Eighty years ago, in the epochal 23–26 October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, the U.S. Third and Seventh Fleets emerged victorious. Failure of Japan’s Operation SHO proved calamitous for its First Mobile Fleet: four battleships, four aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and nine destroyers were sunk over the multiple and widely separated engagements encompassing the battle.1 American losses included the USS Princeton (CVL-23), Gambier Bay (CVE-73), Saint Lo (CVE-63), Hoel (DD-533), Johnston (DD-557), and Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413).2 This strategic battle all but sealed the fate of Japan. Its navy was nearly annihilated, and its naval aviator cadre decimated. The once formidable Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) that had roamed at will through the Pacific and Indian Oceans early in the war was relegated to suicide attacks and sporadic submarine successes.
Regrettably, this thorough American victory became overshadowed by the debate over an interrogative naval message to the Commander, Third Fleet, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC):
“. . . where is rpt where is task force thirty four rr the world wonders.”3
As of October 1944, U.S. Fleet offensive strategy centered around the doctrine of the fast carriers. Until June 1944, the IJN maintained the same canon. In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the IJN realized that its naval aviation was no longer a match against the Americans, and Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s carriers “were offensively useless until planes and trained pilots became available. . . . It was estimated that the next big enemy offensive would come within three or four months, and it was hopeless to think that our carriers could be restored to fighting strength in that time.”4
U.S. intelligence did not assess this condition. Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey Jr. were of the same mind: The Japanese carriers remained the primary naval threat. Halsey, commanding the Third Fleet, was determined to eliminate this peril once and for all.
Popular histories published over the years have examined this battle repeatedly and in detail. Employing 20/20 hindsight, some authors have derided Halsey’s decision to keep the fast battleships of Task Force (TF) 34 with TF 38 while the Third Fleet steamed north to engage the Japanese carriers near Cape Engaño, rather than positioning Vice Admiral Willis Lee’s battle line to defensively guard San Bernardino Strait. While there was an opportunity at San Bernardino Strait for Lee’s battle line to engage “decisively at long ranges,” this did not occur for multiple reasons—none of which resembled a tactical mistake or a blunder.5
Furthermore, Halsey has frequently been blamed for the engagement off Samar where Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s Task Group (TG) 77.4 was attacked by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Central Force. The High Command was divided on the issue of blockading San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Nimitz was of the mind to have TF 34 guard the Strait, whereas Admiral King was not.
This criticism pays little or no heed to Halsey’s principal objective: “In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”6 This disparagement discounts Halsey’s application of certain principles of war, namely objective, simplicity, offensive, mass, and economy of force. Halsey’s objective was as stated above. He strived to achieve this end, as evidenced in the Sibuyan Sea and Cape Engaño victories, all efforts focused on achieving the objective. His simplicity of plan was apparent—no complications in maintaining his objective where he otherwise would have to concern himself with a defensive operation (guarding San Bernardino Strait) while executing an offensive one—seeking out and destroying the enemy carriers. Offensive action carries the war to the enemy and embraces no defensive application. Mass connotes concentration of force at the decisive point; TF 38 and 34 encompassed his concentration of force. The enemy carriers were both his objective and the decisive point. Halsey’s aviators had borne the brunt of all of the Third Fleet’s recent offensive actions. Once the enemy carrier force had been trounced by TF 38’s Air Groups, the offensive balance afforded by economy of force would employ the heavy units of fast battleships, i.e. TF 34, to relieve his air crews of the task to sink the remnants of the enemy force.7
Halsey explained his decisions personally in his memoirs and again in the May 1952 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.8 His Third Fleet was the designated offensive naval force for the invasion and liberation of the Philippines. Its numeric composition was roughly equal in numbers of ships to the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Employing the fast carriers, fast battleships, and the newer cruisers and destroyers, the Third Fleet was by far the more powerful and faster entity.9
In addition to specific ship types, two predominant factors delineated the major differences between the two fleets.
