Forensics for a Downed Soviet Sub
Norman Polmar, coauthor, Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129 (Naval Institute Press, 2010)
In Captain Jack Newman’s discussion of the loss of the Soviet submarine K-129 and the salvage attempt by the Hughes Glomar Explorer (“The Loss—and the Mysteries—of the K-129”), he states that the submarine’s missiles 2 and 3 exploded. They did not explode but were ignited when the submarine’s crew was conducting a scheduled weapon system test. Based on the timing of acoustic events as recorded by a U.S. Air Force system and on lengthy discussions with U.S. and Russian acoustic and submarine experts, it is certain that the initial cause of the K-129’s loss was a failure of the R-21/D-4 missile launch control system. The failure could have been electromechanical or crew-initiated during the training/checkout exercise that went terribly wrong.
While there may have been other contributing factors, the analysis of the acoustic data recorded by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) indicated the K-129 and her entire crew were lost because of the sequential ignition of the two ballistic-missile engines while confined within their launch tubes. The missiles did not explode, as stated in the article.
Catastrophic and unrecoverable damage was almost immediate when those missiles ignited, creating exhaust fumes more than 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit that breached the launch tubes and filled the pressure hull. The entire crew died instantaneously.
There is no mystery as to what killed the K-129 and her crew of 98 men.
The author responds:
Mr. Polmar’s explanation of the loss is simple, but it is based solely on the reading of the two acoustic traces and then speculating as to their meaning. None of that takes into account the K-129’s situational status: systems out of commission vs. in commission; the crew’s state; speed, depth, and trim differential (heavy, light, etc.). The time frame in which the acoustic traces took place was 9.01 minutes. Depending on terminal velocity, the two pieces of the broken-apart hull could have been on the ocean floor within 4–6 minutes. In Mr. Polmar’s version of events, both traces would have emanated from the same half of the hull, and they would have occurred at about the same depth. But the two traces occurred at different depths, and each from a different half of the hull.
The above letter’s certitude ignores basic conventional submarine patrol requirements, which always put the batteries first—that is, to charge them at every opportunity. Exercises such as the one described have no priority during the exigencies of the situation the K-129 was facing. Such an explanation amounts to conjecture based on hearsay, shoehorning acoustic data to fit a preconceived conclusion. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle noted, “There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.”
According to Mr. Polmar’s assertion, AFTAC analysis of acoustic data proved that missiles were ignited in their tubes while the crew was conducting a scheduled weapon system test that failed.
There were two acoustic traces. They were similar but not the same. The initial trace was from the after half of the boat, which would have sunk to the bottom first. The subsequent trace was from the forward half, which remained semi-buoyant when the other half broke off. That second acoustic trace would have occurred when the forward half reached implosion depth; thus, this second trace emanated from a different depth than the first trace.
Each half of the K-129 was about equal in acoustic sources of energy, except for the forward half’s housing of nuclear torpedoes and missile warheads. The high explosives in those warheads did play a part, I believe, in the overall destruction process of the K-129.
The forward torpedo room suffered from implosion and explosion. It was a “clean shotgun barrel.” I saw, firsthand, no evidence of the AFTAC acoustic analysis conclusion posited by Mr. Polmar. In fact, I saw the opposite, and I was actually there to see.
Mr. Polmar’s analysis based on supposed foolproof evidence belies the reality that he could not possibly have had any firsthand knowledge of the situational status of the K-129 at the time of the accident. Definitive-sounding statements made without having a true understanding of submarine operations do not warrant such certitude.
—Captain Jack G. Newman, USNR (Ret.), sole U.S. Navy submariner on the Project Azorian team
Regarding German Military Nomenclature
Marc J. Cohen
I enjoyed the article on the 1943 invasion of Sicily (“A Glorious Retreat”). However, I would like to clarify a point for readers about the terminology regarding the German Army in World War II, which is commonly—as in the case of the article—referred to as the Wehrmacht.
Yes, it was part of the Wehrmacht (regular armed forces—Army, Navy, Air Force), but the name should not be implied to refer to the Army only. The German Army was called the Heer, and the Wehrmacht thus consisted of the Heer (Army), Kriegsmarine (Navy), and Luftwaffe (Air Force).
All three services fell under the command of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. This is also reflected in the license plates of German military vehicles of their respective branches: WH (Wehrmacht Heer), WM (Wehrmacht Marine), and WL (Wehrmacht Luftwaffe).
