John Adams, the second President of the United States and a key Founding Father, receives well-earned acclaim for his involvement in the creation and growth of the American Navy. The Navy’s first advocate, he led the Naval Committee of the First Continental Congress in the Revolutionary War and allotted funds for ships and crews to combat the Royal Navy. Later, as President, Adams prompted the construction and staffing of heavy frigates to protect the nation and ward off seaborne threats. His naval legacy remains evident in the plethora of U.S. Navy ships that have borne his name. And his wisdom to “dare to read, think, speak, and write” serves as the core tenet of the U.S. Naval Institute.1
But the annals of American history also should recognize the contributions of John Adams’ oldest son, John Quincy Adams, to American maritime excellence. Sharing the ideals of his father, Adams the younger advocated for investment in U.S. naval influence and prompted the country’s eventual maritime supremacy. Throughout his long and diverse service as a statesman, he pushed for a powerful navy, an interconnected maritime infrastructure, and a global maritime presence. He even argued a case before the Supreme Court on international maritime law. Yet he did not realize much of his vision in his lifetime. While in office, he often was stymied by rampant partisanship and opposition. Nevertheless, John Quincy Adams should be recognized for his stalwart support of the Navy and his contributions to America’s maritime presence.
in his efforts. Left: National Portrait Gallery; Right: Naval History And Heritage Command
A Vision of a Greater Navy
Throughout his pre-presidential tenure in public office—in various ambassadorial posts, in the U.S. Senate, and later as Secretary of State during the Monroe administration—Adams ceaselessly advocated for federal investment and expansion of the U.S. Navy.2 He perceived that the United States required a large navy to protect its coastal borders and its substantial maritime trade. As the nation’s largest rivals were in Europe, an ocean away, the United States could maintain a defensive advantage with a strong navy. (The Royal Navy had already illustrated the effectiveness of this strategy, dissolving Napoleon’s embargo and thwarting the French Emperor’s Continental System.)3 But with the tepid sea-power inclinations of the Jefferson and Madison presidencies, the early 19th-century Navy did not become the powerhouse Adams desired.
Adams advocated for the Navy as President James Monroe’s Secretary of State from 1817 to 1825 and then as President himself from 1825 to 1829. In his first annual message to Congress, President Adams applauded the work of naval commanders who protected American commerce on the high seas. He also noted an allocation of $500,000—$15.6 million today—for the “gradual increase of the Navy.” Finally, he admonished that, despite the glories of the U.S. Navy, it only recently had acquired the ships and manpower wherein “it could deserve the name of a navy.”4 Adams continued to propose naval expansion throughout his presidency and subsequent congressional career. The Navy eventually was transformed into a formidable global power. He would not witness it, though, in his lifetime.
Adams also pushed for standardized and structured officer education. In his first address to Congress, while also calling for a larger navy, Adams argued, “The want of a naval school of instruction, corresponding with the Military Academy at West Point, for the formation of scientific and accomplished officers, is felt with daily increasing aggravation.”5 Adams saw that an effective navy required a proper and proficient cadre of officers. A naval academy would be an ideal way to accomplish this, as it standardizes training and education while instilling a sense of camaraderie and companionship in the officer corps. These benefits become compounded as graduates later return to the academy and impart their own knowledge and experience, growing the competency of the organization.
To Adams, the requirements for officers went beyond technical competence to include the highest levels of etiquette and decorum. In his private diary, he reflected on his court-martial of Master and Commander William Carter. Carter was convicted of drunkenness on duty and disorderly conduct in the presence of British officers; to Adams, Carter lacked the virtues necessary to lead a ship. The latter charge stung, as Adams wished to cultivate a positive and professional image of the U.S. Navy.