Mission: The Third Fleet’s mission was offensive, with the additional duty of coverage of the landings.10 CINCPAC tasking directed, in part: “Maintain and extend unremitting military pressure against JAPAN. Apply maximum attrition to enemy air, ground and naval forces and merchant shipping, by all possible means in all areas.”11 And importantly, “In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”12
The Seventh Fleet’s mission was defensive: shore bombardment in the amphibious objective areas (AOAs), convoying amphibious forces and transports to the AOAs, providing defensive cover forces during landings and subsequent unloading, and protecting these forces during retirement.13
Command: Halsey, as Commander, Third Fleet, reported to Admiral Nimitz. Kinkaid, as Commander, Seventh Fleet, reported to Army General Douglas MacArthur. There was no unity of command in this battle. The two fleet commanders communicated directly and indirectly, but coordination between the two did not occur. Halsey did advise Kinkaid of his decision to steam north with TF 38 to attack the Northern (carrier) Force, as Halsey had no intention of splitting his forces during the forthcoming engagement off Cape Engaño.14 Later, Kinkaid radioed Halsey asking if TF 34 was guarding San Bernardino Strait, evoking a negative reply, stating it remained with him to engage enemy carriers.15
20/20 hindsight affecting some authors and historians propagated further to some participants in the battle. The Japanese perspective is equally judgmental, as opined by Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, Kurita’s Chief of Staff. He asserted:
"By continuing aerial contact with us he would have known that our retreat was only temporary. Then the enemy carrier force commander could have ignored Ozawa's Mobile Fleet and concentrated his ships outside San Bernardino Strait to ambush us. If he had done so, a night engagement against our exhausted force would undoubtedly have been disastrous for us."16
Koyanagi was correct regarding the outcome of a potential ambush of Kurita’s Center Force. However, he too ignored certain principles of war. IJN operational planning throughout the Pacific war was rife with this fault, evidenced by some disastrous results they suffered or were caused when dividing their forces (Midway, Leyte Gulf), not maintaining their primary objective (Savo, Samar), mass (Midway, Leyte Gulf), simplicity (Midway, Leyte Gulf), security (Coral Sea, Midway, Leyte Gulf). This point, however, is the subject of a different discussion.
Halsey’s tactical decisions notwithstanding, further research casts considerable light on unforced errors made by Taffy 2 (Rear Admiral Felix Stump). Collectively the three Task Elements of TG 77.4 (77.4.1, 77.4.2, 77.4.3; aka Taffy 1, 2, and 3 respectively) possessed more than 550 combat aircraft between the 16 escort carriers, none of which managed to launch a long-range patrol in sufficient time to search the vulnerable approaches from the north.17 At 0430 Sprague ordered Stump to launch three daybreak searches, one of which was tasked to scout the northwest to northeast sector from 340 to 030 out to 135 miles.18 This search did not complete launching from the USS Ommaney Bay (CVE-79) until 0658.19 This was too late to detect, much less warn of, Kurita’s approach.
The U.S. Fleet’s 1944 war instructions discussed aircraft employment; long-range search and scouts are delineated equally with the offensive employment of aircraft.20 It is curious as to why neither Sprague nor Stump did not place a heightened sense of urgency for the dawn search, proven as one of the two most vulnerable time windows for enemy attack. (Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King’s memoirs provide a very thorough analysis of this point, he himself being quite “puzzled” regarding the absence of long-range air search by TG 77.4).21 Had this simple expedient been executed on time, Kurita may very well have been discovered much earlier on that fateful morning.
The only warning came from a 0640 report from an Avenger flying a routine antisubmarine patrol, just as the 14-, 16-, and 18-inch projectiles of Kurita’s battleships began to fall among the escort carriers and their escort groups.22 Likewise, considering the toll the surprised and unprepared Taffy aircraft wrought on the Center Force during this engagement, one can only imagine their possible success (and dispersal) had the long-range search been executed having used those earlier 45 minutes to launch full and coordinated deckload strikes!23
Divine intervention and extraordinary gallantry, in consonance with the heat of battle and the fog of war, rendered a victorious outcome for the Taffys, albeit at high cost.24 Nor did Kurita’s force emerge unscathed, losing three heavy cruisers and suffering severe damage to other ships from the pressed-home attacks of TG 77.4 aircraft and the valiant torpedo and gunfire attacks of the escorts, notably the Hoel, Johnston, and Samuel B. Roberts.25 Kurita, on edge after very heavy losses at Palawan Passage and the Sibuyan Sea, assessed that he was engaging and under air attack from elements of TF 38 and broke off the engagement, retiring north back through San Bernardino Strait.26 Retreating without achieving his objective of destroying the landings and amphibious forces in Leyte Gulf, Kurita replicated the strategic mistake made by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa off of Guadalcanal the night of 9 August 1942, following his victory near Savo Island.
