On the evening of 16 May 1919, three of the U.S. Navy’s new Curtiss flying boats began an epic journey to be the first to fly across the Atlantic Ocean. The mission had been conceived and spearheaded by Commander John H. Towers—Naval Aviator No.3. In the darkness below was a picket line of 21 destroyers positioned every 50 miles or so along the 1,200-mile route from Trepassey Bay, Newfoundland, to Horta in the Azores. The pickets would fire star shells and use their searchlights to help the aircrafts’ navigators stay on course.
The second ship in the string was the USS Aaron Ward (DD-132), a newly commissioned Wickes-class destroyer commanded by Commander Raymond A. Spruance. As fate would have it, both Towers and one of the pilots—Lieutenant Marc Mitscher—would serve in the Pacific war with Spruance, in an often contentious relationship that pitted the aviators against their “black shoe” colleague. But that was far in the future, and this was just the first in a series of events on board the Aaron Ward that would shape the career of the Navy’s “Quiet Warrior.”
The Wickes class was authorized in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, part of the Wilson administration’s stated goal to build a Navy “second to none.” This class and the Clemson class that followed were known collectively as the flush-deck four-stackers and were designed with a speed sufficient to match that of the new battlecruisers also authorized by the act. Prevailing tactical doctrine directed that destroyers launch massed torpedo attacks against an enemy fleet, either as a preliminary action to weaken the enemy’s gun line or to act as a screen to allow a friendly fleet to retire in safety. Because the U.S. Navy had few cruisers, destroyers were also called on to act as scouts for the fleet. As the United States entered World War I, a new mission was added: antisubmarine convoy escort.
To meet the task, large numbers of destroyers were needed as soon as possible, and so they were designed to be mass produced quickly by multiple builders—hence the flush-deck design that simplified construction and provided a strong hull form. At 1,300 tons displacement as commissioned, the Aaron Ward was more than twice the displacement of the Navy’s first destroyer—the USS Bainbridge (DD-1) of 1901—and her two oil-fired, geared Parsons steam turbines put out 24,610 shaft horsepower, giving her a top speed of 35 knots. She carried four 4-inch/50-caliber guns and four triple torpedo launchers, in addition to several 3-inch antiaircraft guns. However, the old and new ships had this in common: Authorized by Congress during wartime, both entered service too late to participate in the war for which they were intended. When the Great War ended only a handful of the flush deckers had been completed, but the contracts were not canceled, and eventually 237 destroyers would be delivered to the Navy.
Spruance had received orders in March 1919 to proceed to Bath Iron Works in Maine to complete the Aaron Ward’s fitting out for commissioning. This was done with his usual efficiency, and she was commissioned on 21 April 1919, reporting immediately thereafter for duty with Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 2 of the Atlantic Fleet. After her mission in support of the flying boats and a brief sojourn in the western Mediterranean, in September 1919 the Aaron Ward was ordered to join DesRon 4 of the Pacific Fleet stationed at San Diego, California. Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet Admiral Hugh Rodman set about reorganizing the destroyer force to complement the operations of the fleet.
In October 1919, the USS Wickes (DD-75)—under command of William F. Halsey Jr.—joined Spruance and the Aaron Ward’s Destroyer Division 13. The two officers formed a fast friendship that would last the rest of their lives. Spruance admired Halsey’s seamanship and daring and, as Halsey’s second in command, said he would follow Halsey anywhere, while Halsey appreciated Spruance’s “electric brain” and coolness under pressure. They would be an unbeatable team in the Pacific war.
Spruance and Halsey had great fun putting their fast-moving ships through their paces during high-speed maneuvers and practicing the techniques of laying an effective smoke screen. This was a new tactical innovation for the Navy that could be done only by ships with oil-fired boilers. Instead of the usual 300-yard spacing maintained between ships underway, the distance was reduced to as little as 50 yards for the leading ship to maintain visibility for the trailing ship in the resulting murk. To avoid serious mishaps, every skipper had to know instinctively how his ship and those of his section mates would react, something that could be obtained only through practice and experience.
In the spring of 1921, Halsey had temporary command of the squadron, with Spruance assuming command of the division, and in fleet maneuvers the squadron demonstrated the offensive effectiveness of high-speed destroyers. Making dense smoke, they closed with a target at high speed from 10,000 yards, and—at 3,000 yards—fired a total of 36 exercise torpedoes before veering away, making 22 hits against the participating battleships. The attack was successful, but because the torpedoes were fired at such short range, they caused extensive damage to several ships even though they had been fitted with dummy warheads. While Admiral Rodman was pleased with Halsey’s dash and initiative, the commander gave Halsey a good dressing down. But as no other action was taken, one can assume he was not overly discomfited by the damage to his ships, reported to be on the order of $1.5 million. However, the minimum range for torpedo fire was thereafter set at 5,000 yards.
The Aaron Ward and her sisters provided an ideal teaching tool for young officers to learn the elements of command at sea. An important factor in DesRon 4’s success was the ability of its captains to work together as a team. Each knew what was expected and how a plan was supposed to work, but if some assumption made during planning proved false, they were expected to use their own initiative and take action to ensure the intent of the plan would be achieved. This style of leadership would be a hallmark of Halsey’s and Spruance’s commands in the future.
Spruance moved on to other duties, and in July 1922 the Aaron Ward was placed in fleet reserve. She would be placed in and out of that status for the next 17 years, until in September 1939 she was recommissioned for Neutrality Patrol in the Caribbean. A year later came a momentous change: On 9 September 1940 she was decommissioned, transferred to the Royal Navy in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and recommissioned as HMS Castleton (I-23) through the “Destroyers for Bases” deal with Great Britain.
Three guns and one torpedo launcher were removed and replaced with additional depth charge racks and “hedgehog” antisubmarine mortars. For the next five years, she would provide yeoman’s service as a convoy escort in the North Atlantic and escorting minelayers in the North Sea. While the British sailors found her less maneuverable and too wet compared with their home-grown destroyers, as one British admiral said, “Any destroyer that could steam, shoot, and drop depth charges was worth its weight in gold . . . in the autumn of 1940.” The gallant little ship was “paid off” for the final time in March 1945 and scrapped in 1948. The Admiralty sent her bell to her namesake town of Castleton, Vermont.
Sources:
1. Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004).
2. “Aaron Ward I,” Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Naval History and Heritage Command.
3. CDR Ted Wilbur, USN (Ret.), First Flight Across the Atlantic, May 1919, National Air and Space Museum, 1969.
4. E. B. Potter, Bull Halsey: A Memoir (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 116–17.
5. CDR Jennifer Rigdon Teter, USNR (Ret.), “Destroyers for Bases: A Win-Win for Allied Maritime Superiority,” Naval History 35, no. 2 (April 2021), online.