As for a naval academy, Adams would not realize his vision while in the Executive Mansion. But 18 years after his first address to Congress, Adams, now a congressman in the House of Representatives, spoke with Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft; according to Adams’ diary, the meeting went well, and Bancroft expressed a “great zeal to make something of his department.”6 Adams’ vision became reality when Bancroft established the U.S. Naval Academy (originally, “the Naval School”) in 1845. This accomplishment refined naval officer instruction and sharpened the organization’s leadership pool, creating a more effective navy. Adams’ persistence and interactions with Bancroft illustrate his influence on the Academy’s genesis.
Maritime Infrastructure for a Growing Nation
Adams realized the United States needed not only a large standing navy, but also an in-depth, versatile maritime infrastructure. As a senator, he advocated for the construction of canals and waterways throughout the country. To Adams, a network of canals would accommodate the nation’s expanding commercial trade and draw revenue to fund future projects.
On the Senate floor, Adams continually introduced proposals “to subsidize the creation of canals and to dredge harbors.” These efforts, however, came to no avail. The Democratic-Republican majority voted down all his proposals “with little discussion.”7 Adams would see the completion of the Erie Canal in his first year as President. However, this achievement arose from the efforts of New York Governor DeWitt Clinton and the State Legislature, after the Jefferson and Madison administrations vetoed federal allocation.8 Federal involvement in infrastructure projects remained an ever-elusive dream.
As President, Adams continued to push for greater investment in interstate canals. His most notable success was marked on Independence Day 1828, when he attended the groundbreaking for the Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) Canal. The canal expedited coal shipments between Cumberland, Maryland, and Georgetown, D.C.; the peak tonnage on the canal, in 1871, reached up to 850,000 tons. The construction and operation of the canal not only increased shipping, but also employed thousands of workers and sailors alike. The canal eventually closed in 1924 due to flooding and railroad competition, becoming a national monument in 1938.9 Despite its eventual closure, the C&O Canal illustrated the lucrative benefits of infrastructure growth and inspired the federal government to invest in other projects.
Adams also envisioned the development of a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. During his first year as President, he courted several opportunities to invest in and carry out the development of the Panama Canal. Partisan discord, however, stymied American involvement. Much of the vitriol against Adams’ vision came from race-minded and states-rights advocates, who both feared a Pan-Americanism strengthening the government and legitimizing regional countries such as Haiti.10
Future American politicians implemented Adams’ foreign policy initiatives at the eve of the next century, realizing his vision. The Isthmian Canal Commission, created and sponsored by the United States, completed the waterway in 1914.11 Today, American commercial vessels and warships alike use the Panama Canal to expedite their transits and conduct vital operations in support of the national interest.
Global Maritime Presence
John Quincy Adams’ most consequential contributions to American naval thought stem from his foreign affairs background. As a diplomat, Adams used his intellect and experience to secure and expand America’s nautical presence. By his own account, he effected his greatest contribution to international amity by arranging the Treaty of Ghent, the peace agreement between the United States and Great Britain to end the War of 1812.
The war itself had proved a stalemate, with neither country achieving significant advantages or losses in the global balance of power. With peace on the high seas, British-American seagoing trade resumed status quo ante, revitalizing the economies of both nations. During the negotiations, Adams the New Englander zealously defended fishing activities in Northern waters, including against Canadian fisheries.12 The issue, a major contention with Great Britain, did not appear in the final treaty, implicitly allowing New England fishermen to resume their practice. Through the Treaty of Ghent, Adams ensured the United States survived the War of 1812 relatively unscathed, ready to resume its expansion in the maritime domain.
Later, as Secretary of State, Adams drove the creation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States’ response to apparent European encroachment in the Americas. Adams personally wrote a third of the doctrine while assisting President Monroe with the rest. There was a fear of re-colonization of Latin America by imperial Spain or other powers. The Monroe administration soon received an opportunity to head off this trouble. British Foreign Secretary George Canning offered to support a joint British-American declaration against further European intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.13 Adams, however, fiercely argued that the United States should craft its own independent doctrine.
