1968: The Year of Lost Submarines

The year 1968 would go down in history as a tragic and mysterious chapter in naval operations. Four submarines, the USS Scorpion (SSN-589), the Soviet K-129, the French Minerve, and the Israeli INS Dakar, were lost in a span of six months, claiming the lives of 318 submariners and leaving a lasting legacy on the navies of their respective countries. Each of these losses occurred under unique circumstances, in separate locations across the globe, and would prompt changes in submarine safety, design, and operating procedures worldwide. 

The USS Scorpion

The USS Scorpion was a Skipjack-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). She was considered one of the fastest and most maneuverable submarines of her time, as the class namesake was the first time the U.S. Navy mated a nuclear propulsion unit with an albacore hull shape.¹ Commissioned in 1960, she measured 252 feet in length, was powered by a single Westinghouse S5W nuclear reactor, and had a crew of 99.² The Scorpion was equipped with six 21-inch torpedo tubes capable of firing both conventional and nuclear-tipped torpedoes, making her a vital asset in the Navy’s Cold War arsenal.

On 15 February 1968, the Scorpion departed her home port of Norfolk, Virginia, for deployment in the Mediterranean Sea. The Scorpion’s commanding officer, Commander Francis A. Slattery, had graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy 14 years earlier and was only 36 years old. The submarine conducted operations and made port calls in Rota, Spain; Naples, Italy; and Lisbon, Portugal. 

Six years earlier, a young officer named William E. Richardson had qualified in submarine warfare and earned his “dolphins” on board the Scorpion. In 1968, having since transferred and moved on to shore duty in Naples, the Richardson family hosted the Scorpion wardroom at their home during the last port visit before the submarine’s loss. Among those there that night was Richardson’s eight-year-old son, John M. Richardson, who would later serve as Chief of Naval Operations. By May 1968, the Scorpion was en route back to Norfolk when, on 21 May, she came to periscope depth for routine communications approximately 250 miles south of the Azores.³ This would prove to be the last transmission from the submarine.

When the Scorpion failed to arrive at Norfolk on 27 May, a massive search was initiated involving the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force. The search centered on an area 450 miles south of the Azores, based on two underwater explosions detected on 22 May and thought to be associated with the Scorpion.⁴ Despite these efforts, no trace of the submarine was found, and she was officially declared lost ten days later. 

The wreck eventually was discovered in October 1968, 400 nautical miles southwest of the Azores, at a depth of 10,000 feet, but the cause of her sinking remains undetermined to this day.⁵ Theories abound, but no conclusive evidence has emerged. Likely scenarios include a battery explosion, control surface failure, and a torpedo casualty. Less likely possibilities include a malfunctioning trash disposal unit, issues with the propulsion shaft, collision with a sea mount, and, most sensationally, attack by a Soviet submarine.⁶

The loss of the Scorpion, coming just five years after the sinking of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in 1963, forced the Navy to confront the risks associated with operating nuclear-powered submarines and the extreme engineering challenges posed by their maintenance and upkeep. In response, the Navy implemented additional changes to the newly created SUBSAFE program instituted following the Thresher disaster, further strengthening the requirements designed to ensure the material integrity of submarine systems. The loss of the Scorpion was a grim reminder to navies worldwide of the dangers inherent in submarine operations during the tense Cold War era.

The Soviet K-129

The K-129 was a Golf II–class diesel-electric ballistic-missile submarine of the Soviet Navy commissioned in 1960. At 328 feet in length and equipped with three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles and six torpedo tubes, the K-129 played a key role in the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear deterrence.⁷

On 13 February 1968, after completing in-port maintenance, the Soviet Navy ordered the K-129 to redeploy by 24 February. (See “The Loss—and the Mysteries—of the K-129,” August 2024, pp.14–21.) With just 11 days to prepare, the crew rushed to get the submarine ready for her new mission, which may have involved verifying intelligence, such as U.S. Navy communications in the Hawaiian region. On 24 February shortly after midnight, the K-129 set off from Tar’ya Bay, passing Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula and entering the Pacific Ocean. With an expanded complement of 14 officers and 84 enlisted, including 10 untrained sailors thought to be associated with the “special mission” the K-129 had been assigned, the crew worked to establish a routine in the confined quarters of the submarine.⁸

