to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, the ship was “habitable only in the forward part.”⁴¹

If the ship could have supported additional crewmen, Gehres likely would have recalled them to help prepare the ship for repairs at the shipyard so the Franklin could return to the war as soon as possible.⁴² Gehres did not bring more crewmen back on board because conditions didn’t allow him, not because he harbored anger toward them.

Gehres’ perceived animus has also been cited to explain why he gave crewmen only 15 or 20 minutes to retrieve their personal belongings at Pearl Harbor before the Franklin departed for the United States.⁴ But this decision is best explained by looking at the timing of the voyages of the different ships from Ulithi to Pearl Harbor (see Table 2). 

The attack transport ship Oneida (APA-221), carrying more than 1,200 Franklin survivors, departed Ulithi on the morning of 27 March, and the Franklin and Santa Fe departed 10 hours later. The Oneida stopped at Guam to drop off Air Group 5 personnel, then stopped at Eniwetok. Meanwhile, the Franklin and Santa Fe sailed directly to Pearl Harbor, arriving on 3 April. The Oneida did not arrive at Pearl Harbor until late in the afternoon of April 8, five days after the Franklin. While enroute, the survivors on the Oneida were formally detached from the Franklin by change-of-station orders from the Commander, Air Force Pacific Fleet (ComAirPac).⁴³

By the time the Franklin survivors had disembarked from the Oneida on the morning of 9 April, a three-hour process,³⁵ Gehres was already preparing the Franklin to get underway for the Panama Canal.²¹ Gehres gave the men limited time to come on board, retrieve their personal gear, and debark the Franklin, most likely to avoid a delay in departure. Gehres had to adhere to the schedule of the pilot and the tugs required to maneuver the big carrier out of the harbor in a predetermined time slot. According to one survivor, the crewmen who arrived in Pearl Harbor on board the Oneida were transported to the Franklin in organized groups. They assembled on the pier next to the Franklin, then went to the hangar deck where they were given instructions, including that they were allowed 15–20 minutes to go to their quarters to retrieve their gear. After that time, they were to disembark the ship. This could explain why disembarkation of Franklin survivors from the Oneida required three hours.⁴⁴

Gehres also would have been on the bridge going through his departure checklist, not at the gangway making decisions about who could embark the ship. The story goes that the men asked a ship’s chaplain to intervene on their behalf and convince Gehres to allow them back on board.⁴ If a lower-ranking officer had blocked the crewmen from coming aboard, then it would have been Gehres who gave them the courtesy to embark the Franklin, even at the risk of delaying the ship’s departure.

At that point, the fate of the survivors who remained at Pearl Harbor rested with ComAirPac authority, not with Gehres. They had been transferred to Receiving Station, Naval Air Station 128, Pearl Harbor, for further assignment.⁴³ If they were mistreated at Pearl Harbor—abandoned, forgotten, moved out to distant barracks because of their night terrors, as has been described—this would have been because of decisions by ComAirPac. ⁴ 

Any lack of consideration Gehres had toward the crew remaining at Pearl Harbor was not necessarily due to animus he felt toward them. It might have had more to do with his focus on the men and the ship still under his command. Some Franklin survivors contended that Gehres planned to file charges of desertion against anyone who did not remain on board.^3,4 The men who left the Franklin on 19 March did so because: 

1. They were blown overboard or were forced off by flames and smoke. 

2. They were wounded and were transferred to rescue ships. 

3. They were ordered over to the Santa Fe when she came alongside the second time, such as the air group. 

4. Without orders to do so, they jumped into the sea to swim to the Santa Fe or they crossed over when she came alongside the Franklin.

The focus of Gehres’ displeasure was the officers in group 4.^3,4,11 Gehres instructed Executive Officer Commander Joe Taylor to give each officer recalled to the ship a letter asking him to explain in writing when and why he had evacuated the Franklin on 19 March.^3,4,36 Presumably, Gehres determined from those letters which officers, in his opinion, displayed a “dereliction of duty” by not remaining on board. Gehres’ interest in ferreting out and charging officers who voluntarily left the Franklin on 19 March without permission may have started the scuttlebutt that his ire was directed toward all men who left the ship. In addition, Gehres’ reported berating of men who were recalled to the ship in Ulithi as “cowards” and “deserters” may have fueled the harmful gossip that developed.^4,45 

However, there is no documented evidence that Gehres considered the conduct of the enlisted men who left the ship to be improper. He was considerate of them in his action report:

As soon as the last of the wounded were transferred to the SANTA FE, I requested her to clear the side in order that no more of my crew could leave the ship. The junior ratings and non-rated men who left the ship in this phase are not to be severely criticized, as they were undoubtedly confused and, of course, badly frightened.⁶

These are not the comments of a CO angry with his crew. 