Adams’ position won, and President Monroe included the doctrine in his annual address to Congress in 1823. The doctrine stipulated that “the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers.”14 The decision to make a unilateral declaration, rather than a joint one with Great Britain, gave the doctrine an independent character; it also encouraged the United States’ growing individuality in the international realm. It soon became a new buzzword of American foreign policy.
In the years following 1823, government leaders across partisan lines employed the doctrine to support their foreign policy initiatives. President James Polk, for one, used it to legitimize U.S. expansion into Texas and war with Mexico.15 Prominent Whigs, meanwhile, employed the doctrine to craft the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; per the agreement, Great Britain and the United States promised not to colonize Central American territories and to jointly construct a cross-isthmus canal in Central America.16 (The two nations, however, later would nullify the treaty to permit the unilateral development of the Panama Canal.) The doctrine would continue to influence U.S. foreign policy, reaching its zenith in the 1890s and 1900s.
By adopting the Monroe Doctrine, the United States created a need for a formidable maritime presence, especially a large, powerful navy. The immense coastline of the Americas necessitates a sizable naval force to ensure no one could intrude and disturb the peace. At its genesis, the Monroe Doctrine lacked an American navy large enough to enforce it. The Royal Navy filled that role for a time; notably, its presence enforced the ban on the international slave trade.17
The later emergence of Theodore Roosevelt as a leading naval strategist gave rise to widespread American support for the Navy. President Roosevelt adopted the Monroe Doctrine as a part of his foreign policy that linked the doctrine, the Panama Canal, and the Great White Fleet to promulgate the United States’ influence and power in the Americas and throughout the globe. Roosevelt even added to the doctrine his own 1904 Corollary. In this, he advocated for further American stewardship of the Americas and encouraged Latin American nations to assist with the work.18 Roosevelt’s naval strategy continues to hold influence today. The United States maintains a sizable navy, frequently employs the Panama Canal, and promotes international law through naval action. Roosevelt realized the goals of John Quincy Adams and propelled his vision into modern naval strategy.
The highly interventionist character of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, though, likely would have perturbed Adams, who employed caution in foreign involvement. In his writings and speeches, Adams showed a preference for conducting foreign affairs through commerce and comity rather than cannon and carronade. He once stated, “[America] might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit . . . her march is the march of the mind.”19 Despite this dissonance, Adams, through his work on the Monroe Doctrine, helped set in motion the eventual expansion of America’s maritime presence to its modern dominance.
Influence on Admiralty Law
In between the various postings of his political career, Adams practiced law with passion but mixed success. Before he accepted the position of Secretary of State in the Monroe administration, Adams declined a Supreme Court seat from President James Madison; Adams believed his temperament did not suit the role of Justice.20 Adams did appear before the Supreme Court, however, in a case concerning slavery, a practice he grew to despise and attempted to eliminate.
The Amistad case concerned a group of Africans from the Mende tribe who were being taken across the Atlantic Ocean in the slave trade in 1839. They broke free and took control of the Amistad, the Spanish ship transporting them. After some time, the Amistad reached Long Island Sound, where the U.S. Revenue Cutter Washington seized the ship.21 A dispute quickly arose to whether the Africans belonged to Spain, belonged to the Washington’s commanding officer as salvaged property, or were in fact free men.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Adams joined attorney Roger Sherman Baldwin to represent the Mende tribesmen. Adams argued that, because the Africans’ origin of captivity began in Sierra Leone and not in the Americas, the international laws against the transatlantic slave trade trumped domestic slave laws and treaties with Spain. In its decision, the court found that the men were indeed free Africans because they were taken in Sierra Leone.22 Recognized as free men, the Mende returned to their homes in Africa.
Through the court’s decision, the Amistad case reinforced the concept that the international slave trade violated maritime law and that the government should recognize and enforce the ban. This decision and underlying concept persist in international law, seen in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which explicitly prohibits the slave trade. In Article 110, UNCLOS allows warships to approach and board vessels reasonably suspected of human trafficking.23 Adams’ legacy reverberates on the high seas, with the Amistad case a prelude to the global recognition of slavery as a universal crime.