Summarization of Key Points
- • Halsey as Commander, Third Fleet, was tasked by CINCPAC to destroy the Japanese fleet if the opportunity was offered or could be created. This would become his primary task.
- • The Third Fleet badly mauled the Japanese Center Force earlier in the day in the Sibuyan Sea. That force was in retreat when Halsey learned about the enemy carriers off Cape Engaño.
- • Bringing the entire Third Fleet with him was completely in accordance with the principles of war. Any knowledge of Ozawa’s Northern Carrier Force being a decoy or having few aircraft embarked was not known to either Halsey or his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Robert Carney, at that moment.27 Third Fleet intelligence had indications of this, but the existence of the enemy carriers was deemed an existential threat then and in the future.28 Although they no longer possessed the cream of IJN naval aviation as they did in 194–42 either in aircraft or pilots, the Japanese did, however, possess many thousands of aircraft, obsolete and modern, which in all probability would have been employed in kamikaze missions from those very decks in future operations.
- • Kinkaid s Taffy's comprised 16 escort carriers embarking more than 550 combat aircraft. While one of their missions was to support the troops ashore until Army tactical air was able to fly from the newly captured Philippine airfields, they were also quite capable and possessed sufficient economy of force to conduct both long-range patrols and offensive strikes against enemy ships. These aircraft included Wildcats and Avengers. This organic airpower was more than sufficient to handle any enemy threat that came against them as the Japanese Center Force had no air cover.29 Air patrols to the north could have discovered Kurita long before they were in gun range. Considering the destruction that the Taffy aircraft wrought upon Kurita’s Force, if sufficiently warned they could have done considerably greater damage.
- • The absence of a unified commander between the Third and Seventh Fleets precluded, in part, general coordination and direction to place TF 34 at San Bernardino Strait. In this author’s opinion this would have been a world class battleship versus battleship engagement; however, it did not happen.
Conclusion
Considering Halsey's primary objective, the principles of war, the considerable offensive firepower available to the Seventh Fleet, and the divided command structure, Halsey was correct in his actions and decisions. Kinkaid failed to place aerial reconnaissance at or near his most vulnerable points. King was critical of Kinkaid and his failure to ensure airborne reconnaissance. He did not criticize Halsey for taking his battle line with him when he pursued the enemy carriers. He concurred with his decisions and commended his actions.30
Nimitz “kept his counsel” with Halsey following the battle, never bringing up the subject.31 After the war, Carney visited Kinkaid to discuss the controversy, recollecting the public embarrassment suffered by the Navy during the infamous Sampson-Schley squabble after the Spanish-American War, asking Kinkaid to put the incident behind him.32
One final observation: Admiral Nimitz may have erred by sending the “Where is Task Force 34” message. He disdained questioning his subordinates in the heat of battle, but apparently Kinkaid’s frantic messages and his own curiosity as to the location of Task Force 34 compelled him to act.33
The phrase “The World Wonders” was not authored by Nimitz.34 It was routine padding added by CINCPAC’s communications watch officer, discerned by its following the double consonant “RR” and should have been discarded by the Third Fleet’s communicators.35 Regrettably, it was not.36 The connotation was bitterly received by Halsey as criticism from Nimitz.37 The rest, as they say, is history.
1. FADM Ernest J. King, USN, U.S. Navy at War, 1941–1945: Official Reports [to the Secretary of the Navy] by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N. (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department, 1946), 233–44. This tally includes BB Kongo, sunk 21 November 1944 by the USS Sealion (SS-315).