The K-129 headed south toward her patrol area west of the Emperor Seamounts. On reaching 40 degrees north latitude, the submarine likely turned east toward her designated operating areas. She was likely scheduled to transmit a check-in message to Moscow reporting her position on or around 8 March, placing her approximately 1,560 miles northwest of Hawaii.⁹ However, no transmission was ever received. When the K-129 failed to report in, the Soviet Navy launched a massive search, but the submarine remained unlocated. The mysterious loss of the K-129, with her unusual crew composition and secret mission, remains one of the enduring enigmas of Cold War submarine operations.

In August 1968, the United States managed to locate the wreck of the K-129, thanks to the help of a covert intelligence operation.¹⁰ After extensive search operations, the submarine USS Halibut (SSGN-587) had been successful in identifying the K-129. The Halibut brought back pictures of the Russian submarine lying on the bottom in two pieces but otherwise relatively intact.¹¹ 

In 1974, the CIA initiated Project Azorian, using the specially designed Glomar Explorer to attempt a salvage operation from the ocean floor at a depth of 16,500 feet. The CIA recovered a portion of the K-129, including the remains of six sailors. A formal burial-at-sea ceremony was conducted in both English and Russian, featuring the U.S. and Soviet flags and national anthems.¹² The ceremony was filmed, and, in 1992, as a gesture of goodwill, CIA Director Robert Gates presented the film to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.¹³ Despite the recovery of part of the sub, there is still speculation about the exact circumstances of the submarine’s loss.¹⁴

For the Soviet Union, the loss of the K-129 was not only a human tragedy, but also a strategic setback. It underscored the secrecy of Cold War submarine operations, with the Soviets never acknowledging the true nature of the K-129’s mission. The incident heightened Cold War tensions and prompted the Soviets to strive to improve submarine safety and communications to avoid similar disasters in the future. These improvements, however, were of limited effect. 

Since the loss of the K-129, the Soviet/Russian navies have experienced several submarine losses. The loss of the K-8, a November-class attack submarine, in 1970 to a fire in the Bay of Biscay was followed in 1983 by the sinking of the K-429, a Charlie I–class cruise-missile submarine, near the Kamchatka Peninsula because of flooding from a valve malfunction. She was later refloated but sank again in 1985 during repairs. 

In 1986, the K-219, a Yankee-class ballistic-missile submarine, was lost in the Atlantic Ocean after a missile compartment explosion. In 1989, the Komsomolets, a Mike-class attack submarine, sank in the Norwegian Sea after a fire on board, claiming 42 lives.¹⁵ Most notably, in 2000, the Kursk, an Oscar II–class nuclear-powered submarine, was lost following a catastrophic torpedo explosion in the Barents Sea, resulting in the death of all 118 crew members.¹⁶ More recently, in 2019, the AS-31, a small nuclear-powered submarine used as part of Russia’s undersea reconnaissance program, was lost after a fire in the Barents Sea, killing 14 crew members.¹⁷ These tragic incidents reflect the poor record of Russian submarine safety protocols.

The INS Dakar

Earlier in 1968, two other submarines mysteriously had gone missing in the Mediterranean Sea only four days apart. The first of these was the Israeli submarine INS Dakar. The Dakar originally was commissioned as HMS Totem, a T-class submarine of Britain’s Royal Navy. Built in the 1940s and sold to Israel in 1965, she was 276 feet in length and capable of long-range patrols.¹⁸ On 10 November 1967, after an extensive refit, the sub was recommissioned by the Israeli Navy as the Dakar. She was placed under the command of 33-year-old Lieutenant Commander Ya’acov Ra’anan, who had been born in Vienna, Austria, in 1934. In 1939, when Ra’anan was five years old, the family fled Europe amid the rise of Nazism and immigrated to Israel.¹⁹ Following the refit, the Dakar immediately conducted sea and dive trials and relocated to Portsmouth. On 9 January 1968, the Dakar departed Portsmouth and embarked on her voyage to Israel.²⁰ 

As the submarine proceeded through the Strait of Gibraltar and into the Mediterranean, the Dakar radioed her position to headquarters in Haifa every 24 hours and radioed a control telegram every 6 hours. The Dakar originally was scheduled to arrive in Haifa on Friday, 2 February, but was making faster progress than expected. As a result, Ra’anan requested permission to enter port earlier. He received approval to enter on 29 January. 