In March, while the Franklin was at Ulithi (not in April in New York, as previously reported^4,11), Gehres conferred with CTG 58.2 CO Rear Admiral Ralph Davison about filing charges, then “submitted the recommendation for court-martial of only seven of his officers.” Two days later, Gehres submitted another letter recommending witnesses for the defense and prosecution.⁴⁶ If Gehres’ actions and intent were leaked, that might explain the start of rumors that all the men who left the Franklin on 19 March would be charged. 

On 28 April, the Franklin moored at pier 12 at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.²¹ On 31 May, the naval inspector general released the report from the investigation of the bombing of the Franklin and the charges Gehres had filed at Ulithi. During the investigation Gehres withdrew the charges—perhaps because of discussions with the inspector general, but exactly when and why is unknown.⁴⁶

The inspector general’s findings included the following:

• In filing charges and a list of witnesses with letters of 25 and 27 March, Gehres had not followed Navy Regulations, Articles 197(1)(2) and 200(2) and Naval Courts and Boards section 344 regarding the proper steps for reporting misconduct.^47,48

• The order that Gehres gave on 19 March for “non-essential personnel” to evacuate to the Santa Fe was passed from person to person by word of mouth, resulting in confusion and different interpretations by the officers and crewmen. ^3,4,16 Gehres’ “judgement in recommending the seven officers for General Courts-Martial was not sound, but Gehres notably had a badly damaged ship to save and he, himself, had been through a terrible experience.”⁴⁶

• Gehres was not familiar with the “abandon ship” and “salvage ship” documents on the ship that explain who would be required on a skeleton crew in the event of significant damage to the carrier; where on the ship officers and men should muster in case they could not go to their battle stations and/or evacuate the ship; how communications should be passed; or which officers were assigned to supervise personnel. He also had not conducted abandon-ship or salvage drills since leaving the navy yard in January. The inspector general considered this “a serious charge against the administration of the FRANKLIN and [indicated] that the Commanding Officer, and perhaps the division commander, had not given sufficient thought and attention to providing for just such a catastrophe as that which occurred.”⁴⁶

The inspector general recommended against courts martial, because the charges by Gehres could not be proved, due to the ambiguity and confusion of his order to evacuate the ship. But the inspector general recommended for placing a censure against the six officers upon their records, because they did not actively participate in saving the ship.⁴⁶

The censure of the six officers, however, was halted by Fleet Admiral Ernest King, who submitted the final word on the matter in his letter of 10 June:

After study of the record, I find it difficult to come to any conclusion as to the extent to which the actions of the officers in question were the result of personal shortcomings rather than the general confusion that existed, due, in large part, to the fact that the Commanding Officer had not indoctrinated and trained his officers and men sufficiently with respect to what they should do in case the ship were severely damaged. There appears to be no question that a number of officers and men were bewildered by the lack of preparation to deal with the serious situation that developed when the vessel was bombed. Some of them acted irrationally, but the fact remains that the vessel was successfully extricated from a very dangerous situation, by courageous, if not in all respects rational and well-guided, effort. In view of the foregoing, I think it would best serve the interests of the service to take no further action in the matter.

King’s decision was approved by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on 16 June 1945.⁴⁹

Lessons for Leaders

This analysis is not intended to judge the character of the Franklin’s CO, Leslie Gehres. What can be judged is that most of the criticisms of Gehres’ decisions in March and April 1945 find no support in the data. Gehres had good reasons to not take the entire crew back to the United States on board the Franklin, and to not give the survivors a lot of time on the ship to retrieve their belongings at Pearl Harbor. And he had no plans to file charges against his enlisted crew, nor against many of his officers who departed the ship on 19 March. During their darkest hour, and against recommendations by a superior officer to abandon ship, Gehres made the decision to save the Franklin. In doing so, he saved many lives.

As for the men of the Franklin who perceived ire and retribution from Gehres in 1945 after surviving a traumatic wartime event, who were swept up in the scuttlebutt and rumors, who were stung by his criticisms, and who lived under the specter of courts-martial for decades, the details in this paper have arrived far too late. That these men lived with the anger and sense of betrayal for the rest of their lives may be the greatest tragedy of all in the story of the Franklin. 

There is an important leadership lesson here: Keeping people informed in real time about what is happening to them and why, and delivering that information in an environment of mutual trust and respect, matters immensely. May we all learn something of value from the story of the USS Franklin.