His Legacy in the Modern Navy
John Quincy Adams receives little recognition for his service to the nation, especially compared with other Presidents such as his father. While he possessed grand visions for American maritime influence, Adams could not accomplish many of his goals. This likely stemmed from the opposition he faced in his one term as President, as well as the partisan friction in Congress that became increasingly vitriolic throughout his subsequent service as a congressman. The contentious position of slavery in the nation proved the main wedge between Adams and his opponents. For some years, Congressman Adams fought against a gag order that prevented him from mentioning slavery in House sessions.24
Nevertheless, the United States’ modern maritime activity and naval strategy owe much to John Quincy Adams. He may not have personally brought about his vision of a powerful U.S. Navy, but his contributions to American domestic policy and international relations drove the impetus for a large naval force and global maritime presence.
Today, the federal government continually invests in the Navy, funding the construction of new warships.25 The country’s maritime infrastructure continues to grow as shipping dominates international trade; the United States possesses numerous canals and intracoastal waterways that expedite commerce across the nation. And the United States maintains a robust influence in foreign affairs, investing in partnerships with other nations to encourage maritime governance. Adams, through his tireless advocacy, inspired progress in each of these key facets of American maritime governance.
Adams’ most significant naval contribution arose from his tenure as Secretary of State, during which he penned the lion’s share of the Monroe Doctrine. While not official naval strategy, the policy created a need and purpose for a powerful navy and spurred future Presidents to build one. Alfred Thayer Mahan, possibly the most consequential American naval theorist, cherished the Monroe Doctrine as a “product of [national] interest” and a conduit for massive naval expansion.26 Whether John Quincy Adams would approve of the United States’ persistence as an interventionist and its use of naval power is uncertain. His insight and dedication as a statesman, though, directly contributed to the nation’s growth into a maritime power. As such, he should be recognized as a vital sponsor and advocate for the U.S. Navy.
1. LCDR F. E. Cross, USN, “The Father of the American Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 53, no.12 (December 1927): 1296–97; David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 491, 566; CAPT Dudley W. Knox, USN, “The ‘Adams’ Men-of-War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 58, no. 11 (November 1932): 1549–64, 1573–76; and David McCullough, “Advocate of ‘Wooden Walls’” (address delivered at the U.S. Naval Institute’s 127th Annual Meeting), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 6 (June 2001), 42–43.
2. Fred Kaplan, John Quincy Adams: American Visionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 159, 177.
3. Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 403–8.
4. John Quincy Adams, “First Annual Message to Congress,” 9 February 1825.
5. Adams, “First Annual Message.”
6. Rhonda Barlow, “John Quincy Adams and the Education of a ‘Warrior Patriot,’” The Beehive, Massachusetts Historical Society, 8 May 2019.
7. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 232.
8. Erie Canalway National Heritage Corridor, “Building a Nation.”
9. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 417; National Park Service, “Canal Construction—Chesapeake & Ohio Canal National Historic Park.”
10. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 401–10.
11. David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 604–7.
12. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 292–94.
13. Arthur Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800–1830 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1941), 464–91; Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 49–50.
14. James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message to Congress.” 2 December 1823.
15. James K. Polk, “First Annual Message to Congress,” 2 December 1845.
16. William Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 659–63.
17. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 420–21, 439.
18. Aida D. Donald, Lion in the White House: A Life of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 150–51, 197.
19. John Quincy Adams, “Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy,” 4 July 1821.
20. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 270.
21. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 500–501.
22. United States v. the Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841).
23. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Art. 110, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, entered into force 1 November 1994.
24. Kaplan, John Quincy Adams, 490–94.
25. Mallory Shelbourne, “Amphibious Warship Richard M. McCool Jr. Wraps Acceptance Trials,” USNI News, 4 March 2024.
26. Thomas F. X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 (2016): digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/9.