At 0610 on 24 January, the Dakar transmitted her last known position just north of Crete. Over the next 18 hours, she radioed three more times. All of these were control transmissions, which did not include position. Two minutes after midnight on 25 January, Israeli Navy headquarters received the last coded telegram from the Dakar. The next radio message should have been received at 0600 the next morning. The submarine was never heard from again, vanishing with 69 persons on board.²¹ 

Some sources claimed an Egyptian warship had sunk the Dakar in the Eastern Mediterranean.²² Speculation mounted as the Six-Day War (also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War) had ended only six months before. An emergency buoy from the sub that washed ashore in Gaza 13 months later added to the mystery.²³ Decades passed without answers, with the government not officially declaring the crew dead until 13 years after they were presumed missing, to allow their widows to remarry under Jewish law. Eventually, a joint Israeli-American expedition located the wreck of the Dakar in 1999 at a depth of 9,800 feet between Crete and Cyprus.²⁴ This location was inconsistent with earlier claims of Egyptian involvement. The submarine was found to have exceeded her crush depth, resulting in a catastrophic hull rupture. The cause of this depth excursion is unknown.

The loss of the Dakar was a national tragedy for Israel, leading to extensive international search efforts and reshaping Israeli naval strategy. The wreck’s discovery brought closure to a long-standing mystery, and the event highlighted the difficulties faced by smaller navies operating complex, aging platforms in challenging environments.

The French Minerve

In the early evening of 27 January 1968, the French submarine Minerve set off from her homeport of Toulon for what should have been a routine training exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. A Daphné-class diesel-electric submarine, the Minerve was one of the more modern vessels in the French Navy, designed for antisubmarine warfare and coastal defense. At 181 feet long and with a crew of 52, she was equipped with advanced sonar systems and capable of extended patrols.²⁵ 

The weather that evening was unforgiving, with strong winds and rough seas battering the coast. As the vessel conducted maneuvers with a French aircraft overhead, she vanished without warning. The last communication came at around 2000 when the submarine briefly reported her position just 25 miles off the coast of Toulon. After that, the Minerve disappeared into the depths of the Mediterranean.²⁶

Ashore, panic set in when the Minerve failed to check in at the scheduled time. French naval authorities launched a massive search-and-rescue operation, deploying ships, aircraft, and submarines in a desperate attempt to find the missing vessel. For days, rescuers combed the waters near Toulon, but there was no sign of the Minerve. The French government, along with grieving families, held on to hope that the crew might have survived in an air pocket, trapped at the bottom of the sea. But as time passed, it became clear the submarine and her 52 crew members were lost.²⁷

Theories about the cause of the Minerve’s sudden disappearance began to emerge. Some speculated a mechanical failure such as a malfunction in the fairwater planes, which control the submarine’s depth, or a failure of the snorkel induction valve, leading to catastrophic flooding that could have led to the submarine sinking.²⁸ However, without concrete evidence, the mystery of the Minerve’s loss remained unsolved for more than five decades.

Shortly after the tragedy, France’s President Charles de Gaulle traveled to Toulon to deliver a speech and attend a memorial honoring the 52 sailors who had disappeared with their submarine. In a surprising show of faith in the French Navy’s submarine fleet, de Gaulle suggested taking a dive himself in one of the Minerve’s sisters, the Eurydice. It was an unplanned but symbolic gesture, as the President descended to 130 feet, demonstrating his confidence in the Daphné-class submarines.²⁹