2. King, U.S. Navy at War, 287–88.
3. Naval History and Heritage Command, H-Grams, H-038-2 “Leyte Gulf in Detail,” https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-038/h-038-2.html.
4. RADM Tomiji Koyanagi, IJN (Ret.), “With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 79, no. 2 (February 1953): https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1953/february/kurita-battle-leyte-gulf.
5. ADM William F. Halsey Jr., USN, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 78, no. 5 (May 1952): https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1952/may/battle-leyte-gulf.
6. CinC PAC & POA Operation Plan 8-44 (27 SEP 1944), 3, https://www.usnwcarchives.org/repositories/2/archival_objects/22526.
7. The Principles of War conveyed throughout this article are summarized and paraphrased from “THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: A Lecture delivered by Captain Frank L. Johnson, USN at the Naval War College August 20, 1951,” https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol4/iss8/2.
8. ADM William F. Halsey Jr., USN, and LCDR J. Bryan III, USNR, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947) 220–27; Halsey, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
9. The Seventh Fleet employed the modernized prewar classes of battleships and cruisers, and the escort carriers. While the cruisers and destroyers were capable of more than 30 knots, the old battleships and the escort carriers were limited to no more than 21 knots. Conversely, the newer generations of combatants in the Third Fleet were all capable of 33 knots.
10. Halsey, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
11. CinC PAC & POA Operation Plan 8-44, 3.
12. CinC PAC & POA Operation Plan 8-44, 3
13. Halsey, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf.” AOA is “Amphibious Objective Area.”
14. Halsey, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
15. Halsey, “The Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
16. Koyanagi, “With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
17. Carl Solberg, Decision and Dissent: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 172.
18. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 12, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 244–45.
19. Morison, Leyte, 244–45. According to Morison, the Ommaney Bay experienced flight deck management issues resulting in a one-hour delay in the launch of her search aircraft.
20. War Instructions United States Navy 1944. UNITED STATES FLEET, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief. Specifically, Chapter 6, Section VII, “Scouting” and Chapter 10, Section I, “Aircraft Employment,” https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/w/war-instructions-united-states-navy-1944.html).
21. FADM Ernest J. King, USN, and CDR Walter Muir Whitehill, USNR, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1952), 577–80. When “King inquired into Kinkaid’s air searches . . . [he did not receive] what he considered a satisfactory answer.”
22. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 134–35.
23. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 134–35. The escort carriers collectively had launched a 26-plane strike at 0545 to attack remnants of the Japanese Southern Force decimated at Surigao Strait the night before by VADM Jesse Oldendorf’s Battle Line.
24. The USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73), Hoel (DD-533), Johnston (DD-557), and Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413), were sunk near Samar. The USS Saint Lo (CVE-63) was sunk by a kamikaze later in the day.
25. Morison, Leyte, 288, 308.
26. Koyanagi, “With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf.” Kurita was also agonizing over fuel consumption.
27. RADM Robert B. “Mick” Carney, USN—Halsey’s chief of staff (and future Chief of Naval Operations).
28. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, Chapter 9. Halsey’s intelligence staff possessed a copy of the Mobile Fleet’s SHO Plan outlining the decoy mission of its carriers. In reviewing the historiography of the subject, the question of whether Halsey and Carney were completely apprised of this remains unclear.
29. Koyanagi, “With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf.”
30. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 226.
31. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 173.
32. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 173.
33. E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 339–40.
34. Potter, Nimitz, 339–40. The random phrase added by the communications watch officer was paraphrased from Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade.” The Balaclava anniversary was coincident with the day and month of the message.
35. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 153–54.
36. The three rules of “padding” messages were: use nonsensical phrases and no familiar words or quotations; must be separated from the message text by use of double consonants; and must not be susceptible to being read as part of the message. (Potter, Nimitz, 339). “The World Wonders” barely met Rule #1, was clearly preceded with the double-consonant separator of Rule #2, but was unacceptable per Rule #3 as evidenced by the Third Fleet watch officer’s uncertainty as to its possible intended content in the message, and it was not deleted before it was delivered to Halsey (Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 153–54).
37. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 220–21.