Two years later, the Eurydice slipped out of port from St. Tropez for what was meant to be a routine three-hour training exercise. Her skipper, Lieutenant Bernard de Truchis de Lays, had served as executive officer on board the Minerve for two years before being transferred just months before her tragic loss. At 0713, the Eurydice transmitted that she was diving in calm seas off Cape Camarat, 35 miles east of Toulon. Moments later, the eerie stillness of the Mediterranean was shattered as geophysical sensors picked up shock waves from a violent underwater explosion. Searchers soon found an oil slick and a few bits of debris, including a spare parts tag that bore the sub’s name. The Eurydice, too, was lost.³⁰

It was not until 2019, more than 50 years later, that the Minerve was finally discovered. A renewed search effort using modern technology, including underwater drones and advanced sonar, located the wreck of the submarine lying at a depth of 7,000 feet, approximately 28 miles south of Toulon.³¹ Data from the time of the accident also was re-examined. This included seismic reports that suggested the submarine probably imploded as she dropped to the bottom of the sea. The discovery brought long-awaited closure to the families of the lost crew and to a nation still haunted by the mystery.

The loss of the Minerve, followed by the sinking of her sister Eurydice under similar circumstances in 1970, deeply affected the French Navy and forced it to reexamine its submarine safety procedures.³² The incident also spurred global naval forces to improve their search-and-rescue capabilities in the event of future submarine disasters.

The Effects of the 1968 Submarine Losses

The year 1968 stands as an anomaly in peacetime naval history, marked by the loss of four submarines from four different nations within a short time frame, which shocked the world and threatened to exacerbate Cold War hostilities. These losses occurred against a backdrop of heightened tensions: The Scorpion incident intensified U.S. concerns about Soviet naval capabilities, while the covert mission and subsequent loss of the Soviet K-129 near U.S. waters heightened anxieties about the reach of Soviet nuclear forces. The disappearance of the Dakar threatened to inflame hostilities between Israel and its neighbors lingering from the recently concluded Third Arab-Israeli War.

These losses significantly affected the submarine programs of their respective nations. For the U.S. and Soviet navies, the losses of the Scorpion and K-129 underscored the dangers of continuous submarine operations and the intensifying technological race between the superpowers. Since the Scorpion disaster, the U.S. Navy has not lost a submarine, reflecting its commitment to systematic improvement and accountability. In contrast, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, experienced at least six more submarine disasters, with the most recent occurring only five years ago. This disparity may be attributable to fundamental differences in safety culture influenced by governmental regime type. In democratic systems such as that of the United States, the shared valuation of human life and inherent accountability to the populace foster transparency and institutional reforms. Conversely, authoritarian regimes such as that in the Soviet Union (and later Russia), in which information suppression and lack of accountability prevail, may have hindered similar reforms in military practices, potentially contributing to repeated tragedies.

The loss of the Dakar had lasting implications for the Israeli Navy. It reevaluated its submarine doctrine and procurement strategies, seeking to avoid the risks associated with purchasing older submarines that had already been operated for years by other navies. Following the loss of the Dakar, the Israeli Navy acquired three Gal-class submarines, designed by Germany for Israel and constructed at the Vickers Shipyard in the United Kingdom between 1973 and 1977.³³ The Gal-class vessels were a modified Type 206A coastal submarine. Eventually, in 1990, Israel acquired the German-built Dolphin-class submarines. In 2018, it announced that three future air-independent propulsion–capable submarines under development would be classified as the Dakar class, in honor of the Dakar.³⁴ 

Similarly, following the losses of the Minerve and Eurydice, the French Navy instituted new safety protocols and enhanced search-and-rescue capabilities, particularly through advances in underwater detection technology.

The legacies of these submarines extend far beyond the events of 1968. The tragic losses of the Scorpion, K-129, Dakar, and Minerve prompted significant advances in submarine safety practices, search protocols, and submarine rescue capabilities. More recently, the losses of the Argentinean submarine ARA San Juan in 2017 and the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala in 2021 have underscored the continued risks submariners face even in the modern era. These incidents demonstrate that, despite technological advances, the perils of operating beneath the ocean’s surface remain profound. In an era of renewed great power competition and increasing submarine deployments, the lessons from these tragedies are more relevant than ever, emphasizing the need for constant vigilance, improved safety protocols, and robust international cooperation in search-and-rescue operations.